1. Introduction

Historically, organised crime and terrorist groups have been treated as distinct organisations (Rossi, 2014). Organised crime are economic, profit-driven enterprises that seek to infiltrate and manipulate state governance structures to further its economic goals (Rossi, 2014). Terrorist groups seek political change by destabilising the state apparatus through violent, spontaneous attacks on innocent victims (Rossi, 2014). The increased opportunity for interaction between organised crime and terrorist groups in the globalised world has focused international attention on the international security threat posed by the crime-terror nexus, that is, the convergence of or alliance between organised crime and terrorist groups (Rossi, 2014). The traditional distinction between organised crime and terrorist groups has become irrelevant in operational and policy terms as organised crime and terrorist groups are countered within the same intelligence-driven, militarised law enforcement framework (Leong, 2007). One of the weaknesses of the crime-terror nexus as a conceptual tool is that it over-emphasises the connection between violent non-state actors at the expense of analysing the role of the state in perpetuating organised crime and terrorism in developing countries. There is uncertainty regarding the empirical link between organised crime and terrorist groups, with evidence highlighting that the primary focus of each group is the state. The focus on the perceived convergence of violent non-state actors has produced some poorly targeted responses to terrorism and organised crime, and hindered democratic governance and state-building in transitional states. A deeper understanding of the separate definitions of organised crime and terrorist groups, as well as their distinct approaches to the state, is of crucial importance for identifying the primary motives and intentions of seemingly converged groups and targeting policy responses to their economic or political nature and their predatory or hostile relationship with the state.
The paper first outlines the traditional legal, policy, operational and intellectual distinction between organised crime and terrorist groups based on their motives, methods and relationship with the state. It then demonstrates the obfuscation of this distinction under the crime-terror paradigm. The final sections analyse the impact of the dominance of the crime-terror narrative, as opposed to the more empirically sound state-crime analytical framework, on international security and development approaches to organised crime, terrorism and state governance in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

2. Organised Crime

2.1 Definition

There is no consensus regarding the definition of organised crime (Varsese, 2010). Varese (2010) estimates there are approximately 115 definitions of organised crime globally. Historically, organised crime groups have been viewed, particularly in the US, as an “alien phenomena” operating outside legitimate society in “the realm of shadows” (De Danieli, 2014, p. 1236). According to the 1963 US McLellan Committee, centralised, hierarchical and rationalised criminal organisations or *mafias* presented an external, ethnic “conspiracy” to “infiltrate, corrupt and control American society” (Leong, 2007, p. 9).

Later US and European academic definitions contest the idea of well-organised alien criminal conspiracies and instead highlight organised crime as illegal enterprises that are engaged in the provision of goods and services and driven by the profit-maximising logic of the market (Leong, 2007). Skaperdas (2001), Tilly (1985) and Varese (2010) argue that the provision of protection over a given geographic or economic area, as opposed to the mere supply of illicit goods and services, is the defining economic activity of organised crime groups. Protection is provided for criminal groups or the community in return for taxes. (Varese, 2010). According
to Schelling (1971) and Varese (2010), organised crime seeks to monopolise economic governance of the relationships of extraction and protection related to an illicit activity.

The common thread of these definitions is the profit motives of organised crime. The end goal of organised crime is to make money (Madsen, 2009). The UN Convention on Transnational Organised Crime enshrines the economic nature of organised crime in international law by defining organised crime as a “structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crime offences in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, financial or other material benefit.”

Organised crime pursues a monopoly over criminal profits through the use or threat of violence against the state, community or other criminals (Varese, 2010). They also secure non-enforcement and assistance from the state apparatus through corruption (Varese, 2010). Thirdly, organised crime may illicit the silence or complicity of the community regarding its activities through acts of public service (Varese, 2010). These methods suggest that organised crime requires the existence of and co-operation with the state and society to successfully carry out its economic activities (Arias, 2006). For example, drug-traffickers require state infrastructure to transport drugs (Arias, 2006). Society constitutes the demand for supply of illegal goods that drives the drug market (Arias, 2006).

