Title: Extreme Voting under Proportional Representation: The Multidimensional Case
Authors: De Sinopoli, Francesco
Iannantuoni, Giovanna
Issue Date: 14-Mar-2006
Abstract: We study the strategic behavior of voters in a model of proportional representation, in which thepolicy space is multidimensional. Our main finding is that in large electorate, under some assumptionson voters'preferences, voters essentially vote, in any equilibrium, only for the extreme parties.
URI: http://www.dspace.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/131604
Appears in Collections:Cambridge Working Papers in Economics

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