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**ELITES AND POLITICS: WHO GOVERNS US?**  
**Measuring and comparing species of capital**  
**in the Chilean political elite, 1990-2010**

This Dissertation is submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology

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## **DECLARATION**

This dissertation is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text.

It is not substantially the same as any work that I have submitted, or, is being concurrently submitted for a degree or diploma or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or any other University or similar institution except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text.

I further state that no substantial part of my dissertation has already been submitted, or, is being concurrently submitted for any such degree, diploma or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or any other University or similar institution except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text.

This dissertation does not exceed the prescribed word limit for the relevant Degree Committee.

## ABSTRACT

In this study, the Bourdieusian concepts of species of capital and habitus are applied to the field of elites. Although sociological research has examined the reproduction of Chile's elites, there is little empirical evidence as to how different forms of capital operate within them. Based on a survey of the country's elites, this thesis examines the effect of different forms of capital (cultural, social and political) on access to strategic positions in the legislative and executive branches of government. It focuses on the political elite in the 20 years between 1990, when military dictator Augusto Pinochet handed over the presidency to Patricio Aylwin, his democratically elected successor, and 2010, the end of President Michelle Bachelet's first government. At least three points are germane to this analysis: (1) understanding the nature of the party elites during the political transition; (2) describing and explaining the main aspects of the party elites' background and social resources, including their family networks (independent variables); and (3) exploring the effect of those variables on individuals' chances of achieving strategic positions in the political field, comparing the legislative and executive branches as represented by deputies and ministers (dependent variable).

The data was obtained through a survey of 386 members of the nucleus of the Chilean political elite, enquiring about their social, academic and family background, social resources and professional and political careers, among other topics. The empirical analysis includes network analysis of family capital and six logit models for three periods: 1990-2000, 2000-2010 and 1990-2010. The results indicate that age, gender and variables related to cultural, social and political capital are relevant for becoming both a deputy and a minister, but with opposite effects. Only family capital has a significant effect in the same direction for the two branches of government. However, the effects of the variables vary when differentiating by period. The originality of the research lies in the collection and analysis of new empirical data that throws light on a subject of longstanding speculation<sup>1</sup>.

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## PREFACE

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This work is to the best of my knowledge original, except where acknowledgements and references are made to previous work. Neither this, nor any substantially similar dissertation has been or is being submitted for any other degree, diploma or other qualification at any other university.

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## ABBREVIATIONS

ALIANZA	Coalición Alianza por Chile, Chile
AFP	Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones, Chile
AUGE	Plan de Acceso Universal de Garantías Explícitas, Chilean Health Ministry
CASEN	Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional (socioeconomic household survey by the Chilean government - Ministry of Social Development)
CED	Centro de Estudios del Desarrollo, Chile
CEP	Centro de Estudios Públicos, Chile
CIEPLAN	Corporación de Estudios para Latinoamérica, Chile
CONCERTACION	Coalición Concertación de partidos por la democracia, Chile
CODELCO	Corporación Nacional del Cobre, Chile
CONICYT	Comisión Nacional de Investigación Científica y Tecnológica, Chilean government
FONDECYT	Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo Científico y Tecnológico, Chile
CORFO	Corporación de Fomento de la Producción, Chile (government economic development agency)
CPC	Confederación de la Producción y del Comercio, Chile
CUT	Central Unitaria de Trabajadores, Chile
DINA	Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional (Chilean secret police in the military government of Augusto Pinochet)
GDP	Gross domestic product
ECLAC/CEPAL	UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
FLACSO	Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INE	Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas, Chile
MIR	Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria, Chile
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PDC	Democracia Cristiana, Chile
PNUD / UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
PC	Partido Comunista, Chile
PS	Partido Socialista, Chile

PRSD	Partido Radical Social Demócrata, Chile
PUC	Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile
RN	Renovación Nacional, Chile
SOFOFA	Sociedad de Fomento Fabril, Chile
UDI	Unión Demócrata Independiente, Chile
UP	Unidad Popular, Chile

## INTRODUCTION

An elite is a select and often small group of citizens and/or organisations that has an important level of power, occupying “*those positions in society which are at the summits of key social structures*” (Lipset & Solari, 1967, p. vii). Most such groups display their sense of superiority through material and aesthetic attributes and are constantly seeking differentiation and separation from the rest of society (Dalož, 2010). They are formed by highly educated, informed, wealthy and, in some cases, politically active individuals who have an important influence on the public sphere (Castells, 2011). This influence is central to the research object of this study: political elites that form power groups which are strategically positioned at the core of the political system (Mills, 1956) and govern society (Dahl, 1961) by operationalising a series of strategic ties that allow them to maintain a position of dominance as the ruling class.

The study of political elites is important in order to understand the evolutive logic of the distribution of power in societies. As Lipset and Solari (1967) point out, although the term “elite” was first used in the seventeenth century by merchants to identify their goods as being of superior quality, the concept evolved over time and was adopted as a category of analysis by sociology and political science to refer to a society’s governing groups and/or dominant strata. In this context, “*elite analysis*” emerged as an alternative to “*class analysis*” since, under this approach, it is assumed that the social structure and its complexity permit the creation of barriers to the direct exercise of power by the mass of the population. These barriers are used by minority groups that endure over time, regardless of the society’s predominant economic structure. This is why it is possible, through the study of elites, to identify these select groups and explain their functioning in terms of the social mechanisms and strategies they use to maintain their position of power within a particular society.

A key question in the study of elites is whether they are born or made. Although different research approaches have been used in a bid to answer this question, there is consensus that these select groups function and reproduce themselves through social resources or forms of reciprocal capital (Bourdieu, 1986) that allow them to create and maintain ties and differentiate themselves from the rest of society (Dalož, 2007). These ties may be strong or weak (Granovetter, 1973), but it is clear that the elites are socially very homogenous (Higley & Burton, 2006). Moreover, elite analysis is useful for defining and explaining the specific characteristics of a social order and the way in which the social structure is defined and relationships of power evolve over time. This is particularly relevant today for Latin American



countries where social, political and economic inequalities remain a challenge for their sustainable development.

In recent years, empirical political elite research in Latin America has used a wide range of methods of data collection and produced an increasing number of comparative national studies. Most of this research has focused on the political elites' role in the region's processes of democratic transition and consolidation (Cheibub, Pzeworski, Limongi Neto, & Alvarez, 1996; Higley & Burton, 1989; Higley & Gunther, 1992; Higley, Pakulski, Pohu, & Dobry, 2000; Linz & Stepan, 1996; Mainwaring, Brinks, & Pérez-Liñán, 2001; O'Donnell & Schmitter, 2013; Schmitter, 1988). Research has also been carried out into the elites' political perceptions (Alcántara & Rivas, 2007), their biographies and familial, educational and professional trajectories and their recruitment (Camp, 2013; 2006; 2002; 1982; Morgenstern & Siavelis, 2008).

In the Chilean case, political elite research has often used publicly available biographic information about the elite's members, relying mostly on qualitative methods. It includes the study of technocracy or, in other words, those governments in which public positions are held by experts in particular economic sectors or areas of knowledge, rather than by politicians. This topic has been studied extensively, making a significant contribution to our understanding of the formation and evolution of government elites (Markoff & Montecinos, 1993; Montecinos, 1998; Silva, 2009; 1991). This line of research has dominated much of the study of elites in Chile (González-Bustamante, 2013). Secondly, there is the work that seeks to analyse the origins of the elites and their networks of socialisation in order to identify their composition, structure and levels of social cohesion (Cordero, 2003; Espinoza, 2010).

Other studies have focused on the elites' socialisation and political competition (Barozet & Aubry, 2005; Joignant & Navia, 2003) while some empirical studies have sought to define and analyse the profiles of their members with regard to their familial, educational and professional or political trajectories (Delamaza, 2013; González-Bustamante, 2013; González-Bustamante & Olivares, 2016; González-Bustamante & Garrido-Vergara, 2018; Joignant, 2014; Joignant & Güel, 2011). These studies have complemented qualitative information with surveys of the elites that have enabled researchers to gather data on, for example, attitudes, perceptions and opinions among Chile's political elites. Moreover, this work *"has broadened the range of research questions that can be empirically studied since it permits collection of information on subjective indicators such as role perceptions, attitudes and interaction patterns of elites"* (Hoffmann-Lange, Methodological developments in elite research, 2006, p. 1). Political elite

research has also focused on the role the elites played during the political transition (Garretón, 1995; Moulian, 1994).

Although this work has made it possible to study Chile's political elite throughout its history, these approaches have some limitations that need to be mentioned here in order to understand the contribution of this thesis. The biographic approach has made a significant contribution to the development of categories of analysis as regards the definition, development and evolution of the political-government elites. However, viewed from a sociological standpoint, it does not permit observation and empirical measurement of how these groups use the social resources that permit their formation and functioning over time. In turn, the approach which analyses the origins and social networks (structure and level of cohesion) of the political elites has not gone beyond an analytical logic that describes, rather than explains, the effects of certain variables that play a key role in the formation (access) and functioning (performance) of the political elites.

Studies of socialisation and political competition also have a similar limitation in that they tend to be descriptive and do not necessarily explain the effects of the formation of government or party elites. The exception in this case are some studies that explain the effects of variables related to candidates' performance in congressional elections (i.e. Navia 2000). This is also the case of studies of the role of the elites in the political transition, most of which describe and explain the processes related to the decisions and negotiations through which the political-party elites sought to restore democracy in Chile.

Finally, the approach based on the definition and analysis of the profiles of the members of the political elite in terms of their familial, educational and professional or political trajectories is relevant for this research. This approach stands out for its development of models of quantitative analysis for studying the effect of certain variables on the political and professional trajectories of the political elites, but does not include work to measure the effects that variables associated with the use of species of capital have on the formation of elites. This is the context in which this research was undertaken, taking as its reference the typologies of Bourdieu with respect to the uses of species of capital, in order to measure the effect of these variables on individuals' chances of attaining strategic positions in the political field, comparing the legislative and executive branches as represented by deputies and ministers (dependent variable).

Chile is a particularly interesting case for the study of political elites from this perspective. Historically, since its colonisation, it has experienced an evolutive process marked by economic inequality and the concentration of political power. It is a textbook case of how certain social mechanisms have operated and endured over decades, allowing the elites to maintain certain positions of privilege and political control over society. Indeed, some scholars have argued that the prevalence of democratic elitism after the country's successful democratic transition was mainly a result of the ongoing existence of the oligarchic structures and patterns of social concentration seen prior to the Pinochet regime (Delamaza, 2013; Robinson, 2013).

A large volume of empirical research has demonstrated that the prevalence of authoritarian enclaves after the transition to democracy (Garretón, 2012; 1999; Siavelis, 2009; 2009b)<sup>2</sup> resulted in an elitist form of politics between 1990 and 2013. This allowed both the centre-left *Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia* and the right-wing *Alianza por Chile* coalitions to control the political system during this period.<sup>3</sup> With its four successive presidential terms between 1990 and 2010, the *Concertación* became the longest ruling coalition in the country's history and is an exception in Latin America. During this period, it delivered positive macroeconomic results and important social progress (such as the reduction of poverty). It also succeeded in stabilising the country after the military regime (ECLAC, 2001; IMF, 2007).

During these years, the *Concertación* shared legislative power with the *Alianza*, due to the country's binomial system for congressional elections which ensured the shared dominance of the two coalitions (Navia & Sandoval, 1998). This voting system was designed by the dictatorship to over-represent conservative and pro-regime forces after the defeat suffered by Pinochet in the 1988 plebiscite (Navia, 2000; Siavelis & Valenzuela, 1996). The regime's view was that it would ensure the country's post-dictatorship political stability (Carey, 2006). The binomial system resulted in a closed political structure under which, for over 20 years, the two coalitions maintained a balance of power in the allocation of positions of political representation (Siavelis, 2009).

As ruling elites, the *Concertación* and the *Alianza* remained mostly unchanged, fairly closed and insufficiently porous. Different studies have argued that most of their members not only had a similar social origin, but also had access to social networks with frequent interaction,

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<sup>2</sup> The enclaves included el “*cuoteo*”, elite control of candidate selection and electoral politics, party dominated politics, elitist and extra-institutional policy-making, and the untouchability of the economic model inherited from the Pinochet government (Siavelis, 2009b).

<sup>3</sup> After being defeated in 2010 presidential election, the *Concertación* was replaced by *New Majority* (“*Nueva Mayoría*”) coalition, in 2013.

enabling them to reduce their ideological differences and become more compact and effective at keeping outsiders and newcomers out of the political system (Cordero, Hunneus, Berríos, & Gamboa, 2006; Espinoza & Madrid, 2010; Espinoza, 2010; Joignant & Navia, 2003). However, although González-Bustamante (2013) studied the factors affecting the access and permanence of the governmental political elite in Chile, none of these studies has empirically measured the effect of variables related to social, economic and cultural capital on access to strategic positions in the political field, comparing the legislative and executive branches.

In this dissertation, the Bourdieusian concepts of species of capital and habitus are applied to the field of elites. Although sociological research has examined the reproduction of Chile's elites, there is little empirical evidence as to how different forms of capital operate within them. Based on a survey of elites in Chile, this thesis examines the effect of different forms of capital (cultural, social and political) on the access of certain individuals to strategic positions in the political field. It focuses on the political elite that existed between 1990, when Pinochet handed over the presidency to Patricio Aylwin, his democratically elected successor, and the end of Michelle Bachelet's first government in 2010. At least three points are germane to this analysis: (1) understanding the nature of the party elites during the political transition; (2) describing and explaining the main aspects of the party elites' background and social resources, including their family networks (independent variables); and (3) exploring the effect of those variables on individuals' chances of achieving strategic positions in the political field, comparing the legislative and executive branches as represented by deputies and ministers (dependent variable).

The data was obtained through a survey of 386 members of the nucleus of the Chilean political elite, enquiring about aspects such as their social, academic and family background, social resources and professional and political careers. The empirical analysis includes network analysis of family capital and six logit models for three periods: 1990-2000, 2000-2010 and 1990-2010. The results indicate that age, gender and variables related to cultural, social and political capital are relevant for becoming both a deputy and a minister, but mostly with opposite effects. Only family capital has a significant effect in the same direction for both positions. However, the effects of the variables vary when differentiating by period. The originality of this research lies in the collection and analysis of new empirical data that throws light on a subject of longstanding speculation.

Although numerous approaches can be used to analyse the phenomenon of political elites, the research presented here takes as a reference the approach that seeks to define and analyse the

profiles of an elite's members as regards their familial, educational and professional or political trajectories. The data used was obtained from the FONDECYT<sup>4</sup> project entitled "Political elites in Chile: Sociology of the governmental, parliamentary and party staff (1990-2010)" (Project N° 1100877), led by Dr. Alfredo Joignant. As part of this project, a census of Chile's political elite was carried out, covering 386 of its members. Although the database obtained from this project was used for this research, additional variables (related to family capital, the government in which a position was held, age and education) were created by the author and used in quantitative analysis of the data. This is explained in greater detail in Chapter VI on methodological definitions. A series of interviews were also conducted to gather information about the Chilean political elite and served to define the lines of the quantitative analysis (see Appendix III).

The database has been used for numerous studies within this line of research (for example, Delamaza, 2013; González-Bustamante, 2013; González-Bustamante & Garrido-Vergara, 2018; Joignant, 2014). However, this thesis is the only one to focus on measuring the effect of different species of capital on access to the positions of minister and deputy, comparing the executive and legislative branches, in three periods: 1990-2010, 1990-2000 and 2000-2010. Its methodology was defined as a function of the study's theoretical approach, which points fundamentally to a conception of political elites in the framework of power structure research (Domhoff, 2006; 1990; 1967; Mills, 1959; 1956). This theoretical definition is important because the research centres on a unitary conception of the elite in contrast to other more pluralist visions (Dahl, 1956; Schumpeter, 1943; Simon & Eitzen, 2002). It is, in addition, based on an approach that considers species of capital according to the definition of Bourdieu (Bourdieu, 1989; 1984) and their use through strategic relations of power (Boix & Posner, 1996; Lin, 1999).

Although elite research is not as developed as other areas of political sociology research in Chile, it is essential in order to explain and analyse the political elite's creation, evolution and transformation after the end of the military dictatorship in 1990. Little work has been done on this and the research reported here aims to contribute empirical evidence by measuring the effect of different forms of capital (cultural, social and political) on the access of certain individuals to strategic positions in the political field.

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<sup>4</sup> The National Fund for Scientific and Technological Development (FONDECYT) programme aims to encourage and promote the development of basic scientific and technological research. It is the main public fund of this kind in Chile. It was established in 1981 and has financed over 16,000 research projects, whose impact has benefitted the scientific community and society as a whole. I worked as research assistant on this project. As lead researcher, Dr. Joignant gave permission for use of the data. See Appendix 1.

Since political sociology offers a framework for the analysis of political processes according to their context and the configurations determining their duration (Déloye, 1997; Garretón, 2000; Payne, 2007), this research analyses the effects of social resources on the formation of one or more elites or, in other words, groups of agents whose common denominator is a shared worldview (Mills, 1956). It also describes and analyses qualitatively certain key independent variables, notably family connections (including network analysis) within the party elite. The aim of this research is not merely to describe how different forms of capital are used by political elites, but also to measure their impact in obtaining access to certain important positions within the political system.

This doctoral thesis is divided into nine chapters. Chapter I, entitled “The study of political elites: theoretical framework”, discusses in detail the main theories and relevant empirical research that have contributed to the study of political elites and provide this study’s theoretical framework. This chapter deals extensively with the theoretical-empirical contributions that determined the definition of this research and serve as the context for its empirical contribution to the study of political elites as a sociological phenomenon using Bourdieu’s notion of species of capital.

Chapter II on “Political elites and social, political and economic transformations in Latin America” examines key aspects of the context in which Latin America’s recent political evolution has occurred. This is essential in order to understand the specificity of the Chilean case in relation to the region. Latin America’s recent history has been shaped by the existence of authoritarian regimes, with the resulting incentives for maintaining inequalities in the distribution of political power. This has also been reflected in the economy and different spheres of social life. Latin America is particularly interesting because of the institutional instability seen in most countries as from the 1960s, when the first dictatorial regimes were established, through to the 1990s when democracy had mostly been restored.

Chapter III on “End of the authoritarian regime and rearticulation of the political elites in Chile” examines the context in which the *Concertación* and *Alianza* coalitions were created. It looks specifically at the political transition in the light of the institutional factors that made the 1988 plebiscite possible, including the 1980 Constitution, because of its importance in defining the institutional framework for the Pinochet regime, and the transition process at the end of the 1980s. In addition, this chapter looks at the political negotiations that shaped the transition and

explain the existence of authoritarian enclaves in the Chilean political system after the restoration of democracy.

Chapter IV on “Two new coalitions in post-authoritarian Chile: the *Concertación* and the *Alianza*” looks at the definition and formation of the *Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia* and the *Alianza por Chile*, the two coalitions that governed Chile for more two decades after the restoration of democracy. This chapter explains their origins, the parties by which they were formed and the parties that ultimately remained in them.

Chapter V on “Political performance of the party elites after Pinochet: 1990-2010” analyses the transformations seen in the party system after the end of the Pinochet regime and the subsequent restoration of democracy. The establishment of a binomial electoral system, together with the existence of other authoritarian enclaves, allowed the political elites to remain in power without great changes with respect to the period prior to the Pinochet regime. The binomial system allowed the *Concertación* and the *Alianza* to maintain a balance of parliamentary power during the period studied here, with the *Concertación* winning the four presidential elections held between 1990 and 2010.

Chapter VI presents the methodology used in this doctoral thesis. It first explains the methodological design of the research and then the sampling procedure used to select the individuals surveyed and those interviewed in order to provide perspective and guide the quantitative analysis. Finally, this chapter explains the fieldwork and methodological decisions on the statistical technique of quantitative analysis and the variables considered in line with the research objectives.

Chapter VII on “The importance of family ties in the Chilean political elite” examines the historical evolution and importance of family ties in the Chilean political elite. Eight families considered “influential and traditional” in Chile’s political history are studied. They were selected based on an extensive review of the literature on families involved in politics in Chile as well as information obtained from preliminary interviews. These families are referred to as political dynasties and, as the analysis shows, most of them produced at least two presidents of Chile. Gephi software was then used to map family networks in the political elite. After analysing the individual biographies and political careers of the 386 cases, other members of the elite were added concerning their family connections, bringing the total to 588 individuals (nodes). Among these, 328 family ties were found, with these defined as a connection as grandparent, parent, sibling, child, cousin or uncle/aunt.

Chapter VIII on “Measuring and comparing species of capital in the Chilean political elite, 1990-2010” examines the effect of species of capital on the access of certain individuals to strategic positions in the political field, comparing the legislative and executive branches, as represented by deputies and ministers, between 1990 and 2010. First, the hypotheses are presented and the analysis technique is explained, before the chapter goes on to present the descriptive results and measurement of the effects of the species of capital (independent variables) on access to positions in the legislature and the executive.

Chapter IX sets out the conclusions and main findings of the research. The conclusions are divided into general conclusions and the specific findings of the research, referring to each chapter. This is followed by the Bibliography and the Appendices.



## **CHAPTER I: THE STUDY OF POLITICAL ELITES.**

### **THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

This chapter discusses in detail the main theories and relevant empirical investigations that have contributed to the study of political elites and serve as the theoretical framework for this research. It first contextualises the definition of elite as a category of sociological analysis before briefly discussing the relevance of the term ‘political elite’ and its relation with social class as a category of analysis.

The conceptual relationship between elites, political representation and the power structure is then addressed. These discussions are fundamental to contextualise the definition of elites as an object of study in the social sciences and, more specifically, in sociology. Subsequently, the chapter looks extensively at the theoretical-empirical contributions that shaped the definition of this research and serve as the context for its empirical contribution to the study of political elites as a sociological phenomenon.

In addition to presenting these theoretical approaches, this chapter examines their limitations, including a detailed discussion of the theoretical definitions of social capital of Bourdieu, Coleman and Putnam, in order to identify their main strengths and weaknesses and justify the use and relevance of species of capital as a category of analysis in this research. The recent context of the study of political elites in Latin America and Chile is then presented before, finally, discussing the reasons for using Pierre Bourdieu’s approach to species of capital in defining the categories of analysis used in this research and the empirical contribution it makes.

#### **i. The sociology of elites**

An elite is a select and powerful group of citizens and/or organisations. In a bid for social distinction from other groups (Daloz, 2010), elites typically strive for differentiation and separation from the rest of society. In sociological terms, this concept has analytical importance in that it represents a unit of analysis for identifying a form of social differentiation that is shaped by numerous practices and social and symbolic representations. Normally, the concept of elite is used to analyse groups that either control societies or constitute their upper layer. The creation of an elite is also the result of the evolution of elites throughout the history of humanity, with different groups vying for different social resources in order to define their specificity.

Elites and social distinction have a long and vibrant history. Since the times of Ancient Greece and the Roman Empire, social status has been important. Whereas Greek society was divided mainly into free people and slaves, the social structure of Ancient Rome was based on property, wealth, citizenship and freedom, with heredity also playing quite an important role. Social stratification existed in both cases but, in Ancient Rome, was established through objective norms (Grantt, 1978). This form of distinction through social status persisted through the Middle Ages and on to modern societies where it could currently be considered the main principle of social organisation. Research in the social sciences has emphasised the tendency of elites to endure and reproduce their power over time at “*political and economic levels, potentially undermining the effectiveness of institutional reforms. For instance, one specific form of elite persistence is illustrated by the existence of dynasties, a particular form of elite persistence in which a single or few family groups monopolize either political and/or economic power*” (Querubín, 2012, p. 2).

Numerous scholars have studied elites. Using a wide range of both qualitative and quantitative variables such as social status, social stratification and local culture, they have developed theories about their evolution and performance in modern societies. However, a key issue has emerged as regards extrapolation and predictive capabilities: “*One serious problem with this topic is that social theorists have all too often been more interested in finding confirmation for their respective grand theories than in considering the various realities of distinction comparatively. Whenever they have brought empirical evidence to support their position, the main shortcoming has been extrapolation: that is the claim to provide sociological Laws on the grounds of one particular case during a given period*” (Dalo, 2010, p. 2).

In this context, Dalo, argues that one of the major issues for elite research is its dubious extrapolations (Dalo, 2010; 2007). In the literature of elite research, there is a tendency towards generalisation which, through “*universal*” principles, seeks to reproduce theoretical schemes across different societies. However, the particularities of each society prevent the complete reproduction of these theoretical frameworks, explaining the claim of Dalo (2007) about the “*paradox of grand theories*” in elite research. According to Dalo, this issue can be seen from a number of classical theoreticians such as Spencer, Tarde, Veblen, Simmel, Weber and Sombart through to major subsequent neo-Marxist, functionalist and post-modern contributions that have analysed social distinction and emulation (Dalo, 2010). However, when sociological research began to relate social distinction to the creation of elites, a new theoretical background emerged. Pierre Bourdieu’s *Distinction* (1984) is probably one of the first and most important studies of the relationship between elites and social distinction. Under

the premise of “*no judgement of taste is innocent*”, Bourdieu analysed the French bourgeoisie’s tastes and preferences, carrying out a vast ethnographic study of contemporary France through analysis of the bourgeois mind. A remarkable quote, which summarises one of the main principles of distinction in the social sciences according to Bourdieu’s ideas, is the following:

**“Principles of division, inextricably logical and sociological, function within and for the purposes of the struggle between social groups; in producing concepts, they produce groups, the very groups which produce the principles and the groups against which they are produced. What is at stake in the struggles about the meaning of the social world is power over the classificatory schemes and systems which are the basis of the representations of the groups and therefore of their mobilization and demobilization: the evocative power of an utterance which puts things in a different light (as happens, for example, when a single word, such as ‘paternalism’, changes the whole experience of a social relationship) or which modifies the schemes of perception, shows something else, other properties, previously unnoticed or relegated to the background (such as common interests hitherto masked by ethnic or national differences); a separative power, a distinction, diacrisis, discretio, drawing discrete units out of indivisible continuity, difference out of the undifferentiated”** (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 479).

One of this theory’s most important contributions is the idea that social class plays a significant role in the construction of personal identity (i.e. a person’s interests). Thus, the constant interaction of social classes in the course of daily life reinforces “social differences” such as taste which, according to Bourdieu, is an “aesthetic” value defined by the ruling class. These social uses of communication (Bourdieu & Thompson, 1991) also have to do with relations between elites and the mass of the population (Hartmann, 2007). However, this distinction is also related to other social resources such as political power and economic wealth.


## **ii. Political elites and social class**

A political elite is a group of people, corporations, political parties and/or any other kind of civil society organisation that manages and organises government and all the manifestations of political power: “*Elites may be defined as persons who, by virtue of their strategic locations in large or otherwise pivotal organizations and movements, are able to affect political outcomes regularly and substantially*” (Higley, 2008, p.3). Social class and elites are linked. Scholars have shown that social class is, indeed, a key aspect of the formation of elites (Huckfeldt & Kohfeldt, 1989; Lane, 2007; Moore, 1966). The most influential perspectives in sociological research have historically been provided by Marxism and functionalism (Wright, 2005). Max Weber’s sociology developed a strong theoretical framework for understanding the connection between social strata and political action in modern societies. Influenced by Marx’s ideas, Weber created a theory of social stratification, arguing that power could take a variety of forms

in social interplay. He emphasised the idea that, besides class, there were other sources of power in modern societies such as status defined by consumption (Weber, 1978; 1964; 1958).

Since the 1970s, a wide range of sociological empirical research has sought to explain the social determinants of ruling elites. Considering aspects such as social origins, type of education, socioeconomic status and social and political capital, some authors have analysed the factors behind the creation of elites as well as how they evolve over time. The main principle of research of this type is the Weberian sociological concept of “elective affinity” (Weber, 1958) which defines the association between certain variables defined by beliefs, actions and/or unknown or unexpected consequences of social action (Howe, 1978). It is important to consider this concept of elective affinity because there is a link between the Bourdieusian theory of distinction and the social uses of values and this Weberian concept.

Figure 1. Political elites and the mass



Source: Compiled by author.

As Figure 1 shows, political elites must deal with conflict on two different levels: first of all, they must resolve conflicts or potential conflicts with other political elites and, second, with society in general (the masses). By resolving conflicts on these two levels, they earn legitimacy and exercise authority (Pareto, 1991; Putnam, 1976; Schattschneider, 1975; 1942). Furthermore, political elites constantly use their resources of power to exercise control over the mass of the population. The elites have power over the state, that is, the civil organisation of political power. Although they may have conflicts with the mass, which can certainly affect political decisions from “top down” to “bottom up” (Easterly, 2008), the possession of multiple forms of capital (social, cultural, economic and political, among others) allows elites to ensure their social reproduction as well as the cultural reproduction of the ruling class.

### **iii. Elites, political representation and power structure**

Political elites and representation are often related because the elites constantly seek to control government. In modern democracies, political authorities are presumed to represent citizens' interests and, to win elections, candidates must persuade voters that they deserve their support. Politicians frequently have to reconcile the "mandate" of their position with the interests of the people they represent as reflected, for example, in opinion polls.

In Western democracies, political representation depends on political parties. The functioning of democratic systems is determined not only by the action of citizens or the performance of the political system, but also by the behaviour of the political actors. Decision-makers in public institutions are political elites and they operate through political parties. What is in permanent tension in current societies is the relationship between power, conflict and authority (Laswell & Kaplan, 1950). Political elites have to deal with the institutions through which power is exercised and "shape" the political system. In some cases, they draw up strong rules in order to maintain their power and avoid political competition. In other cases, they must compete among themselves and/or with other citizens. This raises the question of whether society is controlled by a small group of insiders. The challenge for political elites is the balance between political representation and maximisation of their own interests.

However, beyond that challenge, elite behaviour is also determined by the definition of the power structure. Most social scientists consider that power can be studied either as collective power (the capacity of a group to achieve its common goals) or as distributive power when there is a fixed amount of power to be distributed among groups and/or individuals, creating a zero-sum game. In this context, it is relevant to analyse the ability of a group (elite) to gain power within a community (over other groups). Both dimensions are intertwined, but the second prevails when studying political elites.

The theoretical starting point for research into elites and power structures is that, in modern societies, the basis of power, authority and conflict lies in human organisations (Domhoff, 2006). Because elites are formed to accomplish a set of purposes, they often develop rules, specific roles and routines. Frequently, they also have to compete with each other. In political sociology, five theories have, from different perspectives and using different models, attempted to explain and analyse power structures (Domhoff, 1978; Hall & Schroeder, 2005; Mann, 1986) (Table 1).

Table 1. Theories of power structure

<b>THEORY</b>	<b>THEORETICAL BACKGROUND</b>	<b>THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE</b>	<b>PRINCIPAL EXPONENTS</b>
Pluralism	General theory of society	Multiple centres of power	Robert Dahl, Seymour Martin Lipset
State Autonomy	Theory of government as an independent force	Government as power centre	Theda Skocpol
Elite Theory	Theory of organisations	The leaders of large organisations inevitably dominate all large-scale societies.	Thomas Dye
Marxism	Marxist theory of historical materialism	Class domination	Antonio Gramsci, Gerald Cohen, John Roemer, Jon Elster, Erik Olin Wright
Class-Domination Theory of Power	Theory of domination and power networks	Domination by the few does not mean complete control, but rather the ability to set the terms under which other groups and classes operate.	Charles Wright Mills, G. William Domhoff

Source: Compiled by author.

The pluralist theory takes the view that, in modern societies, power is held by a wide range of groups and individuals while the state autonomy theory argues that it is held principally by the state. The elite theory, which is closer to pluralism, asserts that global and local societies are controlled by large organisations such as the state and/or large enterprises which are, in turn, under the control of small groups. Following the theory of historical materialism, Marxism categorises societies using the concept of social class, with each individual having a “*position*” in the means of production. Finally, the class domination theory analyses power structures in terms of the different positions of domination of each group in the social order and social networks in terms of how power is wielded (who benefits? who governs? who wins?). This approach explains how different groups compete to control society and how this affects social evolution.

Unlike state autonomy and Marxist theories, the class domination theory does not focus on only a single organisational basis of power (the political network for the state autonomy theorists and the economy for Marxists). In addition, unlike the elite theory, it does not consider that domination by a few leaders means complete control of the society, but rather the ability to set the terms under which other groups and classes must operate.

Pluralism could be considered similar to class domination theory. However, there is an important difference in their definition of the power structure. Whereas pluralism tends to relativism, arguing that, instead of hierarchies, there are multiple centres of power, the class domination theory asserts that control and authority inevitably produce a power structure based on domination. Following this approach, many scholars have studied political elites at both the theoretical and empirical levels. Several authors have also examined social structures in order to compare the influence of the elites across the political system and the rest of the society.


In “Who Rules America?” (1967), Domhoff analysed the power structure in the United States as regards local and national decision-making networks. Following Hunter’s ideas (1953), he pointed out that, rather than “group struggles” (Davis J. , 2011), there was an upper economic elite in which political power was concentrated (Domhoff, 1978; 1967). In later research, Domhoff explained two essential concepts related to this upper elite. On the one hand, there was a power or ruling elite, formed by the leaders of high-level organisations, and, on the other, the rest of the elite’s members who were not involved in the task of ruling (Domhoff, 2002; 1996; 1990).

Domhoff made a significant contribution to the study of political elites in terms of understanding their composition, the ways they act and their spheres of influence on society. His research has proven very useful in analysing elite interactions, given that most political elites tend to comprise several networks which are the result of its members’ institutional and social resources. Domhoff (2012) developed a strategy for power structure research. He argued that the first step consists in the identification of a power structure and that, through the use of two analytical methods, the objective is then to understand, describe and define the groups that control power.

Figure 2 shows how network and content analysis are connected in explaining a power structure. In sociology, social network analysis has emerged as a key technique for addressing complex sets of relationships at different levels, from interpersonal to organisational relations. Domhoff argued that identification of membership in networks is very important for defining

and describing power groups. After that, “*once the membership networks have been established, there are many other types of links that might be analyzed, such as kinship ties or flows of information between organizations. One of the most important of these other types of links concerns the size and direction of money flows in the network*” (Domhoff G. , 1967, p. 73).

Figure 2. Power structure research



Source: Compiled by author based on Domhoff, 2012.

Content analysis focuses on human communication, including all its manifestations and properties, in a bid to understand the meaning of language, words and phrases. It is used to analyse communications in networks at the interpersonal and organisational levels, with the aim of defining what type of individuals and organisations are participating, how elites develop their recruitment strategies, what kind of ideologies are involved, what is their influence and what are their public-private alliances. This methodology is crucial for identifying the specific characteristics of the power structure and the elites that are involved. Based on these empirical findings, Domhoff argues that elite theory can be applied at the local level. This perspective opens up a new insight for understanding elites from the macro to micro levels.

Other scholars have studied a wide range of links in order to define, describe and explain the performance of “power networks” in societies. Gaxie (1983) studied the social factors determining governmental careers during the Fifth Republic in France between 1959 and 1981, concluding that some political networks were created according to social determinants such as family, social class and/or social status. A similar conclusion was reached by Hughes (1993) when analysing the conformation of power networks in Western societies during the half-century between 1880 and 1930, following the change in electricity supply systems. According to Hughes, the change in power supply led to a new form of coordination between technology



and politics, determining the emergence of new elites (Hughes, 1993, p. 175). He compared this change with the impact of manorialism on medieval society.

In the case of the relation between elites, politics and economic power, Kadushin (1995) analysed ties of friendship within the French financial elite. In one of his most important findings, he concluded that most members of the financial elite had significant ties of friendship, allowing them to construct and maintain a certain level of enforceable trust, a key factor in high finance (Mendras & Suleiman, 1997). Similarly, when analysing the performance of the members of Socialist cabinets in France, Mathiot and Sawicki (1999) concluded that this principle of homogeneity of the trajectories of the elite's members can lead to homogeneous behaviour in the public and social spheres (Mathiot & Sawicki, 1999). Confrontation can, however, occur among elites and, particularly, between political and economic elites when their interests diverge, as Garrigou (2016) found in the French case.

Finally, Genieys (2005) attempted to measure and explain the impact of the elite's performance on France's development. Distinguishing between professionals and politicians "by instinct", he analysed French elites from three perspectives - comparative, historical and policy-making - and concluded that, in order to improve empirical observation of elite action, it is necessary to study the decision-making process. He argued that, during this phase of the public policy process, the "select groups" that act can be identified, making it possible to explain how new power elites are formed.

In research into the relationship between elites and the power structure, there has as yet been little work on the development of predictive models to explain the composition and performance of elites over time. In this context, incipient applied sociological approaches have sought to go beyond the definition and interpretation of the processes and structural factors that condition positions of domination in societies and have focused on the analysis of key variables in a bid to explain the formation of elite groups and their trajectories over time. This thesis seeks to contribute to this line of work by empirically measuring the effects of species of capital on access to important positions in the legislature and executive.

#### **iv. The study of political elites**

##### **Definition of the theoretical-analytical perspective of the research**

The objective of this research is to analyse the effect of different forms of capital (cultural, social and political) on access to strategic positions in the legislative and executive branches of government between 1990, when military dictator Augusto Pinochet handed over the presidency to Patricio Aylwin, his democratically elected successor, and the end of Michelle Bachelet's first government in 2010. This implies addressing the political elites as an object of study and the forms of capital as a unit of analysis in order to explain and measure the effect of their use in the formation of these select groups by comparing access to key positions in the executive (as represented by ministers) and the legislature (represented by deputies).

In the study of political elites, significant contributions have shaped this line of research at the global, regional and Chilean level. These contributions can be classified into three topics of study: political-government elites as a community of power; political elites and their role in processes of democratisation and economic development; and political elites and their trajectories, resources and mechanisms of social differentiation. Even though this research focuses on the third topic, it is important to define the topics of study in order to understand the context that determined the development of this study.

##### **iv.i. Political-government elites as a community of power**

The first academic research on political elites was framed in this perspective, which predominated until the mid-twentieth century. It reflects a conception of elites in general and political elites in particular as those select communities that rule over society. It focuses fundamentally on the factors that determine the formation and functioning of these groups. Two perspectives of analysis have shaped the development of this approach: the centralist perspective, which corresponds to the classical view of the theory of elites, and the pluralist perspective.

##### **iv.i.i. The centralist perspective: political elites as a ruling minority**

The centralist perspective begins with the work of three Italian authors who are considered the classics because they were the first to define and give specificity to the study of political elites

in modern societies: Wilfredo Pareto, Gaetano Mosca and Robert Michels. Elitist theories arose in the early twentieth century in response to egalitarian thinking and these authors were pioneers in the political importance they gave to the role of elites and leaders in democratic regimes. Although their theories differ in a number of aspects, all three concur that, throughout history, societies have been governed by small elites and that the institutional structure has been conducive to their endurance over time.

Pareto (1847-1923) was one of the first sociologists to define the concept of ruling elites (Pareto, 1901; Zuckerman, 1977) and his study of the political role played by the aristocracy in Italian society is one of the early attempts at sociopolitical analysis of elites (Rossides, 1998, p. 23). Interested in explaining the social factors that affect human action, Pareto developed one of the main arguments of the social cycle theory: that the evolution of society and human history tend to repeat themselves in cycles. Although recognising the idea of social progress, this theory is in contrast to social evolutionism, which viewed society and human history as constantly progressing in some new, unique direction and/or pattern (Turchin, 2003).

Pareto defined elites as those small and select political groups of individuals, with superior personal qualities, who govern the mass of society or, in other words, all the other individuals whom he considered unintelligent, irrational and, therefore, poorly organised and who could be manipulated by the ruling elite through “carefully used” political propaganda (Pareto, 1991). Implicit in Pareto’s definition is the assumption that individuals differ markedly in their physical, biological, moral and intellectual characteristics. In their social interactions, this produces asymmetries of power which are operationalised through the exercise of intellectual and psychological skills and the use of material resources, as Pareto points out in his *Manual of Political Economy*: “*For a very long time, and among a large number of peoples, political power has belonged to the owners of the land*” (Pareto, 1972, p.62).

Pareto’s theory of elites made an important contribution as regards the distinction between ruling and non-ruling elites. While the former is a small select group with political power, the latter is an also select group that occupies privileged positions in certain activities considered essential for society’s development. Together, the two groups form the upper stratum of society, positioned above the lower or non-elite strata of those individuals without the capacity to influence society. According to Pareto, the majority of the population falls into these lower strata (Pareto, 1991).

For Pareto, the elites are in constant circulation and, despite their origin in an aristocracy and

ties to it, there is no guarantee they will retain their privileged positions over time. In contrast to the Marxist class concept, Pareto believed that not all elite groups have the capacity to administer their power satisfactorily and permanently. On the contrary, he argued that elites and aristocracies may eventually disappear. According to Pareto, all elites, therefore, need to organise themselves within the social structure and to maintain strategic links between their members and the rest of society because their position of power depends on these relationships, which may be determined by loyalty, reciprocity or domination. When an elite group suffers a crisis, a new elite may emerge and position itself at the head of the social structure. For Pareto, these permanent struggles and the circulation of elites are essential for the evolution of history. A social revolution, for example, may not only have consequences at the level of the country, but may also serve to foster a crisis in the traditional elite and the emergence of a new one.

Pareto's theory is based on a circulation of elites in power in which there are families that are constantly vying for these privileged positions. In order to be successful, it is not only social distinction that matters and it is also necessary to build strategic ties with a wide range of individuals or groups (families) in order to exercise influence over society as a whole. Pareto emphasised that these permanent dynamics of circulation permit the rise and fall of elites. In this sense, the true struggle for power is not between the elites and the masses, but between the incumbent elites and their challengers. Rather than talking about the goodwill of rulers towards the people, Pareto believed that it is necessary to analyse the resources they use to maintain control in the face of possible threats.

Finally, Pareto argued that the dynamics of circulation offer incentives for the emergence of new elites and the disappearance of others. There is, therefore, not a single elite, but rather elites that are the result of the dynamics of succession in the domination of power. Hence his famous phrase: "*History is a graveyard of aristocracies*". For both Pareto and Gaetano Mosca, considered by many scholars to be the other founder of this field of study, the circulation of elites was the key concept for their analysis (Bottomore, 2006).

Gaetano Mosca (1939) is recognised as one of the founders of Italian political science. His contribution covers a wide range of topics related to institutions, the role of parties and the state and government in society. However, it is his theory of the political class that is traditionally regarded as his most important contribution to the theory of elites (Martinelli, 2009). In contrast to Pareto, Mosca argued that the formation of elites is determined strictly by the social structure. The members of the upper class, who form the ruling elite, are the wealthiest members of

society who also wield the greatest political power (Bottomore, 2006; Mosca, 1939; Zuckerman, 1977,).

Unlike Pareto, Mosca tried to develop a comprehensive universal approach based on a theory of the political class (Martinelli, 2009). He argued that, in human societies, the administration of political power depends on a special class of individuals who constitute an organised minority, which he referred to as the political class. Under this assumption, Mosca argued that, in every society, there will be two classes of people: the rulers and the ruled. In this context, those who govern are the political class within which there are different hierarchies and levels of authority. This is what Mosca termed the ruling class (Mosca, 1939).

In this division of society into those who govern and the governed, Mosca's approach was similar to that of Pareto but, unlike Pareto, he argued that the ruling class constitutes a select group with different hierarchies, the highest being the level responsible for directing, safeguarding and administering the interests of the state. For Mosca, the political class is permeable to the interests of the governed class, implying that it reacts to the pressures and interests of citizens, even when it cannot be replaced by those it governs.

Mosca argued that, within the ruling class, there is an elite with greater resources of power in administering the state and that this elite must be connected with the population it governs. This is a fundamental principle of the exercise of the ruler's role: *"There is a close connection between the intellectual and moral worth of the second and larger stratum of the ruling class and the intellectual and moral worth of the man who is actually at the head of the political organization and the small group of persons who directly assist him. The men who occupy higher posts are more or less imbued with the ideas, sentiments, passions and, therefore, policies of the social strata which come just below them, the strata with which they are in continuous and immediate contact and without which they could not govern"* (Mosca, 1939, p.430).

Another point of agreement between Mosca and Pareto has to do with the concept of circulation of elites. Mosca argued that their rapid circulation is crucial for guaranteeing the evolution of societies over time: *"Human societies are always governed by minorities... Rapid class circulation is essential to progress"* (Mosca, 1939, p.xviii). However, for Mosca, there is clear tension between the ruling minority and the community it governs since the larger the latter the greater the difficulty the ruling elite will experience in ensuring governability.

Mosca maintained that the existence of the political class is a product of societies' political, economic and cultural evolution in which economic and political power are inextricably linked. This occurs because, with political power, it is also possible to control wealth and, therefore, maintain an institutional framework for its accumulation and conservation. However, for Mosca, there remained the question of how the elite elicits obedience from the majority of the population. For him, the answer is that the ruling class initially has a *de facto* justification in the face of the need to administer the political power (control and authority) that arises from living as a community. However, Mosca argued that this alone does not suffice since a moral and legal structure is also required to give legitimacy to the established order on the basis of which the government operates.

The existence of an elite that administers political power is, for Mosca, the result of a need that manifests itself in human interaction where power determines the existence of conflicts and, therefore, of authority. In this sense, Mosca considered that there is a universal need to govern and to feel governed, which each society addresses through different *political formulas*. These are the institutional orders which, according to Mosca, must be based either on supernatural beliefs or on concepts that, if they are not positive, must have their root in reality or rational criteria. For Mosca, another key element has to do with the ties that are established between the governing class and the governed. In this relationship, the aspiration of the dominated to one day become part of the class of the dominators must always prevail.

The third classic author is Robert Michels (1915) who, after analysing the German and Italian political systems, concluded that political parties, including those considered socialist, cannot be democratic because, after their foundation, they inevitably tend to become bureaucratic oligarchies (Michels, 1915). Following Max Weber, Michels claimed that the main objective of a democracy, which he defined as a society without elites, was inevitably unattainable because democracy is rooted in some form of acknowledgment from the ruling elite. Since, in modern societies, the oligarchy is the elite that rules due to its power, this form of political domination is inevitable (Michels, 1915). Michels developed the theory of the "iron law of oligarchy" which is his most important contribution to sociopolitical thought (Bottomore, 2006; Mills, 1959; Putnam, 1976; Zuckerman, 1977).

The work of Michels is important for the study of the forms of elitism seen in modern societies under democratic regimes. He studied the ways in which power is organised and administered in democratic systems, focusing on political regimes, the party system and social organisations,

considering particularly the prevalence of the national socialist and fascist ideologies at the time. Although there are similarities with the work of Pareto and Mosca in the way Michels understands the governing class as a select group that forms part of an organised power structure, he developed a strategy of analysis based on the nature of elite-mass relations in organisations, putting forward proposals about the limitations of the structural forms of an organised division of labour under democracy.

The fundamental thesis of the work of Michels is that democracies are subject to the existence of oligarchic bureaucratic organisations that control power. For Michels, individuals tend to form organisations that enable them to achieve certain goals and objectives that it would be impossible for them to achieve individually. The problem is that the creation of these organisations tends to lead to a differentiation and specialisation of functions and, therefore, to hierarchies and forms of domination. This implies that, at some point, organisations cease to be a means to achieve certain objectives and become an end in themselves. This also has consequences for the roles of the leaders who, for Michels, eventually tend to protect the organisation's own interests.

He also saw this tendency in the political organisations of the working class. Despite initially being created to defend the workers' interests, they also become an end in themselves and, through the posts that are created and the need to maintain the organisation, develop a bureaucracy. In this context, the leaders of these movements, although initially guided by the will of the masses and defining themselves as revolutionaries, soon become conservative and defend the interests of the organisation. For Michels, leaders will always seek to increase or maintain their power at any price, even at the expense of their former ideals.

As a result, Michels considered that all organisations tend to become elitist. This is the origin of his "iron law of oligarchy" through which he sought to explain why political parties, albeit the main institutions of democracy, are not democratic organisations. The organisation is what gives rise to the dominance of the elected over those by whom they were elected. Organisations produce "*hierarchical orders, of oligarchies*" (Michels, 1915, p.55) and, in this context, the great problem of democratic regimes is that the parties, which constitute their base, are dominated by elites that function in a non-democratic way within the organisations, but need democracy in order to legitimise their internal power and to aspire to power beyond the organisation. In other words, democracy is controlled by a group of people who function non-democratically.

The iron law of oligarchy is based on three arguments. First, the larger an organisation becomes, the more bureaucratic it will also become because it specialises and must, moreover, take decisions that are increasingly complex and do so more quickly. Those individuals who know how to deal with the complex issues facing the organisation gradually become indispensable, forming an elite. Second, a dichotomy between efficiency and internal democracy arises, with the organisation requiring strong leadership in order to be efficient, even if this means less internal democracy. Finally, the very psychology of the masses makes leadership desirable because they are apathetic, unsuited to solving problems on their own, grateful to the leader and prone to the cult of personality. Their only function would, therefore, be to choose their leaders from time to time.

Leadership annuls democracy since the latter is understood by Michels in the Rousseauist way as the government of the people. However, democracy is a better system for the selection of oligarchies than a hereditary system. The work of Michels had a significant influence on authors such as Schattschneider, Schumpeter and Key.

The unitary conception was further developed by Charles Wright Mills (1956), who used a conceptual theoretical approach with a sociological emphasis to define and analyse the power elite in the United States. Following a Weberian approach to legitimation and forms of domination, he studied the formation and functioning of the country's elite. A distinctive aspect of his theory has to do with the understanding of what, for the author, is the psychological functioning of elite groups, which depends on how their members behave in their respective milieux: *"In so far as the power elite is composed of men of similar origin and education, in so far as their careers and their styles of life are similar, there are psychological and social bases for their unity, resting upon the fact that they are of similar social type and leading to the fact of their easy intermingling. This kind of unity reaches its frothier apex in the sharing of that prestige that is to be had in the world of the celebrity; it achieves a more solid culmination in the fact of the interchangeability of positions within and between the three dominant institutional orders"* (Mills, 1956, p.19).

Taking the American power structure as a reference, Mills identified three forms of power: military, corporate and political. They are subject to communities formed through complex interactions between different individuals and groups. Mills, unlike the authors discussed above, took into account the way in which these forms of power are interrelated. For this author, there is a symbolic dimension that is expressed in the rhetoric of public relations, a resource



widely used by members of the higher circles in order to interact and make decisions about public affairs (Mills, 1956, p.5).

Mills defined these forms of power as domains (Mills, 1956, p.6) and maintained that they interact with each other and are not unified, constituting a power-wielding body that concentrates, administers, controls and exercises power in society in general. He viewed these communities as the result of a complex historical process of rationalisation of work, which underwent a decisive evolution after the industrialisation process when the progressive development of new forms of production permitted the consolidation of accumulation as a strategy for concentrating economic resources and political power in general. In other words, the creation of wealth opened the way to the consolidation of new actors capable of exercising influence over public affairs outside the sphere of elected representatives and, in this way, led to the degradation of democracy.

For Mills, this is reflected in the public domain's relegation as a decision-making space to one in which certain discourses on public affairs converge. In other words, elected representatives also respond to the networks of influence of actors interested in certain matters of a public nature. Taking as his reference the elite of American society, Mills explained how this new order positions itself and operates: *"The power elite are not solitary rulers. Advisers and consultants, spokesmen and opinion makers are often the captains of their higher thought and decision. Immediately below the elite are the professional politicians of the middle levels of power, in the Congress and in the pressure groups, as well as among the new and old upper classes of town and city and region. Mingling with them, in curious ways we shall explore, are those professional celebrities who live by being continually displayed but are never, so long as they remain celebrities, displayed enough."* (Mills, 1956, p.74)

The centralist perspective predominated in the study of political elites until the middle of the twentieth century when a new pluralist perspective emerged. Rather than seeing the elite as a unified and centralised community, it takes the view that there are multiple axes or centres of power, which interact and compete with each other to administer power.

#### iv.i.ii. The pluralist perspective

Unlike the unitary perspective, the pluralist perspective views the elites as multiple groups that compete for spaces and positions of power in society. In this context, rather than a unified

community, there are multiple centres of power that coexist with each other and are shaped by this competition between individuals and groups that vie for power. This new perspective emerged in the mid-twentieth century and two of its important exponents are Schumpeter and Dahl.

One of the roots of this theoretical-analytical perspective is found in the work of Schumpeter on capitalism, socialism and democracy (1943), which was a pioneer in its analysis of the evolution and relationship between these three concepts in government regimes in modernity. Schumpeter used the structural-functionalist paradigm to problematise the classical conception of democracy, focusing on the principle of the common good, with respect to the notion of individual rationality. For Schumpeter, individual understanding of aggregate social welfare is limited because the multiplicity of interests which each person has do not necessarily coincide at the aggregate social level. In this way, he contributed to the establishment of rational choice and methodological individualism as a discipline in political science (Downs, 1957).

Schumpeter points out that the classical theory of democracy is based on trust that citizens' virtues will lead them to behave according to electoral expectations, but argues that, under certain conditions, individuals will not behave as expected. Individual interests do not always coincide with those of the group and even subjects' own interests can be at odds with each other. Schumpeter argues that individual interests depend on both social dynamics and a person's own rationality. In this context, optimism about electoral expectations as regards popular representation, which is typical of classical democracy, can be utopian.