Organised crime therefore does not seek direct, violent confrontation with or overthrow of the state, it primarily seeks to manipulate state and community structures in a parasitic and predatory fashion to further its economic goals (Schelling, 1971) (Arias, 2006). Violence is generally used clandestinely and as a last resort as it can undermine state and society relationships (Arias, 2006). It will only violently compete with the state if it directly challenges the group’s territorial or economic monopoly over illicit activities (Varese, 2010).

2.2 The State-Crime Nexus
State collusion or co-operation with organised crime is referred to as the state-crime nexus (Miklaucic and Naim, 2013). Miklaucic and Naim (2013, p. 149) argue the nexus is characterised by “varying degrees of corruption” within the state. At one end of the spectrum is *criminal penetration* which occurs when organised crime forms a relationship with one or two state officials who carry out state and criminal functions simultaneously (Miklaucic and Naim, 2013). *Criminal infiltration* occurs when relationships with organised crime proliferate through the state apparatus (Miklaucic and Naim, 2013). *Criminal capture* is achieved when the level of penetration affects state decision-making (Miklaucic and Naim, 2013). Under advanced criminal capture, which Sullivan (2013) calls *co-opted state reconfiguration*, and Miklaucic and Naim (2013) call *criminal sovereignty*, the distinction between state political and non-state criminal actors is blurred as political actors seek to influence economic and political outcomes to further the interests of organised crime, rather than the state. One of the most important impacts of organised crime on the state is therefore the harm it does to governance quality (OECD, 2012).

### 2.3 Law enforcement approaches

Traditional law enforcement approaches focused on addressing the organised crime threat within a criminal justice framework (Leong, 2007). Local police forces conducted street-level investigations and charged individuals under the organised crime legal framework (Leong, 2007). The legal framework targeted both illegal activities and corruption in order to reduce the economic incentives of organised crime and mitigate the threat of organised crime to strong democratic and economic governance (Leong, 2007) (Shelley and Picarelli, 2010). For example, criminal offences under the *US Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organisations Act 1970* included extortion, narcotics and gambling. Bribery and corruption of a state official is an offence under the *Australian Crime Commission Act 2002*. Leong contends that local police forces underestimated the scope of organised crime and generally lacked the centralised
intelligence and investigatory capability to assess and interdict serious organised crime in a systematic and effective manner (Leong, 2007).

Although the definition of terrorist organisations is as confused and disputed as that for organised crime (Madsen, 2009), it is generally agreed that, traditionally, the activities, motives and impact of terrorist organisations are vastly to different to organised crime (De Danielli, 2014).

3. Terrorism

3.1 Definition

While organised criminals are entrepreneurs, legal provisions and policy documents clearly highlight the political or ideological nature of terrorist groups (Rossi, 2014). There is no definition of terrorism in international law (Crenshaw, 2011). It is, however, defined in national legislation (Crenshaw, 2011). The US federal Criminal Code defines terrorism as “the premeditated, politically motivated violence against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents”. Terrorism is the strategic manifestation of a political, not financial agenda (Crenshaw, 2011). Unlike organised crime which uses violence as one of many methods to maintain its financial position, violence is the defining activity and strategy of terrorist groups (Crenshaw, 2011).

Madsen’s (2009, p. 63) definition of terrorism outlines the logic of terrorist violence:

“Terrorism is the triangular and communicative use by one or more sub-state actors of illegal acts of violence: the originator (the terrorist) sends a message via the transmitter (the victim) to the receiver (an authority) with a view to influence the outcome of the latter’s administrative, judicial or political processes and, by showing the weaknesses of the latter, to evoke to a fourth party, the people represented by the media, the necessity for political change”.
Visible, shocking and spontaneous terrorist attacks on innocent victims is a persuasive form of communication with governments primarily because the psychological state of terror and uncertainty created within the community undermines public confidence in the ability of the state to provide security for its citizens (Madsen, 2009) (Crenshaw, 2011). This theoretically prompts political concessions by the state to remove the source of terror (Daase, 2010). In addition to drawing public attention to the group’s political agenda, attacks can provoke an oppressive state reaction that demonstrates the validity of the group’s cause and mobilises popular support required for the achievement of political goals (Madsen, 2009) (Benedek, 2010). Terrorist violence therefore has a disruptive impact on democratic governance, security and society (Benedek, 2010).

