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Preface.

This project had its origin in a reading of G.E.L. Owen's 'Eleatic Questions'. This paper first suggested to me that Parmenides' poem might be dominated by formal concerns and especially by a view of the relation of language to the world. Discussions with Professor Owen began the search for what now appears as the semantic theory outlined in chapter one below and exploited throughout this dissertation. Jantsen's monograph, *Parmenides zum Verhältnis von Sprache und Wirklichkeit*, came into my hands after my research was sufficiently advanced to feel that his account of Parmenides' semantic assumptions was inadequate and the scope of his investigation too narrow, especially as regards the arguments in B6. Nevertheless, Jantsen's work (as also that of Gräzer and Furth) encouraged me in the view that a 'semantic' interpretation of the poem was both plausible and philosophically fruitful. I still regard 'Eleatic Questions' to be the single most insightful piece on Parmenides in any language; and I only regret that Professor Owen did not live to comment on the present study in its final form.

In what follows, I have tried to take account of the many problems which surround the text and language of Parmenides. Interpretations and reconstructions of Parmenides' arguments are offered which not only seek to conform to the constraints of text and language, but which also seek to present those same arguments in their best light. I am aware that such a charitable enterprise runs the risk of imputing to Parmenides distinctions and ideas not directly evidenced by his text and perhaps not available to him. I have tried to let text, syntax and general canons of historical plausibility prevent excesses. Since I argue, in the end, that Parmenides' argumentative project cannot succeed, and indeed is self-refuting, I refrain from merely naive vindication of his project; but the reader is advised that a large degree of charity informs my interpretation of specific passages. In my view, the fragments of Parmenides' poem under-determine every interpretation having any philosophical merit, and that therefore risks of this kind must be taken if Parmenides is to live for us.

Limitations of space prevent my following as far as they deserve an alternative view of the issues pertaining to Parmenides' text, syntax, arguments and philosophical beliefs. This is the more vexatious, given the value I have found even in those views which I seek to contravene. Debts to other scholars are discharged (inadequately) in the notes and bibliography that follow (I regret that the revised edition of Kirk and Raven came into my hands too late to be taken into account). Nonetheless, I affirm that this work is entirely my own and has not been done in collaboration with anyone else. Acknowledgement is made to the Faculty of Classics for a grant in aid of my research, from the Jebb Fund; to the Master and Fellows of my College for election to a Senior Research Scholarship to the same end. Professor G.E.R. Lloyd took up the duties of supervision upon the death of Professor Owen. He has saved me from many blunders; but the mistakes that remain are my own.

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Chapter One: Language and Reality in Parmenides' Poem.

A. Hermeneutical considerations:

Certain features of Parmenides' poem suggest that a view of the relation that language bears to the world plays a central role in the arguments which are deployed on other subjects. For example, Parmenides shows a sustained interest in truth and falsity (B1.28-32, B2, B6.4-9, B7).1 This interest not only issues in a first-order inquiry but also in a second-order inquiry. That is, Parmenides argues that certain commonly held beliefs are false, as e.g. that whatever there is comes to be and passes away, moves from place to place and suffers qualitative change (B8.39-61). And, by contrast, he seeks to show that it is true that whatever is is ungenerated (ἀγεννητόν), incorruptible (ἀνάκτορον) unique and whole (ἀδιόν μονογενές), immovable (ἀτρομές) and in equilibrium (ἀτάλαντον).2 But Parmenides is also interested in a second-order problem: the very nature of truth and falsity. He announces in B1.28-32 that the argument will reveal the ἀλήθειας εὐκαλέσθαι ἀτρομές ἃτομο.3 He appears also to promise there an insight into the nature of false belief (a theme continued in B6, B7, B8.34-41, 50-61 and perhaps B9). Moreover, in his doctrine of being (τὸ ἔστιν), Parmenides drives through a close linkage of thought and talk with being (B3, B6.1-2, B8.34-36). The leading characteristic of τὸ μὴ ἔστιν is that it cannot be thought or talked about (B2.7-8, B8.7-9, 17-18). By contrast, τὸ ἔστιν can be talked and thought about (B6.1 and perhaps B2.7). On one view of the problem, these contrasting characteristics are important clues to determining the identity of the elusive subject of ἔστιν and τὸν ἔστιν in B2.3,5. If Parmenides takes thought to be a kind of mental discourse, then this linkage of thought and talk with being will represent a single focused attention on the relation of discourse to reality.4

Parmenides thus appears to bring two of his main themes, the nature of truth and of being, into close relation with thought and talk. Moreover, in the course of propounding a series of tightly woven arguments against various kinds of change, he repeatedly touches on the same theme, the relation of discourse to being (B8.7-9, 17-18, 34-36). Elsewhere, the suggestion is that the falsity of mortal opinions is partly due to special properties of language in relation to being (B8.38-42, 53-54, B9 and perhaps B19.3). In these later contexts, he shows a marked tendency to emphasize a single function of language, naming.5 This has suggested to some commentators that Parmenides is especially concerned to discover what happens to assertions of change when the language of change is understood to have the same semantic properties as do names. Names may have provided Parmenides with a model for the relation of language to reality, and he may be using this semantic model as a basic ingredient in the arguments against change. Furthermore, if his doctrine of being and his understanding of the nature of truth and error are also closely bound up with an approach to this fundamental property of discourse, then the poem takes on the appearance of a high degree of unity. It is the prospect of displaying this unity, with its focal point the relation of language to the world, that has begun to excite comment on the part of some Parmenidean scholars.
We cannot proceed further without some indication of the sense in
which we are using the term 'semantic'. In contemporary philosophy of
logic the term can be defined this way: 6

