Whose voice prevails?

Policy-making at the crossroads between security and development in EU-West African migration cooperation

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This thesis is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration except as declared in the preface and specified in the text. It is not substantially the same as any work that has already been submitted before for any degree or other qualification except as declared in the preface and specified in the text. It does not exceed the prescribed word limit for the Politics and International Studies Degree Committee.

Abstract

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Melissa Mouthaan

This thesis adds to understanding of EU-African migration cooperation, forming an empirical study on the politics of policy-making between the EU and West African countries. It appraises the scope and limitations of EU external migration governance in Senegal and Ghana, and the participation of diverse actors in the shaping of migration governance. Contextually, the EU has intensified its cooperation with non-EU countries in the area of migration. Governing, shaping and stemming migration flows in regions beyond EU borders, both in the EU's traditional neighbourhood region of North Africa and the Middle East, but also increasingly in sub-Saharan Africa has formed the basis of an active and dynamic EU external migration policy. This governance overlaps and intersects with security and development policy, where both form an intrinsic part of migration governance agendas and of policy-makers' toolboxes. Yet the picture that emerges is one where the EU is sometimes – but not always – successful in achieving its policy preferences with non-EU countries. The limitations on powerful actors to govern migration through bilateral and multilateral cooperation exist but remain obscure, while the mediating influence of the domestic context EU policy is received in remains under-theorised. This thesis addresses these gaps.

Treating the practice of governance as a complex, multi-layered and multi-sited process, I examine how actors involved in this process form their preferences, and if they are subsequently able to bring their preferences to bear in migration governance. Central to this thesis is the notion that actors involved in EU-African migration cooperation operate in distinct institutional and organisational environments that both inform, and constrain, their actions. EU migration agendas play out at the policy level in formal negotiations but are also implicit in policy narratives that are exported to non-EU countries: both are examined in this research. Policy actors are shown to respond to political imperatives for adapting externalisation in different ways, interpreting and responding to policy adaptation pressures according to diverse rationales and interests. The research finds that this affects

how the EU's external migration governance is shaped and subsequently exported abroad, and the coherence of EU migration policy.

EU and West African migration policy priorities diverge significantly in some areas of cooperation, where despite EU efforts to reach agreement, Senegal and Ghana deploy strategies to minimise cooperation. In other areas, migration policy priorities overlap or converge, resulting in specific migration governance agendas becoming legitimised by African domestic actors. These findings indicate that the domestic context is significant in determining EU-African migration cooperation, whereby the ability of powerful actors to co-opt weaker counterparts is nonetheless limited. Resonance with domestic interests and institutions emerges as a key factor in determining cooperation success, and reflects the agency of African actors in EU external migration governance.

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List of Acronyms

ACP – African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States

ACTED - Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development

AU – African Union

BAOS – *Bureau d'accueil et d'orientation des Sénégalais de l'Extérieur* (Office for Reception, Orientation and Support for the Reintegration of Emigrants)

CAMM – Common Agenda on Migration and Mobility

CFA – West African franc

CMS – Centre for Migration Studies, University of Ghana

CONGAD – *Conseil des organisations non gouvernementales d'appui au développement* (Council of non-governmental development support organisations)

DG DEVCO – Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development

DG HOME – DG for Migration and Home Affairs

DGSE – *Direction Générale des Sénégalais de l'Extérieur* (Directorate-General for Senegalese Abroad)

DPAF – *Direction de la Police de l'Air et des Frontières* (Air and Border Police of Senegal)

EDF – European Development Fund

EEAS – European External Action Service

EMLO – European Migration Liaison Officer

EAM – European Agenda on Migration

ECOWAS – Economic Community of West African States

EU – European Union

EUTF – EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa

FAISE – *Fonds d'Appui à l'Investissement des Sénégalais de l'Extérieur* (Investment Support Fund for Senegalese Abroad)

GAMM – Global Approach to Migration and Mobility

GDP – Gross Domestic Product

GIMMA – Ghana Integrated Migration Management Approach

GIS – Ghana Immigration Service

GIZ – German Development Cooperation

HDI – Human Development Index

ICMPD – International Centre for Migration Policy Development

IOM - International Organization of Migration

JHA – Justice and Home Affairs

MAESE – *Ministère des Affaires étrangères et des Sénégalais de l'Extérieur* (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Senegalese Abroad)

MIEUX – Migration EU expertise

MoFARI – Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration

NAO – National Authorising Officer

NGO – Non-governmental organisation

NMP – National Migration Policy

OECD – Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

REMIDEV – *Réseau Migration et Développement* (Migration and Development Network)

UEMOA – West African Economic and Monetary Union

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Figure 1: Youths on a football pitch in Tambacounda, Senegal, a major region of migrant departure. Copyright of the author, 2017.

Figure 2: View of the Atlantic from Cape Coast, Ghana. Copyright of the author, 2018.

Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 On governing migration

As a transboundary phenomenon, migration is not governed by a single and coherent multilateral framework. The formulation of migration policy has typically been an area of jurisdiction of nation states, such as in the 1980s and early 1990s where early migration cooperation between European Union member states took the form of transgovernmentalism (Geddes 2000; Lavenex 2006), or in the bilateral relations between EU Member States and African nations. To talk of migration governance today is to acknowledge the steadily increasing involvement of a broad range of actors operating at national, regional and global levels. These frequently include non-state actors: international organisations, such as UN agencies – often mandated to work in a specific thematic area of migration, and of which the most recent addition to the UN family is the International Organization of Migration (IOM) – but also think tanks, non-governmental organisations and private sector organisations. Regional and supranational bodies have also increasingly carved out a role for themselves in migration policy, leading to the emergence of intra-regional dialogues on migration such as the Africa-EU Migration and Mobility Dialogue. The tendency of both states and non-state actors to govern migration through ad-hoc initiatives, both formal and informal, nonetheless persists (Newland 2010; Castles 2000; Leon and Overbeek 2015). As a thematic policy area, migration frequently overlaps with other regulated policy areas which further ensures its governance is of a fragmented nature.

The EU has emerged as a supranational actor that plays an increasingly prominent role in the governance of migration. Both the EU and EU Member States have strived to shape migration flows by implementing policies and frameworks that promote the governing of EU borders outside of its actual borders and jurisdiction (Aubarell, Zapata-Barrero, & Aragall, 2009; Betts, 2011; Boswell, 2003; Lavenex & Uçarer, 2004; Samers, 2004). While internal EU borders have eroded,

the control of external borders has been reinforced (Joppke 2002, p.264). In popular imagery, the term 'Fortress Europe' has been used to describe the increasing restrictiveness that characterises immigration policy of the European Union. Northern 'immigration' states have sought to restrict immigration and have implemented policies that either prevent or limit arrivals of third country nationals.[1] At the same time, this restrictiveness has been applied disproportionately, as part of a selective process of allowing some groups of migrants to enter while others are denied (Joppke 1998; McMahon 2015). In this way, the 'securitisation' of migration has been taking place for many decades in the sphere of Western politics, whereby the apparent challenges posed by immigration to receiving countries have been met with a range of security-oriented 'solutions' such as stronger border controls and other restrictive measures (see Bigo 2002; Hollifield 2006; Huysmans 2006; Munster 2009; Walters 2010; Squire 2015). As migration has become an increasingly politicised topic and one of high salience in political agendas in Europe, but also in North America and Australia, the security lens remains omnipresent in migration policy formulation.

The EU's cooperation with two West African countries – Senegal and Ghana – in the area of migration is the subject of this thesis. Migration cooperation now forms part of a dynamic interaction between the EU and so-called migrant-sending and transit states in West Africa, adding a multilateral dimension to an area of cooperation that was previously – and, still is substantially – managed in bilateral relations. Governing, shaping and stemming migration flows in regions beyond EU borders, both in the 'borderlands' of the EU's traditional neighbourhood of North Africa, but also increasingly in the 'hinterlands' of sub-Saharan Africa (Del Sarto 2009) has thus formed the basis of an active and dynamic EU external migration agenda. Both Senegal and Ghana have been partner countries in the EU's external migration governance since 2005 and the introduction of the EU's overarching framework, the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM).[2]

1.2 The research agenda

This thesis is concerned with the politics of policy-making in the context of recent EU-African migration cooperation, adopting an actor-centred perspective. The EU's cooperation with West African countries is characterised by power imbalances, where the EU and EU Member States are

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[1] The term 'third country' is one used in EU discourse to designate a non-EU country. The term is used in the same sense throughout this thesis.

[2] The GAMM, introduced in 2011, replaces the GAM (Global Approach to Migration) that was adopted in 2005.

more likely to achieve their goals in bilateral or multilateral cooperation due to their ability to exert a superior negotiating power (van Criekinge 2009). In an asymmetric relationship, the EU can use its superior bargaining power explicitly in negotiations, but also more implicitly in agenda-setting. The scope and content of cooperation and migration interventions in third countries is thus informed by underlying political or ideological narratives. In this research, I examine how migration governance is formed amid competing, but sometimes overlapping, interests and preferences, where despite power imbalances between the EU and African actors, the latter are still able to exert influence on cooperation outcomes.

Despite the increasing salience of migration on the EU's political agenda, the EU and EU Member States' historical efforts to converge third countries' migration policies in line with an EU migration governance agenda have seen mixed results. While Mobility Partnerships have formed one of the key instruments of the EU's flagship Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) since 2005, the failure to secure a Mobility Partnership with sub-Saharan African states, other than Cape Verde, is evidence of a dubious track record in attaining EU migration policy preferences in the African sub-continent. Literature on the EU's success in achieving formal migration cooperation in African countries have shown that there are limitations on the EU's external governance, whereby the EU struggles to secure agreement in contentious areas, demonstrates a limited capacity to offer strong incentives for cooperation, and where African states selectively implement – or readjust – policies even when formally agreed upon (Cassarino 2014a; Hampshire 2016; Wunderlich 2010). The agency of domestic actors in the policy 'receiving' state in Africa forms the basis of an emerging literature, in which this thesis is also situated (see Adam *et al.* 2019; El Qadim 2015; Frowd 2018; Paoletti 2011; Van Criekinge 2010).

Studies have demonstrated that African actors are not merely 'passive agents' in the EU's external migration governance regime, and that despite power imbalances African agency is nonetheless significant in shaping cooperation outcomes (see van Criekinge 2010; Paoletti 2011; Reslow 2012). The success of the EU's pursuit of its migration policy preferences in third countries is therefore far from a *fait accompli* from the outset (Mouthaan 2019). In other words, how have West African political actors interpreted and acted on the increasing interest of the EU to engage them in migration dialogue? To what extent have African states been able to adapt cooperation to reflect their preferences and strategic concerns in migration governance? In short: what is the impact of Senegalese and Ghanaian domestic actors and their interests on migration cooperation outcomes? The research uses multiple lenses to unpack the preference formation of actors in

migration cooperation, both EU and domestic, and to analyse how this informs EU-African migration governance.

In examining the formation of policy in a contested environment, this research looks at the key participants, architects and stakeholders of migration policy, the formation of their preferences in migration governance and cooperation, and how different actors' voices impact on cooperation, policy and governance. In proceeding, I deliberately treat preference formation as a process where inherent complexity must be acknowledged, and therefore aim to avoid simplified and static interpretations of preferences. Drawing predominantly on institutionalist theories, political and organisational sociology, and social policy, this thesis examines policymaking as undertaken by actors who are neither uniform nor necessarily rational, and who pursue different logics in their decision-making behaviour. Organisational logics are influential in the policy process, whereby internal disagreements may be downplayed in a bid to secure a broader consensus and to minimise internal weaknesses. Pressures to enact policy change may be flexibly reinterpreted by actors and adapted to fit in with their existing activities, or with their organisational ideologies. Domestic state actors may accommodate EU policy proposals because it suits their own domestic governance goals, and when no major constraints to cooperation are present in the domestic arena. In more contentious areas of cooperation, certain policy proposals may be perceived as inappropriate. Finally, domestic actors in the case study countries continually assess (and re-assess) their leverage in EU-African migration cooperation with a view of domestic institutions, and according to their perceptions of the EU as a cooperation partner.

In its theoretical framing, this research posits that the broader institutional context that actors operate in is singularly important in the shaping of migration policies and subsequent migration governance. It establishes how actors' interests shape migration governance in EU-West African migration cooperation where these actors operate in an institutional context that both shapes, and constrains, their actions. Finally, this research is a sustained discussion of the interactions between migration, development and security policy, the different rationales underpinning policy agendas in these thematic areas, and how these feed into each other in policy interventions. The central and guiding research question is:

How do institutions and actors' interests shape migration governance in EU-West African cooperation?

I answer this question through the analysis of the EU's migration cooperation with Senegal and Ghana, the two case studies. Practically, the research question is answered in relation to three elements. Firstly, the role of narratives in migration governance is analysed as a form of export of ideas, where these shape policy and interventions from their inception. Secondly, the role of crisis is considered in terms of its impact on the EU's external migration governance with West Africa. Finally, the preferences of domestic actors in Senegal and Ghana in migration cooperation are analysed to understand how these are formed, and how domestic institutions inform or constrain actors in their decision-making.

Underlying this research is the understanding that the stakeholders of migration policy are many, but the ability to shape discourse and policy on migration is characterised by inequality. Access to arenas of governance is disproportionate. Power imbalances in negotiations and further bolstered by imbalances in who determines the 'problem' at hand, and therefore in agenda-setting. Narratives have formed one such tool of governance, where narratives on migration are disproportionately determined by the political interests of specific actors. While the constructed link between migration and security in migration policies (Bigo 2002; Huysmans 2006) is an important example of a guiding narrative, other top-down narratives also underline migration governance in the case study countries. In examining migration narratives, policy and practice, this thesis frequently observes that migration governance has been subject to processes of bureaucratisation, where the EU's involvement in shaping third countries' migration policies is frequently presented as migration 'management' in an effort to depoliticise the processes employed to govern and regulate migration. This depoliticisation has enabled the superseding of traditional ideological politics by technocratic debates that shift the focus to delivery and implementation, instead of ideas (Boswell *et al.* 2011, p.2). Policies are often framed as technical considerations on how to 'manage' migration, with the political nature of policy making hereby diminished or nullified (Geiger 2010). External narratives are nonetheless confronted with existing understandings in the places they are 'exported' to. The impact of narrative devices – where narratives are disproportionately determined by elite actors – is thus examined in terms of impact on migration governance initiatives in Senegal and Ghana. Elites often determine the content of narratives, and are often external actors. Yet domestic elites in Senegal and Ghana also participate in shaping and defining discourse, where this participation is disproportionate to that of other domestic actors.

The background in which this research is situated is both the EU's evolution as a supranational actor involved in the governance of migration, as well as the migration histories of the case studies and their postcolonial trajectories that help to define their status as migration states. I note that EU policies are not received in a political vacuum in Senegal and Ghana, but are fundamentally negotiated in view of broader institutions – political, historical – that domestic actors in these countries operate under. I rely on public policy theories and organisational theories in sociology to conceptualise how the EU's policy on migration is formed amid the demands and interests of different internal voices, and how shock events can alter policy dynamics. The EU's policy-making processes have been subject to new dynamics and adaptation pressures over time. The 'migration crisis' of 2015 created a new reality for policy makers and practitioners alike, as migration rose to the very top of the EU political agenda (Koch *et al*. 2018). This research considers the implications of a 'crisis' lens that emerged from European domestic political arenas and spilled into the EU's governance, where the EU has sought to respond to these demands through renewed externalisation strategies. As an institutional actor, the EU is also concerned with maintaining a position of strength and competence both in domestic arenas and vis-à-vis third countries. In understanding the driving forces of EU external migration governance in view of a crisis lens this thesis asks: what drives recent EU migration policy interventions? How has the EU as an institution and organisation responded to adaptational demands?

This thesis is based on empirical research conducted between September 2017 and March 2018 in three different sites: Brussels, Dakar and Accra. It draws on fifty-two semi-structured interviews conducted with EU officials in Brussels and in EU Delegations; Senegalese and Ghanaian ministries; project implementers; civil society organisations and representatives of migrant associations; and migration academics or policy experts. It also draws on policy and project documents and participant observation.

1.3 Outline of the thesis

This thesis consists of seven remaining chapters. Chapter 2, following this one, presents the conceptual framework of this thesis as well a literature review of the interactions of migration policy with security and development. The two components of security and development assistance, that form key parts of the EU's policy export to third countries in the matter of migration, are explored. Chapter 3 presents the historical context of the two case studies, as well as an overview of the external dimension of the EU's migration governance and EU engagement with third countries; it also details the methodology that was adopted to conduct this project.

Chapters 4-6 are analytical chapters which incorporate the empirical findings of the research. Chapter 4 examines the construction of narratives and frameworks, and how these form the basis of the EU's external governance approach in migration. It explores the existence of multiple biases in EU migration narratives, including a sedentary bias and a neoliberal bias, which emerge clearly in policy formulation. It examines the forging of linkages between development policy and migration policy where the former is adapted to achieve EU migration policy goals, ensuring development is increasingly viewed through a migration prism. It argues primarily for the understanding of EU external migration governance as the product of embedded narratives that drive policy interventions. Chapter 5 examines recent developments in the EU's external governance regime. In particular, it explores the EU's external migration governance as being subject to two forces: satisfying EU Member States' demands for greater flexibility and results in achieving restrictive migration policy goals, in particular following the 2015 migration 'crisis'; and, on the other hand, organisational interests and internally diverging demands that form important components of the EU's decision-making rationale. Chapter 6 explores how the EU's migration policies are 'received' in Senegal and Ghana, and the extent to which the strategic concerns, interests and preferences of domestic actors in these countries shape migration cooperation. It examines how state actors in the policy-receiving case studies form their responses to EU proposals following either a logic of appropriateness or a logic of consequences, and in some cases both. At the same time, the chapter demonstrates that African state actors form explicit strategies to either contest the EU's externalisation, or act strategically to maximise the benefits extracted from cooperation.

The final chapter offers a discussion and conclusion of findings.

Chapter 2

Theoretical and Conceptual Framework

2.1 Introduction

This chapter supplies the theoretical framework of this research, and situates the contribution made to the literature. This research is concerned with developments in EU-African migration governance as a result of cooperation and interactions between multiple stakeholders. Fundamentally, it adopts an actor-centred approach to study different actors involved in the process of policy-making and how they form their preferences; and if they succeed in having their policy preferences prevail in migration governance. Central to this research is the notion of institutions: the idea that institutions play an important role in shaping, steering and constraining actors' policy options. The research findings presented in this thesis draw on institutionalist theories, as well as public policy ideas, political sociology and organisational sociology.

This chapter proceeds as follows. I discuss the locus of governance and policy-making as multi-sited and multi-actored and the implications this has for migration governance, and provide an overview of the understanding that institutionalist approaches have contributed to the literature, situating my own contribution therein. This chapter subsequently discusses the links between migration and security and how these links are accomplished and constructed by policy actors, contextualising the emergence of particular modes of migration governance. This chapter then turns explicitly to the question of *who* shapes policy in EU-West African migration governance. The EU's development as a supranational actor in the field of migration governance is traced, presenting the EU's foreign policy toolbox but also outlining the limitations of the EU's governance. I discuss the role of third countries' domestic actors in the EU's external migration governance, and the scope for these actors to intervene and shape cooperation and policy. This chapter concludes with a historical and contextual overview of the case studies, as well as their history of migration cooperation with EU Member States.

2.2 A field of governance with several players

Studying migration policy involves examining a distinctly transnational field of governance. As an inherently transboundary and transnational phenomenon, migration is not governed by a single and coherent multilateral framework, and its governance is notoriously characterised by a lack of institutionalised cooperation (Betts 2011, p.2). The formulation of migration policy has typically been an area of jurisdiction of nation states, such as during the era of transgovernmentalism of the 1990s (Geddes 2000; Lavenex 2006). From the 1990s onwards the emergence of new international 'players' in social policy formulation can be observed, such as the World Bank and the IMF, whose prior involvement in the management of social policy issues, and in the delivery of social welfare to populations, was negligible (Deacon 2008). Increasingly, numerous actors are engaged in shaping the substance and discourse of the governance of social policy. This proliferation of actors involved in policy and governance in areas that were purveyed primarily by nation states has not left migration policy-making unaffected. The growth of actors involved in migration governance reflects a 'stretching of power' phenomenon of globalisation: both the sites of power and the exercise of power are increasingly distant from the locales where its impact is experienced (McGrew 1998, p.191).

Migration cooperation since the 1990s has thus seen the steadily increasing involvement of a broad range of actors operating at national, regional and global levels. At the same time, the governance of international migration is fragmented, whereby different 'types' of migration have seen different governance frameworks, ranging from the formal to the informal. Labour migration is most often managed at the transgovernmental level, making its governance distinct from the global management of refugees, which has a formal regime and a specific UN agency dedicated to its regulation (Betts 2011). As I explore later in this chapter, migration governance has also often taken the form of ad-hoc initiatives, both formal and informal, where policy attention paid to migration is often 'sporadic' (Newland 2010, p.331) and driven by 'spectacular events rather than by long-term perspectives' (Castles 2000, p.280).

I situate my research within the topic of West African migration and its governance by EU and African (domestic) actors. I rely on several bodies of literature that have shaped understanding of this topic. I draw on the burgeoning literature on the 'externalisation' of EU migration governance, and how this has formed the basis of a dynamic interaction between the EU and third countries in the matter of migration. This literature stems from international relations and Europeanisation scholarship where many contributions have taken an institutionalist approach, as I subsequently

explore.[3] I also refer to literature on securitising practices, including the Copenhagen security school, that examines the constructed link between (im)migration and security by policymakers. Finally, this thesis draws on dominant themes in development literature, applying critical reflections from development studies on narratives in migration and development; on the ability of different voices to shape policy-making; and the co-opting of development interventions to achieve (restrictive) migration-related policy goals.

2.3 An actor-centred approach

The relative power of actors to determine and shape policy discourse – and therein, development policy discourse – has been the subject of much debate. Studies on global-level discourses have demonstrated that the substance and direction of these discourses are continuously negotiated through interactions between states, international organisations, and other policy actors in a contested governance setting (Deacon 2008; Yeates 2008). Social policy scholars have provided original insights into the impact of globalising processes on the nature of governance and policy formulation at the supranational and global level. Hulme and Hulme (2008) emphasise the multi-directionality of influence between policy actors in processes of social policy transfer: where global actors are increasingly influencing local agendas, it is also often the case that local actors shape global policy agendas. Globalisation has helped to ensure that the policy-making process is increasingly multi-sited, multi-layered and multi-actored (Deacon 2008) where key policy actors operate at the local, national, regional and global level at any one time. Social policy scholars have also played an important part in problematising the role of international organisations as the 'generators, purveyors and agents of knowledge (…) through which policy problems are defined and responses are shaped' (Hulme & Hulme 2008, pp.53-54). This approach captures the highly political nature of decision-making, and the role of political actors in selectively incorporating knowledge from epistemic communities in order to realise political goals. Participatory approaches in development studies have on the other hand highlighted that while there are many who have a 'stake' in development policy, not all stakeholders have a voice, or their voice does not carry equal weight (Cornwall 2003, 2004; Mohan & Hickey 2004; Narayanaswamy 2016). Often the level of access to arenas of governance is disproportionate, where Cornwall (2004) reminds us

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[3] The Europeanisation literature is concerned with the impact of EU integration on institutional and policy practices at the national level of EU Member States (Hix & Goetz 2000; Knill & Lehmkuhl 2002; Lavenex & Uçarer 2004). The 'new face of Europeanisation' is the evolution of this branch of study into the 'export' of European policies to non-EU states using a policy transfer lens (Lavenex & Uçarer 2004, p.418).

that political 'space' is not only taken up by actors; space is created, shaped and guarded as a fundamental exercise of power. [4]

Migration governance is a field traditionally shaped by national actors, and while states still play a pivotal role, globalisation has increased the number and variety of actors involved in its governance. Not all actors involved in migration policy and governance enjoy the same capacity to shape policy agendas. For this reason, scholarship has often referred to the power asymmetry between so-called strong actors, and weaker negotiating counterparts (Thouez & Channac 2006; van Criekinge 2010). Different theories also perceive the role of the state differently. Neoclassical political economy accounts have attempted to explain certain aspects of migration policy and are mainly interested in the capacity of the state to control and regulate migration, and, similarly to neo-institutionalists, this branch of scholarship looks at the mismatch between policy goals and their outcomes. The neoclassical approach offered by Freeman (1995) suggests that migration policy is essentially determined by content and relative power weighting of organised interests in a given society. Accordingly, policy-makers act as 'brokers' who have an interest in producing policies that satisfy (influential) organised interests.

The theoretical underpinning of this research rejects the notion of a unitary or monolithic state actor that acts as a 'broker' for organised interests, as described above, as I find the characterisation of the state as a passive entity in policy formulation to be problematic (see e.g. Boswell 2007). Instead, this research posits that state actors are reflexive and respond in large part to institutional constraints and incentives as these are perceived by the actors in question. This thesis frequently highlights that the state is made up of different agencies, entities or political parties whose mandates or preferences may be divergent, as is often emphasised in organisational sociology scholarship (Boswell 2008; Brunsson 2002; March and Olsen 1989; Meyer and Rowan 1977). Concerning both state *and* non-state actors, I consider March and Olsen's (1989) point valid that rather than just being mirrors of social forces, institutions can and do demonstrate autonomy (p.18). Other actor-centred studies have also accounted for the often-significant level of organisational complexity, diversity and reflexiveness of policy actors and institutions involved in migration governance.

Boswell (2008) has thus demonstrated how Directorate-Generals of the European Commission 'decoupled' and responded differently to integrating immigration and asylum goals into the EU's

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[4] Cornwall's analysis in turn draws on the Foucauldian (1984) notion of space as an inherently political and constructed concept.

external relations. Lixi (2019) analyses dynamics in EU-Tunisian migration governance, observing that governance is accomplished by a multitude of governance actors across the two shores who engage in 'extensive informal and horizontal interactions' and decide on a course of action by '[making] sense' of what is 'out there' (pp.91-92). I draw on Weick's (1995) understanding of this process of 'sensemaking' in organisations where actors generate what they interpret, and where making sense of a given situation is less about discovery than it is about invention:

> *To talk about sensemaking is to talk about reality as an* ongoing accomplishment *that takes form when people make retrospective sense of the situations in which they find themselves. (Weick 1995, p.15).* (My emphasis)

Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2009) equally reject the model of a unitary state actor and adopt a more institutionalist view than traditional foreign policy analysis; they look at the external dimension of EU migration governance primarily through the processes of norm diffusion and policy transfer. They determine that important factors that impact external governance mechanisms are institutions, power hierarchies and domestic structures (in the policy 'receiving' country). They argue there are three levels at which to measure the effectiveness of policy transfer: at rule selection (determined through international negotiations), rule adoption, and finally rule application (the extent to which a rule is actually applied once formally adopted). Institutionalist studies have also conceptualised the formation of the EU's external migration policy through the influence of actors competing to exert their influence, and using the external 'venue' to do so (e.g. Guiraudon 2000, 2003; Lavenex 1999; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2009), where security actors such as officials of EU Member State ministries of Interior have largely succeeded in setting the tone for external migration policy, albeit with a liberal 'restraint' imposed at certain points by instruments such as the 1999 Amsterdam Treaty (Joppke 2002). Neoinstitutionalist models have thus frequently advanced the 'liberal constraint' as explaining tendencies in migration policy formulation (see Hollifield 2004; Joppke 1998; Lahav & Guiraudon 2006). Other institutionalist accounts have stepped away from the notion of a liberal constraint and have focused their attentions elsewhere. Boswell (2007) as such theorises that there are four distinct demands placed on liberal states that they must balance to ensure legitimacy in her theory of functional imperatives: fairness, accumulation (of wealth), security, and institutional legitimacy. Natter (2018) has also called for an analytical toolbox suited to studying (migration) policy beyond the Western state, noting that the liberal constraint hypothesis is an overly Eurocentric model for theorising immigration policymaking across political regimes.

The 'new' institutionalist approaches have been influential in theorising EU integration, where scholarship has discussed the merits and insights that different institutionalist approaches bring (Boswell and Hampshire 2017; Hall and Taylor 1996; Ikenberry 1994; Moravcsik 1998, 2018; Schmidt 2008; Schmidt and Radaelli 2004). I include in my understanding of institutions both the formal and informal: an organised context of established norms, values, relationships, power structures, and standard operating procedures. The policy actors discussed in this thesis represent organisations and institutions that embody various sets of rules, norms and understandings that in turn constitute order; as Heisler (1992) posits: institutions 'signal the presence of order and make for more order' (p.605). I distinguish here between two new institutionalisms that this research deals with: rational choice institutionalism and sociological (or constructivist) institutionalism.

Rational choice institutionalism has been widely employed to theorise policy adoption or rejection in state actors' decision-making. Rational choice suggests that interactions between political actors can be conceptualised using a game analogy: knowledge of the other 'player' is acquired through interaction; players observe each other's behaviour; they then use this information to alter their negotiation strategies in an effort to achieve their preferences, which are deemed fixed. From a rationalist perspective, the decision to adopt or reject a policy would be taken as the result of a cost and benefit analysis, where the benefits are weighed in relation to the disadvantages ('cost') of adopting the proposed policy, and a decision to adopt or reject is reached accordingly. In the Europeanisation literature the existence of a clear-cut 'benefit' to accession countries' cooperation with the EU (in the form of membership conditionality) has meant that rationalist explanations have been well-suited to explain third countries' responses to EU policy proposals, and in explaining relative success in policy transfer (Graziano & Vink 2007; Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2009; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2004; Wunderlich 2012). An appropriate summary of rational choice decision-making is 'individual goal-seeking under constraints' (Snidal 2002, p.74) where the logic of consequentiality applies.

However, sociological institutionalism and constructivist approaches have laid the groundwork for looking at decision-making beyond rational choice theory, and provide a different theory for decision-making on policy adoption or rejection. These perspectives points to the importance of the 'appropriateness' of the proposed policy or agreement in terms of its coherence with the receiving entity's identity, and how the proposed policy fits – or 'resonates' – in relation to national policy objectives, as forming the basis of acceptance or rejection (see Hagemann 2013; March and

Olsen 1989; Reslow and Vink 2015). From a constructivist perspective, the behaviour of policy actors is ultimately rule-guided: given that human agents do not exist independently from their social environment and its shared systems of meanings (Risse 2000, p.5) there is an implied effect of social norms and institutions that shape actors' behaviour (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998; Katzenstein 1984). Actors engage in this rule-guided behaviour, whether consciously or unconsciously, as they seek to decipher a situation and apply the appropriate norm according to their given identities. In turn, the existence of norm entrepreneurs at the domestic level can lead to domestic change when these 'change agents' mobilise in order to persuade actors to adopt a new norm and redefine their identity (Börzel and Risse 2003; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Finally, in contrast to rationalist accounts, constructivists allow for the possibility of argumentative persuasion: interactions between different actors lead to social learning, which in turn may result in *preference change* of one or more of the actors (Checkel 2005).

This research prefers to consider the two logics of political action as being not necessarily mutually exclusive, as actors may for example pursue non-material goals but consequentialism (means and ends calculations) may still underlie policy choices (Checkel 2001). It can and has been considered appropriate, therefore, to use both simultaneously (Börzel & Risse 2003; Checkel 2001; Risse 2000). By applying this rationale, this research demonstrates that state actors in policy 'recipient' countries can be shown to employ both a logic of appropriateness and a logic of expected consequences, thereby substantiating existing ideas that rationalist and sociological or constructivist approaches can be 'bridged' (Thielemann 2001; Zürn & Checkel 2005). By drawing together different theories – both within institutionalist approaches, but also from other areas of sociology and public policy, my approach reflects a stance of 'analytic eclecticism' – where there is an implicit pragmatist ethos 'manifested concretely in the search for middle-range theoretical arguments that potentially speak to concrete issues of policy and practice' (Sil and Katzenstein 2010, p.412). By applying theories from different research traditions, this theoretical framework allows a greater level of incorporation of the complexity and 'messiness' of real-world situations that this research examines (*ibid*).

This chapter turns now to dominant trends in EU migration governance and the dynamics of securitisation. Boswell (2003) and Chou (2009) respectively distinguish between the two main components of EU external migration policy that are exported to sending and transit countries, where the first is classical migration control systems such as border control, measures to combat illegal migration including smuggling and trafficking, and the gradual capacity-building for

migration management in transit countries.[5] The second component aims to address the supposed 'root causes' of migration through targeted development assistance. I start by addressing the implicit security-driven rationale, providing the necessary backdrop for analysing implications of a securitised narrative on EU-African cooperation in migration.

2.4 A securitised field of governance

There is a general consensus that the securitisation of immigration[6] has been taking place for many decades in the sphere of Western politics, whereby the apparent challenges posed by immigration to receiving countries have been met with a range of security-oriented 'solutions' (Bigo 2002; Hollifield 2004; Huysmans 2006; van Munster 2009; Squire 2015; Walters 2010). Securitisation of immigration is the phenomenon whereby immigration has been deliberately and systematically associated with security in political discourse, and is the process of governing through the construction of migration as a threat (Sjursen 2002; Squire, 2015). Securitisation of immigration has gained significant momentum since 9/11, as security concerns topped Western political agendas and have continued to remain prominent ever since (Lazaridis & Wadia 2015).

Following a constructivist logic, securitisation scholarship points to the 'bureaucratic and political processes of threat construction' as a plausible framework for analysis (van Munster 2009, p.5). Highlighting or constructing security threats is a performative act that confers legitimacy on the state in protecting citizens from external 'threats', and in turn elevates political discourse on migration to the exceptional – this then allows for restrictive policies to be introduced that would not otherwise have been considered legitimate (Boswell 2007a; Bourbeau 2017; Huysmans, 2006). The Copenhagen School theory emphasises this discursive production of immigration as a threat on the part of various social actors, known also as 'speech acts' (Bigo 2002; Buzan *et al*. 1998; van Munster 2009). Unease surrounding immigration and the migrant is deliberately fostered, whereby managing these apparent threats is presented as a necessity by the same actors (Bigo, 2002).

Securitisation of immigration at the EU level is associated with a number of regulations that have progressively emerged. Huysmans (2006) identifies the Dublin convention, a regulation relating to

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[5] This control-based approach also includes controversial negotiations with third countries to facilitate the return of rejected asylum seekers and irregular migrants to these countries through the means of readmission agreements. Often the EU and its Member States will seek agreements with third countries on the subject of return not only of nationals of that country, but of nationals of other countries who will have passed through as 'transit' migrants.

[6] I refer to 'immigration' in this section instead of 'migration', as the former is the term used preferentially in the securitisation literature.

EU asylum that determines which EU Member State must process an asylum application, as being aimed at reducing the number of applicants. He furthermore points to readmission agreements with migrant-sending countries, and the 1990 Convention Applying the Schengen Agreement of June 1985 (which connects immigration and asylum with terrorism, transnational crime and border control), as being indicative of a securitising approach. Huysmans and Bigo respectively draw on the Foucauldian conceptual framework of 'governmentality' to provide an analysis of the securitisation of immigration at the EU level.[7] In these accounts, the relationship between security and immigration is 'fully and immediately political' (Bigo 2002, p.71). Both are contested concepts, used to mobilise political responses. A Foucauldian conceptual framework emphasises the role of technologies of government in enforcing security. In the development and application of technological devices to bolster security, attention is shifted from agenda-setting to policy implementation. Border controls are more than just symbolic: they exist as specific routines, devices and knowledge that constitute the practical shaping of free movement through every-day enactment (Huysman 2006, p.97). The development of technologies of control and surveillance are therefore not the outcome of securitisation, but rather the drivers of it: the existence of a transnational field of security professionals and their struggle for resources in a competitive funding environment further bolsters the securitisation of immigration (Bigo 2002, p.73). According to Foucault, the modern administrative state expends greater energy on controlling the population than controlling territoriality: modern power thus intervenes at the level of the individual human body in what Foucault referred to as biopolitics (Foucault 2004; Jessop 2007).

Securitisation is therefore also manifested at the level of policy practice. It consists of routine practices typically carried out by bureaucrats and security professionals, where technology holds a prominent place (Bourbeau 2017). Security professionals, operating transnationally, have an interest in colonising other areas and extending their influence through the export of security technologies and practices (Boswell, 2007; Tsoukala 2005). Fundamental to the securitisation dynamic is a self-perpetuating framework that compellingly explains the persistence of the security narrative in policy discourse: the solution to a migration 'problem' is always framed in terms of 'more' or 'less' security, but never 'no' security (van Munster 2009, p.127). Securitisation is thus the logical outcome of the bureaucratic professionalisation of the management of unease: it is located in the everyday enactment of procedures, routines, regulations and devices that are

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[7] 'Governmentality' is a form of governance, associated by Foucault with the modern state, which relies on a bureaucratic and scientific assessment of risk (see Karamanidou 2015).

aimed at managing risks. Once immigration has been established as a threat through such political discursive acts, bureaucratic processes further render immigration and asylum as challenges to be addressed through professional risk calculations and threat assessments (van Munster 2009: 39). Risk management is presented as a technical matter, free from normative connotations; however, the association of immigration with security is not a value-free assertion (Squire 2015; Van Munster, 2009). With the expansion of migration management practices, the technicalisation of migration control through border management capacity building is a form of this 'normalisation' that serves to align emerging migration policies and governance practices with Western technical norms (Andrijasevic & Walters 2010, p. 984; Frowd 2018, p. 80). The securitisation theory outlined above has proven a compelling explanation of the security rationale in migration governance.

At the same time, it is relevant to note here that some have advocated a more nuanced interpretation of securitisation: Boswell (2007) contends that securitisation theory has provided only a narrow interpretation of organisational behaviour, noting that organisational sociology scholarship has shown that organisations are not exclusively interested in power maximisation. Equally, Neal (2009) argues for interpreting the security rationale and associated practices as a continuum, rather than a process where issues are securitised by virtue of being elevated from the normal interplay of politics. Foucauldian security studies have also been found to be lacking a theoretically rich account of the role of racial and, therein, *colonial* violence in the biopolitics of population control (Aradau & Tazzioli 2019; Howell & Richter-Montpetit 2018; Weheliye 2014). Foucauldian analyses treat race as a marker by which eligibility for life is considered – which forms of life are 'more eligible or more disposed to life and which are not' (Dillon 2008, p.178). As Howell & Richter-Montpetit (2018) highlight, the Foucauldian conceptual reliance on an 'unspecified human body' as subject to biopolitical governance does not take coloniality seriously enough and in particular the 'ongoing colonial histories that rendered enslaved people into things' (p.7). Going beyond a discussion of the racialised body in biopolitics, it is necessary to focus on the mechanisms of racialisation through which certain subjects are 'differentially governed as migrants' and to investigate the political technologies through which these distinctions are produced (Aradau & Tazzioli 2019, p.208).

The conceptual reconciliation of securitising practices with the norms and values of the liberal state have also been the subject of debate in critical security scholarship. There is an apparent tension between the political identity of the EU as a liberal entity, and the pursuit of policies that securitise immigration. Migration policy scholars have distinguished the EU's internal migration

regime, which is seen to be reflective of the EU's liberal values, from the external regime which pursues a migration containment and a security agenda (see for example Joppke, 2002). Such scholars perceive a liberal constraint on EU policy that stands in opposition to processes of securitisation (Squire, 2015). There is some disagreement, particularly on the part of critical security scholars, on how much distinction there actually is between the two notions of liberalisation and securitisation. Joppke (2002) for example refers to the Amsterdam Treaty as addressing the 'liberal deficit' of the external migration regime, and the creation of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice[8] as an important liberal project of the EU which brought 'justice' and, therefore, migrant rights, to the forefront as one of the main considerations of the EU migration agenda.[9] Others have however noted that 'Amsterdam' fell somewhat short in ensuring migrants' rights in Europe (see for example Geddes 2000, p.161). Squire (2015) also notes that liberal values and the pursuit of restrictive migration policies through securitisation are *compatible* concepts, referring to the 'illiberal practices of liberal states' (p.21; see also Bigo & Tsoukala 2008). Liberalisation and securitisation play into one another in the development of a 'managed' migration (Squire 2015, p.30). In order to reconcile securitisation with liberal values, political and administrative practices of liberal states have sought to define and regulate the notion of freedom, and specifically its 'excesses' and associated 'deviant conduct' (van Munster 2009; Huysmans 2006, p.10). These accounts have in common that they emphasise the politicisation of immigration, and the role of political actors in shaping, defining, and regulating freedom and which groups or individuals are deemed unqualified to exercise freedom.

Since the early 2000s, and with the consolidation of partnerships between European and West African actors on migration cooperation, security considerations around migration have come to dominate regional migration agendas in West Africa (Coderre 2018; Kabbanji 2011). In her extensive study of the migration governance approach of ECOWAS, Kabbanji (2011) notes that three important 'mutations' can be identified in the time period of 2000-2008 in comparison to 1975-1999.[10] Firstly, the migration agenda of ECOWAS is more globally oriented, and takes into consideration migration to Europe; secondly, the EU and EU Member States now form part of the actors shaping migration policies in West Africa; and finally measures aimed at restricting migration are more numerous and are aimed at curbing inter-regional migration (*ibid*). EU

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[8] A collection of policies adopted following the Treaty of Amsterdam which together constitute the liberal project of the EU.

[9] See Table 3.6, Chapter 3 for overview of EU treaties marking the multi-levelling of migration governance.

[10] ECOWAS is the Economic Community of West African States: a regional political and economic union of fifteen countries in West Africa.

narratives on migration governance accord a large degree of importance to the role of nation states in the formal and explicit management of borders, in what Schofberger (2019) dubs a European 'solid border' approach. Specific to the European historic and cultural experience of space and territory is the idea that people belong to a determined territory and nation. This embodies the Westphalian notion of statehood, delineated borders and territorial sovereignty (see Hollifield 2004; Little 2007; Waltz 1979). This ideology is firmly rooted in the specificity of the European historical experience, and contributes to the sedentary bias that permeates EU narratives in migration governance that I discuss in Chapter 4.

In migration and development scholarship, it has been demonstrated that the security 'solution' does not solve insecurity, but rather contributes to its continued existence as it often places migrants in situations of further insecurity (van Munster 2009; Cross 2013; Nyberg-Sørensen 2012). There is, at the same time, a lack of empirical evidence to suggest that migration containment policies are successful in deterring migrants (Czaika & De Haas 2013), reinforcing the point that borders are intended to be politically successful, rather than actually successful in containing migration: their existence gives the appearance of control (Nyberg–Sørensen, 2012). The security narrative has nonetheless proven both resilient and persistent in migration governance (Andersson & Keen 2019). This has relevance for the shaping of migration policies in third countries through cooperation with the EU – the security lens of migration discourse is an omnipresent and important driver of EU interventions in third countries. At the same time, as Andersson and Keen (2019) note, the narrative has proven resilient in part because of the 'economic benefits (…) for "partner states" and their security apparatuses' (p.11; see also Frowd 2018). The reasons for Senegalese and Ghanaian domestic actors' participation in, and support of, border management capacity-building informs part of the analysis of Chapter 6.

Crisis-driven action

It is against the backdrop of an existing, securitising narrative that I contextualise the 'migration crisis' of 2015 and its implications for EU migration governance post-2015. The number of asylum seeker arrivals in the EU peaked in 2015 – with over 1.25 million first-time asylum applicants, the year 2015 saw more than twice the number of first-time asylum applicants in comparison to 2014 (Eurostat 2017). As such, 2015 is considered the height of the migration crisis, where the bulk of asylum applicants in Europe were overwhelmingly from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, but were also to a much lesser extent from other countries such as Eritrea. In the same year, the EU established the European Agenda on Migration (EAM) citing the need for 'swift and determined action' in

response to migrant deaths in the Mediterranean (EC 2015, p.3). This came at the heels of the European Council meeting of 23 April 2015 in which the statement of the meeting announces that 'the European Union will mobilise all efforts at its disposal to prevent further loss of life at sea and to tackle the root causes of the human emergency that we face' (European Council 2015b). Further key actions outlined include strengthening presence at sea, fighting trafficking and preventing irregular migration flows (*ibid*). As Koch *et al.* (2018) note, the crisis shifted EU external migration policy to the very top of the political agenda.

The migration crisis has already formed the subject of a burgeoning literature in terms of its impact on EU migration policymaking and governance (Collett & Le Coz 2018; Crawley 2016; De Genova & Tazzioli 2017; Geddes 2019; Niemann & Zaun 2018; Norman 2019; Panizzon & van Riemsdijk 2019). Rhinard (2019) talks of a 'crisisification' of policy-making in which he includes the migration crisis. Den Hertog (2016) examines EU budgetary responses to the crisis, noting that the role of funding pledges can be interpreted as communicative tools intended to reassure EU Member States and European publics that 'management actions and their implementation are taking place' (p.1). Slominski & Trauner (2018) demonstrate that the crisis 'contributed to calls that a higher return rate should be established' (p.106). The critical security literature, using a constructivist perspective, also serves as a reminder that a preoccupation with security and crisis feeds into everyday practices, where a new issue or threat is initially framed as requiring exceptional measures – but where emergency and security-oriented operating procedures subsequently become the norm rather than the exception (Bigo 2002; Huysmans 2006). A public policy lens also encourages a focus on the role of agenda-setting in the policymaking process and considers the possible role of a shock event in political framing. The multiple streams approach considers how crises may act as policy 'windows' that allow political actors to seize on problems and apply specific solutions (Anglund 1999; Kingdon 1995; Teisman & van Buuren 2013). Combining the multiple streams framework with other approaches to policy making captures a more diverse set of factors and provides a 'superior explanatory framework of policymaking than any [framework] does individually' (Béland & Howlett 2016 p. 226; Howlett *et al.* 2016). For this reason, the analysis here uses public policy insights to allow a richer analysis of political momentum and context in decision-making dynamics, but still encompasses an institutionalist view on the role of embedded norms and formal structures as a constraining force on policy actors.

In many cases, attributing an important degree of causal power to the crisis is best done with circumspection: while the crisis may have accelerated certain policy developments, it is not

evident that it has generated entirely new narratives, or led to real novelty in policy instrumentation. Slominski and Trauner (2018) for instance note that the crisis contributed to a stronger reliance on informal patterns of cooperation to secure a higher rate of (migrant) returns: yet, they note that the political will to do so existed prior to the crisis (p.106). Koch *et al* (2018) also note that the crisis served to intensify a 'pre-existing tendency towards the externalisation of migration control and restriction' (p.9). In Chapter 5, I discuss the role of the crisis and its role in decision-making processes within the EU institutions, and I analyse its impact on policy instrumentation in the context of EU-African cooperation.

2.5 Governance as bureaucratic and technocratic management

As I have noted, critical security theorists have contended that the routine enactment of practices by bureaucrats and security professionals, together forming the bureaucratic professionalisation of the management of unease, is one of the 'logics' of securitisation (Bigo 2002). Other studies have also argued that security is enacted through the incremental normalisation of practices that are in themselves not spectacular enough to draw attention (Neal 2009). I delve here into the technicalisation and routinisation of migration control practices, discussing the role of depoliticisation dynamics in practices encapsulated under the umbrella term 'migration management'.

'Migration management' is a notion elaborated in the early 1990s and has since become a popular catchphrase amongst international organisations engaged in migration governance. Geiger (2010) observes that it is a notion mobilised by policy actors to conceptualise and justify their increasing participation in the shaping of migration governance, and is associated with a wide range of practices such as counter-trafficking; training civil servants in transit and sending countries in fields such as border control; the development of migration policies in countries lacking strategies in this field under the auspices of foreign-based experts and organisations; return and readmission programmes; and development projects that focus on enhancing the development benefit of migration (p.6). The term 'management' serves to depoliticise migration policies, as policies are framed as 'technical' considerations on the most appropriate way of addressing migration, rather than political choices (*ibid,* p.11).

Migration management ties in to a wider trend whereby international development is increasingly characterised by a 'new managerialism' which has resulted in the narrowing of 'ends' (through the quantifying of targets) at the same time as the widening of 'means' (the inclusion of development

in migration policy considerations) (Lavenex 2016; Mosse 2004). Walters (2010) expands on the above definition of migration management practices, emphasising that migration management also seeks to punish those actors who facilitate (irregular) migration, such as smugglers, traffickers, employers of undocumented migrants, and commercial carriers who are expected to police the status of their own passengers (p.79). The migration management approach is presented as being congruous with human rights by its advocates, but has been criticised by other actors (such as Human Rights Watch) as eroding Europe's basic commitments and obligations in the area of human, and particularly, refugee, rights (Geiger 2010; Walters 2010).

Narratives around migration management have sought to depoliticise the substance of their proposals where the process of depoliticisation serves a few purposes. In the first instance, such narratives hope to circumvent opposition by proposing a catalogue of 'seemingly technical, simple, or common-sense recommendations' where the tone is adapted so as 'not to hurt states' sensitivities' (Pécoud 2015, p.96). The political nature of these narratives is nullified as language is used in a way that 'naturalises' the topic discussed (*ibid*; Bourdieu 1991). Equally, in her study of international organisations as securitising actors, Maertens (2018) concludes that depoliticisation (as practiced by IOs) allows organisations to bypass politics and intervene in particular thematic fields, to maintain their monopoly of intervention in a given area, or to maintain the status quo (pp.357-358). Wood & Flinders (2014) highlight that depoliticisation displaces issues of concern to 'less obviously politicised [arenas]', and eventually to the private sphere where the issue becomes a matter of private or consumer choice (p.155), indicating a neoliberal rationale that advocates individualised responses to collective problems. Finally, policy instruments are also negotiated in dense institutional settings (Menon & Sedelmeier 2010), and far from being neutral devices, they are subject to 'dynamics of politicization, de-politicization and connected to issues of legitimacy' (Trauner & Wolff 2014, p.9). As I explore in Chapter 6, depoliticisation can also help to shroud action from domestic public scrutiny and remove issues from arenas of contestation, and to lend legitimacy to cooperation initiatives in migration management. The figure below represents this process of relegating public issues to the private realm.