Schumpeter's main reason for asserting the existence of this electoral democratic utopia has to do with the problem implicit in the election of representatives as guarantors of the sovereign mandate and/or citizen interests. Citizens vote to elect political authorities who are representative of their interests but, in practice, there is no guarantee that these authorities will effectively represent their voters' interests. In addition, in electoral contexts, political authorities must compete to ensure a victory and have rationales of action that are determined by these competitive contexts.

Schumpeter points out that modern democracies have a tendency to develop elitisms, that is, groups which establish themselves in power whose competitive rationale of action is geared to retaining power and does not necessarily fully reflect citizens' interests. However, these groups are not a unitary minority but, on the contrary, multiple groups that compete for power (social,

political and economic) within the social order. Schumpeter's work constitutes a first approach to the pluralist idea.

Another important study as regards this approach is that of Floyd Hunter (1953), who examined power relationships in a group of small communities in the US, studying the structural and functional uses of power as well as the definition of hierarchies in social networks. His sociopolitical analysis of power, based on the "mapping" of social relations, later became an important resource for the study of corporate elites (Schwartz, 1987). According to Domhoff (1967), this was the starting point for the systematic study of power by sociology.

Hunter's micro-level study focused on Atlanta, the capital of the state of Georgia, at a time when the city was beginning to grow steadily (1950-1951). He distinguished between two approaches to understanding power: on the one hand, a sociological approach where the fundamental assumption lies in the definition and institutional configuration, implying that power remains under a structure and its exercise is role-based, and, on the other hand, a political science approach under which power is understood through the way it is exercised, beyond institutional logics because, according to Hunter, these change over time. This approach is, therefore, assumed to be individual-based.

Hunter took the first approach to studying community power in Atlanta society. Using a reputational method and snowball sampling, he constructed a sample of those individuals who occupied leadership positions in social organisations, business and universities as well as political positions and positions of influence and wealth. Then, with a list of these names, he asked people whom they identified as the most powerful, adding new names to the list depending on the points of view of interviewees. Since many of his interviewees had direct experience of power, Hunter acknowledged a certain bias in his research.

Among his most important findings, Hunter identified who were really powerful and how their power resources operated. A majority of the most powerful individuals held positions of leadership in the financial sector (business, banks and financial companies), including particularly business owners (Hunter, 1953, p.12). In this context, he noted that the elite's main interest was in maintaining and increasing its monetary wealth, accompanied by effective mechanisms for the protection of private property (Hunter, 1953, p.105). Both strategies became the motor of the city's development. Moreover, Hunter established a distinction between men of independent decision or, in other words, an upper layer of leaders (who set policy and were often the same across different issues) and what he defined as the

*“understructure of power”* or those individuals who implemented the upper leaders’ decisions and who varied from issue to issue (Hunter, 1953, p.91).

In one of his important conclusions, Hunter argued that the ruling elite exists within a power structure which determines a certain order of community life in the context of which the elites ignore the interests of other groups because their power means they have no incentive to take them into account. He maintained that local elites do not operate in a competitive context, marking a difference with Schumpeter’s thesis of democracy as the institutional arrangement necessary to guarantee electoral competition between power groups (Schumpeter, 1950). In addition, Hunter distanced himself from the pluralistic theses of Dahl (1961) and Truman (1951) who, albeit corresponding to different periods, both argued that a plurality of influence groups implies the existence of different levels at which power is shared as a resource. By contrast, Hunter argued that a plurality of groups does not mean widely shared power (Hunter, 1953, p.90-91).

The work of Hunter constituted a significant contribution to the study of elites in that he installed the idea of the existence of a power structure inserted in the community. His empirical study, based on the situation in a city, showed that, beyond the formal power structure, there were individuals and groups that concentrated real power. By mapping these relationships, Hunter demonstrated that hierarchies exist beyond the formal institutional framework and that they correspond to the underlying structure of community life. Based on this idea, Hunter questioned democratic theories and proposed moving towards a real democracy representative of citizens’ interests. This idea was taken up by later studies, including particularly the work of Schwartz, who applied this approach to US corporate elites (Schwartz, 1987).

The work of Robert Dahl (Dahl, 1979; 1961) is also representative of this pluralist perspective. Dahl’s career focused mainly on areas related to political philosophy but his book, *“Who Governs?: Democracy and Power in an American City”*, is an empirical case study that seeks to understand the functioning of the elite by examining political power and representation in the town of New Haven, Connecticut. Taking Hunter as a reference, Dahl sought to analyse the political elite through the relationships established by the different interest groups in this community, examining the social dynamics of the power structure with regard to the behaviour of social groups and the relationship between individual interactions and group-level behaviours.

Dahl's research provides empirical evidence for the pluralist perspective and, in this respect, is probably the single most important piece of work. He demonstrated the existence of diversified elite groups, which do not necessarily correspond to the same group or community and can be differentiated by interests. However, these groups do interact with each other, beyond competing to control power in their area of interest. In addition, they share spaces of socialisation, such as education, and there are schools and universities where the elite is formed and recognises itself.

Dahl's research was of transcendental importance for understanding the functioning of elites as multiple centres of power that operate through interconnected social networks, which determine the way they compete for access to power (Hunter, 1962).

Although the centrist and pluralistic approaches are important in defining the field of study of political elites, there are also other approaches, which developed later and address other dimensions. They include two approaches that have been very important for the study of political elites in Latin America: one that has focused on their role in democratisation and development processes and one that has focused on the study of trajectories and the social resources of their members.

#### iv.ii. Political elites and their role in democratisation processes and economic development

The study of elites' role and impact in the definition of political regimes, processes of democratisation and economic development has been characterised principally by its analysis of the functioning of political elites through party dynamics and their ideological projects as reflected in electoral competition and the implementation of their government agendas.

One of the first key authors corresponding to this perspective was Schattschneider (1960). Although there are similarities between his research and Michels' research, Schattschneider took American post-war society as his reference, both authors attribute significant importance to the relationship between political organisations and democratic regimes. Although carrying out his research several decades later, Schattschneider shared Michel's democratic elitist perspective under which political parties are viewed as organisations that respond to the interests of a dominant elite. In a more recent study, Nardulli explains this perspective: "*Rather than viewing political parties as vehicles for democracy, elitist conceptions stress the*

*dominance of elites in the management of party affairs. Thus, they conceive of parties as political tools elites use to achieve personal concerns and interests*" (Nardulli, 2013, p.84).

Schattschneider's most important work is "The Semi-Sovereign People" (Schattschneider, 1960) in which he attempted to explain the relationship between organisations, political power and conflict and their impact on the functioning of democratic regimes. Schattschneider based his analysis on the premise that, in societies, it is not possible to understand politics "*unless we know what the struggle is about*" (Schattschneider, 1975, p.v). In line with this premise, one of the key questions he asked was "*what makes things happen in American politics?*", arguing that the probability of understanding their dynamics might increase "*if we knew what is going on when things are happening*" (Schattschneider, 1975, p.v).

Based on this question, Schattschneider took a critical view of the American political theory of pluralism, whose best-known exponents are Dahl (1961), Lipset (1959) and Truman (1951). In general terms, this theory asserts that, in addition to the government, there is a wide range of interest groups that use their resources to influence political decisions. In this context, the central question is about how power is distributed within a process or political system. For Schattschneider, on the other hand, that question was already answered by observing the characteristics of the democratic system: "*Democracy is a competitive political system in which competing leaders and organizations define the alternatives of public policy in such a way that the public can participate in the decision-making process*" (Schattschneider, 1960, p.141). However, operationally, democracy is subject to the power of a minority and marked by social differences between those who hold power and the rest of society: "*The flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent. Probably about 90 percent of the people cannot get into the pressure system*" (Schattschneider, 1960, p.35).

This idea is crucial for the argument that people are actually semi-sovereign because they exercise institutional power through the voting system, but are not able to surmount the barrier of social inequality with respect to those with a high economic income and a higher educational level or, in other words, the select group that, according to Schattschneider, holds the true power. In his view, the voting system serves a legitimising role, but does not represent the exercise of substantive political power, which is the prerogative of a minority. It is the latter that really exercises political power in all its fullness.

Despite sharing a democratic elitist vision, Schattschneider and Michels differ on the existence of this order and its justification. Michels argued that the principle of political organisation

makes the existence of democratic regimes inconceivable because, although conferring legitimacy, this principle is ultimately at odds with democracy itself due to its contribution in shaping the iron law discussed above. Schattschneider, on the other hand, argued that the existence of parties contributes to the maintenance of a semi-sovereign order under which citizens exercise a deliberative role protected by the role of these organisations: *“Party government is good democratic doctrine because the parties are the special form of political organization adapted to the mobilization of majorities”* (Schattschneider, 1960, p.208).

However, Schattschneider argued that these semi-sovereign regimes are restricted by the opportunities citizens have to exercise their deliberative right and the matters on which they can do so: *“In mass-democracy, the people are a sovereign whose vocabulary is limited to two words, ‘yes’ and ‘no’. This sovereign, moreover, can speak only when spoken to”* (Schattschneider, 1960, p.52). This idea is related to the lack of incentives for citizens to be as well informed as their political authorities and the elite and the barriers (mainly educational and income-related) to being so. In his study of the United States, Schattschneider asserted that the greatest obstacle to the development of party governments is intellectual, not legal, and, insofar as this is understood by the authorities, new ways of defining the democratic regime can be promoted through the Constitution (Schattschneider, 1942, pp. 209-210).

In addition to Schattschneider, there is the work of Domhoff (Domhoff, 1990). His theory, which is also similar to that of Michels, focuses on the role of organisations as key parts of the power structure. He took Mann’s research into the evolution of power structures in Western civilisation as a reference and, specifically, his idea that power structures are defined by the intertwining of organisations and their relative importance at any given time in four overlapping and intersecting socio-spatial networks of power (Mann, 1986). For Domhoff, these networks correspond to the ideological, economic, military and political spheres. Unlike Mills, Domhoff attached importance to the ideological factor as a relevant aspect of the generation of networks of power.

Domhoff referred to this model of four intertwined networks as the IEMP model (ideological, economic, military, and political networks). In methodological terms, his research strategy meant that the study of power in societies was able to incorporate both the individual and organisational levels: *“This strategy (the IEMP model) was music to the ears of those who analyse American power structures as networks of people and institutions”* (Domhoff, 1990, p.2). The fundamental sociological premise behind analysis of this type is that these four

networks are the most useful organisational bases for the generation of power (Domhoff, 1990; Mann, 1986).

Rather like Hunter, Domhoff attempted to define and explain the structure of power in American society. In probably his most famous work, "Who rules America?" (Domhoff, 1967), he explored the functioning of local and national decision-making networks as a means of illustrating the power structure in the United States. Like Hunter, Domhoff argued that American power structures are dominated by an elite class which owns and manages large income-producing properties (that is, banks, business corporations): "*Only the American upper class is made up exclusively of the descendants of successful businessmen and corporation lawyers. Whatever their pretensions, few families are 'old' enough or rich enough to forget this overriding fact*" (Domhoff, 1967, p.12). Domhoff also asserted that this form of organisation includes succession mechanisms that enable the elite to maintain its privileged position. This form of domination, subject to continuity over time, is determined by the ongoing existence of the power structure through which it is possible to maintain an order that is functional to the elites.

James Burnham is another relevant scholar that studied political elites under this perspective. Albeit a Trotskyist at the beginning of his career, Burnham moved to the liberal right after actively participating in World War II and later the Cold War. In his best-known work, "The Managerial Revolution" (Burnham, 1945), he argued that a new political class - the managers - was emerging and transcending the capitalist class as the guiding force in productive and distributive processes and in the arena of national and international political decisions. Burnham was writing in the context of an evolutive historical process which he believed had begun with World War I in 1914 and would last almost a century.

This new stage would, according to Burnham, be marked by a transition from a capitalist system to a managerial one, a process qualitatively comparable to the transition from the feudal to the capitalist way of production. Although this latter transition took almost 300 years between the fourteenth and eighteenth centuries (Sweezy & Dobb, 1950), Burnham argued that the new transition would be quicker because of the level of specialisation achieved by labour and economic activity, which had brought with it new forms of organisation of work that, according to Burnham, had a significant effect on organisation of the state and the functioning of the government regime since, in this new scenario, the state would become the main owner of the means of production.



In this context, Burnham argued that a managerial revolution would consolidate the position of managers not only as a new political class, but also as the new ruling elite. Although central planning models have historically not been successful, Burnham was right about the consolidation of managers as an important part of the ruling elites, due to the complexity and scale of production processes in the wake of the Industrial Revolution. Most of Burnham's ideas were adopted by some theorists of the managerial state (Francis, 1984; Gottfried, 1984).

Studies of elites' role and influence in the definition of political regimes and development strategies had a significant impact on research into democratisation processes in Latin America, as will be shown later in section vi. However, in recent times, the approach that has acquired importance for applied research into political elites is the study of their social resources, the political and professional careers of their members and the way in which their mechanisms of social differentiation operate.

#### iv.iii. Political elites and their mechanisms of social differentiation

One of the first authors to establish the notion that elites use specific mechanisms to achieve social differentiation was Dahrendorf (1959). His sociological analytical approach is based on a critique of Parsons's structural functionalism theory and Marx's theory of conflict and development. Dahrendorf put forward a theory of conflict that would account for social differentiation and is the basis of his conception of power elites.

His theory is based on the limitations of structural functionalism and Marxism, both of which he viewed as having weaknesses that prevented them from providing an acceptable perspective on advanced society: *"He claims that structural functionalists neglect realities of social conflict and that Marx defined class too narrowly and in a historically-specific context. Furthermore, that traditional Marxism ignores consensus and integration in modern social structures"* (Tittenbrun, 2013, p.118). Dahrendorf argued that, in Parsons's functional structuralism, there is a limited notion of "social change" due to the theoretical-analytical specification implicit in the conception of structure and system. In other words, Dahrendorf considered that this analytical framework simplifies reality and does not necessarily capture social phenomena, particularly at the level of social conflict.

The notion of social conflict is a key element in the sociology of Dahrendorf. Through it, he attempted to develop a theoretical model capable of explaining the formation of conflict groups

and their efforts to achieve integration into the social structure. The underlying idea behind this argument is that conflicts materialise a relationship of opposition between those who defend the interests established in the social structure and those who wish to change them. Conflict is the motor of history because it is through conflict that the social structure is transformed. For Dahrendorf, the relationship between those who dominate and the dominated presupposes the existence of multiple groups that dispute their interests in society. In this sense, he distanced himself from Marx by arguing that the concept of class needed to be updated because the evolution of capitalism to a new post-capitalist phase had brought with it a diversification of the social structure and interest groups. He nonetheless maintained that a governing class and a governed class exist, but that this was determined by a diversified social structure under which some classes exercise power and others do not, and it is these classes that can operate as blocks.

Another relevant scholar as regards this perspective is Putnam (1976), who made an important empirical contribution to the study of elites. His work analyses society in terms of social trust and the use of social capital. However, in contrast to Bourdieu, Putnam's concept of social capital has three components: moral obligations and norms, social values and social networks. In the case of political elites, Putnam argued that, although they tend to position themselves at the summit of the social structure, their definition and analysis are complex because of the way in which their members use their capital and social networks. He, therefore, proposed three strategies through which to identify the political elite: positional analysis (the positions held by individuals), reputational analysis (based on prestige) and decisional analysis (decision-making processes).

Reputational and decisional analysis are more complex than positional analysis due to difficulties in accessing the information and its analytical interpretation. Reputation is a matter of perceptions that are not necessarily explicit while, in the case of decisional analysis, the disaggregation and monitoring of decision-making processes can be very complex, particularly at the state level, due to their scale and the number of actors involved. Indeed, one of the most important studies that can be considered to apply this strategy, Dahl (1961), only considered the case of one relatively small municipal district (New Haven).

Another important contribution by Putnam to the study of elites was his much later work with Aberbach and Rockman, which used a sample of some 700 government officials and 600 politicians from seven countries (the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Sweden, Italy and the Netherlands) for comparative analysis of their behaviour (objectives, attitudes and ambitions) in the sociocultural environments in which they performed their functions

(Aberbach, Putnam & Rockman, 1981). This study made a significant contribution to understanding the decision-making of individuals in senior positions in a political system. A similar approach was subsequently used to study public policy processes (Domhoff & Dye, 1987; Dye, 2001; Gilens & Page, 2014; Gonzalez, 1998).

This idea of differentiation is fundamental for subsequent research into political elites which focused on the definition of certain social resources, referred to as capital, and analysis of their use as a means of forming select groups and maintaining them over time. In addition to Putnam himself, research by authors such as Bourdieu and Coleman laid the foundations for studying social capital as an analytical category to identify a type of intangible resource (additional to economic resources) with positive effects (acceptance) or negative effects (rejection) on certain forms of social integration in specific groups (Portes, 1998).

#### **v. The study of political elites through their species of capital. Identifying the theoretical contribution of this study**

Elite power can be defined according to either the type or level of control that these select groups have over others. This control is usually exercised in the interests of the elite itself or at least consistently with its preferences and actions (Van Dijk, 1993, p. 43-44). An elite is not the same as the upper class, which is formed by social groups and communities with shared links based on heritage and social ties, whereas a power elite is, in addition, characterised by institutional and organisational arrangements that allow it to acquire, maintain and protect different forms of power and control (Domhoff, 2006).

As C. Wright Mills argued, “*Power has to do with whatever decisions men make about the arrangements under which they live, and about the events which make up the history of their times. Events that are beyond human decision do happen; social arrangements do change without benefit of explicit decision. But in so far as such decisions are made, the problem of who is involved in making them is the basic problem of power...*” (Mills, 1958, p. 29). This definition is closely linked with political elites since they manage and organise government and all the manifestations of political power (Higley, 2008). The power resources of political elites may be multiple and include “*property, income, decision control, knowledge, expertise, position, rank, as well as social and ideological resources such as status, prestige, influence, respect, and similar resources attributed to them by other elites, institutions, groups, or other members of the society*” (Van Dijk, 1993, p. 44).

In modern societies, one of the main stabilisers and facilitators of static social domination is the constant access of elites to the higher and technical education that equips them to take advantage of opportunities for economic development (Navlakha, 1989). As most elites are composed of individuals with a wide range of social resources, there are certain requirements for becoming part of an elite. Social resources include certain forms of social capital and social connections with one or more of the elite's members (Granovetter, 1973) as well as mechanisms of social differentiation that determine the elite's specificity (Bottomore, 2006; Domhoff, 2012; 1990; 1967; Mills, 1956; Stanworth & Giddens, 1974).

The interest of this work lies precisely in its bid to analyse the effect of certain social resources (defined as species of capital) on access to key positions in the legislature and the executive. Although social capital has been studied from numerous perspectives, three authors have made the greatest contribution to the definition and operationalisation of this concept as a category of analysis for studying social phenomena: Pierre Bourdieu, James Coleman and Robert Putnam. This section examines these three approaches as background to the theoretical-empirical contribution of this thesis and its analytical approach.

Bourdieu's sociological theory has had an important influence on empirical studies of governmental elites (Joignant, 2009). His concept of species of capital (Bourdieu & Thompson, 1991; Bourdieu, 1989; 1986; 1984) is related to the different positions that a particular agent may occupy in the setting where agents interact and define their social positions. According to Bourdieu, capital, in its objectified or embodied forms, can be classified into three types or species: economic, cultural and social (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 247).

The different species of capital are resources that form part of the individual's habitus and determine that individual's behaviour in a practical sense, at both the reflexive and non-reflexive levels (Aldridge, 1998; Aguilar, 2017). This is a central part of Bourdieu's theory of action since analysis of the species of capital is an important input for the correct interpretation of the significance of social practices (Bourdieu, 1990). These forms of capital are often used by the actors in order to maintain certain positions of privilege within society. This is also related to the logic of reproduction of power in a society since, for Bourdieu, power is a cultural and symbolically-created phenomenon, subject to a process of constant legitimisation through an interplay of agency and structure. In line with this, the principal assumption of the research presented here is that the species of capital constitute a form of power whose possession has effects, positive or negative, for accessing certain key positions within the political system.

In addition to the work of Bourdieu, there are other approaches that are relevant for the analysis of social capital as applied to the study of political elites. James Coleman developed a relational approach in which social capital is defined by its function and exists within the structure of relations between and among the actors (Coleman, 1988, p.98). In this case, social capital constitutes a strategic resource that gives rise to social action and makes it possible to answer the sociological question of agency, structure or both. Coleman views social capital as a resource that resides in the ties between individuals and is, therefore, not privately held (Coleman, 1990; 1988).

According to this author, social capital is a mechanism that serves to link the capacity of individuals to act and decide independently and freely (agency) with the relatively stable criteria that influence or limit the available choices and opportunities (structure): “*Social capital is not a single entity but a variety of different entities, with two elements in common: they all consist of some aspect of social structures, and then facilitate certain actions of actors -whether persons or corporate actors- within the structure*” (Coleman, 1988, p. 98). For Coleman, the family is the natural place where social capital is produced since it is here that children receive their primary socialisation and the structure of their relations is determined, particularly by the parental relationship (Thapar-Bjorkert & Sanghera, 2010).

Another important contribution was made by Putnam’s work focusing on the analysis of social capital in terms of volunteering, cooperation and civil action in society. He argues that, in communities with a higher level of social capital, collaboration also tends to be greater due to the norms of reciprocity of the social networks to which these individuals belong. These norms, the networks and trust serve as mechanisms that facilitate the coordination of social action and, therefore, favour social prosperity (Putnam, 1993). Like Coleman, Putnam takes the view that social capital resides in the social ties of individuals within a community of relations.

In this context, Putnam analysed how social capital generates collective goods through the formation of power networks (Li, Pickles, & Savage, 2005; Putnam, 1977; 1976). Putnam was one of the first scholars to analyse the relationship among elites and technocracy. Working on lines similar to Hughes (1993), he studied the transformation of elites in the wake of the Industrial Revolution and how technocracy became a significant resource for them. However, Putnam did not go so far as to argue that technocracy permitted the advent of a new elite of experts, who later came to be referred to as technocrats (Xiao, 2003).

Putnam (1977; 1976) also proposed three strategies for defining and analysing elites. The first uses positional analysis, defining elites in terms of the position they occupy according to their institutional affiliation. In the second strategy, this approach is combined with reputational analysis, which relies on informal perceptions about reputation and power, while the third strategy corresponds to decisional analysis and focuses on the decision-making process as seen in specific case studies. Although the research presented here does not use this methodology, it is comparable to some aspects of the positional approach in that its methodological strategy seeks to measure the effect of species of capital on certain positions of power.

In the work of Bourdieu, Coleman and Putnam on the use and significance of social capital, it is possible to observe an important difference in use of this concept as a category of analysis. For Bourdieu, social capital is related to an individual's habitus and its operationalisation depends on its recognition by other individuals. Coleman and Putnam, on the other hand, see social capital as a strategic resource that can be operationalised using networks and power structures that allow individuals to position themselves in a certain way. This approach assumes a strategic rationale associated with the actors' use of this intangible resource.

The different forms of convertibility of the different species of capital are central to Bourdieu's approach. He argues that recognition of species of capital can guarantee the access through which individuals are able to acquire new forms of capital or, in Bourdieu's words, convert one type of capital into another. For example, in the case of the formation of political elites, certain subjects can access these select groups thanks to education, which is strictly a cultural species of capital, but, when recognised by members of the political elite, permits the individual's incorporation into it, thereby converting cultural capital into political capital. This recognition of practical dispositions, expressed through certain species of capital, permits distinction, the transformation of social spaces and the symbolic reproduction of power (Bourdieu, 1990; 1989; 1986).

One of the fundamental criticisms and/or limitations of Bourdieu's theory lies precisely in this idea of the convertibility of species of capital. Some authors argue that this idea of convertibility and/or transformation of species of capital is theoretically diffuse and not very concrete (Tittenbrun, 2018). In addition, some have argued that this Bourdieusian notion of capital convertibility implies a deterministic approach to individuals' social practices as regards the reproduction of forms of capital (Yang, 2014).

Coleman's approach, on the other hand, has limitations in the opposite direction to those of Bourdieu's approach since his definition of social capital reflects a logic based on rational use of this resource with regard to an established structure of relations in which individuals position themselves according to their social resources. This is also reflected in the interpretative sense that Putnam observes as regards individuals' possibility of undertaking actions of a cooperative nature. Here, the problem or limitation lies in the notion of networks since the uses of social capital cannot necessarily be explained using the notion of reciprocity or in terms of a rationale of joint action by the subjects (Ponthieux, 2004).

In sociological terms, each of these approaches to social capital has limitations and advantages for the study of political elites. Bourdieu's notion of species of capital is useful for observing and analysing individuals' practices and the recognition of these forms of capital. This approach is also useful for the study of complex phenomena where there are not necessarily power structures or networks or they are difficult to detect. In this context, an important weakness of the approach, which this thesis attempts to address, has to do with empirical measurement (beyond conceptual examination) of the relationship between species of capital and access to important positions in the political field.

The approach of Coleman and Putnam, in turn, is useful for analysing elites according to how they define and operationalise their power networks. This implies a complex methodological exercise since knowledge of the meanings associated with the relationships established by individuals is required in order to reach this level of definition. In this context, this approach is useful for studying organisations whose relationships are previously defined (power structure).

This thesis, therefore, takes the work of Bourdieu as a reference in attempting to explain how the different species of capital are instrumental in accessing important positions in the political field. Rather than merely considering power networks, it focuses on an empirical application to study the effect of multiple species of capital on the formation of the Chilean political elite, comparing their effect on access to key positions in the legislature and the executive.

The use of species of capital (social, cultural and economic) in the formation of political elites assumes three possible situations (Boix & Posner, 1998). The first corresponds to the spontaneous emergence of stable cooperation between individuals, constituting the most basic manifestation of use of this resource. Individuals recognise each other and operate based on this common social resource. The second situation occurs when there is collaborative interaction in order to obtain public and/or private goods. In this case, individuals develop

mechanisms of rational cooperative action in order to obtain benefits at the individual and/or collective levels or, in other words, to maximise well-being through cooperative action. Finally, the third situation implies a more complex logic of action since it occurs when the ability and/or capacity to exert influence over other individuals are used in interactions of this type. In other words, these are situations in which people are able to create and bring into play networks of cooperation, whether with strong or weak ties (Granovetter, 1973) in pursuit of both individual and aggregate interests.

The assumption behind this research is based on the first case. It is assumed that recognition of certain species of capital guarantees access to important positions in the political field when these forms of capital are shared by individuals who have the same social position and, therefore, affinities in a practical sense (for example, activities, education, lifestyles, etc.). This idea enshrines a fundamental analytical principle as regards the creation and reproduction of political elites.

This is particularly relevant in the case of the Chilean political elite. Chile is a very socially unequal country. Although the Chilean model has been one of the most successful in Latin America in terms of economic growth and the reduction of poverty, income inequality has remained high (UNDP, 2010). Chile is, indeed, one of the OECD member states with the highest levels of economic inequality. Social inequality implies a dissimilar use of many forms of capital, including social capital, a resource that is expressed in socio-collaborative interactions and the use individuals make of the resources involved in interactions of this type, basically in the form of affections, trust, formal and informal norms and the creation of social networks of influence. These resources determine not only individuals' behaviour, but also the objectives they pursue when they take individual and collective decisions (Coleman, 1973).

Although this research is based on data from a census of the political elite, its objective is to observe whether there are species of capital that are significant for access to key positions in the political field. This implies recognition of certain forms of capital that allow the political elite to reproduce itself over time. Comparative empirical measurement of resources of this type represents a theoretical and empirical challenge for studying how the political elite has endured over time, based on the evidence of the members of the executive and the legislature between 1990 and 2010. This is the fundamental assumption which determined the definition of the hypotheses and models of empirical analysis used in this research.



## **vi. Study of political elites in Latin America and Chile**

The study of the social origins, education and career patterns of political elites is part of the classical tradition of political sociology (Burch & Moran, 1985, p. 1). However, beyond the significant influence that classical theories have had on the definition and development of research into political elites, the literature about them in Latin America has generally focused on socio-historical and qualitative analysis of their evolution since the region's processes of colonisation and independence. However, over the past decade, there has been a significant increase in quantitative and mixed research in line with the evolution and potential of these techniques for studying social phenomena (González-Bustamante, 2013).

In Latin America, one of the first scholars to study the performance of elites and their political influence was Lipset (Lipset & Solari, 1967; Lipset, 1959). Lipset's research focused on the role of the elites in democratisation processes and economic development. However, his work with Solari, for which he is perhaps best known, includes numerous studies of the region's elites from different perspectives: their role as regards the performance of the economy and business, with respect to the sociopolitical, cultural, religious and military spheres and with respect to their secondary and higher education (Lipset & Solari, 1967). This work is a key reference point for subsequent lines of research into Latin American elites. Currently, the literature on political elites in Latin America in general can be classified into three approaches while, in the case of Chile, it is also possible to identify a fourth approach (Table 2).

Table 2. Research on political elites in Latin America and Chile

Latin America	Chile
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Role in democratisation processes and economic development (O'Donnell &amp; Schmitter, 2013; Mainwaring et al., 2001; Higley &amp; Gunther, 1992; Higley &amp; Burton, 1989)</li> <li>• Political perceptions (Alcántara &amp; Rivas, 2007)</li> <li>• Family, educational and professional background (Camp, 2013, 2006, 2002, 1982)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Role in democratisation processes and economic development (Siavelis, 2009; Menéndez-Carrión, Joignant, &amp; Garretón, 1999; Godoy, 1999; Garretón, 1999; Moulian, <i>Limitaciones de la transición a la democracia en Chile</i>, 1994)</li> <li>• Focus on biographies, socialisation, political competition and electoral growth (Espinoza, 2010; Filippi, 2006; Cordero, 2006; Barozet &amp; Aubry, 2005; Joignant &amp; Navia, 2003; Gazmuri, 2000; de Ramón, 1999)</li> <li>• Focus on technocracy and reproduction of power (Delamaza, 2013; Joignant, 2011; Dávila, 2011; Siavelis, 2009; Silva, 2009, 2007, 1994, 1991; Montecinos, 1998; Markoff &amp; Montecinos, 1993)</li> <li>• Recent studies on the origin, evolution and/or professional career of members of the elite (González-Bustamante &amp; Garrido-Vergara, 2018; González-Bustamante &amp; Olivares, 2016; Joignant, 2014; González-Bustamante, 2013)</li> </ul>

Source: Compiled by author.

The first of the approaches seen in work on Latin America focuses on the role played by elites in post-authoritarian democratisation processes and economic development. As from the beginning of the 1990s, a number of scholars studied the links between, on the one hand, elites and, on the other, political regimes and political stability. This approach has been useful for studying political transitions, particularly in East European and Latin American countries. According to this theoretical perspective, the basic condition for a solid and stable regime is the “unity” of the different elites, which must be expressed mandatorily at the institutional level. In other words, for democratic consolidation, it is necessary to achieve the “consensual unity” of the elites, understood as agreement of all the country’s politically important elites on the meaning of existing democratic institutions and respect for the democratic “rules of the game”,

accompanied by increased “structural integration” among those elites (Higley & Gunther, 1992; Vanden & Prevost, 2002).

In this approach, the concept of national elite is used to explain variations in the political stability of democratic regimes and has been critical in the discussion about democratic consolidation in Southern Cone countries (Higley & Burton, 1989; Higley & Gunther, 1992; Higley, Pakulski, Pohu, & Dobry, 2000; Mainwaring, Brinks, & Pérez-Liñán, 2001; O’Donnell & Schmitter, 2013). These studies have produced significant evidence for viewing political elites as a critical aspect of the analysis of democratic transitions and democratic breakdowns as temporary fluctuations in the forms that unstable regimes take. In this approach, the consensual unity of elites is considered a *sine qua non* if democracies are to endure (Cheibub, Pzeworski, Limongi Neto, & Alvarez, 1996; Mainwaring, Brinks, & Pérez-Liñán, 2001; O’Donnell & Schmitter, 2013) and a critical variable for explaining both political transitions and democratic consolidation (Higley & Burton, 1989).

Over time, this line of research has resulted in numerous applied and comparative studies of the role of elites in the democratisation and economic development of different countries. Much of this work has focused on the strategies implemented by elites in the restoration of democracy, the country’s economic stabilisation and the definition and adoption of development strategies. Each process had its own specific characteristics, reflecting the decisions of a country’s elites in line with its sociopolitical situation (Higley & Burton, 1989).

This line of work has also been complemented by studies analysing the transfer and acquisition of expertise within the elites, based on the influence exercised over Latin American countries by the world’s major powers. In work along these lines, Dézalay and Garth concluded that the export of expertise and ideals from the United States to Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico has played a crucial role in transforming their states and economies since World War II (Dézalay & Garth, 2002). In the political transitions of the 1980s, for example, the Washington Consensus had a significant impact on the economic development strategies adopted by most Latin American countries. This line of work is also related to research that has analysed the ascendancy of technocracy and the imposition of neoliberal economic policies in Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s (Centeno & Silva, 1998). This work has, in addition, examined the influence of certain professions (notably economists) on the expansion of the technocratic phenomenon and the development of public policies in the region (Markoff & Montecinos, 1993).

The second approach focuses on elites' political perceptions and behaviour as regards political cleavages (Alcántara & Rivas, 2007). This research has looked at why these cleavages exist and analysed recent transformations of Latin American party systems, highlighting new critical junctures "*that are likely to have a lasting impact on party competition and on individual political behavior*" (Bornschiefer, 2009, p.1). Generally, the term cleavage is used to refer to divisions that occur because of the structure of the social system. These divisions lead to conflicts which, in turn, produce cleavages that can affect politics in both its practical and operational dimensions (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967). Numerous empirical studies have shown how the configuration of party systems is related to a society's structure of cleavages (Dix, 1989; Mainwaring & Scully, 1995; Moreno, 1999; Roberts & Wibbels, 1999; Torcal & Mainwaring, 2002). More sociological studies have also sought to explore the ideological preferences of cleavages with respect to matters of political interest (Alcántara & Rivas, 2007, p. 350).

Finally, the third approach analyses Latin American elites in terms of their family, educational and professional background. It is characterised by its use of qualitative and quantitative methodologies and ranges from socio-historical studies of the elites and their performance to empirical measurement of the effects of certain variables related to family, education and professional history on access to and permanence in positions of power (González-Bustamante, 2016).

The most important contributions of the socio-historical approach include the work of Camp on Mexico. In particular, his work on the biographies of Mexican politicians (Camp, 2013; 1982) provides an important insight into their personal histories as well as their political and professional careers. He also went on to analyse Mexican mandarins in terms of their mentoring processes and networking (Camp, 2002). Camp's work clearly demonstrates the existence of select private preparatory schools and graduate educational centres and universities for influential members of the Mexican elite. It also provides evidence that the social composition of students at private universities differs greatly from that at state universities.

Years later, Camp empirically analysed leadership preparation and attributes as well as mechanisms for influencing succession in Mexico's elites (Camp, 2006). Other studies, using a similar methodology, have also examined the biographies of Latin American politicians. In the Chilean case, de Ramón has studied the biographies of Chilean politicians from 1876 to 1973 (de Ramón, 1999a; 1999b; 1999c; 1999d).

## **vii. Political elite research in Chile**

As shown in Table 3, it is possible to identify four lines of research on Chile's political elites. One of these focuses on the role they played in democratisation and economic development; another on their biographies, socialisation processes and electoral competition; another on technocracy and the role of the members of the elite in the country's development; and the fourth, and most recent, on their origin, evolution and/or professional career.

The first approach looks at the role elites have played in processes of transition, democratic consolidation and economic development. Numerous studies have examined negotiation strategies and the impact of the new institutional order created by the political elite (Garretón, 1999; Godoy, 1999; Menéndez-Carrión, Joignant, & Garretón, 1999; Siavelis, 2009). However, as regards the elites' role in these processes, it is the work of Moulian (1994) that stands out. It shows how the logic of agreements within the elite opened the way to an institutional order that gave continuity to a series of reforms and transformations introduced by the Pinochet dictatorship. Similarly, Garretón (1995) analysed the way in which the political elites devised strategies for reaching consensus on the maintenance of the authoritarian enclaves that affected the process of re-establishing democracy. This line of work helped to understand not only Chile's transition to democracy but also the prevalence of asymmetries of power in its post-dictatorship social order.

The work of Ffrench-Davis, although not focusing on the elites as such, is also among the most important for understanding Chile's economic development strategy after the breakdown of democracy in 1973 and through to 2017 (Ffrench-Davis, 2017). This is the continuation of earlier work by the same author analysing the relationship between growth and equity with reference to Chile's economic development strategy (Ffrench-Davis, 1999). More recently, Solimano (2012) has studied Chile's political economy since the political transition, examining the attempt to build a market society in a highly inegalitarian society. His research provides historical background to the Chilean economy and society and discusses the cultural effects of the imposition of free markets, the country's macroeconomic and growth performance in the 1990s and 2000s and the social record of the privatisation of education, health and social security. It shows how these new policies fostered a growing concentration of economic power in small groups of elites after the end of the Pinochet regime.

A second line of research has focused on biographies, socialisation, political competition and electoral growth (Barozet & Aubry, 2005; Cordero, 2006; de Ramón, 1999; Espinoza, 2010; Filippi, 2006; Gazmuri, 2000; Joignant & Navia, 2003). Barozet and Aubry (2005) took the

case of the National Renewal (RN) party as an example of how a party's institutional structure affects its electoral performance. Among other important findings, they concluded that, despite its low level of institutionalisation, the RN has shown great capacity to survive in the post-dictatorship democratic system, withstanding the efforts of the Independent Democratic Union (UDI), the other main right-wing party, to establish hegemony.

Other important work within this line of research has examined the profiles of party members as compared to their electoral performance. Joignant and Navia (2003), for example, analysed the UDI from three standpoints: socialisation, political skills and electoral growth. Among other results, they concluded that, as a party, the UDI is rooted in a strong conservative structure of values inspired by the authoritarianism of Pinochet and related to the Catholic Church (principally Opus Dei). They also showed that it owes its political success not only to its territorial strategies but also to its logic of growth, electoral consolidation and the homogeneity of its representatives in Congress where this elite's reproduction strategies play a vital role.

This line of research can also be said to include work of a socio-historical nature that focuses primarily on the personal biographies of the members of the political elite. This research stands out for the detail of the information it provides about the individuals studied. De Ramón (1999, 1999b, 1999c and 1999d) analysed the biographies of the members of the executive, legislative and judicial branches in relation to the evolution of the Chilean state between 1876 and 1973. Similarly, Filippi (2006) analysed the biographies of the members of the country's political elite, including a broad range of positions in these three branches as well as comptrollers general, governors of the Central Bank, Army commanders, heads of the National Plainclothes Police Service, mayors and former presidents during the period between the second government of Arturo Alessandri Palma (1932-1938) and that of Ricardo Lagos Escobar (2000-2006).

In addition, Gazmuri (2001) identified certain patterns that are essential in defining the origin and evolution of the Chilean elites between 1930 and 1999. His research examined their educational and professional careers, rather than family resources, and found that, throughout most of Chile's republican history, the elites and, in particular, what Gazmuri terms "*the elites with a vocation for public service*" (Gazmuri 2001: 105) were a product of the University of Chile. This, however, changed as from the 1930s when other institutions such as the Catholic University began to share this role.

Some work on the evolution of "*political cleavages*" in Chile can also be included in this line of research. Torcal and Mainwaring (2003) examined social cleavages and the impact of

political legacies on Chile's party system between 1973 and 1995. In contrast to society-oriented approaches to the formation of party systems (Heath, Jowell & Curtice, 1985), they assert that the appearance of cleavages in a party system depends on political agency, which can even create or recreate social identities and social conflicts. They used the Chilean case to illustrate this point because the structure of its party system is deeply influenced by distinctive political legacies from the authoritarian period. Other similar studies also provide evidence of the existence of cleavages in Chile and other Latin American countries (Roberts & Wibbels, 1999; Scully, 1992).

In the case of the impact of social resources on the formation of party elites, Cordero (2006) analysed in detail the social background of the members of the Chamber of Deputies between 1961 and 2010. He found, firstly, that most incumbent members of Congress had evolved satisfactorily in terms of their educational careers and, secondly, that common patterns of socialisation seen during these careers, together with the prolongation of their period as incumbents, permitted the consolidation of a parliamentary elite. Taking an approach different to that of Cordero, Espinoza (2010) examined the underlying dynamics of the social base of the power of the Chilean political elite, looking at the networks of members of Congress between 1990 and 2005. He argues that a similar social background, combined with common social spaces of interaction, reduced ideological differences within the elite and had an impact on the stability of the political system.

A third line of research has focused on technocracy and the reproduction of power (Dávila, 2011; Delamaza, 2013; Joignant, 2011; Siavelis, 2009; Silva, 2008, 2006 and 1991). Delamaza (2013 and 2011) argued that, in recent decades, the social reproduction of the political elite has been determined by both democratic elitism and techno-politics. While the first of these concepts refers to agreements, pacts and elite decisions that restrict the access of non-members of the elite to positions of power (Avritzer, 2002), the latter refers to how technocracy has become an important resource for accessing the political elite and remaining there. As a concept, technocracy has to do with "*the political situation in which effective power belongs to technologists termed technocrats*" (Meynaud quoted by Silva, 2009, p.4). The study of technocracy has proved important for understanding the impact that the positivist idea has had on government behaviour (Centeno, 1993; Centeno & Silva, 1998; Silva, 2009). Although the role of technocrats in Chilean politics has been studied extensively (Dávila, 2011; 2010; Markoff & Montecinos, 1993; Montecinos, 1998), it is the work of Silva (Silva, 2009; 2007; 1994; 1991) that has played the key role in this line of research.

His book, “In the Name of Reason: Technocrats and Politics in Chile” (Silva, 2009), which examines the impact of technocracy on successive governments in the twentieth century, starting with the first government of President Carlos Ibáñez (1927-31), is the most important study on this subject. Silva shows that, contrary to the common belief based on the prominent role of the so-called Chicago Boys during the Pinochet dictatorship, technocrats have existed throughout Chile’s recent history, including its democratic regimes. He notes, for example, that President Jorge Alessandri Rodríguez (1958-64) used the slogan “government of managers” to signify administration of the state by highly qualified people. He installed a technical team of lawyers, engineers and doctors and the principal aim of his government was to bring about a transformation of the economy, reducing the role of the state and giving the private sector greater autonomy.

Silva also shows how the influence of the positivist paradigm began to expand in Chilean intellectual circles at the end of the nineteenth century, even before the start of industrialisation. As from the first Ibáñez government onwards, technocrats held important positions in the design and implementation of development strategies and the management of public affairs. In addition, Silva shows that, during this period, the technocratic ideology was compatible with the interests and demands of the middle classes, particularly those espousing the values of personal merit and educational achievement as against privilege rooted in social background. Another factor highlighted by Silva is the positive role played by experts in generating agreements and consensus and setting reasonable limits to political discussion, which was certainly beneficial for the functioning of democracy in Chile, both before and after the military dictatorship.

Some recent studies have gone on to define the concept of *technopols* as individuals who operate transversally across the political system with two types of resources: skills certified by leading international universities and political capital in the form of ties, recognition and capacity to operate within the system (Domínguez, 1997; Joignant, 2011). While technocracy as a concept refers to those members of the political elite with high-level academic qualifications in economics and technical expertise, the concept of *technopols* corresponds to certain members of the elite who, as well as academic qualifications and technical expertise, have political connections: “*Successful technopols have made economics ‘political’ and, in so doing, have created their own power and have enabled their political allies to govern more effectively*” (Domínguez, 1997, p.4).



In the Chilean case, Silva argues that, in addition to the decisive role played by both technocrats and technopols during the political transition and the subsequent democratisation process, the technocratic elite critical of the dictatorship played a key role in opposition to it through, for example, think-tanks and foundations. This gave it, and has continued to give it, a measure of influence over public life (Silva, 1991).

Dézalay and Garth (2002) analysed the underlying patterns of networks of power, profiles and the reconstruction of ties within Latin American elites during political transitions and subsequent democratisation processes. They drew attention to the important influence of hegemonic countries as seen, for example, in that exercised by the University of Chicago in the training of the government elites of Chile and Argentina. This evidence is also backed by the thesis of Silva about the important role played by a growing technocratic elite in Chile as from the beginning of the twentieth century.

Finally, a fourth and more recent approach uses applied methodologies to analyse the profile, origin and evolution of the careers of members of the elite within the political system (González-Bustamante, 2013; González-Bustamante & Garrido-Vergara, 2018; González-Bustamante & Olivares, 2016; Joignant, 2014; 2011). Unlike earlier approaches, this line of research is characterised by its use of applied methodological designs to measure quantitative empirical relations between variables related to the careers of members of the Chilean political elite. This work seeks to define careers and profiles in terms of the types of capital possessed by the agents, considering either their static dimension - that is, the individual's personal qualities and psychological characteristics - or the dynamic dimension related to continuous training and the agent's own career path or *cursus honorum* (Alcántara, 2013; González-Bustamante & Garrido-Vergara, 2018, p.32). This thesis forms part of this line of research.

González-Bustamante (2013) analysed the factors affecting access to the government elite in Chile between 1990 and 2010 and the ability to remain part of it. In one of the most important conclusions of his work, he notes that, although a strong technical profile can facilitate access to senior positions in the elite, political capital and prior participation in a think-tank can be decisive in ensuring permanence there. In addition, he shows that, while academic and professional credentials can be important for appointment to senior positions, it is political capital, expressed as access to leading positions in the parties of the coalitions, which permits permanence within the government elite. Something similar is also seen in the case of family capital.

Recent work on elites and, particularly, that based on this approach has focused on the definition of profiles and the analysis of the careers of members of governmental and ministerial elites (González-Bustamante, 2013; González-Bustamante & Olivares, 2016) as well as on family relations and capital (González-Bustamante, 2014; Joignant, 2014). González-Bustamante and Garrido-Vergara (2018) analysed the prior and subsequent careers of Chilean government ministers between 1990 and 2010, identifying not only common patterns of circulation but also a group with common social circles, career paths and specific types of capital.

### **viii. Political elites, social capital and species of capital in Chile**

Political elites are built and reproduce themselves through the strategic use of social resources. Among these resources, social capital is a key variable for explaining the appearance and evolution of sociopolitical actors. There is extensive literature on the concept of social capital but, in the case of Chile, this research focuses on the Bourdieusian concept of species of capital and also considers the research of Boix and Posner (1998 and 1996), which identifies three possible explanations for the origin and use of social capital.

The first and most commonly cited explanation arises from experimental research showing how stable cooperation can emerge among actors if they value future payoffs and expect to interact again over time. A second explanation distinguishes between collaborative interactions to produce public or private goods while the third emphasises the ability of a third-party enforcer to compel mistrustful people, *“even through the threat of force or the creation of cooperation-facilitating institutions, to overcome the collective action dilemmas that beset them”* (Boix & Posner, 1998, p.687). However, even when social capital has a concrete expression in the functionality represented by its use, different types of capital exist depending on the type of relationship and the resources that individuals invest.

In this thesis, the Bourdieusian concepts of species of capital and habitus are applied sociologically to the field of elites. It thesis focuses on the political field and attempts to define different social resources and, therefore, types of agent, based on the theoretical species of capital and hypothetical types of political agent proposed by Joignant (2012) for the Chilean case (Table 3).

Table 3. Theoretical species of capital and hypothetical types of political agent

Species of capital		Type of agent
<b>Familial</b>		Heir
<b>University</b>		Student leader
<b>Political</b>	Subspecies: militant	Party man
<b>Political</b>	Subspecies: oligarchical	Professional politician
<b>Technocrat</b>	Subspecies: pragmatic	Pragmatic technocrat
<b>Technocrat</b>	Subspecies: political	Political technocrat
<b>Technopolitical</b>		Technopol
<b>Notoriety</b>		Celebrity
<b>Charismatic</b>		Charismatic leader

Source: Joignant, 2012, p.610.

However, these categories are simply a reference framework since the research objective is to determine which of these categories effectively operate as differentiators within the Chilean political elite. In other words, the aim is to examine the effect of species of capital on the access of certain individuals to strategic positions in the political field, comparing the legislative (deputies) and executive (ministers) branches. Despite the extensive literature on the concepts of social, cultural and economic capital, there is a lack of comparative empirical research into the effects that these three forms of capital can have on both the formation of elites and their functioning, which is precisely the focus of this research.

Additionally, this study considers Cordero's (2006) descriptive analysis of the Chilean parliamentary elite, which shows that education, professional career and political and socioeconomic background play a decisive role in its members' socialisation and social interaction, and attempts to test this conclusion using inferential models for the Chilean political elite. To sum up, using datasets for members of the Chilean political elite in 1990-2010, this thesis examines the effect of different forms of capital (cultural, social and political) on the access of certain individuals to strategic positions in the political field, comparing the legislative and executive branches as represented by deputies and ministers. The empirical analysis includes logit models for three periods: 1990-2010, 1990-2000 and 2000-2010.

It focuses on the political elite in the 20 years between 1990, when military dictator Augusto Pinochet handed over the presidency to Patricio Aylwin, his democratically elected successor, and the end of President Michelle Bachelet's first government in 2010. At least three points are

germane to this analysis: (1) understanding the nature of the party elites during the political transition; (2) describing and explaining the main aspects of the party elites' background and social resources, including their family networks (independent variables); and (3) exploring the effect of those variables on individuals' chances of achieving strategic positions in the political field, comparing the legislative and executive branches as represented by deputies and ministers (dependent variable).

## **ix. Concluding remarks**

This chapter has reviewed studies of political elites focusing on the importance of the social distinction theory and the class-domination theory as a theoretical background for understanding elites, political elites and social change. Class-domination theory is an important landmark in political sociology. Domhoff provides a theoretical background and method based on the idea that domination by the few does not mean complete control, but rather the ability to set the terms under which other groups and classes must operate. This principle has permitted analysis of the elite's performance through the policy network, which contributes to understanding the influence of political dynamics on social change.

Elite research is not as developed as other areas of political sociology. Social distinction and power structure theories are essential for identifying which groups are elite and which are not. When the composition of the power elite is clearly stated, it is possible to show how social relations are defined considering the interest of the upper class and the corporate community. Finally, as the very phrase "power structure" suggests, it is extremely difficult to change power arrangements, even in those countries where citizens can vote and there is a high level of freedom of expression.

The theoretical framework means that it is possible to combine the power structure approach with analysis of elites. However, one of the limitations of these theoretical currents has to do with understanding how certain social resources operate or function in forming and maintaining these unitary groups. This is crucial in order to define and categorise elites' mechanisms of differentiation and social closure. In this context, the concept of social capital is an essential resource for analysing political elites.

Social capital is an abstract resource that is expressed in the creation of individual bonds or recognitions which favour certain reciprocal social actions or behaviour. This is where the fundamental difference is found between the theories of Coleman and Putnam and that of

Bourdieu. While the former associate the use of this resource with the formation of cooperative reciprocal social networks, Bourdieu defines it as a species of capital (in addition to the economic and cultural species) that requires its recognition by other individuals for its conversion into a new type of capital. For example, if education at certain schools is valued and recognised as a means of access to the political elite, then those individuals who possess this species of cultural capital can turn it into political capital if they enter the political elite.

In other words, in the case of Bourdieu, recognition of the species of capital (expressed through practical dispositions characteristic of the habitus of each individual) is conducive to certain actions or behaviour of a social nature that favour certain types of social relations. However, there has as yet been no empirical evidence to prove this theory at the level of political elites. In this framework, the research presented here seeks to analyse species of capital as strategic resources which the members of the political elite can use to access certain positions of power within the political system.

Beyond the strengths and weaknesses of the approaches of Bourdieu, Coleman and Putnam, this research takes as its reference the study of the effects that species of capital have on the formation and reproduction of the Chilean political elite. Its aim is to compare the different species of capital (independent variables) as regards access to positions in the legislature and the executive as represented by deputies and ministers (dependent variables), considering three periods: 1990-2010, 1990-2000 and 2000-2010.

## **CHAPTER II. POLITICAL ELITES AND SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA**

### **i. Introduction**

The recent political and economic transformations seen in Latin America are fundamental for understanding the evolution of political elites in the region and in Chile. In the 1980s, most of the region's countries experienced reformist military dictatorships that sought to implement sociopolitical transformations and development models based on reducing state intervention in the economic system. Chile was no exception. After the crisis that brought down the government of Salvador Allende in 1973, the military regime of Augusto Pinochet implemented a series of political and neoliberal transformations that modified the role of the state in the economy and, after the return to democracy in the late 1980s, the transition agreed upon by the political elites favoured the maintenance of these reforms.

This chapter deals with Latin America's recent political and economic development as the background to the evolution of political elites in the region and, particularly, Chile. It examines indicators of democratic development and the region's recent history, taking as a reference the cases of Brazil and Argentina. Another important aspect discussed in this chapter is the relationship between the executive and the legislature in Latin American countries since it is an important indicator of the quality of the region's democracies.

Latin America is a region that has been shaped by the existence of authoritarian regimes in its recent history. Among other consequences, this has meant incentives for maintaining inequities in the distribution of political power. This has also been reflected at the economic level and in different spheres of social life. Latin America is particularly interesting because of the institutional instability seen in most of its countries as from the 1960s, when the first dictatorial regimes were established, through to the 1990s when democracy had mostly been restored.