We shall understand by semantics the totality of
considerations concerning those concepts which, roughly
speaking, express certain connexions between the expressions
of a language and the objects and states of affairs referred
to by these expressions.
The twin notions to which such a definition gives rise, of a semantic
relation and of a semantic property, can be made fully perspicuous only
in the context of a formalised language. It may be complained that
since Parmenides has no formal resources for undertaking his arguments
he cannot be said to pursue any semantic issue. On that view it will be
quite beside the point to appeal to the features of Parmenides' poem
pointed out above, and claim that they have their best explanation as
part of a general approach to 'language and reality'. However, since
even highly formalised logical investigations derive their philosophical
significance from informal arguments and inquiries, and since it is
possible to develop semantic notions even where logical syntax is
relatively crude or even largely absent (compare Plato's definition of
truth at Cratylus 385b 7 ), we cannot allow that Parmenides is simply
precluded from carrying out his argumentative project in the presence of
some basic ideas about the relation of language to the world. Where
formal parallels may fail us, as between Parmenides and, say, Tarski,
informal parallels may yet prove illuminating. The use of terms like
'semantic' need only serve to indicate the general logical level on
which a philosophical project is carried out, and this will be its
principal function in this study. Further caveats respecting our use of
contemporary conceptions in semantic theory will be entered below.

Illumination is just what some recent commentators on Parmenides' poem have generated by pursuing in it the problem of language and
reality. To those who have taken this tack, Parmenides' semantics has
seemed to be comprised of two fundamental elements. The first is that
all discourse is taken to be name-like with respect to its relation to
whatever makes it true. 7 On this view, the relation between names and
their bearers is taken to be primitive notion which will illuminate the
relation of other forms of discourse to reality. Adopting Husserl's
notion of a 'semantic category', we may say that Parmenides tries to
understand the semantic properties of all language in terms of the
properties of a single semantic category, that of names. 8 Such a
'collapse' of semantic categories down to only one has a drastic effect
on the treatment of logical constants, especially negation. 9 This is
easy to make clear if we draw out the second element of Parmenides'
alleged semantics: the referential force of names. Furth has described
Parmenides as a 'hyper-denotationist', illuminating this with a useful
analogy: 'to "mean" something is to speak it with a spoken ( winged?)
word'. 10 It is doubtful that we can go so far as to press on Parmenides
a particular interpretation of the notion of reference to which he
appeals, but Furth's image of spearing captures very well the general
force of a referential semantic. 11 On such a view, however, any simple
declarative sentence which denies the existence of anything, or the
obtaining of any state of affairs, will be taken to imply the reality of
what-is-not ( see further below, p. 20 ). On the present
interpretation, just such a pattern of argument underlies much of
Parmenides' poem. It was not until Plato took up the issue of negation in the Sophist that the confusion about negation occasioned by the collapse of semantic categories, or the failure to multiply them, began to be cleared up.

It is along lines such as these that there has begun to emerge in recent Parmenidean studies a recognizable type of interpretation which we may for convenience call a semantic interpretation. It would be easy to press into its service more of contemporary philosophy of logic than can be warranted. One aim of this introduction is to guard against precisely such a danger. We cannot, after all, show that Parmenides had worked out his semantic notions in anything like the degree of rigour attaching to contemporary semantic theory. It would be the worst form of 'insinuating the future' to suggest otherwise. 12 It remains the case, however, that the suggestions of Furth, Graesser, and others, cause Parmenides' ideas to bear a striking similarity to the general outlines of contemporary semantic theory.

Since Tarski's epochal paper in 1931, it has been customary to provide formal languages with semantics based on the unanalysed (or primitive) notion of reference. 13 There is a persistent tendency to take naming to be the model for this notion:

There is a tendency to think of proper names as, so to speak, the means by which language gets its most direct grip on the world; and perhaps for this reason there is a strong motivation to give a neat and tidy picture of the way naming works. 14

This gives rise to the characteristic form of contemporary formal semantics: the denotation of things by their names is taken to be primitive, and higher order semantic relations, e.g. the obtaining of predicates and the satisfaction of functions, are understood in terms of the semantics of naming. This is what Davidson has aptly called the 'building-block' approach to semantic theory. 15 One temptation, then, for the semantic interpreter of Parmenides is to adopt the full range of conceptions available from contemporary theory, characterizing Parmenides' view of the relation of language to the world as, say, an atomistic referential semantic or as a view which takes all discourse to carry ontological commitment. However, such a characterization would be convincing only where some minimum amount of formal logical syntax (e.g. as would suffice for the deployment of existential quantifiers) could be shown to have an analogue in Parmenides' arguments. 16 This is a vain hope: Parmenides is not doing semantics in the formal mode at all, having no formalism to work in. He cannot make use of even so basic a distinction as that between an object language and a meta-language. 17 Parmenides can perform no semantic ascent of the type which is represented in contemporary logic by meta-syntactical modeling. Far from serving to illuminate Parmenides' philosophical work in its historical particularity, a characterization of it in terms of contemporary semantic theory would be the most debilitating of anachronisms.