Figure 2.1: Conceptualising depoliticisation.

Source: adapted from Wood and Flinders (2014); Hay (2007).

Migration management has also aligned well with the promotion of a 'partnership' concept with third countries. Increasingly, the EU and its Member States, as well as other international actors, have built a narrative around 'partnerships' for migration governance that emphasises a triple-win scenario: one in which migration can be effectively managed for the good of all parties (countries of origin and destination, and migrants) (Collyer 2016; Kunz & Maisenbacher 2013). Inherent to this notion, that focuses on capacity building and technical cooperation, is the idea that migration can be effectively 'managed' to yield benefits; and that interests in migration governance are common among actors and populations (Kunz and Meisenbacher, 2013; Lavenex & Kunz 2008). Equally, Collyer (2016) observes that the discourse of partnership led by the EU in its Mediterranean neighbourhood replaces an older style geopolitics of dominance: overt relations of force are 'deliberately avoided' in favour of a narrative of cooperation and harmonious collaboration that showcases migration management strategies as the way forward (p.610). The promotion of 'partnership' is, as I demonstrate in Chapter 4, used discursively to present as self-evident the idea that African states have a shared responsibility for containing migration.

The discussion of this sub-section has alluded to the role of narratives in framing migration governance. Narrative frameworks, and causal or knowledge claims made by policy actors, have

been shown to define both the ideas and scope of (migration) policy discourse (Baldwin-Edwards *et al.* 2019; Betts & Pilath 2017; Boswell 2011; Roe 1994; Schofberger 2019). In Roe's words, policy narratives are 'stories (...) which underwrite and stabilize the assumptions for policymaking' (Roe 1994, p.34). I subsequently explore how narrative frameworks have informed the ways in which migration governance and development practice have been linked.

2.6 Linking migration governance with development practice

The security dynamic evident in migration discourse runs in tangent to debates ongoing on the contributions of migration to national development in developing countries. I refer to the trend of renewed optimism that characterises academic and policy discourses on migration and development since the early 2000s (Castles *et al.* 2014; de Haas 2012). Where migration and development links were examined from the 1970s onwards, migration was framed as evidence of development failure, focusing on aspects such as brain drain[11]. The huge increase in migrant remittances in the 1990s sparked new optimism, particularly among international organisations, in the possibility of migration forming part of development strategy (Lavenex and Kunz, 2008; De Haas, 2012). Since then, optimism regarding the potential to exploit remittances and other migration outcomes for development purposes has formed what Kapur (2004) dubbed the 'new mantra'. International organisations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the EU have followed up on this renewed optimism, with the EU including migration and development as a key component of the GAMM[12] in 2005.

Contextually, it is important to recall that ideologies over social policy, and development policy, have been at the heart of a 'war of ideas' in which neoliberalism has emerged as the prevailing, and 'common sense', world view (Harvey 2005, p.54). The diffusion of neoliberal orthodoxy has resulted in the emergence of the Washington Consensus in the 1990s and established the phenomenon of the neoliberal state: where the 'freedoms it embodies reflect the interests of private property owners, businesses, multinational corporations, and financial capital' (Harvey 2005, p.7). With the advent of neoliberalism, business interests increasingly dictate political agendas (Deacon 2008; Yeates 2008). Hereunder, the role of government is also reconceptualised

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[11] Brain drain is a term used to indicate the large-scale emigration of highly-trained and qualified professionals from a country.

[12] The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) is the articulation of the EU framework regarding migration. The GAMM has effectively formed the basis of the EU's external migration and asylum policy since 2005 (see Table 3.7, Chapter 3).

to place emphasis on the fostering of a good business climate, instead of ensuring the wellbeing of citizens (Harvey 2005).

Neoliberal orthodoxy has favoured private sector solutions to development challenges. One of the outcomes of this advocacy is the promotion of entrepreneurship in global social policy. As Ennis (2019) observes, entrepreneurship features prominently on the global development agenda, whereby three of the seventeen UN Sustainable Development Goals specifically refer to entrepreneurship and its role in the sustainable development agenda (see also United Nations 2015). Since the 1990s, scholarship in development has moved away from state-based models towards the empowerment of communities and individuals themselves – coinciding 'perhaps awkwardly' with the trend towards marketisation through neoliberalism (Faist 2008). As a whole, the neoliberal agenda 'shifts the regulatory competence of the state onto "responsible" and "rational" individuals' and supplies individuals with the tools to actively participate in the solution of specific problems which hitherto had been the domain of state agencies (Lemke 2001, p. 22). Yet, in shifting this competence to the individual, it also shifts responsibility for failure onto the individual. Naudé *et al.* (2017) also observe that entrepreneurship and migration policies frequently do more harm to the poor and to development agendas than good. Not all entrepreneurs create 'sustainable or substantial jobs'; many lack any element of innovation; and many fail within a few years (*ibid*, pp.1-2).

Several scholars have attempted to theorise links between migration and development, although scholarship still suffers from an under-theorised conceptualisation of the relationship between the two (Castles 2009, p.454). The migration-development literature typically looks at types of migration and migrants such as temporary migration (also referred to as circular or short-term migration); diaspora engagement for development; remittances (both financial and 'social'); and return of skilled professionals. A number of empirical studies have sought to uncover the conditions necessary to realise the development potential of migration.

Despite positive advocacy about the potential of circular migration to contribute to development in origin countries – the idea being that migrants will build skills and knowledge through temporary employment in Europe that they can put to use on return to their home countries – the current reality is that temporary visas are often too short-term and migrants frequently do not manage to save enough money or build enough skills for the experience to be deemed valuable (Adepoju *et al.* 2010; Cross 2013; Nyberg–Sørensen *et al.* 2002). Similarly, in the case of returns – temporary or otherwise – the development potential of a 'returnee' depends not only on the skills gained

and the returnee's savings, but also on the local economic, social and institutional context that the returnee is returning to. The importance of an existing minimum level of local development and, crucially, good governance, is highlighted by several studies as a necessary prerequisite for promoting development through migrant investments and return programs (Castles *et al.* 2014; Ghosh 2000). At the same time, the recruitment processes of Northern immigration countries are skewed in favour of highly-skilled migrants, whereby concerns over brain drain remain unmitigated (Castles 2009).

A similar case can be made for diaspora engagement[13], which became a favoured initiative amongst international policy actors and indeed policy makers in origin countries. For development through diaspora engagement to succeed, there needs to be an attractive investment environment in place in the country of origin (Faist 2008, p.627). While there are a number of initiatives promoting the expansion of business networks through diaspora and transnationals, very little is actually currently known about how migrant entrepreneurs act as transnational brokers in business between two regions (*ibid*, p.624*).* Migration scholars have also cautioned against a rose-tinted view of the role of remittances in promoting development, noting that if political reform remains absent, remittances are more likely to lead to inflation and increasing inequality – and pointing out that most remittances do not flow to the poorest families, nor to the poorest countries (although this critique can also be made of international aid flows) (Castles 2009; de Haan 2006; Nyberg–Sørensen *et al.* 2002).

It is neoliberal agendas that have partly driven migration and development initiatives and narratives by advocating 'self-help from below' (Castles *et al.* 2014, p. 82; de Haas 2012), and these narratives, somewhat uncritically, cast migrants into the role of development agents. Where migrants are key agents for development and take on moral responsibility for communities of origin, this '[shifts] responsibility away from the state itself' (Toma 2017, p.95). Certain development initiatives also have questionable outcomes for migrants. While temporary migration is portrayed as a win-win solution for sending and immigration countries, Nyberg–Sørensen (2012) stresses that temporary migrants are less likely to benefit from political rights and socio-political inclusion in host countries than permanent migrants. Glick-Schiller & Faist (2009) furthermore identify a number of underlying assumptions that pertain to the migration-development mantra, including (but not limited to): that migration will inexorably produce both

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[13] Diaspora initiatives include the circulation of knowledge and business networks through temporary return or visits of scientists, entrepreneurs or investors.

financial and social remittances; that temporary or circular migration produces development more than permanent migration; that migrant diasporas will become collective, organised agents for development; and that economic development will eventually reduce migration pressures. What also emerges from this mantra is that migration is, still, largely portrayed as a 'bad thing' that must be managed and – crucially – reduced (Castles 2009, p.442).

Development conditionality

The EU has incorporated a development component into its external migration governance as part of a more 'comprehensive' approach (EC 2011). The 'root causes' rationale gained momentum after 2011 when the Commission increasingly developed hybrid security-development narratives frames on migration (Schofberger 2019, p.13). It has equally taken the shape of a 'more for more' approach of encouraging cooperation in contentious topics such as returns and readmission by conditioning development aid and financing, and visa facilitation, on third countries' willingness to cooperate in restrictive policies, particularly readmitting their nationals (Adepoju *et al.* 2010; Bisong 2019; Carrera *et al.* 2016; den Hertog 2016). As relations between the EU and third countries are characterised by asymmetries of interest in migration cooperation, the EU has sought to overcome such asymmetries through issue-linkage and development conditionality (Hampshire 2016). Conditionality has formed the basis of, for example, the EU's earlier Mobility Partnership instrument introduced under the GAMM, whereby participating third countries are to benefit from visa facilitation agreements in return for cooperating on returns and readmission. However, as the word 'facilitation' implies and as Koch *et al.* (2018) have also noted, the EU has limited competences in the area of legal migration, weakening the EU's negotiating position.

The development pillar of the EU's migration governance encapsulates the 'root causes' approach, where this has been subject to some changes over time. Discussions on the potential of migration and transnational practices to *contribute* to development – such as those highlighted in the previous section – have become scarcer since 2015, in favour of a stronger focus on security and solidifying borders (Schofberger, 2019). They have 'not only lost visibility in EU policy documents' but have become increasingly contested, where Schofberger attributes some of this contestation to the stance of some EU Member States (p.15). Migration deterrence has instead underlined the rationale driving interventions in third countries. As Kent *et al.* (2019) point out, deterrence strategies aim to change the motivations of migrants, in contrast to defence policies that primarily affect migrants' capabilities. Return policy is instrumentalised as repatriates may be used as a 'weapon of dissuasion' – put to use as human deterrents in the 'illegality industry' (Andersson

2014, pp.40–41). Information and 'awareness raising' campaigns on the dangers of irregular migration form part of the migration governance toolkit that the EU and EU Member States use in migrant-sending countries (Aguillon 2018; Nieuwenhuys & Pécoud 2007; Oeppen 2016). Other development interventions linked with migration governance have sought to foster job creation and training opportunities in migrant departure zones. At the heart of these interventions is the explicitly stated rationale that the 'root causes' of irregular migration can be tackled by promoting economic opportunities, security and development (see e.g. EC 2019a).[14]

The inclusion of a development component to the migration agenda is used primarily as an incitement for third countries to engage in migration cooperation with the EU, it has been argued (see Faist 2008, p.632; Cassarino 2014b). Migration scholars have been critical of past efforts to engage with the development potential of migration policies, noting that it is only lip service that is paid to the development agenda of the European external migration agenda (see Castles 2009; De Haas 2008b). They furthermore point out that such cooperation brings into question both the motives and indeed the benefits of development aid in the context of migration. It has also been argued that the development component is primarily aimed at reducing migration flows to the European continent as part of a preventative approach (Boswell 2003, p.619). Another key challenge surrounding the politics of migration cooperation is that development aid is increasingly made contingent on cooperation in migration control (Samers 2004). This may lead to increased competition between third countries for development funds, and the likelihood of less funds going to centralised efforts (Betts & Milner 2006). It may be creating a situation where development aid is going not necessarily to where it is most needed, but to countries that have proven to be the most cooperative with the EU and its Member States in terms of implementing its migration control agenda (Collett & Ahad 2017). The EU's use of development intervention in migration governance is analysed in Chapter 4 from the perspective of narrative frames.

2.7 Limitations to EU governance

Section 3 of this chapter has so far discussed the EU's role as a supranational actor in migration governance, and its strategies for achieving policy convergence with third countries in the matter of migration. Yet, the EU has been shown to be limited in its ability to attain its preferences in migration cooperation with non-EU states (Carrera *et al.* 2016; Koch *et al.* 2018; Reslow & Vink

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[14] It should be noted that this rationale goes against empirical studies that have concluded that development is likely to increase migration, at least in the short term, as more people then have the means to migrate (De Haas 2007; UNDP 2009).

2015; Wunderlich 2012). As a result, the EU has a track record of partial success in achieving its policy preferences in negotiation with non-EU countries, whereby recent historical efforts to converge third countries' migration policies with the EU agenda have seen mixed results. In the West African context, the EU's failure in securing a Mobility Partnership with Senegal (Chou and Gibert, 2012; Reslow and Vink, 2015) is evidence of this limitation. Wunderlich (2010) stresses that the EU's success in achieving formal migration cooperation with African counterparts has largely occurred when the aims and priorities of African state actors converged with the EU's aims; even when policies are formally adopted, implementation is not guaranteed as countries have been shown to implement policies 'à la carte'. The EU's success in cooperation is dependent on many factors, including the perception of the EU as an effective actor, and the interests of domestic actors in third countries in joint cooperation schemes where costs and benefits of participation are assessed (Mouthaan 2019). Equally, there are significant constraints on the EU's bargaining power with third countries in a negotiating setting where EU membership conditionality is off the table (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009). The other 'carrots' the EU can offer are comparatively weak, and the main concessions that many African governments seek in dialogue – namely, an increase in legal migration opportunities – are not within the EU's power to offer, this being an area of jurisdiction of EU Member States, as noted earlier. The EU also exhibits internal limitations on its capabilities as an effective actor in the external dimension: a common negotiating position is often hard to reach as EU Member States migration interests are diverse, while intra-institutional differences within the Commission may also constrain the EU's negotiating power with third countries (Hampshire, 2016). These limitations create a situation whereby third countries are in a better position to shape the EU's migration governance.

2.7.1 Third country actors in the EU's migration governance

When studying the EU's external governance, policy outcomes following EU-African cooperation and dialogue cannot solely be measured or explained by theories of power asymmetry between the EU, EU Member States and African states (Reslow 2012; van Criekinge 2009). Both state actors and civil society actors in third countries have been shown to resist or negate EU governance, whether in discussions around Mobility Partnerships (Kunz and Maisenbacher, 2013) or in bilateral negotiations (Paoletti, 2011); state actors in policy recipient countries may also readjust or channel EU rules and policies on migration in order to strengthen their own domestic rule, as Cassarino (2014a) has demonstrated in the case of Tunisia.

Theories of power asymmetry, while contributing to greater understanding of EU-African cooperation outcomes, have also largely failed to account for the increasing interest of EU Member States and the EU institutions in engaging West African states in migration cooperation initiatives and how, conversely, this may empower states that are the recipients of these efforts. A few accounts have thus advanced the notion of 'reverse conditionality' (Tittel-Mosser 2018) or 'migration diplomacy' and how states that have typically been the weaker partner in negotiations have strategically use migration flows and migration management policies in their foreign relations – or use diplomacy to achieve migration policy goals (Adamson & Tsourapas 2018; Greenhill 2010; Thiollet 2011). This considers how state actors are affected by their position in migration systems according to whether they are migration-sending, migration-receiving, or transit states. The bargaining power of third countries lies precisely in their strategic position as migrant-sending nations, when the EU is explicitly and politically concerned with reducing migration to its borders (Adamson and Tsourapas 2018; El Qadim 2014).

The agency of African actors and their role in shaping migration cooperation is more commonly negated due to this asymmetry of power dynamics between EU and African countries (El Qadim 2015; van Criekinge 2010). Power-based arguments have stressed that the negotiating power of the EU and its Member States far exceeds that of individual African states. While this is a generally uncontested assertion, African actors are not merely 'passive agents' in the EU's external migration governance and the role of local actors in determining migration cooperation outcomes can be significant, as a few studies have demonstrated (notably: van Criekinge 2010; Paoletti 2011; Reslow 2012). Policy actors in third countries may also develop more sophisticated negotiation strategies over time: contestation strategies develop as a result of long-term experience with EU and bilateral migration cooperation, where states who have experience in negotiating with the EU may be more successful in advancing their interests than negotiation 'newcomers' such as Niger (Koch *et al.* 2018). The development and use of contestation strategies by domestic actors is addressed in Chapter 6.

2.8 Research questions

The conceptual framework and literature review presented in this chapter forms the basis of this inquiry into EU-West African migration cooperation and governance. The various strands of literature and theory have provided important tools to unpack the role of actors, their preferences, and institutions in shaping migration governance. This chapter has also so far served to delineate what is established in the literature, and what is comparatively unknown. Section 2.3

discussed the securitisation of migration, and the links forged between migration and security that ensure that migration is viewed through a security lens in policy frameworks. Section 2.4 charted the progress of the EU as a supranational actor in the governance of migration, and the growth of the external dimension in this timeline. I detailed furthermore the various tools that the EU has introduced in its cooperation with third countries, as well as the limitations that exist that serve to constrain the EU's ability to secure policy convergence in third countries. The characterisation of migration governance as technocratic migration 'management' in an effort to depoliticise the political nature of migration policy proposals relies on bureaucratisation dynamics, whereby migration containment and control is normalised as a practice.

This chapter has proposed that narratives are important steering devices that form the basis of subsequent policy proposals and interventions. Narratives are also indicative of an actor's agenda-setting capabilities, and therefore reflect power dynamics as actors' voices in a policy-making arena are unequal (see section 2.2). The security narrative in migration governance has been well documented (see 2.3) but African actors' interests in security-oriented cooperation schemes are comparatively less defined. Meanwhile, other underlying narratives also warrant closer examination in terms of their impact on shaping cooperation and interventions. What are the other narratives that drive migration policy, either implicitly or explicitly? How are narratives manifested in the content of policy and project interventions?

The EU's external migration governance has expanded and adapted over time, as the EU has acted to build its competence in the arena of external migration governance – an area still substantially managed by nation states (see Chapter 1 and section 2.4). This chapter has identified that the migration crisis of 2015 impacted the EU as an institutional actor and generated a call for action in domestic spheres. A key aim of this research is to identify the driving forces of recent EU migration cooperation with third countries, and to contextualise the EU's renewed interest in engaging West African countries in migration cooperation. This research therefore asks whether recent policy events have created new opportunities, and new constraints, on the EU's external migration governance, and the possible implications thereof.

Building on the premise that African actors can, and do, shape migration cooperation with the EU (as detailed in section 2.7), this chapter has identified that African agency is moreover likely to be additionally significant in the presence of various constraints and limitations on the EU's external governance. Yet, preference formation among African actors in EU migration cooperation, and the mediating role of the domestic context therein, is a body of work still in its infancy (but see Adam

et al. 2019; Andersson 2014; Chou & Gibert 2012; Frowd 2018; Mouthaan 2019; Trauner & Deimel 2013). How African domestic actors perceive cooperation opportunities and constraints, and how they perceive sources of leverage in cooperation, is therefore the subject of analysis in this research.

The central research question is: **How do institutions and actors' interests shape migration governance in EU-West African cooperation?**

This is divided into three sub-questions that guide the analysis:

- What is the role of steering narratives in migration governance?
- What are the key drivers of recent EU external migration policy to West Africa?
- What is the impact of African domestic actors and their interests in determining migration cooperation?

2.9 Conclusion

This chapter has presented the theoretical rationale that underpins this research. It has argued for adopting an actor-centred lens to understand EU-West African migration governance as the product of the preferences and interests of multiple actors, where these need to be closely unpacked. Drawing on ideas in social policy, organisational sociology, and public policy I conceptualise decision-making as taking place in a complex, fragmented environment where actors' preferences may diverge, but also sometimes overlap. By looking at the institutional context that guides and constrains decision-making, I rationalised the application of an institutionalist lens to analyse migration governance in this thesis.

This chapter has also detailed the dominant narratives that exist both in development and in migration governance. It has examined the linkages forged between migration control and development practice, and how development conditionality has been an EU strategy employed to secure third countries' cooperation in migration governance initiatives. I noted the limitations on the EU's capacity to secure policy convergence in its cooperation with third countries. In doing so I set the context for the remaining chapters of this thesis which examines the ways in which the EU has determined migration policy discourse, but also examines the role of African actors in contesting, facilitating, and otherwise negating EU external governance.

In the next chapter I present the methodology adopted to implement this research. I also detail the contextual background of this research in terms of the case studies, Senegal and Ghana, their

attainment in socioeconomic measurements, and their historical experiences of migration. I also discuss the growth of the external dimension in the EU's migration governance and the emergence of the EU as a supranational actor in the field of migration. This sets the context for the remaining chapters of this thesis which examine the ways in which the EU has determined migration policy discourse, but also examines the role of African actors in contesting, facilitating, and otherwise negating EU external governance.

Chapter 3

Research Design and Background

3.1 Introduction

This chapter consists of two parts. The first presents the methodology that was adopted to answer the research questions listed in Chapter 2. I discuss my rationale for using a multiple case study approach, and for the selection of Senegal and Ghana as case studies. The research methods that were used to conduct this study are detailed, including the strengths and pitfalls of these methods and my experiences and reflections of using them. My positionality as a white, European, female researcher conducting research in Brussels and West African countries, and therein primarily policy communities, is presented in terms of how it may have facilitated access in some contexts and created barriers in others. The section concludes by delineating the limitations of the methodological scope of this study. The other purpose of this chapter is to provide a contextual background of the two case studies, Senegal and Ghana, and the EU's development as an actor in migration governance. I explore the histories of the two West African countries in terms of their colonial and post-colonial interactions with Europe, and their experiences of migration. I then chart the evolution of the external dimension of the EU's migration governance and EU engagement with third countries.

3.2 Methodology

3.2.1 Multiple case study approach

This study applies a case study approach to address the research question. Case studies offer a way of generating a rich and detailed insight into a particular topic and are frequently an approach used in qualitative research. A case study approach is moreover useful as it may allow for new hypotheses to be derived (George & Bennett 2005). According to Yin, a case study can be defined as an empirical inquiry that:

- *'investigates a contemporary phenomenon (the "case") in depth and within its real-world context, especially when*

- *the boundaries between phenomenon and context may not be clearly evident'* (Yin 2003, p.13)

Multiple case studies (where two or more cases are studied) have been particularly favoured by researchers in the last years because, it is argued, it improves the outcome of theory-building which is a central component to case study research (Dyer & Wilkins 1991; Eisenhardt 1989). The researcher is in a better position to establish circumstances in which a theory will or will not hold through a multiple case study approach than through a single case study. At the same time, there is a possibility that some depth is lost when using multiple case studies, instead of using a single case (Dyer & Wilkins 1991). My selection of two countries, Ghana and Senegal, is nonetheless a reflection of the relative merits of a multiple case study approach as the potential to generate theories on the processes and outcomes of EU cooperation with third countries is greater through the study of two countries as opposed to one.

It is noted by Bryman (2016) that the strategy for selecting case studies should reflect a rationale of choosing cases that have either contrasting characteristics; or, on the other hand, selecting case studies that are substantially the same. As I explore later in this chapter in the rationale for my case study selection, Senegal and Ghana demonstrate similarities that make them comparable. According to Bryman, this approach offers some advantages:

> *'[The] advantage is that the researcher is able to say that any differences that are found between the cases in terms of the main focus of the research are likely to be due to the factors that the researcher reveals as important rather than to differences between the cases at the outset.'* (Bryman 2016, p.68).

Yin (2003) furthermore notes that a case study is preferred when looking at contemporary events, but where behaviours cannot be manipulated (p.7). As my inquiry looks at the shaping of policies, there is a strong contemporary aspect to my research that makes the choice of a case study approach relevant. Yin (2003) distinguishes between the broad categories of exploratory, descriptive and explanatory case studies. The case studies in this research are explanatory – research questions that ask 'How' or 'Why' are often explanatory and deal with 'operational links needing to be traced over time' rather than measuring frequency or incidence (Yin 2003, p.6). The case study selection rationale carried the aim of examining and thereby forming hypotheses on

the politics of cooperation between different actors, and analysing why certain outcomes can be observed.

There are some critiques of case study research that I will acknowledge and address here. There is, firstly a critique commonly made concerning the external validity of case study research, in that findings from case study research are not generalisable. The argument is that such research generates data and findings which are then only found to be true to that particular case. While this is a valid criticism, the most evident rebuttal is that generalisability to other populations is not a fundamental aim of case study research (Bryman 2016, p.64; George and Bennett 2005). The purpose is, instead, an in-depth study of one or more cases, and incisive theoretical analysis where any theoretical arguments subsequently made are supported by the data (Bryman 2016, p.64). However, the importance of building a strong theoretical aspect to the research thus becomes crucial. As Yin (2003) argues, case studies may not be generalisable to populations, but can be generalisable along theoretical lines (p.4). This research draws theoretical conclusions around EU external governance and how it is received in West African states. In addition, while acknowledging that external validity is an important part of research and knowledge production, it is not the only ideal of research: knowledge contributions are made even when their generalisability is limited. My decision to conduct a study with multiple cases also, I argue, mitigates this criticism.

Additionally, a critique of multiple case study research is that the researcher pays less attention to the specific context and more attention to the ways in which the cases can be contrasted (Dyer & Wilkins 1991). Accordingly, the need to forge comparisons means that the researcher has a specific focus from the outset. I have limited the comparative angle throughout this research, in part to mitigate the above concern, and partly because there are important limitations to note when comparing Senegal and Ghana as case studies. While they have some broad similarities in terms of levels of development, the two countries have differences in their colonial histories and post-independence trajectories that signify that any comparative claims must be made with due caution, and in some cases are best avoided altogether. Senegal's attachment to the francophone economic bloc of UEMOA is a case in point, where it shares ties and a common currency with other francophone countries in the region that Ghana does not. France's exertion of control over its former colonies, including Senegal, take the form of monetary and political influence that is largely absent from the UK's ties with Ghana as a Commonwealth member (Gegout 2017; O'Brien 1979). Furthermore, Ghana's stated intention to move 'Beyond Aid' (Financial Times 2018) places it on a

political trajectory that is comparable to Nigeria, but distinct from Senegal. I use these examples to illustrate my choice to keep comparisons between Senegal and Ghana specific, rather than general; the aim of having two case studies has been to allow greater insight into the extent of EU externalisation in different scenarios, and to add richness to the findings.

3.2.2 The case study countries: Ghana and Senegal

This section discusses the methodological rationale for the selection of my case studies. As detailed above, my research is inductive in the sense that my hypotheses have derived from the research conducted, as is typical of an exploratory approach. At the same time, the selection of my case studies is guided by inferences on key similarities and differences drawn from theoretical and empirical contributions to the literature.

My research focuses on the West Africa region where my choice of region is explained by several factors. Firstly, as discussed in Chapters 2 and 5, the EU has increasingly engaged with Sub-Saharan African states, and therein West Africa as a priority region, for enhanced dialogue on migration management. West African countries are overwhelmingly represented in the 'priority countries' selected by the EU in the new Partnership Framework for enhanced cooperation, as well as being among the main recipients of funding for migration related projects under the EUTF (EC 2016c). West Africa therefore represents a political priority to the EU, and makes the selection of case studies from this region highly relevant when analysing the scope of EU externalisation in third countries. There has been considerable interaction between Europe and West Africa, more so than between Europe and other sub-Saharan African regions (Van Criekinge 2009, p.23). As my research intends to look at policy level interactions, the existence of a recent historical tradition in dialogue between the two regions in development cooperation and other areas also makes the West African region a logical choice.

The geographical proximity of West Africa to Europe (in comparison to other sub-Saharan African regions) further supports the existence of these ties and my selection of region. Finally, and rather crucially, while most extra-continental migration once originated in North Africa, recent decades have seen West Africa become a major region of origin of migrants to Europe (Flahaux & De Haas 2016). This makes it both a politically relevant choice of region, as it is likely to remain a focal point of EU efforts to externalise its migration agenda, as well as a relevant case for researching the dynamics of policy cooperation and governance, and African actors' agency therein.

The empirical research for this study was conducted in Brussels, Dakar and Accra between September 2017 and March 2018. Data collection methods included documentary research, semi-structured interviews and, to a more limited extent, participant observation. Datasets from Eurostat were used to generate descriptive statistics on the topic of returns and readmission and to chart a 'rate of return', informing part of the analysis of Chapter 6.

Document research

Documents used in this research are policy documents of the EU such as official communications published by the European Commission for the attention of the Council; but also a variety of other documents relating to policy or project implementation published by international organisations, national governments, and civil society organisations, including Ghanaian and Senegalese ministries, the ICMPD, the IOM and other UN agencies. The use of documents is useful in gaining insight into the substance of political discourse and narratives. Many documents are in the public domain and were easily accessed through the internet. Other documents were obtained in the field (an example is the Senegalese National Migration Policy, which is at present not available online). Documents are easy to produce, which explains their abundance – a caveat to note is that most documents used over the course of this research were produced by European and international institutions, while documents produced by domestic and local actors in Senegal and Ghana are far fewer in number.

There are disadvantages to using documents that I acknowledge here and that were kept in mind during the analysis process: namely, as MacDonald (2008) states, that 'documents which are intended to be read as objective statements of fact are also socially produced' (p.196). This refers to the notion that documents are often representations of the cultural, political and social environment in which they are produced. Silverman (2006) discusses how in the case of both documents and interviews, the linguistic character plays an important role: the language used is intertwined with cultural and political conceptualisation, which will influence the outcome of the written document and the interpretation of the reader alike. Ethnographers perceive documents as 'social facts' (constructions) of a version of reality: as such, they have to be treated in a manner that recognises what they are, and especially what they seek to accomplish (Silverman 2006, p.169). May (2001) similarly points out that it is important to see documents not as self-evident, but rather as part of the ways in which 'truth' is produced (p.178). It is therefore relevant to reflect upon what is 'constructed' within the document, but also what has been omitted. However, given that an increasingly large amount of data is available in modern societies in the form of

documents, documentary research has become even more relevant. Documents are useful in gaining insight into past events and they can illustrate ways in which the present came about (May 2001). My use of documents has also been important in triangulation, an 'essential check' in research (Gilchrist & Williams 1999, p. 82): documents have enabled a means of comparison with observations derived from the other research methods listed below.

Interviews

Fifty-two semi-structured interviews were conducted with officials working at EU institutions and agencies; the EU Delegations in Dakar and Accra; Senegalese and Ghanaian civil servants; EU project implementers (both in field offices and in Brussels); civil society organisations and representatives of migrant associations; EU Member State diplomats; and Senegalese and Ghanaian epistemic communities. Interviewee selection was purposeful, where interviewees were selected against the criteria of being involved (or having been involved previously) in a professional capacity in EU-African migration cooperation, or on development projects relating to migration or migrants. A combination of snowball sampling and criterion sampling was therefore used: in addition to the profile criteria, I asked interviewees to propose other possible participants from their own personal and/or professional networks. I would make this enquiry after the interview, as it was more likely that some rapport and trust had been established.

A central aim of the selection process was to have a representation of viewpoints from the key government ministries who deal with migration (the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) but to also gather perspectives from wider policy communities: other migration policy researchers or practitioners whose role is more commonly overlooked in the existing literature, as a focus on security and law enforcement (and actors involved therein) often prevails.[15] As such, efforts were made to secure interviews with civil servants at other ministries dealing with aspects of migration, migration scholars in Senegal and Ghana, and government-contracted consultants.

I opted for semi-structured interviews, where I could adapt questions throughout the interview, although the interview was in all cases guided by a set of pre-determined questions.[16] This type of interview structure offers greater flexibility whereby issues or trends unforeseen by the

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[15] I employ the term 'policy community' in the same sense as Kingdon (1995): a community composed of specialists in a policy area, 'scattered both through and outside of government' (p.117) including government ministerial and agency officials but also academics, consultants and analysts for interest groups.
[16] The interview guides are included as an appendix in this thesis.

interviewer may still arise; at the same time, it allows for a degree of comparative analysis in the interview data that couldn't be achieved with an unstructured approach (Hammett *et al.* 2015, p. 141). In all cases, I would end the interview with an open-ended question that invited the interviewee to raise anything that they believed to be pertinent but that had not yet been discussed. In many cases, this revealed information that had not occurred to me, allowed the interviewee to elaborate on a specific point, or allowed the reiteration of a point that would suggest a topic of particular significance in the interviewees' view.

To gain access to Senegalese and Ghanaian government officials, it was necessary to request formal top-down permission to conduct research within the government ministries.[17] The use of an introduction letter detailing my research aims and featuring a link to my departmental profile at my university enabled me to gain access to initial points of contact as well as my first interviewees, who would then introduce me to other research participants within the ministry or agency. A notable disadvantage is that it is not possible to entirely exclude the possibility of bias being introduced as my interviewees within the Senegalese and Ghanaian ministries were in many cases preselected, often by senior officials in a top-down fashion. Permission to conduct interviews in ministries was always limited to the ministry in question: separate requests had to be made by letter to each ministry. In one case, when seeking access to the Ghana Immigration Service, I was informed that my application requesting permission to the Ministry of Interior (of which GIS is a part of) was insufficient, and was advised to relaunch my request with the GIS directly. These obstacles proved time-consuming, although they were often not insurmountable. In addition, once I had secured access within a ministry, I was able to assure participants that I had obtained formal permission, and they were more inclined to introduce me to further participants. The vast majority of my interviews were conducted in person; a small number were conducted by Skype on my return from the field.

Appointments with officials in Dakar and Accra were secured primarily by phone and frequently with the assistance of secretarial and support staff, with emails being notably more likely to fail to deliver or to be ignored. For interviews conducted in Brussels, email generally proved effective as a means of securing participation, where non-responses were followed up by a subsequent email, and eventually a phone call. The directory of staff of the EU institutions, which holds contact details of officials, proved a good initial resource in establishing relevant contacts. My own

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[17] When planning my field research, I spoke to a female academic researcher who had conducted research in Senegal on the practicalities of collecting data, who informed me this had certainly been the case for her fieldwork conducted a few years earlier.

personal contacts were useful in establishing some connections, given my former affiliation working as a consultant within the European Commission. My former head of unit was able to put me in touch with one of my interviewees in Brussels who had a long-term perspective on EU migration policy, having been active in that area for many years. A former colleague of mine had also since relocated to the EU Delegation in Dakar, and was able to inform me about relevant structures of the Senegalese government to contact, as well as putting me in touch with several of his colleagues within the Delegation who then participated in my research.

A challenge that emerged in a select few interviews conducted in Brussels was interviewees' suspicion of researchers, and concerns around how the collected data would be used. Participants mentioned, among other points, the numerous requests for interviews received from researchers suggesting an element of participants' fatigue. In one case, a participant at DG DEVCO cited the example of his team having participated in interviews as part of a research project in good faith, where the subsequent report published made scathing criticisms that were felt to have somewhat deliberately misconstrued the team's accounts.[18] While this suspicion of researchers was by no means universal across my interviewees in Brussels, it remains important to note; it forms a possible constraint as participants may have engaged with a degree of reticence.

I prepared a participants' information sheet in English and French that I shared with participants – where possible, this would be shared prior to the interview by email and allowed the interviewee time to read the document at their leisure. The information sheet was a concise document that contained my research aims, information on how data collected would be used and stored, details of the interview process itself (including the maximum duration, the possibility of declining to record the interview or opting out of answering questions) and contact details for myself and my university department. Clarifying these details was important in gaining access and providing ethical assurances to participants.

Interviews were conducted in English in Brussels and in Ghana; interviews in Senegal were conducted in French. Bryman (2016) notes that cross-cultural research is 'not without problems' (p.65).[19] Where possible, interviews were recorded; when permission to record was not obtained, I would take detailed notes during the interview. The decision of when to record became a considered one as my data collection progressed. In explaining the interview process to participants, I explained that recording ensured that the data produced was accurate in a way that

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[18] Interview 11, DG DEVCO. Brussels, 18 September 2017.
[19] I discuss cross-cultural challenges encountered in the 'positionality' section of this chapter.

could not be guaranteed with field notes. However, I learned that in some cases participants would agree to the recording but would not engage with the questions in the way I had hoped; opting to record may have limited the potential of the interview in these instances. When I discovered this, I ensured that participants understood that declining recording was a valid option and that the participant should choose the option that they felt most comfortable with. Ultimately, 60% of interviews conducted were recorded (see Annex I – list of interviews).

The stages of data collection and data analysis overlapped, where I used my fieldnotes to begin the process of generating theory that is entailed with an inductive approach: as Eisenhardt (1989) noted, fieldnotes as a 'running commentary to oneself' are important in achieving this overlap. Interviews were transcribed – where practical, in the field, and otherwise immediately after my return from the field – and subsequently coded using qualitative analysis software Atlas Ti. A thematic coding analysis approach (Robson & McCartan 2016, pp. 467–470) was used inductively: codes were not pre-determined but generated directly from the data in an initial round of coding, with codes revised and grouped into a smaller number of themes in secondary coding. The software's 'network' function was used as a tool to map and visualise patterns, themes and trends in the data, and to aid analysis.

Participant observation

The final data collection method that was used was participant observation. This research method is used to generally observe events and activities that relate to the research topic. I participated in three events (the events can be found in the table below) as an overt researcher, where my participation was facilitated by invitation, and where my identity and status as a researcher was made known to those I interacted with.

Using this method allowed me the opportunity to observe interactions, activities and discussions, without influencing the nature of interactions to the extent that this occurs within an interview or focus group. This had the necessary trade-off that soliciting accounts through asking questions was not always made possible due to the specificity of the situation or event (Hammersley & Atkinson 1983, p. 108). A strength of this research method was that I was able to observe interactions and dynamics between stakeholders, such as in the workshop for civil society-government stakeholders that I observed in Dakar in November 2017. I took extensive notes and wrote down observations during and directly after the observed event.

Table 3.1: Overview of fieldwork

TIME PERIOD	LOCATION (PRIMARY)	ORGANISATION
September 2017	Brussels, Belgium	EU officials: European Commission, EEAS; IOM Brussels; ICMPD Brussels
October-November 2017	Dakar, Senegal	Government officials: ministries and agencies; EU development organisations; EU Delegations; NGOs; epistemic communities; IOM country office
January-February 2018	Accra, Ghana	Government officials: ministries and agencies; EU development organisations; EU Delegations; NGOs; epistemic communities; IOM country office; migrants' association

Table 3.2: Interviews by institution

LOCATION	ORGANISATION		NO. OF INTERVIEWS
Brussels	European Commission		
		DG DEVCO	7
		DG HOME	1
		DG JRC	1
	EEAS		2
	EU Member State - Ministry of Foreign Affairs		1
	ICMPD		1
	IOM		1
Senegal	Government departments, ministries and agencies		
		ADEPME	1
		MAESE (Diplomatic)	4
		MAESE (DGSE)	4
		DPAF	1
		Ministry of Labour	1
	EU Delegation		3
	IOM		2
	European NGO		2
	Senegalese development organisation		2
	Academic institution		1
Ghana	Government departments, ministries and agencies		
		GIS	1
		MoFARI	3
		Labour and Employment	1

	Ministry of Interior	1
	Ministry of Justice	1
	Diaspora Bureau	1
EU Delegation		1
Academic institution		3
IOM		2
European NGO		1
Migrants' association		1
Ghanaian development organisation		1

Table 3.3: Participant observation events

DATE	LOCATION	EVENT/DETAILS
12-16 November 2017	Tambacounda and Velingara, Senegal	Participation in EUTF project launch events conducted by the EU Delegation in Tambacounda and Velingara. EUTF project *Développer l'emploi au Sénégal* ('Boosting employment in Senegal').
21 November 2017	Dakar, Senegal	Government-civil society stakeholder meeting on key challenges in migration governance.
21 November 2017	Dakar, Senegal	Participation in conference hosted by Italian development cooperation in Dakar: *Choisir en toute connaissance : Programme sous régional sur la migration irrégulière de la Coopération italienne : Les leçons apprises* ('Making informed choices: Italian cooperation sub-regional programme on irregular migration: lessons learned').

3.2.3 Positionality

I will conclude this methodology section with a brief reflection on the role of research, starting with the assertion by Hammett *et al.* (2015) that 'engaged scholarship' is a social responsibility (p.22), a reflection on the collaborative process of research. I therefore strove to be as transparent as possible when dealing with research participants, while the semi-structured nature of my interviews enabled participants some scope to shape the interview process, and to express what they felt was important. My research methods described above were formed considering how participants are to be included in the conduct of research, and in the sharing of findings (Hammett *et al.* 2015, p.22). This was done not only to ensure a robust and sensitive research design and

practice, but also to ensure that findings are relevant and accessible to participants and wider stakeholders.

I use this final section to discuss my positionality as a researcher, which refers to one's own conditions of knowledge production such as social situation, gender and class. Positionality indirectly affects research and can include perception of affluence or privilege (which may create a power imbalance); a perception of relative influence (as a University researcher); one's cultural upbringing which may lead to an unfamiliarity with local practices; and one's national and ethnic identity.

As a white European researcher, my ethnicity and nationality were unremarkable in Brussels. This, combined with the familiar and established presence of both researchers and policy analysts in the city – given the numerous think tanks based there – meant that I was able to blend in fairly easily. As a researcher from a well-known and respected university, I was under the distinct impression in many instances that the 'brand' of my university opened doors. In one instance, a participant in Brussels asked about the 'experience' of being at Cambridge and was eager to hear my views in relation to his son's interest in applying to Cambridge for an undergraduate course. It is equally not uncommon for Ghanaians to pursue graduate study at UK universities, as was the case for two of my interviewees in Accra, who had studied at Leeds and Oxford respectively, and meant that some familiarity with my institution could be inferred, as well as serving as a conversational ice-breaker before the interviews. In addition, my status as a Dutch national meant that my national identity was possibly viewed more neutrally than if I had been, for example, a French researcher in Senegal. My speaking of French as a second language, while of a high standard, meant that my interviewees in Senegal often had a minor linguistic advantage over me, which may in turn have counteracted some of the power imbalance that exists between the researcher and the interviewee. As a female researcher, I felt that my gender also meant that I was perceived as innocuous to many that I interviewed, while I was also younger than many of my research participants.

Perceptions of relative privilege may have an effect on participants in an interview setting. Conducting my interviewees primarily with elites meant that in most cases, my relative affluence or privilege over my interviewees, as an early-career academic and PhD student, was limited or non-existent. Many (though, not all) of the government officials I spoke to had managerial or director roles, or were in other positions of seniority within the civil service or diplomatic service. Some of my interviewees within Senegalese and Ghanaian ministries had acquired transnational

experiences, having spent part of their careers in Europe or the US, or they had travelled extensively in Europe[20]; many of my interviewees equally had postgraduate degrees and were at least somewhat familiar with the research process that I was conducting. In one case, one of my Ghanaian ministerial interviewees had done his PhD on EU-ACP relations, and was inherently familiar both with aspects of the research topics my own work deals with, as well as of the PhD process. Where my interviewees' roles included more technical aspects of managing public projects or funds, or in the case of desk officers, relative privilege was more comparable to my own – a caveat to note is that my status as a researcher conducting extensive fieldwork and enjoying different cultural experiences may still have created a perception of imbalance, as both access to and opportunities for international travel for Senegalese and Ghanaian citizens is limited compared to many EU Member State nationals.

While my positionality meant that I was able to navigate access to interviewees in Brussels fairly effectively, I found that my lack of familiarity with different working practices in Senegal and Ghana formed an obstacle, especially in the early stages of my fieldwork. Having found that communication by email was an accepted norm in Brussels, I was not wholly prepared for email to be such an ineffective means of communication in Accra and Dakar. Pinning down appointments to a specific time also proved more challenging, and on more than one occasion I waited in government offices for lengthy periods of time in order to be seen. I found that in both Senegal and Ghana several interviewees preferred the spontaneity of a meeting, while being comparatively more reluctant to commit to a specified appointment. Navigating different cultural practices meant adapting my methods of accessing participants: I was more persistent in following up with calls in Dakar and Accra to secure access, whereas doing so in Brussels was not only largely unnecessary but may also have been considered inappropriate.

3.2.4 Limitations

My research, which applied the non-random sampling method described above, was conducted primarily with elites. The reason for conducting elite interviews is that my research topic and question necessitate targeting my interviews at a specific group of experts and holders of social knowledge; namely, policy-makers. Yet it is important to acknowledge that interviewing 'experts' has been shown to have very specific disadvantages. There is the problem of accessing elites, as highlighted by Hammett *et al.* (2015) and Harvey (2010), whereby access can often hinge on

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[20] This was certainly the case for Interviews 29, 38 and 43 and may also apply to other interviewees.

gatekeepers and the researcher's personal contacts. It is suggested to pursue multiple avenues of access simultaneously to mitigate this (Harvey 2010, p.8). Another concern is that experts are often, in turn, experts at being interviewed, which may have an undesired impact on the responses given. Miles and Huberman (1984) in turn note that one is more likely to be influenced by elite respondents and be more inclined to '[overweigh] data from articulate, well-informed, usually high-status informants' (p.263). It can only be said that I have taken note of this as a risk, and conducted my analysis with this in mind.

The nature of this research has been to examine policy making and interactions between actors involved in governance. I have taken measures to include a broad range of actors in my research, including not only policy makers but also civil society representatives – international and local – and project implementers. It is important to note what this research is not: it does not include the views of migrants directly, as doing so would have broadened the scope of this research project beyond the boundaries of the research questions. Equally, while bilateral interactions between the case study countries and EU Member States still form an important channel of cooperation, there are no interviews with EU Member State officials included in this project, with the exception of one interviewee whom I interviewed in the context of his role as chair of the Rabat Process. Otherwise, observations that relate to either of these groups were obtained indirectly in my interactions with other stakeholders. These limitations can only be acknowledged, and their reasons explained as above.

3.3 Background of the case studies

The focus turns now to an overview of both the economic and the historical context of the two case studies, in which the analysis of this thesis is to be understood. Senegal and Ghana have common points in their historical trajectories as former colonies, as well as in their post-colonial development and their experiences with migration; but their trajectories also have important distinctions.

Both Senegal and Ghana are developing, low-income countries but have a solid record in achieving political and economic reform, maintaining political stability in a region otherwise characterised by various conflicts, and promoting good governance and democracy (World Bank 2017a, 2017b). They are considered to be relative success stories in international development, and both have been preferred recipients of international aid (OECD 2019, p.7). Both countries are active in regional dialogue platforms. In the case of EU-West African migration dialogue, Ghana and Senegal

are both members of the Rabat Process – a dialogue platform for the West African region. The image below depicts Senegal and Ghana in the region.

Figure 3.1: Map of West Africa.

However, both countries show evidence of constraints to their development: Senegal and Ghana remain largely aid-dependent, have small export markets concentrated mainly in specific agricultural and service sectors, and have ongoing social policy challenges such as poverty and

income inequality (World Bank 2017a; World Bank 2017b). Ghana's position on the Human Development Index (HDI) was 142 out of 189 countries in 2018, putting the country in the medium human development category (UNDP 2019a). Senegal scores lower, at HDI position 166 in the same year, and is considered to be in a low human development category (UNDP 2019b). Between 1990-2018, life expectancy at birth increased by 10.5 years in Senegal to reach 67.7 years in 2018; in the same time frame, life expectancy in Ghana increased by 7 years and was recorded at 63.8 years in 2018 (UNDP 2019a, 2019b). In education indicators, average years of schooling attained in Ghana exceed those attained in Senegal, at 7.2 years and 3.1 years of schooling in 2018 respectively (*ibid.*). While a lack of reliable data means that statistics on migration flows should be treated with caution, it has been shown that both Senegal and Ghana are among the largest contributors of migratory flows to Europe, next to Nigeria (De Haas 2008a). In addition, both countries have a history as migrant-*receiving* nations, given their relative affluence in the region. I expand on individual characteristics below.

Today, Ghana's economy is largely dependent on key exports such as cocoa, timber and gold; in the last decade its service sector has also burgeoned considerably (World Bank 2017a). The discovery of oil in commercial quantities off the coast of Ghana in 2007 has meant that crude oil has also become one of the country's main exports since 2011 (United Nations Statistics Division 2013a). Between 2005 and 2010 Ghana's GDP growth rate averaged just over 7%, however this shrunk to 4% in 2014 following an economic setback that occurred in 2013 and which was linked to a growing public deficit, high inflation, and a weakening currency (*ibid*). Ghana's growth rate has since shrunk and resulted in the country seeking a bailout from the International Monetary Fund. While poverty rates have been falling, the World Bank estimates that in 2015 a quarter of the Ghanaian population was still living on or below the poverty line (considered to be 1.90 USD/day), while inequality was still high with 48.6% of income going to the richest 20% of the population, and 5.2% of income going to the poorest 20% of the population (World Bank, 2017a). This makes it fairly typical for the region, where income distribution in many other West African countries is similarly skewed (*ibid*). A recent estimate notes that around 70% of Ghana's international migrants reside in other ECOWAS Member States (Devillard *et al.* 2015, p.165). Migration to OECD countries remains therefore a comparatively small – although not insignificant – phenomenon.