One notable feature of the region is that its elites have endured over time. As some studies have shown, its elites' development models have been based on forms of circulation and continuity that have prevailed over time, thanks to their mechanisms of differentiation and social closure, as well as their forms of selective integration, albeit with variations in magnitude between countries (Rovira, 2018). This sociopolitical phenomenon occurs against the background of the numerous forms of inequality that have existed in Latin America since the period of Spanish and Portuguese colonisation.

Certainly, the development of political elites depends on the political regime and, more specifically, the development of democracy. This chapter, therefore, provides a descriptive analysis of the historical evolution of Latin American democracies, taking into account the Polity Score developed by the Center for Systemic Peace. This is one of the most important indices for measuring the development of democracies globally and uses a spectrum of governing authority represented by a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy).

Latin America is a region accustomed to numerous forms of inequality. Most Latin American societies are characterised by their high levels of social stratification and poverty. In this context, the region's political elites have historically developed in a centralised and, in some cases, transnational form and those families with economic and political power have exercised great influence (Birle, Hofmeister, Maihold, & Potthast, 2007). In order to put Chile in the context of the region, this section presents a selection of indicators comparing the political regimes of Chile, Brazil, Argentina and the rest of Latin America. The indicators are about democratisation index and data on the legislative power and success of the executive branch. Information about the economic and social changes experienced by the region is also included.

Latin America is particularly interesting because of the institutional instability seen in most countries in the nineteenth century as the result of the colonisation period and then again as from the 1960s, when the first dictatorial regimes were established in the context of the Cold War and the threat of communism, through to the 1990s when democracy was mostly restored. In the Chilean case, it is very important to establish the sociopolitical and economic context that has favoured elitism and the consolidation of numerous forms of inequality because these two phenomena have shaped the recent political evolution of most Latin American countries.

## **ii. Political elites and dictatorial regimes**

A number of dictatorships were established in Latin America during the second half of the twentieth century. Most of the region's dominant elites promoted and/or supported coups and the subsequent installation of different types of dictatorial regimes. Although most were anti-Communist, there were exceptions such as Cuba where Fidel Castro took power after overthrowing Fulgencio Batista through armed revolution. Because the Batista government was considered a military dictatorship, Castro's coup was initially viewed as a revolution and was based on Communist ideology.

Most of Latin America's dictatorial regimes were headed by a military junta. In the case of Chile, the junta that took power after the 1973 military coup against President Salvador Allende comprised the heads of the Army (Augusto Pinochet), the Air Force (Gustavo Leigh Guzmán), the Navy (José Toribio Merino) and the Police Service (César Mendoza Durán). It was led by Pinochet until 1981 when he became President of the Republic, a position he held until the junta was dissolved in 1990.

Pinochet gradually consolidated power around his figure and, despite the restoration of democracy in 1990, held a life Senate seat until 2005 when this position was eliminated. The Chilean case can be compared to the dictatorship of General Hugo Banzer in Bolivia whose first government (1971-1978) followed the coup which overthrew Juan José Torres, a left-wing military president.

Similarly, the 1976-1983 military government in Argentina, with its so-called "Process of National Reorganisation" overthrew the government of President María Estela Martínez de Perón. In this period, Argentina was governed by military juntas formed by the heads of the Army, Navy and other branches of the armed forces, but it differed from Chile in that the president of the junta, who served as head of state, rotated. In all, there were four juntas between the coup in 1976, led by General Jorge Rafael Videla, and the end of the dictatorship (1976-1980, 1980-1981, 1981-1982 and 1982-1983). A similar system also existed in Uruguay between 1973 and 1985, although there the coup was led by a politician, Juan María Bordaberry.

Brazil's dictatorship also involved changes of leadership. It began in 1964 with the coup against the government of President João Goulart and lasted until 1985 under leaders who included Marshall Humberto Castelo and Marshall Artur Da Costa, whom Congress subsequently elected as President in 1966. The restoration of democracy was accompanied by a number of periods of political instability.


There was also a dictatorship in Venezuela in the second half of the twentieth century. It was led by General Marco Pérez Jiménez, who governed the country from 1953 to 1958 and was overthrown in a coup by other discontented sectors of the armed forces, led by Wolfgang Larrazábal. Democracy was restored in 1959 when President Rómulo Betancourt was elected. In other cases, dictatorial regimes lasted for longer. In Paraguay, for example, General Alfredo Stroessner held power for 35 years from 1954 to 1989. Similarly, Rafael Trujillo governed the Dominican Republic from 1930 until his assassination in 1961, while another military dictator,



Anastasio Somoza García, governed Nicaragua between 1936 and 1956, establishing a family dynasty that remained in power until 1979 when President Francisco Urcuyo Maliaños was appointed, before being rapidly replaced by a Junta of National Reconstruction.

In general, these dictatorial regimes arose in response to specific situations characterised by imbalances of power between the political parties, the interests of specific groups and/or the interventionism of other countries in the context of the Cold War. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 was decisive in the consolidation of the democratic transitions of most of the region's countries. It was only in Cuba that Fidel Castro remained in power until 2008 when he was replaced by his brother Raúl.


Figure 3. Democratisation index: Latin America, 1800-2017



Source: Compiled by author with data from Polity IV Project, 2017. **Note:** The "Polity Score" captures this regime authority spectrum on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). The Polity scores can also be converted into regime categories in a suggested three-part categorization of "autocracies" (-10 to -6), "anocracies" (-5 to +5 and three special values: -66, -77 and -88), and "democracies" (+6 to +10).

Figure 3 also shows that, as from the region's colonisation and throughout the nineteenth century, Latin America's average for democratic development was negative. This reflects the prevalence of manorial institutions and high levels of political inequality, maintained by means of censitary democracies in which only those meeting certain requirements could vote. Social inequality, the prevalence of poverty and illiteracy and the legacy of Spanish authoritarianism were key features of this period. It was only as from the 1950s that democracy as such began to be established and it then weakened again significantly in the 1960s and 1970s as a result of a process of militarisation and the establishment of dictatorships in most of the region's countries (Victoriano, 2010).

Figure 4. Democratisation index: Chile, 1800-2017



Source: Compiled by author with data from Polity IV Project, 2017. **Note:** The "Polity Score" captures this regime authority spectrum on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy).

In the Chilean case, which is the object of analysis of this thesis, authoritarian tendencies are apparent as from the mid-twentieth century. However, Figure 4 shows that, until 1973, there was a democratic regime that was then interrupted by the 1973-1990 Pinochet dictatorship.

There have been two dictatorships in Chile: that of Carlos Ibáñez del Campo (1927-1931) and that of Augusto Pinochet Ugarte (1973-1990). The latter, which was established after the overthrow of the Popular Unity government of President Salvador Allende, has some particular characteristics in that Pinochet remained in power for 17 years, after validating his regime in a plebiscite in 1980 that was highly questioned by the opposition. This plebiscite was also used to approve a new political constitution as a means of giving the military government some institutional legitimacy.

The absence of democracy persisted until 1988 when, in another plebiscite, Pinochet was defeated, opening the way to the democratic transition that began with congressional and presidential elections in 1989. As a result, the quality of democracy in Chile improved significantly that year - due to the reestablishment of democratic elections and Congress<sup>5</sup> - and continued to improve in subsequent years under the *Concertación* coalition.


Chile's political transition was shaped by negotiations among the political elites, leading to a pact that gave the transition process stability and meant the ongoing existence of the military regime's authoritarian enclaves (Godoy, 1999; Siavelis, 2009b). It also meant that post-Pinochet renewal of the political elites was quite limited. Most of the more powerful parties that existed before the coup continued to hold central positions of power in a phenomenon referred to as partyarchy (Siavelis, 2009). This is analysed in greater detail in Chapter V where the post-transition electoral performance of Chilean political parties is discussed.

In order to compare in greater detail the context in which Chile's political regime evolved, Brazil and Argentina are taken as a reference, due to their importance in the region. This constitutes only a referential comparison between countries in a single period of time.

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<sup>5</sup> After the government's overthrow on 11 September 1973, the military junta took control of political power, establishing an authoritarian government. Its immediate measures included the closure of the National Congress, a ban on the functioning of political parties and the imposition of a State of Siege throughout the country, all of which certainly affected the working of democracy. The military junta governed the country until 11 March 1990 when political parties were once again formally permitted and Congress was reopened.

Figure 5. Democratisation index: Brazil, 1800-2017



Source: Compiled by author with data from Polity IV Project, 2013. **Note:** The "Polity Score" captures this regime authority spectrum on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy).

Like most of the region in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Brazil experienced numerous coups and military dictatorships. Its most recent dictatorship began with the coup of 31 March 1964, which overthrew the democratic government of President João Goulart and established a military dictatorship led by General Humberto de Alencar Castelo Branco. He was succeeded by a series of military presidents until the election victory of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB) in 1985 when, on March 15, José Sarney took office as the first civilian president. Figure 5 shows that this marked the start of significant improvements in Brazil's indicators of democracy. In 2002, President Luiz Inácio da Silva of the Workers' Party (PT) took office.

The PT's election victory followed an anti-corruption campaign through which it marked a difference with traditional party structures although, in 2005, its government was itself badly hit by a corruption scandal. Nonetheless, President da Silva was re-elected for a second term in October 2006. He was succeeded in 2011 by President Dilma Rousseff, also a member of the PT, against whom the Senate opened an impeachment process on 12 May 2016, which ended with her replacement by her vice-president, Michel Temer.

At present, both da Silva and Rousseff face criminal charges in corruption cases.


In the case of Argentina, there were six successful coups in the twentieth century: in 1930, 1943, 1955, 1962, 1966 and 1976. While the first four resulted in provisional dictatorships, the latter two established permanent dictatorships in line with the bureaucratic-authoritarian state model, a type of organisation of the state characterised by the suppression of political and democratic mechanisms as a means of returning to a certain social and economic order that had been altered by autonomous organisation of the population and, particularly, the workers (O'Donnell, 2009).

Democracy was restored in 1983 with the election of President Raúl Alfonsín. Since then, the country has enjoyed democratic and institutional stability. In 2001, however, it experienced a severe economic crisis that led to a wave of popular protest against the government, culminating with the resignation of President Fernando de la Rúa in 2001. Although his resignation was followed by interim administrations, the armed forces did not take control of executive power or intervene in national politics. In contrast to previous periods, the crisis was managed through constitutional processes, leading to the democratic election of President Eduardo Duhalde (of the Peronist Justicialist Party) in 2002.

At present, former President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, who was elected as the successor of her husband, President Néstor Kirchner (2003-2007), and governed from 2007 to 2015 (having been re-elected in 2011), faces corruption charges.

These cases reveal a common pattern in recent dictatorships in Latin America. However, currently most countries, except for Venezuela and Cuba, have now achieved stability under democratic regimes. This constitutes a favourable context as regards the stability of political power in the region.

Figure 6. Democratisation index: Argentina, 1800-2017



Source: Compiled by author with data from Polity IV Project, 2017. **Note:** The "Polity Score" captures this regime authority spectrum on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy).

### iii. Democratisation processes and the relation between legislative and executive powers

Another relevant aspect of the political development of Latin American countries is the quality of democracy. Since the time of the Spanish colony, most of the region's countries have had to contend, both politically and economically, with social inequality. Although persisting over time, inequality has lessened in most countries, particularly since the democratic transitions of the 1980s, thanks to the concern that arose in these countries about the quality of their democratisation processes (Garretón, 1995). However, it is important to note that the quality of Latin American democratic regimes is quite heterogeneous. When disaggregating by country, differences become apparent as in the case of Uruguay, Costa Rica and Chile, which have

higher indices of the quality of democracy than other countries (Mainwaring & Scully, 2008, p. 118).


Legislative processes and the relationship between the legislature and the executive serve as an important indicator of the distribution of political power and, therefore, the quality of democratic regimes in Latin America (Alemán & Calvo, 2008). After the consolidation of the region's political transitions, research into this increased significantly as a means of assessing the quality of democracies (Morgenstern & Nacif, 2002).

When analysing the evolution of the quality of political regimes in Latin American countries, it is also important to look at the relationship between the legislative and executive powers as regards the exercise of veto power (García-Grandón, Garrido-Vergara, & Navia, 2013; Tsebelis & Alemán, 2005). This is a measure of the capacity that the powers of state have to intervene in drawing up laws and public policy and in other important matters of public interest. This is a key factor in the way in which the political elites operate as well as in the distribution of political power in a society.

Figure 7 shows the relation between presidents' legislative powers and their success in passing legislation, measured as the percentage of the president's bills that obtain parliamentary approval. It shows the dispersion of the executive's legislative powers and success in recent years in Latin America. It is important to note that, until the first decade of this century, Mexico stood out for the executive's legislative success, despite having less legislative powers compared to the other countries in the sample. Chile and Brazil are similar in that, although their presidents have greater legislative powers, they tend to be less successful than in Mexico, Paraguay and Honduras, whose presidents have fewer powers. The most striking case, however, is Ecuador where the executive has great legislative powers but a very low level of success compared to the other countries of the region.

In Figure 7, it can be seen that countries where the executive has a lower level of legislative success tend to be those where the parliament has a greater capacity to block the executive's bills or, in other words, exercises greater veto power. However, it also shows that, in most Latin American countries, the president has an important power of veto and, in some cases, even constitutional powers to intervene in parliamentary debate as, for example, in Chile and Brazil (Londregan, 2000; Tsebelis & Alemán, 2007).

Figure 7. Dispersion of the executive's legislative powers and success



Source: Compiled by author with data from García-Grandón, Garrido-Vergara, & Navia, 2013.

Table 4 shows the way in which the legislative and executive branches relate, depending on their power and capacity to exercise a veto. This is an important indicator of the context in which Latin American democracies have developed since most countries have a strongly presidential system, with impacts of different magnitudes on the distribution of political power (Marsteintredet & Berntzen, 2008).

The first case corresponds to that of an executive which manages to pass almost all the bills it presents (high legislative success) and is the origin of the vast majority of the laws approved (high legislative participation). This was the case of Honduras in 1990-2002. The executive dominates over the legislature, which can only react to the bills presented by the executive and has little impact on the development of legislation.

A second case shown in Table 4 is that of countries where the executive's veto powers allow it to achieve a high level of legislative success, but it is not dominant as in the case of Honduras. In this context, the legislature also plays a reactive role. This is the case of Mexico (1982-2003), Chile (1994-2004)<sup>6</sup>, Bolivia (1997-2001), Uruguay (1995-2002) and Panama (1994-2002).

<sup>6</sup> Chile has a presidential system, which corresponds to the institutional form in which the Political Constitution establishes a division of powers where executive power is exercised by the president, who



A third case corresponds to those countries where the executive has fewer powers to achieve the level of legislative success seen in the previous case. In this context, there is a dynamic of negotiation between the two branches and Congress plays a proactive role in the generation of laws. The countries in this situation are Argentina (1983-2004), Costa Rica (1995-2004) and Paraguay (1989-2002).

A fourth case is that of countries whose president must deal with particularly proactive parliaments in order to pass bills. García Montero (2007) describes the legislative power of these presidents as that of a collaborator and the parliament as “proactive”. This is the case of Peru (1995-2003) and Venezuela (1959-1989). Finally, Ecuador is the only case with a weak executive power, with limited success in approving bills, and a legislature that has played a particularly proactive role, acting as the main driver of the legislation passed there between 1995 and 2002.

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serves as head of state and head of government. The president has co-legislative powers with the parliament in areas that include the presentation of bills, control of the order paper, participation in parliamentary debate through ministers and partial veto powers. In Chile, these special powers are established in the Political Constitution of the Republic.

Presidents hold office for a set period (four years) and cannot be removed as in parliamentary systems. There is also a rigid division of power between the three branches: legislature, executive and judiciary, which is underpinned by checks and balances, that is, they control each other. Examples of this are the president's powers to veto laws, the need for parliamentary approval of some of the president's appointments and the judiciary's power to declare some norms unconstitutional.

The president is elected by direct vote, with an absolute majority in the second round.

Table 4. Legislative and executive powers in legislative activity

Legislative Power	Executive Power				
	Dominant	Preponderant	Negotiator	Collaborator	Weak
<b>Especially Reactive</b>	Honduras (1990-02)				
<b>Reactive</b>		Mexico (1982-03) Chile (1994-04) Bolivia (1997-01) Uruguay (1995-02) Panama (1994-02)			
<b>Proactive</b>			Argentina (1983-04) Costa Rica (1995-04) Paraguay (1989-02)		
<b>Especially Proactive</b>				Peru (1995-03) Venezuela (1959-89)	Ecuador (1995-02)

Source: García Montero (2007) in García-Grandón, Garrido-Vergara, & Navia, 2013, p.65.


Using the classification of García Montero, the parliaments of these 12 Latin American countries can, therefore, be separated into two groups. Six have “reactive” legislatures, with a limited capacity to influence approval of bills presented by executives that have played a “dominant” role in some cases (Honduras) and a “predominant” role in others (Mexico, Chile, Bolivia, Uruguay and Panama). The other six parliaments have had “proactive” legislative powers, particularly in the cases of Peru, Venezuela and Ecuador.

#### iv. Economic changes and the social structure

Throughout their history, Latin American countries have faced the complex challenge of inequality. After the political transitions of the 1980s, most governments introduced economic reforms, albeit differing in their emphasis. In general, they sought to reduce social inequality and boost economic development as a means of generating growth and jobs. However, not all countries advanced equally. Figure 8 shows the evolution of average per capita income as

compared to the United States and the Gini index for 2000-2010, revealing that over half the region's countries failed to increase their average income during this period.

Figure 8. Latin America: Average income and inequality, 2000-2010



NOTE: The orange bars plot the relative value of gross national income per capita in a particular country relative to that in the US, adjusting for purchasing power parity. The blue bars plot the Gini index where 0 indicates perfect income equality (all people have an equal share of national income) and 100 indicates perfect inequality (all national income goes to one individual). The Gini coefficient for the US is 40.8.

Source: Compiled by author with data from Monge-Naranjo, 2014.

This acquires greater importance in the light of the contrast between income and the Gini index in 2000-2010. In countries like Haiti, Honduras and Bolivia, income is low and inequality is high. Nicaragua, on the other hand, stands out as the country with the lowest level of inequality during this period. The case of Chile is also striking since, although it achieved the region's highest per capita income, social inequality remained high. This has been widely debated in the literature (Gwynne & Cristobal, 2014) since the persistence of social inequality has proved a difficult issue for democratic governments in most countries. In this context, the elites have maintained their position of privilege even though social mobility has generally increased, thanks to an increase in access to higher education.

The mechanisms of social closure that have characterised the region's elites have led some authors to refer to their effectiveness in maintaining control of the state and the political system. Despite being closed groups, they have maintained fluid relations with the economic and social


elites and, indeed, due to the historical concentration of power and wealth in the region, one broad elite often dominates the political and economic system (Birle, Hofmeister, Maihold, & Potthast, 2007).

In most countries, the end of a dictatorial regime triggered a rearticulation of the elites because it permitted the re-emergence of the political opposition (mostly on the left). This resulted in a diversification of the political elites as new forces appeared and competed to govern. In this context, Chile is an exception since its *Concertación* coalition governed the country for two decades, winning four consecutive terms in office. In Argentina, the coalition formed by the Front for Victory and the Justicialist Party won three consecutive elections under Néstor Kirchner (2003-2007) and then his wife, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (2007-2015).

A key factor behind this was the political parties' professionalisation and bureaucratisation (in line with the thesis of Michels, 1915), enabling them to maintain structures that concentrated power and, in many cases, favoured the maintenance and reproduction of the elites over time.

Finally, analysis of the evolution of the quality of institutions in the region between 1984 and 2004 (figure 9) shows that it was, on average, lower in Latin America than in emerging Asian countries and OECD member states. However, within Latin America, there are wide differences between countries and, for example, Chile and Colombia were able to meet the standards of the OECD of which they became members in 2010 and 2018, respectively.

Figure 9. Indicators of the quality of institutions in Latin America, 1984-2004



Source: Compiled by author with data from Velasco, 2005, p. 50 (ICRG Risk Ratings).

## v. Conclusions

This chapter has briefly described the context of Latin America's recent political history during which most countries suffered military interventions that led to the establishment of authoritarian regimes. Starting in the 1980s, however, these were followed by democratic transitions, raising the question of the development and quality of the resulting processes of democratisation. In this context, although the political-economic paths of the different countries varied, most adopted democratic institutional designs based on the model of a presidential republic, albeit with different nuances (Figure 3).

The evidence presented in this chapter reveals that the course and quality of the region's processes of democratisation have been quite heterogeneous. Some countries have achieved stable indicators of political development, related to the quality of democracy, but, in most others, the results have been poor. Indeed, the average quality of institutions in the region falls below that of OECD member states and emerging Asian countries.

In general, Latin America's political elites have historically acted as closed groups with little interest in opening spaces for cooperation or the incorporation of other social groups. This has, however, been changing, thanks to a significant increase in the coverage and quality of secondary and higher education and, as a result, an unprecedented increase in social mobility. Despite this, mechanisms of social closure persist in the elites (Aguilar, 2011), which is only to be expected in a region where poverty and social inequality remain high. The elites have conserved spaces of social interaction that permit their reproduction and maintenance over time. The family, education and access to certain goods and spaces of socialisation (social clubs) mean that they continue to have a privileged social status as compared to other groups.

The results of the development of Latin American democracies raise numerous questions about the role played by the region's elites, both locally and across countries (Birle, Hofmeister, Maihold, & Potthast, 2007). In this context, a research agenda that seeks to provide a deeper understanding of these issues, both at the level of individual cases and in the aggregate, has particular relevance. One of the difficulties inherent in such an agenda is access to information since, in order to obtain this, it is necessary to overcome the obstacle of the political elites' social closure mechanisms, gaining entry to a space that is based on trust. In addition, in the case of the political elites, there is an added complexity that has to do with the way in which they take decisions and the dominant ideologies with respect to political parties (Alcántara & Luna, 2004).

The objective of this chapter was to examine the recent political and economic context in Latin America. The data presented, both of an historical nature and as measurements of trends, shows that most countries have experienced difficulties in achieving sustained democratic development and economic progress. The data on the relationship between the legislative and executive branches shows that presidential regimes have prevailed in most countries and maintain strong control of political and legislative power.

The paradox that arises is with stability because, on average, the countries where the executive intervenes more also have more stable democracies. This is vital for understanding the context that has shaped the emergence and development of Chile's political elites.

### CHAPTER III. END OF THE AUTHORITARIAN REGIME AND REARTICULATION OF THE POLITICAL ELITES IN CHILE

#### i. Introduction

In the 1980s and 1990s, most Latin American countries initiated political transitions from authoritarian to competitive electoral regimes (O'Donnell & Schmitter, 2013). As shown in the previous chapter (Figure 3), most countries began to experience improvements in their indices of democratisation in the 1990s, which marked the end of the region's military regimes. In virtually all these changeovers of power, the political elites played a significant role in both establishing and sustaining democratic regimes (Espinoza, 2010; Haggard & Kaufman, 1995; Mainwaring, 1989; O'Donnell & Schmitter, 2013; Stepan & Linz, 1996). Most of these transformations sought to eliminate the authoritarian legacy of former dictators, after a long period of military rule (Silva, 2001). The legitimacy provided by consensus within the political elites on the establishment of institutions and electoral rules became a *sine qua non* for the consolidation and expansion of democratic regimes in the region (Higley & Gunther, 1992).

However, after the establishment of democratic regimes, political democratisation emerged as a difficult and controversial issue for Latin American countries and, particularly, Chile (Garretón, 1995). While the Chilean political transition from authoritarianism to democracy successfully put an end to 17 years of dictatorship, the new democratic regime incorporated a wide range of authoritarian enclaves created by Pinochet's military regime, implying a number of contradictions as regards the democratic regime's consolidation. These inconsistencies survived for quite a long time, affecting democratic consolidation in the post-transitional setting (Siavelis & Valenzuela, 1996).

Among these contradictions, various scholars have underscored the prevalence of a complex party elite power-sharing arrangement between the centre-left ruling coalition (*Concertación*) and a centre-right opposition alliance (*Alianza*). Between 1990 and 2010, these two coalitions led a successful democratic transition and went on to provide stability, consistency and efficiency in governance. However, the consolidation and prevalence of a polity characterised by political party domination - or partyarchy - hampered the full functioning of Chilean democracy and, therefore, democratic consolidation in terms of legitimacy, accountability and

alternation of power (Menéndez-Carrión, Joignant, & Garretón, 1999; Siavelis, 2009; Siavelis & Valenzuela, 1996; Torcal & Mainwaring, 2002).<sup>7</sup>

This chapter describes the political process that led to the end of the military dictatorship and marked the rearticulation of Chile's political party elites as two large political coalitions that defined the post-Pinochet process of democratisation: the *Concertación* and the *Alianza*. This is important in order to understand the research object of this thesis because the list of members of the political elite used here is drawn from a universe of individuals belonging to one of these two coalitions.

## **ii. Origins of the party elites after the political transition**

### **ii.i. 1980 Constitution**

After the coup that put an end to the government of President Salvador Allende and his socialist revolution, the military junta, led by General Augusto Pinochet, indefinitely suspended the country's 1925 Constitution and, following the dissolution of Congress on 14 September 1973, convened a committee to draw up a new constitution in a bid to legitimise the new *de facto* government. Known as the Ortúzar Commission after its president, Enrique Ortúzar Escobar, a former minister of right-wing President Jorge Alessandri (1958-1964), it presented a first draft of the proposed new constitution in October 1978.

This was then reviewed by the Council of State, an independent body created to assist in writing the new constitution which, in July 1980, presented its recommendations to Pinochet and the members of the Junta for their final decision. In August 1980, the new constitution was presented, along with the announcement that it would be put to a plebiscite on September 11, the seventh anniversary of the coup.

This strategy gave the political opposition to Pinochet and other anti-government forces little time to organise and debate such an important document (Hawkins, 2002, p. 158). In the plebiscite, the new constitution was allegedly approved by a 67% majority. However, the

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<sup>7</sup> This is also related to the ongoing existence, after the democratic transition, of enclaves, authoritarian institutions and neoliberal transformations, all established during Pinochet's regime (Garretón, 2012; 1999).



plebiscite did not meet minimum conditions for a free, competitive and fair election (Altman, Piñeiro, & Toro, 2013) and was widely criticised by most opposition leaders, who nevertheless *“were resigned to playing by the military’s rules and timetable if they ever hoped to see them return to barracks”* (Morley & McGillion, 2015, p. 200). Moreover, as most of Pinochet’s detractors were declared illegal by the military regime, he had no major difficulty in being sworn in as President of the Republic after the plebiscite or in implementing this new institutional design on 11 March 1981.

**The 1980 Constitution, imposed through a plebiscite without any minimum democratic guarantee, not only allowed Pinochet to remain in power but also gave continuity to the authoritarian regime and the new economic order that arose from his plan for significant reform of the Chilean economy.<sup>8</sup>**

The new constitution granted the president significant new powers. In addition, it created the National Security Council (COSENA) and re-established the Constitutional Tribunal. As well as conferring specific power on the executive branch, it established that Pinochet would remain president as from its introduction for eight years after which another plebiscite would be held on whether he should stay on for a further eight years. In this way, the regime attempted to design an institutional system that would extend his rule indefinitely. However, as some scholars have argued, the architects of Pinochet’s electoral system fell short of using electoral rules to guarantee his victory (Barros, 2005; Navia, 2003). Given Pinochet’s personal power, no-one anticipated that the centre and left-wing opposition would defeat him in the 1988 plebiscite: *“the victory in the 1988 plebiscite was a pleasant surprise. Many of us feared two things: the first was to lose the plebiscite for reasons similar to what happened in the 1980 plebiscite (which Pinochet and his advisers manipulated in their favour), and the other, far more complex and likely, was that the regime would not recognise its defeat. In this context, it was not only a pleasant surprise when we won, but also when Pinochet himself issued an official statement admitting defeat.”*<sup>9</sup>

### **ii.ii. 1988 plebiscite and a new political system**

As some scholars have argued, the 1980 Constitution laid the foundation for a democratisation process by establishing a plebiscite on Pinochet’s continuance in power. *“It is unusual for an authoritarian regime to write a constitution which then becomes, against the ruler’s wishes, the vehicle for a transition to democracy. And yet this is precisely what occurred in Chile”*

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<sup>8</sup> Personal interview with J. M. Insulza. My translation. See appendix III.

<sup>9</sup> Personal interview with G. Gaspar. My translation. See appendix III.

(Valenzuela, 1997, p. 2). This peculiarity of Chilean history is paradoxical given that Pinochet and his advisers were looking to design a system that would make it easier for him to stay in power (Garretón, 1987; Navia, 2003; Valenzuela, 1997).

The second plebiscite took place on 5 October 1988, but in a very different context from the 1980 plebiscite. In 1987, the regime had approved the existence of political parties and opened the national voter register. In addition, the Junta had agreed to re-open Congress, regardless of the plebiscite's results.<sup>10</sup> This favoured the opposition since, as well as being allowed to participate in public debates, it could compete in the plebiscite as an official alternative to Pinochet's rule. The options were *Sí* (Yes) or *No*. Whereas the right-wing parties and other supporters of Pinochet were in favour of the Yes option, the political opposition supported the No option, which won with almost 56% of the vote (INDAI, 1989, p. 62). In 1989, three months before Pinochet's term expired, presidential and congressional elections were held.

After the restoration of democracy, a two-party political system emerged and continued to exist for the next 20 years. During this period, Chilean politics was dominated by two coalitions: the left-wing *Concertación* and the right-wing *Alianza*. This represented a major change on the pre-1973 situation when politics had traditionally been ordered around three major ideological axes (right, centre and left) (Scully, 1992; Siavelis, 2009; Valenzuela, 1997).

The consolidation of a highly institutionalised political system based on these two coalitions was decisive in providing stability, consistency and efficiency to governance in Chile (Siavelis & Valenzuela, 1996; Torcal & Mainwaring, 2002). However, because it hampered political participation and alternation in power, this new party system also played a key role in the maintenance of a limited democracy. In addition, the system remained confined to the elite level and became increasingly disconnected from civil society (Luna & Altman, 2011).

### **ii.iii. Chile in 1988: the transition as a “transaction”**

The political negotiations that took place after Pinochet's defeat in the 1988 plebiscite meant that the democratic transition took the form of an agreement or, as some scholars have described it, a pact between the relevant political actors of both the incoming and outgoing regimes (Fuentes, 2012; Godoy, 1999). This not only affected the democratic transition but also, given the political hegemony of the two coalitions, its consolidation. Indeed, from 1989 through to

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<sup>10</sup> This finally happened on 11 March 1990.

2010, the *Concertación* and the *Alianza* held almost all the seats in both chambers of Congress and, as shown by a number of scholars, competition between these two multi-party coalitions dominated electoral and legislative politics (Alemán & Saiegh, 2007; Navia, 2008; Siavelis, 2002).

A constitutional reform introduced in 1989 promoted and contributed to the imminent transition to democracy,<sup>11</sup> but also gave the outgoing military regime political power by defining the armed forces as the guarantors of the institutional order and giving them a very significant degree of autonomy. Moreover, Pinochet stayed on as commander-in-chief of the Army.<sup>12</sup> As a result, the military were able to exercise an important veto power on the decisions of the incoming democratic governments (Angell, 1993; Garretón, 1986; Heiss & Navia, 2007). This situation also favoured the right-wing parties as well as members of the outgoing military dictatorship since it meant that, although the *Concertación* won the presidential election of 1989 (under Christian Democrat Patricio Aylwin) and an overall majority in both chambers of Congress, they retained a wide range of political power resources.

The famous phrase of President Aylwin of achieving justice “to the extent possible” epitomises one of the main strategies which the *Concertación* applied both before and after the democratic transition: that of governing on the basis of political consensus. It was used first as a means of permitting a peaceful transition to democracy after almost 17 years of dictatorship. As a former minister, José Miguel Insulza, argues, “*One of the main features of the Concertación had to do with its articulation, which was based on the struggle against the dictatorship.....*”.<sup>13</sup> However, it subsequently allowed the political elites to achieve stability and an appropriate balance of power between these two coalitions. This largely explains why a wide range of constitutional reforms, privatisation policies and other measures were accepted before the end of the military regime.

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<sup>11</sup> Law No 18.825, approved through a plebiscite on 30 July 1989, was published on 17 August 1989. It included 54 reforms aiming to promote political pluralism and strengthen constitutional rights, democracy and the principle of political participation. It also included measures to temper the so-called “state of exception”. On the application of this concept, defined by Carl Schmitt, in Latin American politics, see (Negretto & Aguilar-Rivera, 2000).

<sup>12</sup> Pinochet remained commander-in-chief of the Army until 1998. He then took up a life Senate seat from 11 March 1998 to 4 July 2002. The position of life senator was introduced in Chile under the 1980 Constitution which, in Article 45, stipulated former Presidents of the Republic, who had held office for at least six years, would be entitled to a life Senate seat. Only one other former president, Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle, who was elected democratically, took up this position. Article 45 was eliminated by a constitutional reform in 2005.

<sup>13</sup> Personal interview with J. M. Insulza. My translation. See appendix III.

As many scholars have pointed out, the prevalence of this consensus-based strategy meant that most of the *Concertación*'s original ideas and political views evolved from managing the restoration of democracy to consolidating economic development through efficient technocratic policies. In two decades, the *Concertación* improved the market-oriented reforms that had been introduced in the 1980s and gradually opened up the political system. In this period, it won four presidential elections and became the longest-serving and most successful democratic coalition in Chilean history. In relation to this, former President Ricardo Lagos argues: “*What most scholars do not understand is that, in many cases, politics depends on the contexts.... The contexts are extremely important because they determine the possible lines of political action.*”<sup>14</sup> This principle largely explains why the *Concertación* agreed to negotiate a transition with the Pinochet regime and, afterwards, to govern with the right-wing parties that had supported him. Former President Aylwin has argued that, after the end of the dictatorship, it was not possible to prosecute Pinochet for human rights violations because this would have had enormous negative consequences for the country's nascent democratic stability: “*It would not have been feasible to prosecute Pinochet. It would have terribly divided the country and even put at risk the continuity of my government.*”<sup>15</sup>

Understandably, the result of the 1988 plebiscite troubled Chile's right-wing parties. They were afraid of losing political power and, eventually, their chance of becoming an important actor in Congress: “*It was possible that, with a single-member district system, the right could be effectively shut out of Congress*” (Siavelis, quoted by Pastor, 2004, p. 48). Moreover, Navia (2003) estimated that, with a single-member district system, the *Concertación* would have won almost 90% of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies and virtually all the Senate seats, giving it the special majorities required to reform the authoritarian aspects of the 1980 Constitution.

However, a stable pattern of two-coalition competition emerged, thanks to the implementation of a binomial system for congressional elections.<sup>16</sup> This “unusual” system was originally proposed in 1983 by Arturo Marín Vicuña<sup>17</sup> and became law in 1989, just after the 1988 plebiscite and the beginning of the transition. Based on the D'Hondt method (Bochsler, 2009), it divided Chile into districts and constituencies. Each district comprised one or more municipal

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<sup>14</sup> Personal interview with R. Lagos. My translation. See appendix III.

<sup>15</sup> Patricio Aylwin. *El presidente se confiesa*. Interview in Spain's *El País* newspaper, 27 May 2012. My translation.

<sup>16</sup> Although most scholars take the view that the binomial system was a response to Pinochet's defeat in the plebiscite, there are different accounts of the system's historical evolution in Chile. With regard to this discussion, see Pastor, 2004.

<sup>17</sup> A lawyer, Arturo Marín Vicuña served as Chief-of-Staff to Carlos Cáceres, Pinochet's Interior Minister between 1988 and 1990. He was one of the authors of the plan to reform the electoral system, along with Rafael Larraín Cruz, a lawyer, and Carlos Cruz-Coke Herrera, an academic (Cruz-Coke, 2001, p. 530).

districts and elected two members to the Chamber of Deputies while constituencies comprised two or more districts and each elected two senators. It was based on lists of candidates, rather than candidates individually, and tended to return the first majority on each list, which could result in over-representation of the second most-voted list (Angell, 2003).

The system was adopted by the military government in response to Pinochet's defeat in the 1988 plebiscite in a bid to secure enough representation in Congress to veto the constitutional reforms proposed by the *Concertación* (Pastor, 2004). As Pastor observes, the regime had three main incentives for its adoption:

**“The military regime and its civilian allies adopted the binomial system with three objectives in mind. First and foremost, they wanted to ensure that the Right would be well represented in Congress so that it would have a veto over constitutional reforms and policy initiatives proposed by the Concertación. Second, the architects of the binomial system wanted to impose a two-party political system in Chile in which the Christian Democratic Party (DC) would be forced to align itself with the Left or the Right. Third, the authoritarian designers wanted to deprive the Communist Party of representation....”** (Pastor, 2004, p. 48).

When the *Concertación* defeated Pinochet and democracy was restored, the *Alianza* also had power in the political system, thanks to these new electoral rules and the institutional framework created under the military regime. This institutional design and, particularly, the binomial system allowed the *Alianza* to become an important protagonist in the new democracy. As Carey argues:

**“The incentive that this electoral system gives to form coalitions has carried over from the electoral arena to government, and is so formidable that Chile's traditional multi-party system now performs very much like a two-party system. Although parties remain organizationally distinct and candidates bear party labels on ballots, these labels have effectively been superseded by coalition labels. Coalition leaders negotiate candidate nominations jointly and can impose discipline across all members of the coalition. The result is that the Chilean Congress has come to be organized around two major coalitions which are more stable than was previously the case in Chile's fluid multi-party system”** (Carey, 1997, p. 94).

Moreover, this new model based on two majorities meant that the number of political parties with parliamentary representation decreased significantly after 1989, mostly because a number of small parties merged or joined larger parties (Navia & Sandoval, 1998). Navia (2003) points out that, even though the post-dictatorship political system was designed mainly by right-wing politicians in order to retain power, the *Concertación* nonetheless succeeded in governing Chile for 20 years. However, the *Alianza*, using both political and institutional resources from the

constitutional regime established before the political transition, retained legislative influence and other spheres of influence over politics.<sup>18</sup>

#### **ii.iv. Enclaves after the democratic transition**

Political and institutional transitions often depend on agreements or other forms of consensus within the political elite (Hartmann, 2007; Domhoff, 2006). In the case of Latin America in the 1980s, the political elites played a fundamental role in the civilian-military agreements reached in order to end authoritarian regimes and promote democratic transitions.

In Chile, soon after the 1988 plebiscite on Pinochet's continuance in power, the *Concertación* started negotiations with members of both the military regime and the right-wing parties for an *Acuerdo Nacional por la Democracia y el Consenso Constitucional* (National Agreement for Democracy and Constitutional Consensus) whose aims included reform of 1980 Constitution. In a speech broadcast in May 1989, Pinochet presented a final draft of the Agreement, comprising 54 reforms to the 1980 Constitution. This document, which met with unanimous approval from the *Concertación*, was put to a plebiscite on 30 July 1989. Both emerging coalitions called for its approval while an extremist faction of Socialist Party (which was not a member of the *Concertación*) and the Party of the South (PSUR) advocated its rejection and the Revolutionary Movement of the Left (MIR) and the Communist Party called for a boycott of the plebiscite.

In the end, after a strong campaign in their favour, the proposed reforms were approved with over 90% support. By accepting these new reforms, the *Concertación* forewent the chance of obtaining a working legislative majority in Congress because the absolute majority of the members present in each chamber required for approval of ordinary laws was defined as including non-elected senators and other authoritarian enclaves. These reforms ensured the continuity of a wide range of policies implemented by the military regime, including the neoliberal reforms that had transformed the Chilean economy.

Although this agreement involved extensive negotiations between the *Concertación* and the right-wing parties that supported Pinochet, it was reached with the military regime still in

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<sup>18</sup> The *Alianza* also maintained forms of political influence through several organisations and members of the judiciary and other elites, such as the economic and religious elites. This point has been widely discussed in the literature. See, for example, Akram (2013), Barton & Murray (2008) and Angell & Pollack (1995).

power, implying that its political opponents had little bargaining power (Heiss & Navia, 2008). Moreover, these imbalances of power were reinforced by the fact that many of the forces opposed to the regime, including all those linked to Marxist ideology, had been banned. In addition, because of the absence of a Congress, other parties lacked an institutional design for operating within the political system. However, the *Concertación* decided to accept this situation as essential to ensure the transfer from military to civilian government. As Edgardo Boeninger, a minister in the Aylwin administration, argues:

**“A crucial factor in the Concertación’s unanimous approval of the plebiscite was the conviction that it was fundamental in order to ensure the transfer of government, although this implied not achieving a simultaneous and equivalent transfer of power. There was agreement that the mere fact of being elected and taking office in the Presidency of the Republic and having a majority at least in the Chamber of Deputies would create a new and different context, which would provoke important changes in the power structure and trigger a cumulative process that would produce successive alterations in the correlation of political forces in favour of the ruling coalition”** (Boeninger 1997: 364-365).

Indeed, the *Concertación*’s victory in both the 1988 plebiscite and the 1989 presidential election created a new and more democratic context. However, as René Abeliuk, also a minister in the Aylwin administration, says:

**“We had to accept many things we did not want to, since the possibilities of returning to a new military regime were soaring... At that time, Pinochet himself and many of his advisers were not fully convinced of relinquishing power... In addition, in numerous unofficial conversations, many of my friends from the right warned us that it was not entirely certain that Pinochet would accept defeat without considering certain guarantees. Therefore, we had to give in to many of their conditions.....”<sup>19</sup>**

The heterogeneous *Concertación* remained united in its support for Patricio Aylwin in the 1989 presidential election. After its victory in the 1988 plebiscite, a much more moderate strategy prevailed. Moreover, “*the moderation of the Socialists provided the crucial ingredient to achieve unity and victory*” (Drake, 1997, p. 116). The main aspects of this strategy included agreement on maintaining certain essential aspects of the neoliberal economic model, acceptance of the authoritarian institutional design, avoidance of any populist discourse and the downplaying of the importance of human rights violations as well as agreement on how to divide up seats in Congress. This, however, was merely an initial stance and, once in power, the coalition implemented many reforms related to these issues (Heiss & Navia, 2008).

As Angell argues, as well as being key for achieving political transition, this strategy also provided the military regime with the opportunity to maintain intact much of the institutional

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<sup>19</sup> Personal interview with R. Abeliuk. My translation. See appendix III.

framework it had introduced.

**“One plausible explanation of why the Chilean system can be considered a successful transition is precisely that it is continuing the policies of a successful authoritarian government. This contrasts with the chaos and lack of policy consensus that faced incoming democratic governments in Peru or Argentina, for example. Another equally plausible explanation is that essentially what has happened in Chile is that a normally viable and legitimate pre-Pinochet democratic political system has been restored. Chile did not have to invent a democratic system—it simply returned to the past. While there is a degree of truth in both arguments, to accept them at face value would be to oversimplify the process and underestimate both the difficulties facing and the achievements of the Aylwin government. So to the two original arguments, we must add that of the way in which the present government has, to use the fashionable term, crafted democracy” (Angell, 1993, p. 563).**

The strategy also permitted the survival of authoritarian enclaves or, in other words, authoritarian practices, at odds with the democratic regime’s political norms and rules of the game, which continued to exist within the state and the social spaces that the state claims to regulate (Gilley, 2010, p. 389). Both formally and informally, these enclaves had a negative effect on democratic consolidation (Garretón, 1999) and allowed Pinochet and his collaborators to prolong the institutional authoritarian legacy established by the 1980 Constitution. Garretón classifies these enclaves into four categories: institutional (constitution and laws), sociocultural (such as the prevalence of certain authoritarian values), related to political actors (the armed forces or veto players) and of an ethical or symbolical nature (such as human rights issues).

In addition to these authoritarian enclaves, Siavelis (2009) also identifies what he refers to as transitional enclaves in the form of institutionalised mechanisms and practices (of both a formal and informal nature) that were reproduced by the ruling elite after the end of the military regime to the detriment of the development of a high-quality representative democracy.

**“First of all, an enclave to be termed as such must have been born of the political dynamics of a previous political model. The abrupt end of the Chilean military regime, in the 1988 plebiscite, provided a specific end point for the Chilean military regime and a clear delimitation of a political period in which the elites could inherit a legacy. Garretón refers to a political artefact inherited from the military regime, in temporary terms and clearly delimited. However, for the transitional enclaves, a change of political model is less clear and should be defined... The Chilean transition begins with the 1988 plebiscite and ends in 2005 with the reform of the Pinochet constitution, eliminating most of its non-democratic elements... Therefore, the transitional enclaves were born of both political models and interactions consolidated during this period, between 1988 and 2005” (Siavelis, 2009b, p. 5).**

This approach is important in order to understand the role of party elites in the politics of the Chilean transition to democracy and throughout the subsequent process of democratic consolidation. Both coalitions, the *Concertación* and the *Alianza*, dominated Chilean politics, managing these two types of enclaves, which included the constitutional reforms and privatisations implemented by Pinochet (with an effect until the 2005 reform of the



constitution), the elite's control of candidate selection and electoral politics, party-dominated politics, the informal system of allocation of posts and positions by the political parties (referred to in Spanish as *cuoteo*), elitist and extra-institutional policy-making and the continuation of the economic model inherited from the Pinochet regime (Siavelis, 2009b). All these practices not only limited but also affected Chile's re-democratisation process (Garretón, 1999; Heiss & Navia, 2008). These transitional enclaves persisted until the constitutional reform of 2005 which introduced a number of mechanisms for the elimination of the “*órganos de facto*” (*de facto* bodies) (Linz & Stepan, 1996) inherited from the Pinochet regime and, indeed, most of the authoritarian legacy.

### iii. Conclusions

This chapter has examined the political process that brought an end to the military dictatorship and marked the rearticulation of Chile's political party elites as two broad coalitions: the *Concertación* and the *Alianza*. After the restoration of democracy, the Chilean party system experienced significant changes, due mainly to the appearance of a new division between supporters and opponents of the military regime. In the wake of the 1988 plebiscite, a new political landscape emerged, defined by the dichotomy between authoritarianism and democracy and the political loyalties formed under Pinochet. This situation, combined with the binomial system for congressional elections, led to the formation of two main coalitions, including most of the country's political parties, whose purpose was, for the right, to defend part of the structures inherited from the dictatorship and, for the centre and left, to promote return to a democratic system of popular representation (Luna & Altman, 2011; Torcal & Mainwaring, 2002).

The extensive literature on the Chilean binomial system emphasises precisely the incentives it implied for the creation of two broad coalitions (Alemán & Saiegh, 2007; Carey, 2006; 1997; Navia, 2008; 2000; Siavelis, 2009). This is also reflected in the results of congressional, municipal and presidential elections between 1989 and 2009 in which the two coalitions obtained the majority of votes. However, the consolidation of this system also meant that Chilean politics remained highly concentrated at the elite level and, therefore, increasingly remote from civil society (Luna & Altman, 2011). Finally, another key aspect of this period was the ongoing existence of authoritarian enclaves and their role in a democratisation process with numerous institutional limitations that were, nevertheless, accepted by the *Concertación* for the sake of the stability of the process.

## CHAPTER IV. TWO NEW COALITIONS IN POST-AUTHORITARIAN CHILE: THE *CONCERTACIÓN* AND THE *ALIANZA*

### i. Introduction

This chapter describes and explains the principal characteristics of the two main coalitions that emerged from the 1988 plebiscite and the 1989 congressional and presidential elections. A political transition based on agreement across much of the political spectrum (Godoy, 1999) and the consolidation of a binomial system for congressional elections favoured, among other things, the creation and maintenance of two broad coalitions that dominated political power for more than two decades.

The *Concertación* brought together the parties and supporters of the centre-left and went on to win four consecutive presidential elections before its dissolution in 2013. The other coalition, the *Alianza por Chile*, was formed by the principal liberal right-wing and traditional conservative forces and continued to exist until 2015. The political elite that governed Chile during the period studied here (1990-2010) came from these two coalitions.

### ii. The *Concertación*

The *Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia* was a political coalition that governed Chile from 11 March 1990 to 11 March 2010. It comprised the Christian Democrat Party (PDC), the Radical Party (PRSD), the Party for Democracy (PPD) and the Socialist Party (PS). It was born on 2 January 1988 when the Pact of Political Parties for the No was created in the run-up to the 1988 plebiscite, as a democratic alternative to Augusto Pinochet's 15 year-dictatorship. After winning the plebiscite with 55.99% of the vote, it became a political coalition and competed in the 1989 presidential and legislative elections. It went on to win all presidential, legislative and municipal elections until the 2008 municipal elections. In 2009, Sebastián Piñera, the presidential candidate of the right-wing *Alianza por Chile* coalition, defeated the *Concertación*'s Eduardo Frei in the run-off ballot.

Scholarly studies have argued that the *Concertación* embraced neoliberalism. During PDC Patricio Aylwin's presidency (1990-1994), an important set of social, political and economic reforms was launched, including a reduction of the public debt and of inflation and an increase

in public spending on education and health as well as other important measures aiming to promote sustainable growth and reduce poverty. In addition, his administration introduced direct municipal elections. The presidency of PDC Eduardo Frei (1994-2000) went on to establish new priorities, focusing on international economic relations, with an emphasis on the negotiation of free trade agreements. PPD/PS President Ricardo Lagos (2000-2006) continued to pursue neoliberal policies, signing free trade agreements with the United States and the European Union. His administration adopted a fiscal rule mandating a cyclically-adjusted budget surplus of 1% of GDP in order to protect public spending and saving. Policies on health and education, as well as modernisation of the state and infrastructure development, benefitted the coalition's popularity, allowing PS Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010) to become the country's first woman president. She represented a continuity of the *Concertación's* neoliberal policies, but with an emphasis on strengthening the social safety net.

The *Concertación* was formed by four centre-left parties and existed from 1988 until 2013 when it was replaced by a new pact called *La Nueva Mayoría* (New Majority). It emerged in the context of the 1988 plebiscite and, after democracy was restored in 1990, not only won four successive presidential elections but also obtained a majority in all municipal and congressional elections until 2008 when it was defeated by the *Alianza* in that year's municipal elections.

From the beginning, the *Concertación* comprised a wide range of centre-left parties that were opposed to military rule and demanded the restoration of democracy (Figures 10 and 11). A very important event that contributed to its formation was Pinochet's decision to permit a legal political opposition and to end "forced exile" in the run-up to the 1988 plebiscite.<sup>20</sup> This enabled the coalition to incorporate several leaders who had supported and participated in Salvador Allende's Popular Unity government.

Sergio Bitar, one of the coalition's leaders and a minister in the governments of Allende, Lagos and Bachelet, argues that the *Concertación's* has its roots not only in the neoliberal, authoritarian and anti-democratic reforms implemented by the military regime, but also in the social, political and economic transformations promoted by the government of President Eduardo Frei Montalva and, afterwards, that of Allende:

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<sup>20</sup> In an attempt to depict the October 1988 plebiscite as legitimate and fair, the government announced the end of forced exile on 1 September 1988. However, a considerable number of exiles who had taken foreign citizenship were still banned from returning (Wright & Oñate, 2007, p. 45). Forced exile was central to the Pinochet dictatorship's strategy for consolidating and maintaining absolute control of Chile. Exile began on the day of the coup, September 11, 1973, and continued even beyond the regime's end.

**“The Concertación is the daughter of the Popular Unity, but its origins were also determined by the subsequent crisis. You cannot understand it except in the historical context in Chile: from Frei’s and Allende’s attempts to provoke structural changes within Chilean society through to the radical transformations promoted by the military dictatorship....”<sup>21</sup>**

As widely discussed in the literature, two issues played a crucial role in creating consensus and unity between centre and left-wing parties: opposition to the military regime and the aim of achieving a successful transition to democracy (Altman, Piñero, & Toro, 2013; Siavelis, 2009). Moreover, the overthrow of Allende in 1973, the failure of *socialismo a la chilena* (Chilean Socialism), the traumatic experience of exile and the crisis of Socialist governments in Eastern Europe (Lane, 2007b) produced a shift towards ideological moderation in most of the left-wing parties, especially some factions of the Socialist Party, contributing to a rapprochement with centre parties, particularly the Christian Democrat Party (PDC). After being adversaries during the Allende government, these two parties became allies:

**“For the PDC and even for moderate Socialists, the Communists’ strategy could not be considered. They realized that they must accept Pinochet’s institutional schedule and try and reform it (Garretón, 1991). The more radical Left, MIR and the Communists rejected this idea. Meanwhile, PDC leaders promoted the need to register in the recently created new electoral register..... After this, several political events helped make sense of the opposition’s political organization. Firstly, in 1987, the Socialists - Núñez and smaller Left groups - formed the Party for Democracy (PPD in Spanish) in 1987 as a catch-all electoral instrument to field legislative candidates. Its founder, Ricardo Lagos, had belonged to the modern Center-Left, a moderate party more open to new ideas than the Socialist party” (Dávila, 2011, pp. 117-118).**

In 1982, Chile was plunged into a deep economic and financial crisis (Ffrench-Davis, 2017; 1999). In two consecutive years, 1982 and 1983, GDP contracted by more than 15% (Barandiarán & Hernández, 1999, p. 3). Although the economy recovered relatively quickly, the crisis had important political consequences for Pinochet’s rule because the resulting protests provoked social instability. In an attempt to control this, Pinochet appointed Sergio Onofre Jarpa as Minister of the Interior. Unlike his predecessor, Enrique Montero Marx, he was a civilian. Nonetheless, the political landscape began to change dramatically because, while a number of parties and other social organisations joined forces in a bid to create a common political project to promote a democratic transition, the regime’s supporters splintered into those who wanted to continue with authoritarian rule and those who favoured a return to democracy (Garretón, 1987).