Are we to say, then, that modern commentators who find in Parmenides' arguments a pursuit of what we call semantic issues, have looked into the past and found there only the reflection of their own concerns? This would not be an unfamiliar assessment to have to draw for modern comment on ancient philosophical texts. There are other interpretations of Parmenides' poem which find its centre of gravity to
be elsewhere, especially in either epistemology or ontology. These interpretations can be given very plausible formulations, some of which will concern us more at later stages of the present study. One might be forgiven for deciding that Parmenides is a merely protean figure, his poem susceptible of equally convincing and incompatible interpretations none of which can be finally rejected. But then how secure can any one of these interpretations be? Moreover, some of those who have interpreted the poem along the lines suggested above, have found in it unconvincing and even bizarre philosophical theses which make Parmenides appear a philosophical charlatan ripe for derision. We have been invited to suppose, for example, that Parmenides took the point of his arguments to have been that all meaningful speech should be reduced to a single word (or that it is logically equivalent to a single word ), namely 'it is' (ἐστιν ).

Alternatively, we are supposed to learn from Parmenides' poem precisely that all language is meaningless. These results impede Parmenides positions which are self-refuting immediately they are propounded. They do not serve to recommend the interpretative framework which generated them. Is it not true, then, that the semantic interpretation of Parmenides can only be a curiosity to the serious student of ancient philosophy?

Such a judgement would be premature. In the first place, it only goes to show that we may not yet have the semantic interpretative framework properly focused. I will suggest below that Parmenides is not principally concerned to exploit a conception of reference to secure his arguments, but, rather, undergirds his arguments with a theory of sentence meaning. The tendency among commentators to concentrate on reference is probably a genuine instance of projecting onto the past the characteristic bias of contemporary philosophy of logic (see the quotation from Haack above). By shifting the focus of our inquiry to a theory of sentence meaning we can generate an interpretation of Parmenides' poem which avoids some of the shortcomings of earlier attempts. The earlier rejection of semantic interpretations is premature, in the second place, because in many respects it has yet to be given a fair run. It has not yet been the case that all the main strands of Parmenides' arguments have been drawn into the semantic interpretation. For example, Jantzen's monograph—the only full scale treatment of language and reality in Parmenides to date—virtually ignores the arguments against change in B6. This is a serious oversight, given the fact that Parmenides advert to some features of language during the course of those arguments. It is one of the aims of my study to make up this deficiency (see especially chapter four).

Furthermore, not all of Parmenides' recent semantic commentators have been as sensitive as they might have been to the literary structures in which Parmenides casts his arguments. I have found that Parmenides frequently provides his interpreter with valuable guides to his meaning by way of the carefully worked structures of the poem. Parmenides affords us a full budget of textual and syntactical puzzles also, and it has seemed to me that other commentators have not always made the best choices in these matters. In what follows I have tried to treat substantively with all of the major difficulties of these kinds. In all of these respects, then, the present study aims at completeness.

But completeness is not my main motivation, neither would it be a very convincing one. In the main, this study springs from the deep impression that with Parmenides we are in the presence of a seminal
philosophical mind grappling in an entirely serious vein with fundamental issues. Much of the recent comment on Parmenides' logico-linguistic problematic has seemed to me not to do full justice to the philosophical power of the poem. At the same time, however, much of this commentary has served to illuminate various aspects of Parmenides' argument and language. Even where I have disagreed with others, I have often found their views suggestive of more fruitful lines of interpretation. I have accordingly frequently used the views of others as starting points for my own exposition. Moreover, I have found myself increasingly sympathetic even to those views which I reject. On the whole, I entirely agree with those who find Parmenides to be engaged in exploring some of the ramifications of a certain view of the semantic properties of ordinary discourse. Not only so, I have tried also to show that such an interpretation of the poem can serve to rescue Parmenides' philosophical reputation from some of the criticisms which can be leveled against his arguments (see further, chapter six). The chief testimony in favour of any interpretation of a literary artifact must be its power to illuminate the nature and function of the artifact itself. I take it that success in treating the many problems which are taken up in the chapters which follow will go far towards vindicating the semantic interpretation of Parmenides.