In recent times, Senegal's GDP growth rate has remained comparatively small but steady at a 4.7% average annual increase between 2005 and 2014 (United Nations Statistics Division 2013b). At the

same time, its GDP per capita has remained consistently lower than Ghana's since 2011 (see table 3.4). The present-day economy is based mainly on agriculture – where key agricultural exports include fish and groundnut oil – and migrant remittances, which has become a key source of revenue. Data shows that Senegal has been running a considerable trade deficit where the value of exports regularly exceeds imports by a fair margin (UN Statistics Division 2013b). Inequality in distribution of income is similar to Ghana's, with 46.9% of income going to the richest 20% of the population in 2010, and no significant improvements made in this trend since 1995 (World Bank 2017b).

Table 3.5: Total population (millions) - 1990-2018

Source: UNDESA (2019).

Table 3.4: GDP per capita in Senegal and Ghana 2009-2018

Source: World Bank national accounts data (World Bank 2019).

Table 3.5: ODA received 2015-2017 (in USD million)

Source: OECD statistics by region (OECD 2019).

Regional governance

Both Senegal and Ghana are ECOWAS member states, an important regional institution that promotes integration and the facilitation of free movement. Under the ECOWAS protocol on the free movement of persons that came into effect in 1979, citizens of ECOWAS Member States can move freely to other ECOWAS states for a period of up to 90 days without requiring a visa or an

entry permit. The protocol furthermore details that such travel must be undertaken with a valid travel document and an international health certificate (Part III, Article 3). With the aim of advancing regional integration, ECOWAS States agreed in 1979 to the reduction in the number of checkpoints, and the simplification of administrative procedures at border posts (Adepoju 2009; Coderre 2018). The regional agenda can be seen to have promoted free movement of persons as the early cornerstone of a West African migration policy. However, numerous studies have highlighted that the implementation of the 1979 ECOWAS protocol has been fraught with challenges, including reports of: harassment and demands for bribes from border officials at border crossings; discrimination and refusal of admission for arbitrary reasons; a lack of harmonised immigration procedures and documents; and a limited knowledge among immigration officials and the general public about the ECOWAS free movement protocol (Adepoju 2005; Awumbila *et al.* 2018; Teye *et al.* 2015).

3.3.1 Migration in the region

Migration governance initiatives exported by external actors to West African countries are not received in a vacuum. They are, instead, confronted with historical legacies, with the historical conceptualisation of space in the West African context (where this conceptualisation is distinct from the European one), and with existing migratory practices and understandings in the region. Contextualising migration policies within processes and histories such as colonial experiences and postcolonial state formation, nation-building, development histories and structural dependency has not been regularly or systematically done in theories of migration that have emerged largely from the Global North (Adamson & Tsourapas 2019). I explore migration practices in the region before, during and after the colonial period in the following section.

Pre-colonial and colonial eras

As a practice, migration has a longstanding history in the West African region. The pre-colonial practice of migration established trans-Saharan trade and migration routes, connecting sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa and resulting in the establishment of sub-Saharan African populations in North Africa (Bakewell *et al.* 2009, p.7). From the 6th century to the early 1900s, a fluid system of circulation linked North Africa to the coast of the Gulf of Guinea, where mobile markets featured as links in this chain of commerce (Walther & Retaillé 2008, pp.111-112). Migration for trade and commerce in the pre-colonial era was a particularly important strategy in the Sahel for the management of uncertainty (*ibid.*). Critical studies in geography have placed migration flows in the West African sub-region within this historical context and highlight that,

rather than being the historical *exception*, migration has been the norm (Lima 2013; Schofberger 2019). Pre-colonial movements were undertaken by West Africans for reasons as diverse as pastoralism, commerce, the pursuit of employment, and evangelisation; or in response to natural disasters and warfare (Adepoju 1995, p.89). Migration thus has a long tradition as a crucial livelihood strategy in the region, such as in times of periodical extreme drought (Walther & Retaillé 2008, p.109). For instance, as Awumbila *et al* (2013) point out, traders of foreign origin were already well established in market centres both in the north of Ghana and in Kumasi before the colonial era (p.7).

In the experience of many African regions, the delineation of fixed borders was only introduced during colonial rule (Walther & Retaillé 2008). Borders were drawn arbitrarily, not always following permanent geographical features or reflecting sociocultural realities on the ground, whereby ethnic groups found themselves spanning international boundaries – this is the case for instance for the Ewes in Togo and Ghana, and the Yoruba in Nigeria and Benin (Adepoju 2005, p.3). Due to the arbitrariness of borders established in the colonial period, there is also complementarity between economies of neighbouring countries and cultural affinity, such as common languages and common customs between ethnic groups across these boundaries. European colonisation led therefore both to the construction of 'modern nations' in the continent, and introduced a distinction between 'internal' and 'international' migration, something that pre-colonial African institutions did not emphasise (Akin Aina 1995, p.41). As Adepoju notes: migrants in West Africa have 'always considered most parts of the region as a free zone within which people moved freely' (Adepoju 1995, p.89). As I also noted in Chapter 2, ideals surrounding the formal and explicit management of borders and European 'solid border' norms are specific to Westphalian notions of the nation state and territoriality (Little 2007; Schofberger 2019; Waltz 1979).

Colonial regimes altered migration patterns and its motivations by stimulating patterns of African labour migration towards, mainly, Ghana, Nigeria and Côte d'Ivoire (Adepoju 2005; Bakewell *et al.* 2009, p.8). Migrants from predominantly landlocked countries (for instance the Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso), Mali, Niger and Chad) were both forcibly recruited and offered wages to work on the cocoa farms of the Gold Coast (Ghana), the plantations of Côte d'Ivoire, and the groundnut fields of Senegal (Adepoju 1995, p.90). Transportation systems were developed to streamline labour migration. Migration patterns based initially on colonial systems of forced labour would eventually become institutionalised into regular migration in several African countries (*ibid.*). The

functioning and indeed the profitability of the colonial state was dependent on this system that drew on the continuous circular migration of Africans (Bakewell 2008, p.1344). At the same time, colonial administrators were keen to ensure that labour migrants did not settle permanently (*ibid.*). Efforts to control African mobility thus date back to the colonial era, where colonial systems of tax collection and law imposition were predicated on a good understanding of 'who was where' (Bakewell 2008, p. 1344; see also Andersson 2010, p.44). Rural-to-urban migration also continued to expand rapidly during colonialism, a phenomenon that colonialists attempted to limit (with little success) (Bakewell *et al.* 2009, p.8). The control of urban growth remained an urgent policy concern, with development aid programmes focusing on development of rural areas as a counter measure (Bakewell 2008).

It is important to make a distinction between both the type of colonial rule experienced by Senegal and Ghana, as well as the different relationships the two former colonies have with France and the UK respectively. Writers on colonialism in Africa have frequently distinguished between British 'indirect' and French 'direct' rule (Crowder 1969; Klein 1979) over colonies. The French colonial regime in Senegal remained largely external to the societies governed, where chiefs were recruited from traditional ruling families and served merely as functionaries in the colonial regime, possessing little autonomy (Klein 1979, p.73). The British colonial regime in what was then the Gold Coast was a system of indirect rule defined by Crowder (1969) as 'colonial powers governing their African subjects through their own [traditional] political institutions' (p.166; see also Gocking 1994). The UK also did not sustain its links with its former African colonies to the same extent as France, an outcome Gegout (2017) ascribes to weaker geo-strategic and economic interests in Africa (p.81). Senegal's relationship with its former colonial power, France, differs in some important regards from Ghana's relationship with the UK as a member of the Commonwealth. Senegal's currency – the West African CFA franc – is shared with a number of other countries in the region. The pegging of the CFA to the French franc (and now the euro), together with other monetary policies intended to foster economic integration among French colonies, have meant that France exerts a level of fiscal, economic and therefore political control over its former colonies in the region, including Senegal (Gegout 2017; O'Brien 1979; Sylla 2017).

Post-colonial trajectories

Following independence, the trend of labour migration to the relatively prosperous countries in the region continued, as Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire continued to attract large numbers of migrants from the region in the late 1950s and 1960s. Migration flows became increasingly international –

yet international flows were, and remain, proportionally much less important than intra-regional migration (Black *et al.* 2003; Kabbanji 2017, p.97). Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire and – by the 1970s – Nigeria were major migrant-receiving nations, buoyed by their economies, while countries such as Burkina Faso, Mali, Togo and Cape Verde remained labour exporting countries (Adepoju 2005). Senegal was both a migrant-receiving and a labour exporting nation (*ibid.*, p.2). Shifting economic and political conditions engendered changes whereby both Senegal and Ghana would become countries of emigration.

Ghana

Ghana gained its independence in 1957, making it the first sub-Saharan African country to gain independence from European colonial rule. The country's relative affluence after its independence in 1957 ensured that it remained an attractive place for migrants: in particular, the development of industry and associated employment opportunities with higher wages, induced both rural to urban internal migration as well as sub-regional migration to Ghana's urban centres (Awumbila *et al.* 2008, p.7). In the spirit of pan-Africanism that formed part of the ideological orientation of the Convention Peoples Party, the independent Ghanaian state was also 'conscious of her role in the independence of the rest of Africa' and explicitly welcomed immigrants from the region (Awumbila *et al.* 2008, p.7; Bakewell *et al.* 2009). This culture of openness to immigration was not to last. The Ghanaian government under prime minister Busia introduced the Aliens' Compliance Order in 1969 which resulted in the mass expulsion of undocumented immigrants in Ghana shortly afterwards: citizens of Nigeria, Togo, Benin were among those affected by the expulsions, with estimations that up to half a million were expelled (Adepoju 1983, 1984; Awumbila *et al.* 2008; Peil 1971). The reasons given for the expulsions of 1969 include the scapegoating of immigrants for a deteriorating economic situation (Bakewell *et al.* 2009). It is worth noting that the expulsion of immigrants was not unique to Ghana, as other African countries practiced this at the time – Senegal, for instance, had expelled Guineans in 1967 (Adepoju 1983). Yet, the Ghanaian expulsions were larger in scale than those that had taken place elsewhere in West Africa (Peil 1971, p.207).

The expulsions coincided with the period of large-scale emigration that began in the 1970s and 1980s. Awumbila *et al.* (2008) ascribe a series of political developments and non-continuity of policies as responsible for an economic downturn in Ghana that subsequently instigated a rise in emigration (p.9). In the 1970s and early 1980s, Ghanaians largely emigrated to other African countries both in the region (Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire) but also to countries in other African regions

(Uganda, Botswana and Zambia) (Bakewell *et al.* 2009). From the mid-1980s, migration destinations of Ghanaians diversified as Ghanaians increasingly emigrated to destinations in Europe and North America (Anarfi *et al.* 2003; van Hear 1998). International migration thereafter became established as a strategy for dealing with economic and social challenges in the home country. While migration from Ghana to OECD countries is predominantly oriented towards the UK and the US, the Ghanaian community has grown in Italy, Spain and the Netherlands (de Haas 2008a, p.30). Since the 1990s, the migration of Ghanaians is characterised by their 'diasporisation' (Anarfi *et al.* 2003, p.8). Ghanaians have moved in large numbers to cities such as London, Amsterdam, Hamburg and New York, yet often retain links with their communities of origin (Black *et al.* 2003). Ghana has also grappled with the emigration of its health professionals, which became the subject of recurrent discussions around 'brain drain' in the 1980s and 1990s (Anarfi *et al.* 2003, p.28). Mensah *et al.* (2005) note that the number of Ghanaian-trained doctors in the UK doubled between 1999 and 2004, where they estimate that over half of doctors trained in Ghana have migrated abroad (*ibid.*, p.14). This accounts for the interest of successive Ghanaian governments since the early 1990s in pursuing return migration policies, with the ultimate objective to attract skilled Ghanaians residing abroad (*ibid,* p.17). Similar efforts have been made to tap into the potential and skills of the Ghanaian diaspora to recruit these as agents in the development of their home country.

Ghanaian emigration includes both regular and irregular migration, where migrants range from low-skilled to highly skilled in a fairly proportionate distribution of skill levels (van Criekinge 2010, p.7). Irregular migrants are more often low-skilled, using migration land routes via Morocco and Libya to reach Italy or Malta, or from the West African coast to the Canaries (*ibid.*). As de Haas (2008a) notes, in both the case of Ghanaian and Senegalese irregular migrants in Spain and Italy, a greater proportion are over-stayers compared to those who entered illegally (p.19).

Senegal

Senegal won its independence from French colonial rule in 1960. As I mentioned, the groundnut industry had made Senegal a country of immigration, drawing migrant labour from the wider region. In the 1950s and following independence, Senegalese could enter France if in possession of an identity card or passport, vaccination certificates, and 1500 francs as a guarantee-of-return (Cross 2013). French immigration policy towards Senegal became more restrictive as of the 1970s. In 1985, France introduced a compulsory visa for Senegal, whereby Senegalese migration to Europe diversified and Italy, Spain and Germany became more prominent destinations for

Senegalese migrants (Riccio & Uberti 2013, p.215). In this time period, Senegalese-French cooperation in migration increasingly focused on the (voluntary) return of Senegalese workers living in France, whereby in 1983 the position of Minister in charge of Senegalese living abroad was created (Toma 2018). This heralded the start of an official capacity within the Senegalese government to coordinate the social and economic reintegration of returnees. In 1987, with French financial support, the *Bureaux d'Accueil et d'Orientation des Sénégalais de l'Extérieur* (BAOS) were created: information offices at points of entry into the country that would provide reintegration advice to returnees (Toma 2018, p.96). Diaspora engagement now forms a key policy interest in migration: the government aims to develop diaspora engagement opportunities and involve the Senegalese diaspora more closely in the development of the country (van Criekinge 2009, p.227).

Senegal implemented structural reforms with oversight from the Bretton Woods institutions from the late 1970s onwards, which brought very modest economic benefits and would have a negative social impact for years to come (Diop 2002, p.63). The period immediately after independence had seen the rapid 'Senegalisation' of the civil service as French administrators withdrew, and had brought with it considerable employment opportunities in the 1960s (O'Brien 1979, p.113). Structural adjustment programmes in Senegal in the 1970s led to the decline of civil service jobs, as well as the image of the state functionary as the symbol of success (Toma 2018, p.94; Willems 2013, p.321). The fall in the global price of groundnut oil was a blow to Senegalese economy and altered the country from an immigration nation to a nation largely of emigration after 1975 (Cross 2013). The devaluation of the currency, the CFA franc, in 1994 led to further reforms being adopted that accelerated the liberalisation of the economy (Diop 2002, p.67). Remittances from Senegalese migrants abroad gained in importance as a source of income with the onset of several factors as of 1994: the devaluation of the CFA franc, the hike in petrol prices, and the collapse of agricultural sectors (Cross 2013). These socioeconomic changes contributed to the creation of a migration 'culture' that generated continuous pressures on young men to emigrate as a rite of passage that was 'said to offer the migrant suitable distance from the family to gain autonomy and social status' (Cross 2013, p.49).

With the gradual closure of European borders and the enforcement of entry visas into France as of 1985 and Italy as of 1990, many Senegalese still continued to emigrate to countries such as France under family reunification visas and in other cases became over-stayers (*ibid*). New migratory routes continued to emerge, including the 'pirogue' migration projects – where

traditional fishing boats were used in the attempt to reach Europe through the towns of Ceuta and Melilla. As with Ghana, Senegal stands out as a country that has broken away from colonial migration patterns as Spain and Italy are among the major destinations for Senegalese migrants (de Haas 2008a, p.30). Contextually, these migration journeys sprang up against a backdrop of the hardening of border controls by European countries, the reduction of the public sector in Senegal, and the rising rate of unemployment (Riccio & Uberti 2013, p.215). 2006 marked a sharp peak in the number of pirogue journeys to Europe: 33,000 people crossed the sea, more than half of these Senegalese (*ibid.,* p.217). The phrase 'Barça mba barzakh' – Wolof for 'Barcelona or the Hereafter' – symbolised the determination exhibited by young Senegalese migrants to reach Spain, or otherwise die at sea (Willems 2013).

3.3.2 Bilateral agreements with EU Member States on migration

Cooperation between European states and West African states in postcolonial times has largely occurred in the context of bilateral relations. EU Member States have sought to obtain bilateral readmission agreements with Senegal, with France having the most comprehensive bilateral agreement that includes readmission but also facilitation of entry into the French labour market for a specified range of professions. Under the terms of the agreement, a Senegalese migrant found to be of irregular status in France can claim exceptional leave to stay if in possession of employment (or an offer thereof) within a list of predefined professions. He/she can also claim right to remain for reasons related to his/her personal or family life as stipulated in Article 3 of the agreement (Ministry of Interior of Senegal 2008).

Spain has established numerous migration cooperation frameworks and programmes with Senegal since 2006 – both formal and informal – primarily in the context of joint Spanish-Senegalese efforts focusing on border management capacity-building. This cooperation emerged largely in response to the 2006 'cayuco' crisis that saw a peak in irregular migration journeys from Senegal to, mainly, Spanish territory. A memorandum of understanding was signed in September 2006 on the commissioning of joint patrols of the Spanish *Guardia Civil* and the Senegalese Gendarmerie, in cooperation with FRONTEX, to tackle irregular departures from the Senegalese coastline. Other projects led by Spain have focused on the capacity building of national security forces in border control, on the training of border officers, and building networks of communication centres in order to identify and intercept suspect vessels (Enríquez *et al.* 2018, p.19). At the same time, Spain initiated temporary labour recruitment programmes for Senegalese

migrants to work in seasonal agricultural industries in Spain. Accordingly, since the entry of an agreement signed in 2007, Spanish firms have undertaken 'prospecting missions' to Senegal to directly recruit workers into seasonal agricultural and fishery jobs in Spain under temporary one-year visas (Panizzon 2010, p.17), while in other cases the selection process for such programmes was assigned to the Senegalese government counterparts. One such pilot scheme saw the recruitment of 749 Senegalese women to work on strawberry farms in Andalusia in 2008. The scheme was ultimately discredited due to a series of political and institutional failures including reports of bribery in the selection process of candidates resulting in candidates being put forward who had no experience of working in agriculture, the poor living and working conditions of programme participants in the Spanish agricultural sector, and the fact that many women went on to over-stay their visas (Enriquez *et al.* 2018; IDRC 2013). These multiple failures meant that Spanish-Senegalese labour recruitment schemes were discontinued.

Spanish-Senegalese cooperation has more explicitly emphasised border management, rather than education and training as in the case of the French-Senegalese bilateral agreement (Panizzon 2008; Toma 2014). Despite this, Spanish foreign policy towards Senegal has included 'Plan Africa'[21]: successive frameworks for cooperation with several countries in Africa that emphasise 'sustainable growth, peace, security, political stability' (Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2019, p.14). Within this framework, Senegal is considered one of five priority countries for Spanish cooperation and one with which Spain has an 'enhanced partnership' (*ibid*., p.11). Spain also has an agreement dating from 2006 with Senegal (entering into force in 2008) on the 'protection, repatriation and reintegration' of unaccompanied Senegalese minors (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Spain 2008). The agreement has come under criticism from Human Rights Watch with the latter arguing that the agreement lacks both transparency and safeguards to protect children's rights (Human Rights Watch 2008). Italy signed an agreement with Senegal in 2008 which also has a migrant readmission clause in exchange for a number of visas (di Bartolomeo *et al.* 2010, p. 8).

What these bilateral agreements have in common is that they offer a limited and temporary increase in the channels and opportunities for legal migration between third countries and EU Member States, conditional on cooperation in curbing irregular migration and facilitating the deportation of irregular migrants (di Bartolomeo *et al* 2010; Cassarino 2014b, p. 138). Cooperation on readmission serves as a precondition for the implementation of temporary labour recruitment

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[21] This includes the first Plan Africa (2006-2008), the second (2009-2012) and the third (2017 – present).

programmes where France, Italy and Spain are the main EU Member States who have sought and established such frameworks with Senegal and Ghana.

Ghana has no formal bilateral readmission agreements with EU Member States. The UK has several initiatives on the deportation of Ghanaian migrants, although this is not part of a formal agreement.[22] The IOM assists in the coordination of voluntary repatriations from a number of EU Member State countries such as Belgium, Germany, Malta and the Netherlands (Awumbila & Teye 2014, p. 10). Ghana also has a bilateral agreement on labour migration with Italy that is intended as a job-matching scheme as well as circular migration schemes. As part of this agreement, annual entry quotas are allocated to qualified Ghanaians who are matched with job opportunities in Italy. This matches Ghanaians to seasonal employment sectors in Italy such as in the grape harvesting industry. The number of visas granted under the Ghana-Italy labour migration agreement is, however, too small to have much impact, and lacks a reintegration support package for returnees that would ensure participants can fully benefit from the programme (Awumbila & Teye 2014).

Finally, both Senegal and Ghana are party to the Cotonou Agreement of 2000 between EU Member States and ACP (Africa, Caribbean and Pacific) countries, where Article 13 deals with migration and stipulates a commitment from signatories to readmit their nationals.

3.4 The European Union in the governance of migration

3.4.1 Emergence as a supranational actor

It is in the context of a securitised narrative that the EU's 'external' dimension of migration governance has expanded, and the EU's role as a migration governance actor fortified. Migration has developed into a major item on the EU political agenda. Its prominence is demonstrated for example by the development of EU agencies with the mandate to manage a certain aspect of migration (EASO[23], Frontex), the selection of an EU Commissioner for Migration and Home Affairs, and the planning of research into migration under the post-2015 development agenda. It is also evident from the increasing scope of EU involvement in third countries' migration policies. I refer to the 'externalisation' of migration policy as a process by which EU institutions and EU Member States have implemented policies and frameworks which promote the governing of EU borders

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[22] See UK Home Office (2019) report for details on funding allocation towards projects on returns, where Ghana is listed as one of the principle countries in several projects to which returns are made; see also Ghana Immigration Service (2011, 2012) annual reports.

[23] European Asylum Support Office.

and implementation of migration management[24] initiatives outside of its actual borders and jurisdiction (Aubarell, Zapata-Barrero, and Aragall 2009; Betts 2011; Boswell 2003; Lavenex and Uçarer 2004; Samers 2004). Elsewhere, this is referred to as the 'extraterritorialisation' of immigration law beyond state boundaries (Panizzon & van Riemsdijk 2019; Zürn 2012). They have, in some part, 'increasingly sought to exert extra-territorial authority in order to shape the movement of people within or from other regions of the world' (Betts 2011, p. 32). This section discusses the growth and development of the EU as a policy actor in the field of migration, as well as the re-organisation through 'multi-levelling' of the governance of migration at the European level with EU institutions and agencies becoming active participants in the shaping of EU migration policy.

Cooperation at the supranational EU level in the area of migration and asylum has increased and intensified since the 1990s, and is since 1999 underpinned by EU laws (known as Regulations and Directives). Migration cooperation was pushed by the European 'imperative of harmonization' into a supranational direction (Joppke 2002) which resulted in its formalisation first under the Treaty of Maastricht and subsequently the Treaty of Amsterdam (in 1993 and 1999 respectively). The harmonisation of internal policies has helped carve out a greater role for EU institutions in the shaping of migration policies. In particular, the European Commission gained the mandate in 1999 to propose common EU immigration and asylum policy. However, the role of individual Member States' governments remains influential: the primary responsibility for steering migration and asylum policy lies with the Justice and Home Affairs Council (JHA) (composed of justice and home affairs ministers from EU Member States). In spite of the harmonisation push, EU migration policy is still heavily characterised by transgovernmentalism; particularly with regard to the external European migration regime (Lavenex 2006). The main events marking the multi-levelling of EU migration governance are summarised in the table below.

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[24] See section 2.4, Chapter 2 in this manuscript for a discussion of 'migration management'.

Table 3.6*: Chronology of treaties, agreements and conventions marking the 'multilevelling' of EU migration governance*

TREATY/AGREEMENT	TIME PERIOD	RELEVANCE FOR MIGRATION GOVERNANCE
Trevi group and the Ad Hoc Immigration Group	1980s-1990s	Intergovernmental fora marking the commencement of EU Member States' coordination on migration/asylum issues
Single European Act	Effective 1987	Erosion of internal EU borders initiated
Dublin Convention	1990	Purpose to combat 'asylum shopping': rules out possibility of second applications for asylum in other EU Member States
Maastricht Treaty	Effective Nov. 1993	Migration cooperation pushed into the 'imperative of harmonization' into a supranational direction. The Maastricht Treaty formalised European migration cooperation that had been hitherto characterised by ad-hoc, intergovernmental initiatives. The Treaty placed migration/asylum cooperation under the third pillar: Justice and Home Affairs. A greater scope for the role of the European Commission in migration/asylum cooperation is created.
Schengen Convention	1995	Established freedom of movement internally in the EU. Came into effect (at first between 9 EU Member States) in 1995.

Amsterdam Treaty	Effective May 1999	Formally created the EU's Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. European Commission gained an official mandate to propose common EU asylum/immigration policy. Incorporation of Schengen agreements in the Treaty. Established five-year work-plans for migration/asylum cooperation: these would become the Tampere Agreement (1999-2004); the Hague Programme (2005-2009); and the Stockholm Programme (2010-2014) respectively.
Tampere European Council	Oct. 1999	First formal reference to the 'external dimension' of EU migration policy. Proposed amongst other items: cooperation frameworks in the form of 'partnerships' with countries of origin; better treatment of Third Country Nationals; a Common European Asylum System; 'management' of migration flows.
Lisbon Treaty	Effective Dec. 2009	Represents significant development in EU migration/asylum/border policy. In particular, the European Parliament now has co-legislator status in matters of migration/asylum (along with the European Council).

Source: Author's compilation.

3.4.2 The development of the 'external dimension'

Since the Single European Act of 1985 (effective in 1987), which triggered the steady erosion of the EU's internal borders, control of the EU's external borders in contrast has become an increasing political priority for Member States (Joppke 2002, p.264). This shift of focus to the extraterritorial has contributed to the increasing EU involvement in third countries' migration policies in a process Guiraudon (2000) dubbed 'venue-shopping' on the part of European law and

order officials seeking autonomy to pursue a migration control agenda, away from constraints found in the domestic arena. The 'external dimension' of EU asylum and immigration policy was thus officially announced at the 1999 European Council on Justice and Home Affairs held in Tampere (Boswell 2003). Shaping migration flows beyond the territory of the EU has since constituted a core part of European migration policy in what has become the EU external migration regime.

The external dimension blurs the distinction between internal and external security (Lavenex 2006) emphasising security over rights, and on containment of migration flows over free movement (Joppke 2002, p.264). In essence, the constraints found at the internal level in the pursuit and implementation of a migration containment agenda are not reproduced in the arena of external migration policy. EU Member States found that they could retain autonomy, and even substantially gain it, in the arena of external cooperation because their actions at this level were shielded from the competitive domestic arena characterised by multiple social actors competing on the interpretation of social problems and their possible policy solutions (Lavenex 2006, p.331; Guiraudon 2000). The external dimension therefore developed into a key area of cooperation between EU Member States, a development not seen in the case of Europe's internal migration regime where internal obstacles and disagreements on the course internal migration policy should take prevented its growth (Lavenex 2006). Accordingly, Member States have been key actors in driving the containment agenda. EU institutions, such as the European Commission and the European Parliament, have been able to pursue a more 'comprehensive' approach to migration than the JHA Council because they are not exposed to the same competitive electoral pressures as Member State governments, and have a broader mandate (*ibid*, p.330). This comprehensiveness is reflected in the 'root causes' narrative of addressing irregular migration through targeted development interventions that has formed the second pillar of the Commission's approach (Boswell 2003; Chou 2009).

The nature of EU external migration policy today is indicative of its origins: the Member States of the European Union have forged initial external migration policy, with interior ministers predominantly involved in pushing bilateral cooperation with key third countries, and shaping the agenda in relation to a security oriented approach (Boswell & Geddes 2011; Lavenex 1999). It is also indicative of what Lavenex (2006) refers to as the continuation of the transgovernmental logic of cooperation, and the pursuit of autonomy in the external migration regime by JHA officials vis-à-vis supranational actors in the European policy sphere. At the same time, the involvement of

multiple actors in shaping EU migration governance, whose agendas do not necessarily always converge, leads Lavenex (2006) to conclude that the EU has proved to be resistant to long-term instrumentalisation by national actors, and has allowed scope for a more diverse approach.

3.4.3 The EU foreign policy toolbox

This section will briefly summarise the policy frameworks and tools – political and legal instruments – that together form the EU's migration and asylum policy approach, and are currently used by the EU to export its migration agenda to third countries. [25]

The GAMM is the framework formally guiding the EU's external migration regime since 2005. The Mobility Partnerships are one of the tools established under the GAMM and constitute one of the main tools that the EU and its Member States have attempted to export over the last decade to key migrant-sending countries in both Africa and Eastern Europe. In sub-Saharan Africa, Cape Verde remains to date the only country to have signed a Mobility Partnership with the EU. Some African states have been reluctant to sign a Mobility Partnership with the EU, due in part to the inclusion of obligatory negotiations in the matter of readmission of irregular migrants (see Reslow 2012). This has led to the failure of reaching formal agreements in some cases, or to the adoption of a Common Agenda for Migration and Mobility (CAMM) instead of a Mobility Partnership (as was the case with Ethiopia and Nigeria). It can be noted that the EU considers the CAMM as the precursor to a full Mobility Partnership, in the hope that a Mobility Partnership can eventually be negotiated (see EC 2011, p.11). Migration scholars have noted that the content of Mobility Partnerships demonstrates a strong focus on obligatory cooperation in the matter of return and readmission of irregular migrants as a key component. [26]

The EU has also taken steps to establish dialogue platforms between EU and African actors to further cooperation in migration matters, both at the regional and national level. RCPs are an example of such efforts. The Rabat Process was launched in 2006 and acts as a platform for migration and development dialogue as well as project formulation for the West Africa region. A similar process, called the Khartoum process, was subsequently established in the Horn of Africa region. In addition to formal agreements and visible dialogue processes, the nature of some of the migration agreements between the EU institutions, the EU Member States and African States are

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[25] See Table 3.7 in this chapter for overview.

[26] It should be noted that the main reason the EU has been more successful in securing Mobility Partnerships with countries to its Eastern borders is related to the matter of eventual accession to the Union – this plays a central part in why Eastern countries have proven more cooperative (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2011).

informal: these are considered 'non-standard' and as such are less visible to both the European and African public (Cassarino 2007). [27]

In 2015, the EU established the European Agenda on Migration citing the need for 'swift and determined action' in response to migrant deaths in the Mediterranean (EC 2015, p.3). The EAM also paved the way for the Partnership Framework, proposed in 2016, which builds on 'lessons learned' in the course of the EU's external migration policy implementation over the last decade. The Partnership Framework aims to enhance cooperation between EU Member States, EU institutions and third countries in the area of migration. Of particular importance are the 'compacts' introduced as part of the Partnership Framework – these are outlined as being fluid processes led by EU Member States and combining different policy elements (such as trade, aid, development, security, and digital policy), with the intention of forging a tailor-made migration management approach to each individual country, and possibly resulting in formal international agreements.

Finally, these recent efforts are complemented by the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (hereafter EUTF), an EU tool and funding mechanism introduced at the Valletta Summit in November 2015 aimed at 'address[ing] crises in the regions of the Sahel and Lake Chad, the Horn of Africa and in parts of North Africa' by financing projects which aim at tackling irregular migration directly in 23 African countries through the implementation of security measures, and through development interventions (EC 2016c, p.2). With an investment of over 4.6 billion euros, the EUTF constitutes a major instrument in the externalisation of the EU migration agenda to, primarily, sub-Saharan Africa.

3.4.4 An overview of EUTF interventions in the case studies

I conclude this section with a summarising and analytical overview of interventions implemented under the EUTF in the case study countries since the instrument's launch. As a preferred partner country and as one of the 'compact' countries, Senegal benefits from project funding under the EUTF for national projects for a total of over 179 million euros, spread over 11 projects (EC 2019g). [28] I allocate to each EUTF project one of four categories:

- migration management;

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[27] Informal agreements do have to be ratified in European parliaments, and similarly their lack of visibility is important to African governments – the topic of return and readmission of migrants is often at the core of such agreements and they are therefore unpopular.

[28] This figure is accurate in October 2019.

- strengthening resilience;

- developing local economies and job creation; and

- reintegration of returnees and accompanying diaspora investments.

The breakdown of Senegalese national EUTF projects according to these categories and their respective budgets can be seen in Figure 3.2 below. Project descriptions indicate that 'strengthening resilience' focuses on improving food security in migrant departure zones and providing support to persons affected by conflict in the southern region of Casamance. The largest part of national project funding is allocated to creating employment opportunities in predominantly rural parts of the country (that are key migrant departure zones) and improving the competitiveness of local businesses. Migration management interventions include anti-trafficking initiatives, supporting return migration governance, developing information databases on migration such as civil registries, and raising awareness of the dangers of irregular migration. The fourth category consists of one project aimed at promoting the sustainable reintegration of returnees and supporting diaspora investment. In the case of Senegal, the largest portion of EUTF funding has gone towards promoting employment opportunities in major migrant-departure zones.

It should be noted that these are not clear-cut categories: projects that may fall primarily under 'Developing local economies and job creation' may have elements of a 'migration management' agenda, as is the case for example for the EUTF project titled 'Developing employment in Senegal' that features awareness raising campaigns about the dangers of irregular migration, even though this is not directly stipulated in the project information fiche. Similarly, the project supporting reintegration of returnees and diaspora investment broadly covers the 'management and governance of return migration' (EC 2016b), straddling a line between migration management and development cooperation.

The allocation of EUTF project funding in Senegal reflects therefore a strong emphasis on addressing the 'root causes' of irregular migration, and exploring the potential for local businesses to provide alternatives to migration in the form of entrepreneurial activities. This reflects an important allocation of funds towards projects that target 'would-be' migrants as a category of beneficiaries.

Figure 3.1: Funding allocation of EUTF national projects in Senegal, by thematic intervention.

Source: Author's adaptation from EUTF data on projects implemented at the national level in Senegal (EC 2019g).

It is not possible to make a meaningful comparison with EUTF interventions in Ghana, as Ghana makes up part of the smaller, second wave of African countries to become eligible for financing under the EU Trust Fund, which it became eligible for in June 2017. Ghana's access to the Trust Fund until recently remained largely indirect – it could until 2019 access funding only through regional projects.[29] The limited number of EUTF interventions that have been undertaken in Ghana reflect nonetheless a focus on actions in the domain of migration management, and support to private sector growth in regions of migrant departure as part of the 'root causes' and domestic job growth rationale. At the time of writing, Ghana has two national projects implemented under the EUTF: the first is a project on the strengthening of border security, while the second boosts 'green employment and enterprise opportunities' (EC 2019f). The relative recentness of Ghana's eligibility to the Trust Fund means that other and ongoing frameworks of EU-Ghanaian cooperation in migration feature more prominently.

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[29] Ghana is eligible to access 11 regional projects under the EUTF, where the total budget of these projects represents 250.6 million euros (figure accurate in October 2019).

Table 3.7: **EU frameworks and instruments on migration policy**

EU Framework/ instrument	Details	Established
Global Approach To Migration And Mobility (GAMM)	**Overarching framework of the EU external migration and asylum policy**. Identifies four priority areas ('pillars') and is implemented through various political instruments (bilateral/regional policy dialogues), legal instruments (visa facilitation and readmission agreements), and programme/project support. The four pillars of the GAMM: • legal migration and mobility, • irregular migration and trafficking in human beings, • international protection and asylum policy, and • maximising the development impact of migration and mobility.	2011
European Agenda On Migration (EAM)	Agenda proposed by the European Commission in response to the increase in asylum seeker flows to the EU. The EAM reflects the migration management approach in terms of strengthening border management organisations (e.g. FRONTEX) as well as addressing the 'root causes' of irregular migration through targeted development assistance. Implementation packages proposed as of late May 2015; the EU Trust Fund for Africa was proposed as part of the EAM and launched late 2015.	May 2015
Partnership Framework	Partnership framework with key third countries in (predominantly West) Africa outlining a range of short term and long term measures to address irregular migration. Identifies an initial five African priority countries for partnership. Introduces concept of	June 2016

	'compacts': these constituting a political framework for operational activities and cooperation.	
Cotonou Agreement	Partnership agreement between countries in the African Caribbean Pacific (ACP) Group and EU Member States. The three pillars are development cooperation; political cooperation; and economic and trade cooperation.	June 2000 for a period of 20 years.
Rabat Process	**Regional Consultative Process for the West Africa region**. Brings together European and African states as well as the European Commission and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to enhance regional dialogue on migration and to identify common priorities for practical cooperation. (Other RCPs in Africa include the Khartoum Process.)	Launched in July 2006.
The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership	Africa-EU dialogue platform for cooperation on a broad range of priority areas including fostering synergies between migration and development and tackling irregular migration. Dialogue leads to the identification of programmes for funding. Participation of non-state actors including civil society and private sector organisations both in dialogue and project implementation.	Based on the Joint Africa-EU Strategy adopted in 2007.
Mobility Partnership	Bilateral cooperation tool established under the GAMM. Platform for enhanced dialogue with participating third country, EU Member States and EU institutions to work on GAMM objectives; includes commitment to negotiate visa facilitation and readmission agreements.	In 2005 as part of the GAMM.
Common Agenda On Migration And Mobility (CAMM)	Bilateral cooperation tool established under the GAMM. Platform for enhanced dialogue with participating third country, EU Member States and EU institutions to work on GAMM objectives; **does not**	In 2005 as part of the GAMM.

	include commitment to negotiate visa facilitation and readmission agreements. The EU considers the CAMM a precursor to the Mobility Partnership.	
Readmission Agreements	These are bilateral agreements that constitute a commitment on the participating third country to readmit its own nationals and in some cases other third country nationals. An EU tool since 2005 (but also used prior to this period between EU Member States and African states). Readmission agreements are negotiated as part of a Mobility Partnership.	At the EU level since 2005.
Valletta Action Plan	A political declaration and a common action plan adopted at the Valletta Summit by EU and African heads of state. The resulting Action Plan centres on enhancing cooperation in five thematic priority domains: • Development benefits of migration and addressing root causes of irregular migration • Legal migration and mobility • Protection and asylum • Prevention of and fight against irregular migration, migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings • Return, readmission and reintegration	Nov. 2015
EU Emergency Trust Fund For Africa (EUTF)	Funding tool for implementing projects in three African regions that have migration as their intervention theme. The Trust Fund was set up in response to the 2015 migration 'crisis' and perceptions of irregular migration becoming an increasingly pressing challenge. Pools together resources from different donors to enable the funding of targeted projects at relatively short notice. Since its inception total resources made	Launched at the Valletta Summit on Migration in November 2015.

available through this Fund is more than 4.6 billion

euros. [30]

3.5 Conclusion

In this chapter I discussed the methodological framework that was adopted in the research. The advantages and limitations of the (multiple) case study approach were presented, and the rationale for selecting Senegal and Ghana as case studies was discussed. The nature of my research questions, where these examine actors' decision-making behaviour and the role of institutions therein, informed the selection of research methods detailed here. In presenting the histories of Senegal and Ghana as migrant-sending and migrant-receiving nations, this chapter laid out significant elements of the domestic and regional contexts around which the rest of this thesis is to be read.

While Senegal and Ghana have important distinctions in their histories, their demographics and in their socioeconomic trajectories, I emphasised that some findings are generalisable to theoretical proportions. Studying Senegal and Ghana as negotiation partners of the EU gives insight into bargaining dynamics that weaker states can develop vis-à-vis powerful actors in a politicised area of cooperation. Concerning domestic and regional institutions, and the perceptions of constraints and incentives in cooperation, I note that these often have case-specific characteristics, but can also be comparable along theoretical lines. As such, it is reasonable to draw comparisons between states in the Global South that have similar profiles as migration states, such as a large and influential diaspora; between countries with similar levels of economic development; between countries in the same region that are both members of formal regional institutions; or between countries with comparable political regimes and structures of governance. This chapter noted the limitations of this research, where I delineated the scope of this research and discussed the possible constraints reflected in this project as a result of conducting research with elite respondents. The next chapters are an empirical analysis of data collected from documents, participant observation and interviews in the three fieldwork sites (see table 3.1). I start my empirical discussion examining migration policy narratives as a type of governance.

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[30] Figure is accurate in December 2019.

Chapter 4

Narratives

4.1 Introduction

The role of ideas in shaping policy has been brought to the forefront of neoinstitutionalist scholarship in public policy and sociology since the 1990s, as part of an 'ideational turn' (Blyth 1997; Schmidt & Radaelli 2004). Neo-institutionalism has brought actors' knowledge claims back to the foreground, noting that policy problems do not stem merely from objective 'facts' of a situation, but that policy problems and their proposed solutions are constructed by different actors (Boswell *et al.* 2011; Kingdon 1995). This chapter analyses the role that narratives and frameworks have played in shaping migration governance, in terms of specific policy narratives that form part of an ideational export to third countries in EU migration governance. In doing so this chapter exposes the underlying ideas that are constructed and perpetuated by actors involved in EU-African migration governance – and assesses the role of different actors in this perpetuation. As discussed in Chapter 2, common to these ideas and 'policy narratives' is that they are presented as 'common sense', or as technical considerations on policy issues, rather than political choices. The framing of policy responses in this way forms part of a bureaucratisation push, by which EU external governance is presented as migration 'management' in an effort to depoliticise the processes employed to govern and regulate migration. The bureaucratising and depoliticising approach of the European Commission, as a means of securing cooperation with third countries in migration governance, informs the subsequent discussion in Chapters 6 and 7.

The empirical observations of this chapter demonstrate the existence of multiple biases present in EU migration narratives, including a sedentary bias and a neoliberal bias, which emerge clearly in policy and project formulation in the case study countries. It forms the necessary springboard for the later discussion in this manuscript (Chapter 6) on the extent to which African political actors a) contribute to, and b) adopt or contest EU policy narratives. It demonstrates that EU external migration governance can be understood as the product of embedded and constructed narratives which drive policy interventions.

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The chapter is divided into two principle sections. The first highlights multiple narratives that have been perpetuated or constructed, and are used interchangeably: around West Africa as both an unstable region but also home to development 'success stories'; narratives that foreground the regional security threat and the need to govern African migration through a security lens; and the role of migrants both as development actors and as responsible for curbing their migration projects. The second section examines the practice level at which narratives are adopted, interpreted and contested by non-state actors. Using theories on sensemaking in organisations (Weick 1995), I show that actors at the practice level endeavour to make sense of policy narratives in order to act on them. This final section analyses the uptake of narratives by practitioners in the field and concludes that non-state actors seek largely to accommodate top-down narratives in their practices, but also contest them, in what can be conceived as a spectrum of narrative adoption.

4.2 Narrative frames

4.2.1 Afro-optimism and afro-pessimism in development narratives

> *Africa, a headless figure threatened with madness and quite innocent of any notion of center, hierarchy, or stability (…) a bottomless abyss where everything is noise, yawning gap, and primordial chaos.*

(Mbembe 2001, p.3)

There is a long tradition in Western narratives on 'Africa' to portray it as a place of instability, chaos and darkness, as the above citation, drawn from the introduction of Mbembe's 2001 book *On the Postcolony*, reflects on. Grand narratives on Africa have oscillated between pessimism, and portraying it as the 'dark continent'[31] – and optimistic narratives that highlight development 'success stories' within the continent. While *the Economist* dubbed it the 'hopeless' continent in 2000 (The Economist 2000), *Time* followed suit in 2012 with an 'Africa rising' cover, describing the notion of an 'emerging Africa' as 'a giant continent awakening from poverty and disaster, now bursting with hope and opportunity' (TIME 2012, p.48). Oscillating narratives on both a 'hopeless' and a 'rising' Africa reflect the pendulum of narratives on migration and development, which have swung between neo-Marxist pessimism in the 1970s and 1980s and debates around brain drain,

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[31] The notion of Africa as the 'Dark Continent' emerged as early as the Victorian era, as part of an imperialist discourse that sought to self-validate its asserted power over 'uncivilised' peoples (Brantlinger, 1985; Said, 1979).

towards more optimistic perceptions of the developmental benefits of migration in the 1990s and 2000s (de Haas, 2010).

Afro-optimism has emerged partly in response to pessimistic narratives, seeking instead to portray a 'rosy' alternative that is in turn often guilty of selectively highlighting positive developments, or 'romanticising unsavoury realities' (Addo 2015). Both pessimistic and optimistic development narratives nonetheless deliver simplistic and generalising stories, obscuring variations and a more complex reality. They are often guilty of employing an ideology of racial communalism, where Africa's historicity is 'too easily reduced to a matter of context: having-been-enslaved; having-been-colonized; being-economically-marginalized' (Mbembe 2005, p.9). Postcolonial studies and subaltern studies have done the bulk of the scholarly labour in staging a critique of Eurocentrism in development narratives (see Mbembe 2001; Spivak 1988), while a broader critical debate is ongoing on methodological Eurocentrism in fields such as critical security studies, and in international relations theory more generally (see e.g. Barkawi and Laffey, 2006; Howell and Richter-Montpetit, 2019).

Narratives and knowledge claims are often disproportionately determined, shaped and exported by external actors who demonstrate more agenda-setting power in EU-African cooperation frameworks. These narratives subsequently play an important role in steering both the content, and the direction, of policy interventions. Senegal is commended in an EU appraisal for its status as a 'bastion of democracy' in West Africa where legislative elections, a free press and a dynamic civil society are indicators of Senegal's strong democratic culture (European Parliament 2018, p.5). Ghana has achieved a high quality of democracy despite a turbulent past that includes a history of military coups (Osei 2015). The status that Senegal and Ghana enjoy as developmental success stories has played a significant part in explaining the EU's selection rationale when choosing 'priority' partner countries in its migration governance agenda, as I explore in Chapter 5.

The choice to portray development successes or development failures in a country or region plays into broader policy narratives. Showcasing development success may suit one policy narrative, while emphasising governance weaknesses may suit a different policy narrative. The next section analyses how policy discourse has constructed a narrative of regional 'difference' in pushing for a security-oriented migration governance model that emphasises the comparative precarious security situation in the wider West African region.

4.2.2 Highlighting West African security risks

EU policy narratives on migration governance have highlighted security risks in the West African region in dialogue and policy formulation, supporting a rationale for increased intervention through a security lens. In doing so, EU narratives have presented emerging security risks in the West African region as a common security threat and taken steps to formalise EU-African cooperation in the area of counter-terrorism and tackling cross-border crime as part of a broader strategy in migration governance. While the West African regional security context is absent from policy considerations in the EU's GAMM and the initial 2016 Partnership Framework, the 2015 Valletta Action Plan identifies capacity building for improved border management systems at regional and national level as a key action to prevent irregular migration, cross-border crime and terrorism (European Council 2015a, p.14).[32] In subsequent progress reports on the Partnership Framework, the security situation in Mali is highlighted as an increasing risk, with a knock-on effect on neighbouring countries such as Niger (EC 2017a, 2017b).

EU policy actors stress the importance of addressing regional security risks in migration dialogues with West African states, where an EU Member State diplomat, involved in EU-African migration dialogue, explained the presence of counter-terrorism strategies in migration governance dialogue as follows:

> *We help them organise – better organise – their borders: those things which are* **not directly linked with development but which are of course essential if you want to have a country which is well-run**. *The same thing of course, and it is linked most unfortunately with the security situation, is better cooperation to control their borders. And if you take for instance a country such as Nigeria, Cameroon, with* boko haram *and if you take the Sahel countries with* AQIM *and all those linked or not linked to Daesh; you have of course those kinds of discussions as well, which are not military discussions, that's another fora – but discussions that* are *important because* **we really believe that if there is no security, there cannot be peace, and if there is no peace you cannot have development**. *So, we must talk about those issues.*
>
> - Interview 2, Belgian diplomat. Brussels, 21 September 2017; my emphasis.

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[32] See Table 3.7, Chapter 3 reviewing EU external policy frameworks in migration.

Interventions planned under the EU's Trust Fund instrument address the West African security situation and determine that there is a need for West African governments to monitor and manage their national borders in order to manage cross-border crime and terrorism threats (EC 2019b pp. 26–27). In doing so, the EUTF situates its intervention in the West African security situation within the context of political commitments made at the 2017 African Union (AU)–European Union Summit, held in Abidjan. The result is also the locating of security at the centre of migration and development interventions. At the 2017 Summit, of the four strategic priorities that were agreed upon, 'strengthening resilience, peace, security and governance' emerged as a key thematic priority, in addition to 'migration and mobility' (European Council 2017). The following was thus worked into the final declaration:

> *Africa and EU have common security threats. New threats to international and regional peace and security have an impact on the stability of our two continents, particularly the growing terrorist threats and trans-boundary criminal activities. In this regard, we recognise the need to strengthen the relationship between the AU and EU and agree on the principle of developing as soon as possible a framework document, which will put our partnership on peace and security on a more solid and structured basis, taking into account the complexity of these threats and the need to address their root causes.*

- AU-EU Summit Declaration, Abidjan (European Council 2017, p.2).

The international development narrative of Senegal and Ghana as stable countries and preferred development partners is thus contrasted with the volatility of the wider region and the imperative of dealing with the threat of terrorism. As I explore in Chapter 6, this has impacted on domestic policy formulation on migration in the following way: security actors active at the domestic and regional level have incorporated the narrative of a regional security risk into migration policy frameworks, thereby securitising the regional and national agendas on migration.