In 1983, in the midst of protests by trade unions and other social organisations, the opposition to the regime created the *Alianza Democrática* (Democratic Alliance), a pseudo-coalition<sup>22</sup> to

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<sup>21</sup> Personal interview with S. Bitar. My translation. See appendix III.

<sup>22</sup> It is referred to as a pseudo-coalition because, during the military regime in which Pinochet held executive power (1973-1989), Congress was closed, left-wing parties were declared illegal and other parties were forced into recess.

work for the restoration of democracy. Although including some members of right-wing parties, it mainly consisted of Christian Democrats and some factions of the Socialist Party. This alliance, which was eventually dissolved in 1988, was the first attempt to build a democratic alternative to the military regime. The *Concertación* emerged from this alliance, first as the *Concertación de Partidos por el No* (Coalition of Parties for the No), which supported the No option in the 1988 plebiscite. As former President Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (1994–2000), son of President Eduardo Frei Montalva (1964-1970), argues, the *Concertación* created a political project that sought first to compete against Pinochet in the plebiscite and then against the right-wing parties in democratic elections:

**“Undoubtedly, the main reason is that the majority of Chileans did not want to continue living under dictatorship but under a democratic regime, despite the fact that, at that time, a democratic system was far from being optimal.... During that period, the only political sector that could offer a peaceful transition to democracy was the Coalition of Parties for the No. It was the only coalition, as evidenced by the facts, that guaranteed the rule of law, respect for freedoms and other basic rights of people, such as social peace. Moreover, the Concertación had a strong commitment to promoting economic growth and social development. The objective was to benefit all Chileans, especially the poorest, who, at that time, represented almost half of the country’s population.... Clearly, the right-wing parties were not a better option, as they had not only been the political support of the military government and Pinochet himself, but had also supported him enthusiastically in the 1988 plebiscite with the Yes option, which would have meant extending Pinochet’s rule for eight years more.”<sup>23</sup>**

Figure 10 shows two main phases of the political history of the *Concertación*: the 1988 plebiscite and the period between 1990 and 2013. On 2 February 1988, 14 political parties signed the pact that created the *Coalition of Parties for the No* (initially there were 13 but the Green Party was subsequently incorporated). However, after the democratic transition in 1990, only four parties remained in the coalition through to 2010: the Christian Democrat Party (PDC), the Socialist Party (PS), the Radical Social Democrat Party (PRSD) and the Party for Democracy (PPD). Despite its origin in a wide range of centre and left-wing parties, the *Concertación* was essentially the union of two parties: the PDC and the PS, the main centre and left-wing party, respectively. As Bitar points out:

**“The 1988 plebiscite to decide on whether Pinochet would be given an additional term marked a tremendous historical change. We took on the enormous task of reconstructing the institutional democratic foundations, neutralizing hatred and seeking unity among Chileans. The Concertación (a coalition based mainly on Christian Democrats and Social Democrats) acted with the conviction of re-establishing the authority of the civilian government over the military, showing respect for human rights, seek justice, and focus on reducing poverty”** (Bitar, 2013, p. 5).

As a coalition, the *Concertación* was born out of a heterogeneous group of politicians and activists from a political elite that already existed before the 1973 coup. Most of its key

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<sup>23</sup> Personal interview with E. Frei. My translation. See appendix III.

members had been active participants in politics before the coup, either in the executive or legislative branch. As had previously occurred during the Popular Front under President Pedro Aguirre Cerda (1938-1944), these actors were ready to set aside their differences and start to govern Chile (Navia, 2000). However, although Pinochet had introduced a law in 1987 that allowed some political parties to regain their legality (i.e. the PDC), the 1980 Constitution still banned Marxist parties. Therefore, neither the PS nor the Communist Party could exist legally. This led various factions and leftist groups to create the Party for Democracy (PPD), which was instrumental in the 1988 plebiscite (Angell, 2003; Lagos, 2013; Otano, 1995).

The PPD served as a vehicle for a legal socialist party, inspired by social, liberal, progressive and democratic values, within the nascent *Concertación*. Several members of the PS joined the PPD. This is why, after the restoration of democracy, dual membership of both the PPD and the PS was permitted (until 1997). As an instrumental party, the main aim of the PPD was to contribute to the unified political force (the *Concertación*) that sought to re-establish democracy in Chile by peaceful and political means. It worked actively to achieve the triumph of the No option in the 1988 plebiscite. As former President Ricardo Lagos Escobar, the main leader and co-founder of this party, indicated on the day of its creation in 1987, it was compulsory for members of the coalition and, therefore, the PPD to register to vote in the plebiscite and work to prevent fraud (as had been the case in the 1980 plebiscite on the constitution):

**“If each party or each of us puts forward our respective projects, we are jumping into a subsequent stage, which is the post-military regime transition. The situation now obliges us to set a different programme. It is much easier to achieve consensus among very dissimilar communities for a transition project... The only dilemma in Chile today is dictatorship or democracy: to address this dilemma, those of who are for democracy will make this party an instrument through which to conquer it... We are here, Chilean men and women, from the right, centre and left, as citizens whose sole purpose is to win democracy... The way to win democracy is clear: register in the electoral registers and organise ourselves through the PPD to prevent fraud, to act on behalf of Chile and defend our vote”** (Lagos, 1987, pp. 4-5).

On the 1988 plebiscite, there were two different views within the *Concertación*. Some of its members were uncertain about the political consequences of a new plebiscite on the grounds that Pinochet had committed fraud in the 1980 plebiscite and was, therefore, likely to do so again. They, therefore, urged the need to reconsider participating and competing in the plebiscite. However, most of the coalition’s leaders argued that this was a new moment in Chilean political history and, unlike 1980, international pressure<sup>24</sup> now demanded

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<sup>24</sup> The military regime progressively lost the support of the United States as from 1986 and the assassination of the photographer Rodrigo Rojas de Negri who, along with Carmen Gloria Quintana, was burned alive by a military patrol during protests against the regime. This convinced the government of


accountability, making electoral fraud more difficult. As Lagos argues: “*for Pinochet, the plebiscite was a tremendously negative process because, if he won, only a few would believe in a legitimate victory, especially considering opinion poll results*” (Lagos, 2013, p. 602).

Most of the *Concertación* leaders were convinced that this was the moment to defeat Pinochet and the military dictatorship and this view prevailed. After winning the plebiscite, the aim of this nascent coalition was then to win the 1989 presidential election. The *Concertación de Partidos por el No* became the *Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia* (Concertation of Parties for Democracy), a new coalition comprising the PDC, the PS (now with legal existence), the PPD and the PRSD. Most of the other parties either disappeared or became part of these four main political forces.

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President Ronald Reagan of the regime’s abuses and led many of his advisers to suggest the need to restore democracy in Chile (Ortega, 2010).

Figure 10. The Concertación. Chile: 1988-2010



Source: Compiled by author with data from the Library of the National Congress (BCN), 2015.

Figure 11. The Concertación parties. Chile: 1988-2010

LOGO	NAME	INITIALS	LOGO	NAME	INITIALS
	Democracia Cristiana (Christian Democracy)	DC		Izquierda Cristiana (Christian Left)	IC
	Partido por la Democracia (Democratic Party)	PPD		Partido Humanista (Humanist Party)	PH
	Partido Socialista de Chile (Socialist Party)	PS		Unión Liberal-Republicana (Liberal-Republican Union)	ULR
	Unión Socialista Popular (Popular Socialist Unity)	USOPO		Partido Radical Socialdemócrata (Radical Socialdemocrat Party)	PRSD
	Partido Radical (Radical Party)	PR		Partido Liberal	PL
	Partido Radical Socialista Democrático (Radical Socialist Democratic Party)	PRSD		Los Verdes (The Green Party)	PLV
	Partido Social Demócrata Chileno (Chilean Social Democrat Party)	SDCH		Coalición Juntos Podemos Mas (Together we can do more for Chile)	
	Partido Democrático Nacional (National Democratic Party)	PADENA		Concertación de Partidos por el No (Concertation of Parties for NO)	
	Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitaria (Popular Unitary Action Movement)	MAPU		Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia (Concertation of Parties for Democracy)	
	MAPU Obrero Campesino (MAPU Worker-Peasant)	MAPU OC			

Source: Compiled by author.



On 14 December 1989, Patricio Aylwin (PDC), the *Concertación*'s candidate, was elected president with 55.17% of the vote (SERVEL, 2014), similar to the percentage obtained by the No in the 1988 plebiscite. The *Concertación* remained in power until 2010 when Sebastián Piñera, the candidate of the *Alianza*, defeated Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle in the run-off ballot of the presidential election. With its ability to develop a strategy for governing based on political consensus within and beyond the coalition, the *Concertación* provided a remarkable example of Latin American democratic transitions (Sehnbruch & Siavelis, 2014). From the beginning of the transition, it negotiated reforms with powerful players such as the 'traditional' right-wing parties as well as with the business elite (most of which supported Pinochet), the *Pinochetistas* (politicians and other ardent followers of Pinochet) and the military. This formula "*ushered in high levels of economic growth, impressive strides in eliminating poverty and remarkable political stability, a model example for democratic transition around the hemisphere*" (Siavelis, 2010).

During the 20 years under the *Concertación*, Chileans witnessed a remarkable decline in the poverty rate from 40% in 1990 to 15% in 2009. Extreme poverty, a condition characterised "*by severe deprivation of basic human needs*" (United-Nations, 1995), was also reduced from 15% to just 3% in the same period (Brandt, 2012, p. 6). In addition, significant reductions in illiteracy and mortality rates were achieved, education improved (principally school enrolment), life expectancy increased and infant mortality dropped. The economy also performed strongly and, as Aninat argued, "*Overall, the 1990s were a period of vigorous and unprecedented expansion, with average annual GDP growth of 6.5 percent. While 1999 was a time of economic adjustment after the fallout of the Asian crisis, Chile is now ready to resume healthy growth in 2000 and beyond*" (Aninat, 2000, p. 1).

However, by the mid-1990s, the *Concertación* began to face vociferous criticism from some political parties (such as the Communists), social movements, intellectuals, academics and some of its own members. They complained about its constant pacts and agreements (formal and informal) with power groups (mostly, the economic elites and the right) in order to maintain positions of privilege at both the economic and political levels. Within the coalition, these groups were known as the *autoflagelantes* (the self-flagellators) while those members of the coalition who justified and defended its decisions were known as the *autocomplacientes* (the self-satisfied).

This period saw growing divisions within the coalition. The debate between the 'self-satisfied' and the 'self-flagellators' began during the government of Eduardo Frei in the late 1990s.

Whereas the first group argued, based on economic and political results, that the *Concertación* governments had been successful, the latter countered that it had not accomplished a wide array of tasks that were essential to consolidate the democratic transition. These were defined as *promesas incumplidas*, or broken promises (Ominami, 2011; 2009) and included the ongoing prevalence of socioeconomic inequities, excessive privatisations and the maintenance of a number of institutions created under Pinochet.

In addition to these broken promises, some scholars claimed that some of the agreements which the coalition had reached with power groups were designed to protect its own interests, which also called into question the democratic consolidation:

**“Agreement was reached on only adaptive and pragmatic matters, while the greater issues were obscure or simply excluded from the debate. The big issues were plentiful and pressing: the constitutional issue, human rights, politics and armed forces, the authoritarian enclaves....., the reduction of the leading role of the state and the weakness of the decentralization, regionalization and local democratization processes, labor relations, the sustainability of the development model. While these matters remained unaddressed, there could hardly be any credible talk of consensus”** (Garretón, 1999, p. 259).

The *Concertación* was also criticised for its decision to maintain many of Pinochet’s economic and political reforms: *“It has already been 21 years since the Concertación, moving away from its historical principles, began to manage the inheritance of Pinochet with orthodox neoliberal efficiency... Is it not too long?”* (Salazar, 2011, p. 7). However, and beyond these criticisms, the *Concertación* fostered discipline among the wide range of centre-left political parties that had opposed the military government and negotiated many important reforms with the right-wing parties before and during the plebiscite and after the democratic transition.

After the end of Pinochet’s dictatorship, the *Alianza* and the *Concertación* exercised control over politics and brought institutional and political stability. The latter not only won four successive presidential elections but also led most social transformations in the post-Pinochet period. Some of the *Concertación*’s leading members have highlighted its success as compared to other Latin American countries. The Pinochet dictatorship was one of the longest in the region, but the political stability achieved as a result of the *Concertación*’s project is also among the most successful cases in the region’s recent political history (Navia, 2009).

## ii. The *Alianza*

The *Alianza* (Alliance) was created in August 1989, after the 1988 plebiscite by two parties: the *Unión Demócrata Independiente* (Independent Democratic Union - UDI) and *Renovación Nacional* (National Renewal - RN). The coalition was originally named *Democracia y Progreso* (Democracy and Progress) but changed its name several times in the 1990s (Figure 3) until becoming the *Alianza por Chile* (Alliance for Chile) in 2000. This name was used until the presidential election of 2009-2010 when its candidate, Sebastián Piñera, defeated the *Concertación*'s Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle<sup>25</sup> and it was renamed *Alianza por el Cambio* (Alliance for Change).

The UDI has been historically the coalition's largest party. Although founded 1983, its origins date back to 1967 and *gremialismo* (guildism), a movement inspired by the ideas of Jaime Guzmán Errázuriz. At that time, Guzmán was president of the student union of the Catholic University's Law Faculty and led opposition to a proposed national reform of universities that sought to establish a new institutional framework to promote university autonomy and power-sharing with students and broaden social access to higher education. Guzmán used the word *gremio* (guild) to define the opposition to these reforms: "*The Gremialistas felt student politics should not concern themselves with the opening up of education and broader social demands. Instead they argued they should restrict their focus to the narrowest issues of student welfare (in other words to union or guild demands or 'demandas gremiales')*" (Akram, 2014, p. 30).

Although the reform was eventually approved, Guzmán's ideas led to the formation of the *gremialista* movement, which defines itself as a school of thought or intellectual tradition inspired by Catholic social teaching. Its main beliefs have their root in the principle that any correct social order must be based on intermediate societies between the person and the state, which are created and managed in freedom by its members and should achieve the purposes for which they were created and no others (Moyano, 2017). In 1969, after Ernesto Illanes, the movement's candidate, became president of the Catholic University's Student Federation (FEUC), the *gremialista* movement triumphed in many successive student elections in that university and quickly expanded its ideology to other Chilean universities. In 1975, Guzmán went on to found the *Frente Juvenil de Unidad Nacional* (Youth National Unity Front), and, in 1983, after the 1982 economic crisis, the *Movimiento Unión Demócrata Independiente* (Independent Democratic Union Movement), the UDI party.

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<sup>25</sup> For the presidential election of 2013, after the period covered by this research, the UDI and the RN again adopted the name *Alianza*.

From its creation, the UDI vigorously supported the military regime. Soon after Allende's overthrow in 1973, Guzmán became Pinochet's closest adviser and played a key role in drafting his 1977 Chacarillas speech<sup>26</sup> as well as in the Ortúzar Commission on a new constitution. Although never taking an official position, Guzmán continued as a collaborator, mostly writing Pinochet's important speeches and providing political advice. During this period, he became close to Sergio Fernández, the Minister of the Interior, and the so-called Chicago Boys' neoliberal doctrine.<sup>27</sup> As Correa (2005) argues, the right's support for Pinochet was absolute and decisive in promoting a new political regime in Chile:

**“The support that the right wing – through the parties, businessmen and the press – gave to the military dictatorship was total. Although some members tried to keep their distance from Pinochet and the regime itself, with attempts to create political parties in opposition to the dictatorship, they did not succeed in gaining electoral support. The right wing was *Pinochetista*. Indeed, its members established the military regime's substantive ideological principles and policy, which still prevail with regard to their economic and social transformations as well as the new political institutions established in recent years”** (Correa, 2005, p. 269).

The UDI was founded, as a political movement, on 24 September 1983 by Jaime Guzmán, Pablo Longueira, Javier Leturia, Guillermo Elton and Luis Cordero. Afterwards, in 1987, considering the *gremialista* movement's popularity and the fact that the Pinochet regime had authorised the creation of political parties and opened the national voting register, the UDI decided, along with other social and political groups such as the *Unión Nacional* (National Union) and the *Frente Nacional del Trabajo* (National Workers' Front), to create the *Renovación Nacional* party (National Renewal - RN). The idea was that RN would be the only right-wing party to support Pinochet in the 1988 plebiscite.

However, after irreconcilable differences with Andrés Allamand (of the National Union) and Sergio Onofre Jarpa (of the National Workers' Front), Jaime Guzmán was expelled from the RN on 20 April 1988, six months before the plebiscite.<sup>28</sup> In response, he decided, along with

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<sup>26</sup> The Chacarillas speech was given at an event held by the Youth National Unity Front to commemorate the second anniversary of its foundation and the anniversary of the battle of La Concepción between Chile and Peru in 1882. The event took place on top of the Chacarillas Hill in Santiago on 9 July 1977 and was organised by 77 members of the Front (most of whom became politicians after the return of democracy). Pinochet's speech is considered a declaration of principles by the military government. That night, surrounded by flame torches, he declared: “*It is convenient to reiterate once again that September 11 did not represent just the overthrow of an illegitimate and failed government, but the end of an exhausted institutional regime, and the consequent imperative to build a new one*” (Pinochet, 1977, p. 13).

<sup>27</sup> Under Pinochet, the so-called Chicago Boys, a group of right-wing economists who had studied in Chicago with Milton Friedman, worked seamlessly together with the *gremialistas* because they needed a firm authoritarian political base in order to implement their economic reforms (Akram, 2013; Huneus, 2006; Boeninger, 1998).

<sup>28</sup> Internal party elections were due to be held in March 1988. However, Jaime Guzmán reported irregularities in the election of its leadership, resulting in irreconcilable differences with Sergio Onofre Jarpa and Andrés Allamand, president and vice-president of the RN, respectively. Guzmán was expelled

Pablo Longueira, to create '*la UDI por el Sí*' (the UDI for the Yes) to support Pinochet. In April 1989, they went on to found the UDI party. Subsequently, as shown in Figure 12, from the return to democracy through to 2010, the UDI and the RN were the main parties within the *Alianza*.

The National Party, one of the most important right-wing parties in the 1960s and 1970s, was a member of the *Alianza* from 1992 until 1994 when it merged with the Union of the Centrist Centre (UCC), which remained in the coalition until 1996. The Party of the South (PSUR), a party created in order to promote the interests of southern Chile, also participated from 1993 until its dissolution in 1998, when most of its members joined the UDI. From 1999 onwards, the *Alianza* comprised only the RN and the UDI.

Although the *Alianza* failed to win any presidential election between 1990 and 2010, it did play an active role in Congress, due to the existence of the binomial electoral system. This meant that the *Concertación* constantly had to negotiate numerous aspects of its reform agenda with the *Alianza*. In this context, although the two coalitions maintained a certain ideological distance (Gamboa, López & Baeza, 2013), they were able to reach important agreements on constitutional reform, public policies and the consolidation of a development agenda for the country, despite this causing divisions in the *Concertación* between the so-called *autocomplacientes* (the self-satisfied) and the *autoflagelantes* (the self-flagellators). This situation meant that both coalitions evolved from confrontation to consensus (Waissbluth, 2006).


A key example from this period is the agreement reached by the two coalitions in the face of the political crisis triggered by a high-profile corruption scandal involving the Public Works Ministry (MOP) and the company, GATE S.A., in 2000.<sup>29</sup> This led to a national agreement on modernisation of the state, which not only resolved the crisis but also opened the way to greater transparency and probity in the public administration (Waissbluth, 2006).

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from the party and his supporters decided to resign from the RN and refound the original *gremialista* movement as the *UDI por el Sí*. It is important to note that the members of the UDI who belonged to the RN always sought to conserve their own identity (Muñoz, 2016).

<sup>29</sup> The MOP-GATE case was at the centre of the largest corruption scandal to occur during the government of President Ricardo Lagos. It involved principally officials at the Public Works Ministry (MOP) and the company, Gestión Ambiental y Territorial Sociedad Anónima (GATE S.A.). It was revealed that, since 1997, the MOP had been paying 129 employees wage top-ups for work they had not done while GATE S.A. had received unjustified payments for concessioned highways and their projections.

Figure 12. The *Alianza*. Chile: 1988-2010



Source: Compiled by author with data from the Library of the National Congress (BCN), 2015.

Figure 13. The *Alianza* parties. Chile: 1988-2010

LOGO	NAME	INITIALS	LOGO	NAME	INITIALS
	Union Demócrata Independiente (Independent Democratic Union) Logo used in 1989	UDI		PARTIDO NACIONAL (National Party)	PN
	Union Demócrata Independiente (Independent Democratic Union) Logo used between 1989 - 2005	UDI		Union de Centro Centro (Union of the Centrist Center)	UCC
	Union Demócrata Independiente (Independent Democratic Union) Logo used between 2005 - 2010	UDI		Partido del Sur (Party of the South)	PSUR
	Renovación Nacional (National Renewal) Logo used between 1987 - 2001, 2002 - 2005	RN		Chile Primero (Chile First)	CP
	Renovación Nacional (National Renewal) Logo used between 2001 - 2002	RN		Renovación Nacional (National Renewal) Logo used between 2009 - 2010	RN
	Renovación Nacional (National Renewal) Logo used between 2005 - 2009	RN			

Source: Compiled by author.

### iii. Conclusions

This chapter has analysed the formation and evolution of the two political coalitions that have dominated Chile's recent history, leading the process that put an end to the military regime and the subsequent process of re-democratisation that began with the 1988 plebiscite and the 1989 congressional and presidential elections. Both coalitions were characterised by large-scale political projects and the representation of very heterogeneous groups. However, after formally

taking power, their projects shifted towards the parties with greater political representation and a larger social base.

In the case of the *Concertación*, the four largest parties (PDC, PS, PPD and PRSD) endured over time. Indeed, the coalition's first two governments were led by the PDC and the third and fourth by the PS. The *Concertación* won four successive presidential elections and won a majority in all congressional and municipal elections through to 2008, making it the most successful coalition in the recent history of Latin America. As a governing coalition, it showed pragmatism in the management of public policy and its adoption of the economic development strategy implemented by the Chicago Boys under the military regime (Navia, 2009). This led to debate and divisions within the coalition, which became more marked after its defeat in the run-off ballot of the 2009 presidential election.

Thanks to the binomial system for congressional elections, the *Alianza* played an active role as opposition. Like the *Concertación*, it attempted to attract centre-right political forces after the restoration of democracy, but finally consisted of the two parties with the greatest political impact and largest social base (RN and UDI). As a political force, the *Alianza* grew significantly after its victory in the 2008 municipal elections and the run-off ballot of the 2009 presidential election. However, the incorporation of more progressive centre-right forces marked its end in 2015.

Much of the stability of the agreements reached by the political elite, as expressed in these two coalitions, can be attributed to their social origins. The vast majority of their members came from similar social circles in terms of characteristics such as their socioeconomic origin (high socioeconomic strata), family relationships in common and elite schools. This permitted interaction and negotiation through intermediaries within these elite groups (Espinoza & Madrid, 2010). This is important in explaining the logic of social closure and the low turnover seen in the Chilean post-transition political elite (Davis, 2012). This is discussed in greater detail in Chapters VII and VIII, respectively.

## CHAPTER V: POLITICAL PERFORMANCE OF THE PARTY ELITES AFTER PINOCHET: 1990-2010

### i. Introduction

This chapter describes and analyses the electoral evolution of the Chilean party elite between 1990 and 2010. After the end of the dictatorship and the subsequent return to democratic elections in the late 1980s, the centre-left *Concertación* and the right-wing *Alianza por Chile* coalitions established a partyarchy (Siavelis, 2009). As shown by various scholars, competition between these two multi-party coalitions dominated electoral and legislative politics between 1990 and 2010 (Alemán & Saiegh, 2007; Navia, 2008). They exercised control over the political system and held almost all the seats in both chambers of Congress.

During the democratic transition, the political elite established agreements on certain political matters and policy issues, allowing them to maintain institutional stability and consolidate a successful democratic transition (Angell & Pollack, 1995; Fuentes, 2012; Godoy, 1999). However, this approach favoured the concentration of power in the two coalitions, the incumbent party elites, and affected democratic consolidation. As noted by Sehnbruch and Siavelis, this emerged as one of the main weaknesses of the post-transition period in Chile:

**“Politics in most countries is necessarily and by definition dominated by elites. The problem in Chile, however, is that the deal-making at first necessary to maintain the democratic transition, and now essential to maintaining the Concertación coalition, has undermined democratic responsiveness, accountability and legitimacy. This means that the very strengths of Chile’s transition have now turned into the weaknesses of the post-transition”** (Sehnbruch & Siavelis, 2014, p. 4).

After the transition, these party elites maintained the same political strategy, based on agreements about important political issues of institutional and economic development. This allowed them to preserve some original aspects of Pinochet’s institutional design and favoured their permanence in power as incumbents (Tables 5, 6 and 7). Moreover, most parties in the two coalitions tended to select their candidates for Congress through non-democratic mechanisms. For instance, between 1990 and 2010, only the PDC, and only since 2001, promoted open primaries (Table 8) while other parties continued to control the selection mechanism at the national and, in some instances, local level.

As Navia argues, the failure to adopt open primaries was due, among other factors, to the importance of intra-coalition negotiations:



**“Thus, although the adoption of reforms that promote the use of open primaries might be desirable, a unilateral adoption of open primaries by a party might not produce positive results for that party. Moreover, given that the final decision over which parties will have candidates in which districts depends on the intracoalition negotiations, the adoption of open primaries will not automatically result in the nomination of candidates who win their party primaries. Unless primaries are held at the coalition level rather than the party level, the adoption of open or closed primaries will not limit the existing power of party elites to influence the candidate selection process in Chile. If primaries are eventually held at the coalition level, then the presence of party loyalists will be significantly hindered, since voters –rather than party elites- will make the decision as to who actually makes it on the ballot” (Navia, 2008, p. 112).**

This is also borne out by the electoral results of the PDC which deteriorated after it adopted open primaries. It lost seats in Congress in the elections held in 2001, 2005 and 2009 (Tables 6 and 7).

As Sehnbruch and Siavelis (2014) argue, the strengths of the transition eventually turned into the weakness of the post-transition period. The strategy of consensus and the binomial electoral system led to a highly centralised political system, playing a decisive role in the formation of this partyarchy between 1990 and 2010.

## **ii. Transformation of the Chilean party system**

Along with other independent variables, such as elite preferences, electoral institutions affect the existence and performance of political parties, (Cox, 1997, p.5). When their political transitions took place, most Latin American countries decided either to adopt the same electoral system that existed before the authoritarian regime or to reform them in the direction of greater proportional representation. Chile took a different path and is quite unique in that the party elites agreed to replace an historical proportional system with a majoritarian one (Navia & Sandoval, 1998; Siavelis & Valenzuela, 1996).

Before the 1973 coup, Chile had a multi-party system, organised around right, centre and left axes, in which five parties were the most important at the national level: the National Party (PN), which was the result of the merger of the Conservative and Liberal Parties, on the right, the Christian Democrat Party (PDC) and Radical Social Democrat Party (PRSD) in the centre and the Socialist Party (PS) and Communist Party (PC) on the left (Valenzuela, 1995, pp. 40-41). From Arturo Alessandri Palma’s election as president (PL-PR) in 1932 through to Salvador Allende’s overthrow in 1973, this system remained relatively unchanged. During that period, eight presidential and eleven congressional elections were held.

In 1936, the Radical, Socialist and Communist parties created the *Frente Popular* (Popular Front) which, due to internal conflicts, came to an end in 1941. However, its creation allowed Pedro Aguirre Cerda (PR) to win the 1938 presidential election. This was followed by the governments of Juan Antonio Ríos (PR, 1942-1946) and Gabriel González Videla (PR, 1946-1952), completing a period known as the “Radical era”. In 1952, General Carlos Ibáñez del Campo, who had already been president between 1927 and 1931, won the presidential election, supported mainly by the *Partido Agrario Laborista* (Agrarian Labour Party) and a faction of the Socialist Party. However, the Agrarian Labour Party was dissolved after the end of Ibáñez’s term in 1958. In that year, Jorge Alessandri Rodríguez, son of former President Arturo Alessandri Palma, was elected. Supported by the Liberal and Conservative parties, he tried to implement a model of “*gerentes para Chile*” (managers for Chile). However, it did not produce the expected results and, in the 1964 presidential election, the right-wing parties decided to support Eduardo Frei Montalva (PDC) in order to prevent the election of Salvador Allende (PS). The three-way right-centre-left divide of Chilean politics then again reappeared in the 1970 election won by Allende (Navia, 2000).

Electoral participation was given a considerable boost by the inclusion of women in political life. In 1935, National Decree N° 5.357 gave women the right to vote in municipal elections and, as from 1949, with the modification of the Law N° 4.554, they were also allowed to vote in presidential and congressional elections. Subsequently, as the electorate expanded, the political parties evolved to mobilise the growing mass of voters as the means of political control (Valenzuela, 1995). Moreover, the creation of the *cédula única electoral* (electoral card) in 1958 put an end to vote-buying. In 1969, blind and otherwise visually impaired people were allowed to vote, followed in 1972 by illiterate people. All these measures led to a significant increase in the electorate from 7.8% of the population in 1932 to almost 37% in the 1973 elections (Cruz-Coke R. , 1984). Although the expansion of suffrage strengthened democratic institutions and fostered electoral support for left-wing parties (Toro, Morales, & Piñeiro, El efecto de las leyes electorales sobre la fragmentación partidaria en Chile, 1999-2008: Voto estratégico, barreras de entrada e información, 2011), it coincided with the growth of the political and social tensions and polarisations that led to the breakdown of democracy (Torcal & Mainwaring, 2002).

Shortly before the 1973 coup, although the number of political parties with parliamentary representation had increased, the share of votes obtained by the four largest parties (PN, PDC, PS and PC) was larger than in any of the previous elections held in 1961, 1965, and 1969 (Navia & Sandoval, 1998, p. 5) and the multi-party system consisted mainly in the right-centre-left

axes.

However, this stability came to an end after the 1973 coup, after which the military junta closed Congress and ordered an indefinite political recess. Whereas the PS, PC and other leftist factions were targeted by the dictatorship's repressive security forces and most of their members were arrested, tortured, exiled and/or killed, the PN and the PDC welcomed the military intervention. However, while the PN voluntarily joined the military government, only a few members of the PDC actively supported Pinochet's rule. In fact, as Pinochet and his regime decided to stay on in power, rather than calling early elections, the PDC opted to join the opposition to the regime.

In spite of being officially banned, political activity continued under Pinochet and, after the 1982 crisis and the resulting protests, the political parties gained in importance. The protests triggered by the crisis took the form of demonstrations on the main streets of the country's principal cities. They also included strikes by workers and at schools and universities and clashes with the security forces in poorer peripheral neighbourhoods. The regime's response was always violent, leaving dozens of people dead or injured. These protests continued through to the 1988 plebiscite (Huneus, 2006).

The crisis and the protests led to the emergence of new political leaders within the opposition to the regime. The PDC, which had been able to maintain its internal organisation, played an important leadership role during this period (Dávila, 2011; Scully, 1992). In obedience to the regime's orders, most right-wing parties had ceased to be active but, in the early 1980s, two parties - the RN and, subsequently, the UDI - were founded. The former brought together traditional right-wing leaders while the UDI was formed principally by *Pinochetistas* or, in other words, people whose primary loyalty was to Pinochet and his regime (Huneus, 2006).

The left was definitely the most damaged political force during this period. The PS and the PC continued functioning abroad in exile. While the PS split into multiple factions, the PC retained important influence in trade unions and student organisations. In this context, the *Concertación* and the *Alianza* were created and participated in the 1988 plebiscite. "*By the time the plebiscite was held, more than 30 political parties and groups were operating in the country, excluding the officially illegal Socialist Party, Communist Party and other Marxist and leftist groups. Altogether, Socialists, Communists and other leftist groups were divided into at least 7 parties and/or organizations*" (Navia & Sandoval, 1998, p.6).

In 1987, the military junta decreed that all political parties must register with the Electoral Registry, with the exception of Marxist parties (which continued to be banned until 1989). Most parties formed part of either the *Concertación* or the *Alianza* (Huneus, 2006). This form of political organisation persisted after the democratic transition, due to the binomial system which had replaced the proportional representation system established under the 1925 Constitution:

**“The historical antecedents of the binomial system date back to the creation of the Commission for the Study of a New Constitution by the newly ensconced military government in the waning months of 1973. The Junta believed that the proportional representation (PR) system established by the 1925 Constitution had led to a proliferation in the number of political parties. The intensity of the resulting electoral competition was, in the Junta’s view, a leading cause of the political fragmentation and polarization that preceded the election of Allende in 1970 and eventually resulted in the military coup of 11 September 1973”** (Pastor, 2004, p. 48).

When President Aylwin took office in 1990, most of his appointments for positions of trust went to members of the PDC, PS, PPD and PRSD (Dávila, 2011; Navia & Sandoval, 1998; Siavelis & Valenzuela, 1996). Moreover, a wide range of characteristics of Chilean electoral preferences and the political party structure before 1973 continued to exist after 1989 (Scully, 1992; Valenzuela & Scully, 1997).

The ability of the elites to maintain their power resources plays an essential role in determining the functioning of a political system. As most elites and their members boast multiple resources of power within society, institutions and other legal mechanisms are necessary to regulate their interactions in order to avoid or reduce political crises (Pareto, 1901). In Chile, despite the 1973 coup and an authoritarian regime that lasted nearly two decades, the political elite was able to reach a wide range of agreements that favoured a democratic transition and the country’s stable institutional development.

However, as explained in Chapter III, the ongoing existence of authoritarian enclaves resulted in a paradox between a successful democratic transition and the process of democratic consolidation. While the first refers to the transformation of a government regime, the second is the process whereby a newly established democratic regime acquires the robustness that makes a return to non-democratic rule unlikely (Gasiorowski & Power, 1998, p.740). Although the agreement reached by the governing coalitions on maintaining the Pinochet regime’s institutional and economic legacy gave the post-dictatorship political process institutional and political stability, it constrained its democratic consolidation (Garretón, 2012).

Both the *Concertación* and the *Alianza* played an essential role in defining and implementing

the institutional framework for the new limited democracy. However, as Pinochet's supporters were able to exercise a greater capacity for negotiation during the beginning of the transition, the *Concertación* had to accept a wide range of "conditions" in order to avoid a new authoritarian regime. This was a decisive factor in the definition of the post-authoritarian institutional design (Heiss & Navia, 2008). However, after the transition, this coalition won four successive presidential elections and all legislative and municipal elections until 2008 while, thanks to the binomial system, the *Alianza* maintained the second majority. As Ominami argues, nobody in the coalition could ever have imagined this political outcome:

**"I think it is very important to separate things... Because the Concertación was created with the aim of confronting Pinochet's dictatorship and of consolidating the political transition, nobody, but nobody, thought that the Concertación would stay in power for 20 years. What brought us together at that time? The dictatorship. The idea was that we would generate a mobilisation of the masses, a strike, which would finally end the dictatorship... But this option became unviable. Then, in the coalition's member parties, we knew we had to learn from previous mistakes and generate a common force in order to achieve a transition from authoritarianism to a new democratic regime that did not have the shortcomings of the previous one".<sup>30</sup>**

This *Concertación*'s idea of "*transar en la medida de lo posible*" (to compromise as far as possible) was conceived as a strategic principle of political action, with the clear aim of achieving acceptance of the rules of the game for governing under a more democratic system. However, some politicians and other intellectuals argued that, over the years, the strategy became one of "*transar sin parar*" (constant compromise) (Jocelyn-Holt, 1998, p.231). This argument had weight in that some members of the *Concertación* had supported Allende and his slogan of "*avanzar sin transar*" (advance without compromise) but were now advocating a strategy that implied reaching agreements with Pinochet's supporters.

During the post-authoritarian period, some members of the *Concertación* argued for a change of approach, mostly because of the maintenance of Pinochet's neoliberal transformations. This prompted debate between the *autocomplacientes* (the self-satisfied), who justified and defended coalition's decisions, and the *autoflagelantes* (the self-flagellators), who were critical of its performance (see Chapter IV). While the former pointed to the country's economic performance and the institutional stability achieved by the *Concertación* governments, the latter complained of a lack of political will for more radical reforms to eliminate the vestiges of the military dictatorship, including the authoritarian enclaves (Navia, 2009; Silva, 2007). When the *Concertación* lost the 2009 presidential election, the self-satisfied lost spaces of influence.

The decision not to eliminate the enclaves, including particularly the binomial system, was not

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<sup>30</sup> Personal interview with C. Ominami. My translation. See appendix III.

only decisive in the establishment of democracy, but also enabled the party elites to retain their political power under a balanced system dominated by two coalitions, or a partyarchy (Siavelis, 2009). In this context, an underlying question about the post-authoritarian period has to do with the form in which these party elites were created and reproduced between 1990 and 2010.

### **iii. A political elite “*a la chilena*”**

In Chile, the elites have historically played an important role in maintaining structures of dominance at odds with egalitarian principles. This form of elitism dates back to the Spanish colonisation in the seventeenth century when an “*orden señorial*” (stately order) was established (Jocelyn-Holt, 1998). Albeit evolving constantly, this order persisted with the same ruling class, which maintained its pre-eminence. The agrarian reform, initiated by the government of Frei Montalva and deepened during the government of Allende, marked an important milestone in the redefinition of this structure of domination. However, this ambitious policy ended in an unprecedented political crisis and an imbalance between stability and forms of political integration within Chilean society (Bengoa, 2015; Lehmann, 1992; 1971).

The institutional, economic and political crisis suffered by Allende’s Chile, and, therefore, his road to socialism deepened when the PDC ceased to act as a political centre and decided to support military intervention. This broke the equilibrium within the political elite and, added to the mistakes, gaps and contradictions of the *Unidad Popular* (Popular Unity), aggravated an unprecedented democratic crisis, leading to the 1973 coup (Garretón & Moulian, 1983). The coup resulted in an important transformation of the forms of political domination. While the right-wing parties supported Pinochet and contributed significantly to the design of the new institutional framework and the 1980 Constitution, the centre-left parties were displaced from political power.

In sociopolitical terms, one of the key aspects of this period is the role played by the ruling classes. Moulian argues that their attitude was closer to containment, rather than modernisation, with the right (historically linked to the country’s wealthy classes) always playing a traditionalist-oligarchic role linked to the institution of the “*hacienda*” (agricultural estate), instead of devising a capitalist modernisation project. For this reason, Moulian asserts that the Chilean right suffered an historic split between the so-called “state of commitment” period and the modernisation project whose implementation began in 1975 (Moulian, 2006).

Moulian's thesis contrasts with that of Correa (2005), who concludes that what happened within the Chilean right was, in fact, a silent dispute between a social Christian project, linked to the old agrarian order, and a capitalist modernisation project, with the latter becoming the national project finally implemented by the military regime with the assistance of the "gremialistas" and the Chicago Boys (Akram, 2014; Correa, 2005). Despite this difference, Correa and Moulian, however, agree that the left also ended up being part of this capitalist modernisation project:

**"There is something on which both Tomás Moulian's and Sofia Correa's theses agree. The Chilean modernisation is the result of a rare fusion between a right wing that endorses the modernisation project (quite late, according to Moulian, and quite early, according to Correa) and a left wing that is hegemonised by it. In other words, despite appearances and the fact that Moulian argues that the right wing had a strategy of containment while Correa claims that it possessed a modernising spirit that defeated the social Christian doctrine, both authors agree that the modernising project ended up hegemonising the left-wing parties"** (Peña, 2007, p. 161).

A key feature of this capitalist modernisation in Chile was the lack of inclusive institutions. This was the principal cause of an excessive concentration of power at the economic and political levels. Throughout this period, the Chilean elites developed a number of networks that contributed to the maintenance of this concentration which, as discussed above, already existed before the governments of Frei and Allende. In other words, this form of inequity in the distribution of power not only existed in the past, but also persisted during the military regime and after the democratic transition (Baland & Robinson, 2008; Robinson, 2013).

After the end of the Pinochet dictatorship, political concentration was strengthened mainly due to the ongoing existence of authoritarian enclaves, particularly the binomial electoral system, which favoured the continuity in power of the Chilean political party elites (Navia, 2000). This is a key focus of this research since its purpose is to analyse the type of social resources that are decisive in both the creation and reproduction of the political elite during the period between the return of democracy and the end of the first Bachelet administration in 2010.

#### **iv. Electoral performance of the Chilean political elites, 1990-2010**

In the wake of the success of the end of the dictatorship, few Chileans were aware that much of its authoritarian institutional design remained in place. Instead of retreating from public life, Pinochet stayed on as commander-in-chief of the Army, a clear sign of the military's ongoing importance in post-transitional Chile: *"While in many countries former dictators board a plane for Miami or Paris when their regimes come to an end, Pinochet packed his desk at La Moneda presidential palace and simply moved across the street to the Ministry of Defense"* (Field &

Siavelis, 2009, p.17). This was the result of the agreement established between the *Concertación* and the *Alianza* to foster a peaceful political transition to democracy.

The *Concertación*'s political formula was successful, but projected an image of elitism and excessive party dominance. The same was true of the *Alianza*. After the end of Pinochet's regime, both coalitions established a partyarchy or a "*polity characterized by political party domination*" (Siavelis, 2009, p.3). This brought with it practices such as the elite's control of candidate selection and electoral politics, party-dominated politics, the informal political party quota system ("cuoteo") and elitist and extra-institutional policy-making, which Siavelis defines as post-authoritarian enclaves (Siavelis, 2009b). In the case of the informal political party quota system, many studies have underscored the importance of the relative strength of each coalition's member parties in the allocation of senior positions (González-Bustamante & Garrido-Vergara, 2018; González-Bustamante & Olivares, 2016; González-Bustamante, 2013).

A wide variety of data illustrates the way in which the *Concertación* and the *Alianza* dominated Chilean politics between 1990 and 2010. Table 5 shows the results of presidential elections between 1989 and 2005 when the *Concertación* won four successive elections while the *Alianza* took second place in all of them and consistently obtained a high vote. Indeed, in 1999, since no candidate received more than 50% of the vote, a second-round run-off was held on 16 January 2000 in which Ricardo Lagos, the *Concertación*'s candidate, defeated the *Alianza*'s Joaquín Lavín by a margin of barely 3%. Again, in 2005, no candidate obtained more than 50% in the first round, although, in this case, Michelle Bachelet defeated Sebastián Piñera by a higher margin (7%).

Table 5 also shows each coalition's mechanism for selecting its presidential candidate. In the case of the *Alianza*, the selection method used in all the elections was "elite-centred". In other words, a select group of members of the right-wing political elite nominated its candidate in all presidential elections between 1990 and 2010. By contrast, in the case of the *Concertación*, only Patricio Aylwin, the first president elected after Pinochet, was nominated in this way. For the 1993 presidential election, Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle, son of former President Eduardo Frei Montalva, was selected through a closed primary (only members of the *Concertación* parties could vote) and, in 1999, Ricardo Lagos was selected through an open primary. In 2005, Michelle Bachelet became the *Concertación*'s candidate after the PDC's Soledad Alvear withdrew ahead of an open primary. These elite power mechanisms in the selection of candidates can also be seen in the case of congressional elections where there is abundant evidence of the veto powers exercised by the parties of both coalitions (García-Grandón,



Garrido-Vergara, & Navia, 2013; Navia, 2008; Toro & García-Grandón, 2008).

Table 5. Presidential candidates, Concertación and Alianza, 1990-2005

Coalition	Candidate	Election	Selection method	Elected president?	Percentage of votes	
					1 <sup>st</sup> round	2 <sup>nd</sup> round
<i>Concertación</i>	Patricio Aylwin	1989	Elite-centred	Yes	55.17	--
	Eduardo Frei	1993	Closed primary (a)	Yes	57.98	--
	Ricardo Lagos	1999	Open coalition primary (b)	Yes	47.96	51.31
	Michelle Bachelet	2005	Open coalition primary (c)	Yes	45.9	53.49
<i>Alianza</i>	Hernán Büchi	1989	Elite-centred (d)	No	29.4	--
	Arturo Alessandri	1993	Elite-centred (d)	No	24.41	--
	Joaquín Lavín	1999	Elite-centred	No	47.51	48.69
	Joaquín Lavín	2005	Elite-centred (e)	No	23.2	--
	Sebastián Piñera	2005	Elite-centred (e)	No	25.4	46.5

(a) Only members of the coalition parties.

(b) All voters except members of a party other than those in the *Concertación*.

(c) Although an open primary was planned, Soledad Alvear, Bachelet's contender, pulled out before it was held.

(d) Both Büchi and Alessandri were independent right-wing candidates supported by the *Alianza* (although it was not called that until 1999).

(e) In 2005, the RN supported Sebastián Piñera and the UDI supported Joaquín Lavín. Afterwards, in the second round, both parties supported Sebastián Piñera.

Source: Compiled by author with data from Altman, 2008, pp. 244-249, and <http://elecciones.gov.cl>.

Between 1990 and 2010 the *Concertación* and the *Alianza* exercised veto power. When defining their respective candidates for congressional, presidential and municipal elections, these party elites were normally able to block possible candidates from other parties and, therefore, promote their own candidates. Navia argues that, during this period, “*party elites in Chile exercise effective veto power in the candidate selection process, but they do not fully control it. Negotiations between parties within each political coalition give party elites*

*additional power to block aspirants from other parties and promote candidacies from their own. Often the preferences of political parties with respect to candidate selection are trumped in the interests of coalition unity”* (Navia, 2008, p. 92).

After the end of the political transition, the political parties reacted to the new electoral rules. As from the first congressional election in 1989, party nominations started to become increasingly embedded in a broader electoral support strategy, thereby enhancing their long-term impact. Each party sought to nominate popular candidates or, in other words, those individuals who would eventually obtain more votes in the district, rather than other members of the party. However, because nominations were also negotiated within the coalition (the binomial system meant that party elites had to negotiate the nomination of candidates in each district), most parties tried to nominate not only popular but also loyalist candidates in order to avoid their choices being blocked by the coalition’s party elites (Luna & Altman, 2011; Navia, 2008).

In the case of Congress, the *Concertación* and the *Alianza* took most of the seats in both houses in the elections held between 1989 and 2009 (Tables 6 and 7). In the case of the Chamber of Deputies, the *Concertación* obtained over 50% of the seats in all elections until 2005 while the *Alianza* obtained over 40% in all elections except 1997. As shown in Table 7, the predominance of the two coalitions was even greater in the Senate, with the *Concertación* winning over 50% of the available seats in all elections from 1989 to 2009 and the *Alianza* taking over 40% in 1989, 1997 and 2005. However, in the 1993, 2001 and 2009 elections, each coalition obtained 50% of the seats up for election. This predominance is also evident in the case of municipal elections (Table 9). However, in this case, the *Concertación* obtained a majority of the votes in all elections except for 2008.

Table 6. Chilean Chamber of Deputies Elections, 1989-2009

		DEPUTIES																							
		1989				1993				1997				2001				2005				2009(a)			
		N.C.	C.E.	P.E.	P.S.A.	N.C.	C.E.	P.E.	P.S.A.	N.C.	C.E.	P.E.	P.S.A.	N.C.	C.E.	P.E.	P.S.A.	N.C.	C.E.	P.E.	P.S.A.	N.C.	C.E.	P.E.	P.S.A.
					(120)				(120)				(120)				(120)				(120)				(120)
<b>Concertación</b>	PDC	45	38	84.4	31.7	48	37	77.1	30.8	55	38	69.1	31.7	54	23	42.6	19.2	56	20	35.7	16.7	39	19	48.7	15.8
	PPD	25	16	64.0	13.3	25	15	60.0	12.5	29	16	55.2	13.3	24	20	83.3	16.7	27	21	77.8	17.5	27	18	66.7	15.0
	PS	0	0	0.0	0.0	28	15	53.6	12.5	26	11	42.3	9.2	21	10	47.6	8.3	21	15	71.4	12.5	24	11	45.8	9.2
	PRSD	16	5	31.3	4.2	15	2	13.3	1.7	8	4	50.0	3.3	14	6	42.9	5.0	9	7	77.8	5.8	14	5	35.7	4.2
	Others	30	10	33.3	8.3	4	1	25.0	0.8	2	0	0.0	0.0	7	3	42.9	2.5	7	2	28.6	1.7	16	4	0.0	3.3
	TOTAL	116	69	59.5	57.5	120	70	58.3	58.3	120	69	57.5	57.5	120	62	51.7	51.7	120	65	54.2	54.2	120	57	47.5	47.5
<b>Alianza</b>	RN	66	29	43.9	24.2	41	29	70.7	24.2	52	23	44.2	19.2	45	18	40.0	15.0	50	19	38.0	15.8	51	18	35.3	15.0
	UDI	30	11	36.7	9.2	29	15	51.7	12.5	47	17	36.2	14.2	54	31	57.4	25.8	59	33	55.9	27.5	56	37	66.1	30.8
	Others	23	8	34.8	6.7	50	6	12.0	5.0	20	7	35.0	5.8	20	8	40.0	6.7	11	2	18.2	1.7	13	3	23.1	2.5
	TOTAL	119	48	40.3	40.0	120	50	41.7	41.7	119	47	39.5	39.2	119	57	47.9	47.5	120	54	45.0	45.0	120	58	48.3	48.3
<b>Others</b>	Others	184	3	1.6	2.5	144	0	0.0	0.0	203	4	2.0	3.3	142	1	0.7	0.8	146	1	0.7	0.8	189	5	2.6	4.2
<b>TOTAL</b>		419	120	28.6	100.0	384	120	31.3	100.0	442	120	27.1	100.0	381	120	31.5	100.0	386	120	31.1	100.0	429	120	28.0	100.0

N.C.: Number of candidates.

C.E.: Number of candidates elected.

P.E.: Percentage of candidates elected.

P.S.A.: Percentage of seats obtained out of the 120 seats.

(a) In this election, the Communist Party (included in Others) participated with the *Concertación*.Source: (Navia, 2008, p. 101) and, for the 2005 and 2009 elections, author's calculations based on data from <http://www.elecciones.gov.cl>.

Table 6 uses Navia's formula (Navia, 2008, p. 100) for estimating parties' success rates in getting their candidates elected (the number of candidates elected divided by the total number of candidates, shown as P.E. in the table). Throughout the six elections held during this period, the success rates of both the *Concertación* and the *Alianza* fluctuated around 50% percent. The *Alianza*'s rate exceeded that of the *Concertación* only in 2009. This result is quite similar to the percentage of seats won (P.S.A.) since it was only in 2009 that the *Alianza* defeated the *Concertación*.

Although the success rates achieved by both the *Alianza* and the *Concertación* were quite high, they varied significantly across the parties in each coalition. In the case of the *Concertación*, the PDC's success rate reached around 77% in 1989, 1993 and 1997, but decreased to an average of around 43% between 2001 and 2009. By contrast, the PPD achieved a success rate of around 60% in 1989, 1993 and 1997 and this then increased to almost 77% between 2001 and 2009. The PDC did extraordinarily well in 1989, with a success rate of 84.4%, similar to the 83.3% obtained by the PPD in 2001. The PS and PRSD did well in 2005 when, along with the PPD, they achieved rates of over 70%.

In the case of the *Alianza*, the RN's success rate reached around 53% in 1989, 1993 and 1997, but then decreased to an average of around 38%. For the UDI, on the other hand, the success rate fluctuated around 41% in 1989, 1993 and 1997 before increasing to almost 60%. The RN did extraordinarily well in 1993, with a success rate of 70.7%, while the UDI did well in 2009 when it achieved a success rate of 66.1%.

As a coalition, the *Concertación* did remarkably well in the 2001 election when 69 of its 116 candidates were returned. Similarly, the *Alianza* performed well in 2009, electing 58 of its 120 candidates.