There are two parts of Parmenides' poem which will not be treated in this study. Except for lines 28-32, the proem (B1) will be left to one side. To establish even the literary genre of the proem is a task beyond the bounds of this study. Moreover, it seems unsatisfactory to suggest that the interpretation of Parmenides' arguments should depend on our interpretation of the proem. The philosophical significance of the poem is determined by the arguments which Parmenides deploys. The proem should be interpreted principally in the light of our understanding of the arguments rather than the other way round. My principle concern, then, is with Parmenides' arguments, and I will regard the proem as virtually neutral with respect to this concern. It should also be admitted that the proem may serve other purposes not directly connected with Parmenides' philosophical theses. The traditional imagery and language of the proem, together with its narrative power may be designed to secure a hearing for Parmenides' arguments. The latter, after all, are highly destructive of many of the fundamental beliefs of his contemporaries. It would be prudent to begin such an exercise in as captivating a manner as possible. Casting the body of his arguments in the form of a divine ἔος, will presumably have given to the arguments a weight of authority and an air of seriousness which they might otherwise have been taken to lack.23

I will also leave out of consideration most of the smaller physical and cosmological fragments of the poem (i.e. B10-19, except for some brief comments on B10, B16, and B19). Their interpretation belongs to the history of ancient scientific motifs and concepts. Moreover, most of them are so short that it is now probably impossible to determine fully what the argumentative framework was that they suberved. By contrast, B8.33-59 and B9 can be shown to be important guides to one of the major aims of Parmenides' philosophical project, and these fragments will be treated in detail in chapter five. Interpreting them will generate a view of Parmenides' argument which is compatible with what we find in the other physical fragments.24
B. Parmenides' Semantic Theory:

Since Parmenides lacks even the most rudimentary formal language, we cannot impute to him any formal semantic theory. Neither can we suggest that the expounding of semantic concepts is the main business of his poem. (At the very most, such concepts can be taken to be used in the poem; see further below.) Accordingly, there is no formal Eliotic theorizing about semantic issues, and we do not have direct access to whatever informal semantic thinking may have been done by Parmenides and his students. However, these considerations do not suffice merely to prevent our offering a semantic interpretation of the poem, or a presentation of the semantic judgements which we suppose Parmenides to be exploiting in his poem. Provided that we dispense with the requirements that semantic theory be formalized and fully explicited (which requirements are typically modern), we are free to proceed.\(^{25}\)

Accordingly, we impute to Parmenides only a more or less loosely organized set of semantic beliefs which we will describe as a theory of sentence meaning. But we do not intend to suggest that he possessed a formal theory. Also, it is presumed that this set of semantic beliefs is only as developed as was needed to generate the arguments which we find deployed in the fragments. Our principal interest in Parmenides' semantic theory is heuristic. We aim to establish a unified, coherent interpretation of the main lines of Parmenides' arguments, an interpretation which will take full cognizance of the linguistic and literary features of the fragments and which aims to uncover the philosophical project which binds them together.

We do not insist on the historical veracity of our imputation to Parmenides of a theory of sentence meaning.\(^{26}\) The sole virtue of our imputation is its power to illuminate the fragments, and this will be exhibited in chapters two through five below. Accordingly, we preclude from a full philosophical development of the theory of sentence meaning sketched below. (So far as we can discover, no detailed discussion of it has ever been undertaken.\(^{27}\)) Such a development would entail discussion of the work of such modern investigators as Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein, as well as a multitude of contemporary analyses of sentence meaning.\(^{28}\) Obviously, both the historical and philosophical developments are beyond the scope and aims of the present investigation. However, the matter of historical warrant for our reconstruction of Parmenides' semantic theory should not be let pass altogether.

The theory of sentence meaning described below has been found in Plato's late dialogues by David Wiggins. He notes that in the *Sophist* and *Theaetetus* Plato is exercised with "a single strand of the much more heterogeneous knot of problems which result from complete generalization of the arguments of Parmenides."\(^{29}\) Wiggins goes on to show that the problem of non-being, as Plato treats it in these dialogues, derives from a theory of sentence meaning of the type we describe. Although Wiggins makes no speculation along these lines, it is our view that the *Sophist* is perhaps the most important ancient guide for understanding Parmenides' arguments and their philosophical underpinning. Only detailed study of the Platonic material, in the context of the whole project which occupies the late dialogues, would suffice to defend this view, and this cannot be done here. However, our view of Parmenides has
not sprung solely out of a reading of the fragments. It arises partly by way of a cross-bearing taken through the *Sophist*.

Plato's reliability as an historian of philosophy, and in particular of Eleatic philosophy, has been impugned by some. The general grounds for this attack are the presentation of Eleatic philosophy in the *Parmenides*; especially damaging, on this view, is the presentation of Parmenides and Zeno as monists, and the concomitant emphasis on the special subject τὸ ἐγώ. I find these arguments less than compelling. Neither need they have a decisive influence to erode our confidence in the *Sophist*. But neither is it necessary to impugn Plato a modern historico-exegetical bent, in order to make good use of his dialogue. All I wish to avail myself of is the suggestion that Parmenides' preoccupation with non-being is semantic in origin and that his semantic commitments took the form of a theory of sentence meaning roughly like the one described below. If the historical warrant is not forthcoming, it will suffice us if the semantic interpretation secures a coherent and philosophically nuanced account of Parmenides' arguments.

But now I have entered perhaps sufficient caveats and must turn to substantive matters: a description of the semantic theory from which I take Parmenides' arguments to derive.

The theory of sentence meaning which we ascribe to Parmenides consists of three basic notions. First, every sentence 'that p' that is true, is made true by some situation or state of affairs which we will designate by [p], and which p points to or designates. Second, the situation or state of affairs [p] is an abstract entity which exists as the object of the acts of truly stating, truly believing, and truly judging that p.