The ultimate goal of terrorist groups is not profit and co-existence with the state, but to challenge, demoralise and discredit the operation of government in order to set or change the agenda in a political dispute (Madsen, 2009) (Crenshaw, 2011). This is reflected in one definition offered by the UN Secretary General’s 2004 High-Level Panel Report on Terrorism, which says terrorism is “any action…to cause death…to civilians…when the purpose of such act…is to compel a government or an international organisation to do or abstain from doing any act”.

3.2 Law Enforcement Approaches

Traditional operational approaches attempted to address the terrorist threat to state and civil security through a national security framework (Miller, 2009). National intelligence agencies investigated suspected terrorist groups and charged terrorist actors with political crimes (Leong, 2007). States also used a strategy of coercive diplomacy, which combined limited use of force with positive inducements, in order to integrate terrorist groups into mainstream political society (Crenshaw, 2011). According to Crenshaw (2011) this addresses a key reason
for the choice of terrorism as a strategy – the lack of alternative means of political expression. By giving the organisation a legitimate voice, the threat of violent disruption to society is mitigated (Crenshaw, 2011).

4. The Distinction Between Organised Crime and Terrorist Groups

Despite the lack of a clear definition of terrorism or organised crime (Madsen, 2009), an intellectual, legal and operational distinction between the two terms has developed on the basis of the political motives and violent activities of terrorist organisations, and the profit motives and illegal economic activities of organised crime (Rossi, 2014). The distinct approach of each group to the state is a central factor in determining and addressing the different threats each group poses to society (Lewis, 2014). Organised crime seeks to co-exist with the state by corroding its governance structures (OECD, 2012). Terrorists disrupt and challenge the security and administration of the state with violence (Madsen, 2009). The distinction between organised crime and terrorist groups is meaningful because it has resulted in targeted and effective operational responses (Leong, 2007). For example, pure law enforcement would not address the political motivations of terrorist groups, but might reduce the economic incentives for organised crime (Crenshaw, 2011). Targeting corruption also reduces the impact of organised crime on state institutions but would not resolve political disputes with the state (Crenshaw, 2011). However, after 2001, political and security policy dialogue has shifted its focus from the relationship between the state and terrorist and organised crime groups respectively to areas where organised crime groups and terrorist organisations overlap, giving rise to the concept of the crime-terror nexus (Rossi, 2014).

5. Obviating the Distinction: the Crime-Terror Nexus

5.1 Theoretical Convergence
The globalisation of trade, finance and communications provided opportunities for both organised crime and terrorist groups to expand their activities on an international scale (Rossi, 2014). The events of September 11 2001 highlighted the new reach and scale of religiously-motivated international terrorism (Crenshaw, 2011). It also focused international attention on the increased opportunities for the convergence of or alliance between organised crime and terrorist organisations (Rossi, 2014). UN Security Council Resolution 2195 of 2014 called for more research and resources to break the links between terrorists and organised crime in post-conflict contexts. The 2009 UNODC Report on Addiction, Crime and Insurgency illustrated that the 375 tonnes of heroin trafficked from Afghanistan each year was the primary source of income for terrorist groups (Rossi, 2014, p. 301). In 2007, General Petraeus spoke of a mafia-like presence in Iraq associated with local terrorist groups (Rossi, 2014, p. 301).

