

Social Change and the Growth of Antiquarian Studies
in Tudor and Stuart England

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Pardon us, Antiquity, if we mis-censure your actions, which are ever (as those of men) according to the vogue, and sway of times, and have onely their upholding by the opinion of the present: We deale with you but as posterity will with us (which ever thinkes it selfe the wiser) that will judge likewise of our errors according to the cast of their imaginations.¹

These words of the seventeenth century historian Samuel Daniel appositely frame the subject in hand. The past is always dealt with according to the 'vogue and sway' of the times and is viewed and interpreted through the prevailing cast of its students' imaginations: but what informs the historical imagination of a given time? This question becomes of particular importance when we examine Daniel's own age and the manner in which Antiquarianism developed in Early Modern England; for it is apparent that the reigns of the Tudors and Stuarts witnessed an important change in historical consciousness which gave rise not only to what we now recognise as History but also to studies of field monuments, artefacts and ancient society which are the direct ancestors of modern Archaeology.

At the risk of being simplistic one might identify two possible approaches towards explaining the growth and nature of historical imagination; both are valid and not necessarily mutually exclusive but they are directed towards rather different ends. The first adopts a view in which Ideas in themselves are sufficient cause for intellectual developments. Through the interaction of existing knowledge, coupled to the imaginative response or abilities ('natural genius') of individuals, new knowledge is brought into being. This approach thus tends to involve discussion of the intellectual milieu of an historical period in which a particular idea, or set of ideas, emerged. It also concentrates on studies of the lives of notable men and women and their private and professional contacts, largely through analyses of correspondences. The aim here is to show how prevalent concepts and ideas came into association with each other through social interaction and, thus, why it was that new concepts and ideas came into being. The second approach, by contrast, sees ideas as insufficient cause in themselves for the observed course of intellectual history. The reasons for the combination of existing ideas and concepts to generate new knowledge are seen as being grounded in the social and economic conditions of a given historical period. More precisely, the growth and acceptance of a new idea is felt to be intimately linked to the aggrandisement of particular social groups which, for various reasons, hold to it or champion its cause. This approach tends to involve discussion of the social and economic development of an historical period and concentrates on showing

how intellectual changes were correlated with, or caused by, it. The emphasis is on social groups and not individuals, and upon exposing the determinants of intellectual change: ideas are not felt to have an innate evolutionary quality.

Both of the approaches outlined above are caricatures of popular stances (the first traditional History of Ideas, the second Marxist History of Ideas) and they are not intended as serious analyses. Nevertheless, they do possess that quality of the caricatures which throws into relief salient issues. Traditional History of Ideas does have an unfortunate tendency towards treating its material as if it were hermetically sealed off from other historical developments. By contrast, Marxist analyses err on the side of treating intellectual developments as epiphenomena or, at best, as a relatively autonomous, but ultimately determined, aspect of socio-economic history.² The one can become naive idealism, the other rampant materialism; carried to extremes both are historicist in outlook. Neither approach, however, necessarily requires an extreme interpretation; nor, indeed, are they mutually exclusive in weaker, more pragmatic formulations. However, it is clear that it is absolutely essential to define one's position relative to them -- to lay out the analytical and interpretive apparatus with which one is intending to work -- before attempting any analysis of the historical development of a subject such as antiquarian thought. Before studying the 'historical imagination' of Daniel's time we must study a little our own.

Action, Interest and Knowledge

It is a precondition of historical analysis that one adopt a particular conception of human action and its explanation: it colours one's whole perspective. History written in the belief that the protagonists' motives for their actions are entirely obvious to them is very different from History written in the belief that actions are conditioned by underlying causes. Any understanding of human action necessarily involves some stance with respect to motivation and, consequently, interest; this in turn has ramifications for the attention one pays to actors' perceptions of their environment and to the way in which that perception is influenced by the structure of their knowledge of the World -- their "World View". The way we understand the links between Action, Interest and Knowledge is, then, central to our interpretation of the past.

The view which I wish to take of this triad owes much to recent work by sociologists and, in particular, to Giddens' critique of traditional approaches to social analysis including Structuralism, Marxism and Hermeneutics (Giddens 1976; Giddens 1979). It will not, however, be possible to present in any adequate fashion the whole of Giddens' thesis or the reasons for my departure from its specifics. The following account is thus highly condensed and may prove rather impenetrable, for which I apologise in advance.

Action is "a stream of actual or contemplated causal interventions of corporeal beings in the ongoing process of events-in-the-world" (Giddens 1976:75). Such a definition, despite its unfortunate terminology, encapsulates a number of important points. First, 'action' is commonly conceived as consisting of a series of discrete 'acts'. This view is, however, questionable: it implies a state in which one is not acting and an opposed state which is 'action'. On Giddens' account it represents merely a retrospective abstraction from a continuous stream of past conduct rather than an adequate conceptualisation of the acting individual. Action is continuous, an essential feature of human existence, incorporating all social activity. Second, 'action' is inseparable from consciousness in the sense that it implies a reflexive monitoring of the World and, in consequence, of one's actions themselves. Events which do not involve this quality of sentience are, on this definition, classifiable as 'behaviour' and not as 'action'.³ Third, actions need not, as such, 'take place': an important part of Giddens' definition is that individuals may forebear to carry through a contemplated act. Such "contemplated causal interventions" are not, however, any less important than their 'realised' counterparts for reasons which will shortly become apparent.