Table 7. Chilean Senate Elections, 1989-2009

		SENATORS																							
		1989				1993				1997				2001				2005				2009			
		N.C.	C.E.	P.E.	P.S.A.	N.C.	C.E.	P.E.	P.S.A.	N.C.	C.E.	P.E.	P.S.A.	N.C.	C.E.	P.E.	P.S.A.	N.C.	C.E.	P.E.	P.S.A.	N.C.	C.E.	P.E.	P.S.A.
		(38)				(18)				(20)				(18)				(20)				(18)			
<i>Concertación</i>	PDC	15	13	86.7	34.2	6	4	66.7	22.2	10	10	100.0	50.0	9	2	22.2	11.1	9	5	55.6	25.0	8	4	50.0	22.2
	PPD	9	4	44.4	10.5	4	2	50.0	11.1	4	0	0.0	0.0	4	4	100.0	22.2	2	1	50.0	5.0	4	3	75.0	16.7
	PS	0	0	0.0	0.0	4	3	75.0	16.7	5	1	20.0	5.0	3	3	100.0	16.7	6	4	66.7	20.0	4	2	50.0	11.1
	PRSD	4	2	50.0	5.3	3	0	0.0	0.0	1	0	0.0	0.0	2	0	0.0	0.0	2	1	50.0	5.0	2	0	0.0	0.0
	Others	8	3	37.5	7.9	1	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	1	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0
	TOTAL	36	22	61.1	57.9	18	9	50.0	50.0	20	11	55.0	55.0	18	9	50.0	50.0	20	11	55.0	55.0	18	9	50.0	50.0
<i>Alianza</i>	RN	15	5	33.3	13.2	6	5	83.3	27.8	8	2	25.0	10.0	6	4	66.7	22.2	6	3	50.0	15.0	8	6	75.0	33.3
	UDI	3	2	66.7	5.3	4	2	50.0	11.1	5	3	60.0	15.0	4	3	75.0	16.7	9	5	55.6	25.0	6	3	50.0	16.7
	Others	20	9	45.0	23.7	8	2	25.0	11.1	6	4	66.7	20.0	4	2	50.0	11.1	4	0	0.0	0.0	3	0	0.0	0.0
	TOTAL	38	16	42.1	42.1	18	9	50.0	50.0	19	9	47.4	45.0	14	9	64.3	50.0	19	8	42.1	40.0	17	9	52.9	50.0
<b>Others</b>	Others	66	0	0.0	0.0	19	0	0.0	0.0	27	0	0.0	0.0	14	0	0.0	0.0	27	1	3.7	5.0	18	0	0.0	0.0
<b>TOTAL</b>		110	38	34.5	100.0	55	18	32.7	100.0	66	20	30.3	100.0	46	18	39.1	100.0	66	20	30.3	100.0	53	18	34.0	100.0

N.C.: Number of candidates.

C.E.: Number of candidates elected.

P.E.: Percentage of candidates elected.

P.S.A.: Percentage of seats won out of seats up for election.

Source: (Navia, 2008, p. 104) and, for 2005 and 2009 elections, author's calculations based on data from <http://www.elecciones.gov.cl>.

Navia's formula (Navia, 2008, p. 100) is also used in Table 7 to estimate parties' success in getting their candidates elected. The results show that, similarly to elections for the Chamber of Deputies, the success rates of both the *Concertación* and the *Alianza* fluctuated around 50%. Moreover, in 1993, 2001 and 2009, each coalition obtained the same number of the seats up for election (nine out of 18). Whereas the *Alianza* had a higher success rate than the *Concertación* in 2001 and 2009, the latter was more successful in 1989, 1997 and 2005.

In the case of the *Concertación*, the PDC did remarkably well in 1997 when all its candidates won the seat for which they were competing. The PS and the PPD also obtained a similar result in 2001. The PDC's success rate fluctuated around 85% in 1989, 1993 and 1997, but then decreased to an average of just under 43% between 2001 and 2009. In contrast, the PPD saw its rate, which fluctuated around 32% in 1989, 1993 and 1997, subsequently rise to almost 75%. Similarly, the PS's rate fluctuated around 32% in 1989, 1993 and 1997 before rising to almost 57% between 2001 and 2009. The PRSD's rate was quite low, given that, in 1993, 1997, 2001 and 2009, none of its candidates were elected.

In the case of the *Alianza*, the RN's success rate fluctuated around 48% in 1989, 1993 and 1997 before increasing to almost 64% between 2001 and 2009 while the UDI's success rate fluctuated around 60% in 1989, 1993 and 1997 and remained at around this level in subsequent elections. The RN did extraordinarily well in 1993, with a success rate of 83.3%, while the UDI performed very well in 2001, when 75% of its candidates were elected.

As Tables 6 and 7 show, the *Concertación* and the *Alianza* dominated and exerted control over Chilean congressional elections between 1989 and 2010. The results also demonstrate that, in both houses, success rates varied from party to party and across elections. In the case of the *Concertación*, the most important parties were the PDC, PPD and PS. However, as Navia argues, there seemed to be a zero-sum game between these parties (Navia, 2008, p.100) because, in most cases, the triumph of one was reflected in the defeat of the other. This is illustrated by the Senate elections of 1997 and 2001. In 1997, whereas all PDC candidates won a seat, no PPD candidate was elected and the PS obtained the election of only one of its five candidates. This situation changed drastically in 2001 when only two of the nine PDC candidates were returned and the PPD and the PS obtained the election of all their candidates. By contrast, in the *Alianza*, the RN and UDI parties exercised political leadership within the coalition and maintained similar success rates throughout the period.

The above results meant that the two coalitions shared control of Congress. A new way of doing politics, based on agreements and pacts, emerged and brought political stability (Godoy, 1999;

Mainwaring, Brinks, & Pérez-Liñán, 2001; Siavelis, 2009) but negatively affected political participation. Due to the significant changes that occurred in the social bases of the parties and in their political competitiveness, the Chilean political system became progressively more remote from civil society, showing little capacity for renovation and a high level of endogamy (Luna & Altman, 2011). In other words, the elite co-opted the political system with a negative impact on citizen participation and representation.

In addition, the mechanisms used by the leading parties to select their legislative candidates depended mostly on intra-coalition negotiation. Table 8 shows that only the PDC tried to promote internal democratic selection processes, holding open primaries between 2001 and 2009. The other parties continued to control their selection mechanisms without considering democratising practices, mainly because of the importance of party negotiations in nominating the coalition's candidates.

Table 8. Legislative Candidate Selection Mechanism by Party, 1989-2009

	Party	1989	1993	1997	2001	2005	2009
<i>Concertación</i>	<b>PDC</b>	Provincial	Closed	Closed	Open	Open	Open
		committees	primary	primary	primary	primary	primary
	<b>PPD</b>	National	National	National	National	National	National
		Committee	Committee	Committee	Committee	Committee	Committee
	<b>PS</b>	Central	Central	Central	Central	Central	Central
		Committee	Committee	Committee	Committee	Committee	Committee
			or closed	or closed	or closed	or closed	or closed
<i>Alianza</i>	<b>RN</b>	primary	primary	primary	primary	primary	primary
	<b>UDI</b>	National	National	National	National	National	National
		Council	Council	Council	Council	Council	Council
	<b>UDI</b>	Party	Party	Party	Party	Party	Party
		leadership	leadership	leadership	leadership	leadership	leadership

Source: (Navia, 2008, p. 112), and, for 2005 and 2009, compiled by author.

The institutional transformations introduced by the 1980 Constitution certainly contributed to the consolidation of this way of doing politics. Studies of political campaigns and elections have shown that the existence of a binomial system, along with other independent variables, negatively affected electoral competition between challengers and incumbents (Alemán & Saiegh, 2007; Altman, Piñeiro, & Toro, 2013; Carey, 2006; 1997; Navia & Sandoval, 1998). Designed to provide political stability during the transition (Carey, 2006), the binomial system was introduced by Organic Constitutional Law N° 18.799 of 26 May 1989, which modified

Organic Constitutional Law N° 18.700 of 6 May 1988. Both laws were enacted under the Pinochet regime. The system was first used for the 1989 congressional elections and last used in 2013. The limitations it imposed on electoral representation meant that it has been defined as an authoritarian enclave (Garretón, 1999; Siavelis, 2009b).

Under the system, based on the D'Hondt method, each district returned two members to the Chamber of Deputies and each constituency returned two senators. Candidates were grouped in lists (coalitions) and, in general, the most-voted candidate from each of the two lists was returned. Indeed, it was possible for the second most-voted list to obtain one of the two seats (50% of representation) with just over a third of the vote (Siavelis & Valenzuela, 1996).

However, if the most-voted list doubled the second list, its two most-voted candidates were returned, even if the most-voted candidate of the second list obtained more votes than the second most-voted candidate of the first list (Carey, 2006; Siavelis, 2009b). As a result, a candidate with a relatively low number of votes could be returned if, as a whole, that candidate's list performed well.

The system favoured the two main coalitions at the expense of individual parties and smaller coalitions (Navia & Sandoval, 1998). For instance, in the 2009 election, the Communist Party had to compete in the same list as the *Concertación* to win three seats in the Chamber of Deputies (Table 6). As an authoritarian enclave, the binomial system was key in maintaining the status quo in the Chilean political system, favouring the concentration of political power in the hands of a minority and depriving the vast majority of effective political representation. This was decisive in the increase of distrust in politics and institutions seen over recent decades (Alemán & Saiegh, 2007).



Table 9. Chilean Municipal Elections, 1992-2008 (%)

		Municipalities				
		1992(a)	1996(a)	2000(a)	2004(b)	2008(b)(c)
<i>Concertación</i>	<b>PDC</b>	26.33	23.16	19.87	20.11	16.44
	<b>PPD</b>	8.39	10.39	10.49	5.88	6.36
	<b>PS</b>	7.77	9.53	10.36	10.84	8.54
	<b>PRSD</b>	4.47	5.81	4.98	2.81	2.19
	<b>Others</b>	1.57	1.03	2.21	1.51	1.67
	<b>TOTAL</b>	48.53	49.92	47.91	41.15	35.2
<i>Alianza</i>	<b>RN</b>	12.23	12.18	14.29	12.83	12.09
	<b>UDI</b>	9.27	2.99	14.67	17.88	18.33
	<b>Others</b>	5.5	13.77	7.9	4.84	6.75
	<b>TOTAL</b>	27	28.94	36.86	35.55	37.17
<b>Others</b>		15.49	10.13	7.14	15.12	19.12
<b>TOTAL</b>		91.02	88.99	91.91	91.82	91.49

(a) Includes both mayors and councillors

(b) Only mayors.

(c) In the 2008 election, the *Concertación* competed divided into two pacts: PPD, PRSD and other independent candidates, and PDC, PS and other independent candidates.

Source: Compiled by author with data from <http://elecciones.gov.cl>.

The domination of the two main coalitions is also seen in municipal elections. Table 9 shows the results of these elections between 1992 and 2008. During this period, the *Concertación* won four of the five elections. Only in 2008 did it obtain less than 40% of the votes cast while the *Alianza*, as in the other types of elections, remained in second place until 2008 when it won with 37.17%.

Although Chile is often held up as a successful example of a democratic transition, it is also a case in which the elites agreed on a determined order that helped them remain in power. Between 1990 and 2010, the consolidation of this partyarchy hampered democratic consolidation in terms of legitimacy, accountability and alternation in power, due principally to the ongoing existence of the authoritarian enclaves. That was possible because of the institutional structure created under the 1980 Constitution (Angell, 2007; Valenzuela & Scully, 1997) and, throughout the period studied, the party elites played a central role in not only defining, but also controlling the new democracy created after the transition (Torcal & Mainwaring, 2002).

## **v. Conclusions**

The *Concertación* and the *Alianza* maintained total control of municipal, congressional and presidential elections between 1990 and 2010. Election results demonstrate the *Concertación*'s domination of political power. It won all elections from 1989 through to the 2008 municipal elections when the *Alianza* obtained more votes in the election for mayors. It went on to lose the 2009 presidential election when the new *Coalición por el Cambio* (Coalition for Change), which had replaced the *Alianza* in 2009, was elected under President Sebastián Piñera for 2010-2014.

The existence of a partyarchy through which the *Concertación* and the *Alianza* were able to maintain control of congressional elections was possible because of a binomial proportional electoral system, which played a fundamental role by excluding other parties. Election results speak for themselves: between 1990 and 2010, no party outside these coalitions obtained representation in Congress. This was vital in consolidating their leadership of the political system and is also important in explaining the consolidation during this period of a closed political elite which other parties had little chance of permeating.

From an authoritarian enclave after the political transition, the binomial electoral system emerged as a mechanism that generated a dual political elite, represented by the two coalitions, with an electoral advantage. It produced a political system that was stable but highly elitist as regards changes of government and, therefore, representation of the political diversity of post-transition Chile. A clear example of this was the Communist Party, which played an extra-parliamentary role during this period, given its inability to win seats in Congress under the binomial system.

Although, in maintaining their spaces of power, the elites employ resources of various types, the available information must be examined in detail in order to measure the impact of different species of capital (Chapter VII). The next chapter focuses on one of the most traditional mechanisms used to build elites in Chile: family ties.

## **CHAPTER VI: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

### **i. Introduction**

This chapter describes the methodological design of the research. Studying political elites entails a series of complexities associated with their origin and how they function. As select groups, political elites employ certain practices in order to maintain a degree of exclusivity with respect to the rest of society. It is, therefore, difficult for non-members to access them as objects of research (second order research).

Elites have social closure mechanisms (Aguilar, 2011) that are expressed in numerous ways. One of the most frequent is when the members of the elite recognise each other through certain resources or shared social practices, which are analysed here using the Bourdieusian concept of species of capital. In the Chilean case, for example, there is a consensus about the importance of schools in the formation and performance of elites (Kosunen & Carrasco, 2016).

A second difficulty of studying political elites is that of knowing how their members relate to each other, either at the formal level (for example, negotiations and decision-making by ministers) or the informal level (selection of candidates and promotion of new leaders within the parties). In the light of these problems, this research used a mixed methodological strategy that included in-depth interviews with key members of the elite in order to define the emphasis of the statistical analysis of the survey data.

Under the FONDECYT project entitled “Political elites in Chile: Sociology of the governmental, parliamentary and party staff (1990-2010)”, 386 important members of the Chilean political elite were surveyed (see Appendix II). This was the first time that detailed information had been gathered about personal aspects such as their social origin, families, education and political preferences. In this context, this chapter describes the foundations of the methodological design developed based on the objectives and guiding questions of this research. The chapter then goes on to explain the methods and techniques used to gather the data obtained after the elite census (survey) and the methodological decisions adopted when analysing the information. In addition, it describes the author’s contributions to the FONDECYT project as regards the creation of new variables, based on the existing information, which were included in the quantitative analysis.

The chapter then discusses the prior interviews with key members of the elite as an essential part of the process of defining the socio-historical analysis of eight important families in the Chilean political elite and the comparative quantitative analysis of the effects of species of capital on access to the legislature (deputies) and the executive (ministers). Finally, the methodological scope and limitations of the strategy of analysis are discussed.

## **ii. Research strategy**

### **ii.i. Research aims and questions**

One of the aspects underlying the definition of this research relates to the use of species of capital within the political elite. In this context, a fundamental assumption of the research strategy is that species of capital, in their multiple forms, are a decisive resource for obtaining access to important positions in the public sector which is, in turn, a key aspect of the functioning of the political elite.

The concept of species of capital was extensively developed by Bourdieu (1986; 1984; 1980). The different positions that a person, or particular agent in Bourdieusian terms, may occupy in the field - or, in other words, the setting in which agents interact and define their social positions - are the result of interaction between the field's institutions (or specific rules) and the agent's habitus and capital. According to Bourdieu, the latter can be classified into three types: "*as economic capital, which is immediately and directly convertible into money and may be institutionalized in the form of property rights; as cultural capital, which is convertible, on certain conditions, into economic capital and may be institutionalized in the form of educational qualifications; and as social capital, made up of social obligations ('connections') which is convertible, in certain conditions, into economic capital and may be institutionalized in the form of a title of nobility*" (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 247).

Using datasets for members of the Chilean political elite in 1990-2010, this research examines and measures the effect of species of capital on access to strategic positions in the political field. Although there is extensive literature on the concepts of social, cultural and economic capital, there is a lack of empirical research examining comparatively the effects that these three forms of capital can have on both the formation of elites and their functioning, which is precisely the focus of this research. It attempts to answer two questions:


- 1) How and why was this political party elite created?

- 2) Were the Chilean political party elite's background and social resources, or species of capital, instrumental in allowing its members to access strategic positions in the legislative and executive branches between 1990 and 2010?

#### ii.ii. Research strategy: political elites as an object of study

These questions certainly represent a theoretical and methodological research challenge. The theoretical aspects are addressed extensively in Chapter I while the methodological aspects are addressed as shown in Figure 14.

Figure 14. Elites as an object of study: Proposal of a research strategy



Source: Compiled by author.

Figure 14 sets out a proposal for the study of elites, taking into account all the possible areas mentioned in the literature, which is appropriate for the methodological strategy adopted in this research. First, the definition of the political elite as the object of study in this case corresponds to those groups of individuals who belong to parties and access important positions in the powers of state. Then, at the level of analysis, it can be seen that the elites can be studied from different dimensions. This research considers the dimensions of institutions, social structure and social capital in relation to the objectives defined and discussed in point ii.i. Following on

from this, the perspective of analysis employed is geared to analysis of the functioning of mechanisms of social differentiation.

The strategy of analysis used in this research comprised three stages: 1) descriptive analysis and validation of the quantitative data obtained from the survey; 2) in-depth interviews with members of the Chilean political elite in order to provide additional, more inductive information for developing the findings obtained from the survey data; and 3) selection of the variables and inferential analysis to estimate the effect of the species of capital on access to key positions in the political elite, comparing the executive (ministers) and the legislature (deputies).

### **iii. Research methods, fieldwork and data analysis**

#### **iii.i. Research design**

The methodology for this research has a non-probabilistic (Census) and non-experimental quantitative design, comprising three stages. The first consisted in information gathering and involved the application of a questionnaire with around 80 variables to members of the elite. It was applied to 386 (out of 590) members of the Chilean political elite, who held important positions of political power between 1990 and 2010. The fieldwork was accompanied by a series of in-depth interviews with important members of the elite (including former Presidents Ricardo Lagos Escobar and Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle). This information was important for defining and operationalising the variables and dimensions of the quantitative analysis.

The third stage consisted in the application of quantitative analysis techniques. First, a descriptive analysis of the independent variables was carried out in line with the theoretical framework and previous empirical research. Six binary logistic regression models were then constructed in order to compare the effect of the variables defined on appointment as minister or deputy (binary dependent variable): a logit model for each dependent variable in each of the three periods: 1990-2000, 2000-2010 and 1990-2010. The decision to divide the two decades into two separate periods was taken in order to be able to distinguish between two rather different periods: a conservative decade characterised by the transition and the Christian Democrat governments of Patricio Aylwin (1990-1994) and Eduardo Frei (1994-2000) and the more liberal decade of the Socialist governments of Ricardo Lagos (2000-2006) and Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010).

### iii.ii. The census: Application of the survey

The census of Chile's political elite was carried out according to specific criteria using a positional method (Hoffmann-Lange, 2007)<sup>31</sup> in order to identify the population to be surveyed. In this case, the universe was defined as those individuals who had held the most important positions between 1990 and 2010. For this period, a total of 1,465 individuals were identified in the following positions:

- 1) President
- 2) Minister
- 3) Senator
- 4) Deputy
- 5) Undersecretary
- 6) Head of government division/chief of staff
- 7) Regional governor
- 8) Governor of the Central Bank, superintendent and/or executive director of a state company, including Televisión Nacional (TVN), director of the National Healthcare Fund (FONASA), vice-president of the Corporación Nacional del Cobre (CODELCO) and president of the National Television Council (CNTV)
- 9) Members of the leadership of the political parties.

Out of this universe, 590 cases, the so-called “nucleus of the elite” were selected according to specific criteria: a) all those individuals who had served as president of Chile; b) all those individuals who had served as minister of state; c) all those individuals who had served as undersecretary; d) all deputies who had sat for at least two terms; e) all senators who had sat for at least two terms; f) all those individuals who had been elected first as deputy and then as senator, although they had served only one term in each position; g) all those individuals who had been president of a political party with representation in Congress; h) all those individuals who had belonged for at least three years to the governing body of a political party with representation in Congress; i) all heads of government divisions who had held their post for more than one presidential period; j) all those individuals who had served as president or general manager of a state company; k) all heads of the government Budget Office; and l) a combination of one or more of these criteria.

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<sup>31</sup> Positional method is when members of political elites are defined under specific criteria concerning their role (i.e. decision making) or influence on political system.

Efforts were made to survey all these 590 individuals without recourse to replacements. As well as members of the centre-left parties and independents, a significant number of centre-right members of Congress agreed to answer the survey. It was conducted between 1 October 2010 and 25 April 2012, either online, in print, by telephone or in a personal interview, depending on the difficulty of reaching each particular interviewee. These individuals were asked to answer a questionnaire about matters that included their political career, personal history and perceptions. The 386 replies received represented a response rate of 65.4% (or 68.3% if those no longer alive when the survey was applied are excluded). Each individual was classified according to the highest position held during his/her career (Table 10). The positions that predominate in this nucleus are deputy and minister (123 and 108, respectively, which represents almost 60% of the cases). Regional governors and political party leaders account for only 1% and 1.6%, respectively. Three of the four presidents of Chile during the period studied answered the survey.

Table 10. Composition of the nucleus of the elite in Chile (n = 386)

Position	Cases	Percentage
President of Chile	3	0.8
Minister	108	28.0
Senator	26	6.7
Deputy	123	31.9
Undersecretary	37	9.6
Regional governor	4	1.0
President of Central Bank, superintendent, director of state company	17	4.4
Head of government division and/or chief of staff	62	16.1
Member of governing body of a political party	6	1.6
Total	386	100

Source: Compiled by author with data from Encuesta de Élite en Chile (1990-2010). Last updated: September 24, 2014.

Out of the 204 individuals who did not answer the survey (Table 11), 53 were heads of government division and/or chiefs of staff, accounting for 26% of non-responses, while deputies accounted for 21.6% and ministers for 10.3%. Out of the 167 deputies considered in the nucleus of the elite surveyed, 73.7% responded while, out of the 129 ministers, 83.7% responded.



The principal reasons for not answering the survey include time constraints. Although e-mail, letters, the telephone and in-person meetings were used to apply the survey, many of those who did not respond had problems allocating the necessary time. Only 46 individuals refused to answer the survey, accounting for 22.5% of the total who did not respond. Out of these 46 individuals, 14 were deputies and five were ministers.

The figures show that, although there is a certain bias associated with the response rate, it reached close to 70% and, in the case of ministers and deputies, was higher, reaching over 80% for ministers. This is an important result since replacements were not used for those who did not respond. Moreover, all the people who answered the survey answered the questions considered in the quantitative analysis.

Table 11. Cases that did not respond the survey (n = 204)

Position	Cases	Percentage
President of Chile	1	0.5
Minister	21	10.3
Senator	27	13.2
Deputy	44	21.6
Undersecretary	26	12.7
Regional governor	8	3.9
President of Central Bank, superintendent, director of state company	10	4.9
Head of government division and/or chief of staff	53	26.0
Member of governing body of a political party	14	6.9
Total	204	100

Source: Compiled by author with data from Encuesta de Élite en Chile (1990-2010). Last updated: September 24, 2014.

### iii.iii. Ethical standards

The database was developed under FONDECYT Project N° 1100877 on political elites in Chile (Alfredo Joignant, lead researcher). In line with ethical research standards, the author has due authorisation for the data's use (Appendix I). All survey respondents supplied their full name

but, for reasons of privacy, these are not disclosed in the processed data. The survey comprised 41 questions (Appendix II) that produced some 80 variables. The questionnaire included a letter of consent in which the respondent was informed in detail about the uses to which the information would be put in line with the research objectives.

The in-depth interviews with key members of the Chilean political elite that were also carried out (Table 12) served to complement and enrich the quantitative data according to the objectives defined for this research. All interviewees were duly informed about the objectives of this research for the University of Cambridge's PhD in Sociology programme. This information was set out in the letter requesting the interview. Once the request had been accepted, a message was sent with detailed information about the questions to be asked and my expectations as to the interview's results. In some cases, I have not disclosed the interviewee's identity. While scholars and public institutions are referred to by name, I refer to certain members of the political elite in a generic way so as to protect their privacy.

Table 12. Politicians interviewed (in-depth interviews)

N	Name	Key position in political system
1	René Abeliuk Manasevich	- Minister of Chilean Economic Development Agency (CORFO) under President Patricio Aylwin (1992-1994) - Lawyer Supreme Court (2003-2006)
2	Eduardo Aninat Ureta	- Finance Minister under President Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (1994-1999) - Deputy Managing Director of International Monetary Fund (IMF), Washington D.C. (2000-2003)
3	María Eliana Arntz Bustos	- Head of Citizen Participation and Environmental Education at National Commission for the Environment (CONAMA) (1999-2001) - Deputy Director of Social Organisations Division (DOS) of Ministry for the Government Office (2000-2001) - Undersecretary of Ministry for the Government Office (2001-2005) - Undersecretary for Culture at National Council for Culture and the Arts and Coordinator of the Indigenous Peoples Programme of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2006-x)
4	Jorge Arrate Mac Niven	- President of PS (1990-1991) - Minister of Education under President Patricio Aylwin (1992-1994) - Minister of Labour and Social Security under President Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (1994-1998) - Minister for the Government Office under President Eduardo Frei Ruiz- Tagle (1998-1999)
5	Sergio Bitar Chacra	- Director of Department of Industries and Planning Centre of Faculty of Physical and Mathematical Sciences, Universidad de Chile (1968-1973) - Minister of Mining under President Salvador Allende (March 1973-July 1973) - Minister of Education under President Ricardo Lagos (2003-2005) - Minister of Public Works under President Michelle Bachelet (2008-2010) - Senator, Tarapacá Region (1994-2002)
6	José Joaquín Brunner	- Minister for the Government Office under President Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (1994- 1998) - President of National Television Council (CNTV) (1992-1994) - President of National Commission for Accreditation of Undergraduate Programmes (2006) - Vice-president of Higher Educational Council (2004)

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Member of Council of the National Fund for Scientific and Technological Development (FONDECYT)</li> <li>- Director of Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (FLACSO) (1976-1984)</li> </ul>
7	Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- President of PDC (1991-1993)</li> <li>- President of Chile (1994-2000)</li> <li>- President of Senate (2006-2008)</li> <li>- Former Senator (2006-2014)</li> <li>- Currently Chile's Special Ambassador for Asia-Pacific (2014)</li> </ul>
8	Gabriel Gaspar Tapia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Politician, academic and diplomat</li> <li>- Undersecretary of War (2000-2006)</li> <li>- Undersecretary for the Armed Forces (2014-2015)</li> </ul>
9	José Miguel Insulza	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Minister of Foreign Affairs under President Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (1994-1999)</li> <li>- Minister Secretary General of the Presidency under President Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (1999-2000)</li> <li>- Minister of Interior and Public Security under President Ricardo Lagos (2000-2005)</li> <li>- Secretary General of the Organization of American States (2005-2015)</li> <li>- Senator (2017-)</li> </ul>
10	Ricardo Lagos Escobar	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Director of School of Political and Administrative Sciences and Institute of Economy, Universidad de Chile (1963-1972)</li> <li>- Secretary General, Universidad de Chile (1969)</li> <li>- Secretary General, Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (FLACSO) (1973)</li> <li>- President of PPD (1987-1990)</li> <li>- Minister of Education under President Patricio Aylwin (1990-1992)</li> <li>- Minister of Public Works under President Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (1994-1998)</li> <li>- President of Chile (2000-2006)</li> </ul>
11	Carlos Ominami Pascual	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Minister of Economy, Economic Development and Reconstruction under President Patricio Aylwin (1990-1992)</li> <li>- Senator (1994-2010)</li> </ul>
12	Ernesto Ottone Fernández	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Political analyst and academic</li> <li>- Currently Director of Globalisation and Democracy course, Universidad Diego Portales</li> <li>- Strategic advisor to President Ricardo Lagos</li> </ul>
13	Andrés Solimano	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Coordinator of Economic Area for presidential campaign of Marco Enríquez-Ominami (2013)</li> <li>- Director of FLACSO Chile (2010-2011)</li> <li>- Founder and President of International Centre for Globalisation and Development (CIGLOB)</li> <li>- Director for Andean Countries (Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela), World Bank</li> <li>- Regional advisor, ECLAC (2005)</li> </ul>
14	Andrés Zaldívar Larraín	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- President of PDC (1976-1982)</li> <li>- Minister of Economy, Economic Development and Reconstruction under President Eduardo Frei Montalva (1968)</li> <li>- Finance Minister under President Eduardo Frei Montalva (1968-1970)</li> <li>- Senator (1973)</li> <li>- Senator (1990-2006)</li> <li>- Minister of Interior and Public Security under President Michelle Bachelet (2006)</li> <li>- Senator (2010-2018)</li> <li>- President of the Senate (2017-2018)</li> </ul>
15	Gonzalo Martnet Fanta	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Under-Secretary of Regional and Administrative Development (1990-1994)</li> <li>- President of PS (2003-2005)</li> <li>- Undersecretary of Ministry General Secretariat of the Presidency (2002-2003)</li> </ul>

Source: Compiled by author

Table 12 shows the members of the political elite who were interviewed for the project. The selection of these individuals was based on their credentials considering three dimensions: education, party membership (and political trajectory) and key positions held in the political system (see Appendix III). Fifteen interviews were conducted with individuals who agreed to discuss and explain their experiences and perceptions of how the political elite functions. They included former presidents, ministers, undersecretaries, senators, deputies and party leaders.

The interviews consisted in a conversation about relevant topics in recent years, the political transition and their current perceptions of politics in Chile. In the case of the latter topic, the aim was to learn about the perceptions, practices and processes that shaped the political elite between 1990 and 2010. In general terms, this process showed that family capital is very important in Chile, that there were few changes in the post-1990 elite as compared to that which had existed before 1973 and that many members of the Chilean political elite maintain ties that date back to their time at school.

#### iii.iv. Author's contribution to the FONDECYT project

Work for this research was based on the survey carried out for the FONDECYT project on political elites. However, once the data had been obtained and validated, new questions arose about how to operationalise certain information.

The in-depth interviews conducted were crucial in defining key analytical strategies and incorporating additional information in order to work with the variables considered in line with the concept of species of capital. In this context, additional variables were created using the available data and other sources of information, as indicated in Chapter VIII where the variables analysed are set out according to the models used. Details of the changes incorporated are explained in greater detail in Chapter VII (on the analysis of family capital) and Chapter IX (on the quantitative analysis of the effects of species of capital on access to key positions, comparing the legislature and the executive).

#### **iv. Data analysis: validity, coding and analysis**

Although the study uses a mixed strategy, its emphasis is quantitative. It, therefore, focused on gathering information through the application of questionnaires to members of the nucleus of

Chile's political elite, producing a final number of 386 cases that responded the survey. The interviews were also of assistance in defining the study's hypotheses and methodologies.

The questions included in the survey can be classified as follows: municipal district and/or place of residence, party membership, public-private career, political perceptions, familial, religious, educational and professional background and information about grandparents, parents and children. The questions produced a total of 80 variables of which a pre-selection was made for analysis, according to the research objectives. In the case of the independent variables, a preliminary selection of those included in the questionnaire was made in line with the hypotheses and a review of the literature and these were then subjected to various statistical tests of collinearity (Variance Inflation Factor) and significance in accordance with the logit models used.

Six binary logit models were then constructed for ministers and deputies and the three periods: 1990-2000, 2000-2010 and 1990-2010. In this way, it was possible not only to analyse the effects of the independent variables on the dependent variables, but also to compare them across the three periods. The latter was important because the first decade was characterised by the more conservative policies of the PDC governments of Presidents Aylwin and Frei and the start of the political transition while the decade between 2000 and 2010, with its already more consolidated democratic system, corresponded to the Socialist governments of Presidents Lagos and Bachelet.

The study's methodological emphasis involves the analysis of networks as a means of studying the familial capital of the Chilean elite, followed by binary logistic regression models to study the effects of the different species of capital on access to the positions of minister and deputy in the periods indicated. The analysis was carried out using STATA and R statistical software. This methodological strategy was designed with the aim of contributing to knowledge about the Chilean elites and, through the results obtained, to certain lines of historical research about their evolution (Gazmuri, 2000; Joignant, 2009;) but, above all, to the work that has revealed the positioning of certain forms of capital in the Chilean political elites as in the case of the technocrats (Silva, 2009). In this sense, the research reported here seeks to address a key aspect of how social resources determine the positioning of certain individuals in important posts (Boix and Posner, 1998). In other words, it aims to demonstrate empirically how certain aspects of the social structure (species of capital) permit the creation of elites and their stability in power.

## **v. Methodological limitations**

This research has some limitations related to the gathering of the information and the statistical analysis techniques employed. Firstly, the universe of individuals (1,465) who occupied important positions in the elite between 1990 and 2010 was previously identified (non-probabilistic). Out of this total, 590 cases were identified as corresponding to the “nucleus of the elite”, according to specific criteria that indicate the permanence of individuals in important positions within the political system. However, out of these 590 cases, it was possible to survey 386, as explained above, in section iii.ii (Tables 10 and 11).

Another limitation of this research has to do with the logit models for deputies and ministers for each period. The population surveyed does not necessarily include the counterfactuals for each case and, in other words, does not include all those individuals who may have been considered for the positions of minister or deputy. However, the use of regression models is also appropriate when there are comparison groups (Kuha & Mills, 2018; Williams, 2009; Allison, 1999) and, in this context, the analysis focuses on comparing the effects of specific forms of capital on the Chilean political elite and its members’ access to two important positions related to executive and legislative power. This is explained with more detail in chapter VIII.

## **v. Conclusions**

This chapter has presented the methodological design used to measure empirically the effect of species of capital on access to key positions in the executive and legislature among the Chilean political elite. As shown, the study of elites is complex because their social closure mechanisms impede access to them and it is not possible to understand in detail the way in which they make formal and informal decisions.

The strategy of analysis adopted here was based on quantitative information obtained in the FONDECYT project and on 15 in-depth interviews with key members of the Chilean political elite. This information was useful in defining the importance of family capital and identifying key family dynasties (Chapter VII) and in providing perspective and determining the emphasis of the quantitative analysis, taking into account the research’s objectives and hypotheses (Chapter VIII).

As explained in this chapter, the research strategy comprised three stages. The first involved descriptive analysis and validation of the quantitative data obtained from the survey. In-depth interviews were then conducted with members of the Chilean political elite in order to provide additional, more inductive information for developing the findings obtained from the survey data. Finally, the variables were selected for the inferential analysis to estimate the effect of the species of capital on access to key positions in the political elite, comparing the executive (ministers) and the legislature (deputies).

The response rate to the survey, at an aggregate level of close to 70%, was acceptable, including for deputies and ministers, the positions considered in the analysis of logit models (Chapter VIII).

The next chapter, which serves as an introduction to the importance of family capital in the development of the political elite, analyses eight family dynasties, highlighting family ties among the individuals surveyed in the nucleus of the elite.

## CHAPTER VII: THE IMPORTANCE OF FAMILY TIES IN THE CHILEAN POLITICAL ELITE

*“In all societies, the family  
plays a fundamental role as regards that  
society’s political organization.”*  
(Wasby 1966)

### i. Introduction

Before going on to quantitative analysis of the species of capital, it is important to look at the role family capital has played in the development of Chile’s political elite. From the interviews conducted, information was obtained about eight families which illustrate the importance of this type of capital. Each of the families is identified using its main surnames: the Errázuriz family, the Montt family, the Alessandri family, the Pinto-Bulnes family, the Piñera-Chadwick family, the Frei-Walker family, the Allende family and the Aylwin family. All these families have produced senators, deputies and at least one president.

This chapter seeks to map family ties in Chile’s political elite, looking first at the cases of these eight families which have wielded great political influence since the country’s Independence from Spanish rule in the early nineteenth century - the so-called traditional families - and then as individuals belonging to the nucleus of the party elite that governed Chile between 1990 and 2015 (including former presidents, ministers, undersecretaries, heads of government divisions and chiefs of staff and senior managers of state companies). Starting with 386 cases, numerous analyses of family networks and relationships were carried out but, since new individuals were included after the tracing ties based on family connections, the numbers of persons considered increased to 588 cases as networks of relationship were discovered.

This chapter seeks to provide an empirical insight into how this species of capital operates within these select groups. The purpose here is to display a network with all the family ties of the members of the political elite that responded the survey. The main goal is to provide a schematic model (the network) that serves as an empirical reference for understanding how family capital operates within the political elite. A new variable is created (family connections) and is used as an independent variable for a set of logit models to measure the effect of these connections on becoming a deputy or a minister.



A political family dynasty exists when family ties are observed in the political sphere and are used by agents as a type of social capital: *“When two family ties are present as, for example, between a father who is or was a member of the lower house and a son who is a mayor, we will refer to this as a dynasty on the assumption that the relationship (by blood or marriage) entails advantages for the person who inherits it or receives it as a transfer, particularly when the electoral districts coincide”* (Joignant, 2014, p. 17).

Within this framework, this chapter seeks first to identify historical patterns in the functioning of family capital, taking the case of a set of families traditionally related to political power. Then, taking the nucleus of the political elite, it goes on to analyse their family ties in order to see whether these same patterns continued to be reproduced after the restoration of democracy. The purpose of the study is primarily descriptive in that it attempts to demonstrate the ongoing prevalence of a form of capital in the post-transition political party elite. This chapter is divided into four sections. The first refers to relevant research about family dynasties in politics while the second looks at the way in which family capital has been studied in Chile. It then examines eight traditional families that have had an important influence on Chile’s political history and analyses family ties in the political elite of post-Pinochet Chile, considering 588 cases. Finally, some conclusions of this analysis are set out.

## **ii. The study of family ties within political elites**

Family ties are a form of social capital<sup>32</sup> since they serve as a mechanism for sociocultural reproduction and the formation of elites. One of the pioneering studies of the role of family capital in politics is that by Wasby (1960) who, after analysing the family origins of the members of the US Congress, concluded that most of them had ties to families involved in politics (Wasby, 1966, p. 15). Wasby also asserted that a person from a family group related to political activity was highly likely to be involved in politics. This finding is related to Bourdieu’s theory of cultural reproduction according to which the family provides an individual not only with the possibility of generating networks and contacts, but also with the cultural capital that is crucial for educational and professional success.

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<sup>32</sup> This definition relies on the concept of social capital formulated by Bourdieu: *“social capital is the sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition.”* (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 119).

A broad range of research has demonstrated the importance of family dynasties and family connections in the formation, development and performance of political elites (González-Bustamante, 2014; Joignant, 2014; Filippi, 2006; Cordero, 2003; de Ramón, 1999a; 1999b; 1999c; 1999d; Camp, 2013; 2006; Singerman, 1995; Kadushin, 1995; Padgett & Ansell, 1993; Gaxie, 1983; Arriagada, 1970; Putnam, 1976; Wasby, 1966; Mosca, 1939; Michels, 1915; Pareto, 1901). The familial resource can be put to a variety of uses, ranging from its instrumental use to access an elite (Camp, 2013; 2006) to the creation of networks and the capacity to influence certain groups of power (Padgett & Ansell, 1993) or to obtain advantages of an electoral nature (González-Bustamante, 2014; Joignant, 2014). However, the reproduction of family capital tends to reflect informal logics and reproduction strategies that are difficult to operationalise and call for specific research approaches (González-Bustamante & Garrido-Vergara, 2018, p. 52).

Political dynasties are families that are able to position themselves within the political system and achieve important spaces of control and domination which they maintain over time. In Chile, most studies in this area have focused on the definition of profiles and historical analysis (Filippi, 2006; de Ramón, 1999a; 1999b; 1999c; 1999d). More recent studies have, however, sought to measure the effect of such families in terms of level of access and the careers of the members of the elite (González-Bustamante, 2014).

### **iii. Chilean political dynasties**

This section looks at eight traditional families who have significantly influenced Chile's political history, examining political careers related to positions of great power and family relationships (father, mother, grandparents, cousins and uncles and aunts). The eight families are the Errázuriz, Montt, Alessandri, Pinto-Bulnes, Piñera-Chadwick, Frei-Walker, Allende and Aylwin families. As can be seen in the analysis of networks, more than one member of many of these families served as president of Chile. Through numerous ties, these families are also “related” to each other as, for example, in the case of the Pinto-Bulnes, Piñera-Chadwick and Frei-Walker families.

By analysing the evolution of these families in Chilean politics, this study seeks to identify a socio-historical pattern in the evolution of the Chilean political elite that has its root in family ties. This pattern is then verified using the information provided by the member of the nucleus of the elite in 1990-2010 who actually responded the survey.

### **iii.i. Errázuriz family: 1770-1990**

Of Basque origin, this family has been one of the most important in Chilean politics, particularly in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. As shown in Table 13, it produced four Chilean presidents across three successive generations: Fernando Errázuriz Aldunate (1831), who was an uncle of Federico Errázuriz Zañartu (1871-76) who, in turn, was the father of Federico Errázuriz Echaurren (1896-1901) and the father-in-law of Germán Riesco Errázuriz (1901-06). Moreover, another member of this family, María Errázuriz Echaurren, was a daughter, sister and wife of presidents.

As a family, the Errázuriz were characterised principally by the senior positions held by their members in the executive and legislative branches. Their direct descendants in the political world extend to Hernán Felipe Errázuriz who was a minister (1981-90) during the military regime. Historically, the family has been associated with the centre-right. After serving as minister of war and the navy, of justice and of education under President José Joaquín Pérez (1861 and 1871), Federico Errázuriz Zañartu won the 1870 presidential election with the support of the Liberal-Conservative Fusion. Later, his son Federico Errázuriz Echaurren went on to win the 1895 presidential election with the support of a coalition dominated by conservative parties. Finally, Germán Riesco Errázuriz, with a liberal bent, had to face a period of great political and economic instability, which eventually meant his retirement from politics once he had completed his term.

Table 13. Errázuriz family, 1770-1990

Francisco Javier Errázuriz Larraín Mayor Santiago (1770)	Francisco Javier de Errázuriz Madariaga Member of the First Government Junta (1810)	Fernando Errázuriz Aldunate President of Chile (1831)	Federico Errázuriz Zañartu President of Chile (1871-76)	Germán Riesco Errázuriz President of Chile (1901-06)	Germán Ignacio Riesco Minister of War (1919-20) Minister of Foreign Affairs (1948-50)	
		Francisco Javier Errázuriz Aldunate Consulate (1880-10) (a)		Married to:		María Errázuriz Echaurren (b)
				Federico Errázuriz Echaurren President of Chile (1896-1901)		
				Ladislao Errázuriz Echaurren Deputy (1885-97)		Hernán Felipe Errázuriz Minister of Mining (1981-82) Minister Secretary General of the Presidency (1982-83) Minister of Foreign Affairs (1988-90)
			Maximiano Errázuriz Valdivieso Senator (1879-1882) (1873-1876) Deputy (1867-1873)	--	--	
		Isidoro Errázuriz Aldunate Deputy (1827-30)	--	--	--	
	Ramón de Errázuriz Aldunate Senator (1846-55) Deputy (1823-43)	--	--	--		
		Santiago Errázuriz Madariaga Mayor Santiago (1820)				

(a) Three marriages.

(b) María Errázuriz Echaurren was a daughter, sister and wife of Chilean presidents.

Source: Compiled by author.

### **iii.ii. Montt family: 1770-2015**

The Montt family has its origins in Spain (Catalonia) and Peru. Like the Errázuriz family, it played an important role in Chile's political history, starting in the eighteenth century. With a marked republican spirit and a tradition related to the Freemasonry, it maintained an important network of influence in the political system. Table 14 shows the family ties within this dynasty, beginning with the arrival in Chile of José Esteban de Montt Cabrera in the mid-eighteenth century.

Many of its members sat in Congress and, as in the case of the Errázuriz family, three of its members were elected president of Chile: Manuel Montt Torres (1851-1861), his son Pedro Montt Montt (1906-1910) and his nephew Jorge Montt Álvarez (1891-1896). Manuel Montt Torres married his cousin, Rosario Montt Goyenechea. There is also a branch of this dynasty in whose case it is not clear exactly how they acquired the surname (starting with Felipe Montt and Marcos Montt, see Table 14).

A conservative and Freemason, President Manuel Montt Torres held the presidency between 1851 and 1856 and, despite the revolution of 1851, was immediately re-elected for a second term (1856-1861). In 1891, after the revolution against President Balmaceda, his nephew Jorge Montt Álvarez also became president and, only ten years later, was followed by his son Pedro. During this period, numerous members of the family also served in Congress and the judiciary. Descendants of this family still participate in politics today but, unlike other dynasties, it lost ground in positions of political power as from the last decade of the twentieth century.

Table 14. Montt family, 1770-2015

José Esteban Montt Cabrera Military (1770-80)	José Montt Prado	Lorenzo Montt Valenzuela (a) Deputy (1826-27)	<b>Jorge Montt Álvarez President of Chile (1891-96)</b>					
	Lucas Montt Prado	<b>Manuel Montt Torres President of Chile (1851-61)</b>  <b>Married to:</b>	Ambrosio Montt Luco Deputy (1861-82) <b>Married to:</b> Luz Montt Montt	Lorenzo Montt Montt Deputy (1818-21)	Manuel Montt Balmaceda Diplomat			
			Eugenio Guzmán Irrarázaval Senator (1900-06) <b>Married to:</b> Rosa Montt Montt				Eugenio Guzmán Montt Ambassador (1920-22) Roberto Guzmán Montt Deputy (1912-15)	
			<b>Pedro Montt Montt President of Chile (1906-10)</b>	Jorge Guzmán Montt Deputy (1912-21)				
			Rosario Montt Goyenechea	Luis Montt Montt Deputy (1876-79)	Manuel Montt Lehuedé Deputy (1941-45)	Luis Montt D. Mayor La Reina (2004-12)		
			Maria Montt Goyenechea (a) <b>Married to:</b> Juan Pérez Vergara Deputy (1858-64)	Ismael Pérez Montt Deputy (1885-91) (1897-1900) Senator (1891-97)				
			José Montt Goyenechea Deputy (1852-55) Manuel Montt Goyenechea					
	Rafael Montt Prado	José Montt Irrarázaval Deputy (1837-40)	Santiago Montt A. Deputy (1855-58) Rafael Montt A. Deputy (1885-88)					
				Felipe Montt Nieva	Julio Montt Momberg Deputy (1965-73) Minister of Health (1992-94) <b>Married to:</b> Adriana Vidal Salinas	Julio Montt Vidal Undersecretary (2008-12)		
					Francisco Vidal Salinas Minister of Defence (2009-10), Minister General Secretary of the Presidency (2007-09) (2003-05) Minister of Interior (2005-06)			
				Marcos Montt Opazo	Marcos Montt de Ferrari	Cecilia Montt P. <b>Married to:</b>	Raúl Celis Montt Regional Governor Valparaíso (2010-14)	
						Raúl Celis C. Regional Governor Valparaíso (1985-89)	Andrés Celis Montt Councillor Viña del Mar (2010-14)	
						Mario Garrido Montt President of Supreme Court (2002-03)		

(a) Two marriages.

Source: Compiled by author.

### **iii.iii. Alessandri family: 1898-2014**

The role of the Alessandri family in politics began with the brothers José Pedro and Arturo Alessandri Palma. The latter, as well as serving as senator, president of the Senate, deputy and minister, was twice president of Chile (1920-1925 and 1932-1938). Similarly, his son Jorge Alessandri Rodríguez not only served as senator and minister of finance in the second government of Carlos Ibáñez del Campo but was also president of Chile between 1958 and 1964.

As shown in Table 15, most members of this dynasty have held important political positions, particularly in the legislature and executive. The family's evolution was initially strongly tied to the Liberal Party and later, with the election of Jorge Alessandri Rodríguez as president, to the conservative right. This influence has persisted over time since Magdalena Matte, daughter of Arturo Matte Alessandri, is married to Hernán Larraín Fernández, a close collaborator of Pinochet and currently one of the leaders of the UDI and a minister in the second government of President Sebastián Piñera (2018- ). Another important example of the family's political role is Arturo Alessandri Besa, a deputy and subsequently senator who, in 1993, was the presidential candidate of the Union for the Progress of Chile, a centre-right alliance formed by the UDI, the RN, the National Party, the Union of the Centrist Centre (UCC) and the Party of the South (PSUR).

Table 15. Alessandri family, 1915-2014

Pedro Alessandri Vargas	Arturo Alessandri Palma President of Chile (1920-24) (1925) (1932-38)	Fernando Alessandri Rodríguez Deputy and Senator (1933-61)			
		Jorge Alessandri Rodríguez President of Chile (1958-64)			
		Eduardo Alessandri Rodríguez Deputy and Senator (1965-73)			
		Eduardo Alessandri Rodríguez	Silvia Alessandri Montes Deputy (1933-61)		
		Rosa Ester Alessandri Rodríguez  Married to:	Arturo Matte Alessandri	Magdalena Matte Minister of Housing and Urban Planning (2010-2011)  Married to:	Hernán Larraín Communications Adviser President Piñera (2010-14)
		Arturo Matte Larraín Minister of Finance (1943-44)		Hernán Larraín Fernández Senator (1994-2005)	
		Arturo Alessandri Rodríguez	Arturo Alessandri Besa Deputy and Senator (1973-77) (1990-98)		
	José Pedro Alessandri Palma Senator (1915-27)	Gustavo Alessandri Valdés (a) (b) Deputy (1961-73) (1998-2002)	Gustavo Alessandri Balmaceda Deputy (1990-94)		
			Jorge Alessandri Vergara Councillor Santiago (2008-12) Adviser Assistant Director of Programming to the President Piñera (2012-14)		
			Felipe Alessandri Vergara Councillor Santiago (2004-08) (2012-)		

(a) José Pedro Alessandri Palma's grandson.

(b) Two marriages.

Source: Compiled by author.



### **iii.iv. Pinto-Bulnes family: 1810-2011**

The Bulnes dynasty can be traced back to Mateo de Toro-Zambrano and Ureta who, as well as being the first count of the Conquest, became president of the First Government Junta of Chile on 18 September 1810. Since Chile's Independence, numerous members of this dynasty have held high political positions. As in the case of other families, they include three presidents of Chile: Francisco Antonio Pinto (1827-29), his son Aníbal Pinto Garmendia (1876-81) and his son-in-law Manuel Bulnes Prieto (1841-51). The family is also related to Juan Luis Sanfuentes Andonaegui, who was president between 1915 and 1920 (Tables 16 and 17).

Like María Errázuriz Echaurren, Enriqueta Pinto Garmendia was a daughter, sister and wife of presidents. These are the only two cases in Chile with this particular network of family ties. The Pinto family also has connections with the Piñera-Chadwick family. Josefina Ariztía Pinto, daughter of Luisa Pinto Garmendia, married Nicanor Rozas and their daughter Josefina Rozas Ariztía married José Miguel Echenique Correa. In turn, their daughter married José Piñera Carvallo and was the mother of the Piñera Echenique brothers: Sebastián, president of Chile between 2010 and 2014 and as from 2018, José, a minister under Pinochet between 1978 and 1981 and Pablo, a director of the Central Bank (Table 18).

Table 16. Pinto-Bulnes family: 1810-2011. Part 1

			Salvador Sanfuentes Torres Deputy (1845-46)	Enrique Sanfuentes Andonaegui Senator (1894-1900) <b>Juan Luis Sanfuentes Andonaegui President of Chile (1915-20)</b>	Blanca Sanfuentes Echazarreta  <b>Married to:</b>			
Mateo de Toro-Zambrano y Ureta 1st Count of La Conquista (1810)	Gregorio José de Toro-Zambrano y Valdés 2nd Count of La Conquista (1811)	María Nicolasa Isidora de las Mercedes de Toro-Zambrano y Dumont de Holdre  <b>Married to:</b>	Juan de Dios Correa de Saa y Toro-Zambrano	Carmela Correa y Sanfuentes  <b>Married to:</b>	Diego Bulnes Correa Deputy (1921-24) Senator (1947-53)	Francisco Bulnes Sanfuentes Deputy (1945-53) Senator (1953-73)	Francisco Bulnes Ripamonti	Felipe Bulnes Serrano Minister of Justice (2010-11) Minister of Education (2011)
Roque Correa de Saa y Peñalosa	Rafael Correa de Saa y Lazón Deputy (1826) Senator (1840-49) Carlos Correa de Saa y Lazón Deputy (1811)	Juan de Dios Correa de Saa y Martínez Deputy (1829) (1831-33) (1840-43) Senator (1846-76)						
		<b>Francisco Antonio Pinto President of Chile (1827-29)</b>  Married to:  Luisa Garmendia Alurralde	<b>Manuel Bulnes Prieto President of Chile (1841-51)</b>  <b>Married to:</b>  Enriqueta Pinto Garmendia (a)	Gonzalo Bulnes Pinto Deputy (1882-85) (1901-03) Senator (1912-24)  Manuel Bulnes Pinto Deputy (1879-82)				

- a) Like María Errázuriz Echaurren, Enriqueta Pinto Garmendia was a daughter, sister and wife of Chilean presidents.

Source: Compiled by author.

Table 17. Pinto-Bulnes family: 1810-2011. Part 2

		<b>Francisco Antonio Pinto</b> <b>President of Chile</b> <b>(1827-29)</b>  <b>Married to:</b>  Luisa Garmendia Alurralde	Luisa Pinto Garmendia  <b>Anibal Pinto Garmendia</b> <b>President of Chile</b> <b>(1827-29)</b>  <b>Married to:</b>	Josefina Ariztía Pinto (b)  Francisco Pinto Cruz Deputy (1900-03)
Pablo de la Cruz	Luis de la Cruz y Goyeneche	José María de la Cruz Prieto Regional Governor in Valparaíso and Concepción (1846-51)	Delfina de la Cruz Zañartu	José María Pinto Cruz Deputy (1910-12)
--	José Prieto Sotomayor	<b>José Joaquín Prieto</b> <b>President of Chile</b> <b>(1831-41)</b>	Joaquín Prieto Warnes Deputy (1840-43)	

b) Tie to the Piñera-Chadwick family.

