Title: ‘Unfair’ Discrimination in Two-sided Peering? Evidence from LINX
Authors: D'Ignazio, Alessio
Giovannetti, Emanuele
Keywords: Internet Peering
Two-sided Markets
Network Industries
Antitrust
Issue Date: Feb-2006
Publisher: Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge, UK
Series/Report no.: CWPE;0621
Abstract: ‘Unfair’ Discrimination in Two-sided Peering? Evidence from LINX Abstract: Does asymmetry between Internet Providers affect the “fairness” of their interconnection contracts? While recent game theoretic literature provides contrasting answers to this question, there is a lack of empirical research. We introduce a novel dataset on micro-interconnection policies and provide an econometric analysis of the determinants of peering decisions amongst the Internet Service Providers interconnecting at the London Internet Exchange Point (LINX). Our key result shows that two different metrics, introduced to capture asymmetry, exert opposite effects. Asymmetry in “market size” enhances the quality of the link, while asymmetry in “network centrality” induces quality degradation, hence “unfairer” interconnection conditions.
URI: http://www.dspace.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/131678
Appears in Collections:Cambridge Working Papers in Economics

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