Action, of course, is normally connected to 'motivation' and even in historical analyses it is common to attempt to explain the 'motives' behind an individual's, or a group's actions. This is a particularly difficult line of enquiry to follow without over-simplification or violation of the 'facts'; it is also a philosophical mine-field. Two extreme positions may be adopted: either the motives given by the actor are taken as sufficient explanation, or they are seen as post hoc rationalisations which the actor provides as explanation for actions which are motivated by factors beyond his or her discursive comprehension. Neither position is really tenable or, more importantly, valuable in the explanation of action but they serve to highlight a significant difficulty or, perhaps, confusion -- the distinction between 'intentionality' per se and 'purposeful intentionality'. These are, indeed, rather different things, the latter being sufficiently remarkable in our intuitive grasp (at least in the English speaking world) of motivation to warrant the adjective. In the understanding of action 'purposeful intentions' would signify that actions are prompted by definite and willful goals in the mind of the actor; the simple use of 'intention' suggests, on the other hand, that while actions may be prompted by an actor's goals, these goals may be only partly known or discursively accessible. There is, then, some hint of a tension here in the intuitive understanding of intentionality itself with the implication that the causes of actions hover vaguely on the edge of consciousness. But can we firm up our understanding of this tension?

A distinction should, perhaps, be drawn between 'intentionality' on the one hand and 'reasons' on the other. Reasons are post hoc accounts of action in the context of enquiries initiated either by others or as part of the process of self-monitoring; intentionality, by contrast, is part of the continuous stream of action and does not necessarily imply a

fully conscious goal on the part of the actor. Nevertheless, this does not mean that 'reasons' are epiphenomenal: on the contrary, reasons, as accounts for oneself or others of actions, are part of the continuous process of self-monitoring encompassed by intentionality; indeed, they are actively involved in changing the bases from which action springs. In a sense, then, reasons are purposeful intentions formulated after the conception, though not necessarily the execution, of an 'act'. The essence of the argument here is the incorporation of actors' self-evaluations as a component in the genesis of action (and not merely as inconsequential post mortem explanations) together with factors which are not immediately transparent to them. This, in part, reconciles the banal dichotomy in explanation between conscious and unconscious motives for action by admitting to the involvement of both, but it is an awkward compromise which does not take us very far towards understanding the bases of human action; that requires a re-assessment of the nature of consciousness.

The basic division of consciousness into the Conscious and the Unconscious has been a major obstacle to an adequate concept of motivation and has brought with it a series of unworkable distinctions. One alternative response is to see consciousness as being multi-layered. A more radical reconceptualisation, however, is to insist on consciousness as a continuum; but this begs the question, a continuum of what? Consideration of the popular idea of consciousness is enlightening here: it is more or less interchangeable with self-knowledge. More generally, however, we might take consciousness to be coterminous with knowledge both of the self and of the other (the World). This is not to equate 'stocks of knowledge', with all its connotations of a static body of resources, with consciousness as such. Rather, it is to treat the latter as a temporally situated process of knowledge evaluation and recreation. The important point here is that, in a many layered or continuous model of consciousness, this knowledge exists at all levels. Giddens' formulation of three levels will serve at present: discursive knowledge, which is knowledge which is immediately accessible to actors for the purposes of discourse with others, or for self-reflection; practical knowledge (or consciousness) which is not immediately accessible for discursive purposes but which can be articulated fairly readily (the analogy is 'knowing how to' ride a bike without really having to 'know'); and non-discursive knowledge which incorporated knowledge which is normally discursively inaccessible (does not impinge upon the consciousness directly). These levels are not to be thought of as fixed: practical (or tacit) knowledge, for example, can be brought into discursive (or verbal) consciousness. Moreover, motivation can no longer be conceptualised in terms of Freudian 'drives' and 'impulses' or verbalised 'reasons' and 'motives', nor indeed as a dialectic between these extremes. If motivation springs from perception of oneself and the world, and that perception itself is framed in terms of a knowledge which is grounded in all levels of consciousness, then it follows that motivation must be viewed as something distributed across consciousness and subsisting in a whole series of more or less discursively accessible 'dispositions'.

It is at this point that one can return to the definition of action. Notwithstanding Giddens' formulation, action can be conceived of as the instantaneous realisation in the world, and in consequence the re-creation, of consciousness. In the moment of action the individual's 'stock of social knowledge' (consciousness) is brought into play through an actual, or intended intervention in the external world. Thus action implicates the whole of an individual's knowledge in so far as its motivation is distributed across consciousness. But, at the same time, action entails a self-evaluation (both in terms of the monitoring of the consequences of actions and of the self) which necessarily reacts upon consciousness, thus modifying it (however slightly). In this way action is both a realisation and equally a re-making of consciousness; and it is in this sense that one may speak of the 'reflexive moment of action'. Moreover, the sense of 'moment' here is that of a mathematical 'limit', for action is a continuous stream of conduct; thus the individual's 'stocks of knowledge', the bases of action, undergo constant re-creation in the dialogue between action and consciousness.

There is one final point which must be dealt with briefly before moving on to the discussion of the development of Antiquarianism in sixteenth and seventeenth century England. It concerns the question of 'interest'. This is a particularly difficult and emotionally charged topic, and it seemed wise to leave it until something had been said concerning motivation. The real problem with 'interest' is the confusion which has arisen between the term as an observer's assessment and as an explanatory concept in the philosophy of action. I wish to take the stance that all action is necessarily interested but I do not wish to push the term beyond this so that it acquires the status of a mechanism. This is more conveniently dealt with by the concept of motivation discussed above. I do, however, want to use the idea of interest in the sense of an external observation on motivation in the following way: to say that "this interest X of group A can be tied to their other interest Y" means that I wish to suggest that there is a motivational link; however, I do not wish to make the suggestion that the motivation is located in any one area of consciousness or can be specified in an exhaustive way. In general I shall want to imply that the motivations for both X and Y are interconnected (but not coterminal), and further that they are linked at levels of consciousness removed from the discursive.