Third, the notion of 'pointing to' or 'designating' can be given more specific content. The relation between the sentence 'that p' and [p] is that of name to named, where this relation serves the function of showing how things are with the named thing. On this view, to assert (or to believe, or to think) truly 'that p' is just to draw someone's attention to a real situation, which situation is displayed to the hearer by the sentence. This displaying of [p] is akin to showing someone a picture, a picture of how things are. The sentence which displays [p] is itself, as a whole unit of meaning, the name of [p]. The status of [p], the function of 'that p' and the semantic relation of sentence to state of affairs, all reflect this concentration on names and naming. Accordingly, we will refer to this theory as the nominal theory of sentence meaning. Although we have presupposed from a detailed development of this theory in its own right, it will be important for the exegetical studies that follow, that we draw out some of the obvious ramifications of the theory. These ramifications will serve as a minimal development of the theory.

In this theory, no differentiation is made between speaking or saying 'that p' and thinking or judging that p. Verbs of speaking and verbs of thinking are alike treated as simple transitive verbs: to speak, as also to think, is to say (or think) something, namely, those states of affairs symbolized above by [p]. The reason for this indifference between verbs of saying and verbs of thinking or believing will be that thinking and speaking both made use of sentences for the purpose of asserting or entertaining the existence of the relevant states of affairs. For Parmenides, this means that λέγειν and νοεῖν are not differentiated from one another. (This will be important for our understanding of B3, B6.1, and B8.34–41.) The effect of this part of
the theory is to draw into the semantic sphere such epistemological issues as the poem may evince. For Parmenides, then, epistemology will not be separate from semantics. It also appears that in our theory 'meaning' just is the same semantic property as 'truth' (though one should not draw any Tarskian lessons from this fact). Moreover, in so far as sentences are related to their truth as names to named, the theory makes no distinction between extensional and intensional semantic notions.

The focus on sentences is not idle, nor is it merely fortuitous. The target of Parmenides' elenchus is the beliefs of the mortals, and these beliefs are most simply represented as sets of sentences. What the nominal theory of sentence meaning does is to supply an account of the meaning of any sentence, the meaning being just the abstract object which the sentence names. Such an approach allows Parmenides to treat of the truth of the goddess' doctrines and the falsity of the beliefs of mortals, from a single perspective. His semantic theory thus supplies a single philosophical rationale for both sides of his argumentative task. We will have occasion below to draw attention to signs in the poem that Parmenides desiderates a unified account of the goddess' truth and the falsity of the ἑθικὸς θρόνος.

It might appear, at first sight, that the nominal theory of sentence meaning prevents there being any false sentences. It seems that there must be, for any sentence 'that p', some [p] which the sentence displays, in order for the sentence to have meaning at all. But one can only display, or show, what exists, and does not an existent state of affairs render the sentence true? Must we appeal to negative states of affairs? Wiggins argues for another solution, and this is one which to my mind perfectly suits Parmenides' purposes. 'Display' or 'show' may only mean 'make as to display' or 'make as to show', and we can construe utterances which are false as simply non-genuine sentences. For example, suppose it is false that Socrates is sitting. Then the sentence 'Socrates is sitting' purports to display [Socrates sitting], i.e. the state of affairs that Socrates is sitting. But, since it is false, the sentence 'Socrates is sitting' actually displays [not[Socrates sitting]]. But this last situation is just the situation of there being no situation of Socrates sitting. Our false sentence thus attempts to display the non-displayability of sitting Socrates, 'an utterly self-undermining project'. False sentences, then, turn out to be peculiarly self-refuting or contradictory. The sentences in which they are cast turn out not to be genuine names, but mere noises masquerading as names. But we cannot discover this unless we accept, at the outset, that these bogus sentences appear to be genuine. By pressing upon them the requirements of our theory of sentential meaning, we show their real status. We will see later that such a strategy is foundational to Parmenides' attack on the opinions of mortals (see especially chapter five). Here it is enough to stress that the theory allows for falsity, but treats falsehoods as self-contradictions.

A further ramification of our theory is the peculiar status given in it to "nothing" (τὸ μὴ δὲν = τὸ μὴ ἔστιν). This is the one subject which, on our theory, can be mentioned but not talked about. If all meaningful sentences are names of some state of affairs or other, then it is not possible for there to be any meaningful sentences with "nothing" as their subject. For "nothing" is the complete absence of
any state of affairs. A true sentence about "nothing" must display the situation of there being no situation, and this will be the quintessential contradiction of attempting to point to a thing that is no-thing.\textsuperscript{44} Sentences about "nothing", like false sentences merely make as to show the state of affairs which would make them meaningful if only it were a genuine state of affairs. [ The relevance of this strategy for understanding Parmenides' description of the way \( \acute{\omega} \circ \acute{\omega} \ \varepsilon \tau \mu \nu \) as a \( \varepsilon \lambda \alpha \varepsilon \tau \acute{\sigma} \tau \theta \epsilon \alpha \varsigma \) (2.6) will be drawn out below.] Parmenides' theory thus insulates him against the demand that he be sensitive to the differences between existential claims and predications. For on our theory, both kinds of claims (positive and negative) will stand or fall on similar grounds. (The difficulties which Parmenides' own denials and negative predications will create for him will occupy us further in chapter six.) Moreover, this treatment of \( \tau \circ \nu \rho \circ \nu \varepsilon \) (the semantic object of the sentence \( \acute{\omega} \circ \acute{\omega} \ \varepsilon \tau \mu \nu \)) is shown to be paradigmatic for the analysis of all negative existentials.