Makarenko (2004) developed a conceptual continuum to describe the crime-terror nexus phenomenon. Under the first stage of the continuum, terrorists and organised criminals may co-operate or form a strategic alliance, where one group buys the expertise of the other group to further its political or economic purposes (Madsen, 2009). For example, terrorists may obtain passports from organised crime or organised crime may acquire explosives from terrorist groups (Madsen, 2009). Due to the low levels of trust underpinning the alliance, both groups will incorporate the specialist knowledge of the other group within its own organisational structures (Madsen, 2009). This leads to the second stage, namely where one group uses the tactics or activities of the other to further their political or economic operational purposes (Madsen, 2009). The overlap in operational activities may become such that the types of organisations converge into a “single entity that initially displays the characteristics of both groups simultaneously” (Madsen, 2009, p. 66). For example, the terrorist group FARC in Colombia receives money or funds for protecting illegal drug convoys that travel through Colombia (Madsen, 2009). The continuum culminates in the transformation of the group,
namely, “that the ultimate aims and motivations of the organisation have actually changed” (Madsen, 2009, p. 66-7). An example is terrorist groups that begin pursuing criminal funds for personal, individual profit rather than to carry out politically-motivated violence (Madsen, 2009). One of the weaknesses of this continuum as a conceptual tool is that it shifts attention away from the relationship of each group with the state, which was an important aspect of the definitions of both organised crime and terrorist groups outlined above (Lewis, 2014). The consequences of the over-emphasis on the connection between non-state actors for security and development will be explored in the Central Asian case study below.

5.2 Operational Convergence

The fear of a converged organised crime and terrorism international security threat led to a parallel, US-induced convergence of law enforcement agencies and intelligence services at the national and international level (Daase, 2010) (Madsen, 2009). UN Resolution 1373 notes “the close connection between international terrorism and organised crime” and emphasises the need to “enhance co-ordination of efforts on national, sub-regional, and international levels to strengthen a global response to this serious challenge and threat to international security”. A military and security-oriented response to the crime-terror nexus was foreshadowed by the Bush administrations declaration of ‘war’ on both terror and organised crime (Daase, 2010). Traditional law enforcement agencies were deemed too unsophisticated to effectively manage transnational organised crime (Leong, 2007). Organised crime enforcement was shifted outside of the criminal justice framework that promotes accountable, transparent law enforcement in accordance with civil liberties (Miller, 2009). It moved into the realm of national security under the ambit of intelligence services (Miller, 2009). Even before 2001, US President Bill Clinton had started this operational change by declaring international organised crime as a national security threat in Presidential Directive 42 in 1995 (Daase, 2010).
The current international strategy focuses on using the same central intelligence machinery to pursue and disrupt both terrorist and organised crime activities (Leong, 2007). This reflects, in part, a loss of faith in the domestic criminal justice system to deal with crimes of an international scale (Leong, 2007). The main target of intelligence operations is a key element of the crime-terror nexus – sources of finance (Oliveira, 2014). The approach is premised on the assumption that terrorist organisations use the same money-laundering techniques as organised crime (Oliveira, 2014). The G7 recently emphasised that the monitoring of money trails is essential to stop both criminality and the financing of terrorism (Oliveira, 2014).

At the operational and policy level, the traditional distinction between organised crime and terrorist groups has become irrelevant (Leong, 2007). According to security services, they are criminal security threats that attract the same anti-money laundering, asset recovery and intelligence gathering techniques (Leong, 2007). Policy-makers contend that each organisation has the capacity to pose both economic and political threats to international security (Leong, 2007). As a result, the political motivations of terrorist groups have been ignored in practice (Lewis, 2014). Under the converged international law enforcement apparatus, terrorist groups are subject to the same law enforcement approach as organised crime, with little attempt to coerce them into mainstream political society (Leong, 2007). However, the distinction remains in legal terms (Leong, 2007). The empirical basis for the crime-terror nexus is also disputed in the academic literature (Lewis, 2014). The following sections focus on the impact of the converged security-oriented, law enforcement approach to organised crime and terrorism in the developing country context, which is the primary site for debates regarding the empirical existence of the crime-terror nexus (Makarenko, 2004).