History of Ideas and social change

The above discussion of action, interest and knowledge has involved a long, if still dangerously superficial digression into a set of crucial philosophical problems concerning how human action, past and present, is to be understood. That such matters be discussed was, however, essential: for there is a great danger of the historical analysis presented below being misconstrued unless some indication be given of its philosophical affiliations. It remains, however, to show

the implications of this philosophical position for one's approach to the History of Ideas before moving on to discuss the particular case in hand.

It was suggested earlier that one need adopt neither an extreme idealist nor materialist approach to the study of the History of Ideas and that some middle ground, though not one founded upon compromise, might be more profitable. What should have emerged from the discussion above is that both Idealism and Materialism are opposed poles of a more reasonable and, I would argue, supportable position which sees ideology and socio-economic conditions as indissolubly linked in a relationship of mutual determinacy. There is no granting of privileged autonomy to the Marxist's 'economic base': indeed, 'base' and 'superstructure' are to be seen merely as analytical abstractions. Ideas, then, are fundamental to action because they are fundamental to the 'stocks of knowledge' through which the other (the World) is perceived; they are the bases of action from which motivations spring. On the other hand, this perceptual filter is itself constantly under modification through action, including political action, in the World. Ideas are, thus, intimately linked (as the bases of action) to the genesis of social change; but at the same time they are necessarily modified through such change.

A complex of ideas, such as Antiquarianism, is on this account necessarily linked to political and social action, and thus to study its history is to become involved in a simultaneous study of the accompanying social and economic history and the inter-relation between the two. This is not, however, to assert that there is any one-to-one, or overt connection between the two -- though it is not to deny the possibility of such a connection either. The network of ideas which, with hindsight, we see as being present at any one moment in time does not exist as a thing in itself: it exists as a sharing of knowledge amongst individuals. That sharing is not normative in so far as each individual's stocks of knowledge are unique; but it is normative in that the sharing of ideas is intimately connected to the sharing of common experience so that social groupings necessarily become linked (though not in any deterministic way) to similarities in individuals' stocks of knowledge. Social groups are at one and the same time maintained through more or less similar shared stocks of knowledge and re-created through corporate actions which re-inforce or dissolve those similarities. History of Ideas must thus involve a social history which discusses the structure and development of social groups (including, social classes) and their interaction.

Knowledge exists as a network of ideas from which it is possible to draw out at any one moment in time more or less autonomous entities, such as Antiquarianism; however, what gives Antiquarianism a status above that of an analytical abstraction is contemporary recognition. The aim of historical analysis is then to tease out the complex of ideas which contemporaries recognised as falling within this category and, further, to outline and explain changes in that complex across time and

space, and between different social groups. This is, at any rate, a beginning. More interesting still is to lay bare the way that the complex is pieced together: to discover its underlying structure. At this point one must start to firm up one's terminology and to abandon the rather cavalier use of the term idea. An idea is closely tied to the concept of discursive knowledge and, indeed, History of Ideas has largely been concerned with the history of discursive knowledge such as technological information and 'academic' studies; yet it has been asserted above that knowledge exists at many different levels of consciousness. The 'complex of ideas' which forms Antiquarianism certainly incorporates discursive knowledge, but it must also include non-discursive elements which form low-level assumptions and the symbolic framework upon which discourse then proceeds. Such non-discursive knowledge cannot, of course, be readily grasped: it is only known through historically observable ideas. Nevertheless, it cannot be ignored. History of Ideas must also, then, be willing to hazard the task of dissolving such subjects as Antiquarianism into its component parts; to deconstruct ideas to recover the structuring principles behind them.

Finally, the above discussion of action and knowledge is one which emphasised historical contingency. The past conditions the future in so far as the basis upon which action is predicated (knowledge/consciousness) is historically determined. This can most easily be taken into account by adopting an 'evolutionary metaphor for intellectual history. At any moment in time there is always the potential for many different changes to occur and the task of history is largely to account for why one particular change, and not another, came about; but equally, those changes which are likely to occur are partly determined by the course of previous history and particularly the incorporation of latent potentials and tensions. The analogy here is to the evolutionary development of, say, an anatomical element: previous developments impose long-term limitations upon subsequent developments through the realisation of certain potentials and the relinquishing of others.

The growth of Antiquarian studies in England, 1500-1700

I do not intend to present here an exhaustive account of Tudor and Stuart Antiquarianism. More or less adequate summaries of the period have already been published although, to be sure, these are rapidly becoming dated (Kendrick 1950; Levy 1967; Piggott 1956, 1976b), and it is not my immediate concern to enlarge much upon them. The following is necessarily a selective (though not, I think, wildly biased) discussion of the development of antiquarian studies during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries which aims to draw out certain salient features for subsequent discussion.