Source: Compiled by author.

### iii.v. Piñera-Chadwick family: 1811-2015

The Piñera-Chadwick family is another important dynasty, due both to its own participation in politics and its ties to other important families (Tables 18 and 19). From its origins, it has had ties to important families in the Chilean aristocracy (Rozas, Pinto and Echenique). Members of the Piñera-Chadwick family came to the fore after the military coup since many of them supported the overthrow of Allende and then the dictatorship headed by Pinochet, although Sebastián Piñera has maintained a stance closer to the liberal right.

The Piñera-Chadwick family is connected to the Pinto-Bulnes dynasty through Josefina Rozas Ariztía. It also has ties to the Frei-Walker dynasty through Cecilia Echenique, the wife of Ignacio Walker (see Table 18) and cousin of President Piñera. Despite the Chadwick family's links with the conservative right, some of its members have ties with left-wing parties as, for example, in the case of María Teresa Chadwick, who is married to José Antonio Viera-Gallo, an influential member of the Socialist Party (a former senator and minister). Similarly, her sister, María Paula Chadwick, is the mother of Patricio Fernández Chadwick, an influential journalist and founder of *The Clinic* left-wing newspaper. Finally, this branch of the family also has a connection to the Allende family through Jorge Chadwick Pascal, son of Denise Pascal (niece of Allende, see Table 22) and Jorge Chadwick Vergara.

Table 18. Piñera-Chadwick family, 1811-2015. Part 1

Thayer-Morel Family					Alicia Morel Chaignau  Married to:  William Thayer Arteaga Senator (1990-98)  Eduardo Morel Chaignau	Cecilia Morel  <b>Married to</b>	Magdalena Piñera Morel Chief of Staff President Piñera (2010-14)
Pinto Family	<b>Francisco Antonio Pinto</b> <b>President of Chile (1827-29)</b>  <b>Married to:</b> Luisa Garmendia Alurralde	<b>Manuel Bulnes</b> <b>President of Chile (1841-51)</b> <b>Married to:</b> Enriqueta Pinto Garmendia  <b>Anibal Pinto Garmendia</b> <b>President of Chile (1876-81)</b>  Luisa Pinto Garmendia		Josefina Ariztía Pinto (a) <b>Married to:</b>	Luis Rozas Ariztía Deputy (1921-27)	<b>Sebastián Piñera Echeñique</b> <b>President of Chile (2010-14) (2018-)</b>  Pablo Piñera Echeñique Director of the Central Bank (1991-2001)  José Piñera Carvallo  José Manuel Piñera Echeñique	
De Rozas Family	Juan Martínez de Rozas Correa  Interim President of the First Government Junta (1811)	Carlos Martínez de Rozas Urrutia Mendiburu	Nicanor Rozas Rozas		Democratic Christian party's co-founder  Member of the CORFO  Chile Ambassador To the United Nations (1964-70)	Minister of Mining (1980-81)  Minister of Labour (1978-80)  <b>Married to:</b> Francisca Aninat Ureta	
Echeñique Family	Juan José Echeñique Bascañán Deputy (1927-67) Senator (1876-85)	José Francisco Echeñique Tagle Deputy (1864-70)	José Miguel Echeñique Gandarillas Deputy (1897-1906)			Sister of  Eduardo Aninat Ureta Minister of Finance (1994-99)	
Chadwick Family	Roberto Chadwick Amenábar	--	Carlos Chadwick Castro Deputy (1912-15)				

(a) Tie to the Pinto-Bulnes family.

Source: Compiled by author.

Table 19. Piñera-Chadwick family, 1811-2015. Part 2

Chadwick Family	Roberto Chadwick Amenábar --		Carlos Chadwick Castro Deputy (1912-15)	Roberto Chadwick Castro	Paulette Piñera Carvallo	Herman Chadwick Piñera Mayor Providencia (1981-82) president of the Chile’s National Television Council (2010-14)	Maria Irene Chadwick Director of Communications in <i>La Moneda</i> Palace (2010-14)
			Roberto Chadwick Castro			Andrés Chadwick Piñera Senator (1998-2011) Minister Secretary General of the Presidency (2011-12) Minister of the Interior (2012-14)	Camila Chadwick Communications Adviser Minister of Defense (2011-12)
	Pedro Nolasco Valdés Deputy (1826-28)	José Antonio Valdés Munizaga Senator (1882-91)	José Segundo Valdés González Deputy (1885-91)	<b>Married to:</b>  Adriana Valdés Astaburua-ga	<b>Married to:</b>  Herman Chadwick Valdés	Maria Teresa Chadwick Director of CONACE (2000-10) <b>Married to:</b>	
						José Antonio Viera-Gallo Deputy (1990-98) Senator (1998-2006) Minister Secretary General of the Presidency (2006-10)	
				Maria Paula Chadwick	Patricio Fernández Chadwick Director of political left-wing newspaper “ <i>The Clinic</i> ”		
				Tomás Chadwick Valdés Senator (1965-73)	Tomás Chadwick Weinstein Member of Industrial Property Court (2010-)		
					Isabel Chadwick, <b>married to</b> Claudio Jimeno Presidential Adviser (1970-1973). Disappeared-detainee.		
				Roberto Chadwick Valdés	Patricia Chadwick Mery	Francisco Maza Chadwick Mayor Las Condes (2000-)	
				Maria Chadwick Valdés	Patricio Cortés Chadwick Director National Customs Service (1974-89)		
				Lucía Chadwick Valdés	Roberto Darrigrandi Chadwick Director of National Ferrocarriles of the State (trains) (1987-90)		
				Jorge Chadwick Valdés	Jorge Chadwick Vergara	Jorge Chadwick Pascal (INDAP)	

Source: Compiled by author.

### **iii.vi. Frei-Walker family: 1870-2015**

The Frei and Walker families are linked to an important tradition in Chile's republican and political history through the Christian Democrat Party (PDC). This dynasty's most important member is Eduardo Frei Montalva, president of Chile from 1964 to 1970 and president of the Senate in 1973. His son, Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle, was also president of Chile between 1994 and 2000 and president of the Senate between 2006 and 2008 (Tables 20 and 21).

Carmen Frei, a daughter and sister of presidents, was a senator between 1990 and 2006 and is, moreover, married to Eugenio Ortega Riquelme, who was a deputy between 1990 and 1994. Her son, Eugenio Ortega Frei, married Javiera Blanco, who served as minister of labour and then of justice between 2014 and 2016, and her brother-in-law, Emiliano Ortega Riquelme, was minister of agriculture during her brother's presidency. In addition, her niece, the daughter of her brother Eduardo, Magdalena Frei Larraechea, married Edmundo Pérez Vergara, a son of Edmundo Pérez Yoma, who served in the cabinets of both Eduardo Frei-Ruiz Tagle and Michelle Bachelet, and is a grandson of Edmundo Pérez Zujovic, who was a minister of Eduardo Frei Montalva.

Edmundo Pérez Yoma's daughter, María Elisa Pérez Vergara, was married to Clemente Pérez Errázuriz (former undersecretary of public works and president of Metro S.A., Santiago's underground railway), a nephew of Ignacio Pérez Walker, a former senator and minister during the first administration of President Michelle Bachelet. In addition, his grandfather, Clemente Pérez Zañartu, an ambassador under Frei Montalva, married Teresa Walker Concha, a brother of Ignacio, who married Isabel "Sally" Prieto, the first PDC mayor of the Pirque district of Santiago. Their children have also pursued parliamentary careers: Patricio, a former deputy and then senator; Matías, a deputy; and Ignacio, a former deputy, minister under President Ricardo Lagos and senator. The latter is married to Cecilia Echenique, a cousin of President Sebastián Piñera.

The father of Ignacio Walker Concha, Horacio Walker Larraín, was a senator and minister under Presidents Carlos Ibáñez del Campo and Gabriel González Videla while his brother, Joaquín, was a deputy and their father, Joaquín Walker Martínez, was a deputy and senator.

Table 20. Frei-Walker family, 1870-2015. Part 1

	Victoria Montalva Martínez	Arturo Frei Montalva	Arturo Frei Bolívar Deputy (1969-73) Senator (1990-98) <b>Married to:</b>	
			Beatriz Gabriela Riutort Barrenechea	
			Maria Gabriela Riutort Barrenechea Director of ProChile (2000-03) Director of TVN (2003-2011)	
			Julio Riutort Barrenechea Director of DIGEDER (1994-99)	
	<b>Married to:</b>	Irene Frei Montalva Alderman Santiago (1963-64)		
	Eduardo Frei Schlinz	<b>Eduardo Frei Montalva President of Chile (1964-70)</b>	Emiliano Ortega Riquelme Minister of Agriculture (1994-96)	
			Eugenio Ortega Riquelme Deputy (1990-94) <b>Married to:</b>	Javiera Blanco Minister of Justice (2015-2017) Minister of Labour (2014-15) <b>Married to:</b>
				Eugenio Ortega Frei
			Carmen Frei Ruiz-Tagle Senator (1990-2006)	Maria Paz Ortega Frei Chief of Cabinet in Ministry of Education (2006-10)
			Francisco Frei Ruiz-Tagle Director of TVN (1990-2006)	--
			<b>Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle President of Chile (1994-2000)</b>	Cecilia Frei Larraechea
				Head of Victim Support Section, National Prosecution Service
				Catalina Frei Larraechea Director of SENAME
				Magdalena Frei Larraechea <b>Married to:</b>

Source: Compiled by author.

Table 21. Frei-Walker family, 1870-2015. Part 2

		Edmundo Pérez Zujovic Minister of Interior (1968-69) Minister of Public Works (1965-67)	Edmundo Pérez Yoma Minister of Interior (2008-10) Minister of Defence (1999-2000)	Edmundo Pérez Vergara María Elisa Pérez Vergara <b>Married to:</b>
		Pablo Pérez Zañartu Minister of Public Works (1958-60)	--	Clemente Pérez Errázuriz Undersecretary of Public Works (2003-06) President of METRO (2007-12) (a)
Joaquín Walker Martínez Deputy (1894-97) (1903-06) Senator (1909-15)	Horacio Walker Larraín Senator (1933-49) Minister of Justice (1931) Minister of Foreign Affairs (1950-51)	Clemente Pérez Zañartu Ambassador (1964-70) <b>Married to:</b>	Clemente Pérez Walker	
		Teresa Walker Concha	Ignacio Pérez Walker Minister of Mining (2006-08) Minister of Labour (2002-06) Senator (1990-2002)	--
		Ignacio Walker Concha <b>Married to:</b>	Patricio Walker Prieto Deputy (1998-2010) Senator (2010-)	--
			Matias Walker Prieto Deputy (2010-)	--
		Isabel "Sally" Prieto Alderman Pirque (1963-71)	Ignacio Walker Prieto Deputy (1994-2002) Minister of Foreign Affairs (2004-06) Senator (2010-) <b>Married to:</b>	--
			Cecilia Echeñique (b)	
	Joaquín Walker Larraín Deputy (1933-37)			

(a) Divorced.

(b) Cousin of President Piñera. Tie to the Piñera-Chadwick family.

Source: Compiled by author.



### **iii.vii. Allende family: 1876-2015**

The Allende family, with a left-wing tradition, has also played an important role in Chile's republican history. Ramón Allende Padín, who was nicknamed "The Red", was a leading doctor and radical deputy and then senator who also participated in the nineteenth-century War of the Pacific. Although his son, Salvador Allende Castro, was also an important intellectual in the Radical Party, it is his grandchildren, Salvador and Laura Allende Gossens, who achieved the greatest political prominence (Table 22).

In 1970, Salvador Allende Gossens became Latin America's first democratically elected Marxist president. He was supported by the Popular Unity left-wing coalition that lasted until the 1973 military coup. Two of Allende's daughters, Beatriz and Isabel Allende Bussi, had ties to politics. Beatriz, a doctor like her father, was one of his principal advisers and, after the transition to democracy, Isabel became a deputy and then senator and served as president of the Senate between 2014 and 2015. Finally, one of the daughters of Beatriz, Maya Fernández Allende, is currently a deputy.

Laura Allende Gossens had four children: Mariana, Pedro Gastón, an adviser to the Housing Ministry (1970-1973), Andrés, founder and former member of the Left-Wing Revolutionary Movement (MIR), and Denise Pascal Allende, a former governor of the Melipilla Province and a former deputy. She is married to Jorge Chadwick Vergara (a member of the Piñera-Chadwick family, see Table 19) and has a son, Jorge, who worked in the Ministry of Agriculture's Institute for Agricultural Development (INDAP). Finally, the son of Pedro Gastón, Cristóbal Pascal, worked as head of the social division of the Ministry of Justice under President Frei Ruiz-Tagle and as undersecretary of labour under President Lagos.

Table 22. Allende family: 1876-2015

Ramón Allende Padín Deputy (1876-82) Senator (1882-84)	Salvador Allende Castro Member of Radical Party (1890-1930)	<b>Salvador Allende Gossens President of Chile (1970-73)</b>	Isabel Allende Bussi Deputy (1993-2007) Senator (2010-)	--
			Beatriz Allende Bussi Presidential Adviser (1970-73)	Maya Fernandez Allende Deputy (2014-)
		Laura Allende Gossens Deputy (1964-73)	Andrés Pascal Allende Co-founder and former member of the MIR	--
			Denise Pascal Allende Regional Governor Melipilla (1994-2000) Deputy (2006-10) (2010-14) (2014-18)	Jorge Chadwick Pascal (INDAP)
			Pedro Pascal Allende Adviser Ministry of Housing and Urban Planning (1970-73)	Cristóbal Pascal Chief of Cabinet Ministry of Justice (1994-99) Undersecretary Ministry of Labour (2000-05)

(a) Jorge Chadwick Pascal is a tie to the Piñera-Chadwick family.

Source: Compiled by author.

### iii.viii. Aylwin family: 1957-2003

The influence of the Aylwin family is more recent and is related principally to the Christian Democrat Party (PDC) and its members' activities as lawyers (Table 23). Miguel Aylwin Gajardo, who was president of the Supreme Court in the 1960s, was the father of the Aylwin Azócar brothers: Arturo, a former comptroller general; Andrés, a former deputy; and Patricio, who was the first democratically elected president after the end of the Pinochet military regime. The latter's daughter, Mariana, served as minister of education under President Lagos.

The sister of Mercedes Oyarzún, Patricio Aylwin's wife, married Hugo Trivelli, who was a minister under President Frei Montalva. Their son, Marcelo Trivelli Oyarzún, was Governor of Santiago during the Lagos administration. An important number of this family's members have worked privately as lawyers.

Table 23. Aylwin family: 1957-2003

Miguel Aylwin Gajardo President Supreme Court of Justice (1957-60)	Arturo Aylwin Azócar Comptroller General of the Republic (1997-2002)	Mariana Aylwin Oyarzún Minister of Education (2000-03)
	Andrés Aylwin Azócar Deputy (1965-73) (1990-98)	
	<b>Patricio Aylwin Azócar</b> <b>President of Chile</b> <b>(1990-94)</b>  <b>Married to:</b>	
Manuel Oyarzún Lorca	Leonor Oyarzún	Marcelo Trivelli Oyarzún Regional Governor Metropolitan Region (2001-05)
	Mercedes Oyarzún  <b>Married to:</b>	
	Hugo Trivelli Franzolini Minister of Land (1964-65) (1967-68) Minister of Agriculture (1964-67)	

Source: Compiled by author.

Analysis of these eight families provides an insight into the importance that family ties have had throughout Chile's political history. Most of these families have supplied at least one of the country's presidents and most of their other members have held important positions of political power. Moreover, family ties exist not only within these groups but also bridge different dynasties as in the case of the Piñera-Chadwick, Frei-Walker, Pinto-Bulnes and Allende families.

#### iv. Family connections within the political elite after Pinochet

Certain sociopolitical characteristics specific to Chile have conditioned the formation, structure and functioning of the country's elites since its transition to democracy. After the end of authoritarianism, the elites continued to have a highly cohesive structure, with numerous mechanisms of social differentiation, shaped by a gradual process of renovation and replacement (Huneus, 2013; Aguilar, 2011).

This occurred because the country's elites have historically drawn on specific mechanisms of social reproduction, either in terms of their religious ethos in the case of the economic elite (Thumala, 2007), their habitus as in the case of the aristocratic elites (Stabili, 2003) or their mechanisms of social exclusion (Aguilar, 2011). The latter are fundamental since, in practice, social exclusion takes the form of the actions of subjects who expand their resources in order

to restrict the access of other individuals to a particular social space and their opportunities there (Murphy, 1988). In other words, it occurs when, through its actions, a group defines certain attributes that constitute a form of social differentiation.

In the case of elites, differentiation of this type tends to be reproduced through the use of different forms of social capital that enable them to ensure and maintain certain quotas of power over time. Family ties, understood as one form of this type of capital, are one of the important mechanisms of social exclusion employed by elites. In this sense, the creation of networks is a key mechanism in the way they manage power (Espinoza, 2010) and in how certain family groups administer their assets (Núñez & Gutiérrez, 2004). In this context, family capital is also relevant and may be used in numerous ways, including marriage strategies, as a reproduction mechanism by those who occupy the positions of greatest economic power in Chile (Huneus, 2013).

This analysis of family networks reinforces that argument that, although the Chilean elite has shown a capacity for adaptation and renewal in the face of political, economic and cultural transformations, a stable pattern of homogeneity has persisted due to the prevalence of certain family dynasties in the axes of power, with relatively few opportunities for the entry of new groups and/or actors (Dézalay & Garth, 2002, p. 21). The distance of the elites from the rest of society in terms of social values or social exclusion can be explained partly by their strategic use of family networks, particularly considering that, in the Chilean case, some family dynasties (such as the eight analysed here) have remained in power since the time of the country's Independence (Jocelyn-Holt, 1998).

As Barozet (2006) points out, this is also linked to a deeply rooted culture of exchange of favours based on a common social background:

**“In terms of social circles, the groups formed in early stages of life such as family (extensive kinship) and based on either schooling or university are the most mentioned by respondents. They also mention rituals for maintaining these linkages such as family reunions, regular phone calls, emails or Christmas cards...., but, above all, learning constantly about these others' evolution in every social occasion that allows it: it is possible for them to re-activate these links years after the last meeting, and it would not be seen as strange to do so, because of the strength of the initial socialisation. In other words, the efficiency of the exchange of favours is related to the antiquity, and strength, of the social links. Subsequently, professional circles become a great source of favours for those who work”** (Barozet, 2006, p. 19).

In Chile, the possession of family capital, together with other social resources (education, religion, etc.) and the existence of a common space of interaction determined by networks of contacts, has tended to reduce ideological differences within the political elites, particularly

since the transition to democracy. This has to do with how social circles are formed and operate in Chile where how far connections date back is an important factor for the creation of stable ties (Barozet, 2006, p. 88). However, the Chilean elite's high levels of homogeneity is also the result of a rationale of action based on social exclusion mechanisms, a key aspect that is seen in the way social resources are managed so as to limit new actors' access to the political system and opportunities there and to produce a form of social differentiation.

The evolution of Chile's political dynasties is an important input for models to measure comparatively the impact of different species of capital on access to key positions in the legislature and the executive. In this case, taking the initial 386 cases from the nucleus of the elite, it was found that over half were the child of a party member and/or had family ties within the political field (Table 21).

Table 24. Father or mother as party member and family ties in the political world

	Father/mother as party member(s)		Family ties within the political world	
	(a)		(b)	
	Cases	Percentage	Cases	Percentage
<b>YES</b>	199	51.6	201	52.1
<b>NO</b>	187	48.4	185	47.9
<b>Total</b>	386	100	386	100

Source: Compiled by author.

The variable "*family ties in political power*" was created after reviewing the individual biographies of the members of the nucleus that responded the survey, considering their family ties within the political system as represented by the positions considered in the definition of the nucleus of the elite as well as those of local councillor, mayor and adviser to a ministry or other public service. The results reveal that family name is an important feature of this group of cases. Based on this result, it is necessary to examine the types of connection produced by family ties in the political elite.

Gephi software was used to map family networks in the political elite. After analysing the individual biographies and political careers of the 386 cases, other members of the elite were added considering their familial connections, bringing the total to 588 individuals (nodes). In

this, 328 family ties were found, with these defined as a connection as grandparent, mother/father, sibling, child, cousin or uncle/aunt.<sup>33</sup>


The sociogram in Figure 15 represents family ties for the 588 cases. Only individuals with family connections were included in the sociogram (see Table 24). It was generated using the Force Atlas algorithm iterated 1,000 times in order to improve visualisation and identify the types of ties that exist (Jacomy, Venturini, Heymann, & Bastian, 2014). This algorithm operates expansively. Cases without ties are located in the centre, followed by those with two or three ties, while those with multiple ties are towards the outside. The total universe of individuals considered comprises over 20 families, illustrating the importance of this type of capital.

Figure 15 shows how family ties are distributed, using a different colour for each political party. Yellow is used for the PPD, blue for the DC, red for the PS, orange for the PR and green for the right-wing parties of the *Alianza* coalition (UDI and RN). It is interesting to note that most of the family ties correspond to the same party and go beyond a single party only in a few cases (8 diagrams). In the networks of one tie (two nodes), most relationships correspond to father/mother with son/daughter.

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<sup>33</sup> In this case, family ties were considered until 2015.

Figure 15. Family ties in Chile's political elite, 1990-2015



Colours	
Yellow	Democratic Party (PPD)
Blue	Christian Democracy (DC)
Red	Socialist Party (PS)
Orange	Radical Party (PR)
Green	Right-wing parties (National Renewal - RN and Independent Democratic Union - UDI)

Source: Compiled by author.

Most cases were found to have more than one family tie and individuals who represent centres of power were, therefore, identified since, through their multiplicity of ties (for example, through marriage), they bridge different networks. Many of them have names that are connected to traditional Chilean families such as Aylwin, Walker, Zaldívar, Velasco, Ruiz-Tagle, Chadwick, Piñera, Lagos, Frei, Viera-Gallo, Montt and Girardi. Importantly, this list also includes four of the five presidents who governed Chile between 1990 and 2015: Patricio Aylwin, Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle, Ricardo Lagos and Sebastián Piñera (Table 25).

Table 25. Family connections in political power: Centres of power

CENTRES					
ID	NAME	ID	NAME	ID	NAME
37	PATRICIO AYLWIN AZOCAR	141	EDUARDO FREI RUIZ-TAGLE	555	CRISTINA GIRARDI LAVIN
238	JULIO MONTT MOMBERG	474	CARMEN FREI RUIZ TAGLE	345	MARCELO TOKMAN RAMOS
2	RENE ABELIUK MANASEVICH	318	PAULINA SABALL ASTABURUAGA	221	MANUEL ANTONIO MATTA
7	SERGIO AGUILO MECLO	319	EDUARDO SAFFIRIO ESPINOZA	342	WILLIAM THAYER ARTEAGA
17	PEDRO ALVAREZ-SALAMANCA RAMIREZ	301	XIMENA RINCON GONZALEZ	317	JORGE SABAG VILLALOBOS
57	SERGIO BITAR CHACRA	192	RICARDO LAGOS ESCOBAR	275	DENISE PASCAL ALLENDE
59	VIVIANNE BLANLOT SOZA	236	CARLOS MONTES CISTERNAS	272	ANDRES PALMA IRARRAZAVAL
185	CARLOS ABEL JARPA WEVAR	383	ANDRES ZALDIVAR LARRAIN	219	GUTENBERG MARTINEZ OCAMICA
341	JORGE TARUD MONTES	384	ADOLFO ZALDIVAR LARRAIN		
183	ENRIQUE JARAMILLO BECKER	155	CAROLINA GOIC BOROEVIC		
117	FIDEL ESPINOZA SANDOVAL	113	RICARDO ESCOBAR CALDERON		
79	ANDRES CHADWICK	123	JAVIER ETCHEBERRY CELHAY		
282	PABLO PINERA ECHENIQUE	502	GABRIEL SILBER		
389	SEBASTIAN PINERA ECHENIQUE	126	ERNESTO EVANS ESPINEIRA		
374	JOSE ANTONIO VIERA-GALLO	278	IGNACIO PEREZ WALKER		
448	JUAN ANTONIO COLOMA ALAMOS	378	IGNACIO WALKER PRIETO		
449	ERNESTO SILVA MENDEZ	379	PATRICIO WALKER PRIETO		
140	ALEJANDRO FOXLEY RIOSECO	286	PATRICIA POBLETE BENNETT		
88	ENRIQUE CORREA RIOS	517	ISABEL ALLENDE BUSSI		
462	ANDRES PASCAL ALLENDE	218	JORGE MARSHALL RIVERA		
106	ALFONSO DULANTO RENCORET	97	JOSE DE GREGORIO REBECCO		
109	RODRIGO EGANA BARAHONA	349	SONIA TSCHORNE BERESTESKY		
110	ALVARO ELIZALDE SOTO	377	JORGE VIVES DIBARRAT		
264	CLAUDIO ORREGO LARRAIN	376	EDMUNDO VILLOUTA		
265	EUGENIO ORTEGA FREI	360	FELIPE VALENZUELA		
334	CLAUDIA SERRANO	153	GUIDO GIRARDI LAVIN		

Source: Compiled by author.

## v. Conclusions

In line with the hypothesis of Wasby for the case of the United States (Wasby, 1966, p. 15), this research indicates that family ties are important among those individuals who occupy leading positions in Chile's political elite. This is a fundamental input for the inferential analysis of the effect of species of capital presented in Chapter VIII. Family capital or family ties can be considered an advantage in pursuing a political career. Although other variables may



have comparatively more weight when analysing access to the political elite and permanence there in Chile (González-Bustamante, 2013), this descriptive analysis reveals not only an evolving historical pattern of family dynasties, but also that the majority of members of this elite group share ties of this type.

As Joignant (2014) argues, this type of capital may also confer electoral advantages, which may be directly related to the use of family names. In this sense, as Scott (Scott, 1995) argues in the case of the United Kingdom, the use of patronymics or the hereditary use of paternal surnames is important in determining the way in which certain assets (in this case, political) are passed on. In Chile, most members of the political elites use the familial resource to develop networks and structures of succession and, as seen in the case of the eight families analysed here, this has contributed to the maintenance of certain dynasties in power for generations. This is also the case of the members of the nucleus of the elite, most of whom have family ties in the political field.

However, due to the nature of family political capital, the way in which it operates should probably be compared with other networks and types of capital that could have greater importance than ties of this type. To this end, it would be useful to gather and analyse more information about the personal networks of each individual involved in elites of this type and about the nature of recruitment in the political sphere (Camp, 2013; Siavelis & Morgenstern, 2012).

## **CHAPTER VIII. MEASURING AND COMPARING SPECIES OF CAPITAL IN THE CHILEAN POLITICAL ELITE, 1990-2010**

### **i. Introduction**

In this chapter the quantitative analysis is carried out to respond to the main objective of this thesis. Using datasets for members of the Chilean political elite in 1990-2010 (see sampling procedures, in the Introduction), this chapter examines the effect of species of capital on the access of certain individuals to strategic positions in the political field, comparing the legislative and executive branches, as represented by deputies and ministers, between 1990 and 2010. As indicated in previous chapters (mainly in chapter I), although there is extensive literature on the concepts of social, cultural and economic capital, there is a lack of empirical research examining comparatively the effects that these three forms of capital can have on both the formation of elites and their functioning, which is precisely the focus of this research.

This chapter attempts to respond to the main question of this thesis: were the Chilean political party elite's background and social resources, or species of capital, instrumental in allowing its members to access strategic positions? At least three points are relevant to this analysis: 1) Understanding the nature of the party elites during the political transition; 2) Describing and explaining the main aspects of the party elites' background and social resources, including their family networks (independent variables); and, 3) Exploring the effect of these variables on individuals' chances of achieving strategic positions in the political field, comparing the legislative and executive branches as represented by deputies and ministers (dependent variable).

This chapter seeks to provide an empirical insight into how this species of capital operates within these select groups.

This research, instead of considering the elites solely as "the rich against the poor" (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2001, p. 939), uses a broad definition that considers them as those select groups of citizens and/or organisations that control a great deal of power within the society (Hartmann, 2007; Domhoff, 2006). Through different resources (economic, political, cultural, symbolic), most of these groups are constantly searching differentiation from other people, which is defined in sociological terms as "social distinction" (Garrido-Vergara, 2013; Daloz, 2007; Bourdieu, 1984). In politics, this concept is often used to analyse the formation, performance

and behaviour of the power groups that either control certain fields, in Bourdieusian terms<sup>34</sup>, or are situated at the top of the social class structure (Domhoff, 2006).

## **ii. Methodology, hypothesis and techniques of analysis**

The analysis begins with a descriptive analysis of the 386 members of Chile's political elite that responded the survey. This is followed by a logistic regression analysis (logit models) to measure the effect of the different forms of capital in the case of ministers and deputies. The analysis comprises six models, considering individuals who served as minister or deputy in three different periods: 1990-2010, 1990-2000 and 2000-2010. The decision to divide the two decades into two separate periods was taken in order to be able to distinguish between the whole period and two rather different periods. The two decades were analysed separately in order to distinguish between two rather different periods: a conservative decade characterised by the transition and the Christian Democrat governments of Patricio Aylwin (1990-1994) and Eduardo Frei (1994-2000), and the more liberal decade of the Socialist governments of Ricardo Lagos (2000-2006) and Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010). This criterion has also been used in other recent studies of ministers in Chile (González-Bustamante and Olivares, 2016).

The variables used are classified into three dimensions (Table 26). The first corresponds to political capital as reflected in party membership<sup>35</sup> by political party (considering the main parties of each coalition) and participation in the election campaign of the president under whom the position was held (Samuels and Shugart 2010).<sup>36</sup> The second dimension corresponds to cultural-educational capital represented by three variables: years of university education; whether the person studied as an undergraduate at the Universidad de Chile or the Universidad Católica; and whether the person attended a private school for secondary education. This species of capital is relevant for political recruitment as shown in the literature (Ashraf, 2017;

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<sup>34</sup> Unlike Foucault, who considers power as "*ubiquitous*" and "*all-encompassing*" (Pickett, 1996) and, therefore, beyond any social structure, institution or agency (Foucault, 1983; 1982), Bourdieu sees power as a social construction that is culturally and symbolically instituted. Bourdieu's main contention is that power is constantly legitimised in the interplay of multiple agencies and structures. In Bourdieu's theory, the "fields" are the different social and institutional "arenas" in which people communicate, reproduce and share their dispositions and subjectivities (habitus). Moreover, the fields are structured by a set of relationships, which determine their networks and specificity (i.e. educational, cultural, political, business, economic). According to Bourdieu, individuals experience power in different ways depending on the field as they are constantly competing for the distribution of different kinds of capital (Bourdieu, 1990; 1986; 1984).

<sup>35</sup> Some 20% of the individuals that responded the survey switched political party during the period studied. In this case, the last party to which they belonged is considered.

<sup>36</sup> Party membership on its own was not included as a variable because too large a proportion of the respondents belonged to a party.

Siavelis and Morgenstern, 2012).

Finally, the third dimension corresponds to the social-family species of capital, defined as the number of direct and indirect family connections a person has within the political system (Querubin, 2016). Religiosity is also considered in this dimension due to its remaining influence on political identity in Chile and as a social resource in the conformation of social networks (Thumala 2010; Valenzuela, Scully and Somma 2007). These dimensions and variables are shown in Table 26. Age and gender are considered as control variables.

Table 26. Species of capital, operationalisation and hypothesis

Species of Capital	Operationalisation	Hypothesis
Political	Party membership <sup>†</sup> by political party, considering the main parties of each coalition (PS, PPD, PRSD, PDC, RN, UDI)	H1a. Party membership by political party (X1) is positively associated with the likelihood of being appointed as minister or elected as deputy.
	Whether participated in the election campaign of the president under whom served	H1b. Participation in the campaign of the president under whom the position was held (X2) is positively associated with the likelihood of being appointed as minister or elected as deputy.
Cultural-educational	Years of university education	H2a. Years of education (X3) is positively associated with the likelihood of being appointed as minister or elected as deputy.
	Whether studied as an undergraduate at the Universidad de Chile or the Universidad Católica	H2b. Having studied as an undergraduate at either the Universidad de Chile or Universidad Católica (X4) is positively associated with the likelihood of being appointed as minister or elected as deputy.
	Whether attended a private secondary school	H2c. Having studied at a private secondary school (X5) is positively associated with the likelihood of being appointed as minister or elected as deputy.
Social-family	Number of direct and indirect family connections within the political system	H3. The number of family connections (X6) is positively associated with the likelihood of being appointed as minister or elected as deputy.
Religiosity		H4. Religiosity (X7) is positively associated with the likelihood of being appointed as minister or elected as deputy.

<sup>†</sup> Last party to which the individual belonged.


Source: Compiled by author.

### iii. Results

#### iii.i. Descriptive analysis

In general terms, the nucleus of the Chilean political elite shares certain characteristics in matters like religion, academic background and family connections. Figure 16 shows the frequency distribution by age of the 386 individuals who answered the survey. The X axis shows the year of birth and the Y axis the number of individuals. The oldest members of the nucleus were born in 1918 and the youngest in 1978 (2) while most were born between 1943 and 1958 (the mean is 1952 and the mode is 1953). This is important in that it indicates that most of the people answering the survey were aged between 50 and 70.

Figure 16. Year of birth



- (a) This variable includes 386 cases aged from 38 to 97 years.  
The year of birth ranges from 1918 to 1977. The mean is 1952 and the mode is 1953 (14 cases).

Source: Compiled by author.

Table 27 shows members of Congress, the government and the governing bodies of political parties by gender. According to both the original number of individuals that responded the survey (386 cases), and the 432 cases considering that some individuals were appointed to more than one position between 1990 and 2010, men account for a majority of the political elite. In government positions, however, it is possible to observe a growing trend towards the incorporation of women. These descriptive results coincide with those of other research on

Chile's parliamentary elite (Cordero, 2006) and governmental elite (González-Bustamante, 2013, p.137).

Table 27. Gender

27 Gender								
Gender		Position						
		Member of Congress	Government				Member of governing body of a political party	TOTAL (positions)
			Aylwin	Frei	Lagos	Bachelet		
Men	322	135	45	58	66	52	5	361
Women	64	14	1	7	18	30	1	71
TOTAL	386	149	46	65	84	82	6	432

(a) This variable includes the 386 cases, classified by position held between 1990 and 2010 (n=432).

Source: Compiled by author.

Table 27 shows that Aylwin was the president who appointed least women to senior government positions (only 1%) while Bachelet appointed the most (37%). Between 1990 and 2010, more than 80% of members of Congress were men while women accounted for less than 17%. A similar trend is also seen in the political parties whose leadership included only one woman. Finally, considering the 386 cases, men account for almost 84%, similar to the result for the total based on appointments (432 cases).

Another indicator of the homogeneity and concentration of the Chilean political elite is the municipal district where its members' principal residence is located. A majority of the nucleus of the elite lives in the Santiago Metropolitan Region and, within this, principally in four districts where per capita income is among the highest in the country: Providencia, Las Condes, Ñuñoa and Vitacura (almost 45%). Outside Santiago, Viña del Mar, Temuco, Valparaíso, Concepción, Talca and Puerto Montt appear in the list but, together, account for less than 4% of mentions (Table 28).

Table 28. Principal municipal district of residence

Municipal district/city	N°	%
<b>SANTIAGO</b>	81	21
<b>LAS CONDES</b>	30	7.8
<b>ÑUÑO A</b>	23	6
<b>PROVIDENCIA</b>	22	5.7
<b>VIÑA DEL MAR</b>	13	3.4
<b>TEMUCO</b>	11	2.8
<b>SAN MIGUEL</b>	11	2.8
<b>VALPARAÍSO</b>	10	2.6
<b>CONCEPCIÓN</b>	9	2.3
<b>TALCA</b>	7	1.8
<b>RECOLETA</b>	7	1.8
<b>VITACURA</b>	6	1.6
<b>PUERTO MONTT</b>	6	1.6

(a) This variable includes the 386 cases. The 13 most mentioned municipal districts are shown (corresponding to those with 6 or more mentions).

Source: Compiled by author.

Catholicism has historically been influential among Latin American elites and Chile is no exception (Lowden, 1993). Most members of its political elite identify themselves as Catholic (Table 29). This is hardly surprising. Since the Colonial period (1492-1810) when the Roman Catholic Church moved quickly to expand in what the Spaniards called the “*New World*” (Halperín-Donghi, 1967), this religion has exerted an important conservative influence on political power across Latin America.

This situation, however, changed at some point during the 1970s and 1980s when, under authoritarian regimes, the Catholic Church incorporated new and more progressive ecclesiastical movements and organisations, helping to bring it closer to the oppressed and promote protection of human rights. In most Latin American countries, several of these groups still exist today, alongside the traditional conservative ones (Pawliková, 1997; Lowden, 1993; Lehmann, 1992). An interesting example of this is the Vicariate of Solidarity (1976-1992), an agency of the Chilean Catholic Church established in a bid to stop kidnapping and torture by the Pinochet regime. An historical bond between the elite and its religious tradition also continued to exist after the political transition, with the practice of more conservative forms of Catholicism (Thumala, 2010).

Table 29: Religion

	N°	%
<b>No answer</b>	9	2.3
<b>Catholic</b>	226	58.5
<b>Other non-Catholic Christian</b>	14	3.6
<b>Jewish</b>	4	1
<b>None</b>	113	29.3
<b>Other</b>	20	5.2
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>386</b>	<b>100</b>

(a) This variable includes the 386 cases.

Source: Compiled by author.

Table 29 shows that almost 60% of the members of the political elite are Catholic as compared to some 30% who profess no religion. This is in line with their schooling since more than 40% studied at private religious schools.

The influence of Catholicism is also reflected in the education of the elite's children. As shown in Tables 30 and 31, family and religion are connected and important, "*particularly the centrality of the religious education of children, the family celebration of religious feasts, and the coincidence of belief among family members*" (Thumala, 2010:24). Although a significant number of politicians attended prestigious state schools such as the Instituto Nacional General José Miguel Carrera, the Liceo de Aplicación and the Internado Nacional Barros Arana, most of their children studied, or are studying, at private schools (Table 31). Among these, Saint George's (religious school) receives most mentions for all groups of children, followed by San Ignacio in all groups except the fourth son/daughter. Other schools with a large number of mentions are Padres Franceses (Sagrados Corazones), Colegio Alemán, Alianza Francesa, La Girouette, San Juan Evangelista and Villa María Academy (the latter is a Catholic girls-only school) (Table 31).

An educational reform implemented in Chile in the early 1980s created three types of schools: state schools run by municipalities, privately-managed state-subsidised schools and private fee-paying schools (Mizala, Romaguera, & Ostoić, 2005). Almost all Chile's top schools fall into the latter category.



Table 30. Schooling: Type of school for secondary education

	N°	%
<b>Private secular</b>	51	13.2
<b>Private religious</b>	162	42
<b>State-subsidised privately-managed</b>	16	4.1
<b>State municipality-managed</b>	29	7.5
<b>State</b>	116	30.1
<b>Other</b>	5	1.3
<b>Total</b>	379	98.2
<b>Missing System</b>	7	1.8
<b>TOTAL</b>	386	100

(a) This variable includes the 386 cases.

Source: Compiled by author.

The literature indicates that a school's reputation generates tangible benefits for those who attended it, independently of their abilities and knowledge (Cook & Frank, 1991, p. 124). As a result, some schools become elitist because, in addition to education, they provide pupils with social prestige and other opportunities such as access to select groups that could be decisive for their professional careers. In the Chilean case, the conclusions emphasise the extent to which parents' ability to pay for an expensive private education significantly improves their children's chances of getting into a top university and on an upward path in terms of employment (Mizala & Romaguera, 2000).

Elite private schools are located in or near Santiago and most of them have high tuition fees. Moreover, several of them are single-gender schools (mainly the Catholic ones). They also have their own highly selective admissions procedures. For instance, one of the main requirements for admission to Saint George's is to be from a Catholic family and have been baptised (with the certificate). In addition, it gives priority in admissions to children whose families are already linked to the school (through siblings or other relatives who are alumni or currently studying there). Some give priority to foreign applicants (Alianza Francesa and Scuola Italiana). Finally, in some cases, such as the Grange School, applications for admission may require a letter of reference from a member of the school community.

These schools, which appear frequently in the press and the CVs of the Chilean elites, represent what many Chileans would regard as a consensus set of prestigious private schools. However, as Cavieres asserts, these schools have succeeded in Chile, thanks to a lack of both moral and legal regulation:

**“In the meantime, such debate has blocked the analysis of an important form of private schooling existing in Chile, which is attended by upper class students. These schools, although covering a small sector of the student population, have derived the most benefit from current neoliberal policies promoting competition, as under such a paradigm, elite private schools with their privileged social and economic background have been able to succeed more than any other group in Chile without having to meet any particular form of moral or legal regulation. In this sense, attending elite private schools in Chile is viewed as a legitimate right for those who are able to afford it and which doesn’t necessarily include a responsibility towards the rest of the population. Consequently, there has been no special concern about the effects elite private schools have in the country, about the increasing gap that exists between them and those schools that receive students from lower income sectors, and whether elite schools should receive more regulations” (Cavieres, 2009, p. 34).**

The only elite state school in Chile is the Instituto Nacional, which charges no tuition fee and selects pupils based on a standardised entrance exam. Its alumni include 17 Chilean presidents. Table 31 shows the schools which the members of the elite most frequently attended and where their children studied or are currently studying (considering up to the fourth son/daughter).

Table 31. Schooling: Type of school for secondary education, respondents and their sons/daughters

	RESPONDENT		1 <sup>ST</sup> SON/DAUGHTER		2 <sup>ND</sup> SON/DAUGHTER		3 <sup>RD</sup> SON/DAUGHTER		4 <sup>TH</sup> SON/DAUGHTER						
	N°	%	N°	%	N°	%	N°	%	N°	%					
1	LOS PADRES FRANCESES	23	6.0	SAINT GEORGE'S	25	6.5	SAINT GEORGE'S	23	6.0	SAINT GEORGE'S	20	5.2	SAINT GEORGE'S	8	2.1
2	SAN IGNACIO	23	6.0	SAN IGNACIO	20	5.2	SAN IGNACIO	16	4.1	SAN IGNACIO	14	3.6	LOS PADRES FRANCESES	7	1.8
3	ALEMAN	20	5.2	ALEMAN	16	4.1	ALIANZA FRANCESA	14	3.6	LA GIROUETTE	9	2.3	SAN IGNACIO	7	1.8
4	INSTITUTO NACIONAL	17	4.4	VILLA MARIA ACADEMY	15	3.9	SAN JUAN EVANGELISTA	14	3.6	LOS PADRES FRANCESES	9	2.3	TERESIANO	5	1.3
5	SAINT GEORGE'S	15	3.9	ALIANZA FRANCESA	14	3.6	VILLA MARIA ACADEMY	12	3.1	VILLA MARIA ACADEMY	8	2.1	CUMBRES	4	1.0
6	VERBO DIVINO	12	3.1	SAN JUAN EVANGELISTA	14	3.6	ALEMAN	10	2.6	ALIANZA FRANCESA	6	1.6	LA GIROUETTE	3	0.8
7	INTERNADO NACIONAL BARROS ARANA	10	2.6	LA GIROUETTE	13	3.4	LOS PADRES FRANCESES	10	2.6	SAN JUAN EVANGELISTA	6	1.6	SAN JUAN EVANGELISTA	3	0.8
8	LICEO DE APLICACION	8	2.1	LOS PADRES FRANCESES	10	2.6	LA GIROUETTE	9	2.3	TERESIANO	6	1.6	URSULINAS	3	0.8
9	MANUEL DE SALAS	7	1.8	COLEGIO UNIV	10	2.6	INSTITUTO INGLES	8	2.1	ALEMAN	5	1.3	VILLA MARIA ACADEMY	3	0.8
10	GRANGE SCHOOL	7	1.8	INSTITUTO INGLES	8	2.1	TERESIANO	8	2.1						
11	ALIANZA FRANCESA	6	1.6	SAINT GABRIEL	8	2.1	GRANGE SCHOOL	7	1.8						
12	LICEO JOSE VICTORINO LASTARRIA	6	1.6	MANUEL DE SALAS	7	1.8	COLEGIO UNIV	7	1.8						
13	LUIS CAMPINO	5	1.3	INSTITUTO NACIONAL	6	1.6	SANTIAGO COLLEGE	5	1.3						
14	INSTITUTO SUPERIOR DE COMERCIO	4	1.0	TERESIANO	6	1.6									
15	ALEMAN TOMAS MORO	3	0.8	GRANGE SCHOOL	5	1.3									
16	COMPAÑIA DE MARIA	3	0.8	ANDREE ENGLISH SCHOOL	4	1.0									
17	INSTITUTO ALONSO DE ERCILLA	3	0.8	SANTIAGO COLLEGE	4	1.0									

(a) This variable includes the 386 cases.

(b) Missing cases: 9, 43, 72, 165 and 280, respectively.

(c) The 17 most mentioned schools are shown (corresponding to those with 3 or more mentions in the case of the politicians).

Source: Compiled by author.

Table 31 shows the consolidation of private schools as the place where the elite receives its education. For the politicians surveyed, the Instituto Nacional is mentioned quite frequently but, for their children, only private and state-subsidised privately-managed schools are mentioned.

Many members of the nucleus of the political elite went on to study for undergraduate and postgraduate degrees (Table 32). While 32.6% hold an undergraduate degree, 19.9% hold a master's degree and 11.7% a PhD. Taking into account incomplete studies, less than 4% did not go to university. These descriptive results indicate that Chile's political elite is not only concentrated but also highly educated (González-Bustamante, 2013, p.138). By comparison, according to a national survey in 2015, only 7.5% of the total population has a university degree. It found that 27.9% of Chileans had completed their secondary education and 10.8% had incomplete secondary education, but almost 30% had not reached beyond primary education.

Table 32. Education

ELITE NUCLEUS (a)			TOTAL POPULATION (b)		
	Nº	%		Nº	%
No answer	7	1.8	No studies	2	0.1
Secondary schooling	8	2.1	Incomplete primary education	264	18.4
Undergraduate degree	126	32.6	Complete primary education	159	11.1
Technical or professional qualification	5	1.3	Incomplete secondary education	155	10.8
Incomplete undergraduate degree, technical or professional qualification	32	8.3	Complete secondary education	400	27.9
Incomplete postgraduate studies	66	17.1	Incomplete technical or professional qualification	60	4.2
Master's	77	19.9	Technical or professional qualification	125	8.7
PhD	45	11.7	Incomplete undergraduate degree	79	5.5
PhD candidate	20	5.2	Undergraduate degree	108	7.5
TOTAL	386	100	Postgraduate studies (master's, PhD)	33	2.3
			No answer	2	0.1
			Total	1,387	97
			Missing System	47	3.3
			TOTAL	1,434	100

(a) Includes the 386 cases.

(b) Taken from a survey by the Santiago-based Centro de Estudios Públicos (CEP, 2015) where the universe was the population of 18 years and over (urban and rural) of all the country, except Easter Island (target population). The sample covers 100% of the target population, with the exception of the Atacama Region which could not be surveyed due to the damage caused by an earthquake. The sample selection process is non probabilistic (Census), conglomerates and using a three-stage stratified design.

Source: Compiled by author, with own data and data from [www.cep.cl](http://www.cep.cl).

The educational level of the majority of members of the nucleus may be related to the fact that they come from “*enlightened*” families and received an elite education (Tables 32 and 33) and most live in a municipal district with a high average income. In addition, Table 33 shows that more than 40% of the members of the nucleus's fathers hold undergraduate degrees as

compared to 13% who only completed their primary education. The most common undergraduate degrees are Law (12.4%), Engineering (6.5%) and Medicine (5.4%). A majority of the respondents' mothers completed their secondary education (51.8%) and 15.5% hold an undergraduate degree while 12% completed only their primary education. The main occupation of their mothers is housewife, followed by teacher (11.4%) and public employee (3.9%) (Table 33).

Parental educational level is also an important indicator of the social origins of the political elite, linked to the wealthier social classes, particularly since the most common year of birth of those surveyed was 1952 (Figure 16) when coverage of the Chilean educational system reached only 26.2% of the population (Núñez, 1993, p. 4).

Table 33. Parents' education

	FATHER		MOTHER	
	N°	%	N°	%
<b>No answer</b>	14	3.6	22	5.7
<b>Primary education</b>	50	13	46	11.9
<b>Secondary education</b>	101	26.2	200	51.8
<b>Undergraduate degree</b>	128	33.2	60	15.5
<b>Technical or professional qualification</b>	30	7.8	21	5.4
<b>Incomplete undergraduate degree, technical or professional qualification</b>	31	8	25	6.5
<b>Incomplete postgraduate studies</b>	13	3.4	6	1.6
<b>Master's</b>	12	3.1	4	1
<b>PhD</b>	7	1.8	2	0.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>386</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>386</b>	<b>100</b>

Note: Includes the 386 cases.

Source: Compiled by author.

Tables 30, 31, 32 and 33 indicate that most respondents and their families have received an elitist education. Table 30 shows that more than 50% studied at private schools (70% at private Catholic schools) and this trend is even more marked in the case of the secondary schools attended by their children (Table 31). In addition, Table 34 shows that lawyer is the most

common profession of both those surveyed (30.3%) and their fathers (12.4%) while housewife is the most common occupation among their mothers (50.8%).

Table 34. Occupation: Mother, father and respondent

Mother			Father			Respondent		
Occupation	Nº	%	Occupation	Nº	%	Occupation	Nº	%
Housewife	196	50.8	Lawyer	48	12.4	Lawyer	117	30.3
Teacher	44	11.4	Tradesman	38	9.8	Business administrator	43	11.1
Public employee	15	3.9	Farmer	31	8	Engineer	32	8.3
Secretary	12	3.1	Public employee	29	7.5	Doctor	23	6
Tradeswoman	10	2.6	Engineer	25	6.5	Teacher	22	5.7
Lawyer	9	2.3	Doctor	21	5.4	Economist	15	3.9
Nurse	9	2.3	Employee	20	5.2	Sociologist	13	3.4
Social worker	7	1.8	Armed forces	18	4.7	Architect	9	2.3
Housekeeper	4	1	Businessman	16	4.1	Vet	7	1.8
Politician	4	1	Worker	16	4.1	Agronomist	6	1.6

Note: Includes the 386 cases.

Source: Compiled by author.

In Table 35, which shows the university attended for undergraduate studies, those most frequently mentioned are the Universidad de Chile and the Universidad Católica, with 44.3% and 17.9%, respectively. Whereas the Universidad de Chile is secular and public, the Universidad Católica is Catholic and private. Given that most members of the nucleus of the elite attended private religious schools and define themselves as Catholic, it is striking that, for their undergraduate studies, so many preferred a public secular university. Indeed, 20 former presidents of Chile studied at the Universidad de Chile, including three of the four presidents between 1990 and 2010 (Frei, Lagos and Bachelet). Only Patricio Aylwin studied at the Universidad Católica.

Table 35. Education: University for undergraduate studies

	N°	&
Universidad de Chile	171	44.3
Universidad Católica	69	17.9
Universidad de Concepción	18	4.7
Universidad Católica de Valparaíso	12	3.1
Universidad de Santiago de Chile	9	2.3
Universidad Diego Portales	7	1.8
Universidad Austral de Chile	5	1.3
Universidad de Valparaíso	3	0.8
Universidad Metropolitana de Ciencias de la Educación	3	0.8
Universidad Gabriela Mistral	3	0.8
Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez	1	0.3
Universidad de Antofagasta	1	0.3
Universidad Técnica Federico Santa María	1	0.3
Universidad de Los Lagos	1	0.3
OTHER	29	7.5
N/A	53	13.7
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>386</b>	<b>100</b>

Note: Includes the 386 cases.

Source: Compiled by author.

In the case of postgraduate studies (Table 36), almost 42 % of the members of the nucleus of the political elite studied in Chile and 24% in the United States. Importantly, a high proportion of those with PhDs studied in the United States (16), Spain (6) or Germany (5) while, for master's degrees, most preferred Chile (41), the United States (30) or Spain (10). Most of the respondents who studied in the United States obtained either a master's degree (30) or a PhD (16) while, in the case of those who studied in Chile, most either obtained a master's degree (41) or took a less demanding graduate program such as a diploma or executive program (37).

Table 36. Education: Country and degree for postgraduate studies

COUNTRY	DEGREE					TOTAL	
	PhD	Master's, Magister or DEA	MBA	Other postgraduate	PhD Candidate	N/A	
Chile	1	41	4	37	2	1	86
US	16	30	0	1	3	0	50
Spain	6	10	0	4	3	0	23
Germany	5	4	0	1	1	0	11
UK	2	4	0	0	3	0	9
Belgium	2	3	0	1	2	0	8
France	2	2	0	2	2	0	8
Italy	1	2	0	0	0	0	3
Mexico	0	2	0	0	0	0	2
Others	1	5	1	1	0	0	8
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>103</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>208</b>

Note: 178 missing cases

Source: Compiled by author.