By contrast with the peculiar status of "nothing", \( \tau \circ \varepsilon \circ \nu \) has a privileged place in the nominal theory of sentence meaning. Just as \( \tau \circ \nu \ \cup \ \varepsilon \circ \nu \) functions as the semantic object of \( \acute{\omega} \circ \acute{\omega} \ \varepsilon \tau \mu \nu \), so \( \tau \circ \varepsilon \circ \nu \) is the semantic object of \( \varepsilon \tau \circ \nu \ \varepsilon \tau \mu \nu \). Just as \( \acute{\omega} \circ \acute{\omega} \ \varepsilon \tau \mu \nu \) is the paradigmatic negative existential sentence, so \( \varepsilon \tau \circ \nu \ \varepsilon \tau \mu \nu \) is the paradigmatic positive existential sentence. Wiggins has put this very neatly: 'If the verb \( \sigma \iota \nu \iota \alpha \iota \) to be, can be felt to be implicit in every verb, then its participle, \( \sigma \iota \nu \iota \varsigma \) or \( \sigma \iota \varsigma \), can be felt to be implicit in every true sentence awaiting the status of dependent clause in indirect speech. But every true judgement awaits this status potentially since every judgement can in principle be reported in case it is every said or thought.'\textsuperscript{45} This being so, we will regard \( \tau \circ \varepsilon \circ \nu \) as 'the real' considered simultaneously in two respects: as that which \( \text{exists} \) (\( \tau \circ \varepsilon \circ \nu \) as 'what-is') and as that which makes true sentences true. This is reality regarded in its semantic role. In so far as it is Parmenides' business (especially in B8) to secure various properties of \( \tau \circ \varepsilon \circ \nu \), his arguments constitute an exploration of the "formal" properties of \( \tau \circ \varepsilon \circ \nu \).\textsuperscript{46}

It is of some importance to stress that this view of \( \tau \circ \varepsilon \circ \nu \) does not derive from any reconstruction of Parmenides' use of the verb 'to be'. I have argued that the nominal theory of sentence meaning is indifferent as between the treatment afforded simple existential sentences and that afforded predications. Both kinds of sentences will be true in precisely the same way: if there exists some state of affairs which the sentence names. Both kinds of sentences 'put themselves in the power of reality to establish .... their claim to stand as true', in precisely the same way.\textsuperscript{47} [ Moreover, as we have seen, the theory does not allow any semantic role for \( \tau \circ \nu \rho \circ \nu \varepsilon \) (\( \tau \circ \nu \ \varepsilon \circ \nu \)), for falsehoods are just contradictions and not genuinely meaningful sentences at all.] It is no surprise, then, that Parmenides should put forward \( \tau \circ \varepsilon \circ \nu \) as his subject, for \( \tau \circ \varepsilon \circ \nu \) will be the paradigm of every state of affairs which serves in a semantic role. On this view of \( \tau \circ \varepsilon \circ \nu \), its character derives from two sources: the existential force of the home verb \( \varepsilon \nu \circ \nu \), and the role given to \( \tau \circ \varepsilon \circ \nu \) in the theory of sentence meaning. It will be our view that nothing in Parmenides' arguments turns on any special uses or nuances of the verb \( \varepsilon \nu \circ \nu \).
Arguably, for Parmenides as also later for Plato and Aristotle, the use of \( \varepsilon\lambda\nu\alpha\rho\alpha \) as a copula (in predications and identity statements, which uses may not always be clearly distinguished from one another) is basic to its use in what we call existential statements: to be is to be something. Much of modern interpretation of Parmenides' poem has taken its rise from this fact. These interpretations have sought to find in the poem a nuanced use of the verb 'to be' out of which spring the main arguments. It suffices for the moment to say that in our view this is not a convincing way to proceed (more detailed criticisms of these interpretations will be offered in due course). We doubt that Parmenides' position in the history of the development of the uses of \( \varepsilon\lambda\nu\alpha\rho\alpha \) is determinative of any of his arguments. Rather, his arguments stem from the basic semantic theory which he is bringing to bear on selected sentences or sentence types. Attention paid to Parmenides' uses of \( \varepsilon\lambda\nu\alpha\rho\alpha \) tend to misdirect our attention from the properly formal character of his project (as evidenced, e.g. in the repeated reference, in crucial argumentative contexts, to names and naming). Accordingly, we will devote no special attention to fixing Parmenides' position in the history and evolution (if any) of \( \varepsilon\lambda\nu\alpha\rho\alpha \).