Antiquarianism was a manifestation of a growing historical awareness which characterised Tudor England. That awareness was

grounded in, and in part created by the incorporation of late Renaissance learning into English education and especially the influence of North European Humanism (McLean 1972). By 1500, the concept of Anachronism had firmly taken hold of the historical imagination and the past was increasingly seen as an objective world, much after the fashion of the natural world. This had a number of implications. First, it created an enheightened sense of the tension between 'what really happened in the past' and what people 'said had happened in the past', raising questions about the 'truth' of histories; thus the antiquarian schoolmaster John Twyne was prompted to write in the opening decades of the sixteenth century that:

... but ancient error has taken possession of many minds and fascinated them with an image of their own antiquity, and thus fascinated they no longer wish to discern what is the true nature of things.⁴

Second, Anachronism held the seeds of reformation (in a broad sense) by emphasising historical change: the past was different from the present and history was not simply the playing out of the immutable will of God within a single chronological framework. Recognition that the present order of the social world was not a continuation of past orders naturally led to disputes about authority. Those disputes were, moreover, grounded in a conception of the past as a resource with which decisions might be made for the present: it is a recurrent theme in Tudor historiography that the past can teach the present. Coupled to this was the influence of Humanism, which placed Humanity and not God at the centre of events and emphasised the significance of men's and women's actions in the course of history. Thus the writers of histories started to emphasise the role played by men in the unfolding of historical events and, more significantly, their part in the process of historical change; highly didactic accounts start to appear in which, however much Weird might hover witch-like in the wings, dynastic and personal ambitions came to be seen as a sufficient cause for civil discord and strife. At the same time, religious Dissent started to find a voice in historically-based criticisms of Western Catholicism. This, above all, emphasised the potential of the past as an authority for change or, more strictly, for the realisation of present aspirations: it pointed, in a very practical way, the political implications of the new Humanist learning.⁵

It is against this background that the slow growth of antiquarian studies during the first half of the sixteenth century must be viewed; and it is in the light of the political upheavals of that period in England that it must be discussed; for Antiquarianism, as a manifestation of this growing historical awareness, was deeply implicated in the English Crown's dispute with Rome during the 1530's. The past, and especially England's past, suddenly became of great moment in the face of interested appeals to ancient authority. Thomas Cromwell's anti-Papal propaganda campaign relied heavily upon historical sources for its material and helped promote the publication in English

of historical studies germane to the interests of the Crown;⁶ and it cannot be coincidental that a certain John Leland, sometime librarian to the King, should receive his commission "to peruse and diligently to serche al the libraries of monasteries and collegies"⁷ one year before the telling references in the pre-ambles to the Act in Restraint to "divers sundry old authentic histories and chronicles"⁸ which supported reformations in the Church in England.

Leland was, of course, an outright bigot who openly stated one of the purposes of his Antiquarianism to be the exposure of "the crafty coloured doctrine of a rout of Roman bishops"; but one must not allow alliterative venom to hide the fact that his studies had other purposes beyond toppling the 'Whore of Babylon'. The pride which Leland took in his commission sprang equally from a strong sense of nationalism which, although it was promoted by the Great Controversy, pre-dated the events of the 1530's. English nationalism was not a product of the Henrician Reformation, although it was undoubtedly encouraged and given a peculiar flavour by those events; on the contrary, it had been an increasingly important factor in late fifteenth century English consciousness⁹ and should be viewed both as a product and as a precondition. For the links between Leland's work and the beginnings of antiquarian studies, the propaganda requirements of the English Crown, and fervent nationalism, are not fortuitous. An increasing sense of nationhood and national autonomy made conceivable a break not only with the Papacy but with neighbouring states; but equally that break threatened the existing sense of Englishness and nationhood. The reverse face of the challenge which Humanism could throw down in front of traditional authority and entrenched order was the insecurity which the overthrow of previous orders brought. It became of the essence, and not simply in terms of propaganda, that the state and the Crown, the institutions which encapsulated Englishness, be re-defined or, perhaps, re-grounded on a new historical authority; that the English Church, English Laws, English cultural heritage, the English people themselves be given a new identity. That this should be nationalistic is understandable; but what gave English Antiquarianism a flavour which was quite unique was an intimate involvement in its birth and development. Indeed, if one were to characterise Antiquarianism in England during the period 1500 to 1700 A.D. then one might well regard it as a search for identity.

I have tried to imply that the unusual events of the third and fourth decades of the sixteenth century were, in some sense, decisive for the way in which Antiquarianism in England developed over the next century and a half; they were decisive because they laid down the basis on which future developments were to take place. This is not to say that Antiquarianism after Leland was simply a playing out of pre-ordained patterns: that would be quite untrue.¹⁰ Nevertheless, in the sense discussed above, ideas can be seen to conform to an evolutionary model in which particular events limit and thus 'direct' future intellectual developments. I want to move on, then, by extracting certain elements from Leland's work and following their subsequent development.

Leland's work was informed by, and partly directed towards supporting a growing sense of English national identity. This it attempted to accomplish through the realisation of the Ptolemaic idea of a chorography. A chorography was an exhaustive account of a place which tried to capture its 'likeness', one might say its 'spirit' or 'flavour'. Thus, Leland set about capturing the essence of England through an historical-topographical catalogue: the Itineraries are essentially drafts of an extended essay along just these lines.¹¹ Leland's main problem, and the one which ultimately defeated him, was to know where to start; but some things were clear. The study must be empirical -- it must be grounded in observations of the realm through accounts of the history and geography of each county made as part of a series of 'visitations'; it must comprise a description of the principal towns and their location and resources; it must involve accounts of local wonders and remains of the Roman occupation; it must give a statement about the leading families of the country and their genealogy.¹²

This plan remained essentially unchallenged as the charter for English antiquarian research up to the 1570's (it was in large measure the inspiration behind Camden's Britannia) and the chorographic ideal itself continued until well into the nineteenth century as the dominant influence in Archaeology. Descriptions of the topography, genealogical history, laws, customs, legends, cities, buildings of note, wonders and natural resources were essential features of antiquarian studies even amongst those whose interests were in quite different directions. Archbishop Parker's circle,¹³ for example, though primarily involved with Anglo-Saxon studies directed towards an history of the pre-Norman Church and Legislature, also showed a strong interest in the writing of chorographies. There was, however, a subtle change in the nature of this work as the century advanced. Leland's project had been for a national chorography and this was, indeed, forthcoming when Britannia was published in 1586; but after the middle of the century more provincial interests came into play and attention moved away from national to county studies. From the 1570's onwards the number of county histories increased apace, with a slight peak after the turn of the sixteenth and a remarkable explosion in publication during the last quarter of the seventeenth century.