5.3 The Crime-Terror Nexus in Developing Countries
Shelley and Picarelli (2010) highlight that weak or transitional states have provided safe havens and facilitated interconnection between organised crime and terrorist groups. As discussed above, organised criminal groups are businesses that operate in accordance with “rational principles aimed at minimising risk and maximising profit” (Mazzitelli, 2007, p. 1073). Organised crime face two main kinds of risk (Mazzitelli, 2007). The first is the risk of financial loss from seizure of goods or non-compliance of criminal business partners with obligations (Mazzitelli, 2007). The second is the risk of criminal prosecution (Mazzitelli, 2007). Weak judicial and law enforcement institutions in developing countries provide organised crime with a competitive advantage in reducing the risks and costs of distributing illegal goods (Cockayne, 2013). Developing states are therefore particularly vulnerable to penetration, infiltration and capture by organised crime groups (Cockayne, 2013). Terrorists in turn profit from the corrupt state governance fostered by organised crime, as the state’s popular legitimacy declines as it becomes more focused on decision-making to benefit organised crime rather than society (OECD, 2012). The next part of the essay discusses the empirical evidence for the crime-terror nexus in three countries in Central Asia – Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.

6. The Empirical Basis for the Crime-Terror Nexus: A Central Asian Case Study

6.1 Organised Crime and Terrorist Groups in Central Asia

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, organised crime exploited existing state corruption networks and weak border control capacity in Central Asia to establish the region as a key opiate trafficking route between Afghanistan and Europe (De Danielli, 2014). According to the UNODC, 90 tons of heroin were trafficked through Central Asia in 2010, generating a 1.4 USD billion profit (De Danielli, 2014). Drug-trafficking is carried out by dozens of small criminal enterprises in each country (De Danielli, 2014). In 2006, there were 87 criminal groups in Kazakhstan and 31 in Kyrgyzstan (De Danielli, 2014).
Several radical Islamic terrorist groups also emerged in Central Asia in the 1990s (Lewis, 2014). The transnational groups include the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) (Lewis, 2014). The IJU has claimed responsibility for attacks in Germany and in Central Asia (Lewis, 2014). The IMU’s stated goal is to overthrow the government of Uzbekistan and replace it with an Islamic state (Ceccarelli, 2007). It conducted local attacks in the late 1990s. Hizbut Tahrir (HTU) is a local group (Lewis, 2014).

The Central Asian region has featured heavily in crime-terror nexus policy discourse (Lewis, 2014). The UNODC reported that “drugs are funding insurgency in Central Asia…with extremist groups also profiting from the trade” (Lewis, 2014, p. 338). Lewis (2014) notes that Russian policy discussions of drugs in Central Asia link the trade to narco-terrorism and extremism. The term narco-terrorism is used in the Central Asian context to denote Islamic groups that fund their terrorist activities through drug-trafficking and is therefore a key part of the crime-terror nexus discourse (Lewis, 2014).

### 6.2 The Relationship Between Organised Crime and Terrorist Groups

The IMU are rumoured to have carried out extensive drug operations between 1999 and 2001 (Lewis, 2014). Some sources say IMU once controlled drug trafficking routes through the mountain passes that connect Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan (Ceccarelli, 2007). The OECD (2012) interprets IMU guerrilla-style attacks in 1999 as efforts to clear key drug trafficking routes through Central Asia. Others argue the key motivation for these attacks was political as the IMU was able to bargain with the government for the release of political prisoners after the attacks ceased (Ceccarelli, 2007). The IMU is therefore cited as one of the best examples of a convergent group on the Makarenko continuum (Ceccarelli, 2007). Interpol has defined IMU as a hybrid organisation in which criminal interests often override political goals (Ceccarelli, 2007).
De Danieli (2014) and Kupatadze (2014), based on new evidence obtained through extensive interviews with local law enforcement, argue there is limited empirical evidence linking IMU with drug groups in Central Asia at the present time as the group has now merged with Al-Qaeda and is based in Afghanistan. Kupatadze’s (2014) interviewees also questioned IMU’s historical links to organised crime as a source of funding. IMU appears to have gained its initial funding not from organised crime, but from a community of Uzbeks resident in Saudi Arabia (Kupatadze, 2014). Some law enforcement officials said the evidence regarding the involvement of IMU in drug-trafficking is “vague and inconclusive” (Kupatadze, 2014, p. 1181). Lewis (2014) suggests it is possible Central Asian governments exaggerated IMU’s links to organised crime to justify repressive action against them. IMU’s combative rather than corrosive relationship with the state seems to indicate that it is primarily a terrorist organisation with political motives rather than a hybrid that sometimes prioritises a criminal agenda (Lewis, 2014).

