Title: The Separation of powers in the WTO: how to avoid judicial activism
Authors: Bartels, Lorand
Issue Date: 17-Jan-2008
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Citation: Lorand Bartels (2004). THE SEPARATION OF POWERS IN THE WTO: HOW TO AVOID JUDICIAL ACTIVISM. International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 53, pp 861-895
Abstract: As with other legal systems based on a separation of powers, the World Trade Organization is marked by a degree of tension between its political organs and its quasi-judicial organs, in particular the Appellate Body. In late 2000 this tension spilled out into the public domain, when the Appellate Body announced a procedure for the filing of amicus curiae briefs in the EC-Asbestos case.1 The question of public participation in WTO dispute settlement proceedings is sensitive to many WTO Members, and in expressly encouraging the submission of amicus briefs in this way the Appellate Body was felt to be overstepping its functions.2 In the end, this dispute settled with a draw, the Appellate Body deciding that it had no need to consider any of the amicus briefs submitted in that particular case, and yet still maintaining that panels and the Appellate Body have the right to take unsolicited amicus briefs into account, should they so choose.
URI: http://www.dspace.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/237059
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/iclq/53.4.861
Appears in Collections:Scholarly works - Law

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