The reasons for this shift will be discussed below, though it is apparent that the sheer quantity of material being tackled must have been a significant factor. In terms of nationalism, however, these studies are of great interest largely because English identity is seemingly being moved from the national to the regional context and from national to local or county history. Works such as Lambarde's Perambulation of Kent (Lambarde 1596), Carew's Survey of Cornwall (Carew 1602) and Burton's Description of Leicester Shire (Burton 1622) still rehearse in various ways the old chorographic formula, but they rehearse it in a county setting. By 1695 Britannia itself had firmly become an extended exercise in county history. At the same time, other elements

of Leland's project were slowly being developed as part of the charting of the great antiquity of the English national identity. Parker's work on the early Church, for example, attempted to show through "diligent search for such writings of historye, and other mounumentes of antiquitie" how its distinctive English qualities pre-dated the rise of Roman domination of the Western Church, and that the English ecclesiastical formulation (or rather the re-formulation) possessed the authority of antiquity.¹⁴ One must also mention here William Lambarde's influential studies of English Law and Custom which, amongst other things, helped to establish the myth that Parliament had an ancestry which stretched back to before the Conquest. These too advanced the claims of English practice to authority by attempting to show that they possessed great antiquity; indeed, it was one of the leading marks of English Law at the time that it adopted a rampantly nationalistic stance, largely because of its antiquarian bias (Kelley 1974).

Both of these areas of antiquarian study were almost directly descended from the 'precedent seeking' of the Great Controversy years, yet their significance by the end of the century was altogether different. Lambarde's intentions were undoubtedly to defend English legal tradition against foreign criticism; but in bringing into the light the potential of history as a theatre for legal dispute he went far towards creating the kind of historical consciousness which brought conflict with the early Stuarts. Similarly, Parker's work was grounded in the need to build up a strong national Church to counter the claims of Rome; but this depended upon an attack on Roman practices and doctrine as a corruption of the faith of the Church Fathers and was founded on detailed critical studies of Scriptural and Patristic sources. In this way Antiquarianism became firmly bound in England to didactic history and to the spirit of reform. If antiquity might show just reason for the overthrow of the authority of a Pope then it could command the same force with respect to a King. Criticism of spiritual princes brought with it an uncomfortable awareness of the evils of their temporal counterparts, and the possibilities of removing them from power.

These potential and, indeed, realised political implications for antiquarian research did not go unnoticed by the Crown and were an increasing source of anxiety. Legal antiquarianism, in particular, held no end of problems for an intransigent and increasingly authoritarian monarchy faced with a gentry which required, and sought justification in antiquity for, greater political power and authority.¹⁵ Many leading antiquarians were also notable 'trouble-makers' from the perspective of the Stuart dynasty, some taking a major part in the Parliamentary cause -- one must mention here Sir Edward Coke and Sir Robert Cotton, though there were similar, if less outstanding, figures such as Sir Simonds D'Ewes involved in arguments from precedent or custom established through antiquarian researches. It is in this context that one should interpret Elizabeth's politic indifference, and James I's positive antipathy, to the foundation of an academy for antiquarian studies (Styles 1956:51-2).

Antiquarian studies during the seventeenth century follow very much in the lines described above, with an increasing emphasis on local and county 'Views' and 'Descriptions'. There is, however, a change in the detail of description and in the way in which Antiquarian studies are viewed. This is largely to do with the rise of Empiricism and, in particular, to the influential writings of Francis Bacon. An adequate discussion of Bacon's thought is not in order here, but two main threads should be isolated. First, in providing a scheme within which the already thriving study of subjects such as astronomy, mathematics, surveying, chemistry (in so far as it existed) and medicine, Bacon gave purpose and direction to work which had, with a few exceptions, been carried out in the isolation of particular trades and professions. Second, Bacon saw 'scientific' study as having specific ends; indeed, it was the ends which justified the study. Far from being interested in Empiricism for its own sake, Bacon himself was profoundly utilitarian in attitude. The aim of empirical science was "to establish and extend the power and domain of the human race itself over the universe".¹⁶ Not only was this desirable so that life might be made more attractive: it was, further, a Christian virtue and one which offered the hope of Redemption: "For man, by the Fall fell at the same time from his state of innocence and from his domination over created things. Bothe these losses can even in this life be partially repaired; the former by religion and faith, the latter by arts and science".¹⁷ In this way, Bacon gave scientific research religious sanction by linking it to certain trends in contemporary Protestant doctrine.