With regards to other terrorist groups, there is no evidence linking IJU to organised crime, with the group receiving funds from charitable donations from the Middle East and Europe (Lewis, 2014). Kupatadze (2014), citing interviews with Central Asian police officers, concludes that HTU has never had the capacity or expertise to control drug-trafficking routes.

Given the clandestine nature of both organised crime and terrorist groups, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions regarding the nature of the alliance or convergence between them. Lewis (2014), Kupatadze (2014) and De Danieli (2014) hold that the crime-terror nexus paradigm holds little explanatory power for security issues in Central Asia because any empirical links between organised crime and terrorist groups are sporadic, short-lived or based on inconclusive or conflicting evidence. They contend that the concept of the state-crime nexus is a more relevant basis for international security approaches in Central Asia (Lewis, 2014).
6.3 The Importance of the State-Crime Nexus

Central Asian drug groups operate under the protection of states in return for corrupt payments to officials (Ceccarelli, 2007). State-crime connections in Central Asia have existed since Soviet times (De Danielli, 2014). The political rivalry of clans and elites in the transition to competitive electoral democracy in Central Asia has resulted in widespread criminal capture of the state decision-making apparatus as power-holders compete for revenues from organised crime to fund election campaigns (Ceccarelli, 2007). In Kyrgyzstan, competition over drug-related interests underpinned regime changes in 2005 and 2010 (Kupatadze, 2014). In 2005, drug group financial support for the leaders of the Tulip Revolution was crucial in their victory (Kupatadze, 2014). A number of MPs in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are former drug-traffickers that continue to protect criminal or run drug-trafficking businesses (Kupatadze, 2014). There is evidence that organised crime has captured the upper echelons of the security services, with the Kyrgyzstan state shutting down the State Drugs Control Agency in 2009 (Kupatadze, 2014). Given that the agency had successfully seized large quantities of drugs, this criminally-motivated decision severely undermined Kyrgyzstan’s law enforcement capacity (Kupatadze, 2014). The National Security Chief of Tajikistan’s brother was arrested on charges of drug-trafficking in 2009 (Lewis, 2014). At the lower levels of the state law enforcement apparatus, many police officers stationed at border controls are engaged in smuggling (Lewis, 2014). In 2007, a Tajiki police officer was arrested with 109kg of heroin (Kupatadze, 2014). Given the extent of organised criminal involvement in political regime change, decision regarding state security and street-level law enforcement practices it appears the primary relationship of organised crime in Central Asia is not with terrorist organisations, but with governments (Lewis, 2014). The corrosive impact of this relationship on state governance and law enforcement is not detected by the crime-terror analytical framework,
resulting in poorly targeted international counter-narcotics policy in the region (De Danielli, 2014).