One final ramification of our semantic theory will complete this introduction. Our theory makes nothing of the constituent parts of sentences. That is, in the nominal theory the semantic properties of sentences are not functions of semantic properties attaching to their parts. In particular, words are not regarded as themselves names; it is the sentence which is a name. So far as the nominal theory goes, sentences are the most primitive semantic unit, and semantics is not done by the 'building block' strategy. It is perhaps not surprising that this should be so, given that our theory is one in which meaning is just identical with truth, for sentences will be the simplest bearers of truth. Avoidance of a semantic atomism (of words, rather than sentences) is not, however, merely a theoretical preference. Jantzen has taken the view that Parmenides does indeed believe that words are names which name 'the real' and are thus the lowest level of semantic analysis. But in doing so he comes up with a disturbing result. As regards the possibility of expressing non-being, Parmenides 'verwirft sie und verwirft damit weil er die Aussage von Nicht-Seiendem in jeden Satz impliziert sieht, das Sprechen überhaupt.' But if this analysis goes through, Parmenides has undermined his argumentative enterprise at the outset: his only consistent recourse is to silence or the poem becomes operationally self-refuting. If, on the other hand, \( \tau\delta\mu\rho\varepsilon\lambda\nu\) is not itself a name (where all genuine names name the real), but rather functions as a designation for a putative state of affairs to which alleged sentences make as to point, the incoherence disappears. We can always mention such a putative state of affairs, even if in fact, upon analysis, it emerges that no sentence can coherently be formed which has \( \tau\delta\mu\rho\varepsilon\lambda\nu \) as its semantic object. There seems, then, to be good reason to stress that the nominal theory does not assign semantic values to the parts of sentences, and in particular does not treat discrete words as names. Obviously, if Parmenides is to construct a complete semantic theory, words must come in for some treatment. Moreover, to treat them as names is a natural thing to do. But it is not Parmenides' business in his poem to offer or exploit any semantic analysis of individualized words.
With these ramifications and caveats we complete our introduction of the nominal theory of sentence meaning. It will now be our main business to seek to use it in exegesis of the fragments of Parmenides with a view to illuminating the philosophical project which he pursues there.

Chapter One, Notes:

1. Unless otherwise noted, all references to the pre-socratic philosophers are to the relevant section of W. Diels, and W. Kranz (ed.), *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, sixth edition, Berlin, 1951 (hereafter cited as DK).

2. I have here assumed what will later be argued, that the subject of the deductions in B8 is τὸ ἐὖν, and that the text of B8.4 should read ἣθ ἄτηλαντον.

3. The text of B1.29 may read εὐτελεῖος rather than εὐμυκλέος, but the choice makes little difference to our interpretation of B1.28-32. See further chapter two.

4. The antecedent is not susceptible to direct demonstration, though B6.1 is especially suggestive of it, as also B8.34-36 (see chapter 5.2). According to Onians (1954) 13-22 such a view was standard in the archaic poetic tradition; and Sansone (1975) 88 finds it still in Aeschylus. It is explicitly entertained by Plato, *Theaetetus* 189e-190a and *Sophist* 263e, and there are signs of it in the early Aristotle (e.g. in *De Interpretatione* 23a 32, perhaps 21a 32-33.).
5. ὁνομάζειν ἔστω (unless the text should read δῶσαι ἔστω; on which see further chapter 5.3 below), 53, and B9.1; δῶσαι at B19.3 (and possibly B8.38). But notice also B2.7-8 (οὗτε γὰρ ὁ νοούς τὸ γε μὴ ἱέρο ... οὗτος ἡ ἀρετή) with B8.8-9 (οὗ γὰρ ὁ φωτὸν ὁ πόνος νοητὸν ἔστω δῶσαι ὁ πόνος ἦσται and cf. 17-18). B8.35 (ἐν δὲ περιστα- 
μένου ἔστω) and the use of κόσμον / ἐκδόσιν in B8.52, 60 are not 
without significance in this respect also, as will be shown later.

6. Tarski (1956) 401; cf. Haack (1978) 251. For my purposes it will 
not be necessary to distinguish further between the semantic 
properties of meaning and truth. Moreover, so far as the 
distinction is an important one, I regard Parmenides' semantic 
commitments under the rubric of truth-value semantics, rather than 
speech-act semantics. The distinction is usefully discussed by 
Kempson (1975) 37-46, (1977) 58-74. It seems right to argue, as 
she does, that the two kinds of semantics are compatible.

7. So Vlastos (1973) 238 n.46, Grasser (1977b) 363, Woodbury (1958) 
155-157.

8. Husserl (1913/1970) 511. The notion of semantic category is 
adopted by Tarski (1956) 215-220, though he characteristicallly 
insists that it applies only in formal contexts (p. 217, n.1).

9. This particular problem was noticed by Husserl (1913/1970) 512. It 
would be more accurate to say that Parmenides failed sufficiently 
to multiply semantic categories. I do not imply by referring to a 
collapse of semantic categories that he had abandoned some more 
complex semantic scheme for a purely onomastic semantic. 
Parmenides stands at the very beginnings of semantic theorizing, 
but the results must appear to us as a collapse.

10. Furth (1968/1974) 255 n.27, 256-57. He is followed by Nussbaum 
(1979) 71.

11. For a thorough discussion of the differences between purely 
denotative theories of naming and descriptive theories see Haack 
in B9 to be abbreviated descriptions.