Antiquarianism was, together with other areas of thought in Stuart England, greatly influenced by Bacon's thesis and adopted his rigorous approach to categorisation and description; its students, drawing upon the precedents of the previous century, became absorbed in meticulous documentation and arrangement of information about natural wonders, British camps, Roman roads, healing springs, and family histories much in the same way as others explored the heavens or the nature of magnetism. In a very real sense, seventeenth century Antiquarianism was the Baconian Science of the English countryside and its history. Moreover, in line with Baconian thought, antiquarian studies began to adopt, at first implicitly, but latterly quite openly, a utilitarian approach to its material, emphasising the control and exploitation of natural resources. This had been latent in some Elizabethian chorography¹⁸; but by the last quarter of the seventeenth century we find Antiquarians such as Aubrey recording soil types, mineral resources, customs and archaeological monuments with the explicit intention that knowledge of them be made available to those who might find an economic advantage in it (Hunter 1975: passim). Above all the seventeenth century in antiquarian studies was a period of intensive classification and description in which field studies started to play an ever increasing importance and to exert an influence over public tastes. It is during the closing decades that the market for antiquarian books seems to have most expanded marking the beginning of a period when antiquity was to directly impinge upon the consciousness of those other

than Antiquarians, and when the results of antiquarian studies were to become implicated in wide social and religious controversies.

Discussion

I have tried to approach the topic in hand with a pincer movement: on the one hand I have laid out the sketch of a 'theoretical' apparatus; on the other, I have attempted to present a more or less complete 'potted history' of the growth of Antiquarianism during the reigns of the Tudors and Stuarts. It remains now to see whether these two arms can be brought together in some overall synthesis and conclusion.

(1) The Henrician Reformation of all European reformations was the one which appealed most directly and extensively to historical sources (Levy 1967:79ff). This was decisive for the subsequent growth of antiquarian studies in England. From its beginning, Antiquarianism was intimately tied to the foundation of English identity, in the form of nationalism, as well as to a strong tradition of didactic, reforming history. Reform and criticism of contemporary conditions became linked to the establishment of historical identity through antiquarian research: this is a crucial point. The kind of identity, of 'Englishness', which emerged was one founded not only on documentary sources but also on a keen appreciation of topography and custom enshrined in the chorographic tradition: this remained the central thread of Antiquarianism during succeeding centuries. Work during the first half of the sixteenth century seems primarily nationalistic in emphasis -- it originates in, and touches upon, the particular interests and requirements of the State and Church. As the century advanced, however, there was a move towards a more local bias. (2) Antiquarianism becomes intimately connected with local or county histories and with country chorographies. Studies begin to concentrate upon descriptions of the genealogies and estates of local gentry families on the one hand, and on the details of regional topography and geology, including mineral resources, on the other. The explanation of this shift in emphasis is interesting precisely because it is correlated with what has been called the 'Rise of the Gentry'. The interest emerges from showing how the two might be interconnected; the danger lies in reducing 'interconnection' to banal determinism. There is, moreover, the whole question of the 'Rise of the Gentry' itself, of which something must now be said.

The 'Rise of the Gentry' is a topic which has provoked heated historical controversy.¹⁹ Some of the argument seems to have been at cross-purposes and to have arisen out of a confusion of different categories of data and of the potentials of certain lines of research. Then again there has been the problem of defining the nature and limits of the groups which are meant to have 'risen' and 'fallen', and the statistical uncertainty of subsequent economic analyses. Throughout all of this, however, it has been assumed that there is, indeed, some phenomenon which deserves attention and that this is closely linked to the mobility of late Tudor and Stuart society; the controversy has

centred on the specific form and explanation of upward and downward mobility. At the risk of being accused of naivety, I wish to assert that the period under discussion here does witness the 'rise' (ideological no less than economic) of an élite of middling or 'gentry' families: 'ideological' in so far as this group increasingly thought of itself as the power in the kingdom, and was thus motivated to act to defend and increase that power; 'economic' in that their ideology was frequently (thought not necessarily) buttressed by real aggrandisements in wealth, both through mercantile speculation and through investment in property. Their rise is, indeed, difficult to tie down to statistics; but this is largely because of a lack of agreement on the categories on which to perform analysis. The position I wish to adopt is to use the term 'middling folk' in a heuristic sense to identify a group which largely shared common outlooks and patterns of behaviour and which fell economically (and in their own eyes) somewhere between the upper and lower strata of contemporary society. This is, of course, a very loose definition and will not lend itself to tidy classification; it desperately needs close study of the extent of sharing of outlook and behaviour to lend it substance (something which cannot be undertaken here); but it does admit to the truth that social groupings are of their essence untidy, fluid entities.²⁰ The 'middling folk' I refer to include both landed gentry and merchants, supporters and opponents of the Parliamentary cause, economically 'rising' and 'falling' families. What binds this group is their increasing sense of self-awareness and authority.

Antiquarianism developed as an aspect of national identity during the sixteenth century, but as the century advanced it increasingly became bound to more local interests and materials. National chorographies were accounts of the history of England, but county chorographies were increasingly accounts of the history of middling families and their possessions. The century witnessed, then, a subtle shift from an emphasis on the realm's past as a whole to an emphasis on the realm's past as constituted through the histories of counties and their administrators. In this way a tacit correspondence was set up between the history of England and the history of English gentlemen and, consequently, between English identity and the identity of middling folk. Antiquarianism can be seen, then, as a context of knowledge production which was intimately tied to the growth of the gentry's self-awareness and their sense of historical identity. It was, moreover, a knowledge of the past which emphasised, through the chorographic formula, those things closest to the interests of gentlemen: the history and nature of land-holding patterns; the origins and prerogatives of Parliament; the development of English Law; the links between their estates and England's ancient and venerable origins; the location and mapping of routes of communication and natural resources. County chorographies implicitly stated the gentry's direct associations with, and access to, the remains of Britannia; they provided a context within which the landed and monied might place themselves:

I knowe not (in respect of the place) unto whom I may more

fittly send it than unto you, that are either bred and well brought up here, or by the goodnesse of God and your owne prouision, are well settled here: and here lawfully possess, or are neere unto sundry of those things that this book specially speaketh of; and thus, as of your selves, doe you see that they are now, and thus of this booke, may you know why they were, and by whom they were, and what they were long agone²¹

By the turn of the sixteenth century middling folk were becoming possessed of an historical identity which implicitly equated their own destiny with that of England; and in Antiquarianism they were more closely linked than ever before to the origins of the kingdom. The need for such historical identity was, moreover, a pressing one given the fluid nature of contemporary society. The sons of landed gentry moved into Trade while tradesmen's sons bought into Land (Grassby 1978). Antiquarian books served, at least in part, as manuals for the new country squires, introducing them to both the social and physical geography of their surroundings and to the local history with which they were now to be linked by adoption. Even if their new station did not possess the sanction of Antiquity they might at least place themselves in relation to it through antiquarian reading and study. Well might Lambarde write to his gentlemen readers:

... there is nothing either for our instruction more profitable, or to our minds more delectable, or within the compasse of common understanding more easie and facile, then [sic] the studie of histories; nor that studie for estate more meet, then for the estate of gentlemen ...²²

for gentlemens' increasing sense of their own worth and prestige was grounded in such studies.

At the same time, Antiquarianism necessarily linked the growth of middling folk's self-awareness to earlier, and continuing, programmes of reform initiated by the Crown. If some, at least, of the upward social mobility of Tudor England had its origins in the dispersal of Church property amongst enterprising gentry and merchant families, then even more so was their growing self-importance founded on the didactic history which had formed a context, and then a warrant, for the Henrician Dissolution. The political repercussions of this, from the latter decade of Elizabeth's reign onwards, were considerable: the battle lines for confrontation with existing patterns of authority were firmly laid down in historical argument and research; and that historical research itself tacitly, as well as openly, encouraged a spirit of opposition and reform.

I want to suggest at this point that Antiquarianism be viewed as a vital part of social and political developments in late Tudor and Stuart England. The role suggested is not an explicit one: I do not wish to assert that Antiquarianism was the 'cause' of political unrest, nor indeed the 'result' of it. Antiquarian studies were, it is true,

sometimes directly involved in political debate, but this is more a reflection of their underlying importance. When one is looking for the reasons behind political unrest one is looking for what brought about the conditions provoking it. I want to suggest that immanent in antiquarian studies were such conditions; in particular, that Antiquarianism helped generate an attitude which necessarily led to a confrontation in Stuart England over power and authority. My reasons for this assertion should now be partly clear. They hinge on the way in which Antiquarianism was implicated in the forging of an historical identity for middling folk. This identity, which increasingly elided the interests of England with the interests of gentry and merchants, in turn formed the basis upon which their actions were predicated. In other words, antiquarian studies were intimately connected to the motivations (in the sense outlined above) for political actions. It is against the background of antiquarian studies that the increasing intransigence and self-assurance of the Commons should be understood for it largely emerged from its members' growing sense of their historical ancestry and prerogatives. The House's continual resort to historical records and precedents, and its attempts to give traditional practices the force of rules, betrays the antiquarian influence informing its members' actions (Mitchell 1957).

But we are dealing with more than identity here, or at least more than identity in any simple sense; we are dealing with certain dispositions and symbolic connections which became established in the thought of middling folk (and indeed others) through the medium of antiquarian studies. It is symptomatic that the discourse of unrest was carried out partly in an antiquarian context. What had occurred during the previous half-century had been the incidental incorporation of latently proactive attitudes and assumptions. Through carrying out research into the kingdom's history gentlemen began to change in a rather radical, if not immediately apparent, way their perception of the world and themselves: that is, the stocks of knowledge upon which their actions were predicated. In turn, as these bases of motivation changed, so in consequence did gentlemen's attitudes both to Antiquarianism and the past as well as to other aspects of their life; thus, their actions in other spheres of life became intimately tied, though not in any deterministic way, to the study of Antiquity.

This pattern of development can be most clearly traced if we follow the changing attitudes to the natural environment inherent in chorographies. Leland's work was aimed towards a catalogue of the contents of the kingdom, a mapping in time and space; but it had unacknowledged implications. Later scholars drew out more clearly the details of the chorographic 'map' emphasising various aspects. One of these was the location and description of field monuments. This implied certain changes in attitude, particularly towards the natural world. In particular, it was grounded in repercussions of the growth of Anachronism: objectification and distancing of the world from the observer. Antiquarian studies re-inforced this attitude, stressing in particular the way in which humans had modified Nature in the past.

These changes, forged in the bases from which Antiquarianism rose, in turn fostered a growing sense of the material potentials of the kingdom which became incorporated as a new, largely non-discursive, element in subsequent work. Such elements, both informing and informed by discursive philosophical positions such as that entertained by Bacon, were the basis for seventeenth century assertions about the duty and rights of humankind to exploit Nature and bend it to material advantage. The direct repercussion upon Antiquarian research was to encourage the utilitarian attitude promoted by men like Aubrey as well as to reinforce at non-discursive levels objectification of the Past as a resource which could itself be exploited and, hence, which should be protected from abuse. It is not too difficult to take the argument a few steps further, incorporating the emphasis lent by antiquarian studies to images of Britain as the new Rome, to start to show how Antiquarianism was an essential and unwitting ideological pre-condition of the emergence of British imperialist Capitalism.