Highlighting regional security and terrorist risks has provided a legitimising rationale for EU-African migration cooperation to be increasingly constructed around a security lens. The emphasis on security in shaping migration and border management practices is one which the EU has advanced in cooperation with third countries, informing the rationale of intervention of border management projects implemented under the EU's Trust Fund instrument. Yet EU narratives have compounded an emphasis on security risks with a narrative of deterrence that promotes alternatives to

migration – and encourages would-be migrants to opt out of migrating altogether, as I explore below.

4.2.3 'Rooting them in their place': a sedentary bias

European policy-makers construct and deploy specific narratives to govern and restrict mobility in their cooperation with non-EU countries, seeking to export a model of migration governance that is characterised by a 'sedentary bias' (Bakewell 2008). Sedentarism comprises 'a view of the world that is based on the assumption that sedentarism and nation-states are the norm, and mobility is problematic' (Schofberger 2019, p.9). In the political process of constructing a narrative that views sedentarism as the norm, and migration as outside the norm, EU policy narratives of sedentarism are manifested in the following ways. First, sedentarism plays out through the construction of a notion of shared responsibility: in this rationale, humanitarian arguments are deployed to mobilise African states and migrants themselves to share in the responsibility for reducing irregular migration. Secondly, in promoting a sedentary narrative, interventions have taken on migration deterrence as an important dimension in which return and readmission plays a key part, as does the recruitment of returnees and local voices in awareness-raising activities on the dangers of irregular migration. Return policy is thus instrumentalised as a core element of dissuasion and deterrence efforts. Information campaigns about the dangers of irregular migration form part of migration dissuasion initiatives implemented in Senegal and Ghana, where I demonstrate that these campaigns nonetheless face important credibility issues among the audiences they are intended for. I demonstrate that sedentary narratives also serve to promote 'alternatives' to irregular migration that take a prescriptive form and draw on neoliberal ideology, and promote a dynamic 'stay at home' discourse in Senegal and Ghana. In seeking to diffuse this narrative in third countries, the sedentary narrative has engaged with social and cultural elements and actors at the sub-national and local levels, taking steps to recruit these as participants in a European migration-containment agenda.

Shared responsibility and humanitarian arguments

The sedentary narrative plays out at the policy level against a rationale of shared responsibility. The EU's migration containment agenda frames interventions in non-EU countries from a distinctly humanitarian perspective (Bosworth 2017; Frowd 2015; Stambøl 2019), where this rationale has been consistently deployed following the 2015 migration 'crisis'. At the European Council meeting of 23 April 2015, a host of additional measures were announced in response to the migration crisis that include strengthening presence at sea, fighting trafficking and taking steps to prevent

irregular migration flows, in a bid to 'prevent further loss of life at sea and to tackle the root causes of the human emergency that we face' (European Council 2015b). In recent policy documents, the EU has reasserted its intention to 'intervene upstream in regions of origin and transit' to prevent irregular migration, by building partnerships with specific countries (EC 2015) p.5).

By promoting sedentarism, EU narratives have conceptualised migration firstly as problematic in the sense that migration is portrayed as a phenomenon to be addressed and reduced (Castles 2009; see Chapter 2). The humanitarian lens has also enabled implicit value judgements to be made that categorise migration as risky and, consequently, irresponsible. Increasingly, 'burden sharing' can be alternatively construed as 'responsibility sharing' where both African states, but also migrants themselves, are cast as responsible for containing South-North migration. The EU perspective on responsibility-sharing is adequately summed up in the following comments of an interviewee at the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, when asked about the EU's response to the migration crisis of 2015:

> *One of the big principles of international cooperation and certainly also the migration crisis is shared responsibility. So, it is true that African countries, that African governments should do something in order to reduce the flow [of migrants]. The question is: are they willing to do it; and are they able to do it?*

> - Interview 2, Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Brussels, 21 September 2017.

Put differently, African governments share an equal responsibility in managing migration flows, despite the acknowledgement of the above-cited interviewee that the capacity of West African states to effectively participate as co-managers of a migration containment agenda may be limited. This notion of shared responsibility also appears in the following citations from the EU's Partnership Framework (2016):

> *'The Valletta Summit, with its Action Plan of 16 priority initiatives, framed a shared responsibility, and underlined that the EU and African countries must work in a spirit of partnership.' (EC 2016, p.3)*

> *'Increased cooperation with countries of transit is equally important as they are **more responsible for managing irregular migration flows** – and have stronger incentives to step up border management – especially if they are obliged to readmit irregular migrants that crossed their territories (…)' (EC 2016, p.7)*

This has served to advance a political rationale that carries an implicit moral imperative for African states to be participants in the co-management of South-North migration flows. This is furthermore reflected in the concept of EU-African 'partnerships' in migration that place the responsibility of migration management in part on African states, and do so by embedding it within a humanitarian logic. Recruiting African governments in the control of migration flows is part of the EU's wider strategy of burden-shifting of migration management to third countries (Betts & Milner 2006), and is especially attractive as a strategy to liberal democratic states seeking to control migration flows before they reach the common territory where migrant removals face considerably more juridical and societal constraints (Lavenex 2006, pp.337-338). In the process of burden sharing, African states are recruited in the governance of the EU's external borders.

Instrumentalising return policy

Dissuasion and deterrence take on several dimensions in policy narratives. On the one hand, EU policy has adapted to reflect the use 'legislated disincentives' (Heller 2014) where legislation and practice on migrant returns can be seen to connect to a broader strategy of deterrence of irregular migration. The following citations from EU policy documents published since 2015 demonstrate that returns are intended to serve the purpose of curbing further irregular migration, by 'sending a message', 'dissuading', and 'providing disincentives.' By rendering the returns system more effective, it is understood that migrants will be deterred.[33] The instrumentalisation of return is therefore an important component of the sedentary narrative and its implementation. The citations below, from Commission policy documents published since 2015, illustrate how return policy is instrumentalised.

Table 4.1: Return policy in deterrence

'This renewed Action Plan provides a number of focused actions to enable Member States and the European Union to substantially improve return rates. **This will at the same time send a clear message to those migrants that will not have a right to stay in the European Union that they should not undertake the perilous journey to arrive in Europe illegally.** This will also help disrupting the business model of migrant smuggling.'	EC (2017d) Action Plan on a More Effective Return Policy, p.13.

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[33] This is in itself a reflection of the implicit assumptions made about migration decisions, migration aspirations and disincentives within EU narratives of dissuasion, which I discuss in later in this chapter.

'**Improving return and readmission has been a key objective of the Partnership Framework, to** allow the full chain of migration management to work and to dissuade **people from embarking on hazardous journeys.**'	EC (2017b) 4th Progress Report, p.13.
'**Effective return and readmission remains key** to provide disincentives to irregular migration **and protect the integrity of asylum systems.**'	EC (2017a) 5th Progress Report, p.15.
'One of the incentives for irregular migrants is the knowledge that the EU's return system (…) works imperfectly. **Smuggling networks often play on the fact that relatively few return decisions are enforced – only 39.2% of return decisions issued in 2013 were effectively enforced.**'	EC (2015) European Agenda on Migration, p.9.

Similarly, one of the measures of successful and sustainable reintegration in international programmes, when this forms part of a return initiative, is the lowered likelihood of returnees embarking on another migration journey. Reintegration packages are valued not only in terms of providing a critical support to returnees, but are rationalised in terms of their impact on preventing further migration.[34] Reintegration efforts therefore aim to preclude the likelihood of repeat migration. This dimension of return and reintegration programming was described by an IOM interviewee in Accra:

> [We aim] to ensure that reintegration is sustainable in the long term. What do I mean by that? You see, if the basic push factors that made the migrant move from his or her community of origin, if these push factors are not being addressed, what will happen is that you help in the return but then because those push factors are still prevalent, the person moves out. So then what we are trying to do – that's why we provide psycho-social counselling, right from the time the prospective returnee is in contact with IOM, right through the return, and then even the reintegration phase we take them through psycho-social counselling, to help them fight stigmatisation, to help them ensure that

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[34] As I explore in Chapter 6, African governments are often poorly equipped to manage the needs of returnees and to provide reintegration support independently of external donors. This is one of the reasons cited by state actors regarding their reluctance to accept returnees, and why reintegration support increasingly forms part of return programmes implemented by EU Member States and the EU.

> *whatever they come up with, the reintegration – their individual return business*
>
> *plan – will be sustainable in the long term.*

- Interview 37, IOM Ghana. Accra, 19 Feb 2018.

Recent EU policy narratives – implicitly or explicitly – identify 'incentives' for irregular migration, and outline legislative steps to remove them. In a communication on the delivery of the EAM, the employment of irregular migrants in sectors of European economies is identified as a 'pull factor':

> *A portion of our economy continues to rely on the labour of irregular migrants,*
>
> *which creates a pull factor (…). The possibility of finding illegal work remains a*
>
> *significant incentive to irregular migration into the EU.*

- EC (2017c), p.9.

Measures to tackle this include the improving of detection mechanisms, and sanctions for employment of undocumented migrants by EU businesses under the Employers Sanction Directive (*ibid*). On the one hand, such policy measures are based on implicit assumptions about the motivations of migrants, and the idea that once migrants are better 'informed' about working conditions in Europe and the risks of irregular migration, they will opt out of migrating. Yet, there is also evidence that return policy has adapted to reflect actors' learning from past experience of EU-African migrant return cooperation, as well as considerations of added institutional barriers to implementing returns that appear at later stages. As such, EU policy measures in deterrence place emphasis on minimising delays in returning migrants, ensuring the 'swift returns of newly arrived irregular migrants', and where possible, ensuring that migration is disrupted before arrival in Europe by stepping up returns from the African sub-continent through the Assisted Voluntary Returns scheme (EC 2017b, p.16). This is because there are additional barriers to removing persons from EU territory, whether legal or otherwise: on the one hand, the EU perceives that there is perhaps a 'greater willingness' to facilitate the return of *newly arrived* irregular migrants, in particular 'those who are not yet part of the diaspora contributing with remittances to the livelihoods of their own communities' (*ibid*). Returns conducted from EU Member States' territory also prove more difficult to arrange in cooperation with countries of origin and transit, than returns implemented through the Assisted Voluntary Return scheme implemented outside EU borders along prominent migration routes. An official at DEVCO stressed that while Senegalese officials were relatively proactive in repatriating Senegalese citizens from Niger and Libya, the same could not be said of those in EU Member States:

> *They are preoccupied with the risk that some Senegalese are running when*
> *they either go by boat, or they go by Niger and Libya: they don't want that to*
> *last too long. But their argument is that people who are in Europe, they should*
> *stay in Europe – that once people have reached Europe, they should be*
> *allowed to stay.*

- Interview 11, DG DEVCO. Brussels, 28 September 2017.

In this way, return policy and practices are designed and adapted to serve the dual purpose of returning detained migrants, and of deterring future migration. As Pécoud (2008) illustrates, this dynamic of control is intended to represent, in the minds of migrants, the territorial borders of the EU. I subsequently explore how returnees are used as voices within the EU's deterrence campaigns, particularly in information campaigns aimed at encouraging migrants' self-governance.

Awareness-raising information campaigns

Dissuasion narratives can also be identified at the level of project interventions in Senegal and Ghana. Information campaigns are intended to deter potential migrants from migrating, and are implemented by the EU and other international actors where these have formed part of the migration governance toolkit used in third countries (see Aguillon 2018; Kent *et al.* 2019; Nieuwenhuys & Pécoud 2007; Oeppen 2016). As discussed in chapter 2, deterrence strategies are intended to alter the motivations of migrants, unlike other restrictive policies that are targeted at reducing migrants' capabilities to migrate (Kent *et al.* 2019). Fundamentally, deterrence narratives implemented through information campaigns operate on the idea of migrants and youths participating in their own governance (Pécoud 2013; Rodriguez 2019). It is nonetheless apparent that information campaigns function according to implicit assumptions that limit their effectiveness, in particular as the politics of control and the logic of migrants clash.

Deterrence narratives emphasise the dangers and risks of clandestine migration. Yet, this narrative is confronted with the reality of a strong and vibrant 'culture of migration' that is embedded in many Senegalese and Ghanaian communities. Social and cultural anthropologists have noted the pervasiveness of the desire to migrate is deeply cultural, rooted in part in pressures exerted by families, and the fact that 'succeeding' as a migrant brings social prestige in many West African communities, such as in Cape Verde (Åkesson 2011) and Senegal (Willems 2013). Rodriguez (2019) notes that present-day migration aspirations in Senegal are linked to the perceived need to

acquire wealth and a house, in order to achieve social standing. The emergence of the migrant as a role model of success furthermore has a historical basis, linked to the decline of the Senegalese civil service sector as a route for stable employment, as I explored in Chapter 3. In many cases, familial solidarity is a cultural concept that is drawn on by families to exert pressure on young Africans to provide financially for their families (Riccio 2005; Willems 2013). An additional factor is the sheer visibility of 'success' that is enjoyed by migrant communities in Senegal and Ghana who benefit from remittances sent by a relative abroad. Migration policy-makers in Senegalese and Ghanaian ministries are well aware of the cultural rootedness of migration, with a Senegalese DGSE official noting: 'Here [in Senegal], it is said that to take on the adventure – to emigrate – it shows determination. It shows courage and ambition.'[35] Another Senegalese DGSE official commented on the visible impact of remittances in spurring migration aspirations:

> *There is also family pressure. You're in a neighbourhood, or in a village, and you see the property of someone who went abroad. He regularly sends financial support, whether it's for the mosque, or the church, places of culture, school, or health. So, you tell yourself: I'm going to be like him.*
>
> - Interview 20, DGSE. Dakar, 3 November 2017. My translation.

Awareness-raising campaigns on the dangers of irregular migration, in key migrant departure zones, tackle these migration aspirations and have formed a crucial tool of dissuasion strategies that project interventions have deployed. Deterrence narratives and information campaigns operate on a set of implicit assumptions, where these assumptions permeate the resulting projects implemented in Senegal and Ghana. Their premise rests firstly on the idea of 'informing' uninformed populations about the legal requirements of migrating to Europe, of the hardships to be encountered there as an irregular migrant, and that aspiring migrants will reconsider their plans if they are given more information about risks. Migrants are thus portrayed as purely rational actors that can be made to see reason. It has nonetheless been indicated in broader research that aspiring migrants are not unaware of the risks of irregular migration, but that this risk information is still filtered through a broader assessment of life opportunities at home (Hernández-Carretero & Carling 2012; Rodriguez 2019). It is, as Pécoud (2019) illustrates, not as though life 'at home' were free from all forms of violence or coercion. Additionally, it is implicitly assumed that given alternatives, youths can be persuaded to give up their migration aspirations and remain at home, where the mechanism of persuasion can draw on feelings of duty to participate in the

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[35] Interview 16, DGSE. Dakar, 17 October 2017. My translation.

development of one's country of origin. This relies on the idea of methodological nationalism: that an individual belongs to a specific country and carries duties and responsibilities towards their homeland (Åkesson 2011; Wimmer & Glick Schiller 2002). Methodological nationalism is in turn intrinsically linked to the concept of the modern nation state, and state-building processes. I explore how information campaigns aim to shape migrants' subjectivities, and how implicit assumptions driving these campaigns are confronted with legitimacy issues.

Under the EUTF, two projects implemented in Senegal have a portion of their budget explicitly dedicated to awareness-raising activities on the dangers of irregular migration.[36] *Développer l'emploi au Sénégal* notes that over 20,000 'migrants, or potential migrants' were reached in information campaigns on migration and the risks linked to irregular migration (EC 2016d). *Renforcement de la gestion et de la gouvernance des migrations* allocated just over 5% of Component 2 of the project's provisional budget to awareness-raising activities, and aims to reach 30,000 migrants and would-be migrants through information campaigns (EC 2016b).[37] A further EUTF project titled 'Strengthening the management and governance of migration and the sustainable reintegration of returning migrants', implemented in the Sahel region where Ghana is listed as a beneficiary country, has as one of three key goals to 'increase awareness of the communities in high migration areas and migrants on the consequences and viable alternatives to irregular migration' (Project fiche (EC 2016a, p.11)). The project aims to be complementary to the information campaign carried out under the Ghana Integrated Migration Management Approach (GIMMA) project, while introducing some innovation including 'different methods of outreach and a larger geographical area' (*ibid,* p.12).

In tangent, development cooperation projects funded by other external donors feature awareness-raising campaigns as part of their intervention. The Italian development cooperation funded an awareness-raising campaign in Senegal, in collaboration with the IOM, reaching over 10,000 people in its outreach efforts; the project was considered a success to the extent that the stated intention is to replicate it in six other African countries (Le Quotidien 2018). NGOs implement awareness-raising campaigns as part of development projects, such as the Spanish AIDA (*Aida, Ayuda, Intercambio y Desarrollo*) in Senegal, and the Italian network of NGOs *Solidarietà e Cooperazione (CIPSI)* that runs project PONTI (*Inclusion sociale et économique, jeunes*

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[36] See projects: *Développer l'emploi au Sénégal* ('Boosting employment in Senegal'); and *Renforcement de la gestion et de la gouvernance des migrations, retour et réintégration durable au Sénégal* ('Supporting the management and governance of migration, return and sustainable reintegration in Senegal') (EC 2019g).
[37] Percentage my calculation.

et femmes, innovation et diaspora) in Senegal, funded by the Italian Ministry of Interior (AIDA 2019; CIPSI 2019). As I demonstrate later in this chapter, civil society organisations fall onto a spectrum where they either reproduce donor narratives, negate them, or partially accommodate or adopt them.

Crucially, the export of sedentary narratives has taken on a distinct cultural dimension as policies to combat irregular migration have mobilised 'cultural actors', as noted by elsewhere by Pécoud (2019). Their intervention is through the medium of media, popular culture and advertising, rather than through legislation and overt control mechanisms.[38] I found this strategy of using cultural actors was more explicit and developed in the case of Senegal, that is recipient to more projects under the EUTF than Ghana; and acts as something of a test ground for such projects that now form the basis for replication in other West African countries.[39]

One prominent project that uses this approach is the aforementioned EUTF project '*Développer l'emploi au Sénégal*' ('Boosting employment in Senegal'), implemented in nine Senegalese regions, which, with a budget allocation of 40 million euros, makes it the largest budgeted EUTF national project in Senegal to date (EC 2019g). While a key aspect of the project is to develop employment opportunities in migrant departure zones – on the principle of 'succeeding at home' as an alternative to migrating – the project also juxtaposes a 'stay at home' discourse with the dangers of irregular migration. An important output of the project is the '*Tekki fi*' ('Succeed at home' in Wolof) video series. Using Senegalese actors, the videos deliver a fictionalised account of the misery endured by a Senegalese migrant working in a non-descript warehouse in Europe, while his brother in Senegal thrives as an entrepreneur running his own business.[40] By using Senegalese actors and the Wolof language, the series aims to connect with its target audience of young Senegalese would-be migrants at a cultural level. The series has been subsequently screened on a national television channel (EC 2019k).

The Tekki Fi initiative has been reproduced under an EUTF project in the Gambia that was adopted in May 2018. The Gambian project uses the same Wolof slogan, where the project explicitly draws

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[38] As Heller (2014) notes, information campaigns implemented in African countries also have a historical reference point in 'educational colonial cinema': educational documentaries streamed from mobile vans used in the colonial period to 'educate' colonial audiences.

[39] As noted in Chapter 3, Ghana was until recently a beneficiary only of regional projects, and no national projects, under the EUTF. This is not the case for Senegal, that has benefitted from a range of projects implemented at the national level since 2016.

[40] These observations are drawn from my accompanying a number of the EUTF project's launch events in the Senegalese regions of Tambacounda and Vélingara in October 2017, where the 'Tekki Fi' video was screened. The Tekki Fi series can be found online.

on lessons learned from the Senegalese project (as evident in the project fiche). The project's stated aim is to 'support the Government in its attempt to nurture [a] perception shift for the Gambian population moving away from a 'future through migration' to a 'future in The New Gambia'' (EC 2018b). In the Gambian Tekki Fi programme, Gambian rap and hip-hop artists are recruited into delivering the message that Gambians can 'make it' at home without resorting to irregular migration (see YEP Gambia 2019).

In the case of the awareness-raising campaign implemented in Senegal and implemented by the Italian NGO network CIPSI, the medium of film was used to disseminate the message of dissuasion in communities of migrant departure. Accordingly, the aim was to encourage potential migrants to 'renounce the adventure' after seeing the projected film(s), that included 'poignant testimonies told by the migrants themselves' (*Le Quotidien* 2018 – my translation). As I go on to demonstrate, migrants and returnees are purposefully recruited in dissuasion campaigns in order to lend credibility to external actors' messages.

In ensuring the message of dissuasion is disseminated along important migratory routes, the EAM outlines the setting-up of 'multi-purpose' centres in Niger and other countries of origin and transit, aiming to provide migrants with information on resettlement opportunities but also to 'provide a realistic picture of the likely success of migrants' journeys' (EC 2015, p. 5). The cumulative effect of these interventions is an effort to 'shape the subjectivities of potential migrants' (Rodriguez 2019, p.735) and can be interpreted as a 'steering of human behaviour' (Pécoud 2010, p.184).

The diffused messages of dissuasion therefore go beyond highlighting the dangers of the migration route through to Libya. Firstly, they set out to shape perceptions of the irregular migrant's experience in Europe, and to reinforce the message of dissuasion by emphasising precarity. An interviewee at the EU delegation in Accra described this rationale of awareness campaigning as follows:

> *You try to explain to the people that Europe is not very keen to host as in the*
> *past, and that they will not have many chances as maybe others did in the past.*
> *There are risks that they are taking in crossing the desert and then they will*
> *arrive in Europe, where they can't work because they don't have papers.*

- Interview 36, EU Delegation to Ghana. Accra, 25 January 2018.

In addition, awareness-raising campaigns such as *Tekki fi* stress the duty of the migrant towards his/her community of origin by remaining 'at home': this message transpires clearly in the series.

Described in an EU press article, the series is seen as raising important questions about 'the notion of success [and] commitment to one's country' (EC 2019k). In this way, deterrence narratives evoke notions of a patriotic duty that migrants and would-be migrants have towards their countries, while implicitly casting them as agents for national development.

Narratives that so evidently derive from an external source, and that counter local narratives about migration, face credibility issues among local populations in Senegal and Ghana. The effectiveness of the EU's deterrence campaigns depend on the willingness of migrants to accept such narratives as legitimate; refusal therefore forms an important obstacle (Pécoud 2010). My interviewee at the EU delegation in Accra noted the distrust faced by both European implementers and Ghanaian government officials when carrying out awareness raising activities in-country:

> *If GIS go to the communities to explain this, they don't believe it. Because it's GIS, Ghana Immigration Service. If it's us, as Europeans, they will not believe it. But if it's an association of people that are Ghanaians, and from the communities from the North for example, they will pay attention. (…) That is why in our campaigns we are working with schools, and parents and families – it's crucial. And it's crucial that we work with Ghanaians and these associations of Ghanaians, that have already crossed the desert and they faced all these difficulties.*

- Interview 36, EU Delegation to Ghana. Accra, 25 January 2018.

As noted in the citation above, a perception that dissuasion narratives fail to convince their intended audience has led several interventions to recruit locals in campaigning and awareness-raising efforts. In particular, 'failed' migrants and returnees are recruited into dissuasion campaigns to lend credibility to EU narratives about the dangers of irregular migration. Driving this initiative is the notion that giving externally-derived narratives a local dimension will make them more acceptable to intended audiences. The founder of a Ghanaian migrants' association that I interviewed works with international donors including the German development cooperation agency GIZ, the UN, the EU as well as with the Ghana Immigration Service in awareness-raising campaigns. He was adamant that personal experience as a migrant was crucial when engaging young aspiring migrants:

> *We try to discourage people from passing to the road* [sic]. *Because the way we see it, mostly when you talk to them, and you have never passed through the*

> *road, they say: 'You have never been there. What are you trying to tell us?' But*
>
> *for us, we have been there. I've passed through the land, through the desert,*
>
> *I've passed through the sea. I have both of those experiences.'*

- Interview 47, founder of a Ghanaian migrant returnees' association (himself a returnee from Libya, having attempted and failed to cross to Europe in 2006). Accra, 3 March 2018.

The migrants' association represented above has helped to produce warning messages disseminated on national television; and a video that highlights the risks of migration, with the intention of this being played on buses going north along the Ghanaian migration route.[41] As mentioned, the dissemination platforms that are used to diffuse messages of dissuasion are diverse and extensive, including broadcasting warning messages on national TV and radio. Common to both Senegalese and Ghanaian awareness-raising campaigns is that they use local voices, local languages, and the personal (often traumatic) experiences of returnees in the dissemination of warning messages about the dangers of irregular migration. In doing so, they aim to give a local dimension to externally-produced narratives, and to re-orient local perceptions away from the migrant as a successful role model.

These reflections on information campaigns nonetheless highlight another important feature: that insofar there is a 'logic' of migration in migrant communities, it is not easily reconciled with the politics of control. This supports the findings of other authors who have highlighted conflicting 'logics' of policymakers and migrants (see Åkesson 2011; Flahaux & Kabbanji 2013; Rodriguez 2019), where this conflict has implications for policy effectiveness. I argue that it demonstrates the limitations of EU control narratives when exported to Senegal and Ghana, and indicates a role for local agency in countering deterrence strategies that play to the immigration agendas of EU Member States without also accounting for migrants' voices.

4.2.4 Entrepreneurialism as a panacea: a neoliberal bias

The final external narrative device that I discuss here is the presentation of entrepreneurialism as a logical 'fix' for migration aspirations. As I have argued above, in advancing a stay-at-home discourse, EU narratives have presented aspiring migrants and returnees with migration alternatives. Yet, these alternatives invariably take a prescriptive form: entrepreneurship and vocational training options are presented as the most plausible options for programme beneficiaries. These alternatives reflect top-down narratives that, I contend, uncritically cast both

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[41] Interviews 36 and 47.

migrants and would-be migrants as development agents in a 'self-help from below' push that detracts responsibility from the state as a provider of basic services and social protection. Such 'self-help' development narratives are partly driven by neoliberal ideologies, as also observed by Castles, de Haas, and Miller (2014, p.82). They increasingly present, I argue, a one-size-fits-all solution to a heterogeneous group of 'beneficiaries', whether these are aspiring migrants or returning migrants.

While working with third countries to prevent irregular migration has been an explicit intention since the GAMM (2005), the Valletta Action Plan of 2015 specifically advances the 'root causes of irregular migration' rationale where planned interventions in third countries include '[enhancing] employment opportunities and revenue-generating activities in regions of origin and transit of migrants' (European Council 2015a, p.3). In particular, the 'compacts' established under the 2016 Partnership Framework have, as one of three key objectives, the aim 'to enable migrants and refugees to stay close to home and to avoid taking dangerous journeys' (EC 2016c, p.6). A progress report on the Partnership Framework furthermore notes the importance of ensuring effective migration management to 'dissuade people from embarking on hazardous journeys' (EC 2017b p. 13). These are indications of the sedentary narrative that advocates 'staying at home' as an alternative to migrating, that adopts a paternalistic tone around 'enabling' migrants to stay at home; and emphasises risk as part of a broader, targeted strategy of migration dissuasion.

As a priority partner country, Senegal has been a major recipient of funding under the EU's EUTF instrument, where the link between job creation and reducing irregular migration is explicit. This is iterated for instance in the 2016 Partnership Framework that stipulates that dialogue with Senegal on migration-related topics 'should be strengthened in particular in view of offering economic opportunities and reducing irregular flows' (EC 2016c, p.14). It is reiterated in subsequent progress reports on the Partnership Framework that point to the implementation of EUTF projects in the country as 'concrete actions to prevent irregular migration, in particular in the field of employment creation' (EC 2017a, p.5). An EU delegation official in Dakar (coordinating the Trust Fund's portfolio on employment and job creation in Senegal) emphasised that Senegal's status as a recipient for these kinds of projects was almost unparalleled in the region, while highlighting the prominence of job creation in the strategy for EU intervention in the country:

> *Our portfolio in Senegal is one of the biggest: the second after Niger, in terms*
> *of financial volumes for the [Trust] Fund. And with an important focus on job*
> *creation, where even in [my colleague's] portfolio on increasing resilience – even*

there is also a strong focus on job creation in rural areas. In fact, the starting point was that traditionally, one of the main push factors for migration is the search for economic opportunities in Europe. And so the idea is to propose credible alternatives to irregular migration, in the form of economic opportunities.

- Interview 22, EU Delegation to Senegal. Dakar, 7 Nov 2017. My translation.

Projects that focus on job creation are well received by Senegalese and Ghanaian state actors, where they are seen as complementary to national development plans despite the overriding goal of reducing irregular migration. Job creation projects chime with the economic development agendas of both states, and while the underlying interest in migration control is understood, it nonetheless forms an area of overlapping interests. Creation of employment emerged as one of the five Valletta Summit pillars that African states have voiced a stronger interest in.[42] Vocational training and youth employability is a priority of the Senegalese state as stipulated in the 'Plan for an Emerging Senegal', the national strategy for socioeconomic development of President Macky Sall's government.[43] A MAESE official similarly commented on the synergies between the EUTF's employment creation focus, and the Senegalese state's '*terre ferme*' agenda of promoting agricultural development while also acting as a mechanism to prevent migration from places of origin:

'Terre ferme' refers to the possibility of stabilising migrants in their places of origin. To make sure people do not have to worry about moving, but can stay and cultivate their land. It is in this context that the EU, in the framework of Valletta, wanted to support many initiatives. These projects, among others, are for keeping populations in their places of origin.

- Interview 19, MAESE. Dakar, 2 Nov 2017. My translation.

The above citation of a Senegalese official reflects some of the language of external dissuasion narratives of 'enabling' youths to forego migration and remain in their places of origin. Equally, in Ghana, ministry officials speak of young Ghanaians leaving in search of 'greener pastures' and theorise that there will be a fall in the number of perilous journeys undertaken if there is a greater

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[42] Interview 10, DG DEVCO. Brussels, 28 September 2017.
[43] Interview 24, European NGO. Dakar, 7 November 2017.

abundance of employment opportunities.[44] The fostering of a more 'attractive environment' for young people is at the heart of a number of government initiatives set up by the Ghanaian government that promote employment in migrant departure zones.[45] The EU's root causes narrative therefore finds overlap with national initiatives implemented by the Senegalese and Ghanaian political administrations. To some extent, third country officials argue that the narrative of addressing 'root causes' of irregular migration was co-constructed between EU and African stakeholders. Senegalese officials thus considered that the uptake of a 'root causes' approach focusing on expanding employment opportunities in migrant departure zones into the pillars of the 2015 Valletta Summit was directly inspired by existing national initiatives and discourse led by Senegal and other African countries of origin that participated at Valletta.[46]

The number of projects funded by international donors that promote entrepreneurship 'at home' as an alternative to migrating, or as part of reintegration packages, are numerous (examples of these initiatives are in the table below). Common to these initiatives is that they target youths, focus on business formation, and place an emphasis on personal endeavour and private sector solutions in overcoming local development challenges. These elements strongly reflect a neoliberal ideology underpinning their rationale. In the case of the third project depicted in the table, project beneficiaries explicitly include *both* returnees and would-be migrants, with the geographical location of the project reflecting this target audience.

Table 4.2: Entrepreneurialism projects targeting youths and migrants

PROJECT	DETAILS
Initiative implemented by the German development cooperation (GIZ) in Senegal	Guidance and support is provided to Senegalese youths in the setting up of a business, and in the formation of a business plan to '[enable] the entrepreneur candidate to convince financial, technical and institutional partners to accept and participate in the realisation of their business idea' (GIZ 2019).
Implemented by the Technical Centre for Agricultural and Rural	An institution funded by the EU and active in promoting agrobusiness in ACP countries runs a project promoting youth entrepreneurship in Mali and Senegal in order to 'help them

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[44] Interview 43, MoFARI, Europe Bureau. Accra, 23 February 2018.
[45] Interviews 41, 42 and 43, MoFARI. Accra, February 2018.
[46] Interviews 16 and 19, MAESE and DGSE. Dakar, November 2017.

Cooperation ACP-EU (CTA) in Senegal	overcome the challenges they face in rural areas and encourage them to stay in their home country' (CTA 2019).
Initiative implemented by an Italian development organisation in Ghana	'We are focusing on professional [training]; specifically we are doing a training course in organic agriculture in the Brong-Ahafo region. Not only [training]; our purpose is to create a link with the labour market and we have set up a micro-credit fund to help this target group, which is: migrant returnees (especially from Libya) *and* potential migrants. So, young people unemployed – [offering them] training, and implementing after what they have learned from the training with these tools to start their own business. And we are working right now only in Brong-Ahafo region – it's the most affected region in Ghana for irregular migration.' (Interview 45, European NGO. Tema (Ghana), 1 March 2018).

A DGSE official confirmed that EU project goals had broadened in scope since Valletta, as the EU would 'not only continue to finance projects for reintegration and reintegration of migrants' but would also 'finance projects to prevent those who have not left yet'.[47] As EU policies increasingly focus on deterrence and containment, so migration projects implemented in Senegal and Ghana reflect a target audience that includes those who have never migrated but are considered likely to do so.

The optimism found in political discourse on the potential of entrepreneurship in migration policy plays on notions of personal responsibility that are common in neoliberal political ideology. The promotion of a single solution may prove either ineffective, or in other cases may have undesired outcomes: such as the creation of a large pool of entrepreneurs with limited entrepreneurial skills or ability (Naudé *et al.* 2017).

I draw on a further example of one such project advocating migration 'alternatives' through the promotion of entrepreneurship opportunities in the region of origin. The French development agency ACTED, reported the following of a 2018 promotional campaign that it conducted in the

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[47] Interview 16, DGSE. Dakar, 17 October 2017. My translation.

Senegalese regions, where the cultural dimension of the initiative is apparent as it aims to break with popular conceptions on migration, and uses the voices of local actors:

> *To break with popular belief in Senegal, the campaign promotes economic opportunities and success stories in different regions. (…) Posters with the slogan 'All entrepreneurs!' were displayed at the stall; photos from the project and the testimonies of the two actors present were broadcast to attract the attention of visitors.*

- *(ACTED 2018).*

The narrative of 'alternatives' to migration serves to deconstruct existing notions of migration as the path to success, and presents instead a neoliberal narrative of success through personal perseverance and entrepreneurship. What is reflected in the discourse of the entrepreneurial projects listed in this section is a form of politically-saturated advocacy for a particular 'alternative': remaining at 'home' and pursuing an entrepreneurial endeavour in one's region of origin. What is obscured (but not altogether hidden) in these narratives is that while irregular migration carries an important element of personal risk, business ventures are not risk-free: financial proposals have to be drawn up by applicants and financial partners have to be 'convinced' to pledge their support (see table 4.2); and youths are assisted in such projects to 'win the bet of self-promotion and self-employment' - Senegalese National Migration Policy (NMP) (Ministry of Finance of Senegal 2018, p.96).

The choice to focus on entrepreneurialism as a solution to migrants' aspirations places the implementation of projects that focus on this firmly in the domain of the technical, despite such solutions being informed by political agendas and a neoliberal ideology. The EU's cooperation with state actors in Senegal in the context of EUTF projects on job creation and entrepreneurialism is largely with technical ministries and agencies linked to private sector development, such as the *Bureau de Mise à Niveau* (BMN), the Agency for the Development of Small and Medium Enterprises (ADEPME) and the Ministry of Vocational Training, Learning and Crafts (MFPAA).[48] As an interviewee at the EU Delegation in Dakar noted, this mirrors the expertise of participating

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[48] Interviews 22 and 23, EU Delegation to Senegal. Dakar, 7 November 2017; Participant observation, EUTF project. Tambacounda, Nov 2017.

development agencies of EU Member States (such as LUX-DEV) who build on their historical cooperation with technical ministries in the implementation of vocational training projects.[49]

Top-down narratives have shaped migration deterrence initiatives such as awareness-raising campaigns and projects promoting entrepreneurialism. Many of these initiatives are driven and implemented by international donors, with Senegalese and Ghanaian state entities involved in varying degrees in their conceptualisation or implementation. In contrast, Senegalese and Ghanaian government ministries have been the main architects of diaspora engagement policies, which encourage the return of the diaspora to contribute to national development.

4.2.5 Diaspora diplomacy and extracting obligations

The previous sections have discussed deterrence and neoliberal narratives driving migration interventions and their deployment in Senegal and Ghana, where these can be traced back to the EU as the source of ideational export. The policy discourse on diaspora engagement, where programmes and policies aim to channel the diaspora's investments and skills into national development, similarly relies on an assumption of entrepreneurial ability of migrants. Yet where the narratives so far described are EU-driven, I discuss in this section the narrative of diaspora engagement that is substantially shaped by domestic elites. These narratives still instrumentalise migrants and place them within a value system where their net 'worth' to the state is determined. African governments have shown an increasing interest in engaging their diaspora abroad as contributors to national development, and in including the diaspora in the national political consciousness. This heralds a change in the political discourse: in earlier decades, such as the 1980s in Ghana, skilled emigrants who left the homeland were unequivocally portrayed as 'unpatriotic' (Teye, Alhassan, and Setrana 2017, p.158). An academic and regional migration expert at the Centre for Migration Studies in Ghana affirmed that up until the late 2000s, migration was viewed negatively in Ghana, primarily revolving around brain-drain arguments.[50] The shift towards a more positive perspective on migration signalled a departure from the labour-export model that many African countries actively pursued in previous decades, to a diaspora engagement policy model (Sinatti 2018).

Migration is increasingly construed as an instrument to stimulate national development, through the mechanisms of promoting return to the homeland, transnationalism, and migrant

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[49] Interview 22.
[50] Interview 49, Centre for Migration Studies (CMS). Accra, 7 March 2018.

entrepreneurship. At the level of discourse, this is evident in the emerging national migration policies (NMPs) of Senegal and Ghana that both frame migrants as important development actors. The Senegalese NMP perceives the importance of 'making the migrant a key player in capturing the demographic dividend and economic development', envisaging more financial products tailored for migrant entrepreneurs (Ministry of Finance of Senegal 2018, p.31). It aims to put in place concrete measures to encourage the diaspora abroad to invest their remittances, in addition to sending remittances for daily household consumption (*ibid.*, p.18). The Ghanaian NMP perceives that returning migrants, having acquired or enhanced their skillset while abroad, are more likely to be investors and able to contribute to national development through the use of their 'skills, knowledge and productive resources' (Ministry of Interior of Ghana 2016, p.42). Initiatives for diaspora return are often skewed in favour of attracting the 'ideal migrant returnee' or investor who is simultaneously resourceful, experienced and entrepreneurial (Sinatti 2018, p.2; Naudé, Siegel, and Marchand 2017). As I demonstrate in this section, domestic discourse in Senegal and Ghana on diaspora engagement comprises many state-led, top-down policy narratives, that seek primarily to derive economic gains from migrants. In addition, both national discourses reflect a bias in favour of encouraging the return of skilled over un-skilled migrants.

The interest of African states in diaspora engagement policies is not a recent one. As an interviewee in the DGSE was keen to stress: the purpose of the *Bureaux d'Accueil et d'Orientation des Sénégalais de l'Extérieur* (BAOS), operational since the 1970s, has been to support returns to Senegal while elsewhere the Senegalese government has mapped zones at high risk of migrant departure, and sought to stimulate employment in these regions through the strategic placement of projects implemented by technical ministries such as ANIDA (National Agency for Agricultural Integration and Development).[51] The Senegalese government has long been funding and implementing programmes that promote diaspora return and investment. A flagship programme in this area is the *Fonds d'Appui à l'Investissement des Sénégalais de l'Extérieur* (FAISE) programme, launched in 2008 and run by the Directorate-General for Senegalese Abroad (DGSE) as part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Senegalese Abroad (MAESE). The FAISE programme offers small loans to members of the Senegalese diaspora for the purpose of financing investment projects in Senegal. Eligibility to accessing project funding is limited to Senegalese abroad who have a legal immigration status in their host country, and who have significant entrepreneurial skills (see MAESE 2016). In principle the DGSE asserts that funding through the FAISE is open to

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[51] Interview 16, DGSE. Dakar, 17 October 2017.

both skilled and un-skilled members of the Senegalese diaspora, where a female interviewee at the DGSE working on the FAISE programme noted 'All Senegalese abroad can benefit from financing: whether he/she is qualified or not qualified, he can benefit from financing.'[52] However, the eligibility criteria arguably increase the likelihood that those eligible – and those subsequently selected – for funding will be highly skilled. The DGSE's interest in targeting specifically highly-skilled members of the diaspora – as these are deemed more likely to contribute to productive economic sectors – is furthermore highlighted by an interviewee at the DGSE:

> There are some areas where we are separating highly-skilled migrants. These days we are working on how to have a database of Senegalese who are experts; highly qualified. For example, Senegal is a country that has recently discovered oil. So, there are Senegalese who work in multinationals: if we can identify them, they can come back. They may be experts in petroleum-chemistry, in hydrocarbons; they can come back (…) to come help in economic and social development.

- Interview 20, economist at DGSE (formerly at FAISE). Dakar, 3 November 2017.

Ghana's evolution of its diaspora policies has gained considerable political momentum in recent years. The *Joseph Project* was introduced in 2007, and is intended to promote return visits of the African diaspora to Ghana for both tourism and development. Ghana's diaspora engagement policies carry a distinct cultural dimension: to this end, initiatives such as the Joseph Project promote learning of Ghanaian culture among the diaspora. The Ghanaian diaspora engagement policy is distinct from the Senegalese model in that it aims to foster links also with second-generation Ghanaians abroad,[53] and to involve them in cultural programmes that promote symbolic nation-building (Teye, Alhassan, and Setrana 2017). Equally, in the case of Ghana, the Ghanaian administration has adopted an 'active policy' to encourage the contributions of the diaspora to national development, however this is skewed in favour of its citizens abroad who studied abroad, or acquired knowledge and experience, in the expectation that such returnees will 'bring some aspect of that to national development.'[54]

A dynamic that has emerged is that both Senegalese and Ghanaian state actors have firmly emphasised economic and developmental gains from migration, while extending migrants social

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[52] Interview 27, DGSE, FAISE office. Dakar, 10 November 2017.
[53] Interview 40, CMS. Accra, 20 February 2018.
[54] Interview 38, Diaspora Bureau. Accra, 20 February 2018.

protection and rights remains a lesser priority. Teye, Alhassan, and Setrana (2017) note that not much has been done in terms of provision of social and civil services to the diaspora; matters such as portability of social security are of high importance to potential returnees, yet the Ghanaian government has made little effort to discuss this with host state governments. The inclusion of a clause on initiating processes to achieve portability of social security of diaspora in the Ghanaian National Migration Policy (Ministry of Interior of Ghana 2016, p.72) appears so far mostly rhetorical. While extending rights to the diaspora has been the subject of much government rhetoric, in practice, laws introduced such as 'Right of Abode'[55] have been poorly implemented where the process of getting a residence permit have proven frustrating for eligible applicants (Teye *et al.* 2017). Other entitlements extended have an explicit economic dimension: the government has enabled Ghanaians abroad to hold foreign accounts in Ghanaian banks, in order to enhance financial transfers and enable the diaspora to obtain housing loans. Diaspora criticisms of the government have also noted that the environment for investments needs to be improved, and that pertinent issues such as land acquisition procedures and the time taken to formalise investment documents remain an important hurdle (*ibid*, p.156).

Extending rights has also been superseded on two counts in the Senegalese National Migration Policy: on the one hand, by migration and border management capacity building aims, and on the other by the government's emphasis on economic gains to be made through diaspora engagement. The focus on migration management, and the comparatively low level of representation of migrant groups *other* than the diaspora in stakeholder consultations is expressed by an interviewee from a Senegalese NGO working on migration and development:

> *Our authorities are interested in other priorities – political and economic aspects*
> *– than other areas of migration. (…) The themes they have proposed are more*
> *linked to the management of migration, rather than human rights and such. So,*
> *they have sooner prioritised topics of migration management. This is normal*
> *also because the IOM – which funded the process – IOM is more focused on the*
> *issue of border management. Another aspect that has also been noted is that*
> *most migrant associations are not involved. There's the involvement of the*
> *relevant ministries, there's civil society, there are the diaspora… but there are*
> *no migrant associations that are based in Senegal [that are involved].*

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[55] The Right of Abode law allows any person of African descent to apply and be granted right to stay in Ghana.

- Interview 18, Project manager of a Senegalese NGO. Dakar, 30 October 2017.

The project manager cited above notes that protecting the rights of immigrants should be also an important consideration in the formulation of a national migration policy, but this has not constituted an important dimension of the Senegalese NMP.[56] The emphasis on extracting obligations and producing economic gains from migration as a policy priority of Senegalese state actors is affirmed in the following assessment of the European Migration Liaison Officer of the EU Delegation in Dakar, who noted in response to my question about the political priorities of her Senegalese government interlocutors: 'it is especially the economic interest of migration. I would say, the *first* priority is that: the economic benefits to be derived from migration.'[57]

4.3 Civil society actors: sense-making of narratives

The preceding sections have analysed how specific narratives and interests have driven migration governance in the case study countries, and how they have shaped the initiatives both of external donors as well as government policy. This section looks at the uptake of narratives by practitioners in the field and concludes that civil society actors often respond to top-down narratives by integrating these with existing practices and mandates. Much like policy actors, civil society actors on the ground engage in 'sense-making' of their environment including the social construction of justification; as Weick (1995) notes, a characteristic of sense-making is that situations are progressively clarified in reverse, where it is more often the case that an outcome develops a definition of a given situation (p.11; see also Garfinkel 1984). I propose that in many instances NGOs opt to straddle two narratives by 'not being anti-migration' but also being involved to varying degrees in the EU's governance narratives in their implementation of awareness raising campaigns and other migration dissuasion and deterrence strategies. This also often takes the form of choosing beneficiaries, and targeting interventions geographically, to ensure that development project interventions have an impact on migration flows.

Straddling narratives

A feature common to multiple civil society actors and non-governmental organisations working on migration governance topics in Senegal and Ghana is the attempt to incorporate EU narratives on risk and deterrence with other narratives, such as a rights-based approach. As most NGOs I

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[56] Interview 30, Italian NGO. Dakar, 17 November 2017.
[57] Interview 14, EU Delegation to Senegal. Dakar, 13 October 2017.

spoke to received either bilateral or EU funding in the implementation of their activities, this utilitarian stance may emerge as a practical necessity.[58] The outright rejection of deterrence narratives, on the far end of the spectrum, was rare in my sample as all civil society interviewees – local and international – noted some incorporation of EU narratives of deterrence in their project activities. This tendency to straddle a containment narrative with narratives on the rights of migrants resulted in the at-times awkward amalgamation of assertions: while activities were not intended to *prevent* migration, they did serve to deter.

In one such instance, an Italian NGO working in Ghana featured the following in its organisational mandate, acknowledging at once the complexity of managing irregular migration, the right to a decent life in one's country of origin, and the right to migrate:

> *We consider that the irregular migration is a complex issue that require multi-faceted and multi-disciplinary approach. (…) We believe that human beings should have the right to live a decent life and enjoy it in their countries in according to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Art. 11 (…) This should include the right to find this life outside their own nations by following the national and international migration laws.*

- Charter of Italian NGO active in Ghana. VIS 2018, p.1.

Three interviewees of development organisations active in the case study countries were keen to emphasise that their organisation's activities in raising awareness on the dangers of irregular migration served the purpose primarily of informing: in other words, ensuring the decision to migrate is an informed decision. As with the organisational mandate of the Italian NGO cited above, they situate this within a broader framework that recognises the right to migrate. In the case of a Ghanaian NGO working in research and providing counselling to migrants, the director I interviewed clarified that the migration information campaigns conducted by his organisation sought to ensure that migrants are empowered to make an informed decision, while his organisation also sought to offer decent alternatives.[59] The citations below from NGO representatives reflect this rationale, where raising awareness on risk is an activity that is considered to fit within the normative framework that civil society organisations operate.

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[58] Smaller NGOs are being unable to access EUTF funding directly, but are sub-recruited into implementing parts of EUTF initiatives by larger NGOs, or the IOM (Interviews 24 and 30, European NGOs. Dakar, November 2017).

[59] Interview 48, Ghanaian NGO. Accra, 7 March 2018.

Table 4.3: Migration as an informed decision

'We as an NGO we are all for the free movement of people, that is to say, **we are not *against* migration**. There is no NGO that is working to stop migration. We might do projects that inform about the dangers of irregular migration. As in: be careful, if you travel irregularly, and you go to Mali, Libya etc., it's likely to go badly for you. (My translation.)	Interview 30, Italian NGO. Dakar, 17 Nov. 2017.
'**We believe that migration is a natural phenomenon - and it is a right. So** we are not here to ask migrants - young people - not to leave**. We try to inform them about the risks and everything - but it's up to them to decide.**' (*My translation.*)	Interview 18, Project Manager of a Senegalese NGO. Dakar, 30 Oct. 2017.