Table 37 shows the country and field of postgraduate studies. Almost 27% of the respondents opted for economics, which is consistent with the growing role that this discipline has acquired in recent decades in administration of the state. As Markoff and Montecinos argue, economists took on an unprecedented role after the political transitions in Latin America and this certainly had an important impact on academia (Montecinos & Markoff, 2009; Montecinos, 1998):

**“Professional economists were assuming a role without precedent in politics and public policy in the last third of the twentieth century (Markoff and Montecinos 1993). In Latin America, as in Europe, the emulation of US-style professional norms, the wider use of mathematics both for theory and for the analysis of data as well as other international standards of professionalism have become more prevalent, although regionally distinctive professional profiles have not been totally abandoned, not even in institutions that closely follow the dominant canon. Economic journals and graduate programs advertise both their disciplinary rigor and their focus on Latin American issues (as illustrated by the *Programa Doctoral Latinoamericano* created in 2000 by the *Universidad de Chile* (Chile), the *Universidad Torcuato Di Tella* (Argentina), and Mexico’s ITAM” (Montecinos & Markoff, 2009, pp. 10-11).**

In Table 37, it can also be seen that most of those who studied postgraduate economics did so in the United States (22) or Chile (17). This is the only discipline in which Chile does not have the largest number of mentions.



Table 37: Education: Country and field of postgraduate studies

FIELD	Chile	US	Spain	Germany	UK	Belgium	France	TOTAL
<b>Economics</b>	17	22	1	3	4	2	4	53
<b>Political Science</b>	13	7	5	3	1	1	0	30
<b>and</b>								
<b>International</b>								
<b>Relations</b>								
<b>Public Policy</b>	12	5	2	0	1	0	0	20
<b>State</b>	12	2	2	0	0	0	0	16
<b>Administration</b>								
<b>Law</b>	6	2	5	1	0	1	0	15
<b>Social Sciences</b>	8	1	0	0	3	1	2	15
<b>Medicine</b>	8	2	2	0	0	1	0	13
<b>Architecture</b>	4	0	1	1	0	0	0	6
<b>Education</b>	2	2	0	1	0	1	0	6
<b>Engineering</b>	1	5	0	0	0	0	0	6
<b>Philosophy</b>	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	4
<b>Development</b>	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	3
<b>Studies</b>								
<b>History</b>	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	2
<b>Others</b>	1	2	3	0	0	0	0	6
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>195</b>

Note: 178 missing cases. Includes only the 7 most mentioned countries (N=195).

Source: Compiled by author.

Another important aspect at the descriptive level is party membership. In politics, the parties normally strive to get their members elected to government. This is one of the main reasons why most politicians belong to a party and why this is a key variable for the study of politics and the behaviour of elites, “*Parties and party membership are key variables in democratic politics. Party organizations vary in strength and party membership in viability. Theoretically the impact of party members on democracy is viewed differently – from essential to irrelevant. But even if party members are considered irrelevant as providers of vital mechanisms in democracies, the party membership will impact the way politics operate in practice. Members may, for example, distort (or at least affect) the true market mechanisms sustaining elite democracy*” (Heidar, 2007, p. 3).

For the Chilean case, González-Bustamante analysed the factors that determine access to and permanency in the governmental elite and concluded that, while professional experience and academic background favoured access, both political capital and previous participation in think-

tanks favoured permanency (González-Bustamante, 2013). Although this is related with the *permeability* of the elites or, in other words, “*quite simply the ease with which aspiring individuals can become members of the elite*” (Laswell & Kaplan, 1950, p. 35), in Chile, political capital is important for the development of a political career and membership of the political elite.

As Joignant (2014) argues with respect to the 2013 elections in Chile, those politicians with both political and family resources have a considerable electoral advantage over other candidates. This, among other reasons, explains the formation of political dynasties. Table 35 shows party membership in the political elite between 1990 and 2010 and includes three questions from the survey: Question 3 on whether the politician is - or has been - a member of a party; Question 34 (recoded) on whether his/her mother and father is - or has been – a member of a party; and Question 7 on whether the politician worked in the presidential campaign of the government of his/her first appointment.

Table 38. Party membership

Q3 Party membership		
	N°	%
No	25	6.5
Yes	361	93.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>386</b>	<b>100</b>
Q34 (REC) Mother or Father with party membership		
	N°	%
No	187	48.4
Yes	199	51.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>386</b>	<b>100</b>
Q7 - Did you work in the presidential campaign of the government of your first appointment?		
	N°	%
N/A	125	32.4
Yes	209	54.1
No	52	13.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>386</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: Compiled by author.

As shown in Table 38, the vast majority of those surveyed are or have been a member of a party. Moreover, most of their parents (almost 52%) are or have been a member of a party. Finally, a majority of those surveyed (54.1%) worked in the presidential campaign of the government of their first appointment.

Table 39. Party membership. Name of the political party

	N°	%
<b>Christian Democrat Party (PDC)</b>	116	30.1
<b>Party for Democracy (PPD)</b>	67	17.4
<b>Socialist Party (PS)</b>	59	15.3
<b>Independent Democratic Union (UDI)</b>	32	8.3
<b>Independent (IND)</b>	32	8.3
<b>National Renewal (RN)</b>	24	6.2
<b>Radical Social Democrat Party (PRSD)</b>	20	5.2
<b>Regionalist Independent Party (PRI)</b>	4	1
<b>Communist Party (PC)</b>	2	0.5
<b>Humanist Party (PH)</b>	2	0.5
<b>Others</b>	2	0.5
<b>Centre Action Party (PAC)</b>	1	0.3
<b>Without party membership</b>	25	6.5
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>386</b>	<b>100</b>

Note: Includes the 386 cases.

Source: Compiled by author.

Table 39 shows that the PDC accounts for 30% of the respondents, followed by the PPD (17.4%) and the PS (15.3%). The right-wing UDI and RN parties are in fourth (8.3%) and sixth position (6.2%), respectively.

Table 40. Main reasons for the first appointment

	Senator or Deputy		Leader		Public system (a)		Personal relationships		Professional trajectory		Presidential Campaign	
	N°	%	N°	%	N°	%	N°	%	N°	%	N°	%
<b>YES</b>	34	8.8	124	32.1	4	1	187	48.4	273	70.7	103	26.7
<b>NO</b>	350	90.7	260	67.4	380	98.4	197	51	111	28.8	281	72.8
<b>N/A</b>	2	0.5	2	0.5	2	0.5	2	0.5	2	0.5	2	0.5
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>386</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>386</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>386</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>386</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>386</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>386</b>	<b>100</b>

(a) Public system refers to the *Alta Dirección Pública* (Civil Service) system created in 2003.

Source: Compiled by author.

Table 40 shows the factors which those surveyed view as decisive for their first appointment. The most important ones are professional career (70.7%) and personal relationships (48.4%). These results indicate that social resources related to either family ties or ties of friendship are relevant for appointment to positions of political power. In Chile's hyper-presidential system with a single strong executive and very few constitutional constraints (Couso, Lovera, Guilloff and Coddou 2011, p.87), the president is allowed to appoint '*cargos de confianza*' (positions of trust) which include ministers, undersecretaries and regional governors.

Other resources are, however, also important. For instance, membership of certain organisations is common among respondents (Table 41). Those most frequently mentioned include student organisations (44.3%), professional associations (41.5%) and think-tanks (31.1%).

Table 41. Membership of organisations before being appointed

Type of organisation	YES/NO	N°	%	Type of organisation	YES/NO	N°	%
Community organisations	NO	315	81.6	Religious organisations	NO	295	76.4
	YES	71	18.4		YES	91	23.6
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>386</b>	<b>100</b>		<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>386</b>	<b>100</b>
Professional associations	NO	226	58.5	Indigenous organisations	NO	385	99.7
	YES	160	41.5		YES	1	0.3
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>386</b>	<b>100</b>		<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>386</b>	<b>100</b>
Trade/business associations	NO	352	91.2	Student organisations	NO	215	55.7
	YES	34	8.8		YES	171	44.3
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>386</b>	<b>100</b>		<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>386</b>	<b>100</b>
Trade unions	NO	367	95.1	Cultural organisations	NO	360	93.3
	YES	19	4.9		YES	26	6.7
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>386</b>	<b>100</b>		<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>386</b>	<b>100</b>
NGOs	NO	303	78.5	Human rights organisations	NO	320	82.9
	YES	83	21.5		YES	66	17.1
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>386</b>	<b>100</b>		<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>386</b>	<b>100</b>
Voluntary organisations	NO	336	87	Others	NO	370	95.9
	YES	50	13		YES	16	4.1
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>386</b>	<b>100</b>		<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>386</b>	<b>100</b>
Think-tanks	NO	266	68.9	None	NO	342	88.6
	YES	120	31.1		YES	44	11.4
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>386</b>	<b>100</b>		<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>386</b>	<b>100</b>
Private clubs	NO	328	85				
	YES	58	15				
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>386</b>	<b>100</b>				

Source: Compiled by author.

### iii.ii. Measuring and comparing species of capital in the Chilean political elite

The analysis includes a set of binary logistic regressions to measure the effect of certain forms of capital (Table 26) on appointment/election to two relevant positions within the political system: minister and deputy. The positions of minister and deputy were chosen because they were the most common ones in the total of individuals that responded the survey (108 ministers and 123 deputies).

A limitation of this analysis is that the total of individuals who responded the survey does not include the counterfactuals for each case. In other words, it does not include all those individuals who could have been considered to serve as minister or deputy. However, the use of regression models is also appropriate when there are comparison groups (Kuha and Mills, 2017; Williams, 2009; Allison, 1999) and, in this context, the analysis focuses on comparing the effects of specific forms of capital, considering the political elite and its access to two important positions related to executive and legislative power.

The hypotheses for this analysis are derived from three species of capital: political, cultural/educational, and social/family (Table 22). Each hypothesis (X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6) indicates that these species of capital are positively associated with the likelihood of being appointed as minister or elected as deputy (Y). After carrying out different tests with numerous variables and considering indicators of the models' fit, reliability and of multicollinearity (see appendix IV), eight variables were included in the logistic regression models, as indicated in Table 39.

In all models, the dependent variable is dichotomous and defined according to either appointment as minister or election as deputy. In the case of deputies, it is important to note that they are assumed to be those individuals who were nominated as candidates and won the election. For each position, the dependent variable takes a value of 0 or 1, according to whether the politician did not obtain the position or obtained it, respectively. Most of the independent variables are dichotomous, except in the case of years of education, which is continuous (Table 42). The analysis includes six models considering the individuals who became ministers or deputies for the three different periods: 1990-2010, 1990-2000 and 2000-2010.

Between 1990 and 2000, 40 individuals served as minister and 71 were deputies while, between 2000 and 2010, 71 were ministers and 109 were deputies. It is important to note that there were some repetitions between the two periods. Party membership and variables related to electoral performance were not included in this analysis. In the case of party membership, this was due to the respondents' high level of homogeneity with respect to this variable and, in the second, because the study's objective is to analyse the effect of species of capital on access to positions, not on electoral performance.

Table 42. Values for binary logistic regressions (logit models)

	Variable	Concept	Measurement		
Dependent variables	Minister	The politician was appointed as minister.	0	Not appointed	
			1	Appointed	
	Deputy	The politician was elected as deputy.	0	Not elected	
			1	Elected	
Independent variables	Age	Age in number of years	Continuous		
	Gender	Gender	0	Man	
			1	Woman	
	Socialist Party (PS)	The individual is member of the PS.	0	No	
			1	Yes	
	Party for Democracy (PPD)	The individual is member of the PPD.	0	No	
			1	Yes	
	Radical Social Democrat Party (PRSD)	The individual is member of the PRSD.	0	No	
			1	Yes	
	Christian Democrat Party (PDC)	The individual is member of the PDC.	0	No	
			1	Yes	
	National Renewal Party (RN)	The individual is member of the RN.	0	No	
			1	Yes	
	Independent Democratic Union (UDI)	The individual is member of the UDI.	0	No	
			1	Yes	
	Campaign	The individual participated in the presidential campaign of the government under which served.	0	No	
			1	Yes	
	Years of education	Number of years of education	Continuous		
	Undergraduate Chile/Católica	Undergraduate studies either at the Universidad de Chile or the Universidad Católica	0	No	
			1	Yes	
	Private school	The individual studied at a private school.	0	No	
			1	Yes	
	Family connection	The individual has direct family connections (father, mother, child, sibling, grandchild) and/or indirect connections (cousin, nephew/niece, great-grandchild).	1	Yes	
			1	Yes	
	Religion	The individual professes a religion.	0	No	
			1	Yes	

Source: Compiled by author.

Table 43 shows a set of binary logistic regression (logit) models according to each dichotomous variable for the three different periods. Table 43 also shows the goodness of fit for each model. Given the number of cases included (N considered), this is relatively good, with the pseudo  $R^2$  oscillating between .19 and .38. The value of the AIC test, which reflects the relation between the bias and variance in construction of the model, shows that, although the six models are quite similar, the third one tends to have a better goodness of fit. Moreover, in order to prevent instability of the final results, variance inflation factor tests (VIF) were used to verify the absence of multicollinearity in both models.

In this type of analysis, it is necessary to guard against problems of multicollinearity. Multicollinearity occurs in a logit model when two or more independent explanatory (or predictor) variables are highly inter-correlated, implying that one variable can be linearly predicted from the others with a non-significant degree of accuracy (Saikia & Singh, 2014; Tsutsumi, Shimizu, & Matsuba, 1997). In order to quantify the severity of multicollinearity, a variance inflation factor (VIF) test was carried out, providing an index that measures how much the variance of the estimated regression coefficient models increases because of collinearity (Stine, 1995). For this reason, the categories proposed by Joignant were taken as a reference, but the variables finally considered in the analysis are those that did not present problems of multicollinearity.

Both the correlation matrix and the VIF analysis conducted prior to the logit models can be found in Appendix IV. The correlation matrix analysis is important in order to detect statistical correlations that contribute to the development of the hypotheses of analysis while the VIF tests are necessary to detect collinearity problems which, in this case, are indicated by a VIF of above or close to 10. The values obtained for each model do not indicate such problems.



Table 43. Logit models for appointment/election by position

	1990-2010		1990-2000		2000-2010	
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6
	Ministers	Deputies	Ministers	Deputies	Ministers	Deputies
<b>Age</b>	.048*** (.014)	-.033** (.014)	.141*** (.023)	.060*** (.016)	-.014 (.015)	-.053*** (.015)
<b>Gender</b>	1.17*** (.340)	-.816** (.416)	-.084 (.617)	-.509 (.520)	1.41*** (.347)	-.635 (.412)
<b>Socialist Party (PS)</b>	.622 (.472)	1.05* (.652)	.009 (.685)	.908 (.896)	1.04** (.545)	1.08* (.676)
<b>Party for Democracy (PPD)</b>	.600 (.463)	2.02*** (.613)	-.212 (.706)	1.52* (.685)	1.11** (.535)	1.94*** (.632)
<b>Radical Social Democrat Party (PRSD)</b>	.226 (.711)	1.65** (.814)	-.848 (1.18)	2.04** (1.00)	-.992 (.804)	1.50* (.832)
<b>Christian Democrat Party (PDC)</b>	.845** (.417)	.716 (.574)	-.270 (.611)	1.18* (.766)	1.33*** (.495)	.816 (.603)
<b>National Renewal Party (RN)</b>	(omitted)†	2.24*** (.759)	(omitted)†	2.89*** (.887)	(omitted)†	1.64** (.737)
<b>Independent Democratic Union (UDI)</b>	(omitted)†	2.42*** (.757)	(omitted)†	2.57*** (.865)	(omitted)†	2.47** (.748)
<b>Campaign (political)</b>	1.57*** (.307)	-2.09*** (.314)	1.82*** (.523)	-1.81*** (.379)	1.16*** (.340)	-1.89*** (.317)
<b>Years of education</b>	.235*** (.074)	-.265*** (.079)	.242** (.104)	-.203*** (.084)	.185** (.081)	-.242*** (.077)
<b>Universidad de Chile or Católica</b>	.624** (.315)	-.482 (.324)	.783* (.521)	.070 (.379)	.350 (.349)	-.271 (.326)
<b>Private school (secondary education)</b>	.229 (.296)	-.611** (.333)	-.161 (.441)	-.930** (.379)	.598* (.332)	-.478 (.331)
<b>Family connections (social)</b>	.701*** (.280)	.484* (.307)	.512 (.442)	.328 (.346)	.504* (.311)	.297 (.301)
<b>Religion</b>	-.671** (.326)	1.35*** (.385)	-.311 (.499)	1.35*** (.493)	-.550 (.355)	1.02*** (.376)
<b>Constant</b>	-10.8*** (1.84)	5.40*** (1.91)	-17.5*** (3.02)	-2.83 (2.09)	-6.91*** (1.92)	5.89*** (1.91)
<b>N (N Considered)</b>	386	386	386	386	386	386
<b>Log likelihood</b>	-173.679	-152.165	-87.617	-125.488	-149.986	-154.982
<b>LR <math>X^2</math></b>	108.34***	181.81***	81.82***	117.51***	68.51***	149.52***
<b>Pseudo <math>R^2</math></b>	.24	.38	.32	.32	.19	.33
<b>AIC*n</b>	373.359	334.330	201.234	280.975	325.971	339.694

(a) Beta coefficient values.

(b) \*p&lt;0.1; \*\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*\*p&lt;0.01.

(c) Standard error in parentheses.

(d) † Variables omitted because, as these parties were in opposition, their members could not be appointed as ministers.

Source: Compiled by author.

The results partially support the hypothesis of this research. The first two models (for the full two-decade period) show that age, gender (control variables) and variables related to cultural-educational capital (except having attended a private school) and to social-family and political capital are significant for both positions, but have opposite effects. Considering the results, being older is more likely to be ministers than to be deputies, and being younger increases the likelihood to be deputies rather than ministers. Similarly, having had many years of education turns out to be significant to ministers in comparison with deputies, while having had less years of education is more likely to be deputy instead of minister.

This is also reflected in the importance of having studied as an undergraduate at the Universidad de Chile or the Universidad Católica, which has a positive effect for ministers and a negative one for deputies. This may be related to the profile for the position of minister in Chile, which calls for technical and academic credentials as well as political experience (González-Bustamante and Olivares 2016). Only family capital has a significant effect in the same direction for both positions, but loses importance when the data is analysed separately for each of the two decades, reflecting the fact that the models for the full period include different generations (parents and children).

Another interesting result is seen in the case of gender. In the full period, being a woman is more likely to be minister than to be deputy but, when the two decades are separated, it remains significant only for 2000-2010. This is because there were very few women ministers in the Aylwin and Frei governments in comparison to the Lagos and Bachelet governments, which saw a significant increase in the incorporation of women as a result of the adoption of gender parity criteria in the executive branch (González-Bustamante and Olivares 2016). This was not the case for deputies where the negative effect of being a woman persists through both periods. However, it is important to consider that most of the women of the nucleus held their positions in 2000-2010, explaining why this variable was not significant in the period corresponding to the Aylwin and Frei governments.

Another clear trend is participation in the presidential campaign of the government under which the position was held. In the case of ministers, this variable is significant for all three periods analysed. This is hardly surprising since a cabinet seat is a position in the trust of the president. The opposite occurs in the case of deputies which is also not surprising since access to this position is determined by other election processes and the function does not depend on the executive.

Finally, religion is seen to be significant for both ministers and deputies considering the whole period (1990-2010). However, for ministers, the effect is negative and loses significance when the period is divided into two decades. For deputies, on the other hand, it has a significant positive effect in all three periods, suggesting that, for them, unlike ministers, there is a species of capital related to their religious beliefs (H4).

The fact that years of education is a significant variable confirms the importance of academic and technical specialization to be appointed as minister and is in line with the literature on this for Chile. After analysing the results of the logit models, it is interesting to look at the predictive capacity which this variable and gender have for access to the positions of minister and/or deputy. This was calculated using non-linear models.


Hypothesis H1b is borne out only for ministers. In the case of deputies, participation in the election campaign of the president under whom the position was held is significant, but negatively, which may be explained by the fact that deputies, unlike ministers, do not necessarily depend on the president's support for access to their positions. Similarly, H2a is partially borne out only for ministers because the profile of the position makes academic specialisation important. For deputies, years of education is significant, but negatively, because their position is one of popular representation for which academic qualifications are not a *sine qua non* of access.

H2b is ruled out partially for ministers and totally for deputies. Having studied at either the Universidad de Chile or the Universidad Católica has a significant effect for ministers in the two-decade period, but does not have a significant effect for deputies. Having attended a private school (H2c) does not have a significant effect for either position. Finally, H3 on the impact of family connections is borne out by the results for both ministers and deputies for the two-decade period. This variable, unlike others, needs to be considered for the two decades together, rather than separately, because the family relationship most frequently observed among those surveyed is that of parent/child.

Returning to the hypotheses of this research, H1a is totally borne out for deputies and partially for ministers since, in the case of the former, most parties have a significant effect in both 1990-2000 and 2000-2010 while, in the case of ministers, only two parties (PPD and PDC) have a significant effect and only in the second period. This was only to be expected given the profile of the position of minister as technocratic and in the trust of the president.

The fact that years of education is a significant variable confirms the importance of academic and technical specialisation for becoming a minister and is in line with the literature on this for Chile. After analysing the results of the logit models, it is interesting to look at the predictive capacity which this variable, disaggregated by gender, has for access to the positions of minister and/or deputy. This was calculated using non-linear models.

Figures 17 and 18. Probability of being appointed minister by years of education and gender



- (a) Predictive margins are based on predicted probabilities calculated from the logistic regression analysis.
- (b) Margins are used to get the predicted probabilities for the values of years of education (considering men and women) from 12 to 23 in increments of 1 holding in 1 (in this case, appointed as minister) the dependent variable at its mean.
- (c) Y axis shows the probability of the outcome.
- (d) Red and blue areas show the shaded area between the upper and lower confidence interval. The smaller the interval, the better the fit of the data.


Source: Compiled by author.

Figures 17 and 18 show the probability of being appointed as minister by gender and years of education, with a 95% level of confidence. Predictive margins are based on predicted probabilities calculated from the logistic regression analysis and are used to get the predicted probabilities for the values of years of education (considering men and women) from 12 to 23 in increments of 1 while holding in 1 (in this case, appointed as minister) the dependent variable at its mean. In the case of women, there is an important difference between the two periods.

In both, the number of years of education and being a women increases the probability of appointment as a minister but, in 1990-2000, the confidence interval tends to be much wider than for men, reflecting the small number of women in the nucleus for that period, while, in 2000-2010, both the probability and the fit increase. The curve for men is similar to that for women in the first period, but with a better fit while, in the second period, it is below the curve for women, but with a good fit.

These results show that number of years of education and gender satisfactorily predict appointment as minister. For deputies, however, the opposite is true (Figures 19 and 20). Having less years of education (considering primary and secondary education as the minimum) and being a man increase the probability to be appointed as deputy rather than minister. This analysis does not consider effects at the level of elections. This position is only analysed comparatively with that of ministers.

Figures 19 and 20. Probability of being appointed deputy by years of education and gender



Source: Compiled by author.

- (a) Predictive margins are based on predicted probabilities calculated from the logistic regression analysis.
- (b) Margins are used to get the predicted probabilities for the values of years of education (considering men and women) from 12 to 23 in increments of 1 holding in 1 (in this case, appointed as deputy) the dependent variable at its mean.
- (c) Y axis shows the probability of the outcome.
- (d) Red and blue areas show the shaded area between the upper and lower confidence interval. The smaller the interval, the better the fit of the data.


Source: Compiled by author.

Despite the differences for men and women, these results reinforce the idea that number of years of education is relevant for becoming a minister, but not for becoming a deputy. This is in line with the positions' respective profiles. While ministers are expected to have a level of specialisation and technocratic credentials on a par with their brief, deputies require a more political profile that does not necessarily call for specialisation.

The results also confirm the favourable effect of the introduction of gender parity criteria on women's incorporation into the executive branch, but not the legislature. Finally, the only variable that is not relevant in the analysis is secondary education at a private school. This could be due to the difficulties implicit in quantitative measurement of the school as a place of socialisation and a social entry barrier to the elite, as discussed in the descriptive analysis (Table 31). This represents an important challenge for future research.

The results of the models show that membership of a political party has a significant effect for ministers in 2000-2010 in the case of the PS, the PPD and the PDC. In line with this, the predictive capacity of membership of these parties, together with years of education, is compared as shown in Figures 21, 22 and 23.

Figures 21, 22 and 23. Probability of being appointed minister by political party and years of education, 2000-2010 (PS, PPD and PDC)



- Predictive margins are based on predicted probabilities calculated from the logistic regression analysis.
- Margins are used to get the predicted probabilities for the values of years of education (considering men and women) from 12 to 23 in increments of 1 holding in 1 (in this case, appointed as minister) the dependent variable at its mean.
- Y axis shows the probability of the outcome.
- Red and blue areas show the shaded area between the upper and lower confidence interval. The smaller the interval, the better the fit of the data.


Source: Compiled by author.

The figures show the probability of being appointed minister by political party and years of education in 2000-2010 (PS, PPD and PDC), with a 95% level of confidence. In the case of ministers, although there are more significant variables related to technocratic qualifications, membership of a political party, together with years of education, has significant effects and is a predictor of appointment as minister for the PDC, PPD and PS. Out of these three parties, the

effect is most significant for the PDC, followed by the PPD and, finally, the PS. In other words, being a member of one of these parties in 2000-2010 and more years of education and specialisation increased the probability of appointment as minister.

For deputies, membership of a political party has a significant effect in both decades. Therefore, after analysing the results of the logit models, it is relevant to look at the predictive capacity of this variable and years of education for access to the position of deputy. This was calculated using non-linear models considering each of the six parties included in the analysis.

Figures 24 and 25. Probability of being appointed deputy by political party and years of education (PS)



† The full two-decade period was considered because membership of the PS does not have a significant effect in 1990-2000.


- (a) Predictive margins are based on predicted probabilities calculated from the logistic regression analysis.
- (b) Margins are used to get the predicted probabilities for the values of years of education (considering men and women) from 12 to 23 in increments of 1 holding in 1 (in this case, appointed as deputy) the dependent variable at its mean.
- (c) Y axis shows the probability of the outcome.
- (d) Red and blue areas show the shaded area between the upper and lower confidence interval. The smaller the interval, the better the fit of the data.

Source: Compiled by author.

Figures 24 and 25 show the probability of being appointed deputy rather than minister by political party and years of education for the PS, with a 95% level of confidence. The full two-decade period is considered as a reference because the logit analyses indicate that membership of this party did not have a significant effect in 1990-2000. The results show predictive capacity in both periods but, given that membership of the PS was not significant for 1990-2000, it is relevant only for 2000-2010.

In this case, it is important to note that, for the full two-decade period, the variables mentioned have significant predictive capacity for being appointed deputy rather than minister but, as membership of the PS does not have a significant effect in 1990-2000, the comparison shown in Figures 24 and 25 indicates that this effect is, in fact, concentrated in the second period, implying that a predictive analysis for the first decade would be spurious.

Figures 26 and 27. Probability of being appointed deputy by political party and years of education (PPD)




- (a) Predictive margins are based on predicted probabilities calculated from the logistic regression analysis.
- (b) Margins are used to get the predicted probabilities for the values of years of education (considering men and women) from 12 to 23 in increments of 1 holding in 1 (in this case, appointed as deputy) the dependent variable at its mean.
- (c) Y axis shows the probability of the outcome.
- (d) Red and blue areas show the shaded area between the upper and lower confidence interval. The smaller the interval, the better the fit of the data.

Source: Compiled by author.

Figures 26 and 27 show the probability of being appointed deputy rather than minister as relevant groups of comparison by political party and years of education for the PPD, with a 95% level of confidence. In contrast to the case of the PS, both variables are significant for both periods. However, the effect is larger in the second period as is also seen in the case of predictive capacity. Figure 26 shows that the confidence interval tends to be smaller and the probability of being appointed deputy is greater than for those who were not members of this party.



Figures 28 and 29. Probability of being appointed deputy by political party and years of education (PRSD)




- (a) Predictive margins are based on predicted probabilities calculated from the logistic regression analysis.
- (b) Margins are used to get the predicted probabilities for the values of years of education (considering men and women) from 12 to 23 in increments of 1 holding in 1 (in this case, appointed as deputy) the dependent variable at its mean.
- (c) Y axis shows the probability of the outcome.
- (d) Red and blue areas show the shaded area between the upper and lower confidence interval. The smaller the interval, the better the fit of the data.

Source: Compiled by author.

Figures 28 and 29 show the probability of being appointed deputy instead of minister by political party and years of education for the PRSD, with a 95% level of confidence. As for the PPD, both variables are significant for both periods, but the logit analyses show that membership of this party tends to be more significant in the first decade. However, in the predictive graphs, it can be seen that the confidence interval is wide, reflecting that fact that the number of deputies belonging to this party is lower than for other parties since it is a smaller party with less electoral strength.

Figure 30. Probability of being appointed deputy by political party and years of education (PDC)




- (a) Predictive margins are based on predicted probabilities calculated from the logistic regression analysis.
- (b) Margins are used to get the predicted probabilities for the values of years of education (considering men and women) from 12 to 23 in increments of 1 holding in 1 (in this case, appointed as deputy) the dependent variable at its mean.
- (c) Y axis shows the probability of the outcome.
- (d) Red and blue areas show the shaded area between the upper and lower confidence interval. The smaller the interval, the better the fit of the data.

Source: Compiled by author.

Figure 30 shows the probability of being appointed deputy rather than minister by political party and years of education for the PDC, with a 95% level of confidence, between 1990 and 2000. The PDC is the only party for which membership is significant only in the first decade. This is explained by its electoral and political decline as from 2000. After the transition to democracy, it was the most powerful party in the Concertación and the two first post-transition presidents, Patricio Aylwin and Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle, were drawn from its ranks. However, the subsequent two governments were headed by a member of the PS (Ricardo Lagos and Michelle Bachelet) and, in the 2009 congressional elections, the PDC began to lose electoral strength, with a drop in the votes obtained by its candidates for both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate.

Figures 31 and 32. Probability of being appointed deputy by political party and years of education (RN)




- (a) Predictive margins are based on predicted probabilities calculated from the logistic regression analysis.
- (b) Margins are used to get the predicted probabilities for the values of years of education (considering men and women) from 12 to 23 in increments of 1 holding in 1 (in this case, appointed as deputy) the dependent variable at its mean.
- (c) Y axis shows the probability of the outcome.
- (d) Red and blue areas show the shaded area between the upper and lower confidence interval. The smaller the interval, the better the fit of the data.

Source: Compiled by author.

Figures 31 and 32 show the probability of being appointed deputy by political party and years of education for the RN, with a 95% level of confidence. Membership of this party was highly significant in both decades. In the predictive graphs, it is clear that, in the first period, the probability was extremely significant as compared to those who were not members of this party. This was due to the binomial system for congressional elections, which heavily favoured the *Alianza* and its two parties (Carey, 2006).

Figures 33 and 34. Probability of becoming a deputy by political party and years of education (UDI)



- (a) Predictive margins are based on predicted probabilities calculated from the logistic regression analysis.
- (b) Margins are used to get the predicted probabilities for the values of years of education (considering men and women) from 12 to 23 in increments of 1 holding in 1 (in this case, appointed as deputy) the dependent variable at its mean.
- (c) Y axis shows the probability of the outcome.
- (d) Red and blue areas show the shaded area between the upper and lower confidence interval. The smaller the interval, the better the fit of the data.

Source: Compiled by author.

Figures 33 and 34 show the probability of being appointed deputy by political party and years of education for the UDI, with a 95% level of confidence. In this case, both variables are significant, but in opposite directions, with the probability of being appointed deputy decreasing with years of education (12) and increasing with membership of the party. Like the RN, the UDI benefitted from the binomial electoral system.

#### iv. Conclusions

This study contributes empirically to the study of Chile's political elites. The results show that ministers are highly qualified and have a shared space of socialization through where they studied and family connections. In the case of deputies, educational cultural capital tends to significant but in the inverse direction seen for ministers, suggesting that other resources or species of capital are very probably relevant for access to this position. Only religion and family tend to have a relevant significance, which is in line with the literature on this subject in Chile and other Latin-American countries (Camp 1997, 2013; Thumala 2010).

In the full period, family capital is significant for both positions, reflecting the fact that, in most cases, there is a generation (for example, a father or a mother) that held the position in the first decade, followed by a second generation (for example, a son or daughter) in the subsequent decade. These results provide empirical evidence to the prevalence of this form of capital within the elites in Latin America since the oligarchic regimes (Lake Frank 2001; Rovira Kaltwasser 2009, 2018).

Within the implications of this study, the analysis of the results reveals a marked difference between members of the executive and legislative branches. In the case of ministers, a technocratic profile is seen to be important, which is a phenomenon that has prevailed since the mid-fifties in Chile (Silva 2009). Empirically, the results show that cultural capital expressed as level of specialization (years of education) is important for this position. This reflects the strategic role that ministers play in the design and implementation of public policies (González-Bustamante and Garrido-Vergara 2018; González-Bustamante and Olivares 2016).

In the case of deputies, an interesting result is that, as for ministers, family is important, along with religion. This is not trivial because it confirms the importance of this resource, not only for membership of the elite but also for access to key positions. The prevalence of religion, especially catholic, within the members of parliament also has happened in other Latin American countries (Fleet and Smith 1997).

The data also reveals that other factors have important effects for becoming either a minister or a deputy. Age, which is equated with experience, is important for appointment to a ministerial position while, for deputies, youth (relative to other positions such as minister or senator) matters. Indeed, in the period studied here, the average age of deputies was between 45 and 48 years. It is also important to note that regulation of the legislature (the Political Constitution and Constitutional Organic Law N° 19.918) stipulates that, among other requirements, deputies must be at least 21 years old and senators at least 35. There are, therefore, incentives for young people to seek these positions whereas ministers, because they are expected to have high levels of educational qualifications and specialisation, tend to be older.

Both the existence and reproduction of these species of capital imply a growing effort of socialization on the part of individuals in which social recognition is determined by numerous relations of interaction through which it is constantly affirmed and reaffirmed (Bourdieu 1985, p. 52). Based on this logic, the results presented here indicate that, although many species of capital fulfil different functions for being appointed minister or deputy, family capital is a fundamental resource for access to both positions.

Given the limits of the data used here, there are some challenges that further research could address concerning the uses of cultural and social capital within the political elite. With regard to the cultural capital, it would be certainly relevant to study the elite preferences concerning their tastes and to compare them with the rest of the society, in order to analyse the relationship between the differentiation of tastes and the reproduction of social inequalities. This could certainly be addressed by replicating some other interesting studies that do measure these dimensions (Špaček 2017).

On the other hand, with regard to social capital, although it is difficult to quantify as regards relations and reciprocal ties of power, there are some studies that have addressed the conformation, structure and consequences of political networks (Van Gunten 2015). This certainly remains as a challenge for further research.

In general terms, this quantitative analysis is the first applied analysis to measure quantitatively the effects of species of capital in Chile's political elite. It tests empirically a series of hypotheses that were defined and operationalized as indicated in the literature on elites in Chile. From a sociological standpoint, the analysis has defined and compared the profiles of ministers and deputies according to the species of capital found to be instrumental for accessing these positions.

## IX. CONCLUSIONS

In the previous chapters, this thesis has sought to explain the nature of the party elites during the political transition; to describe and explain the main aspects of the party elites' background and social resources, including their family networks (independent variables); and to measure the effect of those variables on individuals' chances of achieving strategic positions in the political field, comparing the legislative and executive branches as represented by deputies and ministers (dependent variable). The quantitative data was obtained from 386 members of the nucleus of the Chilean political elite, who were surveyed to obtain information about their social, academic and family background, social resources and professional and political careers, among other topics.

In general terms, the work presented here is the first applied analysis to measure quantitatively the effects of species of capital in Chile's political elite. From a sociological standpoint, the study has defined and compared the profiles of ministers and deputies according to the species of capital found to be instrumental for accessing these positions. This instrumentality is expressed in shared social recognition of certain species of capital which enable individuals to access certain positions in the political system. This is referred to as the "transformation or convertibility of capital" and is a key concept from Bourdieu's theory which is applied in this research.

As regards the conclusions and scope of the research, Chapter I discussed in detail the main theories and relevant empirical research on political elites. This background is vital as context for this research and its theoretical and empirical contributions to the study of this sociopolitical phenomenon. This chapter also sets out the foundations of the conceptual definition of elites, the power structure and social differentiation. These three broad concepts are addressed from different theoretical perspectives and the standpoint of different contributions to the study of political elites as a phenomenon analysed by political sociology.

Chapter I also examined the theoretical-conceptual foundations of species of capital as a category of analysis, comparing the approaches of Bourdieu, Coleman and Putnam. While the latter two associate the use of social capital with the formation of reciprocal social networks of cooperation, Bourdieu defines it as a species of capital (in addition to the economic and cultural species) that requires recognition by other individuals for its conversion into a new type of capital. For example, if education at certain schools is valued and recognised as a means of access to the political elite, then those individuals who possess this species of cultural capital can, as shown by this research, turn it into political capital if they enter the political elite. This

empirical application of the Bourdieusian concept of social capital implies that this resource functions through individual recognitions that favour certain reciprocal social actions or behaviour.

In other words, in the case of Bourdieu, recognition of the species of capital (expressed through practical dispositions characteristic of the habitus of each individual) is conducive to certain actions or behaviour of a social nature that favour certain types of social relations. This is where the empirical contribution of this thesis lies because, until now, no empirical evidence existed to prove this theory at the level of political elites.

Chapter II showed that the course and quality of Latin America's processes of democratisation have been quite heterogeneous. While some countries have achieved stable indicators of political development, related to the quality of democracy, the results in most others have been poor. This raises numerous questions about the role played by the region's elites, both locally and across countries.

The data presented, both of an historical nature and as measurements of trends, shows that most of the region's countries have experienced difficulties in achieving sustained democratic development and economic progress. The data on the relationship between the legislative and executive branches shows that presidential regimes have prevailed in most countries and maintain strong control of political and legislative power. The paradox that arises is with stability because, on average, the countries where the executive intervenes more also have more stable democracies. This is vital for understanding the context that shaped the emergence and development of Chile's post-Pinochet political elites, considering the previous period which determined the end of the military regime and the subsequent political transition to democracy.

Chapter III examined the political process that brought an end to the military dictatorship and marked the formation of the two coalitions that governed Chile between 1990 and 2010: the *Concertación* and the *Alianza*. This chapter explained how the Chilean party system experienced significant changes after the restoration of democracy. In the wake of the 1988 plebiscite, a new political landscape emerged, defined by the dichotomy between authoritarianism and democracy and the political loyalties formed under Pinochet. This situation, combined with the establishment of a binomial system for congressional elections, led to the formation of two main coalitions, grouping the main centre-left parties in the *Concertación* and the main right-wing parties in the *Alianza*. One of the main objectives behind the latter's creation was to maintain Pinochet's legacy and keep control over the executive and legislative branches. For the centre-left coalition, on the other hand, the main objective was to



promote a return to a democratic system of popular representation (Luna & Altman, 2011; Torcal & Mainwaring, 2002).

As shown in this chapter, an authoritarian enclave in the form of the binomial system (Garretón, 1999; Siavelis, 2009b) allowed these coalitions to stay in power. Thanks to this electoral system, both coalitions obtained the majority of votes in congressional, municipal and presidential elections between 1989 and 2009. The binomial system also meant that Chilean politics remained highly concentrated at the elite level and, therefore, increasingly remote from civil society. Another key aspect of this period was the ongoing existence of other authoritarian enclaves and their role in a democratisation process with numerous institutional limitations that were, nevertheless, accepted by the *Concertación* for the sake of the stability of the process.

Chapter IV described and explained both the formation and evolution of these two coalitions before the 1988 plebiscite and after the first post-Pinochet presidential election in 1989. In the case of the *Concertación*, it notably won four consecutive presidential elections as well as a majority in all congressional and municipal elections through to 2008, making it the most successful coalition in the recent history of Latin America.

When founded in 1988, this coalition comprised 14 parties, but only the largest - PDC, PS, PPD and PRSD - endured over time. Indeed, the first two of the coalition's four consecutive governments were led by the PDC (Patricio Aylwin and Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle) and the two following ones by the PS (Ricardo Lagos and Michelle Bachelet). As a governing coalition, the *Concertación* showed pragmatism in the management of public policy and adopted the economic development strategy implemented by the Chicago Boys under the military regime (Navia, 2009). This led to debate and divisions within the coalition, which became more marked after its defeat in the run-off ballot of the 2009 presidential election.

Thanks to the binomial system, the *Alianza* played an active role as opposition. Like the *Concertación* in the case of centre-left forces, it attempted to attract centre-right political forces after the restoration of democracy, but finally comprised only the two parties with the greatest political impact and largest social base (RN and UDI). As a political force, the *Alianza* grew significantly after its victory in the 2008 municipal elections and the 2009 presidential election. However, the incorporation of more progressive centre-right forces marked its end in 2015.

These two coalitions shared similar social origins and formed a very closed political elite, with various mechanisms of social differentiation (as shown in Chapters VII and VIII). Their successful political performance is explained in detail in Chapter V, looking at how they

maintained total control of municipal, congressional and presidential elections between 1990 and 2010. Election results demonstrate the *Concertación*'s domination of political power, since it won all elections from 1989 through to the 2008 municipal elections when the *Alianza* obtained more votes in the election for mayors. The *Concertación* then lost the 2009 presidential election when the new *Coalición por el Cambio* (Coalition for Change), which had replaced the *Alianza* in 2009, was elected under President Sebastián Piñera (2010-2014).

The binomial system also helped these two coalitions by excluding other parties from representation in Congress. Between 1990 and 2010, only individuals who were members of their partners or independents supported by one of the coalitions won seats, as either senators or deputies. There was, in other words, a partyarchy, a concept used to define the form of bipartidism seen in Chile during this period. The binomial system promoted political stability but also political exclusion and the consolidation of a political elite after the end of Pinochet's regime.

Chapter VI described the methodological strategy used in this research, both as regards the gathering of the information and the analysis adopted. The quantitative information was obtained from the FONDECYT project that surveyed members of the nucleus of Chile's political elite, covering a group of individuals defined according to specific criteria using the positional selection method (Hoffmann-Lange, 2007). At close to 70%, the response rate for the survey was acceptable, including for deputies and ministers, the positions considered by this research in its logit models (Chapter VIII).

This chapter also describes the process in which 15 key members of the elite were interviewed in order to obtain qualitative information for use in defining the emphasis of the quantitative analysis. This information was useful in determining the importance of family capital and identifying key family dynasties (Chapter VII) and in providing perspective and determining the emphasis of the quantitative analysis, taking into account the research's objectives and hypotheses (Chapter VIII).

At the level of analysis, the research strategy comprised three stages. The first involved descriptive analysis and validation of the quantitative data obtained from the survey. In-depth interviews were then conducted with members of the Chilean political elite in order to provide additional, more inductive information for developing the findings obtained from the survey data. Finally, the variables were selected for the inferential analysis to estimate the effect of the species of capital on access to key positions in the political elite, comparing the executive (ministers) and the legislature (deputies).

Chapter VII analysed family ties, considering eight important political dynasties and the members of the nucleus of the political elite who were surveyed. This was essential in revealing the importance of this type of capital in the Chilean elite and justifying its inclusion in the logit models described in this chapter. As shown by network analysis, most members of the elite have familial links within political system and this form of capital can, therefore, be considered an advantage in pursuing a political career. Although other variables may have comparatively more weight when analysing access to Chile's political elite and ongoing membership of it (González-Bustamante, 2013), this descriptive analysis reveals not only an evolving historical pattern of family dynasties, but also that most members of this elite group share ties of this type.

As Joignant (2014) argued, this type of capital may also confer electoral advantages, which may be directly related to the use of family names. In Chile, most members of the political elites use the familial resource to develop networks and structures of succession and, as seen in the case of the eight families analysed in this chapter, this has contributed to the maintenance of certain dynasties in power for generations. This is also the case of the members of the nucleus of the elite, most of whom have family ties in the political field.

Chapter VIII examined the effect of species of capital on the access of certain individuals to strategic positions in the political field, comparing the legislative and executive branches, as represented by deputies and ministers, between 1990 and 2010. The empirical analysis included network analysis of family capital and six logit models for three periods: 1990-2000, 2000-2010 and 1990-2010. In general terms, the results indicate that age, gender and variables related to cultural, social and political capital are relevant for becoming both a deputy and a minister, but with opposite effects: while ministers are highly qualified and have a shared space of socialization through where they studied and family connections, for deputies educational cultural capital tends to be significant but in the inverse direction seen for ministers, which can be explained mainly for the requirements to be appointed in this position (from 21 years).

Only religion and family tend to have a relevant significance, which is in line with the literature on this subject in Chile and other Latin-American countries (Camp 1997, 2013; Thumala 2010). In the full period, family capital is significant for both positions, reflecting the fact that, in most cases, there is a generation (for example, a father or a mother) that held the position in the first decade, followed by a second generation (for example, a son or daughter) in the subsequent decade. These results provide empirical evidence to the prevalence of this form of capital within the elites in Latin America since the oligarchic regimes (Lake Frank 2001; Rovira Kaltwasser 2009, 2018).

The results of this work permit the development of a sociology of the political elite through comparative analysis of the executive and legislative branches as represented by ministers and deputies. This study forms part of the FONDECYT project led by Alfredo Joignant, which has used the same data in a number of important applied research projects. Most of this work (for example, Joignant, 2014; González-Bustamante, 2013) has been used as a reference in this thesis. However, none of it follows the line of research addressed here, underlining the originality of the work presented here whose theoretical and methodological approach is unique at the local and regional level.

Its results lay the foundations for a line of research that I intend to continue to pursue at the Chilean and Latin American level. It is clearly important to understand the role of the different species of capital in the formation and functioning of elites and, therefore, to expand this study to parliaments and other spheres of the executive. In the case of Latin America, it is interesting to compare parliaments at the local level (considering the counterfactuals) and between countries. In the case of the executive, it is more difficult to take the counterfactuals into account (that is, those who could have been appointed ministers but were not) because this is a decision at the discretion of the president. For Chile and Latin America, it is also important to look at the way in which senior civil servants are appointed since, in many cases, this is a competitive process, carried out either through a public application process or performance evaluation.

## X. BIBLIOGRAPHY

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## Appendix I. Letter of Permission for Use of Data



Santiago – Chile, December 28, 2010

**Chairman  
Selection Committee for the  
PHD Graduate Program  
University of Cambridge**

Dear Ms., Dear Mr.:

Through this letter I certify that Mr. Luis Garrido Vergara is entitled to use the full quantitative data basis from the research that I supervise, in order to realize his Graduate Studies at Doctoral level. This research is entitled "Political elites in Chile: Sociology of the governmental, parliamentary and party staff (1990-2010)", and is funded by the National Fund for scientific and technological development of the Government of Chile ([www.fondecyt.cl](http://www.fondecyt.cl), Project nº 1100877) for a period of 3 years. Since January 2009, the candidate has been working as a research assistant on this project with an outstanding performance.

This data basis is composed by formal political positions of about 2000 persons (including former presidents, ministers and other relevant political authorities) from 1990 to 2010, according to 70 variables that include information about: extraction and social origin, education and educational socialization, political trajectories and socialization, access to formal positions in the government, political parties and the Parliament, governmental trajectories including reconversion and exit from the government, parties and the Parliament. Considering his great quality in academic and professional levels and his consistent research proposal, I have no doubts that Luis will show a perfect use of this data basis, in order to obtain empirical results contributing to the study of the governing elites. Indeed, this is a great opportunity for a Student of PHD Program to use such a data basis, considering its strengths at the empirical quantitative level.

If you need additional information on any aspect related to this candidate and/or letter of recommendation, please do not hesitate to contact me at my telephone: 0056-2-6762805 or e-mail address: [alfredo.joignant@udp.cl](mailto:alfredo.joignant@udp.cl), in Santiago, Chile.

Sincerely yours,

---

Alfredo Joignant Rondón  
Ph.D. in Political Science  
Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne  
Professor-researcher at the Diego Portales University  
Santiago of Chile

## Appendix II. Questionnaire

FOLIO N°	
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### Cuestionario Proyecto "Elites Políticas en Chile 1990-2010" FONDECYT N° 1100877

#### DATOS DEL ENTREVISTADO

Nombre Completo:

Teléfono de Contacto:

E-Mail:

**P2. Cuál fue su primera comuna de residencia. Si no nació en Chile, señale el año de llegada al país.**

Primera comuna de residencia (Chile)	Año de llegada a Chile

**P3. ¿Milita o militó en algún partido político?**

<input type="checkbox"/>	Sí <b>(pase a P5)</b>
<input type="checkbox"/>	No <b>(pase a P4)</b>

**P4. Si NO milita en ningún partido. ¿Se siente cercano, o simpatiza usted con alguno de estos partidos?** (Marque una sola opción y continúe con pregunta 6)

<input type="checkbox"/>	Chileprimero (CH1)
<input type="checkbox"/>	Partido Comunista de Chile (PC)
<input type="checkbox"/>	Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC)
<input type="checkbox"/>	Partido Humanista (PH)
<input type="checkbox"/>	Partido Izquierda Cristiana de Chile (IC)
<input type="checkbox"/>	Partido Por la Democracia (PPD)
<input type="checkbox"/>	Partido Radical Socialdemócrata (PRSD)
<input type="checkbox"/>	Partido Regionalista de los Independientes (PRI)
<input type="checkbox"/>	Partido Socialista de Chile (PS)
<input type="checkbox"/>	Renovación Nacional (RN)
<input type="checkbox"/>	Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI)
<input type="checkbox"/>	Partido Progresista (PRO)
<input type="checkbox"/>	Otro (Por favor especifique):



**P5. Si militó ¿En qué partidos políticos milita o ha militado? Por favor, complete el año de incorporación y retiro en cada uno de ellos, y especifique el nivel del cargo directivo que ocupa u ocupó (Nacional, Regional o Local).** (Marque el nivel más alto de cargo por cada partido en que ha militado).

	Años de Militancia		Nivel del Cargo Ocupado		
	Año de Incorporación	Año de retiro	Nivel Nacional	Nivel Regional	Nivel Local
Chileprimero (CH1)					
Izquierda Cristiana (IC)					
Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitaria (MAPU)					
Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR)					
Partido Comunista de Chile (PC)					
Partido de Acción De Centro (PAC)					
Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC)					
Partido Ecologista					
Partido Humanista (PH)					
Partido Izquierda Cristiana de Chile (IC)					
Partido Liberal					
Partido Nacional (PN)					
Partido Por la Democracia (PPD)					
Partido Radical (PR)					
Partido Radical Socialdemócrata (PRSD)					
Partido Regionalista de los Independientes (PRI)					
Partido Republicano					
Partido Social Democracia (SD)					
Partido Socialista de Chile (PS)					
Renovación Nacional (RN)					
Unión de Centro Centro (UCC)					
Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI)					
Otro (indicar) _____					

**P6. Ordene cronológicamente su trayectoria pública y/o privada desde 1990 hasta el 11 de marzo de 2010.** (Marque con una "x" y sólo una alternativa para cada columna)

Cargo	1er cargo	2do cargo	3er cargo	4º cargo	5º cargo	6º cargo	7º cargo	8º cargo	9º cargo
Presidente de la República									
Ministro									
Alto Oficial de FF.AA o de Orden									
Miembro Corte Suprema									
Contralor General de la República									
Miembro Tribunal Constitucional									
Jefe de gabinete									
Subsecretario									
Diputado									
Senador									
Embajador									
Asesor ministerial									
Jefe de División									
Jefe de Servicio SEREMI									
Gobernador									
Intendente									
Agregaduría en el extranjero									
Directorio o Gerencia Emp. Pública.									
Superintendente									
Consejero Organismo Púb.									
Directorio o Gerencia de Emp. Privada									
Consultor									
Ejercicio libre de profesión									
Org. Internacionales									
Universidades									
Think Tanks									
ONGs									
Otro									
Especificar									

**P7. ¿Trabajó en la campaña presidencial del gobierno en el cual ejerció su primer cargo?**

<input type="checkbox"/>	Sí
<input type="checkbox"/>	No

(continuar con P9)

**P8. ¿En cuál de las siguientes actividades de campaña participó usted?** (Marque con una "x" sí o no, en cada una de ellas).