7. The Impact of the Crime-Terror Narrative on Security and Development Policy in Central Asia

7.1 Counter-Narco-Terrorism

Reflecting the security-oriented law enforcement approach to the crime-terror nexus, international assistance has focused on strengthening the military and security capacity of Central Asian governments to wage war on both terrorism and organised crime within its borders (De Danielli, 2014). A US major military assistance programme is called Counter Narco-Terror and its main objective is to promote regional stability in the region (De Danielli, 2014). Between 2003 and 2007 the European Commission committed 43 million euro for border control and law enforcement programmes (De Danielli, 2014). The US allocated 20.32 USD for security and law enforcement assistance to Tajikistan in 2007 (De Danielli, 2014). Despite the huge resources invested, international counter-narcotics interventions have achieved few results in combatting organised crime or terrorism (De Danielli, 2014). Narcotics flows through the region have not reduced largely because the governance structures of funded security institutions are weakened by corruption and capture by organised crime (De Danielli, 2014) (OECD, 2012). In a recent report, the OECD (2012) predicted the resurgence of the IMU in the region due to weak government capacity to find constructive, political solutions to the problem of terrorism. Radical Islam is also attracting increased support among local populations disillusioned with corrupt criminalised states (OECD, 2012).

In addition to cementing state-crime links, the mistaken focus on the security threats posed by converged non-state actors has inadvertently supported the authoritarian tendencies of Central Asian states at the expense of democratic reforms to the political system and a corrupt,
oppressive security sector (Lewis, 2014) (Ceccarelli, 2007). President Karimov of Uzbekistan consistently refers to the need for strong leadership to deal with the grave threat to national security posed by narco-terrorists (Lewis, 2014). He frequently uses the label of terrorism to quash political opposition (Lewis, 2014). Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan all operate under constitutions giving the President centralised control of all aspects of government affairs (Ceccarelli, 2007). There are no elected officers in control of the police and military institutions (Ceccarelli, 2007). Uzbekistan has had one ruler since 1991 and Tajikistan is beset with clan-based civil wars (Ceccarelli, 2007).

7.2 Towards Separate Counter-Narcotics and Counter-Terrorism Approaches

An international development policy based on a clear understanding of the distinct motives of organised crime and terrorist groups and their different impact on state structures could result in more appropriately targeted and separate counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism strategies (Shelley and Picarelli, 2010). A focus on the unique tendency of organised crime to penetrate, infiltrate and capture state structures to further its economic goals promotes emphasis on non-military governance capacity-building and anti-corruption reforms to increase the resistance of the state to organised crime (OECD, 2012). Stronger democratic governance would foster trust between the government and the community and eliminate the basis of popular support for terrorist groups (Shelley and Picarelli, 2010). Strong democratic states are in turn better placed to integrate terrorist groups using counter-terrorism or counter-radicalisation tools to specifically address the political nature of terrorism’s challenge to the state (Lewis, 2014). As the predicted resurgence of IMU in Central Asia indicates, law enforcement approaches designed for organised crime groups do little to address the political grievances of terrorist groups (Lewis, 2014). The distinction between organised crime and terrorist groups has not become meaningless in the globalised world. It is critically important in the developing country context to ensure security responses both adequately address the different challenges posed by
terrorism and organised crime, and are commensurate with a democratic state-building agenda (Benedek, 2010).

8. Conclusion

There is little empirical basis for the emphasis on the security threat posed by alliances between violent non-state actors in Central Asia. The confusion that the crime-terror nexus paradigm has created regarding the motives and intentions of organised crime and terrorist groups that exhibit some features of both group types, such as the IMU in Central Asia, has resulted in a narrow security-oriented law enforcement approach that does not tackle the negative effect of organised crime on state governance or the political grievances of terrorist organisations with the state (Rossi, 2014). The confusion is perhaps due in part to the lack of consensus regarding the respective definitions of organised crime and terrorism (Madsen, 2009). A renewed academic focus on the motives and intentions of so-called hybrid groups would promote responses targeted to their political or economic nature (Madsen, 2009). An organisation’s relationship with the state is a key indicator of its ultimate purpose. Organised crime will seek to co-exist with and corrupt the state, while terrorist groups maintain a combative relationship with the state (Rossi, 2014). The relationship of the state with organised crime and terrorist groups is not adequately captured by the crime-terror nexus conceptual framework, resulting in poor choices by policy-makers operating within that paradigm (Lewis, 2014). There is much scope for future research regarding the complex interaction between the state, organised crime and terrorist organisations, particularly in the post-conflict context. However, it must begin by including the state as a central player in the analytical frame.