Civil society organisations have also been active in creating opportunities for youths in sending regions, viewing this component of a deterrence-driven agenda as better aligned with a development mandate. One interviewee, representing a NGO whose activities were based exclusively in the Northern region of Ghana that is a major migrant departure zone, put it as follows: 'It's not enough to say, "Don't go" – you have to give another option or chance'.[60] Employment generation has also tended to fit in with classical development initiatives implemented by civil society organisations; yet, increasingly the EU encourages projects to be implemented in rural migrant departure zones, rather in cities that youths have tended to migrate to and where bilateral development initiatives have often based their interventions.[61] Some are sceptical about the potential for these types of projects to reduce irregular migration, and on the effectiveness of awareness-raising campaigns, despite implementing these types of activities. As one project coordinator of an Italian NGO in Senegal commented in relation to projects that promote 'alternatives' to migration: 'These are things NGOs have always done (…) But I don't know what direct impact it will have on migration flows.'[62]

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[60] Interview 45, Italian NGO in Ghana. Tema, 1 March 2018.
[61] Interview 3, DG HOME. Brussels, 22 September 2017; Interview 22, EU Delegation to Senegal. Dakar, 7 November 2017.
[62] Interview 30, Italian NGO in Senegal. Dakar, 17 November 2017.

Critically engaging with narratives

NGOs engaged in political advocacy on migration topics were, unsurprisingly, more likely to be explicitly critical of the dominant narratives, and to take steps to independently assess the approach adopted by the EU – or that of the state – from a broader perspective of thematic interventions. The question of free movement protocols in the West African region and their associated legal frameworks forms a key reference point for this category of NGOs in their contestation of political narratives.[63] Equally, NGOs on this end of the spectrum scrutinise migration policies formed between EU-African political actors, and point to notable shortfalls in the emerging migration policy framework created in the collaboration between the EU and (predominantly) state actors.

The network of Senegalese civil society organisations, CONGAD, actively lobbies on human rights and aims to bolster the institutional capacity of civil society organisations in the country to critically assess migration governance issues.[64] A recent coordinated campaign of the network has been to challenge the hardening of immigration controls in West Africa using the example of the Senegalese-Mauritanian border, and the arrest and deportation of migrants that this has entailed, which it argues is directly in contradiction with free movement protocols established between Mauritania and ECOWAS (CONGAD 2017, p.18). It thus considers 'the proliferation of obstacles to the freedom of movement of persons' to have the cumulative effect of putting the right to mobility in the region at risk (*ibid.;* my translation). In particular, CONGAD's research directly links EU external governance since 2015 to these developments as the 'tightening of Mauritanian legislation is one of the consequences of the outsourcing of European policies that have materialised through the instrumentalisation of official development aid' (*ibid.*). The report was extensively shared with government stakeholders in Senegal and formed an important part of the network's government lobbying campaign.[65] Three different NGO representatives that I interviewed in Dakar also included advocacy and political lobbying among their organisation's principal activities, where advocacy activities were targeted at either the Senegalese state, or international actors, or both.

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[63] For an overview of the ECOWAS free movement protocol, see Chapter 2.

[64] CONGAD was set up in 1982 by Senegalese NGOs as a coordinated mechanism of communicating between civil society actors and the Senegalese state. The network is active in lobbying and works to promote common positions between NGOs for a more 'efficient public action' (CONGAD 2018).

[65] Notes from civil society-government stakeholder meeting. Dakar, 21 November 2017.

The network REMIDEV (*Réseau Migration et Développement*) was set up by CONGAD in 2007, and constitutes a working group of civil society organisations that engage specifically on migration and development questions. The working group's main activities encompass advocacy, awareness raising, and conducting observation missions on the treatment of migrants in transit.[66] Yet, information campaigns led by the REMIDEV network have focused primarily on raising awareness of the Free Movement Protocol of ECOWAS and the rights conferred thereunder.[67] The network has also been active in producing 'alternative' reports that counter dominant narratives and interpretations, such as producing an alternative report on a national migration policy for Senegal. A key contention that it has formed is that the current NMP of Senegal is skewed in favour of a securitised approach on the one hand, under the influence of external actors and the IOM; on the other hand, the Senegalese state's interests in migration governance have prioritised diaspora engagement over a more comprehensive approach that accounts for the protection of immigrants' rights in Senegal. This has led to the NMP being subject to criticism from NGOs that contest this policy bias: 'When we talk about national migration policy, it must really concern all migration: migrants based in Senegal, *and* the diaspora.'[68] In other instances, NGOs speak out against the security lens of EU external governance: one interviewee noted his organisation's activities focused on lobbying for the rights of migrants to be taken into account in policy formulation while contending the 'displacement of Europe's southern border' as far as Libya and Mauritania.[69]

Accommodating narratives

Regarding civil society actors, I did not discover any in the course of my research that were wholly accommodating of external narratives or top-down narratives on migration. Certainly, non-state actors whose activities focus on the technical implementation of migration projects without extending their activities into advocacy, are more accommodating of EU narratives of deterrence. These actors place their intervention largely at the practice level, without venturing into influencing policy discourse.

Besides civil society, the IOM emerges as an actor that, as an organisation whose agenda is donor-driven, enacts the dominant external narratives on migration. IOM interventions in Senegal and

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[66] Interview 18, Senegalese NGO. Dakar, 30 October 2017.
[67] *ibid*.
[68] *ibid;* my translation.
[69] Interview 31, Senegalese NGO. Dakar, 17 November 2017.

Ghana are project-led: all projects are donor-funded while there is no other core funding for activities.[70] IOM interviewees at the Accra and Dakar offices noted that the organisation's activities in-country consist of providing direct assistance to migrants in terms of return and reintegration support; and border management capacity-building. In Ghana, the IOM has been a key implementer of the GIMMA project and is involved in counter-trafficking and fraud detection initiatives.[71] In Senegal, the IOM assists in the equipping and training of border post officers; it also participates in youth training projects where beneficiaries include returnees but also 'candidates for migration'.[72] The IOM in Ghana undertakes awareness-raising on the dangers of irregular migration; and technical research activities such as stakeholder mapping, aimed at establishing the network of migration policy actors in regions, as well as fostering migration data exchange for more effective migration management.[73] These activities are in line with EU narratives on migration governance.

4.4 Conclusion

In Chapter 2, it was determined that migration is an area of governance that has been subject to securitising dynamics, where political actors have played an important role in regulating the freedom to migrate, and in determining the groups or individuals qualified to exercise this freedom (Huysmans 2006; van Munster 2009). This chapter affirmed a security bias in EU narratives, in support of what has been affirmed in the broader literature that has concluded that migration is construed in the EU's migration agenda through a security lens (see e.g. Boswell 2003; Chou 2009; Paoletti 2011). It also analysed the manifestation of control narratives in a 'sedentary bias' (Bakewell 2008). Steering narratives are shown to combine neoliberal orthodoxy in development policy with security discourse, with the intended aim of rooting migrants in their place and curbing migration aspirations.

Credibility issues nonetheless arise in the transfer of sedentary narratives to local communities in Senegal and Ghana. The analysis shows that the limitations of EU narratives of control in Senegal and Ghana therefore exist at the level at which such narratives are accepted, or rejected, by their intended audience. African domestic actors were also shown to have their own distinct interests in migration policies, hinging primarily on economic gains, and predating EU externalisation in

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[70] Interview 17, IOM office in Senegal. Dakar, 17 October 2017; and Interview 37, IOM in Ghana. Accra, 19 February 2018.

[71] Interview 52, IOM in Ghana. Skype, 4 May 2018; Interview 37, IOM in Ghana. Accra, 19 February 2018.

[72] Interview 17.

[73] Interview 37.

West Africa. Narratives around diaspora engagement are rooted in symbolic nation-building, and promoting return to the homeland to participate in national development. As I go on to discuss in Chapter 6, state actors also perceive the influence of diaspora populations in political terms and consider the diaspora to be a constraining force in decision-making.

Finally, this chapter analysed the responses of non-state actors to policy narratives. I found that these responses reflect a process of 'sense-making', where, in many instances, NGOs opt to straddle narratives of control and a rights-based approach. The next chapter refocuses the analysis on EU policy-making as a contested site of governance, where actors compete to shape the content and direction of policy.

Chapter 5

Drivers of EU external migration governance in crisis

5.1 Introduction

In the preceding chapter, the narrative frames that guide EU and other top-down migration governance interventions in the case studies were presented. In this chapter the discussion refocuses on the drivers of EU migration governance and developments since the introduction of the GAMM, and in the context of the migration 'crisis' of 2015. I examine here the impact of the crisis on policy-making processes.

Drawing on theories of policy change in organisational sociology and public policy, this chapter assesses how the EU responded to renewed demands from its political environment to achieve more results in its external relations with African countries in migration. It is firstly established that the crisis played a role in providing EU Member States with the political momentum to call for a coordinated response, and to scale up engagement with third countries on migration. The deepened politicisation of migration in domestic arenas led to mounting pressure applied by individual EU Member States for the EU to 'act' on migration. The first section situates the renewed demands made by EU Member States in the context of the 2015 migration 'crisis' and analyses how this has shaped the EU's external migration governance. Using Kingdon's idea of 'policy streams' I contextualise this adaptational pressure and its effect on policy developments since 2015 that demonstrate a series of shifts made possible by the appearance of an agenda-setting opportunity, or a policy 'window' (Kingdon 1995) seized upon by EU Member States. By applying the multiple streams approach as a metaphor rather than strictly as a model to be tested, the analysis below benefits from a simplified overview of what are often subtle policy dynamics in an otherwise complex process. West Africa became a key region for the EU's migration governance intervention, and West African countries, presently, receive the largest percentage of funding under the EUTF, in comparison to other African regions (EC 2019b).

The second contribution of this chapter is to question the extent of policy novelty. This driving force has constituted a significant adaptational pressure on EU institutions to adopt a 'crisis governance' approach and to redefine or reinvigorate relations with third countries in migration. I argue that this pressure has not translated into a straightforward internalisation of demands that led to policy change. Examining the impact on policy development, I analyse the context in which the EUTF instrument was introduced, concluding that the actual extent of novelty in policy tools used is limited, and suggesting a partly performative role in the EU's crisis response. The EU's governance in the context of the migration crisis can be read as a continued commitment to pursuing an externalising logic, where policy adaptations can be observed such as an increasing prioritisation of containment in migration interventions in Senegal and Ghana; changes in political cooperation dynamics whereby establishing a higher rate of return has become prioritised; and changes to projects that reflect a crisis governance rationale.

Finally, this chapter examines the different voices within the EU institutions and differentiates responses at the organisational level, where I illustrate that different entities within the EU strive to shape policy-making dynamics and devise their own responses to external pressures. I conclude that 'deliberate malintegration' of policy (Brunsson 1989) has emerged as an organisational strategy at the EU level to allow for the broad enlisting of support from different parts of the administration, and a reconciling of different interests under one approach. This allows the EU to encapsulate different priorities and 'speak with one voice', a crucial part of the EU's goal of maintaining a position of strength vis-à-vis third countries.

5.2 Politicisation and the crisis

5.2.1 EU Member State demands

In 2015, the number of migrant arrivals and asylum applicants in the EU peaked with over 1.25 million first-time asylum applicants, more than twice the number of first-time applicants in 2014 (Eurostat 2017). In the same year, the EU established the European Agenda on Migration (EAM) citing the need for 'swift and determined action' in response to migrant deaths in the Mediterranean (EC 2015, p.3). The notion of a migration 'crisis' became firmly entrenched in EU political and public discourse. It is from 2015 onwards that the scaling up of EU engagement with West African countries became apparent through the European Agenda on Migration (2015), the Partnership Framework (2016) and the Valletta Summit that took place in late 2015, where the EU's Trust Fund instrument was launched against the backdrop of the migration crisis. West Africa

became a key region for migration governance intervention, and West African countries, presently, receive the largest percentage of funding under the EUTF, in comparison to other African regions (EC 2019b).

A public policy lens serves to highlight the importance of agenda-setting within the policy process. A central question to an agenda-setting perspective is: How do problems and solutions come to be matched together in public policy formulation? (Rochefort and Donnelly 2013, p.189). Kingdon's (1995) multiple streams approach sets out three 'streams' of problems, politics and policies that exist largely independently of each other, and develop according to their own dynamics and rules:

- The **problems stream** is the perception of problems that are considered public concerns, requiring government action to resolve.
- The **policy stream** is the output of experts and analysts who examine problems and propose solutions, where possibilities for action are identified and narrowed down according to feasibility.
- The **political stream** consists of factors that influence the current (national) political mood, shaped for example by interest advocacy groups (see Béland and Howlett 2016).

Policy windows are political opportunities created by external shocks such as a crisis, whereby the three independent streams envisaged by Kingdon flow into each other at a critical junction. In a similar vein, migration scholars have highlighted the historical tendency for policy shifts in migration governance to be sporadic, characterised by ad-hoc initiatives, and driven by sudden events (Castles, 2000; Leon and Overbeek 2015; Newland, 2010). Collyer (2012) demonstrated that the fatal shootings of 11 migrants at the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in September 2005 generated a level of public shock in Europe that he argues was a critical factor in the increasing focus on African-EU migration and in initiating the policy framework that would become the GAMM (p.506). Stern (2015) noted that the incident also paved the way for the Rabat Process to be launched in 2006, with the aim of establishing a framework for dialogue and consultation between the EU and African states, in the form of 'concrete and practical initiatives' to address the issue of migration management (p.5). In these cases, an external event caused African-EU migration governance to rise to the foreground of policy agendas, generating a series of responses at the level of agenda-setting and broader policy formulation.

Unlike rationalist approaches, the multiple streams framework envisaged by Kingdon (1995) sees the policy process as frequently chaotic and unpredictable, much like the 'garbage can' model of March and Olsen (1989) that it draws inspiration from (Howlett *et al.* 2016). In the 'garbage can' organisational choice model, decision-making processes take place in ambiguous and unstable environments, and decisions are taken by unpredictable actors moving between policy-making arenas while bringing their ideas and interests with them. Agenda setting opportunities come and go – timing is therefore important – and crises act as policy windows that enable the reframing of policy as political actors seize on problems as opportunities to apply their proposed (or 'pet') solution (Kingdon 1995, p.194; Anglund 1999; Teisman and van Buuren 2013). In other words, crises and their 'exploitation' (Boin, 'T Hart, and McConnell 2009) act as a disruption to societal routine and create a political space for actors – both inside and outside of government – to redefine issues, or to propose new policies and organisational reforms (p.82). Actors who are sufficiently strategic can in such cases exploit opportunities to further policy goals (Rhinard 2019, p.6). In the model below, the 2015 migration crisis can be construed as a policy window whereby governing migration became a political priority.

Figure 5.1: Multiple streams model.

Source: Author's compilation from Kingdon (1995).

Chapter 2 established that a public policy lens allows a richer analysis of decision-making dynamics and explanations of policy change or continuity; while institutionalism considers the formal structures and norms that have a constraining or 'dampening' force on policy actors (see John 2003). Additionally, organisational dynamics within the EU as an administration are an important variable to be integrated into theories of policy change (Boswell 2008). Since 2015, there is significant adaptational pressure that has arisen in the context of mounting pressure for the EU

(and, at the global level, the UN) to 'come up with a plan' (Panizzon and van Riemsdijk, 2019). Accordingly, EU Member States' call for action have demanded 'results' in areas such as securing more migrant returns. I establish how this pressure has taken form, and subsequently analyse how, at an organisational level, the EU has responded to it.

The EU Member State interactions with the EU form one of the 'levels' of the policy-making process of EU external migration governance, within a broader three-level game (see e.g. Reslow and Vink 2015).[74] Interviewees within the EU institutions cited the influence of (select) EU Member States as one of the key catalysts for driving policy formulation following the crisis, and in the development of the policy instrument that emerged – the EU's Trust Fund instrument. In particular, the efforts of Italy and Greece in generating pressure for the EU to act on the migration crisis was cited by an EEAS desk officer, who indicated these had initiated the push that led to the formulation of the new policy instrument.[75] The 28 EU Member States do not, of course, necessarily converge in their aims and views on migration policy, or on migration and its governance. While an aim common to most EU Member States is the reduction of irregular migration, how this is to be achieved is then subject to disagreements.[76] The question of increasing legal pathways – a concession that African states are keen to secure in negotiations with the EU and EU Member States – is indicated as being more politically contentious to southern EU Member States than to northern ones.[77] An interviewee at DG DEVCO furthermore asserted that security 'solutions' to migration were pushed more by some EU Member States, while others favoured looking at migration and development interventions.[78]

Interviews with staff within the European Commission illustrated how the need to act on the migration crisis created an impetus for policy development. On the one hand, citizens' expectations prompted action as migration increasingly emerged as an issue to be addressed, as discussed by a DG HOME official.

> *We had to find quick solutions that were addressing the problem; this is what*
> *our citizens expected, and we had to find solutions to the crisis. If you check the*

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[74] Within this 'three-level' game, the three different levels are i) the EU Member State level, ii) the EU institutions level and iii) third countries.
[75] Interview 1, EEAS. Brussels, 19 September 2017; see also EC (2017a).
[76] Interview 1.
[77] Interview 3, DG HOME. Brussels, 22 September 2017.
[78] Interview 7, DG DEVCO. Brussels, 26 September 2017.

> *Eurobarometers (...) migration was always one of the top priorities for EU citizens.*

- Interview 3, DG HOME. Brussels, 22 September 2017.

Furthermore, there was a clear political will to increase spending on addressing migration, as domestic politicisation of migration legitimised greater budget allocation. This was signalled by an interviewee at DG DEVCO: 'The money is entirely due to the migration crisis. Basically, the EU was pushed by the Member States very much to do something – and to mobilise funding.'[79] This correlates with Slominski and Trauner's (2018) observation that the EU was considered the best vehicle for mobilising and consolidating funds on a large scale following 2015.

The need to find a 'solution' to the crisis is also rationalised from a humanitarian perspective, combined with the perception that past policy has been largely ineffective. Another DEVCO official thus argued:

> *The Valletta Process was a reason, following the tragedies in the Mediterranean, to say: we have to really take action, because what we have done so far hasn't really worked, and we have to do that with the African side.*

- Interview 8, DG DEVCO. Brussels, 26 September 2017.

The need to engage African states in the search for a solution is emphasised in this last citation. As noted in Chapter 4, EU discourse reflects the recruitment of African states as partners in the EU's governance, but this partnership carries a 'burden sharing' imperative for African state actors to carry responsibility for implementing a migration management agenda.

The crisis therefore generated an imperative for action in the political sphere, both from EU Member State governments and citizens' expectations. There is a performative role that policy actors are required to enact following a crisis event, where the symbolism of 'doing something' becomes paramount, and where crises demand action from politicians especially in their immediate aftermath (Rhinard 2019, p.6; Kingdon 1995; Kuipers and 'T Hart 2014). Boin *et al.* (2009) employ the term 'crisis exploitation' to describe how crises disrupt societal routine and create a political space for 'actors inside and outside government to redefine issues, propose policy innovations and organizational reforms' (p.82). I analyse below if this is an appropriate

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[79] Interview 7.

interpretation of the EU organisational response; noting first that the crisis led to West Africa becoming a focal region of the EU's external migration governance.

5.2.2 West Africa as a priority region

The renewed drive for migration policy governance in the EU's external arena has led the European Commission to take on specific priorities, in line with demands to produce 'results' and tackle irregular migration more vigorously. A new policy instrument emerged in the form of the EU's Trust Fund instrument, introduced at the EU's Valletta Summit in late 2015. Within this context, West Africa has emerged as a key region of interest, and West African countries are among those taking centre stage in the EU's external migration policy. The selection of West Africa – and therein specific West African countries for enhanced partnership – reflects the drivers of recent EU migration policy interventions. While countries are selected based on their status as contributors to irregular migration, the EU's strategy is also largely based on pragmatic considerations: put differently, the EU considers where it is most likely to succeed in its partnering efforts. I also discuss the varied implications of this strategy for migration cooperation with third countries.

Since 2015, West Africa has formally become a key region of interest to the EU's external migration governance, as reflected in the European Agenda on Migration (2015), the Partnership Framework (2016) and the EU's Trust Fund instrument launched following the 2015 Valletta Summit. The EUTF constitutes an investment of over 4.1 billion euros in the externalisation of the EU migration agenda to sub-Saharan Africa primarily – of the three eligible regions of North Africa, Horn of Africa and the Sahel, the latter two regions receive a larger proportion of funding by an important margin (EC 2018a, p.15). The Partnership Framework contains a roadmap for scaling up EU involvement with sixteen priority countries in the area of migration governance. Thirteen of these sixteen priority countries are in Africa. Cooperation efforts are particularly intensive with respect to Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Mali and Ethiopia: the EU's migration 'compact' countries in Africa that are flagged as priority countries for increased engagement and project funding (EC 2017a, 2017b). In February 2017, the EU extended the geographic scope of the EUTF to include a further three countries within the West Africa region, with Ghana being among these. Out of the three African regions eligible for funding under the EUTF, the Sahel and Lake Chad region covering West Africa has benefitted from the largest investment in projects through the EUTF (EC 2018e).

These elements are a reflection of the strategic importance of West Africa in the EU's recent external migration policy. They also signal the intention of the EU and EU Member States to step

up engagement on migration policy with third countries in West Africa. Of particular relevance are the compacts introduced under the Partnership Framework – these are outlined as being fluid processes led by EU Member States and combining different policy elements (such as trade, aid, development, security), with the intention of forging a tailor-made migration governance approach to each individual country.

The underlying rationale that has led to the EU's selection of a number of West African states as preferred partners in an intensified EU-African migration dialogue can be traced to two dominant factors. First, the EU's selection of key third countries in this intensified dialogue has followed the European political imperative of addressing irregular migration at its perceived point of origin, whereby sub-Saharan African countries with proportionally higher levels of irregular migration to Europe have been primarily targeted. While data on irregular migrant numbers is unreliable, the EU collects data on return orders issued by nationality to third country nationals across EU Member States, where this gives an indication of the major 'contributors' (see Figure 6.5 on rate of return, Chapter 6).[80] Unsurprisingly, irregular migrant numbers play an important part in the selection of third countries for enhanced cooperation. This is evidenced in the progress reports on the Partnership Framework that unambiguously focus on the 'main countries of origin and transit of migrants on the way to Europe' (EC 2017b, p.7) and the 'largest source of departures' (EC 2017a, p.9). Irregular migrant numbers as a part of the partnership selection rationale for individual African countries is widely affirmed by several interviewees in the EU institutions.[81] One interviewee at DEVCO commented in relation to the selection process for the five 'compact' countries that 'there are several reasons but the main one is the number of irregular migrants to Europe' while an interviewee at DG HOME noted that it was 'one criteria – a very important one' and noted furthermore that third countries are ranked according to arrivals of migrants to Europe in a 'top ten list'.[82] Establishing a strong partnership with Ghana has been of lower salience in the EU's external migration governance, whereby migration dialogue between the EU and Ghana has been less intense than other third countries (van Criekinge 2010, p.3). Yet, an interviewee at the

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[80] I also note in Chapter 6 that a contention brought by Senegalese government officials is that many irregular migrants apprehended in EU Member States may claim Senegalese citizenship, but that this is not always the case. For this reason, identification missions conducted by officials are considered (by Senegalese and Ghanaian state actors) to be a crucial part of the return process.

[81] Interviews 1 and 13, EEAS; Interview 2, EU Member State diplomat; Interview 3, DG HOME; Interviews 8 and 10, DG DEVCO. Brussels, September 2017.

[82] Interview 10, DG DEVCO. Brussels, 28 September 2017; Interview 3, DG HOME. Brussels, 22 September 2017.

EU Delegation in Ghana stated that Ghana's recent accession to the EUTF stemmed from an increase in the number of irregular migrants to Europe from 2015 to 2016.[83]

This first condition of irregular migrant numbers is simultaneously weighed against the likelihood of achieving meaningful cooperation with the third country government. The second factor in the EU's selection rationale is therefore more pragmatic in nature: it is an estimation of whether cooperation *can* be achieved and is dependent on the country's perceived political stability. This pragmatic approach considers 'the potential where you can work – and, with the authorities as such – in these countries' as noted by an interviewee at DEVCO.[84] This factor resulted in the decision to select Senegal as a compact country where the country's reputation as a stable, peaceful and democratic nation made it a more ideal partner at the time than, for example, the Gambia, whose levels of irregular migration proportionally exceed Senegal's – but where the perception that the Gambian administration was comparatively 'closed' signalled to the EU a poorer likelihood of achieving a meaningful partnership.[85] Historical relations with an intended partner country are also taken into consideration, insofar as these offer the opportunity to build on past cooperation, bilateral or otherwise. As the Partnership Framework notes: 'The special relationships that Member States may have with third countries, reflecting political, historic and cultural ties fostered through decades of contacts, should also be exploited to the full for the benefit of the EU' (EC 2016c, p.8). As a geographical coordinator within DEVCO furthermore commented: 'We have a very good relationship with Senegal – for us (the European Union) Senegal is a key partner in many issues, and for stabilising the region as well'.[86] Senegal's status as an 'ally in regional and global issues' such as security, and its influence within ECOWAS, ensured that it was considered a good candidate for a 'compact'.[87] As discussed in Chapter 3, Spain has been successful in fostering cooperation with Senegal in the matter of border management since 2006. The EU's relationship with Senegal is not, however, one where the EU's proposals in migration policy are unequivocally accepted, with a DG HOME interviewee commenting, primarily in the matter of cooperation on migrant returns, that Senegal is 'not the best pupil by DG HOME standards'.[88] Recent historical failures on the part of the EU to secure a Mobility Partnership with Senegal (Chou & Gibert 2012; Reslow 2012) also cast some doubt on the EU's rationale of selecting

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[83] Interview 36, EU Delegation to Ghana. Accra, 25 January 2018.
[84] Interview 8, DG DEVCO. Brussels, 26 September 2017.
[85] Interview 1, EEAS. Brussels, 19 September 2017.
[86] Interview 10.
[87] Interview 1.
[88] Interview 3, DG HOME. Brussels, 22 September 2017.

Senegal according to the likelihood of achieving its preferences in cooperation, yet this has not prejudiced Senegal's selection as a priority partner in migration governance.

The crisis and the politicisation of migration in European domestic spheres created new demands, and expectations, on the EU in terms of its migration governance. One of the institutional responses has been to bring West African countries to the foreground of the EU's migration agenda, stepping up engagement with third countries of migrant origin that are also deemed cooperative partners in negotiations. Yet, while policy windows can provide an opportunity for introducing significant policy change, my subsequent analysis finds that much of the EU's migration governance approach builds on past policy approaches and instruments, where large-scale policy novelty is limited.

5.3 Policy novelty: old wine in new bottles?

EU policy responses to the migration crisis have continued to build on the logic of externalisation. Rather than heralding significant change, the direction and substance of EU external migration governance since 2015 has remained constant, drawing substantially on existing policy as well as recent EU-African cooperation experiences. At the same time, the EU's action can also be read as providing a 'theatrical' response; this has been noted in the EU's bordering work, where migration scholars are divided over the actual effectiveness of migration control measures, but note that borders are also meant to be symbolic (Czaika & De Haas 2013; Nyberg-Sørensen 2012). Interrogating the effectiveness of awareness-raising campaigns in Senegal, Rodriguez (2019) notes that these campaigns also form part of the theatre of response for electorates in Europe. I argue that part of the EU answer to political pressure from internal domains is to engage in the spectacle of response, thereby increasing funds to externalisation efforts, but not deviating substantially from existing policies or practices.

A historical perspective that includes past policy tools allows the observation that past policy frameworks have been reformulated, but that this reformulation remains largely at the level of discourse. In the 2005 GAMM framework, the EU's two-pronged approach in external migration governance combines both restrictive measures with measures that engage with migration-development debates in its policies and interventions in third countries (Boswell 2003; Chou 2009). The 2005 framework also produced the Mobility Partnership tool in cooperation with third countries, where the notion of EU-African partnerships for migration governance is clearly discernible. An interviewee at DG DEVCO therefore observed: '*partnership* – we're talking about

2015 but we've done it since 2006. And the truth is that partnerships with partner countries is absolutely not new.'[89] In this sense, the EU's external migration governance draws on notions that are already present in previous policy frameworks. The lack of novelty is something that is expressly acknowledged, as it emerged elsewhere in discussion with several EU interviewees. While discourse on addressing the 'root causes' of irregular migration emerged out of the 2015 Valletta Summit, whereby development interventions in third countries are increasingly envisaged to play a role in reducing irregular migration, several interviewees observed that it was not substantially different from EU development policy as a whole, with a DEVCO official commenting, 'this discussion of the root causes of migration: let's be honest, that's what we've been doing for the last 60 years of development cooperation.'[90] A Member State diplomat further clarified: 'We didn't wait to have a migrant crisis to do something about poverty reduction in Africa. Of course it has been our development policy for the last 60 years.'[91]

As these citations discuss, EU development policy interventions over the last 60 years have already served to address the 'root causes' of migration, insofar that root causes are understood to include development challenges such as poverty. On the surface, there is little to immediately distinguish past EU development policy that has addressed development issues in third countries, from recent EU development projects on migration that follow a 'root causes' rationale. Yet the focus on containment and deterrence discussed in Chapter 4 represents an important nuance, while projects that explore developmental benefits from migration have diminished in prominence, as I subsequently demonstrate. On the topic of partnership with African states in migration governance, a DG HOME interviewee mused that the 'tailor-made' approach to third countries is a crucial difference between the EU's new approach and its pre-crisis cooperation model with third countries.[92] This is however disputed by Commission officials who have longer-term experience and memory of EU migration policy and who note that the Mobility Partnerships were similarly intended to be a tailored approach to third countries' individual needs and situations. [93] Neither the notion of 'partnership' with third countries, or the use of tailor-made instruments in cooperation with third countries, is fundamentally new: both have been used in cooperation with African countries since 2005 and the introduction of the GAMM. Yet in the detail of policy

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[89] Interview 7, DG DEVCO. Brussels, 26 September 2017.
[90] Interview 8, DG DEVCO. Brussels, 26 September 2017.
[91] Interview 2, Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Brussels, 21 September 2017.
[92] Interview 3, DG HOME. Brussels, 22 September 2017.
[93] Interview 7, DG DEVCO. Brussels, 26 September 2017; Interview 12, DG JRC. Brussels, 28 September 2017.

orientation, adaptation occurred to cater to a crisis governance rationale and a results-focused agenda.

Looking at the level of formal policy frameworks and instrumentation, the 2015 Valletta Action Plan outlined five pillars (see Chapter 3, Table 3.7) that broadly follow the four pillars set out by the 2005 GAMM. The existence of 'returns and readmission' as a *distinct* pillar in the Valletta Action Plan, separate from the fourth pillar on measures for reducing irregular migration, is an indication of the increasing emphasis placed on securing a higher return rate as demanded by EU Member States. Legal migration opportunities still emerge as a pillar in the Valletta Action Plan; equally, maximising the development benefits of migration still appears, although the pillar is expanded to include the addressing of 'root causes' of irregular migration which did not form part of the GAMM. In official policy, it can be said that Valletta represents broad continuity with the GAMM framework of 2005 and the four pillars delineated thereunder, rather than a significant departure from it, although different elements are emphasised and prioritised.

I turn to the policy frameworks introduced since 2015 in more detail, and in particular the policy instrument that was introduced at Valletta (the EU's Emergency Trust Fund for Africa – EUTF), assessing its added value to the EU's external governance. I explore how in the finer details of the EU's crisis-driven governance adaptations, existing development policy has been reframed and recast as a tool in achieving EU migration policy interests, such as refocusing interventions to serve the deterrence and containment agenda presented in Chapter 4. The EUTF also caters to political demands that emphasise the production of tangible and immediate results as expressed by EU Member States, where this affects the instrument's design from the outset.

5.3.1 What changes under the EUTF?

The introduction of a policy instrument is a politically-informed act. Policy instruments are not 'neutral' devices but are the object of dynamics of politicisation and depoliticisation; the decision to introduce new policy instruments often stems from a perception that past instruments are inefficient or no longer credible (Trauner and Wolff 2014). The introduction of a new policy instrument served in this case to address the needs as determined by EU Member State priorities, and provided an 'answer' to the emergency the EU was facing in a 'swifter but also more efficient way', as asserted by a DEVCO interviewee when asked about the added value of the new instrument.[94] The new instrument also enabled the EU to bring together financial and human

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[94] Interview 34, DG DEVCO. Brussels, 7 December 2017.

resources specifically on the topic of migration, while the new partnerships with 'compact' countries intensified dialogue in migration.[95] The introduction of the EUTF and the increasing importance of migration on the EU political agenda resulted in EU institutional actors extending their activities in migration governance, as seen below.

A spectacle of intervention

In areas of policy that are highly politicised and are the object of intensive media scrutiny, actors may resort to rhetoric and symbolic gestures aimed at securing public approval (Boswell 2011). The scale of intervention by the EU and its accompanied publicity indicate that an important part of the EU's crisis action is performative in responding to EU Member State demands. The EU's ability to pool funds indicate a capacity to act on the crisis that far exceeds what bilateral initiatives can achieve individually. This has led to what Slominski and Trauner (2018) dub the strategic 'use of Europe' by EU Member States following the crisis; the importance of Brussels-led initiatives is underlined in a context of globalisation, and the perceived added value of supranational action in crisis response (Rhinard 2019).

The Trust Fund represents a significant financial investment, where other EU funds are redirected to serve migration policy goals. It therefore represents, above all, a quantitative shift, given the significant increase in funding channelled into migration projects in select third countries. The politicisation of migration brought on by the crisis, and with it the political will to fund migration governance, has meant that actors have acted upon opportunities to expand their field of activities. The significant increase in 'money on the table'[96] and increased staffing reflects the topicality of migration in political and policy spheres, and the institutional responses to it. As one interviewee in the Commission observed, 'there has been much more awareness on migration – if you talk about migration, everyone has something to say.'[97] The introduction of the Trust Fund 'created a new reality on the ground' as it took precedence over other EU-funded migration initiatives that were already running in West Africa, largely intending to supersede or replace these.[98] The development and aid industry have also responded by exploring ways to capitalise on the topicality of migration in European political discourse. An Italian civil society representative in Dakar commented on the highly publicised intervention that the EUTF represents, as well as the impact of this publicity:

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[95] Interview 1, EEAS. Brussels, 19 September 2017.
[96] Interview 7, DG DEVCO. Brussels, 26 September 2017.
[97] Interview 8, DG DEVCO. Brussels, 26 September 2017.
[98] Interview 6, ICMPD. Brussels, 22 September 2017.

With the increase in funds available on the theme of migration, it has become sensational. There is a lot being communicated about the 'crisis' of migration. While for us, we don't consider that there is a migration emergency. But with the increase of funds, there are more and more actors (whether they have the experience or not) who begin to work on this theme. So it has become a little fashionable.

- Interview 24, Italian NGO. Dakar, 7 November 2017 – my translation.

Both of the above quotations also indicate that the politicised and topical nature of migration in current policy spheres is something that actors in the migration – and development – 'industry' are keenly aware of, and use to their advantage in accessing funds.

Organisational overview

It is necessary to provide an overview of the EU institutional map of migration actors and map their contributions to the governance debate. In the matter of involvement in the external governance of migration, EU institutional actors comprise several entities. In the first instance, within the European Commission, DG HOME (Migration and Home Affairs) and DG DEVCO emerge as key players. DG HOME has a mandate for managing internal migration, although its activities include involvement in international cooperation (EC 2019j). Within DEVCO, two units are primarily involved: B3 (Migration and Employment) and, in the context of this research, Unit D1 is the relevant geographical unit of DEVCO that manages relations with West African partner countries. Other DGs within the Commission do play a role, although this is more sporadic, and specific: for instance, an interviewee in DEVCO's D1 unit noted that DEVCO is required to consult and collaborate with other entities in project formulation when applicable, such as the DG for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion when formulating projects dealing with employment.[99] Other parts of the Commission such as the Directorate-General Joint Research Centre (JRC) are involved in providing technical research support for policy.[100] The European External Action Service (EEAS) manages and maintains diplomatic relations with third countries, covering also the EU Delegations based in non-EU countries. The role of EU Delegations in migration governance has been stepped up: the Delegations play a key role in shaping EUTF project formulation as they

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[99] Interview 5, DG DEVCO. Brussels, 22 September 2017.
[100] EC (2019h); Interview 12, DG JRC. Brussels, 28 September 2017.

provide technical inputs and suggestions for thematic areas of intervention, and play a further central role in coordination since 2015.[101] Finally, EU agencies such as FRONTEX and EASO are tasked with managing specific areas of the EU's migration governance, according to their respective mandates. The following diagram illustrates this institutional setup, while noting this should not be taken as an exhaustive list of EU actors.

Figure 5.2 Institutional diagram - the EU in external migration governance with West Africa.

Source: Author's compilation; drawn from (EC 2019i).

The EUTF is financed through a reallocation of funds from other EU financial instruments already in existence – including, most notably, 1 billion euros allocated from the EU's main development funding instrument, the European Development Fund (EDF) – and voluntary pledges from EU Member States (EC 2019e). The European Commission's Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO) has taken on the management of the Trust Fund, while the EU's external migration affairs had not previously fallen within DEVCO's remit. This has resulted in the rapid expansion and increased staffing since 2015 of certain units within the directorate, such as the Migration and Employment Unit (B3) and the geographic units representing the regions that the Trust Fund is targeting. DEVCO therefore has a substantially larger 'portfolio' dealing with migration topics than it did prior to 2015.[102] The EU has since 2015 deployed European Migration Liaison Officers (EMLOs) in key partner countries (including Senegal), where EMLOs are seconded immigration officers from EU Member States intended to

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[101] EC (2015) p. 8; Interviews 22 and 23, EU Delegation to Senegal. Dakar, 7 November 2017.
[102] Interview 4, DG DEVCO. Brussels, 22 September 2017.

step up dialogue with local authorities on migration cooperation.[103] The EMLOs represent DG HOME interests in the EU Delegations in key third countries.[104] These developments, in sum, point to the expanded scope of activities and influence of several EU actors.

Project-oriented and results-driven

Through the EUTF, and following calls for action, the EU has shifted to a crisis governance rationale following events in 2015. This is reflected in administrative and organisational shifts that enabled an increasingly short-term, project-oriented approach favouring the faster delivery of results.

The focus on delivering results within a short timeframe pervades EU project frameworks under the EUTF. As an interviewee in the Belgian diplomatic service described it, the expectations (of EU Member State officials) placed on the instrument to deliver these results is significant:

> *They expect our development policy to produce results very, very quickly regarding migration. And it is very obvious when you speak with the people of Home Affairs, that they see the investment made by the European Union globally, collectively, and by [EU] Member States individually in some countries of origin as not producing the results they expect. But of course if our policy aim at reducing the root causes, and one of the root causes is poverty, and non-access to justice and non-access to public health – it takes of course more than one year to produce results. It takes 10, 20 [years], and of course even more if you realise that we have been doing that for the last 50 years in our former colonies.*

- Interview 2, Belgian diplomat. Brussels, 21 September 2017.

The focus on results appears is likewise emphasised by an interviewee at the EU Delegation in Dakar responsible for managing employment and training interventions under the EUTF. She commented the following on the new centrality of producing and monitoring results in the rationale for projects:

> *The priority is now really to advance with implementation: to show results. (…) The Trust Fund is still something quite new, and we have taken things much further in everything that is monitoring and evaluation. The Fund has indicators*

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[103] EC (2015) p. 8; Interview 14, EU Delegation to Senegal. Dakar, 13 October 2017.
[104] Interview 3, DG HOME. Brussels, 22 September 2017.

> *that are standard and common to all projects and the whole region, and which*
> *will allow us to have an immediate overview of the impact of projects for all of*
> *the countries of the Trust Fund.*

- Interview 22, EU Delegation to Senegal. Dakar, 7 November 2017. (My translation.)

Key qualitative differences exist between the EUTF and the EU's traditional development funding instruments, such as the European Development Fund (EDF). Predominantly, these differences include the centrality of migration under EUTF development interventions; and, to allow for the required flexibility in achieving faster results, project management processes are streamlined under the EUTF. The EU was hampered in its ability to use the EDF for migration-related development interventions: the EDF focuses on three areas of thematic intervention, whereby migration could appear only tangentially to these predetermined themes.[105] In comparison, projects implemented under the Trust Fund have an attached conditionality of migration as a central theme. The EUTF thus provided a framework for interventions to focus on migration-specific outcomes in their rationale. The incorporation of restrictive migration goals is thereby incrementally but increasingly legitimised in development practice in third countries. Project interventions that are framed as development interventions are shown to have the reduction and containment of migration as an overriding goal, as seen in Chapter 4. At the same time, projects have steered away from a previous policy ambition to maximise the development potential of migration: this is the subject of just one out of 11 EUTF projects implemented in Senegal, for instance (see Figure 3.2, Chapter 3).

Given that the Trust Fund was intended to function as an 'emergency' tool, project management processes are simplified in comparison to traditional EU development instruments. The Trust Fund represents a structural shift from traditional development financing, applying a greater emphasis on quicker procedures and results, while circumventing administrative procedures that exist under the EDF. The emphasis is on both prompt project proposals, and prompt implementation.[106] A key example is the lack of a National Authorising Officer (NAO) as with the EDF – a national (Ministry of Finance) counterpart in the beneficiary country, who works in partnership with the EU representatives and whose approval is needed for project management decisions. With the

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[105] Interviews 8 and 11, DG DEVCO. Brussels, September 2017.
[106] Interview 4, DG DEVCO. Brussels, 22 September 2017.

Trust Fund, the role of the NAO has been eliminated and no direct approval needs to be sought; rather, national counterparts in partner countries are kept 'informed'.[107] These elements have served to streamline EU action in migration project interventions, and to speed up project implementation.

Another key difference is that implementation under the Trust Fund goes primarily to the EU Member State agencies, who are active in proposing interventions in the beneficiary countries.[108] This is distinct from traditional development instrumentation, where there is significantly less devolvement to agencies.[109] Given the large budget of the Trust Fund projects, and what one NGO worker in Dakar called a 'tendency towards mega projects'[110] it is generally only large agencies, such as the Spanish development agency FIAAP, or the ICMPD based in Vienna, that have the management and organisational capacity to put in a project bid and to act as lead implementers. This has produced a trend of 're-nationalisation' of EU development policy as EU Member State development organisations take on a large role, while the relevance of civil society organisations decreases under the new instrument (Koch *et al.* 2018, p. 16).

Combined with the described rationale for selecting partner countries for enhanced funding under the EUTF, the resulting governance framework is an allocation of development funds according to migration policy interests, whereby development practice is instrumentalised as a tool in migration cooperation. The EU has also enabled a more flexible project implementation framework where procedures and standards that exist under the EDF are not reproduced under the EUTF. These changes have largely been rationalised in view of the crisis and the drive for obtaining direct, and fast, results from the EU's migration cooperation with third countries. I subsequently explore how, at the level of political cooperation, the externalisation drive has also adapted.

5.3.2 Adapting the conditionality model

In adapting its conditionality approach, the EU has sought to satisfy EU Member State voices that have favoured the adoption of a stricter bargaining position with African migrant-sending states. Mounting pressure from the EU Member States and demands for tangible 'results' in cooperation with African states has led discourse and resulting policy to reflect stricter measures in EU-African

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[107] Interviews 10 and 11, DG DEVCO. Brussels, September 2017.
[108] Interview 10, DG DEVCO. Brussels, 28 September 2017.
[109] Interview 5, DG DEVCO. Brussels, 22 September 2017.
[110] Interview 24, Italian NGO. Dakar, 7 November 2017.

migration cooperation. The EU's 'more for more' approach of conditionality has typically linked cooperation in contentious areas, such as returns and readmission, with other areas of cooperation such as trade, aid and visas (for more on conditionality, see Chapter 2). This approach is reflected in, for instance, the EU's earlier Mobility Partnership instrument introduced under the GAMM, whereby participating third countries are to benefit from visa facilitation agreements in return for cooperating on returns and readmission.

In the context of the migration crisis, EU Member States have been vocal in expressing dissatisfaction with the actual rate of returns, perceiving this as one of the failures of the EU's migration policy.[111] They have pushed for the EU to adopt a more punitive approach by using visa policy as a tool in diplomatic retaliation for cases of 'persistent non-cooperation' (EC 2017c, p.22). Past policy of the European Commission has generally favoured positive incentivisation for third countries to cooperate on migration and specifically returns, whereby the Mobility Partnerships for example offered visa facilitation in return. Since 2017, measures taken in visa policy have moved towards a model of 'negative leverage' as countries that are uncooperative in returns and readmission face visa restrictions being imposed for high-level persons, such as government officials and diplomats.[112] The use of visa policy as negative leverage appears in EU discourse and policy documents since this period. The intention for this to become a formal and legitimised mechanism to be used in cooperation is evident, given the reforms agreed between the European Parliament and Council to allow the adoption of restrictive visa measures against 'non-cooperative third countries':

> *EU visa policy has already helped facilitate negotiations on readmission and the visa suspension mechanism has helped closely monitor readmission obligations. The Commission welcomes the agreement reached between the European Parliament and the Council on the reform of the Visa Code, including the possibility to adopt restrictive visa measures against non-cooperative third countries on readmission. Further steps to deploy leverage will be essential to step up readmission.*
>
> -   *EC (2019b) p.11.*

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[111] I discuss returns in more detail in Chapter 6.
[112] Interview 12, DG JRC. Brussels, 28 September 2017; Interviews 7 and 8, DG DEVCO. Brussels, September 2017.

The application of 'negative' leverage through visa measures is absent from the 2015 European Agenda on Migration (EAM). However, subsequent progress reports on the EAM published in 2017 and 2019 state the intention to apply visa measures. It is stated that consultations with EU Member States have brought about a need to 'assess critically whether the current visa policy still matches the present and future challenges' (EC 2017c, p.16). Specifically, there is a call for 'addressing more systematically and effectively non-cooperation by key third countries of origin, mobilising all the incentives and leverages available, both at EU and at Member State level' (*ibid.,* p.22). In addition, the exploration of additional 'informal arrangements' is announced, pursued in tangent to formal agreements, on return and readmission (*ibid*). The EU's adoption of Standard Operating Procedures in returns mechanisms is an indication of this increasingly informal approach (EC 2017b). Further instances where the use of informal mechanisms are envisaged are listed in the table below:

Table 5.1: Informalising return policy

'With countries with which a formal readmission agreement could not be pursued, the **Commission focused on improving practical cooperation** through operational tools and instruments such as standard operational procedures.'	EC (2017d) on a more effective return policy, p.12.
'(…) explore, if necessary, **alternative practical arrangements separate from negotiated agreements** leading to equivalent results in terms of cooperation on actual returns.'	EC (2017a): Partnership Framework Progress Report, p.3.
'Member States and the EU should **extend common operational partnerships** with third countries to support activities such as joint investigation teams, capacity building and the exchange of liaison officers.'	EC (2019b): European Agenda on Migration Progress Report, 2019, p.12.

In September 2015, the Commission adopted the EU Action Plan on Return, which outlines up to 36 'concrete actions' to render the EU's return system more effective (EC 2017d, p.2). The policy draws inspiration from the examples of restrictive tools implemented in other Western so-called immigration countries, in particular 'in the experience of certain Member States', and the US and Canada, vis-à-vis third countries (EC 2017b, p.14). Among the outlined next steps, informal and technical measures are envisaged to secure a higher return rate: these include 'operational

partnerships' with third countries for tasks associated with processing and implementing returns, such as the creation of joint investigation teams, and the exchange of liaison officers (EC 2019c). The influence of restrictive policies implemented elsewhere therefore appears in the rationale for the EU's shifting stance on return and readmission policy.

The pursuit of informal agreements to secure returns is evident in the case of Ghana, which has no formal return agreements with the EU or EU Member States. In April 2016, the Ghanaian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration (MoFARI) and Ministry of Interior signed a Joint Declaration with EU counterparts, with Ghana signifying its willingness to expand cooperation in the matter of returns of Ghanaian citizens of irregular status in the EU (EEAS 2016). This was prompted by the EU's dissatisfaction with the return rate of Ghanaian irregular migrants (*ibid*.). While Italy has a memorandum of understanding with Ghana dating from February 2010 aimed at strengthening police collaboration, Italian authorities have sought a further technical agreement with Ghana on repatriation (Colella 2019). There is little evidence that such an agreement is as of yet forthcoming. The emphasis on returns leads an interviewee at the EU Delegation in Accra to conclude that the overall EU-Ghana dialogue has taken a negative turn, halting overall progress. [113]

The proposal of alternatives to irregular migration in the specific form of legal migration routes is comparatively diminished in policy frameworks since 2015. While the Mobility Partnerships of the GAMM focused heavily on offering visa 'facilitation' as an incentive for cooperation (this is evident in, for instance, the Cape Verde Mobility Partnership - Council of the EU (2008)), the EU has played down visa facilitation in recent policy frameworks. Although Valletta identified legal migration avenues as a pillar, and subsequently outlined the creation of pilot projects for legal migration, the EU has struggled to obtain commitments from EU Member States to make 'concrete offers' in this domain (EC 2018d). The most significant EU proposal on legal migration for third country nationals remains in a deadlock: the Commission has repeatedly made the case for an important revision of the EU 'Blue Card' facilitating the entry of highly-skilled migrants, however has failed to secure agreement EC (2019b). The pilot projects outlined in the Valletta Action Plan have faced numerous challenges 'mainly due to Member States' reticence to fully implement the agreed concept and launch concrete projects' (EC 2018c, p.8). The few that have been launched address specific skill shortages (such as IT) and most projects have engaged with North African countries (EC 2019c, p. 17). An ad-hoc query launched by the Commission into the status of legal migration

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[113] Interview 36, EU Delegation to Ghana. Accra, 25 January 2018.

initiatives between EU Member States and Partnership Framework 'priority' countries revealed that 16 out of 23 Member States reviewed had no specific initiative on legal migration other than the EU Erasmus+ programme for students' mobility; only two reported having ongoing bilateral initiatives facilitating mobility for young graduates and professionals with Senegal and Mali (EC 2017b, p.14). As a DG HOME official asserted, while legal migration avenues are a 'solution' in the long-term, the present political climate prevented progress being made in this area:

> *Member States have the mandate for deciding who comes in – it's not for us to decide, or to oblige them to take say irregular or legal migrants; they have to decide it for themselves. And politically, especially for our southern Member States, the view of the huge influx of irregular migrants, it's quite challenging to open up new legal pathways. So, of course it will be a solution in the long term, but politically for the time being there's not much that can be done.*
>
> – Interview 3, DG HOME. Brussels, 22 September 2017.