	SI	NO
Trabajo Programático		
Trabajo Territorial		
Recaudación de Fondos		
Comunicaciones		
Otras		

**P9. Mencione si los siguientes elementos fueron determinantes en el nombramiento de su primer cargo y luego señale los tres más relevantes en orden de importancia. (1) el más importante y (3) menos importante.** (Responder SI o NO en cada una de ellas)

	SI	NO	Importancia (1, 2 y 3)
El apoyo de un partido			
El apoyo de un sector de un partido			
El apoyo de un senador o diputado			
El apoyo de un líder o dirigente de partido importante			
Por Alta Dirección Pública			
Por relaciones personales			
Por trayectoria profesional previa			
Haber trabajado en la campaña presidencial			
Otro:			

**En caso de haber elegido OTRO en la pregunta anterior, especifique por favor qué otros elementos fueron determinantes en su nombramiento al primer cargo.**

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**P10. Nombre las personas que usted considera que más influyeron en los diferentes gobiernos de la Concertación.** (Indique nombre y apellido. Ej: Juan García, Pedro Guzmán, Andrea Castro)

Gobierno de Aylwin	Gobierno de Frei	Gobierno de Lagos	Gobierno de Bachelet

**P11. Nombre a quienes más lo han influenciado a lo largo de su trayectoria gubernamental.**

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**P12. Nombre a quienes más lo han influenciado en su trayectoria política.**

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**P13. Nombre a personas de corrientes ideológicas - diferentes a la suya - a quienes suele prestarle atención.**

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**P14. Nombre a quienes han tenido mayor influencia política en el país, desde 1990.**

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**P15. En su opinión, ¿Qué personas han sido líderes de opinión en Chile desde 1990 en los siguientes ámbitos?:**

<b>RELIGIOSO</b>	<b>INTELLECTUAL</b> (columnistas, escritores, académicos, periodistas, etc.)	<b>ECONOMICO</b> (empresarios, economistas, etc.)	<b>SOCIAL</b> (dirigentes gremiales, sindicales, etc.)	<b>OTROS</b>

**P16. Por favor, describa -en no más de cinco líneas- a qué actividad profesional, laboral u oficio dedicaba la mayor parte de su tiempo inmediatamente antes de asumir su primer: (cargo de confianza /cargo de Diputado o Senador /cargo de dirección partidaria).**

DESCRIPCIÓN ACTIVIDAD:

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**P17. ¿Pertenebió a alguna(s) de las siguientes organizaciones antes de asumir su primer (cargo de confianza/cargo de Diputado o Senador /cargo de dirección partidaria)?** (Si perteneció, por favor indique el nombre de la organización, si ocupó un cargo directivo y si siguió participando mientras ejercía su cargo)

	SI/NO	Nombre de la Organización	Ocupó cargo directivo (Sí- No)	Siguió participando en ella, mientras ejercía su cargo (Sí- No)
Organizaciones territoriales, vecinales y funcionales (centros de madres, clubes deportivos, etc.)				
Colegios Profesionales				
Asociaciones Gremiales y Empresariales				
Organizaciones sindicales				
ONGs de la sociedad civil				
Organizaciones de Voluntariado				
Centros de Estudio y/o Think Tanks				
Clubes de Membresía de Pago (Club de la Unión, de Polo, Stade francés, etc.)				
Asociaciones y movimientos religiosos, filosóficos o espirituales				
Asociaciones y Comunidades Indígenas				
Organizaciones estudiantiles				
Asociaciones y movimientos culturales				
Asociaciones de derechos humanos				
No, a ninguna				
Otra				

**P18. Hijos: año de nacimiento y principal establecimiento educacional (colegio) en el que está o estuvo.** (Si no recuerda año de nacimiento puede indicar la edad)

	<b>AÑO DE NACIMIENTO</b>	<b>PRINCIPAL ESTABLECIMIENTO EDUCACIONAL</b>
Hijo 1 (el mayor)		
Hijo 2		
Hijo 3		
Hijo 4		
Hijo 5		
Hijo 6		
Hijo 7		
Hijo 8		
Hijo 9		
Hijo 10 o más		

**P19. ¿Tiene algún lugar habitual de veraneo?**

	Sí	<b>Favor IndicarCuál:</b>
	No	

**P20. ¿Profesa usted alguna religión? En caso de responder afirmativamente ¿qué tan religioso se considera usted?**

	<b>Marque religión que profesa</b>	<b>¿Qué tan religioso se considera?</b>			
		<b>Muy Religioso</b>	<b>Bastante Religioso</b>	<b>Poco Religioso</b>	<b>Nada Religioso</b>
	Católico				
	Cristiano no Católico Romano				
	Judío				
	Mormón				
	Ninguna				
	Otra (Por favor especifique):				

**P21. ¿Vivió en el exilio?** (Si su respuesta es sí indique por favor año de salida y año de retorno a Chile)

	SI	<b>Año de salida:</b> <b>Año de retorno:</b>
	NO	

**P22. ¿Ha vivido en el extranjero por más de un año continuo por razones de estudio, trabajo u otras diferentes del exilio?**

	SI
	NO

**P23. Si ha vivido fuera de Chile por más de un año, indique en orden cronológico el o los países de acogida y el año de retorno a Chile.**

PAISES DE RESIDENCIA	AÑO RETORNO A CHILE

### **DATOS EDUCACIONALES**

**P24. Máximo nivel educacional alcanzado**

	Básica
	Media
	Universitaria completa
	Técnica completa
	Universitaria o técnica sin título
	Estudios de Postgrado
	Titulado de Magíster
	Titulado de Doctor
	Candidato a Doctor

### **EDUCACION BÁSICA**

**P25.1 Nombre del Colegio:** \_\_\_\_\_

**P25.2 Comuna o País:** \_\_\_\_\_

**P25.3 Tipo de dependencia del colegio principal de educación primaria (básica)**

	Privado pagado no religioso
	Privado pagado religioso
	Privado subvencionado
	Municipal
	Escuela Básica Fiscal
	Otro

### **EDUCACION MEDIA**

**P26.1 Nombre del Colegio:** \_\_\_\_\_

**P26.2 Comuna o País:** \_\_\_\_\_

**P26.3 Tipo de dependencia del colegio principal de educación media**

	Privado pagado no religioso
	Privado pagado religioso
	Privado subvencionado
	Municipal
	Liceo Fiscal
	Otro



**PREGRADO**

(En caso de varias carreras, favor indique la que usted considera como principal)

**P27.1 Nombre de la Carrera:****P27.2 Nombre de la Institución:****P27.3 Comuna o País:****P27.4 Condición académica**

<input type="checkbox"/>	Licenciado
<input type="checkbox"/>	Egresado no titulado
<input type="checkbox"/>	Titulado
<input type="checkbox"/>	No terminada

**P27.5 Año de obtención del Título o Grado (sólo si fue terminado)**

Año: \_\_\_\_\_

**POSTGRADO****P28.1 ¿Posee estudios de postgrado?**

<input type="checkbox"/>	Sí
<input type="checkbox"/>	No (continuar con pregunta 30)

**Datos de la Institución donde realizó Postgrado.****P28.2 Nombre:****P28.3 Comuna o País:****P28.4 Grado obtenido** (Marque una sola opción)

<input type="checkbox"/>	Doctor (o PhD)
<input type="checkbox"/>	Máster, Magíster o DEA
<input type="checkbox"/>	MBA
<input type="checkbox"/>	Postítulo
<input type="checkbox"/>	Candidato a Doctor

**P28.5 Disciplina**

Disciplina estudiada \_\_\_\_\_

**P28.6 ¿Presencial?** (Marque una sola opción)

<input type="checkbox"/>	Sí
<input type="checkbox"/>	No
<input type="checkbox"/>	Semi presencial

**P28.7 Año de obtención del postgrado**

Año obtención: \_\_\_\_\_

**SEGUNDO POSTGRADO****P29.1 ¿Estudió otro postgrado?** (Marque una sola opción)

<input type="checkbox"/>	Sí
<input type="checkbox"/>	No (* continuar con preg.30)

**Datos de la Institución****P29.2 Nombre:****P29.3 Comuna o País:****P29.4 Grado Obtenido** (Marque una sola opción)

<input type="checkbox"/>	Doctor (o PhD)
<input type="checkbox"/>	Máster, Magíster o DEA
<input type="checkbox"/>	MBA
<input type="checkbox"/>	Postítulo
<input type="checkbox"/>	Candidato a Doctor

**P29.5 Disciplina**

Disciplina estudiada: \_\_\_\_\_

**P29.6 Modalidad ¿Presencial?** (\* Marque una sola opción)

<input type="checkbox"/>	Sí
<input type="checkbox"/>	No
<input type="checkbox"/>	Semi presencial

**P29.7 Año de obtención del título o grado**

Año Obtención: \_\_\_\_\_

**P30. Indique -sólo si corresponde- ¿Qué otros idiomas domina además del castellano?**  
 (Especifique nivel en una escala de 1 a 10, donde (1) es Básico y (10) Avanzado)

IDIOMA	NIVEL DE 1 A 10

**PADRES****Máximo nivel educacional alcanzado por su PADRE y MADRE**

(Marque una sola opción)

<b>31.1 PADRE</b>	<b>31.2 MADRE</b>	
		Básica
		Media
		Universitaria completa
		Técnica completa
		Universitaria o técnica sin título
		Estudios de Postgrado
		Grado de Magíster
		Grado de Doctor
		No sabe/no recuerda

**32. Describa por favor, ¿A qué actividad profesional, laboral u oficio se dedicaba su PADRE y MADRE?****32.1 PADRE:****32.2 MADRE:****33. ¿Su PADRE y MADRE ocuparon alguna de las siguientes posiciones durante su vida? (PUEDE MARCAR MAS DE UNA)**

<b>CARGOS</b>	<b>33.1 PADRE</b>	<b>33.2 MADRE</b>
Presidente de la República		
Ministro		
Alto Oficial de FF.AA o de Orden		
Miembro Corte Suprema		
Contralor General de la República		
Miembro Tribunal Constitucional		
Jefe de gabinete ministerial (de ministro o subsecretario)		
Subsecretario		
Diputado		
Senador		
Embajador		
Asesor ministerial		
Jefe de División		
Jefe de Servicio		
SEREMI		
Gobernador		
Intendente		
Agregaduría en el extranjero		
Directorio o gerencia Emp. Púb.		
Superintendente		
Consejero Organismo Púb.		
Directorio o gerencia de Emp. Privada		
Consultor		
Ejercicio Libre de Prof.		

Org. Internacional		
Rector o autoridad central de Universidades		
Directivo de centros de estudio		
Directivo de ONGs		
Alcalde		
Regidor o concejal		
Director establecimiento educacional		
Funcionario Público		

**34. ¿Militaba su PADRE y MADRE en algún partido político?**

<b>34.1 PADRE</b>	<b>34.2 MADRE</b>	
		Sí
		No ( <b>pasar a P37</b> )
		No sabe/No responde ( <b>pasar a P37</b> )

**35. ¿En cuál o cuáles? (MARQUE CON UNA X)**

	<b>35.1 PADRE</b>	<b>35.2 MADRE</b>
Partido Conservador		
Partido Socialista (PS)		
Partido Nacional (PN)		
Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC)		
Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitaria (MAPU)		
Partido Radical (PR)		
Partido Social Democracia (SD)		
Izquierda Cristiana (IC)		
Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR)		
Partido Comunista (PC)		
Partido de Acción De Centro (PAC)		
Unión de Centro Centro (UCC)		
Partido Republicano		
Partido Liberal		
Partido Por La Democracia (PPD)		
Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI)		
Renovación Nacional (RN)		
Partido Agrario Laborista		
Unión Socialista Popular (USOPO)		
Otro		
Ninguno		

**36. Si su respuesta en la pregunta anterior fue OTRO. Especifique por favor partido en el que militaba su PADRE y MADRE.**

**36.1 PADRE:**

**36.2 MADRE:**

**37. En regla general, ¿cuál ha sido la principal preferencia política de su PADRE y MADRE?**

37.1 PADRE	37.2 MADRE	
		Izquierda
		Derecha
		Centro
		No sabe/No responde
		Otro (Por favor especifique):

### **P38. ABUELOS**

**¿Algunos de sus abuelos/as ocupó o tuvo cargo público o privado de relevancia?**

	Abuelo Paterno	Abuela Paterna	Abuelo Materno	Abuela Materna
Presidente				
Ministro				
Subsecretario				
Alto Oficial de FF.AA o de Orden				
Miembro Corte Suprema				
Contralor General de la República				
Miembro Tribunal Constitucional				
Senador				
Diputado				
Alcalde				
Regidor o concejal				
Intendente				
Embajador				
Director o gerente de empresa privada				
Director o gerente de empresa pública				
Propietario o Principal Accionista de gran empresa (Industria, Comercial, Agrícola, etc.)				
OTRO				

**P39. SUEGROS**

**¿Algunos de sus suegros tuvo cargo público o privado de relevancia?**

(Marque con una X la o las alternativas que corresponden)

	<b>SUEGRO/A N°1</b>	<b>SUEGRO/A N°2</b>
Presidente		
Ministro		
Subsecretario		
Alto Oficial de FF.AA o de Orden		
Miembro Corte Suprema		
Contralor General de la República		
Miembro Tribunal Constitucional		
Senador		
Diputado		
Alcalde		
Regidor o concejal		
Intendente		
Embajador		
Director o gerente de empresa privada		
Director o gerente de empresa pública		
Propietario o Principal Accionista de gran empresa (Industria, Comercial, Agrícola, etc.)		
OTRO		

**P40. ¿Por qué medios se informa Ud. habitualmente?** Elija todos los medios que Ud. Considere y por favor ordene según importancia (1 es más importante, 2, 3, 4,...).

	<b>Se Informa</b>
Diarios Nacionales	
Diarios Extranjeros	
Revistas Nacionales	
Revistas Extranjeros	
Radios	
Canales de Televisión Nacionales	
Canales de Televisión Extranjeros	
Sitios Web	
Blogs Nacionales	
Blogs Extranjeros	
Boletines institucionales o especializados	
Facebook u otras redes sociales	
Twitter	
Otros medios electrónicos. Señalar cual:	

**P41. ¿Publica o ha publicado Ud. regularmente sus opiniones en alguno de los siguientes medios de comunicación? (Marque con una X)**

Diarios Nacionales	
Diarios Extranjeros	
Revistas Nacionales	
Revistas Extranjeros	
Radios	
Canales de Televisión Nacionales	
Canales de Televisión Extranjeros	
Sitios Web	
Blogs Nacionales	
Blogs Extranjeros	
Boletines institucionales o especializados	
Facebook u otras redes sociales	
Twitter	
Otros medios electrónicos. Señalar cual:	

Proyecto FONDECYT N°1100877  
Metropolitana.  
Investigadores:

### CONSENTIMIENTO INFORMADO

Yo....., declaro estar debidamente informado,

1. Que he sido invitado/a a participar en el estudio que trata sobre LAS ELITES POLITICAS EN CHILE EN EL AMBITO GUBERNAMENTAL, PARTIDARIO Y PARLAMENTARIO.
2. Que este estudio cuenta con la aprobación de la Universidad Diego Portales.
3. Que la investigación busca estudiar las características de las élites políticas chilenas entre 1990 y 2010 a través de una encuesta y/o entrevista, la que podrá ser administrada de tres modos: cara a cara, telefónicamente o de manera autoadministrada.
4. Que participaré en la investigación contestando una encuesta y/o entrevista y que mis respuestas serán tratadas respetando el total anonimato de mi persona.
5. Que la información entregada será manejada de manera responsable, siguiendo las normas éticas establecidas por la comunidad científica, y utilizada únicamente para los fines de la investigación mencionada.
6. Que más adelante puedo ser contactado para tener una segunda entrevista personal con uno de los investigadores.
7. Que mi participación en este estudio es completamente voluntaria y que puedo negarme a participar o, incluso, retirarme en el momento que lo desee.
8. Que si tengo alguna duda, pregunta o reclamo, yo puedo contactar a ALFREDO JOIGNANT (investigador responsable) en el teléfono (56-2) 6762805 o en la dirección Ejército Libertador 260 Santiago.

Por último, declaro que he leído esta página o que ésta me fue leída por una persona de mi confianza, y que estoy de acuerdo en participar en este estudio.

Ante cualquier consulta de carácter ético, puede contactarse con el Comité de Ética de la Universidad Diego Portales, fono: 676-2175

\_\_\_\_\_  
Firma

En Santiago,.....



Le agradecemos su tiempo y disposición, le recordamos que los datos son confidenciales y el objetivo del estudio es un proyecto Fondecyt con fines netamente académicos.

Cualquier duda sobre el estudio contactar a Alfredo Joignant, investigador responsable, en el teléfono 56-2-6762805 o en la dirección Ejército Libertador 260, Santiago.

### Appendix III. Persons interviewed

The interviews listed below were conducted between 2014 and 2017. Interviewees were selected based on the criteria of membership of an important political party, having held key positions in the Chilean political system and having important connections within the Chilean political elite. The aim of the interviews was to obtain information about important aspects of the functioning of the political elite as an input for quantitative analysis. The interviewees included former presidents, undersecretaries and leading members of political parties in the Concertación coalition during the period studied (1990-2010).

N	Name	Career	Date
1	<b>René Abeliuk Manasevich</b>	<b>Education</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Law, Universidad de Chile</li> </ul> <b>Party membership</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Radical Party (PR) (1948-1973)</li> <li>- Social Democracy Party (PSD) (1973-1980)</li> <li>- Party for Democracy (PPD) (1989-2014)</li> </ul> <b>Key positions</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Minister of Chilean Economic Development Agency (CORFO) under President Patricio Aylwin (1992-1994)</li> <li>- Lawyer Supreme Court (2003-2006)</li> </ul>	6/6/2013
2	<b>Eduardo Aninat Ureta</b>	<b>Education</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Economics, Universidad Católica de Chile; PhD in economics, Harvard University</li> <li>- Researcher and academic</li> <li>- Currently lecturer at Universidad del Desarrollo, Universidad Católica de Chile and Universidad Alberto Hurtado</li> </ul> <b>Party membership</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Former member of Christian Democrat Party (PDC) (1987-2017)</li> </ul> <b>Key positions</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Business association leader, consultant and politician</li> <li>- Finance Minister under President Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (1994-1999)</li> <li>- Deputy Managing Director of International Monetary Fund (IMF), Washington D.C. (2000-2003)</li> <li>- First Director General of International Christian Union of Business Executives (UNIAPAC) established in Paris (2010-2013)</li> </ul>	6/3/2014
3	<b>María Eliana Arntz Bustos</b>	<b>Education</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Geography, Universidad Católica de Chile; Master's in sociology, Universidad Academia de Humanismo Cristiano</li> </ul> <b>Party membership</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Socialist Party (PS) since (1985)</li> </ul> <b>Key positions</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Head of Citizen Participation and Environmental Education at National Commission for the Environment (CONAMA) (1999-2001)</li> <li>- Deputy Director of Social Organisations Division (DOS) of Ministry for the Government Office (2000-2001)</li> <li>- Undersecretary of Ministry for the Government Office (2001-2005)</li> </ul>	8/15/2017

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Undersecretary for Culture at National Council for Culture and the Arts and Coordinator of the Indigenous Peoples Programme of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2006-2013)</li> <li>- Chair of the Board of Directors of Casa de la Paz Foundation (2014-2015)</li> <li>- Executive Director of Casa de la Paz Foundation (2015)</li> </ul>	
4	<b>Jorge Arrate Mac Niven</b>	<p><b>Education</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Law, Universidad de Chile; postgraduate studies in economics and diploma in economic development, Graduate School of Latin American Economic Studies (ESCOLATINA), Universidad de Chile; Master of Arts (MA), Harvard University</li> </ul> <p><b>Party membership</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Socialist Party (PS) (1963-2009)</li> <li>- Communist Party (PC) (2009-2010)</li> <li>- Movimiento Amplio de Izquierda (Broad Movement of the Left) (2011)</li> </ul> <p><b>Key positions</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- President of PS (1990-1991)</li> <li>- Minister of Education under President Patricio Aylwin (1992-1994)</li> <li>- Minister of Labour and Social Security under President Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (1994-1998)</li> <li>- Minister for the Government Office under President Eduardo Frei Ruiz- Tagle (1998-1999)</li> </ul>	7/9/2013
5	<b>Sergio Bitar Chacra</b>	<p><b>Education</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Civil engineering, Universidad de Chile; postgraduate studies in economic theory, Centre d'Etudes des Programmes Economiques; MPA Harvard University</li> </ul> <p><b>Party membership</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Party for Democracy (PPD) (1987)</li> <li>- Izquierda Cristiana (Christian Left) (1971)</li> </ul> <p><b>Key positions</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Director of Department of Industries and Planning Centre of Faculty of Physical and Mathematical Sciences, Universidad de Chile (1968-1973)</li> <li>- Minister of Mining under President Salvador Allende (March 1973-July 1973)</li> <li>- Minister of Education under President Ricardo Lagos (2003-2005)</li> <li>- Minister of Public Works under President Michelle Bachelet (2008-2010)</li> <li>- Senator, Tarapacá Region (1994-2002)</li> </ul>	9/8/2014
6	<b>José Joaquín Brunner</b>	<p><b>Education</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Law, Universidad Católica de Chile; postgraduate studies, Oxford University; PhD in sociology, Leiden University</li> </ul> <p><b>Party membership</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Christian Democrat Party (PDC)</li> <li>- Popular Unitary Action Movement (MAPU)</li> <li>- Worker-Farmer MAPU (MAPU OC)</li> <li>- One of founders of Party for Democracy (PPD) (1987-2017)</li> <li>- One of founders of Fuerza Pública (Public Force) political movement led by economist Andrés Velasco (2013)</li> </ul> <p><b>Key positions</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Minister for the Government Office under President Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (1994- 1998)</li> <li>- President of National Television Council (CNTV) (1992-1994)</li> <li>- President of National Commission for Accreditation of Undergraduate Programmes (2006)</li> <li>- Vice-president of Higher Educational Council (2004)</li> </ul>	10/4/2014

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Member of Council of the National Fund for Scientific and Technological Development (FONDECYT)</li> <li>- Director of Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (FLACSO) (1976-1984)</li> </ul>	
7	<b>Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle</b>	<p><b>Education</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Civil engineering with specialisation in hydraulics, Universidad de Chile; postgraduate studies overseas in administration and management techniques</li> </ul> <p><b>Party membership</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Christian Democrat Party (PDC) (1958)</li> </ul> <p><b>Key positions</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- President of PDC (1991-1993)</li> <li>- President of Chile (1994-2000)</li> <li>- President of Senate (2006-2008)</li> <li>- Former Senator (2006-2014)</li> <li>- Currently Chile's Special Ambassador for Asia-Pacific (2014)</li> </ul>	8/7/2014
8	<b>Gabriel Gaspar Tapia</b>	<p><b>Education</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Law, Universidad de Chile; postgraduate studies in political science, FLACSO; PhD in Latin American studies, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM)</li> </ul> <p><b>Party membership</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Socialist Party (PS) (1982)</li> </ul> <p><b>Key positions</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Politician, academic and diplomat</li> <li>- Undersecretary of War (2000-2006)</li> <li>- Undersecretary for the Armed Forces (2014-2015)</li> </ul>	6/3/2014
9	<b>José Miguel Insulza</b>	<p><b>Education</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Law, Universidad de Chile; Master in political science, University of Michigan</li> </ul> <p><b>Party membership</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Christian Democrat Party (PDC)</li> <li>- Worker-Farmer MAPU (MAPU OC) (1969-1973)</li> <li>- Socialist Party (PS) (1985-)</li> </ul> <p><b>Key positions</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Minister of Foreign Affairs under President Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (1994-1999)</li> <li>- Minister Secretary General of the Presidency under President Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (1999-2000)</li> <li>- Minister of Interior and Public Security under President Ricardo Lagos (2000-2005)</li> <li>- Secretary General of the Organization of American States (2005-2015)</li> <li>- Senator (2017-)</li> </ul>	26/2/2014
10	<b>Ricardo Lagos Escobar</b>	<p><b>Education</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Law, Universidad de Chile; PhD in economics, Duke University</li> </ul> <p><b>Party membership</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Radical Party (PR) (1958-1961)</li> <li>- Socialist Party (PS) (1983-1987)</li> <li>- Party for Democracy (PPD) (1987)</li> <li>- Currently, member of both parties (PS-PPD)</li> </ul> <p><b>Key positions</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Director of School of Political and Administrative Sciences and Institute of Economy, Universidad de Chile (1963-1972)</li> <li>- Secretary General, Universidad de Chile (1969)</li> <li>- Secretary General, Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (FLACSO) (1973)</li> <li>- President of PPD (1987-1990)</li> </ul>	7/1/2014

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Minister of Education under President Patricio Aylwin (1990-1992)</li> <li>- Minister of Public Works under President Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (1994-1998)</li> <li>- President of Chile (2000-2006)</li> </ul>	
11	<b>Carlos Ominami Pascual</b>	<p><b>Education</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Economics, Universidad de Chile; PhD in economics, Université Paris Nanterre</li> </ul> <p><b>Party membership</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Independent</li> <li>- Socialist Party (PS) (1984-2009)</li> <li>- Convergencia Socialista (Socialist Convergence) (1978-1983)</li> <li>- Left-Wing Revolutionary Movement (MIR) (1968-1975)</li> </ul> <p><b>Key positions</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Minister of Economy, Economic Development and Reconstruction under President Patricio Aylwin (1990-1992)</li> <li>- Senator (1994-2010)</li> </ul>	12/10/2014
12	<b>Ernesto Ottone Fernández</b>	<p><b>Education</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Sociology and PhD in political sciences, Université de Paris</li> </ul> <p><b>Party membership</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Communist Party (PC) (1967-1983)</li> </ul> <p><b>Key positions</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Political analyst and academic</li> <li>- Currently Director of Globalisation and Democracy course, Universidad Diego Portales</li> <li>- Strategic advisor to President Ricardo Lagos (2000-2006)</li> </ul>	5/9/2014
13	<b>Andrés Solimano</b>	<p><b>Education</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- PhD in economics, MIT</li> </ul> <p><b>Party membership</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Not available</li> </ul> <p><b>Key positions</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Coordinator of Economic Area for presidential campaign of Marco Enríquez-Ominami (2013)</li> <li>- Director of FLACSO Chile (2010-2011)</li> <li>- Founder and President of International Centre for Globalisation and Development (CIGLOB)</li> <li>- Director for Andean Countries (Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela), World Bank</li> <li>- Regional advisor, ECLAC (2005)</li> </ul>	9/7/2014
14	<b>Andrés Zaldívar Larraín</b>	<p><b>Education</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Law, Universidad de Chile</li> </ul> <p><b>Party membership</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- PDC (1957-)</li> </ul> <p><b>Key positions</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- President of PDC (1976-1982)</li> <li>- Minister of Economy, Economic Development and Reconstruction under President Eduardo Frei Montalva (1968)</li> <li>- Finance Minister under President Eduardo Frei Montalva (1968-1970)</li> <li>- Senator (1973)</li> <li>- Senator (1990-2006)</li> <li>- Minister of Interior and Public Security under President Michelle Bachelet (2006)</li> <li>- Senator (2010-2018)</li> <li>- President of the Senate (2017-2018)</li> </ul>	9/8/2014

15	<b>Gonzalo Martnet Fanta</b>	<b>Education</b> - Economics, Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne; PhD in economics, Université Paris X Nanterre <b>Party membership</b> - PS (1985-2016) <b>Key positions</b> - Under-Secretary of Regional and Administrative Development (1990-1994) - President of PS (2003-2005) - Undersecretary of Ministry General Secretariat of the Presidency (2002-2003)	9/8/2016
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#### Appendix IV. Correlation matrix and VIF analysis

The correlation matrix and variance inflation factor (VIF) analyses conducted for each of the logit models are shown below. The codes for each variable are indicated in the table below.

<b>Dependent Variables</b>	<b>Variable</b>	<b>Variable code</b>
	Ministers (1990-2010)	Minist~s
	Deputies (1990-2010)	Diputa~s
	Ministers (1990-2000)	Min_p1
	Deputies (1990-2000)	Dip_p1
	Ministers (2000-2010)	Min_p2
	Deputies (2000-2010)	Dip_p2
<b>Independent Variables</b>	<b>Variable</b>	<b>Variable code</b>
	Age	Edad2
	Gender	Sexo_Mujer
	Socialist Party (PS)	PS
	Party for Democracy (PPD)	PPD
	Radical Social Democrat Party (PRSD)	PRSD
	Christian Democrat Party (PDC)	PDC
	National Renewal Party (RN)	RN
	Independent Democratic Union (UDI)	UDI
	Campaign (political)	CAMPANA
	Years of education	Years_Ed
	Universidad de Chile or Católica	Chile_PUC
	Private school (secondary education)	Col_Privado
	Family connections (social)	Familia
	Religion	Religion_Rec

## Model I. Ministers (1990-2010)

### I.i. Correlation matrix analysis model I

	Minist~s	Edad2	Sexo_M~r	PS	PPD	PR	DC
Ministros	1.0000						
Edad2	0.1529* 0.0026	1.0000					
Sexo_Mujer	0.1238* 0.0149	-0.1490* 0.0033	1.0000				
PS	0.1130* 0.0265	0.0039 0.9396	0.0315 0.5366	1.0000			
PPD	0.0409 0.4235	-0.0615 0.2282	0.0198 0.6983	-0.2153* 0.0000	1.0000		
PR	-0.0142 0.7809	0.0468 0.3587	-0.0161 0.7532	-0.1042* 0.0407	-0.1129* 0.0266	1.0000	
DC	0.0782 0.1251	0.1343* 0.0083	-0.0610 0.2320	-0.3067* 0.0000	-0.3481* 0.0000	-0.1685* 0.0009	1.0000
RN	-0.1595* 0.0017	-0.0581 0.2545	-0.0346 0.4981	-0.1148* 0.0241	-0.1243* 0.0145	-0.0602 0.2381	-0.1856* 0.0002
UDI	-0.1582* 0.0018	-0.1608* 0.0015	-0.1088* 0.0325	-0.1294* 0.0109	-0.1402* 0.0058	-0.0679 0.1834	-0.2093* 0.0000
CAMPANA	0.3376* 0.0000	0.0483 0.3444	0.0298 0.5598	0.1307* 0.0102	0.0063 0.9019	0.0509 0.3183	0.1373* 0.0069
Years_Ed	0.2388* 0.0000	-0.1128* 0.0267	-0.0171 0.7378	0.0944 0.0639	0.1020* 0.0452	-0.0582 0.2537	-0.0300 0.5562
Chile_PUC	0.2324* 0.0000	0.0797 0.1180	0.0381 0.4549	0.0892 0.0802	0.0083 0.8703	-0.0346 0.4980	0.0217 0.6707
Col_Privado	0.0079 0.8770	-0.1123* 0.0273	0.0178 0.7275	-0.1049* 0.0395	-0.0595 0.2434	-0.1902* 0.0002	0.0200 0.6955
Familia	0.1451* 0.0043	0.0380 0.4565	-0.0526 0.3023	0.0216 0.6721	0.0438 0.3912	-0.0406 0.4268	0.0190 0.7096
Religion_Rec	-0.1277* 0.0121	-0.0052 0.9188	0.0002 0.9966	-0.3099* 0.0000	-0.1666* 0.0010	-0.2095* 0.0000	0.3121* 0.0000
	RN	UDI	CAMPANA	Years_Ed	Chile_~C	Col_Pr~o	Familia
RN	1.0000						
UDI	-0.0747 0.1427	1.0000					
CAMPANA	-0.2152* 0.0000	-0.2378* 0.0000	1.0000				
Years_Ed	-0.0878 0.0849	-0.1012* 0.0469	0.1209* 0.0175	1.0000			
Chile_PUC	-0.0646 0.2050	-0.1527* 0.0026	0.1721* 0.0007	0.3825* 0.0000	1.0000		
Col_Privado	0.1877* 0.0002	0.1240* 0.0148	-0.0509 0.3181	0.1165* 0.0220	0.1499* 0.0032	1.0000	
Familia	0.0206 0.6859	0.0675 0.1859	0.0172 0.7359	0.0816 0.1097	0.0594 0.2440	0.1133* 0.0261	1.0000
Religion_Rec	0.1742* 0.0006	0.1813* 0.0003	-0.0875 0.0861	-0.1385* 0.0064	-0.0633 0.2150	0.2997* 0.0000	0.0888 0.0815
	Religi~c						
Religion_Rec	1.0000						



### **I.ii. VIF analysis model I**

Variable	VIF	1/VIF
DC	2.80	0.357660
PPD	2.24	0.446937
PS	2.14	0.467024
UDI	1.79	0.558119
RN	1.59	0.627819
PR	1.47	0.678967
Religion_Rec	1.47	0.680485
Years_Ed	1.27	0.789041
Chile_PUC	1.26	0.793534
Col_Privado	1.24	0.805958
CAMPANA	1.17	0.858369
Edad2	1.13	0.888228
Sexo_Mujer	1.08	0.925646
Familia	1.06	0.943868
Mean VIF	1.55	

## Model II. Deputies (1990-2010)

### II.i. Correlation matrix analysis model II

	Diputa~s	Edad2	Sexo_M~r	PS	PPD	PR	DC
Diputados	1.0000						
Edad2	-0.1320* 0.0094	1.0000					
Sexo_Mujer	-0.1166* 0.0220	-0.1490* 0.0033	1.0000				
PS	-0.1448* 0.0044	0.0039 0.9396	0.0315 0.5366	1.0000			
PPD	0.0616 0.2269	-0.0615 0.2282	0.0198 0.6983	-0.2153* 0.0000	1.0000		
PR	-0.0119 0.8156	0.0468 0.3587	-0.0161 0.7532	-0.1042* 0.0407	-0.1129* 0.0266	1.0000	
DC	-0.1254* 0.0137	0.1343* 0.0083	-0.0610 0.2320	-0.3067* 0.0000	-0.3481* 0.0000	-0.1685* 0.0009	1.0000
RN	0.2345* 0.0000	-0.0581 0.2545	-0.0346 0.4981	-0.1148* 0.0241	-0.1243* 0.0145	-0.0602 0.2381	-0.1856* 0.0002
UDI	0.3161* 0.0000	-0.1608* 0.0015	-0.1088* 0.0325	-0.1294* 0.0109	-0.1402* 0.0058	-0.0679 0.1834	-0.2093* 0.0000
CAMPANA	-0.4631* 0.0000	0.0483 0.3444	0.0298 0.5598	0.1307* 0.0102	0.0063 0.9019	0.0509 0.3183	0.1373* 0.0069
Years_Ed	-0.2824* 0.0000	-0.1128* 0.0267	-0.0171 0.7378	0.0944 0.0639	0.1020* 0.0452	-0.0582 0.2537	-0.0300 0.5562
Chile_PUC	-0.2822* 0.0000	0.0797 0.1180	0.0381 0.4549	0.0892 0.0802	0.0083 0.8703	-0.0346 0.4980	0.0217 0.6707
Col_Privado	-0.0033 0.9477	-0.1123* 0.0273	0.0178 0.7275	-0.1049* 0.0395	-0.0595 0.2434	-0.1902* 0.0002	0.0200 0.6955
Familia	0.0878 0.0849	0.0380 0.4565	-0.0526 0.3023	0.0216 0.6721	0.0438 0.3912	-0.0406 0.4268	0.0190 0.7096
Religion_Rec	0.2294* 0.0000	-0.0052 0.9188	0.0002 0.9966	-0.3099* 0.0000	-0.1666* 0.0010	-0.2095* 0.0000	0.3121* 0.0000
	RN	UDI	CAMPANA	Years_Ed	Chile_~C	Col_Pr~o	Familia
RN	1.0000						
UDI	-0.0747 0.1427	1.0000					
CAMPANA	-0.2152* 0.0000	-0.2378* 0.0000	1.0000				
Years_Ed	-0.0878 0.0849	-0.1012* 0.0469	0.1209* 0.0175	1.0000			
Chile_PUC	-0.0646 0.2050	-0.1527* 0.0026	0.1721* 0.0007	0.3825* 0.0000	1.0000		
Col_Privado	0.1877* 0.0002	0.1240* 0.0148	-0.0509 0.3181	0.1165* 0.0220	0.1499* 0.0032	1.0000	
Familia	0.0206 0.6859	0.0675 0.1859	0.0172 0.7359	0.0816 0.1097	0.0594 0.2440	0.1133* 0.0261	1.0000
Religion_Rec	0.1742* 0.0006	0.1813* 0.0003	-0.0875 0.0861	-0.1385* 0.0064	-0.0633 0.2150	0.2997* 0.0000	0.0888 0.0815
	Religi~c						
Religion_Rec	1.0000						

## II.ii. VIF analysis model II

Variable	VIF	1/VIF
DC	2.80	0.357660
PPD	2.24	0.446937
PS	2.14	0.467024
UDI	1.79	0.558119
RN	1.59	0.627819
PR	1.47	0.678967
Religion_Rec	1.47	0.680485
Years_Ed	1.27	0.789041
Chile_PUC	1.26	0.793534
Col_Privado	1.24	0.805958
CAMPANA	1.17	0.858369
Edad2	1.13	0.888228
Sexo_Mujer	1.08	0.925646
Familia	1.06	0.943868
Mean VIF	1.55	

## Model III. Ministers (1990-2000)

### III.i. Correlation matrix analysis model III

	Min_pl	Edad2	Sexo_M~r	PS	PPD	PR	DC
Min_pl	1.0000						
Edad2	0.3470* 0.0000	1.0000					
Sexo_Mujer	-0.0680 0.1826	-0.1490* 0.0033	1.0000				
PS	0.0770 0.1311	0.0039 0.9396	0.0315 0.5366	1.0000			
PPD	-0.0123 0.8103	-0.0615 0.2282	0.0198 0.6983	-0.2153* 0.0000	1.0000		
PR	-0.0028 0.9566	0.0468 0.3587	-0.0161 0.7532	-0.1042* 0.0407	-0.1129* 0.0266	1.0000	
DC	0.0416 0.4151	0.1343* 0.0083	-0.0610 0.2320	-0.3067* 0.0000	-0.3481* 0.0000	-0.1685* 0.0009	1.0000
RN	-0.0875 0.0858	-0.0581 0.2545	-0.0346 0.4981	-0.1148* 0.0241	-0.1243* 0.0145	-0.0602 0.2381	-0.1856* 0.0002
UDI	-0.0987 0.0527	-0.1608* 0.0015	-0.1088* 0.0325	-0.1294* 0.0109	-0.1402* 0.0058	-0.0679 0.1834	-0.2093* 0.0000
CAMPANA	0.2105* 0.0000	0.0483 0.3444	0.0298 0.5598	0.1307* 0.0102	0.0063 0.9019	0.0509 0.3183	0.1373* 0.0069
Years_Ed	0.1184* 0.0200	-0.1128* 0.0267	-0.0171 0.7378	0.0944 0.0639	0.1020* 0.0452	-0.0582 0.2537	-0.0300 0.5562
Chile_PUC	0.1425* 0.0050	0.0797 0.1180	0.0381 0.4549	0.0892 0.0802	0.0083 0.8703	-0.0346 0.4980	0.0217 0.6707
Col_Privado	-0.0543 0.2871	-0.1123* 0.0273	0.0178 0.7275	-0.1049* 0.0395	-0.0595 0.2434	-0.1902* 0.0002	0.0200 0.6955
Familia	0.0963 0.0588	0.0380 0.4565	-0.0526 0.3023	0.0216 0.6721	0.0438 0.3912	-0.0406 0.4268	0.0190 0.7096
Religion_Rec	-0.0579 0.2564	-0.0052 0.9188	0.0002 0.9966	-0.3099* 0.0000	-0.1666* 0.0010	-0.2095* 0.0000	0.3121* 0.0000
	RN	UDI	CAMPANA	Years_Ed	Chile_~C	Col_Pr~o	Familia
RN	1.0000						
UDI	-0.0747 0.1427	1.0000					
CAMPANA	-0.2152* 0.0000	-0.2378* 0.0000	1.0000				
Years_Ed	-0.0878 0.0849	-0.1012* 0.0469	0.1209* 0.0175	1.0000			
Chile_PUC	-0.0646 0.2050	-0.1527* 0.0026	0.1721* 0.0007	0.3825* 0.0000	1.0000		
Col_Privado	0.1877* 0.0002	0.1240* 0.0148	-0.0509 0.3181	0.1165* 0.0220	0.1499* 0.0032	1.0000	
Familia	0.0206 0.6859	0.0675 0.1859	0.0172 0.7359	0.0816 0.1097	0.0594 0.2440	0.1133* 0.0261	1.0000
Religion_Rec	0.1742* 0.0006	0.1813* 0.0003	-0.0875 0.0861	-0.1385* 0.0064	-0.0633 0.2150	0.2997* 0.0000	0.0888 0.0815
	Religi~c						
Religion_Rec	1.0000						

### III.ii. VIF analysis model III

Variable	VIF	1/VIF
DC	2.80	0.357660
PPD	2.24	0.446937
PS	2.14	0.467024
UDI	1.79	0.558119
RN	1.59	0.627819
PR	1.47	0.678967
Religion_Rec	1.47	0.680485
Years_Ed	1.27	0.789041
Chile_PUC	1.26	0.793534
Col_Privado	1.24	0.805958
CAMPANA	1.17	0.858369
Edad2	1.13	0.888228
Sexo_Mujer	1.08	0.925646
Familia	1.06	0.943868
Mean VIF	1.55	

## Model IV. Deputies (1990-2000)

### IV.i. Correlation matrix analysis model IV

	Dip_p1	Edad2	Sexo_M~r	PS	PPD	PR	DC
Dip_p1	1.0000						
Edad2	0.1737* 0.0006	1.0000					
Sexo_Mujer	-0.1142* 0.0248	-0.1490* 0.0033	1.0000				
PS	-0.1397* 0.0060	0.0039 0.9396	0.0315 0.5366	1.0000			
PPD	-0.0414 0.4168	-0.0615 0.2282	0.0198 0.6983	-0.2153* 0.0000	1.0000		
PR	0.0097 0.8495	0.0468 0.3587	-0.0161 0.7532	-0.1042* 0.0407	-0.1129* 0.0266	1.0000	
DC	-0.0180 0.7239	0.1343* 0.0083	-0.0610 0.2320	-0.3067* 0.0000	-0.3481* 0.0000	-0.1685* 0.0009	1.0000
RN	0.2377* 0.0000	-0.0581 0.2545	-0.0346 0.4981	-0.1148* 0.0241	-0.1243* 0.0145	-0.0602 0.2381	-0.1856* 0.0002
UDI	0.2118* 0.0000	-0.1608* 0.0015	-0.1088* 0.0325	-0.1294* 0.0109	-0.1402* 0.0058	-0.0679 0.1834	-0.2093* 0.0000
CAMPANA	-0.3280* 0.0000	0.0483 0.3444	0.0298 0.5598	0.1307* 0.0102	0.0063 0.9019	0.0509 0.3183	0.1373* 0.0069
Years_Ed	-0.2533* 0.0000	-0.1128* 0.0267	-0.0171 0.7378	0.0944 0.0639	0.1020* 0.0452	-0.0582 0.2537	-0.0300 0.5562
Chile_PUC	-0.1537* 0.0025	0.0797 0.1180	0.0381 0.4549	0.0892 0.0802	0.0083 0.8703	-0.0346 0.4980	0.0217 0.6707
Col_Privado	-0.0452 0.3754	-0.1123* 0.0273	0.0178 0.7275	-0.1049* 0.0395	-0.0595 0.2434	-0.1902* 0.0002	0.0200 0.6955
Familia	0.0737 0.1484	0.0380 0.4565	-0.0526 0.3023	0.0216 0.6721	0.0438 0.3912	-0.0406 0.4268	0.0190 0.7096
Religion_Rec	0.2096* 0.0000	-0.0052 0.9188	0.0002 0.9966	-0.3099* 0.0000	-0.1666* 0.0010	-0.2095* 0.0000	0.3121* 0.0000
	RN	UDI	CAMPANA	Years_Ed	Chile_~C	Col_Pr~o	Familia
RN	1.0000						
UDI	-0.0747 0.1427	1.0000					
CAMPANA	-0.2152* 0.0000	-0.2378* 0.0000	1.0000				
Years_Ed	-0.0878 0.0849	-0.1012* 0.0469	0.1209* 0.0175	1.0000			
Chile_PUC	-0.0646 0.2050	-0.1527* 0.0026	0.1721* 0.0007	0.3825* 0.0000	1.0000		
Col_Privado	0.1877* 0.0002	0.1240* 0.0148	-0.0509 0.3181	0.1165* 0.0220	0.1499* 0.0032	1.0000	
Familia	0.0206 0.6859	0.0675 0.1859	0.0172 0.7359	0.0816 0.1097	0.0594 0.2440	0.1133* 0.0261	1.0000
Religion_Rec	0.1742* 0.0006	0.1813* 0.0003	-0.0875 0.0861	-0.1385* 0.0064	-0.0633 0.2150	0.2997* 0.0000	0.0888 0.0815
	Religi~c						
Religion_Rec	1.0000						

#### IV.ii. VIF analysis model IV

Variable	VIF	1/VIF
DC	2.80	0.357660
PPD	2.24	0.446937
PS	2.14	0.467024
UDI	1.79	0.558119
RN	1.59	0.627819
PR	1.47	0.678967
Religion_Rec	1.47	0.680485
Years_Ed	1.27	0.789041
Chile_PUC	1.26	0.793534
Col_Privado	1.24	0.805958
CAMPANA	1.17	0.858369
Edad2	1.13	0.888228
Sexo_Mujer	1.08	0.925646
Familia	1.06	0.943868
Mean VIF	1.55	

## Model V. Ministers (2000-2010)

### V.i. Correlation matrix analysis model V

	Min_p2	Edad2	Sexo_M~r	PS	PPD	PR	DC
Min_p2	1.0000						
Edad2	-0.0703 0.1679	1.0000					
Sexo_Mujer	0.2017* 0.0001	-0.1490* 0.0033	1.0000				
PS	0.0760 0.1360	0.0039 0.9396	0.0315 0.5366	1.0000			
PPD	0.0610 0.2318	-0.0615 0.2282	0.0198 0.6983	-0.2153* 0.0000	1.0000		
PR	-0.0205 0.6884	0.0468 0.3587	-0.0161 0.7532	-0.1042* 0.0407	-0.1129* 0.0266	1.0000	
DC	0.0665 0.1921	0.1343* 0.0083	-0.0610 0.2320	-0.3067* 0.0000	-0.3481* 0.0000	-0.1685* 0.0009	1.0000
RN	-0.1222* 0.0163	-0.0581 0.2545	-0.0346 0.4981	-0.1148* 0.0241	-0.1243* 0.0145	-0.0602 0.2381	-0.1856* 0.0002
UDI	-0.1128* 0.0266	-0.1608* 0.0015	-0.1088* 0.0325	-0.1294* 0.0109	-0.1402* 0.0058	-0.0679 0.1834	-0.2093* 0.0000
CAMPANA	0.2356* 0.0000	0.0483 0.3444	0.0298 0.5598	0.1307* 0.0102	0.0063 0.9019	0.0509 0.3183	0.1373* 0.0069
Years_Ed	0.1983* 0.0001	-0.1128* 0.0267	-0.0171 0.7378	0.0944 0.0639	0.1020* 0.0452	-0.0582 0.2537	-0.0300 0.5562
Chile_PUC	0.1497* 0.0032	0.0797 0.1180	0.0381 0.4549	0.0892 0.0802	0.0083 0.8703	-0.0346 0.4980	0.0217 0.6707
Col_Privado	0.0758 0.1369	-0.1123* 0.0273	0.0178 0.7275	-0.1049* 0.0395	-0.0595 0.2434	-0.1902* 0.0002	0.0200 0.6955
Familia	0.1009* 0.0477	0.0380 0.4565	-0.0526 0.3023	0.0216 0.6721	0.0438 0.3912	-0.0406 0.4268	0.0190 0.7096
Religion_Rec	-0.0815 0.1097	-0.0052 0.9188	0.0002 0.9966	-0.3099* 0.0000	-0.1666* 0.0010	-0.2095* 0.0000	0.3121* 0.0000
	RN	UDI	CAMPANA	Years_Ed	Chile_~C	Col_Pr~o	Familia
RN	1.0000						
UDI	-0.0747 0.1427	1.0000					
CAMPANA	-0.2152* 0.0000	-0.2378* 0.0000	1.0000				
Years_Ed	-0.0878 0.0849	-0.1012* 0.0469	0.1209* 0.0175	1.0000			
Chile_PUC	-0.0646 0.2050	-0.1527* 0.0026	0.1721* 0.0007	0.3825* 0.0000	1.0000		
Col_Privado	0.1877* 0.0002	0.1240* 0.0148	-0.0509 0.3181	0.1165* 0.0220	0.1499* 0.0032	1.0000	
Familia	0.0206 0.6859	0.0675 0.1859	0.0172 0.7359	0.0816 0.1097	0.0594 0.2440	0.1133* 0.0261	1.0000
Religion_Rec	0.1742* 0.0006	0.1813* 0.0003	-0.0875 0.0861	-0.1385* 0.0064	-0.0633 0.2150	0.2997* 0.0000	0.0888 0.0815
	Religi~c						
Religion_Rec	1.0000						



## V.ii. VIF analysis model V

Variable	VIF	1/VIF
DC	2.80	0.357660
PPD	2.24	0.446937
PS	2.14	0.467024
UDI	1.79	0.558119
RN	1.59	0.627819
PR	1.47	0.678967
Religion_Rec	1.47	0.680485
Years_Ed	1.27	0.789041
Chile_PUC	1.26	0.793534
Col_Privado	1.24	0.805958
CAMPANA	1.17	0.858369
Edad2	1.13	0.888228
Sexo_Mujer	1.08	0.925646
Familia	1.06	0.943868
Mean VIF	1.55	

## Model VI. Deputies (2000-2010)

### VI.i. Correlation matrix analysis model VI

	Dip_p2	Edad2	Sexo_M~r	PS	PPD	PR	DC
Dip_p2	1.0000						
Edad2	-0.1946* 0.0001	1.0000					
Sexo_Mujer	-0.0937 0.0659	-0.1490* 0.0033	1.0000				
PS	-0.1249* 0.0141	0.0039 0.9396	0.0315 0.5366	1.0000			
PPD	0.0645 0.2064	-0.0615 0.2282	0.0198 0.6983	-0.2153* 0.0000	1.0000		
PR	-0.0168 0.7419	0.0468 0.3587	-0.0161 0.7532	-0.1042* 0.0407	-0.1129* 0.0266	1.0000	
DC	-0.1247* 0.0143	0.1343* 0.0083	-0.0610 0.2320	-0.3067* 0.0000	-0.3481* 0.0000	-0.1685* 0.0009	1.0000
RN	0.1721* 0.0007	-0.0581 0.2545	-0.0346 0.4981	-0.1148* 0.0241	-0.1243* 0.0145	-0.0602 0.2381	-0.1856* 0.0002
UDI	0.3338* 0.0000	-0.1608* 0.0015	-0.1088* 0.0325	-0.1294* 0.0109	-0.1402* 0.0058	-0.0679 0.1834	-0.2093* 0.0000
CAMPANA	-0.4160* 0.0000	0.0483 0.3444	0.0298 0.5598	0.1307* 0.0102	0.0063 0.9019	0.0509 0.3183	0.1373* 0.0069
Years_Ed	-0.2463* 0.0000	-0.1128* 0.0267	-0.0171 0.7378	0.0944 0.0639	0.1020* 0.0452	-0.0582 0.2537	-0.0300 0.5562
Chile_PUC	-0.2465* 0.0000	0.0797 0.1180	0.0381 0.4549	0.0892 0.0802	0.0083 0.8703	-0.0346 0.4980	0.0217 0.6707
Col_Privado	0.0066 0.8972	-0.1123* 0.0273	0.0178 0.7275	-0.1049* 0.0395	-0.0595 0.2434	-0.1902* 0.0002	0.0200 0.6955
Familia	0.0605 0.2355	0.0380 0.4565	-0.0526 0.3023	0.0216 0.6721	0.0438 0.3912	-0.0406 0.4268	0.0190 0.7096
Religion_Rec	0.1921* 0.0001	-0.0052 0.9188	0.0002 0.9966	-0.3099* 0.0000	-0.1666* 0.0010	-0.2095* 0.0000	0.3121* 0.0000
	RN	UDI	CAMPANA	Years_Ed	Chile_~C	Col_Pr~o	Familia
RN	1.0000						
UDI	-0.0747 0.1427	1.0000					
CAMPANA	-0.2152* 0.0000	-0.2378* 0.0000	1.0000				
Years_Ed	-0.0878 0.0849	-0.1012* 0.0469	0.1209* 0.0175	1.0000			
Chile_PUC	-0.0646 0.2050	-0.1527* 0.0026	0.1721* 0.0007	0.3825* 0.0000	1.0000		
Col_Privado	0.1877* 0.0002	0.1240* 0.0148	-0.0509 0.3181	0.1165* 0.0220	0.1499* 0.0032	1.0000	
Familia	0.0206 0.6859	0.0675 0.1859	0.0172 0.7359	0.0816 0.1097	0.0594 0.2440	0.1133* 0.0261	1.0000
Religion_Rec	0.1742* 0.0006	0.1813* 0.0003	-0.0875 0.0861	-0.1385* 0.0064	-0.0633 0.2150	0.2997* 0.0000	0.0888 0.0815
	Religi~c						
Religion_Rec	1.0000						

## VI.ii. VIF analysis model VI

Variable	VIF	1/VIF
DC	2.80	0.357660
PPD	2.24	0.446937
PS	2.14	0.467024
UDI	1.79	0.558119
RN	1.59	0.627819
PR	1.47	0.678967
Religion_Rec	1.47	0.680485
Years_Ed	1.27	0.789041
Chile_PUC	1.26	0.793534
Col_Privado	1.24	0.805958
CAMPANA	1.17	0.858369
Edad2	1.13	0.888228
Sexo_Mujer	1.08	0.925646
Familia	1.06	0.943868
Mean VIF	1.55	