The same pattern of development -- the dialogue between changing motivations for actions and actions themselves -- can be followed with regard to social change during the period; indeed, the change in attitudes to Nature was intimately bound to these changes. The outlines of this are evident: the search for precedent; the growth of country chorography; the growing importance of antiquarian legal studies; the stress upon history as a vital context for disputes over power and authority, particularly after it successfully secured the aggrandisement of middling folk or, at least, a group of them. What the pattern stresses, however, is the lack of determination in this history of development. Antiquarianism did not exhaust the influences upon motivation; neither were its deeper elements the only ones upon which actions were predicated. What has not been stressed, for want of space, is the part played by antiquarian studies in the denouncing of Parliamentarianism: by no means were all antiquarians opponents of the Crown. It is clear, nevertheless, that their work formed more than an incidental aspect of the events of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

Conclusions

It has only been possible in this paper to offer a very broad and necessarily generalising thesis linking the rise of the 'gentry' to the growth of Antiquarianism. From an historian's point of view this will, no doubt, prove most unsatisfactory. I have had to rely on simplifications verging on school-book history which have made extremely complicated issues seem rather unproblematical. The paper is not, however, intended as a final statement, nor as a detailed piece of historical analysis. Its sole aim is to suggest that links exist between social change and intellectual change, and that the two are mutually dependent; also that Antiquarianism should be understood as a vital part of the social and political climate in which it was first nurtured and not as a quaint groping at Archaeology. Counter-examples

thrown at the case which I have attempted to present will not, I think, touch its force; nevertheless, there is an obvious need for detailed work to substantiate it and to encourage revision. In particular, there is a great deal of documentary work to be done on antiquarian texts themselves especially from the perspective of assessing changes in attitudes towards the natural world.²³ Really adequate quantitative studies along these, and complementary lines, are very rare and it is to be hoped that the thesis outlined here will form a provocative framework within which such work might be undertaken.

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Notes:

1. From The first part of the histories of England (London, 1612) quoted in Levy (1967), p. 277; see Blissett (1957) for a more detailed account of Daniel's approach to the historical past.
2. Marxists may complain that I have adopted an unfair parody of their approaches to intellectual history, and it is true that these reflect wide differences in methodology and attitudes. Nevertheless, I have yet to be convinced by neo-marxist attempts to gloss over determination (even in the 'final instance') or by various concessions to the autonomy of the superstructure such as have been made by structural-marxists.
3. This distinction between action and behaviour is held in common by a number of schools of thought, including versions of symbolic interactionism.
4. "Sed vetus error occupavit animos multorum, ac fascinavit specie antiquitatis suae, atque ita fascinavit, ut quod verum est deinceps certe nolint cernere" (De Rebus Albioniciis (1590), quoted by Fergusson (1969)). Twyne was unusual for his time in his utter dismissal of the Brut as fable and his attention to palaeography and the use of ethnographic parallels. In this he pre-empted much later thinking, including the postulation of a British 'Stone Age'; see Fergusson (1969).
5. Nicholson (1977) provides an interesting account of the effect of Dissenting Histories upon Early Tudor views of the past and its study.
6. For example, Valla's treatise on the Donation of Constantine: Lorenzo Valla, A Treatise on the Donation ... unto Sylvester pope of Rome by Constantine (London, 1534).
7. From the Laboryouse Journey, quoted in (Piggott 1956:103).
8. See (William 1967:738-9) for the essential text of the pre-amble.

9. A rather self-conscious attempt, for example, had been made by the Crown to forge a symbolic link with the past 'glories' of England in naming Henry VIII's elder brother Arthur.
10. Though, of course, it is true that Leland's manuscripts (for hardly any of his work was published in the sixteenth century) exerted a strong influence over later antiquarians such as Camden; for some discussion of this see Piggott (1976a) and Levy (1964).
11. The intinerary of John Leland, edited by Thomas Hearne. 2nd edition. 9 vols. Oxford & Eton, 1745.
12. These are, at any rate, the main outlines of Leland's project; see John Bale (ed), The Laboryouse Journey and serche of Johan Leylande (London, 1549). For an account of the German chorographic tradition upon which men such as Leland, and particularly Camden, were drawing see Strauss (1958).
13. Parker's household comprised a formidable group of antiquarian scholars with access to perhaps the most extensive library in the kingdom; see, for example, Wright's (1951) article.
14. This was, of course, an interested piece of research on the part of the architect of the Elizabethian Church Settlement, but not an unscholarly one, nor indeed one aimed solely at scholars: his sponsoring of a translation for the educated lay public of Aelfric's account of the Anglo-saxon Church, A Testimonie of Antiquitie (London, 1566), seems to have been motivated both by political concerns and a genuine interest in what the past might 'reveal' about the present.
15. See Styles (1956) and Pocock (1957) for the general background.
16. quoted by Hill (1982), p. 94.
17. Ibid., p. 89.
18. For example, Carew (1602) occupied more than 32 pages of his survey with an account of tin mining; the manuscript of this work had been in circulation for many years before its publication (Levy 1967:159).
19. There is a convenient summary of part of the debate given by Stone (1965).
20. I have drawn here upon Stearns excellent treatment of the problem of defining the Middle Class (Stearn 1979).
21. From the preface, 'To his councitriemen ..' to the Perambulation of Kent (Lambarde 1596).
22. Ibid.
23. The author is currently engaged in such a study of Camden's Britannia (McVicar forthcoming).

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