Faced with these constraints, the EU increasingly perceives its main tool for incentivising third countries in migration cooperation to be the offer of development financing, rather than visa facilitation. When asked about the positive incentives for third countries to engage with the EU, several interviewees responded that development financing emerged as the key reason.[114] This marks therefore a departure from the EU's previous bargaining strategy of offering visa facilitation as a key incentive for cooperation.

To conclude, the structure of the EUTF reflects both an increased urgency, and the new conditionality of migration in development interventions under the instrument. However, the crisis was not used to introduce large-scale policy reform. Incremental changes can be observed in project formulation, whereby migration (governance) outcomes feature more explicitly in the rationale for development interventions, given that the EUTF projects unambiguously have a central element of curbing migration flows. As a critical report published by Oxfam in 2017 therefore observed:

> *The narrative according to which development projects can serve to curb migration flows does not remain at the instrument level; it trickles into the objectives and indicators of several projects.*

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[114] Interviews 1, 7 and 11, DG DEVCO and EEAS. Brussels, September 2017.

-   Oxfam 2017, p.24.

At the political level of cooperation, changes can be observed in the adaptation of the EU's approach on conditionality, and a more results-oriented stance on returns, demonstrating the continuation of the logic of externalisation in a direction of increasing restrictiveness. As I explore in the next section, the substance of EU policy proposals and the direction of travel is still subject to internal contestation in a complex, multi-actored process. Internally, actors within the European Commission as well as EU agencies responded to demands and signals from their political environment in different ways.

5.4 Speaking as one voice

In the matter of formulating a crisis response, EU institutional actors demonstrate internal tensions. While some actors have favoured restrictive measures, others consider the application of more restrictive or punitive measures against partner countries to be counter-productive or in contradiction with their mandate. These internal disagreements indicate that different voices strive to shape EU governance in a competitive policy-making arena, in line with what has been found in other actor-centred and organisational studies of the EU as a migration policy actor (see (Boswell 2008; Guiraudon 2003; Hampshire 2016). On the other hand, the EU has perceived the importance of speaking as one in maintaining a strong bargaining position, and attempts to limit the appearance of disunity. This section argues the EU's external governance is substantially shaped by organisational interests and rationales, to the extent that these take precedence over policy coherence. In particular, I draw on Boswell's typology of organisational responses to demands from the environment: organisations may respond to political pressure for adaptation by fully adapting; by evading and thereby resisting external pressure for change; by institutionally 'decoupling'; or by reinterpreting (see Boswell 2008, pp.496-497). I note that these are not categories that are necessarily neatly delineated, as actors may pursue two strategies, or shift strategies.

The focus on returns, and the exploration of 'negative leverage' methods of securing cooperation, is not an approach that has found consensus internally within the European Commission, where its premise has been subject to disagreement both on the need for such an approach, and its effectiveness. There have been internal proponents of an increasingly punitive approach, but also a significant element of contestation from internal actors. The European Commission's Directorate-General for Home Affairs (DG HOME) emerges – perhaps unsurprisingly – as one of

the driving forces behind the use of negative leverage in migration cooperation, which can be understood as full adaptation to external demands. In addition, the Ministries of Interior of EU Member States continue to be prominent voices in deciding policy direction. As summed up by one interviewee of an EU Member State Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

> *Unfortunately – or maybe just because it is normal in a certain way – the discussions on migration in Europe are discussions that are mainly led by Ministries of Interior. And of course, they want Home Affairs, and they want results, and the result is 'how many people – how many irregular migrants – could we send back to their countries of origin'. And of course they are not satisfied with the number. The number remains very weak.*

- Interview 2, Belgian diplomat. Brussels, 21 September 2017.

The citation above also captures the results-oriented expectation placed on the EU's external migration governance and its migration cooperation with third countries, where this drive has come from Home Affairs actors at the Member State ministerial level. Yet, disagreement on how to proceed can also be traced back to the EU Member State level. The interests and perspectives of EU Member States and their ministries are not uniform, as is acknowledged by several interviewees. An example of this internal discord is given by an interviewee who had previously worked in the Netherlands as a civil servant, who noted that conditionality at its genesis was already 'very controversial'. Using the example of Dutch foreign policy, the interviewee noted that conditionality did not form a component of the Dutch model of external cooperation, where an emphasis was instead placed on socialising with diplomats and foreign officials of third countries as a means of achieving aims diplomatically.[115] Equally, an EEAS official in Brussels was keen to stress that the internal decision-making procedures of the EU are something of an 'internal game' as agreement on policies need to be found, yet the 28 EU Member States 'are not converging on migration as an issue'.[116]

The disagreements on migration policy direction that exist internally between EU Member States' administrations, as well as the different approaches favoured by different Member States, are mirrored at the level of the EU institutions. In my research, interviewees at the Commission's DG DEVCO tended to view conditionality and issue-linkage as controversial, and problematic for

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[115] Interview 12, DG JRC. Brussels, 28 September 2017.
[116] Interview 1, EEAS. Brussels, 19 September 2017.

relations with third countries. The question of using visa policy as negative leverage was a source of disagreement between DG HOME and DG DEVCO on how to move forward. This disagreement emerged in relation to the new European Consensus on Development in 2017, where the inclusion of Article 40 on conditionality in the Consensus had been largely pushed by DG HOME, and unsuccessfully contested by DG DEVCO. As a result, the 2017 Consensus notes the intention of attaining the aims of the Partnership Framework by 'applying the necessary leverage by using all relevant EU policies, instruments and tools, including development and trade' (Council 2017, p.18). The 2017 Consensus now forms a reference point for DG HOME to leverage cooperation in returns to cooperation in other areas, as noted by a DEVCO official:

> *For us, conditionality... although it's in the Consensus, the new Consensus for Development there is conditionality indicated – nevertheless as DEVCO we try to always fight that. And then for example DG Home refers to the Consensus and we say, well,* you *put it in.*

- Interview 8, DG DEVCO. Brussels, 26 September 2017.

Other entities within the EU institutions have broader institutional mandates that are in tension with the implementation of a more punitive approach. A case in point is that of the External Action Service, where EEAS officials are keen to stress that their key institutional mandate is to promote and maintain good relations with third countries. As such, one EEAS interviewee noted that migration was just one component of diplomatic relations with third countries, to be balanced with 'other aspects' (other thematic activities and areas of the EEAS) while not disturbing overall relations; equally, migration policies pursued should be 'appropriate in the context of overall relations'.[117] An EEAS desk officer for relations with Ghana perceived a conundrum in maintaining the 'same' relations with Ghana (an institutional priority) while advancing the more contentious questions of migration with the Ghanaian government.[118] Concerning embassies based in third countries, there is also a discrepancy in perspective between 'Brussels' and the 'field': what may seem a plausible or logical course of action in Brussels is perceived entirely differently at the level of direct political interaction with partner country governments, where the risk of souring political dialogue with African government counterparts is more considered. This is summed up by my interviewee at the EU Delegation in Ghana:

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[117] Interview 1, EEAS. Brussels, 19 September 2019.
[118] Interview 13, EEAS, 29 September 2017.

> *In Brussels they say, yes, we should use the visa leverage, but here the embassies*
> *they are working with the government and trying to establish a political*
> *dialogue on different issues – they don't want to talk about negative issues.*

- Interview 36, EU Delegation to Ghana. Accra, 25 January 2018.

The interviewee above furthermore noted that while restrictive visa policy measures had already been announced in Brussels as a tool for incentivising un-cooperative third countries, the Delegation had thus far refrained from mentioning these developments to their Ghanaian interlocutors, perceiving little benefit to be gained from doing so, while also commenting that the measure was disproportionate in the case of Ghana. The risk of halting political dialogue altogether as a result of being too forceful on particular issues shows that there is a line in the sand where, once crossed, applying negative leverage becomes counter-productive. 'Frankly you can see that in certain countries we have not progressed much, maybe because we're too pushy on certain things,' speculated one of my interviewees within DEVCO, when prompted about the progress achieved with West African states in migration cooperation.[119] These internal disagreements on how to move forward demonstrate clearly that migration governance and policy direction is continuously being negotiated internally, with different entities in constant dialogue on which approach to adopt. There is little to suggest that specific actors are more frequently successful than others in these 'game' dynamics. Instead, as noted by an EEAS interviewee commenting on the internal interplay: different actors prevail at different times.[120]

The response of the EEAS and the EU Delegations to adaptation pressures from Brussels can be interpreted as institutional decoupling, where it is not evident that the everyday dialogue conducted by the EEAS and EU delegations with African state counterparts has fully accommodated developments in Brussels. By decoupling, organisations might adopt the 'trappings of cooperation', whilst trying to 'minimise the impact of the new agenda on day-to-day practice' (Boswell 2008, p.501). In this scenario, external adaptation pressures are taken into account, but actors are more likely to adjust formal structures without changing internal practices (Boswell 2008; March & Olsen 1989). Decoupling suggests a willingness to demonstrate compliance with external demands, but where activities may still vary in response to other (practical) considerations (Meyer & Rowan 1977). The emergence of the 'root causes' discourse since 2015 on the other hand points to an organisational reinterpretation of external pressures,

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[119] Interview 8, DEVCO, 26 September 2017.
[120] Interview 1, EEAS. Brussels, 19 September 2017.

and the need to shape action in a way that allowed DG DEVCO to be enlisted in a pan-institutional response. In this scenario, demands for action are reinterpreted in a way that fit organisational priorities and goals, where action can be reasonably reconciled with an ideology or mandate (Boswell 2008). As I later demonstrate, this characterises the course of action taken by DG DEVCO, and comes at the cost of policy coherence.

A lack of uniformity can therefore be distinguished at multiple levels. Firstly, at the Member State level, as EU Member States differ in their approach where Southern EU Member States appear more likely to favour a harder approach than Northern ones. Secondly, within the European Union institutions there appears a distinction between DGs and agencies favouring a development-focused approach that is also mindful of diplomatic relations with third countries, with those who align more closely with a Home Affairs agenda. Thirdly, there is a discrepancy between 'Brussels' and Member States 'at home', and the level of political discourse conducted in the 'field' by embassies and their staff. Despite this lack of uniformity – or indeed because of it – the EU institutions make significant efforts to 'speak as one voice' as initially set out in the GAMM (EC 2011; Hampshire 2016). This is a deliberate policy that promotes a united front and coherence when negotiating with third countries, and has as its main aim to strengthen the EU's position as an actor in negotiations. As a DEVCO interviewee described it, the EU aims at coherency, particularly in the 'field' as an external actor.[121] Other EU civil servants commented on this 'one voice' policy as a strategy. A DEVCO interviewee – when asked about aligning the EU response to that of the EU Member States, commented:

> *Not necessarily to align with them, but to align altogether: to make sure that*
> *we all have a joint line; that we don't say different things. That is say the idea*
> *behind the Partnership Framework.*

- Interview 7, DG DEVCO. Brussels, 26 September 2017.

Similarly, another interviewee was keen to stress the united front of Commission migration policy, noting:

> *I think you shouldn't speak about 'DEVCO' as such. It's the EU that is trying to*
> *achieve something, and DEVCO is only part of the broader undertaking. (…) So,*
> *DEVCO doesn't have a policy as such. It's the EU policy on migration.*

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[121] Interview 34, DG DEVCO, West Africa Unit. Brussels, 7 December 2017.

- Interview 11, DG DEVCO. Brussels, 28 September 2017.

A few elements emerge from the above comments from EU civil servants on the one-voice strategy. In the first instance, the tensions that exist between different entities within the organisational setup of the EU institutions are both openly acknowledged (as noted in a previous section), but downplayed in favour of presenting a common EU stance on migration governance. At the same time, 'speaking as one' is an explicit strategy that EU institutions apply at the macro and the meso level, in an effort not to undermine the EU's institutional authority from within. Given the multitude of actors and the different tensions that exist internally, the complexity of managing these tensions within a three-level game is one of the largest constraints the EU faces as an actor in external migration governance. Hampshire (2016) concludes that the difficulty of creating commitment among diverse interests means that the EU emerges as an 'unpromising vehicle' for international migration cooperation when compared to bilateral negotiations, given that individual states – although not necessarily monolithic actors – have less internal complexity. I argue that the effort of the EU institutions to speak as one has a knock-on effect on policy coherence, and reflects a balance between different competing interests that come together in an amalgamation of policy.

In an effort to extoll a 'balanced' approach, the 'root causes' narrative of the EU has stressed the value of development financing as a tool in reducing irregular migration. This approach has been prominently adopted in some partner countries, notably Senegal, although less so in other partner countries (e.g. Niger). According to the root-causes rationale, migrants leave their place of origin because of untenable situations at home, where it is understood that poverty and lack of opportunity drive them to seek a better future elsewhere. Much of the EU's migration management intervention therefore aims at creating jobs and employment in migrant departure zones (see Chapter 4). An underlying tension that emerges is that the literature on the links between development and migration is somewhat known among policy practitioners active in EU-African cooperation. This tension makes up the proverbial 'elephant in the room' in policy discourse and interaction. This stance, which is inconsistent with the broad consensus in empirical studies on migration, is referred to in several instances:

Table 5.2: Policy ineffectiveness

'They are tying in development with reduction in numbers of migration. Which is a perverse way of looking at it, because we know that once development picks up, the effect that it has on migration initially is that emigration increases! It doesn't reduce. But the EU seems to be of this mindset that if only they support African countries to improve employment prospects, or to develop, then people do not see the need to leave their home countries. And that's not going to happen. You do that, the numbers go up initially, until we get to finally a peak (…). But that's much further down the line.'	Interview 40, CMS. Accra, 20 Feb. 2018.
'I think we should treat Ghana differently. To put an example of how migration or legal migration can work better [*sic*]. Because in the end, in Europe, we continue to receive migrants. Migration will continue to increase. All the statistics say that if the economic situation of a country is increasing, there will be more migrants. Because there will be more people who have means to go to Europe. In any case it's going to increase. (…) It's better to start managing migrants and flows in a proper way, and new ways, than trying to stop [flows].'	Interview 36, EU Delegation to Ghana. Accra, 25 January 2018.
'And let's be honest: when a country moves from low-income to middle-income, migration may even increase, because people have more ability to move. Rather than now, where it's a matter of you have to sell everything and get a loan from family to move. People may be able to move by their own means.'	Interview 8, DG DEVCO. Brussels, 26 Sept. 2017.

Equally, the issue of policy effectiveness of deterrence campaigns was raised in Chapter 4, noting that EU and international actors have reflected on issues of credibility of implementing external narratives to dissuade migrants in Senegal and Ghana. Awareness-raising campaigns have nonetheless formed an important component of the EU's external migration governance. It may be possible to ascribe, as a reason for this policy dissonance, a broader lack of engagement of policy practitioners with the work of epistemic communities on the topic of migration and

development. However, the above citations demonstrate at the very least some familiarity and reflexivity with the academic literature on migration and development on the part of several key actors that were interviewed. The notion of a positive correlation between development and migration flows is also not a recent one, but one that has been around for some time, where Castles (2009) denotes that this point was originally made by Georges Tapinos in 1990 and is 'one of the few things that virtually all migration scholars agree with' (p.442).

A more compelling argument then is that there are organisational and functional interests that are served in maintaining this policy dissonance. As the citations on pp.134-135 of this chapter highlight, the demands made by EU Member States place a results-oriented expectation on the EU's evolving external migration policy that cannot be realistically met. On the other hand, an entirely restrictive approach is at odds with either the organisational ideologies or the practices of parts of the Commission and the EEAS, these constituting influential actors within the policy process, and would be subject to internal contestation. An organisational lens allows the observation that deliberate malintegration of goals is a strategy employed by agencies and organisations to enhance viability (Boswell 2007a; Brunsson 1989) and ensure that in the longer run, the EU's position as a competent actor in external migration governance is not weakened. As Brunsson (1989) describes it, such 'hypocrisy' is a fundamental form of behaviour in political organisations: 'to talk in a way that satisfies one demand, to decide in a way that satisfies another, and to supply products in a way that satisfies a third' (p.27). When exposed to inconsistent demands or competing and contradictory goals, tolerating policy incoherence may emerge as the preferred option.

Finally, it can be said that the EU institutions endeavour to 'make sense' only retrospectively of the situations in which they find themselves, drawing cues from the environment. This can be particularly the case when the environment shifts rapidly, and new demands emerge that must be dealt with quickly. Organisational behaviour and decision-making are often shaped by plausibility rather than accuracy, as accuracy is 'nice, but not necessary' (Weick 1995, p.56). If accuracy is not important, this leads to the question: what is? Weick (1995) argues that plausibility; the extent that a narrative is reasonable, and resonates with others; and something that embodies both past experience, and expectations, all take precedence in an organisation's sense-making over accuracy. Boswell, Geddes, and Scholten (2011) similarly note that narratives are successful when they are cognitively plausible, morally compelling, and when they chime with perceived interests, determining that the main requirement regarding accuracy is that policy narratives be

of *relative* coherence. The notion that development financing is an appropriate tool in reducing or containing irregular migration, or that migrants can be persuaded to abandon their migration plans, is therefore a policy incoherence that the EU institutions may tolerate to ensure that a common 'line' can be adopted, regardless of whether it stands up to empirical scrutiny.

5.5 Conclusion

This chapter applied public policy theories and an organisational sociology lens to analyse EU policy following a crisis event. Recalling the theoretical framework of this research, policy actors such as the EU are not monolithic, but demonstrate complex behaviour, responding differently according to distinct rationales or interests. I explored in this chapter the tensions underlying the EU's response to political demands from internal arenas, demonstrating a will to meet these demands but also meeting other, organisational, interests. The drivers of EU migration policy to the case study countries can be seen to include pragmatic considerations such as a perception of the likelihood of succeeding in cooperation with a given country. Increasingly, the EU's external migration governance focuses on achieving a higher return rate in its cooperation with West African states, and development financing emerges as the main tool for incentivising African counterparts. Yet, the drive for results within EU external migration governance has led to an institutional response that is also substantially symbolic: one that is as much about performing the role of governing migration in crisis, as it is about attaining stated goals.

At an institutional level, the EU strives to minimise internal weaknesses by reconciling competing and overlapping demands and by making concerted efforts to speak as a unitary actor. This chapter examined this effort, concluding that pan-institutional unity came at the relative cost of policy coherence. I noted that a loss of accuracy or coherence in narratives can be an acceptable cost to policy-makers, if other organisational goals and diverse actors' interests can be met instead. The next chapter turns to the preferences of domestic actors in Senegal and Ghana in the EU's migration governance, in an analysis of their interests in migration governance.

Chapter 6

Senegalese and Ghanaian domestic actors' preferences

6.1 Introduction

Building on the preceding analysis of the EU's recent governance and the greater prominence of West Africa therein, this chapter examines the responses of domestic actors in Senegal and Ghana to the EU's policy proposals. In doing so, it explores to what extent varying outcomes of the EU's cooperation in migration with Senegal and Ghana can be explained by domestic actors' preferences. How are these preferences shaped, and then acted upon? How is EU external governance mediated by domestic actors? This chapter therefore unpacks the 'black box' of preference formation among actors at the receiving end of the EU's migration policy proposals (Mouthaan 2019). In doing so, it addresses one of the sub-questions of this thesis: What is the impact of domestic actors and their interests in determining migration cooperation?

The intricacies and domestic context of preference formation of actors in the policy 'receiving' country, within EU-African migration cooperation, have not been the subject of extensive analysis. (Exceptions include Adam, Trauner, Jegen, & Roos, 2019; Andersson, 2014; Frowd, 2018; Chou & Gibert, 2012; Trauner & Deimel, 2013.) In Chapter 2, I compared rational choice and sociological institutionalist approaches and argued both logics of political action can work simultaneously: actors might formulate policy decisions based on cost-benefit calculations, while also applying a logic of 'appropriateness' in terms of how the proposed policy resonates with national policy objectives and domestic rules. The EU's policy proposals to Senegal and Ghana are received, considered and acted upon by state actors who operate in a social context that both shapes and constrains their policy choices, and where domestic institutions – or rules – can be both formal or informal (see e.g. Rhinard 2017; Thielemann 2001). While existing studies have examined external incentives for third countries to cooperate with the EU (e.g. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier,

2004), or internal constraints that limit the EU's bargaining power in negotiations (e.g. Hampshire 2016), analyses of actors and institutional dynamics in countries at the receiving end of the EU's migration policy proposals are more limited. Contextually, it is also important to recall that the EU has a comparatively limited capacity to offer strong incentives for cooperation with West African countries in both the absence of EU accession conditionality (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2009), and given constraints in expanding visa facilitation and legal migration avenues for third country nationals (see Chapter 5).

This chapter is laid out as follows. The first three sections analyse areas of EU-African cooperation that have seen progress, as well as those that have been the subject of domestic contestation. The growth of capacity-building of the state's apparatus in border surveillance, border management and civil registries is explored in both the Senegalese and Ghanaian cases, examining how this has emerged as a key area of successful cooperation. It is demonstrated that capacity-building in this area matches the preferences of key state actors and aligns with a broader securitising agenda at the West African regional level; and that the technocratic character of border management cooperation has common points with domestic governance goals. I subsequently turn to returns and readmission as a key area of contention in cooperation, where I demonstrate that the visibility of returns in communities, and domestic public disapproval, effectively prevents domestic policy actors from openly cooperating in this area. The fourth section of this chapter adopts a constructivist lens and examines domestic actors' perceptions of: the EU as an actor; the strength of their domestic institutions; and of alternative partners in cooperation. I examine the implications of these perceptions in terms of how they subsequently affect EU-African power dynamics in cooperation. The final section examines the impact of organisational factors shaping EU-African cooperation, notably the effect of staff turnover, competition between domestic actors, and the lack of institutionalised practices such as information sharing between stakeholders. It demonstrates that these factors have an impact – largely unintended – on both cooperation and policy implementation outcomes.

6.2 Progress in cooperation

This section demonstrates that the securitisation rationale has resonated to some extent with West African state actors, whereby processes of migration control and surveillance have been accorded legitimacy by West African state actors. In particular, technocratic elements of the EU's policy proposals have resonated with Senegalese and Ghanaian state actors' preferences, who perceive technological solutions as appropriate in solving domestic governance challenges. Rather

than being reluctant or co-opted participants in the EU's external migration agenda, in the matter of border management capacity building and the development of the state's capacity to monitor and document migration flows, West African governments have been demonstrably proactive in seeking out external financial and technical support. In both Senegal and Ghana, state actors have engaged with the EU and EU Member States in the area of border management, documenting migration, and, especially in the case of Senegal, population registration and documentation in the form of establishing a functioning civil registry. This has formed the basis of extensive and historical cooperation.

Examples of key project interventions in border management/surveillance

Figure 6.1: Projects in Ghana since 2006.

EU Support to GIS for project on 'Countering Document Fraud'. Project operational **2006-2009**: Aeneas Programme

The Ghana Integrated Migration Management project (GIMMA) - EDF funded (**2014-2017**)

Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) received funding through MIEUX to build capacities in project management – **2011-2013**

EUTF project: Strengthening Border Security in Ghana. Adopted in **2019**

Figure 6.2: Projects in Senegal since 2006.

Sources: Author's compilation; EEAS 2017; IOM 2017.[122]

It is demonstrated in the subsequent section how progress in the matter of capacity-building in border surveillance and border management, and developing civil registries, has been largely successful and can be explained by the interests and preferences of Senegalese and Ghanaian state actors.

6.2.1 Population registration and data harmonisation

Domestic actors are interested in forms of cooperation with the EU that add to their own governance toolbox. In the search for common ground with African states on migration policy priorities, areas of cooperation emerged from dialogue platforms where the scope for tangible EU-African cooperation was established. An interviewee from the Belgian foreign ministry, involved in the Rabat Process, noted that the Rabat dialogue had provided insight into an area for potential cooperation, notably, expanding documentation on the population in the form of a comprehensive civil registry:

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[122] In the above timelines: MIEUX (Migration EU Expertise) is an EU-funded initiative that provides tailor-made assistance in migration and mobility management on request to partner countries; the Aeneas programme, run by the European Commission, provided financial and technical assistance to third countries in the area of migration and asylum.

> *Where we discussed and [where] we found that there was scope for cooperation – and demand from African countries – is for example registration of the population, or 'état civil'. Because it is something which of course is necessary if you want to identify people who are in Europe without documentation; but it is also essential of course to the countries who want to build their economy and have a political, demographic and democratic governance.*

- Interview 2, Belgian diplomat. Brussels, 21 September 2017.

With a budget of 28 million euros, the project supporting the creation of a civil registry in Senegal constitutes one of the most prominent EUTF project interventions in the country.[123] The project has been welcomed by Senegalese state actors in various ministries. As the above quotation indicates, a functioning civil registry is an important tool of demographic and political governance. Speaking positively about the EU's support in establishing a national civil registry, a MAESE interviewee working in the diplomatic branch of the ministry emphasised that a key concern for the state is the 'massive document fraud' that takes place in the country, linking this to the problem of an unreliable civil registry.[124] The Senegalese and Ghanaian NMPs both highlight the need for a reliable documentation system on the resident population, including immigrants (Ghanaian NMP, 2016, p.46; Senegalese NMP 2017, Art. 226). For the Ministry of Interior, its mandate to manage entry and exit to Senegalese territory means that the introduction of biometric databases will make this task easier, as well as monitoring the resident migrant population in Senegal.

The issue of a reliable civil registry plays into the larger question of limited data and statistics on migration in both countries. A senior official at the Ghanaian Ministry of Interior flagged data collection as a key issue, noting an absence of official statistics on how many Ghanaians reside abroad, or an idea of how many embark irregularly.[125] As a Senegalese NGO representative commented, it is 'inconceivable' that a 'migration state' such as Senegal lacks reliable migration data, and relies heavily on the IOM for migration statistics, where this reliance on an external actor for data that informs governance is also seen by domestic actors as a sovereignty issue.[126] Data

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[123] See project titled 'Programme d'appui au renforcement du système d'information de l'état civil et à la création d'un fichier national d'identité biométrique', launched 15 May 2017 for an estimated duration of 48 months (EC 2019g).

[124] Interview 19, MAESE. Dakar, 2 November 2017.

[125] Interview 44, Ministry of Interior of Ghana. Accra, 23 February 2018.

[126] Participant observation: government-civil society workshop. Dakar, November 2017.

that is collected is often not harmonised in a way that allows for comparison or meaningful analysis; in other instances, data is not shared between ministries and institutions.[127] A senior official at DPAF (Senegalese Air and Border Police) noted that one of the agency's goals was to increase data collection on travel, and to improve information sharing between police services, with the aim (among others) of creating a profile of migrants travelling outside of Senegal.[128] In Ghana, the IOM has introduced data harmonising and sharing tools for the purpose of monitoring migration trends and contributing to more effective migration management.[129]

The EU has thus far funded 'all that is biometrics' in Senegal.[130] Advances in biometry serve to improve the 'traceability' of persons, including migrants on the move. It is the diplomatic branch of MAESE that deals with requests for identifications of Senegalese irregular migrants. With the rolling out of a biometric ID card system, the ministry anticipates that identification missions will become easier, as well as helping to prevent returns being made by EU Member States on the false assumption of Senegalese citizenship.[131]

Senegalese ministries thus perceive technological modernisation as appropriate in achieving specific aims of domestic governance. Institutionalised processes can thus represent an end in themselves. The political choice of pursuing technological solutions for domestic governance issues also has organisational and reputational ends, as 'quite apart from their possible efficiency, such institutionalised techniques establish an organisation as appropriate, rational and modern' (Meyer & Rowan 1977, p.344). The Senegalese NMP notes, for instance, that Senegal's manual databases are 'globally obsolete' and in need of modernisation (Article 78). Reputational gains also act as an incentive: that Senegal is the first ECOWAS country to launch the ECOWAS biometric ID card establishes the West African nation as a forerunner in the region, something that interviewees across ministries were keen to stress.[132] This echoes Frowd's (2018) observation that governance technologies are pursued by West African states as part of a 'modernising zeal' linked to state-building ambitions (p.75). The rolling out of a national biometric ID card is also a priority of the Ghanaian administration, although Ghana and Nigeria have preferred to develop their own ID card independently of the ECOWAS model.[133] Technological advances in biometry thereby assist

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[127] Interview 9, IOM. Brussels, 27 September 2017. The IOM interviewee was commenting specifically on the case of Senegal.
[128] Interview 21, DPAF. Dakar, 3 November 2017.
[129] Interview 37, IOM. Accra, 19 February 2018.
[130] Interview 19, MAESE. Dakar, 2 November 2017.
[131] Interviews 19, 20 and 29, MAESE. Dakar, November 2017.
[132] Interviews 20 and 21, DGSE and DPAF. Dakar, November 2017.
[133] Interview 36, EU Delegation to Ghana. Accra, 26 January 2018.

state actors in modernising governance mechanisms and bringing these in line with international standards, capable of dealing with the challenges of document fraud and other governance challenges linked to a weak civil registry. At the same time, as illustrated by the quotation from the Belgian ministry interviewee (p.155 in this chapter), it is clear that it is also intended to provide an avenue for EU Member States to overcome some of the difficulties encountered in carrying out returns. This is referred to in the Partnership Framework (2016) that foresees the 'facilitation of the identification of irregular migrants in view of their readmission by strengthening third countries' capacity to ensure functioning civil registries and fingerprint or biometrics digitalisation' (EC 2016c, p.7).

Ghana has not benefitted from the Trust Fund to the extent that Senegal has, in financial terms. Yet, it is one of six West African nations participating in a Trust Fund project that is strengthening police information systems in the broader region.[134] In the project fiche of the initiative, it can be ascertained that ECOWAS member governments have 'asked for support to provide local law enforcement authorities with effective means to collect, search, analyse and share relevant criminal information' (EC 2016e, p.1). This project effectively consolidates and expands the WAPIS (West Africa Information System) system piloted in Ghana and three other West African countries since 2012, which was set up in response to an ECOWAS request for support in 2011 (*ibid).*

Both Senegalese and Ghanaian state actors have perceived a reliable civil registry, and the expansion of harmonised data on migration, as useful tools in domestic governance. Given the overlap of interests, this has emerged as a fruitful area of cooperation with the EU. The following section notes that other elements of the EU's migration management agenda have also found resonance with domestic actors.

6.2.2 Securitisation of national and regional migration governance

Chapter 4 outlined a security bias present in the EU's ideational export to West African states in the matter of migration governance. This section expands on the security bias in the policy frameworks of Senegal and Ghana, analysing domestic interests in the security agenda.

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[134] Project 'Support to the strengthening of police information systems in the broader West Africa region', adopted Oct 2016, with a budget of 5 million euros (EC 2019f).

In October 2013, UEMOA heads of state introduced a common policy on peace and security, including intensifying the fight against terrorism (UEMOA 2013).[135] At the subsequent meeting on the implementation of the UEMOA Common Policy in Dakar in October 2017, the Senegalese President Macky Sall delivered a speech where he noted among the major advances of the policy the establishment of a General Delegation for Peace and Security at the heart of the UEMOA Commission, and the political adoption of the UEMOA Action Plan for peace and security by UEMOA Member State governments in June 2016 (UEMOA 2017, p.3). President Sall further emphasised the importance of building cooperation within the UEMOA space in the matter of security and information sharing, in a regional context marked by 'increasingly numerous and increasingly complex security challenges' (*ibid,* pp.3-4). In April 2018, UEMOA states signed an agreement enhancing their cooperation in security matters, with the aim of tackling documentary fraud, terrorism, human trafficking, and 'illegal or clandestine migration', among other areas (UEMOA 2018, p.4).

The above reflects a broader trend whereby EU and EU Member States efforts to expand migration management initiatives have resulted in the growth of the security hegemony in West African regional policy frameworks, as noted in Chapter 2 (see Kabbanji 2011; Coderre 2018). Through the consolidation of various partnerships with West African domestic security actors, I demonstrate that security has taken a prominent place in emerging national migration policy frameworks in the two case studies.

The security imperative, and policy priorities of European 'host' states, are evident in the discourse of the recently formulated national policy frameworks in Senegal and Ghana. In both countries the EU has provided funds in support of the development of a National Migration Policy (NMP), with technical support and oversight provided by the IOM. This financial aid has been a key catalyst for the development of a formal policy in both cases. It is important to note that the NMPs of both countries currently merely reflect policy wishes – that is, projected policy – rather than actual policy. This is because to date both policies remain unimplemented. On the other hand, the two documents offer insight into the aims and priorities of key migration policy stakeholders in both countries in terms of the main thematic interventions foreseen in migration governance. Crucially,

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[135] The regional body for economic integration for francophone West Africa, the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA), consists of eight states that share the West Africa CFA Franc as a common currency. Established in 1994, it was created with the aim of forging a common market based on the free movement of persons, goods and services. Member States are: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo. (All eight countries are also ECOWAS Member States.)

as the documents act as a compilation of aims of different government ministries, non-state actors and international actors, they also represent the final agreed compromise between migration stakeholders in Senegal and Ghana on thematic areas delineated for migration policy intervention. The analysis below identifies an important security-oriented perspective in both national policy frameworks, following developments at the regional level.

The Senegalese government, through the Ministry of Interior, elaborated a new national border management strategy in 2013 (*stratégie nationale de gestion des frontières*) with the financial support of the EU (see Figure 6.2 earlier in this chapter). The main objective of this strategy is the 'strengthening of the internal security of the country', facilitating free movement of people and goods, and promoting cross-border cooperation (Senegalese NMP, 2018, p.63). It foresees the ongoing capacity-building of relevant ministerial departments including the police, border posts, and the army (*ibid*). An EU-funded project in support of the strategy, implemented by the IOM and coordinated by the Senegalese Ministry of Interior, has built the capacity of the Senegalese government in border management and surveillance by supporting the expansion of border post infrastructure, and the training of over 250 officers in new methodologies and standard operating procedures (EEAS 2017; see also Figure 6.2). The rationale applied by Senegalese authorities in this instance for strengthening border management and surveillance is the 'sub-regional context marked by terrorism, organised crime and trafficking of all kinds, including migrant trafficking' (EEAS 2017).

In the case of Senegal, the process of drafting a National Migration Policy began in July 2015.[136] It is the Senegalese Ministry of Economy, Finance and Planning (and thereunder the Directorate-General for Human Capital) that has been assigned the lead in formulating the National Migration Policy, and collating inputs from over 100 stakeholders. The policy emerged from a perceived need to understand common priorities in migration between government ministries, and to formulate a policy 'plan' accordingly in consultation with actors involved in migration in Senegal – including state entities, but also international organisations and non-state actors. Perhaps more significantly, the catalyst for eventually launching discussions on a National Migration Policy can be traced to the EU's offer to support the government financially in the drafting of such a policy. As the project manager of a Senegalese NGO put it, the interest in migration policy increased among Senegalese state actors when there was evidence of substantial funding attached to it:

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[136] Interview 32, Directorate-General for Human Capital, Ministry of Finance. Dakar, 21 November 2017.

> *A few years ago, they were not very interested in this [migration] question. It was only once there was talk about a lot of funding appearing related to migration issues, that they initiated the development of a migration policy at the national level. Before, a few years ago, when they were told by us that Senegal did not even have a migration policy, they denied this. It was only in 2011 when they learned that the EU now has a fund for the setting up of a migration policy, that they said, 'we do not have a migration policy'.*

- Interview 18, Project Manager of a Senegalese NGO. Dakar, 30 October 2017.

In Ghana, it is clear that migration gained in salience as a topic on policymakers' agendas when the context of migrants' precarious situation in Libya precipitated the development of the National Migration Policy.[137] There was a growing need to address the situation of Ghanaian citizens abroad, in particular with growing public awareness of, and concern over, the abuse of human rights of migrants in the North African country. A further cited factor was the need to better formulate an immigration policy in Ghana.[138] Several project interventions from international development organisations operating in Ghana had highlighted the need for a National Migration Policy as early as 2009.[139] By the late 2000s, an inter-ministerial steering committee had been formed, made up of representatives of different Ghanaian government departments involved in some aspect of migration.

In the early stages of the policy consultation process, the architects of the Ghanaian National Migration Policy at the Centre for Migration Studies, University of Ghana noted that the initial focus as provided by the inter-ministerial steering committee was on international migration, with little reference to internal migration challenges and governance.[140] This led to the initial terms of reference being heavily security-oriented – a reflection of the security-oriented concerns of external development partners – as well as the fact that migration had been largely viewed as a negative phenomenon at the time, due to debates around brain-drain.[141] The focus of the policy was ultimately broadened to explore the ways in which migration could be harnessed for national

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[137] Interview 35, IOM. Skype, 11 December 2017; and Interview 36, EU Delegation to Ghana. Accra, 25 January 2018.
[138] Interview 49, CMS. Accra, 7 March 2018.
[139] Interview 37, IOM. Accra, 19 February 2018; Ghanaian NMP, 2016.
[140] Interviews 40 and 49, Centre for Migration Studies. Accra, February-March 2018.
[141] Interview 49, Centre for Migration Studies. Accra, 7 March 2018.

development, and to look at migration in all its aspects, thereby including internal and intra-regional migration within West Africa in the discussions and policy drafting.

In both cases, the respective Ministries of Interior have played an important role in ensuring an emphasis on security concerns remains prevalent. Migration and particularly immigration is viewed through a security lens in both documents; additionally, there is an emphasis on the broader security risks of the wider region, which feeds into a rationale for solidifying borders. Several measures to step up migration control and border management capacities are outlined. The following extracts from the National Migration Policy documents of Senegal and Ghana illustrate this, as they frame border management activities in relation to regional security risks, as well as the needs of the 'international community':

Effective management of national borders constitutes an important concern for the promotion and maintenance of security and is an essential element in the national migration system of Ghana. The country is currently attracting immigrants from the West Africa region, due to its relative economic strength and political stability. Increased numbers of immigrants from unstable countries and with unknown intent have also given rise to potential security threats (…)

- Ghana National Migration Policy (2016), p.47.

the current context of evolving international migration flows and the operational challenges these pose for States and the international community have led the Government of Senegal to adopt appropriate measures for the improved management of entry and exit from the territory. This need to manage migration flows is linked to the necessity of combatting transnational organised crime (…)[142]

- Senegalese National Migration Policy (2018), p.62.

In both the Senegalese and Ghanaian NMPs, there is an intention to create a rapid response capability to deal with the 'growth of transnational criminal trafficking, terrorist threats and other multiple threats' (Senegalese NMP, 2018, p.60). In the case of Ghana, the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) would host the rapid response unit, for which the GIS submitted a funding proposal to US development partners (Ghanaian NMP, 2016, p.48; Ghana Immigration Service 2015, p.24).

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[142] My translation. Note that the word '*contrôle*' used in the original text in French in the phrase '*contrôle des flux*', is nuanced: it can refer to management or monitoring of flows.

These developments closely echo the creation of an early warning system to combat irregular migration as stipulated in the ECOWAS Common Approach.

Senegal and Ghana are member states of the regional body ECOWAS, whereby they are subject to the ECOWAS free movement protocol as mentioned previously. Interviewees in Ghanaian and Senegalese ministries – particular the ministries of Interior – have by and large presented capacity building in border surveillance as congruent with the free movement protocol of ECOWAS. An interviewee at the Senegalese Air and Border Police (DPAF) noted that free movement within ECOWAS is enshrined, but reiterated that movement and mobility should take place with a valid ID document; this argument is echoed by the Ghanaian Immigration Service.[143] In my interview with a senior official of the Senegalese DPAF – in relation to how border management capacity-building related to the ECOWAS principle of free movement – the officer asserted that while there was a right to free movement, states also have a right to control borders, and that '*la politique s'adapte*' ('the politics adapt').[144] The role of framing by domestic actors in this process is paramount: the relative success of the EU's migration management approach in West Africa is supported by an institutional narrative shift that presents increasingly solid borders in the region as congruent with the regional integration agenda. This endeavour has been necessary to ensure that on the surface, furthering border management capacity building in the region is not perceived as conflicting with an important domestic institution, notably that of free movement within the economic bloc. The securitisation of migration policy, and the imperative of solidifying porous borders – while originating, as a discourse, externally to the domestic institutional context of West Africa's ECOWAS – has formed the substance of EU-West African 'common ground' in migration cooperation.

The regional integration framework still places a constraint on domestic actors in pursuing a fully-fledged containment agenda. It ensures that in theory, movement across an ECOWAS border by an ECOWAS citizen (with a valid ID) cannot be prevented, regardless of the suspected onward journey of a migrant. In the event that it is suspected that a migrant crossing a border may be aiming to travel outside of the ECOWAS region – for which the migrant or may not have a legal basis to do so – there is no corresponding legal basis for border control staff to prevent the migrant from crossing an ECOWAS border, except in light of an absent or invalid ID document.[145] Giving an example, an interviewee at MAESE noted that:

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[143] Interview 21, DPAF. Dakar, 3 November 2017; Interview 50, GIS. Accra, 9 March 2018.
[144] Interview 21.
[145] Interview 21, DPAF; Interview 19, MAESE. Dakar, 2 November 2017.

> *We have free movement of people at the level of ECOWAS, and when someone*
> *goes to Niger we cannot call him out at [the Niger border]. We don't know if his*
> *final destination is Europe. The person crosses the border to Niger, and there is*
> *no traceability of migrants to these countries, since the juxtaposed border posts*
> *do not have biometric [technologies].*

- Interview 19, MAESE. Dakar, 2 November 2017. My translation.

In the case of both Senegal and Ghana, national actors have proactively requested support from EU and international partners to build capacity in border management and border surveillance. International appetite for securing borders in West Africa has provided an opportunity for domestic security actors to expand their activities and to broaden their financial support base. The EU's MIEUX[146] initiative accepts requests for technical assistance from partner countries and regional organisations in all four areas of the thematic pillars of the EU's GAMM (see Table 3.7, Chapter 3). The implementing organisation of MIEUX, the ICMPD[147], received a request from the Senegalese Ministry of Interior which led to a project being launched in 2010 for the early stage of developing a strategy and action plan for border management, and which resulted in the formulation of the national border management strategy.[148] The other project implemented in Senegal under the MIEUX initiative ran from 2010-2012 and focused on combatting irregular migration and document fraud, where the project request was made by the Senegalese DPAF, in conjunction with police and immigration departments of several other West African states (MIEUX 2019). Ghanaian ministries placed three successful requests for technical assistance with MIEUX. Of these three requests, two were made by the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) and the Ministry of Interior, and the third by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[149] The two requests that the GIS was involved in focused on the capacity-building of the GIS – with one in particular focusing on building the agency's capacities in project management, in light of the many projects it had already secured:

> *GIS at that time – I don't know about the situation right now, but at that time*
> *was benefitting from a lot of assistance from the EU via other international*
> *actors such as the IOM, or UK Development Aid; the Netherlands was*

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[146] Migration EU Expertise.
[147] International Centre for Migration Policy Development.
[148] Interview 6, ICMPD (MIEUX initiative). Brussels, 22 September 2017.
[149] The request made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs aimed at creating a Diaspora Engagement Policy and resulted in a project that was later abandoned in favour of another implementer.

> *particularly active (…). So they were benefitting from all these projects but they*
> *didn't have, at that time, project management skills and capacities and*
> *capability. So they asked us to teach them, to train them how to initiate a*
> *project; how to formulate it; how to prepare a budget and a logframe and so*
> *on. So basically that was the main objective of the project. To invest in the*
> *institutional capacity of GIS.*

- Interview 6, ICMPD - MIEUX initiative. Brussels, 22 September 2017.

The above citation is broadly indicative of the success that the GIS has enjoyed in securing funding to expand its activities and build its capacities. A senior official based within the GIS's Migration Information Bureau noted that the agency had enjoyed 'good relations with the EU' and that this had resulted in the implementation of many projects since she had been at the GIS (since 2004).[150] This had also often taken the form of bilateral cooperation, with individual EU Member States involved in supporting the development of particular areas of the GIS's capacities: as such, the UK had pushed for the setting up of the Migration Management Bureau and had also helped build up the intelligence unit of the GIS; the Netherlands had supported the training of Ghanaian officers in detecting document fraud; and Spain had financed border management capacity-building activities.[151] The extensive capacity-building of the GIS, and the role of the EU in funding this, is not lost on other ministerial and non-state actors within the Ghanaian migration policy environment, who perceive the EU and EU Member States' preference in this area. An official at the Europe Desk within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs perceived that the EU had built a strong working relationship with the GIS over other interlocutors within the Ghanaian government.[152] At the EU Delegation in Accra, it was similarly acknowledged that 'our counterparts at the government level, it's mainly the Ministry of Interior, but should be also the Ministry of Foreign Affairs'.[153] In assessing the EU's targeted support in the area of border management, a migration academic at the Centre for Migration Studies commented:

> *The EU support to different government agencies – we are aware of building*
> *capacity of the Ghana Immigration Service for instance – is also in the long run*
> *tied to stemming the flow of irregular migrants. Even though it looks like an*

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[150] Interview 50, GIS. Accra, 9 March 2018.
[151] Interview 50.
[152] Interview 42, Desk Officer at Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ghana. Accra, 23 February 2018.
[153] Interview 36, EU Delegation to Ghana. Accra, 25 January 2018.

> *altruistic type of gesture, the real aim is to better equip the Ghana Immigration*
> *Service with the hope that [it] will then be able to better protect the borders or*
> *patrol the borders or manage migration to minimise the numbers that are*
> *leaving Ghana and making their way to Europe through Libya.*

- Interview 40, Centre for Migration Studies (CMS), University of Ghana. Accra, 20 February 2018.

The EU thus demonstrates a tendency to work directly with individual ministries in specific areas, whereby an IOM official at the Dakar office noted, in relation to EU-Senegalese migration projects, that every project has its '*ministère d'ancrage*' ('anchoring' ministry).[154] This strategy has seen favourable results in building strong working relationships with the Ministries of Interior and attached immigration agencies in both Senegal and Ghana, and achieving tangible cooperation in the area of border management and surveillance. The relationship that security and Ministry of Interior domestic actors have long enjoyed with EU Member States in security matters also means that recent cooperation in this area be viewed and understood through a broader lens of extensive and historical bilateral and multilateral cooperation, where such cooperation has become routinised and inter-institutional networks firmly established. The historicity of these working relations signify that domestic security actors have streamlined institutional capacity-building, while becoming adept and highly professional at navigating and accessing the multiple funding opportunities available to them from an array of international donors.

It is plausible that the emergence of the security lens in the West African context is related to the need to accommodate international donor agendas and security narratives, whereby these increasingly take centre stage over economic regional integration efforts. A policy conditionality explanation alone however is insufficient in accounting for the successful cooperation in border management between the EU, Senegal and Ghana: this would suggest that Senegal and Ghana accepted capacity-building in border management in exchange for development funding. Instead, the EU's cooperation with Senegal and Ghana in the area of border management occurred where the security imperative was accorded legitimacy by domestic actors at both the national and regional level, where I have shown that Ghanaian and Senegalese actors have been proactive in requesting support from the EU and other international partners in this area. From an organisational perspective, the historical, extensive and ongoing capacity-building of border and

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[154] Interview 17, IOM. Dakar, 17 October 2017.

security actors by EU Member States and the EU has enabled security actors at the domestic level to expand and professionalise at a rapid rate. This has enabled domestic security actors to bolster their mandates and emerge as active participants in an increasingly security-oriented discourse at the national level.

It is also, as I elaborate below, that security actors active at the domestic level have perceived fewer constraints when pursuing border management capacity building, owing to the technical and depoliticised nature of such cooperation.

6.3 Conceptualising cooperation decisions

The previous section analysed how state actors in Senegal and Ghana cooperate actively with the EU in areas of migration governance. In particular, technocratic elements of the EU's policy proposals have resonated with domestic security actors. On the other hand, areas that are more politicised and subject to public scrutiny have seen little progress as governments are constrained in their ability to cooperate in an area of public contestation. I conceptualise these elements further in this section, suggesting that the comparatively internationalised and technical policy area of border management and security acts as a buffered space, in which policy actors are insulated from domestic pressures that appear in more politicised areas of cooperation.

To a large extent, the transnational nature of security cooperation, knowledge and practice has acted as a buffer from domestic constraints. Combined with the depoliticised, technical nature of this domain of cooperation, domestic actors have effectively perceived little in the manner of typical domestic constraints in the pursuit of cooperation with the EU in this area. Practices of security cooperation and state-building are, on the one hand, unspectacular practices of buttressing the state, and are not necessarily 'hard' forms of security and military capacity building (Frowd 2015). Such practices stand in contrast to the 'political theatre of securitization' (Neal 2009) that deliberately aims for an elevation from 'normal' politics. While some areas of migration management have been subject to domestic politicisation, media attention and public contestation – such as cooperation in returns and readmission – the comparative lack of institutional barriers has therefore made border management and population surveillance a fruitful area for cooperation. This link is explored and conceptualised in the table below, in the example of two different areas of migration management.

Table 6.1: Mapping domestic constraints and opportunities onto areas of cooperation

AREA OF COOPERATION	Visibility & salience among public & domestic interest groups	Degree of 'transnational-isation' of policy issue	Resonance with domestic governance goals	International perception of domestic constraints
Border management	Low	High	Medium-high	Low
Returns & readmission	High	Low	Low	High

By means of conceptualising this, I propose that the comparatively low level of politicisation of border management cooperation means that Senegalese and Ghanaian state actors have perceived fewer institutional constraints in this area. While some non-state actors have contested border management capacity-building as interfering with free movement protocols, infringing on human rights and generating disturbances for communities at the borders (see Chapter 4, section 4.2; Stambøl 2019), the legitimisation of border management activities by domestic political elites has helped to ensure that politicisation of this form of cooperation is generally low. As mentioned previously, the relationship that security and Ministry of Interior domestic actors have long enjoyed with EU Member States in security matters also means that recent cooperation in this area be viewed and understood through a broader lens of extensive and historical bilateral and multilateral cooperation. Domestic actors also perceived distinct organisational and state-building gains to be made from cooperation in this domain. Security cooperation affords the application of technological 'solutions', while underlining the role of the state in the provision of these solutions.

Comparatively, highly politicised areas of cooperation that are by definition highly visible to the public have been subject to domestic contestation, whereby state actors negate or reject the EU's governance approach. Facilitating returns, particularly in the case of involuntary returns, does not resonate with state actors' goals and interests. The next section explores domestic perceptions of constraints, and strategies of contestation.

6.4 Contentions in cooperation

This section proceeds through the lens of 'contentions': migration topics that are highly politically controversial in third countries have seen little progress in terms of negotiation with EU and EU Member States. Contentious areas of cooperation are either deemed to carry an unacceptably high cost, or they are deemed inappropriate by domestic actors. Often, both of these cases apply in domestic actors' decision making.

### 6.4.1 Domestic costs of return and readmission

While progress is notable in the area of EU-African cooperation in border management capacity-building, the subject of migrant return and readmission is one that has been highly contested in EU-African cooperation. I examine here how the EU and EU Member States have applied a policy conditionality approach in the area of returns and readmission, which has largely failed to convince Senegalese and Ghanaian state actors of the benefit of enhanced cooperation on returns. I demonstrate how domestic actors have responded to the EU's efforts in this area by applying a logic of consequences, where the 'cost' of accepting returns is frequently deemed too high. In doing so, this section aims to unpack the 'black box' of preference formation among domestic actors, and examines the rationale applied by Senegalese and Ghanaian state actors in responding to the EU's governance approach.

Recalling Chapter 5, the migration crisis has generated increased political pressure for a higher return rate to be established with third countries. As such, the EU has sought to adopt new methods to increase the rate of returns with most notably a 'stronger reliance on informal patterns of cooperation' (Slominski and Trauner 2018, pp.106-107; see also Cassarino 2018). Since the introduction of the Partnership Framework in 2016, the 'paramount priority is to achieve fast and operational returns, and not necessarily formal readmission agreements' (EC 2016c, p.7). The context for this shift in the EU's approach is the general failure to secure rates of return that EU Member States are satisfied with, and that 'experience in dialogues with partner countries has shown a gap between expectations and results on returns and readmission' (*ibid*). This expectations-results gap persists, as follow-up progress reports published by the European Commission since 2016 have illustrated. Despite numerous readmission agreements in place with third countries, the European Commission considers that 'results remain disappointing in terms of the number of persons returned' (EC 2019c, p.15). To illustrate further, the graphs below detail the total number of return orders issued by EU Member States to presumed Senegalese and Ghanaian irregular migrants in the years 2011-2018 (Figure 6.3) and the percentage of these

return orders carried out, or the 'rate of return' (Figure 6.4). They demonstrate the limited success of the EU in expanding cooperation on returns with Senegal and Ghana in the period 2011-2018.

Figure 6.3: Return orders by country of citizenship (EU total).

Source: Eurostat, 2018a (adapted from dataset [*migr_eiord*]).

Figure 6.4: Rate of return.

Source: Eurostat, 2018b (adapted from datasets [*migr_eiord*] and [*migr_eirtn*]). The graph shows migrant returns that were carried out to third countries (beyond EU borders).

A rationalist approach emphasises cooperation outcomes as the outcome of strategic cost-benefit calculations whereby domestic actors weigh up the relative costs and benefits of a policy course

of action (see Chapter 2; Graziano & Vink 2007; Snidal 2002). It is evident that Ghanaian and Senegalese state actors consider the political, economic and social costs of accepting returns and find these to be significant. Accepting and facilitating returns has economic, social, and political implications that factor into policymakers' decision making, as demonstrated below.

Economic contributions of emigrants

From an economic perspective, the cost of accepting returns is twofold. Firstly, migrant returns entail the immediate loss of remittances, while remittances constitute an important contribution to the economy in both Senegal and Ghana. As the European Migration Liaison Officer in Dakar observed, the government of Senegal considers that the 'economic weight of its diaspora is more important than the external aid (development aid)', and for this reason returns remain a 'sensitive issue'.[155] The extent of household dependency on remittances is also made clear by interviewees in the Ghanaian Diaspora Bureau and the Senegalese DGSE respectively. A DGSE official noted that a loss of remittances would be a 'disaster' to households (see citation below).

Table 6.2: Household dependency on remittances

'In the household, most of those migrants are the breadwinners. (…) And wanting to return and reintegrate these migrants – it's difficult. Because if they come [back], you can imagine the number of lives that will be destroyed, because they depend on them.'	Interview 38, Ghanaian Diaspora Bureau, Office of the President. Accra, 20 February 2018.
'Here, one can go into neighbourhoods where I can easily say that 90% of households - the money for their daily expenses comes from Europe and from outside. It is the emigrants alone who support many families here. (…) If the emigrants did not remit, it would be a disaster.' (*My translation.*)	Interview 16, DGSE-MAESE. Dakar, 17 October 2017.

Challenges in reintegrating returnees

The other economic impact that policymakers consider are the challenges in reintegrating returnees, whereby returnees who do not reintegrate socially and economically are likely to

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[155] Interview 14, EU Delegation to Senegal. Dakar, 13 October 2017. (My translation.)

become a burden to the state. Existing domestic policy tools aimed at reintegrating returnees are also largely inadequate for dealing with involuntary returns, as they are primarily designed for attracting the return of members of the diaspora.

In the case of Senegal, the gaps identified in the National Migration Policy (NMP) document note the lack of a 'national mechanism to deal with "involuntary returns" and repatriates, particularly with regard to psychological, social, legal and economic support' (Ministry of Finance of Senegal: NMP, 2018, p.18). Ghanaian officials refer to the 'abrupt return' of Ghanaians between 2011-2012 as having posed 'significant challenges' concerning reintegration (Ministry of Interior for Ghana: NMP, 2016, p.44). My interviewee at the Ghanaian Diaspora Bureau furthermore pointed to the impact of returns on government policy:

> *It will trickle [back] into the government's policy also. Because if the migrants don't send money to take care of the household – they also depend on the government; there will be crime and other things. So, the government is very careful in how it deals with that.*

- Interview 38, Ghanaian Diaspora Bureau, Office of the President. Accra, 20 February 2018.

As such, increasing crime rates and unemployment are possible consequences that the state would need to manage.

This chimes with studies that have been conducted on return migration and development that point to the need for migrants to have agency in the timing of their return, in order to make preparations or generate sufficient savings (see e.g. Åkesson, 2011; Cross, 2013). Forced returns, due to their abrupt nature, remove this agency and make it more likely that returnees become dependent on family members (*ibid*). State mechanisms to facilitate economic reintegration and support returnees are moreover limited in terms of capacity, and focus largely on voluntary returnees – an example is the flagship programme *Fonds d'Appui à l'Investissement des Sénégalais de l'Extérieur* (FAISE)[156] in Senegal, run by the Senegalese DGSE, that offers small loans to members of the Senegalese diaspora and prospective returnees for setting up projects in Senegal. These state-run programmes were designed for voluntary returnees, as is also indicated by a DGSE interviewee working for the FAISE.[157]

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[156] Support Fund for the Investment of Senegalese Abroad.
[157] Interview 20, DGSE-MAESE. Dakar, 3 November 2017.

State-run programmes as such are frequently a poor match with the needs of returnees whose profile is not a close match with the primarily intended beneficiaries. Moreover, public programmes intended to support returnees with assistance or information often lack the resources and visibility required to be effective. Senegal has since the 1980s hosted offices for providing emigrants with information on reintegration support funds (the BAOS): offices based at points of arrival into the country that provide information, advice and guidance to returnees, including raising awareness of funding opportunities for returning migrants. However, the BAOS are systematically understaffed and underfunded, as is acknowledged in the Senegalese NMP (Ministry of Finance of Senegal, 2018, p.88). Other criticisms of the BAOS come from civil society organisations working with returnees, with one Senegalese NGO project manager dubbing the BAOS '*coquilles vides*' ('empty shells') and noting that returnees are too often unaware of their existence, or indeed of other state mechanisms for support.[158]

In terms of international donor programmes, the provisions for reintegration support vary widely by donor. Some are perceived more favourably, such as the Swiss-Senegalese cooperation on reintegration of returnees from Switzerland and implemented by the DGSE, and cited as a preferred model by the diplomatic branch of MAESE.[159] Other donor programmes for reintegration support have only recently been implemented: the EUTF, for instance, has provided stipends for reintegrating returnees from EU Member States since 2017 for returnees.[160] While some donor-funded return programmes have therefore adapted to include greater reintegration support, there are still important political costs associated with accepting returns that are difficult to overcome. These factors affect the perceived 'cost' of returns to Senegalese and Ghanaian state actors.

Public relations

Political costs are associated with the negative public opinion surrounding returns, whereby media attention surrounding returns disincentivises state actors to be seen cooperating in the matter of returns. The European Migration Liaison officer in Dakar qualified this pressure as follows: 'When there are migrants who come back - immediately the media accuses the government of cooperating with the sending country. It puts the government in difficulty.'[161] This has led to an exploration, by the EU and the EU Member States, of informal cooperation on returns in the form

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[158] Interview 18, Senegalese NGO. Dakar, 30 October 2017.
[159] Interview 25, MAESE. Dakar, 10 November 2017.
[160] Interview 42, MoFARI, Europe Desk. Accra, 23 February 2018; EUTF Annual Report 2017 (EC 2018a).
[161] Interview 14, EU Delegation to Senegal. Dakar, 13 October 2017.

of non-standard arrangements that are less visible to the public (both African and European) than formal agreements (Cassarino 2007; Slominski & Trauner 2018). As both Senegal and Ghana are democratic states, public opinion and electoral pressures ensure that state actors proceed with a measure of caution when dealing with sensitive issues: there is always the possibility that opposing political parties will capitalise on negative public sentiment in the run up to elections. Within the Migration Unit of the Ministry of Interior of Ghana, a senior official pointed to public opinion as a key determinant in the ministry's unwillingness to cooperate with the EU in the matter of identification missions to facilitate returns.[162] The media is influential in shaping public opinion, however relationships between policy communities and the media are often strained, where the quality of reporting by local journalists on migration issues was raised in several interviews as being poor. An interviewee in the Ghanaian Ministry of Interior thus asserted: public opinion is largely based on the media, but the media 'gives false information'.[163] In both Senegal and Ghana, there have been efforts to train journalists on basic concepts in migration reporting with a view to improving the quality of media coverage. In one such case, a Senegalese NGO that was providing training for journalists in migration reporting, felt that it was necessary to counter the local media's tendency to rehash news stories and migration narratives from 'Northern' countries without added context.[164]

While this determines that voters at home and the role of the media are influential, it is also important to note that the diaspora constitute a powerful constraining force on policymakers. As Adamson and Tsourapas (2019) have highlighted in their typology of 'migration states' (where they have adapted their typology to states in the Global South), the 'developmental' migration state is characterised by a reliance on remittances, where the management of transnational diaspora populations abroad is a key feature. This characterises the case of both Senegal and Ghana, that have taken significant steps to involve their diaspora communities in politics and national development. In Senegal, this has taken the shape of direct political empowerment, while Ghana has undertaken a considerable charm offensive aimed at its diaspora. In 2017, fifteen seats were added to the National Assembly of Senegal, intended for members of the Senegalese diaspora and representing a notable political empowerment through direct parliamentary representation. The Senegalese diaspora represent less than 5% of the electorate, but have political influence that is disproportionate to their numbers: political parties in Senegal run

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[162] Interview 44, Ministry of Interior of Ghana. Accra, 23 February 2018.
[163] Interview 44.
[164] Interview 18, Senegalese NGO. Dakar, 30 October 2017.

election campaigns that cater to the diaspora, and the Senegalese diaspora are considered *grands électeurs* (influential voters) in their wider influence over voting behaviour (Maillard & Costard 2019). In the 2019 national elections, the discourse of sovereignty from pan-African candidate Ousmane Sonko resonated strongly with the diaspora and Senegalese youths (Niang & Tandia 2019).

Table 6.3: The voice of the Senegalese diaspora

'A reminder that we are the only country in Africa - almost - to have representatives who are elected in the diaspora. There are 15 representatives today who have been elected in the diaspora. This is to develop our democracy. To say that those abroad must be represented. And that plays an important role.' (*My translation.*)	Interview 20, DGSE-MAESE. Dakar, 3 November 2017.
'We have not had so much advances - specifically in Senegal is where we need to work more closely with regard to returns and readmission, which is very sensitive for the Senegalese government. Also they have a very strong diaspora as you know, even with voting rights; in the recent election it was also a very sensitive subject for them. So there we need to step up cooperation.'	Interview 3, European Commission (DG HOME). Brussels, 22 September 2017.

The citations in table 6.3 indicate the (growing) political influence of the Senegalese diaspora, and how this may impact on EU-Senegalese cooperation in matters such as return and readmission. The citations emphasise the importance accorded to the voices of the Senegalese diaspora.

The policy conditionality approach applied by the EU is therefore confronted with the relative domestic costs of cooperation on returns, where in Senegal and Ghana these are both multi-faceted and considerable. At the same time, state actors perceive the EU's approach regarding returns and readmissions as inappropriate. This relates to two contentions in particular: the issue of state sovereignty, where this has crystallised on the issue of migrant identifications; and a conflicting perspective on the appropriateness of implementing returns, with different understandings of obligations regarding returns. Domestic actors furthermore perceive EU dominance in agenda-setting and attempt to counteract it. This forms the analysis of the next section.

6.4.2 Competing narratives and norms

Migration benefits to host countries

Senegalese and Ghanaian Foreign Affairs officials have effectively presented counter arguments to the EU's narrative, and argue for a different understanding on migration and returns in the following ways. Firstly, policymakers argue for having the contributions of migrants in their host countries recognised, and political acknowledgement in EU-African migration dialogue that migration brings benefits to both origin and host countries. This was raised by officials working in diaspora affairs in both government administrations:

> *Let's talk about the contribution they can make in the host country, and also in the origin countries. If you look at the household that they are taking care of – look at also their contribution in the host country (…) They contribute to the GDP of the host country, they pay taxes there, and of course they also enjoy other benefits. But so we should concentrate on the benefit that can be derived from migrants.*

- Interview 38, Ghanaian Diaspora Bureau. Accra, 20 February 2018

> *In these dialogues [with the EU], we have to push the benefits of migration. Because migration has a positive impact for host countries as well as countries of origin (…) Why do we talk of 'benefits' of migration for development? Because it brings benefits: to the host countries, where they [the migrants] live; and to countries of origin.*

- Interview 20, DGSE, Senegalese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MAESE). Dakar, 3 November 2017. (My translation.)

Migration as a phenomenon is similarly linked, by Ghanaian and Senegalese policymakers, both to globalisation and to natural developments that are difficult to counter. In Senegal, the shift the country has experienced from an immigration to an emigration – and, transit migration – country is attributed to the economic downturn of the 1970s and the globalisation of migration flows which has rendered the country a place of 'mass departure' (Senegalese National Migration Policy, 2018, p.9). Although noting that 'nobody encourages irregular migration', an official at the Ghanaian MoFARI stressed that curbing migration altogether would prove an unrealistic goal as it is a distinctly 'human' phenomenon; in particular, the official noted this argument is frequently

adopted as a countering narrative by both the African Union and ECOWAS.[165] This difference in perspective on key concepts surrounding migration, and how it is viewed, accounts for the apparent 'schizophrenic approach' observed by an EU Member State diplomat in the EU-African Rabat dialogue: 'because, we use the same word in Europe and in Africa – but they have a completely different meaning, a different weight'.[166]

A key concession that both Foreign Affairs ministries have sought in negotiations with the EU and EU Member States is the increase in legal migration pathways. A Senegalese DGSE official commented that the number of EU Member State student visas, and for visas for business, ultimately issued remained deplorably low in 2015/2016.[167] Senegalese applicants struggle to have their visa applications approved, with a DGSE official commenting that particularly in the case of student visas, more flexibility is expected: 'there are many people who meet many conditions to go to Europe to study, who are sometimes blocked in their visa [application].'[168] Senegalese and Ghanaian policymakers point to the absence – and, even reduction – in the number of visas as being a major driver of the decision to migrate irregularly (see e.g. Senegalese NMP, 2017, p.21). It is felt that an integral part of reducing irregular migration is a corresponding increase in legal pathways, and the need for the EU to facilitate a system of what one DGSE official dubbed 'organised immigration'.[169] Recalling the discussion of Chapter 5, visa policy is managed by EU Member States individually, whereby there is little that the EU can bring in terms of concrete proposals to increase visa quotas. A DEVCO official summed up this difficulty, that often arises in dialogue:

> *What the Africans always bring to the table is legal migration. And there we always have a problem. There are* some *harmonised rules on* some *issues, on students', staff and researchers' mobility – but for us it's very firmly a competence of EU Member States. And [the EU Member States] are not willing in the current climate to give anything added for legal migration.*

- Interview 8, DG DEVCO. Brussels, 26 September 2017.

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[165] Interview 43, Europe Desk, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ghana. Accra, 23 February 2018
[166] Interview 2, Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Brussels, 21 September 2017.
[167] Interview 20, DGSE-MAESE. Dakar, 3 November 2017.
[168] Interview 16, DGSE-MAESE. Dakar, 17 October 2017.
[169] Interview 16.

I reiterate my conclusion that the EU's inability to offer African countries an increase in visas – this being an area of EU Member State jurisdiction – constitutes a major constraint to its bargaining position with African states, and offers Senegalese and Ghanaian governments little in the way of tangible benefits in cooperating with the EU in contentious areas of cooperation.

Returns and readmission

In instances where there is agreement on return and readmission, follow-up commitments to facilitating returns do not always translate into practice. While the Cotonou Agreement is referred to by interviewees in DG DEVCO and DG HOME as constituting an international obligation for Senegal and Ghana to take back migrants[170], there is little indication that African political counterparts perceive this as a binding obligation. This difference in perspective is summed up by an official at the European Commission's DG DEVCO:

> *We also have this famous Article 13 [of the Cotonou Agreement] that every country should take back its own citizens without any conditions. Well, we believe that that is very clear; the African side is a little bit more blurred about that.*

- Interview 8, DG DEVCO. Brussels, 26 September 2017.

This chimes with Cassarino & Giuffré's (2017) observation that EU Member State agreements with third countries on returns and readmission – whether standard or 'non-standard' – do not always lead to implementation (p.2).

Return practices may also conflict with domestic norms. It is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, both in Senegal and Ghana, that retains competence over signing political agreements with the EU in matters such as returns and readmission, and in dealing with requests to facilitate returns. Despite repeated efforts on the part of the EU, the Senegalese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Senegalese Abroad (MAESE) has refused to sign a formal agreement with the EU which would expand cooperation on returns (see Reslow, 2012; Chou and Gibert, 2012).

A point of serious contention with domestic rules is the identification of Senegalese or Ghanaian migrants. Senegalese diplomatic officials consider the returns conducted without the explicit involvement of the Senegalese state (specifically, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) in confirming citizenship as unlawful. MAESE considers identification of Senegalese abroad an area of its own

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[170] Interview 3, DG HOME. Brussels, 22 September 2017; Interview 8, DG DEVCO. Brussels, 26 September 2017.

jurisdiction, to be conducted according to its own criteria. Ministry officials cite the risk of false identifications occurring, resulting in migrants of other nationalities being returned to Senegal.[171] The use of chartered over commercial flights to conduct deportations is likewise strongly contested and considered by Senegalese officials to be dehumanising: a Senegalese diplomat noted that returned migrants must at all times be in possession of their rights and dignity, something that chartered flights do not allow.[172] The use of chartered flights to deport migrants has been a practice of EU Member State governments since the 1980s, gaining momentum in the early 2000s (Statewatch 2003).[173] The question of sovereignty emerges in relation to the use of 'laissez passer' by EU Member States to return migrants: the Senegalese government determines that only 'sauf conduits' issued by MAESE, following case-by-case identification missions, are legally acceptable documents.[174] The Senegalese Air and Border Police (DPAF), as part of the Ministry of Interior, also cites sovereignty infringement in explaining its policy of refusing entry to migrants returned with a European laissez-passer.[175] The question of identification of Senegalese nationals as being an area of jurisdiction of MAESE, and the fact that the ministry only considers travel documents in the form of 'sauf conduits' issued by the Senegalese state as legally acceptable, has provided a normative framework for the Senegalese government to limit cooperation on returns with the EU and EU Member States. This is expressed by an interviewee at the political branch of MAESE, who argues that the ministry's response to EU pressure to accept returns has been to fall back on 'classical mechanisms of cooperation' including diplomacy, and references to applicable legal frameworks.[176] The EU's Partnership Framework nonetheless determines that the acceptance of the European 'laissez passer' by third countries is an element of the EU approach that must be prioritised (EC 2016c, p.7).

Returns and readmission is, similarly, a contentious topic in EU-Ghana migration cooperation, although Ghanaian officials interviewed did not cite sovereignty infringement as a key issue. Instead, references were primarily made to public perceptions on the government's cooperation in return, and how this acts as a constraint in cooperating openly. Ghana has no formal bilateral readmission agreements with EU Member States. As noted previously, the Ghanaian MoFARI and Ministry of Interior signed a Joint Declaration with EU counterparts to expand cooperation in

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[171] Interviews 25 and 26, MAESE. Dakar, November 2017.
[172] Interview 29, Senegalese diplomat, MAESE. Dakar, 17 November 2017.
[173] A report by Corporate Watch (2018) shows that chartered flights are used in the UK border regime.
[174] Interview 19, MAESE. Dakar, 2 November 2017.
[175] Interview 21, DPAF. Dakar, 3 November 2017.
[176] Interview 19.

returns (EEAS 2016). While the data on returns effectively carried out (see Figure 6.5) since the signing of the agreement is far from conclusive given the short timeframe, there is as of yet no indication that the agreement has expanded cooperation on returns.[177] Ghanaian ministries consider in any case that returns should always be optional, and not forced.[178] The question of both visas and readmission agreements has brought the EU-Ghana political dialogue on migration to a halt, where an interviewee from the EU Delegation in Accra commented that the finding of 'another framework' might be necessary, or for the EU Member States to push for readmission agreements bilaterally rather than through the EU.[179]

This section has demonstrated the key normative contentions that feature in EU-African dialogue on returns and readmission. Conflicting perspectives on key questions surrounding migration and returns have blocked progress in this area of EU-African dialogue, where contestation over migrant identification emerges as one institutional mechanism for domestic political actors to limit cooperation.

6.4.3 Returns in humanitarian cases

While the subject of return and readmission has proven to be highly contentious, an area where the Senegalese and Ghanaian governments have demonstrated willingness to facilitate returns is in the case of voluntary returns. I noted in Chapter 4 that EU Member States encounter substantially more resistance in facilitating returns from Europe than from the African sub-continent. The necessity of facilitating returns for humanitarian reasons – when government inaction on the widely reported abuses of migrants' rights in transit countries would undermine the legitimacy of the state – is what drives domestic actors to enable returns in these cases. In particular, reporting by the media on the conditions endured by sub-Saharan migrations in Libya spurred government action in the repatriation of Senegalese and Ghanaian citizens.[180] The EU-IOM voluntary returns initiative that repatriates migrants from the African sub-continent to their countries of origin has seen success for this reason, although the number of returns is considered

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[177] While a spike can be observed in the return rate for Ghana in 2017-2018 (Figure 6.5), this should be read in the context of a correlated drop in the overall number of return orders issued to Ghanaian nationals in the same year.
[178] Interview 38, Ghanaian Diaspora Bureau. Accra, 20 February 2018.
[179] Interview 36, EU Delegation to Ghana. Accra, 25 January 2018.
[180] Interview 17, IOM. Dakar, 17 October 2017; Interview 36, EU Delegation to Ghana. Accra, 25 January 2018.

by the EU to be of a small scale[181], with an IOM interviewee in Ghana estimating the total number of Ghanaians repatriated from Libya under this scheme to be around 300.[182]

Senegal also facilitates returns in the framework of its 2006 comprehensive bilateral agreement with France (amended in 2008), that includes readmission alongside other areas of migration cooperation such as entry of Senegalese into the French labour market under defined circumstances. MAESE officials note that in principle, as part of this agreement, the ministry cooperates with France in the matter of the repatriation of irregular migrants. However, a senior diplomat at MAESE notes that this avenue is only taken when other 'intermediate political options' have been explored and exhausted.[183] Although the negotiation of the agreement hints at unequal power relations (Adepoju, van Noorloos, & Zoomers, 2010) the agreement allows the Senegalese government some power in contesting return orders. A detained Senegalese migrant can claim exceptional leave to remain under specific circumstances defined in the bilateral agreement, such as when in possession of employment (or an offer thereof) within a list of predefined professions, or for reasons related to his/her personal or family life, as stipulated in Article 3 (Ministry of Interior of Senegal 2008). The senior diplomat I interviewed, who had been working for MAESE for 17 years, stated that the ministry was working to promote the option of regularisation of irregular migrants in French-Senegalese bilateral cooperation, this being a much-preferred option to return, and had succeeded in some cases.[184] In either case, he noted that the question of irregular migration and returns was one that France 'attacks with vigour', with Senegalese government counterparts having to fight equally hard to promote other interests and, indeed, alternatives to return.[185]

It is also apparent that the EU has made efforts to socialise West African political counterparts on the necessity of facilitating returns from Libya and southern Europe by highlighting conditions of hardship endured by migrants. In the flagship GIMMA project implemented in Ghana, the IOM facilitated a 'study visit' for Ghanaian officials to Italy in November 2015 that included visits to migrant landing sites near Catania, Sicily to 'observe the reality of the migrant crisis in the Mediterranean and gain the perspectives of receiving countries' (IOM 2016, p.5).[186] Domestic

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[181] Interview 11, DG DEVCO. Brussels, 28 September 2017.
[182] Interview 37, IOM. Accra, 19 February 2018.
[183] Interview 29, Senegalese diplomat, MAESE. 17 November 2017.
[184] Interview 29, Senegalese diplomat, MAESE. 17 November 2017.
[185] Interview 29.
[186] An EU Member State diplomat also provided an example of the IOM's facilitating a Malian foreign affairs minister to visit migrant camps and prisons in Libya, where the visit aimed to sensitise the Malian Ministry of

actors may therefore facilitate returns when there is a strong humanitarian imperative, when inaction would detract from their legitimacy, and when perceiving few alternatives.

6.5 Cooperation alternatives as empowerment

This chapter has so far discussed how domestic actors perceive benefits or constraints to cooperating with the EU in different thematic areas of migration cooperation. The analysis now shifts to a constructivist lens where I propose that domestic actors in Senegal and Ghana are also influenced by their interest in engaging with the EU according to their perceptions of the EU as an institutional actor. This section covers the perception of state actors' bargaining power vis-à-vis the EU, referring to three elements in particular: perception of the EU as an actor; perceptions of bargaining power as derived from domestic institutions; and perceptions of cooperation alternatives.

While the EU has emerged as a key actor in the governance of migration since the European Council of Tampere, an obstacle it faces is the recognition as a legitimate and influential interlocutor in its relations with third countries. Bilateral relations have typically featured prominently in European-African relations, where these have been built on historical links not least those established by colonial relations. The EU has therefore been pressed to demonstrate the added value that it can bring to relations with third countries in the matter of migration, where its success in doing so is mixed. Additionally, third countries may perceive engaging at *both* the bilateral and multilateral level on similar topics as excessive and might as a result favour one over the other. The EU's struggle to demonstrate added value is one that is ongoing; yet some actors within this process perceive that some progress has been made. As an interviewee at DEVCO, who had been working on migration at the European Commission (in DG HOME and DEVCO) for over 10 years, observed:

> *I think maybe in the past there was more a feeling, also on the side of the partner countries, that more can be reached bilaterally. The EU added value is small in the area of external dimension of migration, or however you call it. Whereas now I think now there is quite some understanding that yes, as the EU we can do more, and I think the EU is also seen differently by the partner countries now than it was 10 years ago.*

Foreign Affairs on the conditions of Malians detained in the north African country. (Interview 2, Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Brussels, 21 September 2017.)

- Interview 7, DG DEVCO. Brussels, 26 September 2017.

To some degree, the consolidation of funds since 2015 under the EU's Trust Fund instrument mean that the EU's 'seriousness' as an actor must be considered. My above interviewee's perception of a shift in third country attitudes towards the EU is a difference that 'might have come about with more money, simply', reinforcing the idea that the EU's growing recognition may be tied merely to its corresponding increasing financial power in migration governance. In policy communities in Senegal and Ghana, perceptions of the EU differ, even within ministries. Interviews with the Ministry of Interior of Ghana demonstrated this, as a senior official at the Migration Unit in the ministry felt that working with the EU was preferable over working bilaterally, as EU Member State representatives 'make visits' but they 'all want the same thing' which is to prevent irregular migration.[187] In this sense, working with one unitary actor appears to be the preferred option, rather than pursuing negotiations and discussions in a similar vein with multiple interlocutors. Yet a senior official at GIS felt that working with EU Member States bilaterally was easier, as working with the EU has also entailed the growing complexity of working relations and the proliferation of other actors involved: in particular, she cited the greater involvement of the IOM as an interlocutor and partner organisation, and working more closely with the IOM instead of EU Member States.[188] An interviewee within the diplomatic branch of MAESE echoed this sentiment, noting that often the same actors are active at the bilateral and multilateral level, and that in some ways it can be easier to reach agreement through bilateral channels.[189] These citations are also indicative of a broader struggle to differentiate clearly between the EU as an organisation, and its disparate Member States. The 'fuzziness' of the EU as an actor, as viewed by domestic actors in third countries, is one that a Senegalese academic and consultant for the Senegalese government in migration policy noted:

> In reality, the activities of the EU are in my opinion very poorly-known. For a
> very simple reason: it is hard to distinguish – or, we struggle to tell the difference
> – between a country like France, and the EU. We are used to talking about
> countries - cooperation with Germany, cooperation with Italy – but, the EU as
> an entity, its presence is a bit fuzzy in people's minds. The visibility and legibility
> of EU action is lacking. One does not always grasp the idea that the EU is an

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[187] Interview 44, Ministry of Interior of Ghana, 23 February 2018.
[188] Interview 50, GIS. Accra, 9 March 2018.
[189] Interview 25, MAESE. Dakar, 10 November 2017.

> *institution made up of the different countries - and that its activities come in* parallel to *the actions of the countries. Because, at the same time, each country continues to have [bilateral] cooperation programs.*

- Interview 33, Senegalese migration consultant, by Skype, 3 December 2017. (My translation.)

Other interviewees also expressed, more broadly, a limited understanding of how the EU 'functions' as an entity. In addition, as the citation above demonstrates, the fact that bilateral migration cooperation is pursued by EU Member States in tangent adds to the confusion of distinguishing the EU's approach. The proliferation of actions, engagements and discussions conducted with third countries serves therefore to obfuscate, and may undermine the EU's efforts: to build meaningful relations with third countries; to be recognised as a legitimate and key actor in migration governance; and its efforts to 'speak as one'. As I explore in section 6.6 of this chapter, the proliferation of migration actions and initiatives can limit cooperation effectiveness, while actors on the receiving end of these initiatives may use proliferation as a source of empowerment.

A further limitation on the EU's influence as an actor is the perception of the EU's relevance in relation to migration and cooperation realities for policymakers in third countries. This emerged strongly in the case of Ghana, where interviewees cited the existence of alternative cooperation partners in development. The Ministry of Interior noted that China had already lent extensive support to Ghana in migration governance, implemented through the IOM.[190] Equally, an interviewee in the Diaspora Bureau noted that migration cooperation formed a mere part of an overall assessment of the future relations between Ghana and the EU. Discussions on the Economic Partnership Agreement and the future of the EU-ACP agreement, due to expire in 2020, take on a new dynamic as policymakers consider that while the EU is Ghana's biggest trading partner, there are 'other options for the ACP and also the EU,' and that 'even if we don't have any cooperation, there are other powers who are ready to come in like the Chinese.'[191] This signals that while finding agreement with the EU is preferential, Ghanaian policymakers are sceptical about finding agreement at any cost. Migration relations with the EU also form just a subsection of policy and governance concerns that steer the domestic political agenda on migration. The prominent trend of female migration from Ghana to the Gulf countries for domestic work is an

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[190] Interview 44, Ministry of Interior of Ghana, 23 February 2018.
[191] Interview 38, Ghanaian Diaspora Bureau. Accra, 20 February 2018.

example of a South-South migration corridor that poses important labour migration governance challenges for policymakers, as noted by several interviewees both within and outside of government. The Ministry of Employment and Labour Relations has taken the lead in government policy on the management of foreign labour migration in view of concerns around trafficking and the exploitation of Ghanaian domestic workers in the Middle East.

Under the current government administration and President Nana Akufo-Addo, who assumed office in January 2017, a number of new initiatives have also been introduced as part of 'Ghana Beyond Aid' that have as objective making Ghana aid-independent. An interviewee at the Europe Bureau of the Ghanaian MoFARI contextualised these political changes, noting that the current government is looking for greater equality in partnership with the EU and not 'give and take' arrangements, and citing as examples of initiatives the One District, One Factory initiative, as part of the Ghana Beyond Aid agenda.[192] To promote the industrialisation of the Ghanaian economy, One District One Factory aims to establish a minimum of one factory or enterprise in each of the 216 national districts while creating jobs for youth (Government of Ghana 2019). In view of Ghana's national economic development goals, and the existence of cooperation alternatives beyond the EU, it suggests the EU's ability to exert power through conditionality has limitations in the case of Ghana. As Mawdsley (2014) has pointed out, the era of Western-dominated development aid, development norms and institutions, while broadly intact, is beginning to rupture as states in the Global South challenge this domination and increasingly play a role both as donors and development partners.

At the same time, Senegalese and Ghanaian domestic actors cite national, regional and continental institutions as significant reference points in the further governance of migration. Recognising that the EU aims to bring a unitary approach in dialogue, Senegalese and Ghanaian domestic actors emphasise a need to respond accordingly through the formal institutions of ECOWAS and the African Union, and to bring together African stakeholder voices and perspectives under a common approach. This is framed as an important necessity to strengthen the position of individual African states in EU-African dialogue and negotiation. An interviewee at DPAF thus speculated that a major disadvantage is that African states take different positions in dialogue with the EU; making an effort to speak as one voice would benefit both African states but also the

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[192] Interview 42, MoFARI. Accra, 23 February 2018.

EU, as there would be more coherence in dialogue.[193] The interviewees cited in the table below offered similar perspectives.

Table 6.4: Perceived importance of a common approach

'If you look at the migration issue, even pre-Valletta Summit, the African Heads of State met to have a position on migration, and this agenda – 2063 – it deals with issues of migration.[194] If you look at ECOWAS, it deals with issues of migration. So, Africans have now risen to the occasion to always meet to have a position – so that they can better engage with the Europeans.'	Interview 38, Ghanaian Diaspora Bureau. Accra, 20 Feb. 2018.
'Africans should be making collective decisions. We will be much stronger at bargaining collectively than negotiating individually (…) So if we are going to negotiate, let's negotiate in a concentrated circle, in which all West Africa is integrated.' (*My translation.*)	Interview 31, Senegalese NGO. Dakar, 17 Nov. 2017.
'We must head in the direction of common positions. First ECOWAS, and then the African Union. Because if the EU has a common position, the AU must also have a common position. And on that, we are working.' (*My translation.*)	Interview 20, DGSE-MAESE. Dakar, 3 Nov. 2017.

The consensus that emerges is that bargaining collectively would strengthen the position of individual African states over bargaining individually with the EU. While developing 'common positions' is something that actors are working towards, the centrality of ECOWAS and, to a lesser extent, the African Union as an appropriate mechanism for a common approach is one that is asserted across interviews. ECOWAS is seen by several actors as an institution equipped to bring a clearer regional position vis-à-vis the EU, where its status among regional organisations is viewed as fairly unique: as a migration development consultant in Senegal observed: 'In West Africa, we have ECOWAS which is a very dynamic institution; it has its limitations, but it is very dynamic nonetheless, unlike other regional organisations in Africa.'[195]

State actors also consider their position and status within such formal regional institutions, and draw on this in their interactions with the EU. This takes the form of 'leverage' derived from a

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[193] Interview 21, DPAF. Dakar, 3 November 2017.
[194] Agenda 2063 is the strategic framework for inclusive and sustainable development set by the African Union.
[195] Interview 31, Senegalese NGO. Dakar, 17 November 2017.

perception of a certain rank both within the region, but also as a development partner with the EU. Particularly in the case of Ghana, there is a distinct notion of leverage associated with status. As a government official at the Diaspora Bureau of Ghana stipulated:

> *We are utilising and taking advantage of our leverage to influence decision, to influence policy (…). We are using that, of course, in our engagement with the EU. Because they know that whatever Ghana says, it has weight. Especially in the sub-region. Ghana is respected in the AU and it is respected in ECOWAS. So, with this leverage, you can better face your partner. And your partner knows what you are bringing on board.*

- Interview 38, Diaspora Bureau, Office of the President. Accra, 20 February 2018.

The perception of Ghana as an important regional player is indeed reflected by EU institutional actors. An EEAS policy officer, working on relations with Ghana, observed that Ghana has solid indicators in terms of democracy and good governance and thus serves as a 'model' country to others in the region.[196] In addition, both the previous and current Ghanaian administrations had fostered good working relations with the EU, according to the interviewee. A DEVCO official observed that Ghana's status as a Pan-African player and advocate for regional integration distinguished the nation.[197]

The perception of Senegal by its civil servants is tied into the notion of 'teranga', meaning hospitality. Senegalese policymakers also note the country's longstanding history as a country of peace, and democracy. A DGSE official noted:

> *With regards to the democratic process, we have taken many steps. Overall, what does this mean? It means that in our relations with our partners, whether it's the EU, or America, or the countries of Asia, Senegal is well perceived, and respected. And that's an image to preserve.*

- Interview 20, DGSE-MAESE. Dakar, 3 November 2017.

In both cases, Senegalese and Ghanaian policymakers emphasise reputation within the region and the wider international community as a source of negotiating leverage. As noted earlier in this chapter, self-image and reputation may also compel policymakers to adopt specific decisions, such

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[196] Interview 13, EEAS. Brussels, 29 September 2017.
[197] Interview 5, DG DEVCO. Brussels, 22 September 2017.

as repatriating migrants from Libya when it becomes clear that failing to act would damage the government's image.

A final notable point is that, as long term 'recipients' of EU bargaining strategies and policy proposals in migration, both governments have perceived investment in their human resources and the professionalisation of their diplomacy as a source of increased bargaining power. 'It's not like cooperation between as-it-were the former weak Africa, and the powerful EU. Now most of these Africans who go into negotiation are experts, who can go into issues and know the history,' argued a Ghanaian official.[198] Senegalese officials also cite expertise and professionalism as a reason that 'Senegal is listened to' in negotiations, as there is a 'quality of human resources' that is characteristic of Senegalese diplomats and officials.[199] This indicates that policymakers have perceived the importance of investing in the expertise and capabilities of civil servants to conduct negotiations with EU political counterparts.

6.6 Organisational dynamics limiting cooperation effectiveness

In this final section I analyse organisational factors and their impact on migration policy formulation, and cooperation in migration. Particularly, the impact of inter-ministerial competition, domestic party politics, the proliferation of donor programmes in migration, and organisational realities such as staff turnover are explored.

In the context of migration governance and policy formulation, the dynamics of inter-ministerial interaction within the government administrations of Senegal and Ghana are characterised by the pursuit of independent goals. Often, there is little formalised or regular coordination or interaction that takes place between ministries. The slow progress in the drafting of the National Migration Policy of Senegal can be partly attributable to the competing priorities of various state entities as well as poor communication. As the responsible body for the drafting of the NMP and for bringing together different stakeholder perspectives, the DDCH (Directorate-General for Human Capital) of the Ministry of Finance noted a 'deficit of communication', with different entities managing migration with a view of their own priorities.[200] The delayed production of the NMP is deplored by civil society actors, where a workshop held between government stakeholders and Senegalese civil society representatives in November 2017 raised the issue of the resulting document no

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[198] Interview 38, Diaspora Bureau. Accra, 20 February 2018
[199] Interview 20, DGSE-MAESE. Dakar, 3 November 2017.
[200] Interview 32, DDCH. Dakar, 21 November 2017

longer being relevant or timely as a result.[201] While the process of formulating the NMP began formally in July 2015, the policy document has yet to receive the required 'political stamp' of approval from the over-seeing inter-ministerial council, and as a result the policy remains unimplemented.[202] Ad-hoc coordination and competition between ministries also characterises migration governance in Ghana, where both internal and external actors commenting on the challenges this raises. The EU Delegation in Ghana observed that it was challenging to bring ministries together at a table, while commenting in particular on the competition between MoFARI and the Ministry of Interior with regard to identification missions for Ghanaian citizens, and with which ministry the competence for this lies.[203] While Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) accompanies consulate and MoFARI officials during identification missions of Ghanaian citizens, coordination issues have arisen and generated tensions between the ministries.[204] Similarly, the Ministry of Justice of Ghana is the entity dealing with legal and human rights aspects of migration governance, and provides advice and guidance to other ministries on national and regional law. However, an interviewee at the Ghanaian Attorney-General's Office described the ad-hoc coordination, and limited consultation with her Office on pertinent issues, as problematic, where earlier consultation could have helped to circumvent eventual issues that arose:

> *That is why I am saying that the inter-ministerial cooperation and coordination*
> *is virtually non-existent. They were thinking of creating a desk for the various*
> *stakeholder groups that didn't already have a desk for migration. You know, like*
> *[the Ministry of] Labour and so forth, and when you went to Ministry of Interior,*
> *they have a desk for migration. (…) But, this is the case: we have no idea what*
> *they are doing out there. So, we go in and we're like, oh OK. We have to go and*
> *do* that. *Someone give me some information! But had we had contact with*
> *them, probably it would have made the process easier.*

- Interview 46, Attorney-General Office of Ghana. Accra, 2 March 2018.

Project implementers also cite poor coordination between ministries and inter-institutional competition as hindering smooth implementation. For instance, the IOM's office in Dakar referred to the example of MAESE lodging a technical assistance request with the IOM, which was

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[201] Notes from civil society-government workshop. Dakar, 21 Nov 2017.
[202] Personal e-mail communication, DDCH official, 3 October 2018.
[203] Interview 36, EU Delegation in Ghana. Accra, 25 January 2018.
[204] Interview 36, EU Delegation in Ghana. Accra, 25 January 2018.

accepted, and activities commenced. Over the course of the project, it transpired that the involvement of the Senegalese Ministry of Justice was required, given the project dealt with legal technicalities that fell under the Ministry of Justice's remit: yet, the ministry had so far not been included in any aspect of the project's formulation or implementation.[205] As no framework for formal consultation between the two ministries had been set up, a meeting of the two ministries was organised externally by the IOM to facilitate coordination.[206]

Senegalese and Ghanaian ministries also exhibit a high rate of staff turnover. This often results in the erosion of inter-personal networks that compounds the issue of inter-ministerial communication, and communication with external actors. Staff turnover and the migration of entire agencies or departments may also result in a loss of expertise or institutional memory. The decision to migrate the Ghanaian Diaspora Bureau, which was formerly under MoFARI, to the Office of the President, resulted in the loss of institutional memory in addition to shrinking the capacity of the Bureau as a number of staff were moved to other departments.[207] There are many other similar examples: a senior official at MAESE who participated in the Valletta Summit in 2015, and who had been a key participant in the EU-Senegal political dialogue following Valletta, had moved to an embassy role in South Africa by the time my interviews were conducted in the ministry in late 2017. In other cases, political commitment to a project would abruptly disappear when key facilitators in government switched roles and departments;[208] or, as in the case of the Migration Information Centre in the Ghanaian Ministry of Interior, the departure of a senior official resulted in the decline of inter-ministerial communication with the loss of a key facilitator.[209]

While a lack of inter-ministerial coordination therefore hinders efficient governance, another dynamic that mediates outcomes is domestic party politics. Interest and commitment to migration policies varies over time among state actors, where this variance is linked to the dynamics of party politics. Policies that are formulated under one administration may lose political momentum when a new government is elected. While the Ghanaian NMP was officially launched in April 2016, political developments have in effect prevented its implementation. With the election of a new government, advancements in implementation have ground to a halt with interviewees across

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[205] Interview 17, IOM. Dakar, 17 October 2017.
[206] Interview 17.
[207] Interview 40, CMS. Accra, 20 February 2018.
[208] Interview 6, ICMPD, MIEUX initiative. Brussels, 22 September 2017.
[209] Interview 46, Attorney-General Office of Ghana. Accra, 2 March 2018.

Ghanaian ministries indicating a desire on the part of the current political administration to revisit the premise of the NMP. As a result, the document has been effectively shelved. While the NMP envisaged the setting up of a body to oversee the Policy's implementation – the Ghana National Commission on Migration – this entity has not been set up. Interviewees cite a shifting political context and agenda, as introduced following elections, and the desire of the current governing party to distance itself from the activities of the previous administration as a key factor.[210] In addition, several actors have cited the need for renewed external funding.[211] The NMP document established the need for a Diaspora Engagement Policy, as well as a Labour Migration Policy, as different ministries perceived that the NMP was insufficiently targeted to cover these thematic areas. However, the Diaspora Engagement Policy suffers from similar political constraints that have affected the implementation of the NMP: it is largely associated with the activities and priorities of the previous government administration, and further developments have not materialised. Party politics and the dynamics of elections can also impact the efforts of civil society actors to raise their concerns with government administrations, as I found was the case in Senegal. A project manager of a Senegalese NGO working on migrants' rights noted that advocacy interventions were highly time-sensitive, which is something that NGOs are forced to consider. In the citation below, the NGO's production of an 'alternative report' taking into account the concerns of civil society organisations on the formulation of the NMP proved difficult to bring across to policymakers, who were pre-occupied with political campaigning in the run-up to the election. Additionally, the election of new Members of Parliament meant that the NGO needed to re-build its network in government, while the delay in bringing the report across meant that some of the original research conducted in 2015 would need to be redone:

> *Because there has been this election, and we knew that the parliament would change. We really had to wait for the new team, because normally there is the MP for the diaspora, but there are also the parliamentarians with whom we work, including a network of parliamentarians for the promotion of the Senegalese diaspora that exists, and we work with that network. But it will change because there are members of our wider network who are no longer members of Parliament. So, in reality, the work we did in 2015: we have to redo*

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[210] Interview 40, Centre for Migration Studies. Accra, 20 February 2018; Interview 36, EU Delegation to Ghana. Accra, 25 January 2018.
[211] Interviews 44, Ministry of Interior of Ghana. Accra, 23 February 2018; Interview 46, Attorney-General Office of Ghana. Accra, 2 March 2018.

> *it. Earlier I was discussing with [my colleague] and we were seeing who the*
> *Members are, what are the Commissions, with whom we have to work.*

- Interview 18, Senegalese NGO. Dakar, 30 Oct 2017. (My translation.)

The proliferation of donor programmes in migration has also impacted migration governance within Senegalese and Ghanaian administrations at an organisational level. The abundance of initiatives, funds and projects has entailed that domestic actors perceive the opportunity to bolster their individual institutional capacities in migration governance, and to extend activities in different thematic areas. Project implementers have observed that the proliferation of programmes has led government ministries and agencies to cherry-pick programmes, choosing both implementation partners and project frameworks according to their sectorial and structural preferences. As an IOM interviewee in Dakar commented:

> *Many of the Senegalese ministries have appreciated the financial support,*
> *whether it's from the EU or somewhere else. To strengthen both their mandate,*
> *and to be able to build their capacity for action and to expand their activities.*
> *(…) Suddenly, ministries find that they can negotiate in relation to their interests*
> *and their needs.*

- Interview 17, IOM. Dakar, 17 October 2017. (My translation.)

State actors increasingly have access to a range of funding options for migration programmes, where this is particularly true of West African states, and can turn to different programmes of technical cooperation if a request for support is refused:

> *At least for Africa, and specifically West and Central Africa, the countries they*
> *are facing a massive amount of initiatives from the EU that are coming from*
> *different perspectives. Political perspectives and regional perspectives. So, at*
> *the same time, one single country they have access to different possibilities. (…)*
> *If by knocking on the door of the action, if there is a refusal, they will go to*
> *MIEUX. If there is a refusal, they will go to another one.*

- Interview 9, IOM, EU-ACP Programme. Brussels, 27 September 2017.

State actors exercise this flexibility in pursuing different funding options to maximise their gains, and to build collaborations with external development partners that best suit their preferences.

In one instance, a technical assistance programme implemented by the ICMPD accepted a request for support from the Bureau of Diaspora Affairs of Ghana (at the time under MoFARI) to assist in the elaboration of the Diaspora Engagement Policy. While the project was initiated, 'other international actors came into play' bringing both more funds and an implementation framework that better suited the Ghanaian ministry's preferences.[212] This resulted in the collaboration with the ICMPD being discontinued in favour of another development partner.

The proliferation of funds, programmes, and indeed actors involved in migration governance, is also considered to have a negative impact both in terms of coherence and the greater added value of numerous individual programmes. This is particularly notable in Senegal. As mentioned in Chapter 5, civil society organisations, particularly those who have been established in-country for a longer period and have a history of working on migration governance and migrants' rights, perceive the proliferation of 'new' actors working on migration topics as potentially problematic: an interviewee at a small Italian NGO long-established in Dakar thus noted that increasing funds had been accompanied by 'more and more actors' working on migration themes, 'whether they have experience or not'.[213] Often, actors and their interventions are not coordinated by a relevant state entity such as the DGSE or, for projects implemented in the regions, the Senegalese state's Regional Development Agencies (ARD).[214] These concerns are reflected in the Senegalese NMP, that notes the diversity of interventions 'usually take place in the context of specific projects, carried out in relation to a particular context and in an isolated way' where it is often 'difficult to measure their impact in terms of added value' (Senegalese NMP, 2018, p.16). The proliferation of interventions and actors therefore presents important coordination and coherence issues to both project implementers and domestic actors; yet, as demonstrated above, state actors have also found that it enables them to pursue organisational ends such as building institutional capacity and pursuing their preferences in cooperation with development partners.

6.7 Conclusion

A theoretical premise of this thesis is that EU-African migration relations are characterised by power asymmetry; however, within these particular relationships, actors in the policy-receiving state demonstrate a capacity to shape cooperation outcomes. African state actors form explicit strategies to contest or negate externalisation, such as when under pressure to accept and

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[212] Interview 6, ICMPD, MIEUX initiative. Brussels, 22 September 2017.
[213] Interview 24, Italian NGO. Dakar, 7 November 2017. (My translation)
[214] Interview 24.

accommodate returns and readmission. Strategies to contest externalisation may also become more sophisticated over time: as Koch et al. (2018) highlight, states who have longer term experience in negotiating with the EU may fare better than states that have limited experience.

Chapter 2 showed that little attention has been paid to the preferences of domestic actors in EU-African migration cooperation, and how the domestic setting shapes these preferences. This chapter has examined some of these preferences. Securitisation through border management, border surveillance and the development of civil registries has resonated with, predominantly, West African security and immigration control actors, leading to significant capacity-building in these areas in both Senegal and Ghana. Yet, despite EU interests in expanding cooperation with Senegal and Ghana in returns and readmission, this emerges as an area of cooperation hampered by multiple obstacles. This chapter finally explored domestic actors' perceptions of the EU, of domestic sources of leverage, and of enhancing bargaining power through a common approach. The following chapter delves further into the key findings of this thesis.

Chapter 7

Discussion & Conclusion

7.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the empirical findings of this PhD as well as theoretical and policy implications. The research presented in this thesis focused on the politics of policy-making in the context of EU-West African migration governance, explored in three empirical chapters. Chapter 4 examined the role of constructed and perpetuated narratives in steering migration governance, and discussed how narratives are adopted, interpreted and contested by non-state actors. Chapter 5 examined the drivers of recent EU policy intervention in migration, analysing the EU's institutional response to the 2015 migration 'crisis' and the adaptational demands this placed on the EU's external migration governance approach. Chapter 6 shifted the focus to African domestic actors and their interests in EU-African migration cooperation, analysing ways that these actors respond to EU policy proposals, and discussing the scope for such actors to shape governance outcomes. Senegal and Ghana were used as case studies in this research to draw empirical and theoretical conclusions about the EU's migration cooperation with third countries in West Africa – a region that has gained importance in the EU's migration agenda. The research has built on, and contributed to, the existing literature on the EU's external migration governance in non-EU countries, and practices of 'externalisation' whereby the governance of EU borders increasingly takes place in locales and sites far from EU territory (as seen in Chapter 2).

The aim of this thesis has been to examine how different actors shape EU-African migration governance in a competitive policy-making arena. The central research question was: **How do institutions and actors' interests shape migration governance in EU-West African cooperation?** In addressing this question, the research took an actor-centred approach, rejecting the premise that actors are monolithic and act only as a vehicle for influential and organised interests. Instead, I have explored how actors demonstrate autonomy, while formulating policy decisions in a

complex institutional environment that both shapes and constrains their actions. This thesis has also proceeded on the premise that actors' capacities to shape governance are unequal. In terms of defining what constitutes a policy 'problem' to be addressed, as well as in negotiation dynamics with third countries, the EU emerges as an actor with superior agenda-setting and bargaining power vis-à-vis Senegal and Ghana. Despite this power asymmetry, I find that it is not a given that the EU always prevails in attaining its interests in migration cooperation with African countries.

The following section details the main findings of this thesis before proceeding to discuss wider theoretical and policy implications.

7.2 Key findings

What is the role of steering narratives in migration governance?

A key focus of this research has been the role of ideas and policy narratives in steering migration governance. This thesis has deconstructed some of the key narratives and their impact on migration policy and project formulation; and demonstrated that policy narratives often invoke 'common sense' or technical solutions in an effort to distance themselves from political agendas. Narratives also implicitly and explicitly define what the key policy challenges are, and they help to define the range of proposed solutions. Governance was analysed in terms of the ideational export of EU policy narratives to third countries, revealing a security bias; a sedentary bias; and a neoliberal bias underlying migration policy proposals. At the same time, while the notion of EU-African 'partnerships' for migration governance imply a concerted effort to limit the traditional asymmetry of relations between the EU and African counterparts, the notion of partnership is also used to make a discursive case for recruiting African actors in the management of the EU's external borders, using humanitarian arguments in the process.

A security bias manifests in the way in which EU narratives highlight regional security risks in the West African region; stress the importance of increased capacities for border management and surveillance; and incorporate security concerns into migration governance discussions with the case study countries. This chimes with other studies that have conclusively demonstrated the security elements both in the EU's external migration governance (Boswell 2007; Chou 2013) and the security dimension of migration management initiatives as perpetuated by transnational actors active in West Africa (Frowd 2018). A key finding of Chapter 4 was both the prevalence of a sedentary bias in EU policy narratives and its manifestations, whereby the EU increasingly places an emphasis on *containment* of migration in regions and countries of origin in its externalisation

rationale. This containment narrative is enacted through policy changes as well as pervasively in the rationale of implemented projects, whereby I argued that dissuasion and deterrence tactics have taken on specific dimensions to bolster a containment agenda.

On the one hand, the EU uses legislative changes: this involves adapting return policy and instrumentalising returns as a tool in dissuasion, as well as implementing wider domestic policy changes intended to have the effect of removing 'incentives' for irregular migration. At the level of discourse and project implementation, the EU has since 2015 made a definitive shift towards a 'root causes' rationale to implement a range of projects in third countries that advance a 'stay at home' narrative. I demonstrated that the emphasis on containment in these projects has resulted in the categorisation of EU migration project beneficiaries to the more tenuous and loosely-defined category of 'would-be migrants', ensuring also that such projects are geographically targeted to be implemented in key regions of (migrant) departure. Returnees are recruited into dissuasion and deterrence campaigns run by external actors, where their voices are employed to lend credibility to information campaigns that raise awareness about the dangers of irregular migration. Development financing becomes the primary tool the EU deploys in incentivising third countries in migration cooperation; increasingly, development practice is adapted as a tool for producing results in an EU migration containment agenda. The deterrence narratives are nonetheless confronted with an existing cultural understanding of migration in communities, that is rooted in the local experience and history of migration as a practice dating back to the pre-colonial era. The legitimacy of externally-driven dissuasion narratives is thus called into question at the local level, whereby I argued that the 'logic' of migration is not easily reconciled with the politics of control. This is indicative of a limitation to EU control narratives in the Senegalese and Ghanaian communities they are received in.

Information campaigns such as those implemented in Senegal and Ghana inextricably link irregular migration with risk and insecurity. In doing so, externalisation practices implicitly depoliticise risk and render invisible the role of the EU and external actors in adding to the precarity of migrants along migration routes in West and North Africa. Bordering practices and the externalisation of migration controls have been shown to make migration journeys more dangerous, making migrants more vulnerable to death at sea or in the desert, and to arrests and abuses in, for example, post-war Libya (see e.g. Andersson 2014). In deterrence narratives, it is migrants and aspiring migrants themselves who are viewed as the responsible parties for managing risk through their choices, practices and self-governance. This strategy of depoliticisation through a steering of

narratives has led Heller & Pécoud (2019) to call for a repoliticisation of migrant deaths to question the violence implicit to border management practices, rather than to deter migrants.

On the ground, civil society actors active in Senegal and Ghana are confronted with politically-infused narratives and endeavour to 'make sense' of them in view of their own activities and mandates, which often reflect a rights-based approach. In many cases, civil society actors attempt to incorporate containment agendas with a rights-based approach, whereby they are often involved in the implementation of donor-driven deterrence strategies such as awareness-raising campaigns and other migration dissuasion efforts. Non-state actors involved in political advocacy and lobbying on migration issues were more likely to be explicitly critical of dominant narratives, and to provide a counter force to EU narratives, or to top-down narratives produced by domestic elites.

I argued that many migration projects taking the form of development interventions implemented by the EU and external actors in the case study countries demonstrate a neoliberal bias, placing an emphasis on entrepreneurial 'solutions' to migration aspirations. Narratives around entrepreneurialism as a 'solution' to irregular migration draw heavily on notions of personal responsibility that are common to neoliberal ideology; they also shift the focus from the state as the provider of basic services to the individual, and cast migrants and would-be migrants as 'self-help' agents in proposed policy solutions. A narrow palette of 'alternatives' to migration are presented, building on notions of personal responsibility and a corresponding duty for African migrants and youths to participate in national development, and promoting success through personal perseverance and entrepreneurial activities. This implicitly disregards policy options for developing a more comprehensive approach, and detracts from discussions on alternative approaches that would better facilitate access to stable, wage employment. It does little, therefore, to counter an already existing trend initially triggered by neoliberal deregulation policies in the 1980s that has eroded job security in many African countries, and that has led to the stratification of the labour market as well as the gradual disappearance of regular, protected wage employment (Mbembe 2001). As I noted in chapter 3, the erosion of the Senegalese public sector in the 1970s contributed to the emergence of the migrant as a role model of success in place of the civil servant. Steering narratives of control can be interpreted as a form of 'soft' governance that external actors such as the EU export to third countries. Their depoliticised nature normalises specific solutions in view of a migration control agenda, while obscuring the political and ideological basis of such solutions.

Policy narratives on migration can be constructed, perpetuated or accorded legitimacy by domestic elite actors. As countries of emigration, Senegal and Ghana have shown themselves to be concerned with managing their diaspora populations as a key area of migration policy interest. I argued that recent and emerging governance frameworks in the case study countries reflect a greater emphasis on extracting economic benefits from migration and from diaspora populations than on extending the base of rights of migrants and immigrants. While diaspora engagement is a small component of the EU's migration policy and projects with Senegal and Ghana, diaspora voices were shown to have an important influence over governing elites in Senegal and Ghana. This, I find, has implications for EU-African cooperation. It also illustrates the centrality of economic interests in domestic actors' decision-making on migration policy.

I illustrated how technocratic elements of the EU's policy proposals that focus on capacity-building in border management have been shown to resonate with domestic security actors, whereby the security narrative is legitimised in domestic policy agendas on migration. This domestic legitimisation has been key to ensuring that the desirability of increased border management and surveillance, while originating in external narratives, is successfully advanced. This research found that it is also domestic elite actors that play an important role in reconciling the drive for solidifying borders with a pre-existing regional institution of free movement under ECOWAS, as I reiterate below.

What are the key drivers of recent EU external migration policy to West Africa?

The multiple streams model as envisaged by Kingdon (1995) was used as a metaphor to explore the impact of the 2015 migration 'crisis' on the EU's external migration governance in West Africa. In this model, the three separate streams of problems, politics and policies develop according to their own dynamics, but stream together at a critical junction such as following an external shock event. This research did not have the intention to analyse or otherwise deconstruct the notion of whether a crisis occurred, or to assess the empirical basis for the claim that a migration crisis took place. Instead, the focus was restricted to the impact of an external event on policy-making processes through a deepened politicisation of migration in domestic political arenas, and the calls for action that emerged from this politicised environment.

The research identified driving forces of recent EU migration policy interventions in Senegal and Ghana. Firstly, it was determined that pressures from the environment took the form of increased demands that were placed on the EU's external migration governance by EU Member States

following the 2015 crisis. I argued that domestic politicisation of migration acted as an opportunity for individual EU Member States to place a demand for tangible 'results' from the EU's migration cooperation with third countries. The research showed that the EU responded by drawing on past policy instruments and tools that have formed part of its migration governance toolbox in third countries, with limited policy novelty, indicating a continuing logic of externalisation. Areas that have seen little progress in cooperation with West African partner countries, in particular the rate of return of irregular migrants to countries of origin in this region, have formed the basis of increased demands for action and results. The results demanded by EU Member States were shown to have led to the increased importance of the West African region, and West African partner countries, in the EU's external migration governance. In the selection of 'priority' countries for enhanced partnership, it was found that two factors emerged in the EU rationale for country selection. Firstly, irregular migrant numbers were considered, where countries perceived to be contributing the most in terms of irregular migration to Europe were prioritised. This condition was balanced against a perception of the likelihood of succeeding in partnership goals, and was based on historical relations (including bilateral relations with individual EU Member States) and perceptions of the country's stability.

I argued in Chapter 5 that EU Member State demands place a results-oriented expectation on the EU's cooperation with third countries that cannot be realistically met. It is nonetheless important for the EU to formulate a response to these demands, which it has done by bringing together funds in the form of a new policy instrument, the EU's Trust Fund instrument. The significant increase in funds dedicated to migration governance, and the highly publicised nature of the EU's new policy instrument, the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, strongly suggested a performative element in satisfying demands 'at home' through the spectacle of intervention. At the same time, the EU's external migration governance is subject to internal contestation where different voices attempt to prevail in a competitive policy arena. This finding agrees with other studies that demonstrate the EU's internal policy-making is a contested process, and that internal competition dynamics are an important factor that shape resulting policy frameworks (Boswell 2008; Wunderlich 2010). While some EU institutional actors favour a restrictive approach, other actors are shown to be more concerned with maintaining diplomatic relations with third countries. A distinction was furthermore made between 'Brussels', and the EU Delegations in the field who engage systematically with third country counterparts. Different interests represent, equally, different

mandates within the EU institutions and particularly within the European Commission. Who prevails is not a given: different actors succeed in having their interests prevail at different times.

In analysing the EU's response at an organisational level, an organisational sociology lens was shown to be effective in giving insight into policy formulation since 2015. I demonstrated that within the EU institutions, different actors pursued different organisational strategies and compete to shape policy within this competitive environment. A purely restrictive approach towards migration cooperation with third countries was shown to be at odds with the rationales of some internal actors, such as the EEAS and – within the Commission – DG DEVCO. Actors within the EU institutions and agencies engaged in strategies of adapting, reinterpreting, and institutionally decoupling to accommodate new demands from their environment and to fit this within the scope of their organisational ideologies and existing activities. The policy orientations established at Valletta and demonstrated in EU policy documents and actions towards third countries in West Africa reflect these strategies of adaptation. The EU's response to the demands generated by the 2015 crisis are therefore shown to be geared to responding to internal, organisational logics, and an effort to establish a narrative that encompasses the views of multiple stakeholders. The policy incoherence that emerges from this context is that while EU policy documents extoll the appropriateness of development interventions in a bid to reduce irregular migration, policymakers and other stakeholders in EU-African migration cooperation otherwise take a more nuanced view in acknowledging the possibly limited effectiveness of applying development policy to meet restrictive migration goals. This outcome can be explained as a mal-integration of policy goals or a 'fudging of policy' (Boswell 2008, p.508) as a deliberate organisational strategy to deal with conflicting interests, where policy incoherence or ineffectiveness is tolerated in order to enlist the support of a wide range of actors. The research found that there was a broad commitment across EU institutions to minimise internal differences and for the EU to 'speak as one voice' in the field. Failing to do so would otherwise diminish its competence – and perceptions thereof – as an actor in the domain of migration governance.

What is the impact of African domestic actors and their interests in determining migration cooperation?

The interests of domestic actors in third countries were shown in Chapter 2 to be an under-researched aspect of EU external migration governance. A key section of this PhD was dedicated to exploring domestic actors' interests in Senegal and Ghana, analysing (a) how these are formed, and (b) how these interests shape outcomes in EU-African migration governance. I noted as a

precursor to my analysis that African states have specific historical experiences as countries of immigration, migration and emigration, and postcolonial trajectories that influence their interests, institutions and policies in migration in the present. At the same time, it is important to note that states are not static in their preferences or practices in migration policy. This is keenly illustrated in the examples of both Senegal and Ghana, where in the postcolonial period alone governments have oscillated between welcoming migrants, engaging in mass expulsions, viewing emigration as a detriment to national development, and viewing migration as a boon to development. Understanding West African states' shifting stance on migration policy over time, and the role it plays in strategies of state-building, national development and foreign policy, also illustrates how there is a prior history in West Africa of instrumentalising migration governance and cooperation to achieve specific aims.

Actors' policy aims are sometimes in conflict, sometimes overlap, and other times can be seen to converge. In the matter of border management capacity-building, and in the development of the state's capacity to monitor and document both migration and the population, it emerged that several domestic actors have an interest in cooperation. In this area, domestic state actors are neither reluctant nor co-opted participants in the EU's external migration agenda – instead, they are demonstrably proactive in seeking out and securing external support. On the other hand, other areas of cooperation have been subject to significant domestic contestation whereby progress has been minimal or non-existent. This is the case for the EU's cooperation with Senegal and Ghana in the matter of returns and readmission.

By applying institutionalist theories, two elements were clarified. Firstly, it was demonstrated that domestic actors perceive significant costs in accepting migrant returns, where these costs outweigh benefits from cooperation. The exception was returns from the African sub-continent which are accepted primarily for humanitarian reasons; and because failing to act carries reputational costs for the state with regard to its own population. However, it was also demonstrated that returns are largely deemed inappropriate by state actors. In the case of Senegal, return practices of EU Member States were frequently considered to infringe on national sovereignty. Both rationalist and constructivist explanations are therefore applicable in decisions to participate in EU cooperation proposals.

Chapter 6 proposed a four-part conceptual model to explain domestic actors' alternating participation in, and contestation of, different thematic areas of EU migration cooperation. The model draws on ideas of politicisation and depoliticisation to theorise success and failure in

cooperation. Conceptualising domestic constraints and opportunities in EU-African migration cooperation, the following categories were proposed:

- Resonance with domestic actors' goals

- Domestic salience of issue

- Degree of 'transnationalisation' of issue

- International views of domestic constraints

The model proposed that low levels of domestic politicisation of an issue ensures fewer constraints for external actors to secure agreement with domestic actors in a given area of cooperation. (When an area of cooperation is both contentious and highly visible to domestic audiences, this forms an important obstacle for cooperation.) Where domestic actors perceive external policy proposals as simultaneously meeting organisational interests, they are more likely to engage in cooperation due to a perception of organisational gains to be made. When neither of these conditions is met, the likelihood of cooperation is minimal. The transnationalisation of a given policy issue acts on the other hand as a buffer from domestic constraints: as more external actors are involved in a given area of cooperation, two developments may occur. Firstly, international actors aim to detach cooperation from political fields, whereby cooperation is increasingly routinised and characterised by technical intervention as is the case of migration 'management' initiatives shaped by security rationales (Geiger 2010; Maertens 2018). Depoliticisation is thus an active organisational strategy used by international organisations to maintain or expand their field of intervention (Maertens 2018). On the other hand, while domestic actors are driven by the need to maintain institutional legitimacy (Boswell 2007), highly internationalised fields of cooperation may offer the possibility of extracting legitimacy from 'outside' the domestic arena. Finally, areas for fruitful cooperation are identified by international actors based on perceptions of domestic constraints. These perceptions are based on past cooperation experiences and are furthermore informed by EU-third country migration dialogues.

Areas of cooperation that rely primarily on technical implementation rather than political cooperation and coordination are therefore more acceptable to domestic actors. It is nevertheless a fallacy that such projects constitute non-political intervention: this thesis has shown that such intervention follows politically-derived narratives.

The asymmetry of relations between EU and African actors was outlined in the conceptual framework of this chapter, interpreted to mean that the dominant position of the EU in

negotiations remains broadly unchallenged in EU-African migration cooperation. Despite this, the preferences of domestic actors in Senegal and Ghana exert an influence on migration governance outcomes, as cooperation outcomes cannot be solely explained by EU preferences. A constructivist lens demonstrated that perceptions of influence and power are important: there are limits to the EU's external governance that stem from perceptions of the EU, perceptions of leverage (where this is subject to change over time, and through historical experience in cooperation), and the existence of negotiation alternatives in the case of Ghana.

The added value of EU cooperation over bilateral cooperation was not always clear to domestic actors, where ministerial officials were divided over whether bilateral or EU cooperation was preferable. This lack of clarity of the 'added value' of the EU served to weaken the EU's position vis-à-vis Senegalese and Ghanaian state actors. This effect was partially off-set by the scale of funds consolidated rapidly under the EU's Trust Fund instrument, whereby domestic actors are still prone to take the EU seriously as an interlocutor. Domestic actors also consider the leverage they can wield where perceptions of leverage are derived from the strength of domestic institutions. Reputation plays an important role, as state actors reference their standing in the region – and globally – as a reference point in their decision-making. Ghana's economic progress and the government administration's mid-term policy plan to move away from aid dependence meant that state actors perceived a shift in power dynamics that reduced the asymmetry in EU-Ghana relations. This dynamic was largely absent in the case of Senegal that has not matched Ghana's socioeconomic development.

Broader geopolitical shifts, and the rise of south-south development cooperation as a challenge to Western domination in development institutions (Mawdsley 2014), also mean that cooperation alternatives act as a source of empowerment for domestic actors in negotiations with the EU. Ghanaian state actors referenced cooperation alternatives with other prominent regional power blocs such as China. Alternatives to cooperation empower weaker negotiating partners to negate EU influence, as no-agreement becomes a more acceptable outcome: it shifts the bargaining parameters of EU-third country cooperation. Critical reflections on strengthening leverage over the EU in EU-African relations also suggest that Senegalese and Ghanaian state actors have adapted strategies by learning from past cooperation and have taken or outlined steps to address African negotiating constraints. While African states still largely negotiate with the EU and EU Member States as independent entities, both Senegalese and Ghanaian state actors perceived an important role for the regional body of ECOWAS in bringing together African voices and acting as

a vehicle to meet the EU's common position in negotiations. Additionally, Senegal and Ghana pointed to investment in human resources in the form of expertise and professionalism of civil servants and diplomats dealing with EU political counterparts as a strategy for counteracting EU negotiating power.

The mediating impact of organisational dynamics in Senegalese and Ghanaian ministries emerged as a final key finding of a largely unintended impact of domestic actors on EU-African migration cooperation. Both Senegalese and Ghanaian ministries demonstrate inter-ministerial competition, and limited or ad-hoc coordination and communication; and day-to-day organisational realities such as staff turnover or organisational reshuffling have an added impact on cooperation initiatives. Domestic actors have to some extent succeeded in capitalising on the proliferation of donor programmes to pursue structural or thematic preferences in cooperation, as shown in Chapter 6.

7.3 Policy implications

The analysis of migration policy dynamics in EU-African cooperation revealed that actors strive to shape policy according to their interests, and with the tools available to them. This thesis has reviewed policy communities in a broad sense, considering actors both inside and outside of government. In the process of formulating migration policy, actors determine how migration, development and security policy intersect. This has implications for development policy and practice in the following ways.

Linking migration, security and development

It was determined in Chapter 2 that globalisation has ensured that policy is increasingly multi-sited, multi-layered and multi-actored (Deacon 2008). In this context, international organisations emerge as the 'agents of knowledge' determining the types of knowledge both generated, and subsequently incorporated into policy (Hulme & Hulme 2008). It was also argued in Chapter 5 that the introduction of a policy instrument is a politically informed act, subject to dynamics of politicisation and depoliticisation, often with the aim of drawing a distinction between past instruments and new ones.

This research has found agreement with numerous other studies that EU migration policy is constructed and enacted through a security lens. Externalising practices have continued along a linear trend where, increasingly, development practice is incorporated into migration

containment agendas. This occurs as the emphasis of EU externalisation becomes increasingly focused on third countries themselves and their territory, and policies and projects related to the externalisation agenda are enacted far from the EU's external borders. This emphasis is fundamentally strategic, as the complexity of implementing restrictive practices increases at later stages of the migration journey such as when migrants cross into EU territory. Obstacles are then more numerous and are both practical and judicial, including both the difficulties of enacting returns to third countries, but also the restraints imposed by social actors active in domestic arenas that in turn represent a liberal constraint to policy making in an EU context (Lavenex 2006).

The resulting effect is that expected migration governance outcomes now feature more explicitly in rationales for development intervention and development projects. Chapter 4 illustrated that a crisis rationale underpins migration projects implemented under the EUTF, and highlighted important distinctions between the EUTF as a development financing instrument, and traditional development instruments such as the EDF. As migration governance aims increasingly feature in development interventions, the risk that development practice follows a migration containment logic becomes more substantial. Skeldon's (2008) astute observation that 'the migration tail is beginning to wag the development dog' (p.5) is therefore still pertinent. As development financing becomes the main tool for incentivising third countries in cooperation, the implications of pursuing migration goals through development policy are amplified.

It is still largely elite, external actors that determine how migration is conceptualised. Bureaucratic processes of migration management continue to normalise specific securitising practices and subsequently present a narrow range of policy options. Dissuasion narratives by their nature do not carry much distinction between the types of migration they aim to prevent: as EU-African cooperation solidifies borders, this has implications for the ability of migrants to pursue migration within the region as a historical livelihood strategy. The desirability of solid borders becomes furthermore normalised as a practice as diverse actors legitimise stricter border management in their discourse and in their activities. At the same time, this research has shown that civil society actors still play a role in resisting dominant narratives, in re-politicising migration management practices, and in elucidating the political and ideological agendas underlying bureaucratic security practices.

Stakeholders in migration policy

There are many who have a 'stake' in migration policies. Yet not all stakeholders of migration policies have access, or otherwise equal access, to decision-making spheres; this is true in terms of asymmetries of power in EU-African political cooperation on migration, but additionally reflects decision-making dynamics in other spheres. I argued that a principle interest among domestic elites is the extraction of obligations from diaspora populations for economic development purposes, where economic value to be drawn from migrants takes precedence over extending rights and social protection of migrants in national migration policy formulation, and over implementing a more holistic or comprehensive migration policy (see Chapter 4). While deriving economic gains from migrants has received significant policy attention, areas of key concern to migrants and immigrants, such as portability of social security, remains a far lesser priority where little progress has been demonstrated, and with comparatively little scope in emerging migration policy frameworks. Crucially, this ensures that policies consider migrants primarily as a *source* of benefits, rather than as *beneficiaries* of social policy frameworks erected in their name.

The analysis in this research thus showed that certain migrant groups have stronger and more influential voices than others, where diaspora groups are represented in government stakeholder consultations for migration policy formulation, but other migrant groups do not enjoy this level of inclusion and agency to shape policies that affect migrants. Beyond this, returnees who are considered to offer more in terms of skills and remittances are favoured in policy tools. Privileged members of the diaspora are better able to pursue transnational identities, and to benefit from migration policies shaped with their needs in mind. Where such inequalities of access persist, they form a barrier to creating a truly inclusive and comprehensive migration policy. Addressing this will necessitate explicitly and systematically including the voices of various migrants and migrant communities in stakeholder consultations, and ensuring migration policy reflects the rights of migrants and addresses gaps in social protection, and not just what benefits can be derived from them.

7.4 Theoretical implications

The conceptual framework applied to examine institutions and actors' preferences in EU-West African migration cooperation drew on public policy theories, organisational sociology, and institutionalist approaches. The findings drawn in this thesis reflect these different research traditions, which I found better captured the 'messiness' of real-world policy and its practice in an

approach of analytic eclecticism (Sil and Katzenstein 2010). Simple and static overviews of actors' interests and decision-making behaviour were deliberately avoided, in favour of gaining a richer understanding of the broader social and historical legacies that actors operate under. The research conceptualised migration as a contested field of governance, highlighting the struggles between multiple and diverse actors as they compete over shaping policy direction and content, where this lens drew inspiration from ideas of global social policy theorists (Hulme and Hulme 2008; Deacon 2008; Yeates 2008). Studying actors in this sense enabled the examination of dynamics of policy-making and the contexts, opportunities and constraints that policy actors work with. It also illustrated how policy actors bring their diverse interests and identities with them, even when going 'abroad'. The specific lens adopted in this research showed that actors demonstrate autonomy from the social forces that they are subject to, but that these forces still impose constraints on their decision-making. Autonomy is therefore relative, rather than absolute: policy actors continuously assess and navigate constraints, and form their responses accordingly.

I outlined the two 'new' institutionalisms of rational choice theory and sociological institutionalism in Chapter 2: while rationalist theory adopts a logic of consequences when considering decision-making dynamics, sociological institutionalism considers how a proposed policy or agreement is 'appropriate' with reference to existing norms and institutions (Checkel 2005; Hagemann 2013; March and Olsen 1989; Pollack 2007). This research has determined that both rational choice theory and sociological institutionalist theory can explain actors' decision-making processes in EU-African migration cooperation, supporting Checkel's argument for 'bridging' institutionalist theories. Actors do not operate in an institutional vacuum: rather, their actions are fundamentally informed by institutional opportunities and constraints. Additionally, this thesis illustrated how organisational complexity, diversity, and organisational logic are significant factors in shaping governance, as actors strive to enact their interests and find acceptable compromises, where emerging policy and governance reflect this competitive process.

A key ambition of this research was to examine the ability of the EU to co-opt third countries in its migration governance, and, equally, the ability of domestic actors in policy 'receiving' countries to determine migration cooperation in their relations with the EU. The findings do not negate the dominant role of the EU in relations with Senegal and Ghana. Nonetheless, they corroborate what has been concluded in other studies: that African states are not 'passive' recipients of EU policy proposals (El Qadim 2014; Paoletti 2011; Reslow 2012; van Criekinge 2010). Instead, migration governance and cooperation frameworks in Senegal and Ghana reflect EU preferences, but are

also a reflection of domestic influence and preferences. I argued that the EU's limited capacity to offer substantial 'carrots' in migration cooperation with African states continues to constrain its ability to steer cooperation, despite its superior negotiating power. In this way, the findings agree with the literature on Europeanisation that has concluded the EU's ability to secure agreement in cooperation in non-accession contexts is necessarily weaker (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2009). The weakness of external incentives in cooperation only serves to reinforce domestic considerations in African actors' decision-making in EU-African cooperation. As domestic population's disapproval of cooperation is significant in contentious areas, such as returns and readmission, this forms a considerable obstacle that the EU struggles to overcome. The significant influence of diaspora populations in countries that have evolved into emigration states also emerges as a significant feature of domestic politics that shapes policy-makers' decision-making.

These elements indicate that a more dynamic and rigorous appraisal of the domestic features and institutions of migration states in the Global South represents an important progression in theorising migration policy formulation and governance in non-Western contexts, and its role in expanding understanding of EU-African migration cooperation outcomes. This research has contributed to this effort. This theoretical endeavour also requires a systematic recognition in EU-African migration research that African policy communities behave strategically in cooperation, bringing their own domestic governance ambitions to the table; and have their own sources of bargaining power specific to migration states (Adamson & Tsourapas 2018; El Qadim 2014). Bargaining in view of maximising benefits from cooperation more accurately reflects the status of EU's cooperation with migrant-sending African states, rather than a relationship of co-optation. Beyond the specific aim of understanding implications for EU-African migration cooperation, addressing the knowledge gap in migration policy dynamics of non-Western states is also a valuable research project in its own right for migration policy theory development (Natter 2018).

7.5 Avenues for future research

This thesis has produced theoretical and empirical insights into the EU's cooperation with Senegal and Ghana in migration governance. It has focused on the level of political cooperation and the ways that narratives inform migration policy formulation and governance. It has discussed the implications of EU-African cooperation in this area for development and security practice. Finally, it has analysed dynamics of politicisation and depoliticisation, and ways in which actors shape these dynamics to pursue their interests.

While this thesis has showcased the voices of migration stakeholders, migrants' voices have not been directly included in this research (this decision was justified in Chapter 3). It has furthermore analysed the direction of travel of EU external migration policy in terms of projects but has necessarily steered away from offering an analysis of policy effectiveness in achieving restrictive goals. Future research would benefit from an explicit focus on migrant voices – in particular how the aspirations and lived experiences of migrants, returnees, and youths in countries of migrant origin either contend with or match underlying assumptions, narratives and policymaker agendas on migration and return projects implemented in third countries. The sociological literature on this topic in the context of West African countries remains underdeveloped (but see Flahaux & Kabbanji 2013; Åkesson 2011). An important future research avenue would also be to examine the level of policy implementation, and the ways in which the domestic context may mediate policy effectiveness. Equally in this area, the literature on evaluation of EU external migration policy is in its infancy (a few notable studies include Wunderlich, 2012 and 2013; Reslow 2019).

This research explored ways in which a sedentary bias (Bakewell 2008) manifests in the policies and projects that form the substance of EU policy export to third countries. It identified that narratives of sedentarism contend with the pre-existing institution of free movement in ECOWAS, and with the historical and cultural rootedness of migration as a practice in the region. Further research would need to be conducted to firmly establish the implications of an EU 'solid border' approach (Schofberger 2019) in the West African region – and the increased focus on containment practices discussed in this manuscript – in terms of its impact on migration flows, migrants' practices, and the ongoing securitisation of migration in policy frameworks.

By shifting attention to the role of domestic actors in countries that are the recipients of EU migration policy proposals, this research contributes to calls for stepping away from overly Eurocentric analyses of migration governance, and for more rigorous theorisation of migration governance regimes in the Global South (see e.g. Adamson & Tsourapas 2019; Natter 2018). Further research into EU-African migration cooperation will benefit from more systematic analysis of the domestic setting and its impact on cooperation outcomes. This is particularly relevant in the absence of EU accession conditionality, whereby the EU's ability to offer strong incentives for third countries' cooperation is necessarily weaker (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2011; see also Chapter 2). This research has examined domestic actors' preference formation in response to EU migration policy proposals in Senegal and Ghana – two West African countries that have their own particular historical relationships with the EU and specific EU Member States; and demonstrate different

levels of socioeconomic development in their postcolonial trajectories. Further research could explore the responses of yet other African states whose experiences of cooperation and perception of leverage vis-à-vis the EU may differ, such as Nigeria or Côte d'Ivoire. In other instances, the EU's engagement with specific governments has changed substantially over time due to domestic regime shifts – this is the case for the Gambia, for example, and warrants being the subject of further research. Insights from other case studies would allow for more theorisation on the spectrum of adaptation and contestation of EU external governance in view of different domestic conditions, different perceptions of leverage, and different levels of historical experience in negotiating with EU counterparts.

Finally, this research has proposed that (de-)politicisation dynamics are important in determining migration governance. Depoliticisation may be a tool employed by actors to reduce constraints in expanding the scope of their activities or to circumvent domestic contestation. It is furthermore relevant to examine more closely the processes by which migration, and migration cooperation, despite being politicised in domestic arenas, is depoliticised 'in the field'. Failure to secure cooperation or policy convergence may in turn result from a failure to successfully depoliticise a given topic. The model proposed in Chapter 6 for conceptualising these dynamics may be developed further to expand understanding of depoliticisation in EU external migration governance, or indeed its possible application to other thematic areas of cooperation.

7.6 Conclusion

This thesis has contributed to a richer understanding of how EU-African migration cooperation and the ways in which actors' interests shape migration governance. In doing so, it has focused on the domestic context of policy-receiving states and illustrated how domestic influences are significant in explaining policy decisions. The research focused on the underlying politics of policymaking, considering this to be comparatively obscure, but nonetheless significant, in determining the scope, direction and content of resulting cooperation frameworks. By understanding migration governance as a site of policy formulation where multiple actors compete to have their interests prevail, this thesis demonstrates that policy is continuously shaped and accomplished in view of constraints and opportunities. It also constitutes a sustained analysis of the ways in which weaker counterparts form strategies of contestation in negotiation with stronger powers, and strive to have cooperation frameworks reflect their own interests.

Annex I:

List of Interviews

INTERVIEW NO.	RECORDED / NOT RECORDED	AFFILIATION	LOCATION	DATE
1	NR	European External Action Service (EEAS)	Brussels, Belgium	19-Sep-17
2	R	Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Brussels	21-Sep-17
3	R	European Commission (DG HOME)	Brussels	22-Sep-17
4	NR	European Commission (DG DEVCO)	Brussels	22-Sep-17
5	NR	European Commission (DG DEVCO)	Brussels	22-Sep-17
6	R	International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD)	Brussels	22-Sep-17
7	R	European Commission (DG DEVCO)	Brussels	26-Sep-17
8	R	European Commission (DG DEVCO)	Brussels	26-Sep-17
9	R	International Organization for Migration (IOM)	Brussels	27-Sep-17
10	R	European Commission (DG DEVCO)	Brussels	28-Sep-17
11	R	European Commission (DG DEVCO)	Brussels	28-Sep-17
12	NR	European Commission (DG JRC)	Brussels	28-Sep-17
13	NR	EEAS	Brussels	29-Sep-17
14	R	Delegation of the European Union to Senegal	Dakar, Senegal	13-Oct-17
15	NR	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Senegalese Abroad (MAESE) –	Dakar	16-Oct-17

		Directorate-General for Senegalese Abroad (DGSE)		
16	R	MAESE – DGSE	Dakar	17-Oct-17
17	R	IOM Senegal	Dakar	17-Oct-17
18	R	Senegalese NGO	Dakar	30-Oct-17
19	R	MAESE (Political)	Dakar	02-Nov-17
20	R	MAESE (DGSE)	Dakar	03-Nov-17
21	NR	Ministry of Interior of Senegal – Air and Border Police (DPAF)	Dakar	03-Nov-17
22	R	Delegation of the European Union to Senegal	Dakar	07-Nov-17
23	R	Delegation of the European Union to Senegal	Dakar	07-Nov-17
24	R	Italian NGO	Dakar	07-Nov-17
25	NR	MAESE (Political)	Dakar	10-Nov-17
26	NR	MAESE (Political)	Dakar	10-Nov-17
27	R	MAESE (DGSE)	Dakar	10-Nov-17
28	NR	Senegalese Development and Management Agency for Small and Medium Enterprises (ADEPME)	Tambacounda Senegal	15-Nov-17
29	NR	MAESE (Diplomatic)	Dakar	17-Nov-17
30	R	Italian NGO	Dakar	17-Nov-17
31	R	Senegalese NGO	Dakar	17-Nov-17
32	NR	Ministry of Finance of Senegal	Dakar	21-Nov-17
33	R	University of Cheikh Anta Diop, Senegal	Skype	03-Dec-17
34	NR	European Commission, DG DEVCO	Brussels	07-Dec-17
35	R	IOM West and Central Africa	Skype	11-Dec-17
36	R	Delegation of the European Union to Ghana	Accra	25-Jan-18
37	R	IOM Ghana	Accra	19-Feb-18
38	R	Office of the President of Ghana - Diaspora Bureau	Accra	20-Feb-18
39	R	Centre for Migration Studies, University of Ghana (Legon)	Accra	20-Feb-18
40	R	Centre for Migration Studies, University of Ghana (Legon)	Accra	20-Feb-18
41	R	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration of Ghana (MoFARI), Multilateral Relations	Accra	22-Feb-18
42	NR	MoFARI (Ghana), Europe Bureau	Accra	23-Feb-18
43	NR	MoFARI (Ghana), Europe Bureau	Accra	23-Feb-18
44	NR	Ministry of Interior of Ghana, Migration Unit	Accra	23-Feb-18
45	R	Italian NGO	Tema, Ghana	01-Mar-18

46	R	Ministry of Justice of Ghana, Attorney-General's Office	Accra	02-Mar-18
47	R	Ghanaian migrants' association	Accra	03-Mar-18
48	NR	Ghanaian development organisation	Accra	07-Mar-18
49	R	Centre for Migration Studies, University of Ghana (Legon)	Accra	07-Mar-18
50	NR	Ghana Immigration Service	Accra	09-Mar-18
51	NR	Ministry for Labour and Employment of Ghana	Accra	09-Mar-18
52	NR	IOM Ghana	Skype	04-May-18

Annex II:

Interview Guides

Interview Guide A – EU institutions

<u>1. Profile</u>

a. Affiliation
b. Length of time working for the department/institution
c. Length of time working on migration (determine thematic 'expertise')
d. Thematic field of expertise prior to migration (if any; can include academic background)

<u>2. Institutional profile</u>

a. Department's priorities in migration
b. Department's key goals through cooperation/partnerships (if not covered above)
c. Involvement in migration projects/policy/cooperation (and nature thereof)
d. Which other EU bodies/IOs/regional orgs (ECOWAS?) etc. do you most work with on this topic? (List in order of importance)
e. To what extent are your institution's/department's priorities reflected in the EU external approach overall?

<u>3. Policy conceptualisation</u> (adapt as appropriate)

a. What is the added value of recent policy instrument(s) and frameworks?

b. Why were certain countries selected as 'priority' countries and recipients for EU policies/projects?

c. What catalysts (both internal AND external) for new policy instruments?

Respondent might discuss: **migration crisis**; '**timeliness**' of migration in global politics; failure of **past policy instruments**; institutional **learning through past cooperation**; **insights from existing projects** and dialogues and 'feedback loop'

d. How homogenous are these new partnerships with priority countries (e.g. 'compact' countries)?

e. Do new policy tools and framework represent a continuation of EU external migration approach or a departure from it? How do new instruments relate to previous instruments? (e.g. compacts vs. Mobility Partnerships)

f. How have intergovernmental dialogues (e.g. Rabat) shaped new policy/instruments (if at all)?

4. Recent policy developments

a. What have been the experiences of migration cooperation with Senegal/Ghana/SSA broadly?

b. How successful has EU cooperation been in achieving its goals with Senegal & Ghana?

c. "EU efforts in third countries only pay 'lip service' to development". True/not true?

Finish on: Is there anything we haven't discussed that you think is important?

Interview Guide B – Political (third country)

1. Profile

e.   Affiliation
f.   Length of time working for the department/institution
g.   Length of time working on migration (determine thematic 'expertise')
h.   Thematic field of expertise prior to migration (if any; can include academic background)

2. Institutional profile

f.   Department's priorities in migration
g.   Department's key goals through cooperation/partnerships with the EU (if not covered above). What are your ministry's incentives to work with the EU in migration?
h.   To what extent are your ministry's/department's priorities reflected in the EU external approach overall?

3. Policy developments & perceptions (adapt as appropriate)

A.   Since 2015, there have been policy developments including the Valletta Action Plan, the **Migration Compacts**, and the introduction of a new financial instrument (EU Trust Fund for Africa). How has this affected your ministry?
   a.   There has been an increase in funding for migration projects, specifically in West Africa. What has been the effect of a greater number of projects and funding available to your government?
B.   Ghana/Senegal is a relatively important partner for the EU in West Africa in migration cooperation. Has this position helped your government achieve its wishes in migration cooperation in EU-Ghanaian/EU-Senegalese negotiations?
   a.   Have the intergovernmental dialogues (e.g. Rabat Process) helped your government convey its wishes/priorities in migration to the EU? (If so, examples where possible)
C.   Do you find that regional organisations play an important role in EU-African negotiations on migration? (e.g. ECOWAS ; African Union)
D.   Many projects funded in West Africa by the EU have an element of migration management incorporated. To what extent is migration management a priority for your ministry/government?
E.   Development aid is increasingly conditionned on cooperation in migration management. What do you think of this statement?

4. IF TIME AVAILABLE:

a. Ghana has elaborated a National Migration Policy. Can you describe this process and your cooperation with external partners to put it in place?

b. For implemented projects, are these elaborated in consultation with other ministries, NGOs, civil society? How involved is civil society?

5. General

a. How have Senegal's/Ghana's experiences of cooperation in migration with the EU been, in comparison to bilateral cooperation with EU Member States?

b. What are the difficulties (if any) in cooperating with the EU?

Finish on: Is there anything we haven't discussed that you think is important?

Interview Guide C – NGOs/external

1. Profile

i.   Affiliation
j.   Length of time working for the organisation
k.   Length of time working on migration (determine thematic 'expertise')
l.   Thematic field of expertise prior to migration (if any; can include academic background)

2. Institutional profile

i.   Organisation's priorities in migration
j.   Which projects/initiatives do you participate in/run?
k.   Which orgs/ministries/NGOs do you work with the most? (e.g. MFA, other NGOs?)
l.   Do you think your organisation's priorities in migration are reflected in EU initiatives?
m.   Are your organisation's priorities in migration in line with those of the Ghanaian government?

3. Policy developments & perceptions (adapt as appropriate)

    F.   Since 2015, there have been policy developments including the Valletta Action Plan, the Migration Compacts, and the introduction of a new financial instrument (EU Trust Fund for Africa). How has this affected your organisation?
    G.   Ghana has established a National Migration Policy, in consultation with e.g. the IOM. Was your organisation consulted on the elaboration of this Policy?
    H.   How does your organisation generate funding? How often are your project proposals accepted for funding?
    I.   The EU Trust Fund projects in Ghana – has your organisation been consulted or involved in their elaboration or implementation?
    J.   Many projects funded in West Africa by the EU have an element of migration management incorporated. To what extent is migration management a priority for your organisation?
    K.   Do you find that African regional organisations (ECOWAS, African Union) play an important role in migration negotiations with the EU?

L. How have intergovernmental dialogues such as the Rabat Process enabled your org and civil society to convey migration priorities to the EU? (if involved in e.g. Rabat)

4. General

a. What have been your organisation's experiences in working with the EU on migration?

b. Has your organisation been able to convey its migration priorities to the EU? To the Ghanaian State?

Finish on: Is there anything we haven't discussed that you think is important?

Annex III:

Participants' Information Sheet

If you have received this it is because I have contacted you to request your participation in my research which addresses EU and African cooperation in the field of migration. Please take the time to read the following information which should answer any questions you may have. If you have any further questions regarding my research, please contact me by phone or email (contact details below).

What is the purpose of this study?

My name is Melissa Mouthaan and I am a PhD candidate at the University of Cambridge, Department of Politics and International Studies (POLIS), in the United Kingdom. My departmental profile page can be found here [link removed]. My PhD research addresses the processes of policy-making on the topic of migration and as a result of the recent cooperation efforts between the EU Member States, EU institutions and African governments. I aim to contribute to a better understanding of the priorities of different stakeholders in migration policy formulation, and how migration cooperation can contribute to development goals in partner countries. My case studies are Senegal and Ghana.

Why have I been invited to participate?

You have been invited to participate because I believe that you belong to a category of persons of interest to my study: local or international NGO staff, bilateral cooperation officer, EU Member State official, EU institutional staff or consultant, government official, academic researcher, or project implementer. It is my understanding that you have some expertise or professional experience of working on migration policy.

What will happen if I take part?

If you agree to participate in my study, I will arrange an interview slot with you at a time and place of your convenience. The interview will take no more than 40 minutes. You are free to withdraw from the study at any time and without giving a reason: either prior to the interview, during it, or after. If you choose to drop out, the information collected up to that point (if any) will not be used. You may choose to skip particular questions that you don't wish to answer. I will offer you the choice of recording the interview for purposes of accuracy; alternatively, I will not record the interview and will take field notes instead.

Remuneration

Please note that participants will not be paid for their participation as this would pose an ethical problem for my research.

Confidentiality and privacy

All information which is collected will be strictly confidential. All electronic data will be stored on a password-protected drive where procedures for handling, processing and storing data meets the requirements of the 1998 Data Protection Act. All identifying personal data will be removed from data files, with interviews anonymised and given a random research code.

What will the data be used for?

The data will be used in my PhD and possibly in the production of related academic publications. I will share any research outputs with participants, if this is of interest.

Further details

This research has been approved by my supervisor, Dr. Alexandra Winkels, and reviewed and approved by the Research Committee of the Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Cambridge.

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