13. Tarski's paper is reprinted in his (1956) 152-278. Tarski himself 
objected to extending his semantic theory of truth beyond its 
formal environment because natural languages are semantically open, 
i.e. one can only discourse about a natural language in a natural 
language (usually the same one) and this will commonly, if not 
invariably, generate intolerable paradoxes: see Tarski (1956) 
164f., 167, 247. These strictures are cheerfully ignored by 
Davidson, et al.; it remains to be seen whether Tarski was right.

15. For discussion see Field (1972/1980) and Davidson (1977/1980). It is far from clear that the notion of reference, and therefore a theory of naming, is not the right place to begin general semantic theory. Despite recent calls for an analysis of reference (Field) and even for dispensing with the notion altogether (Davidson), it is notoriously difficult to do either.

16. For the distinction between objectually and substitutionally interpreted quantifiers, and its significance for semantic theory, see Haack (1978) 39-43.

17. Pace Graesser's suggestion to the contrary: (1977a) 150.

18. E.g. by Furth (1968/1974) and Jantzen (1976), both continuing the theme started by Calogero (1932/1970) 1-62.


20. The immediacy of the self-refutation is our point here: no interpretation of Parmenides known to us avoids the challenge of self-refutation altogether (see further chapter 6).


22. As will appear, his use of particles is especially important in this connexion.

23. Hussey (1972) 81 suggests that Parmenides sees himself to be possessed of a new method of inquiry and sets the poem in its unusual context in order to draw attention to his method. We agree that Parmenides' arguments represent a radically new form of inquiry. All the more do they require authoritative commendation.

24. It is sometimes alleged that Parmenides cannot consistently condemn to unreality the world of sensory experience, and also indulge in cosmology, and that such inconsistency is philosophically unmotivated. Hussey (1972) 98f., following a hint in Aristotle (Met. 986b 27-33 ), suggests that Parmenides kept the truths of reason and the beliefs sponsored by sense-experience in two separate compartments, such that neither bears on the other. But the aim of the poem's main arguments is to show how reality actually exists, by contrast with the beliefs of ordinary men. The aim of the cosmology is to present the beliefs of ordinary men in their most defensible form (see further chapter 2.1.C and chapter 5). Aristotle's claim that Parmenides was forced by experience to entertain the cosmology, is wrong-headed: B7 shows Parmenides aware of and resistant to, the blandishments of sensory experience. We will argue in chapter 5 that the cosmology serves strictly dialectical interests. Its motivation is to explore the
ramifications of Parmenides' approach to language. For discussion of ἐγκώμια at 88.60 see further chapter 5.4.

25. We could go further and insist that informal concepts and arguments necessarily underlie any formal semantic theory which we may generate or adopt: Haack (1978), especially pp. 221-232, is a powerful statement of the dependency of formal logic on informal arguments. But, given the historical position of Parmenides, we need not press these issues here.

26. But neither do we admit that there is nothing to be said in support of its veracity: see below on the Sophist.


28. Among the more creative of such, Sommers (1982) 153-163 is especially important. Chisholm (1981) 9-11, 123-132 has offered an ontology of states of affairs which might be of value in such a development. Neither Sommers nor Chisholm, however, directly support our theory.


31. For defense of Plato's reading of Zeno see, e.g., Furley (1967) 63-78 and Owen (1957-58/1975). Barnes (1979b) is an especially important attack on Parmenides' alleged monism. I agree with Barnes at least that the establishment of monism is not the primary aim of Parmenides' poem. But I find it very difficult not to find monism an immediate implication of 88.12-13, 36-38 (see further chapters four and five below).

32. My presentation follows closely that of Wiggins (1971) 268-84, but without the peculiarities of the Platonic priorities, from which I have tried to abstract.

33. The existence of [p] is perhaps the least well-developed notion in this theory, and the one upon which Parmenides' arguments shed the least light. But it seems to me very doubtful that Parmenides regards [p] as existing in any other sense than that of the existence of , say, middle-sized material objects. Some back-bearing through Plato must be resisted!

34. Wiggins (1971) 278,280, following suggestions in Cratylus on names (388a-c, 422d) and sentences (430e-431b).

35. Compare the tendency noted by Haack (p. 5, above) in modern semantic theories. By contrast, Geach (1982) 93f. must argue that since sentences are not names, and yet do 'point to' something
(when they are true) and away from it (when false), the semantic notions of 'pointing to' and 'pointing away from' must remain unanalyzed.

36. Graeser (1977a) 147, following a suggestion from Muchelmann (1973) 9, draws attention to the transitivity of verbs of saying and thinking. However, it is doubtful that this fact tells us very much until it is construed as part of a sentential semantic theory, and this Graeser does not provide. Wiggins (1971) 276f. suggests that their affinity, in Greek, for constructions with participle- and infinitive-clauses may explain Plato's treatment of such verbs. The comparative data (especially to verbs of seeing and touching) is not available for Parmenides, but perhaps the suggestion can be borrowed nonetheless.

37. For a useful short discussion of the distinction, see Haack (1978) 378-379.

38. Presumably Parmenides was principally concerned with simple declarative sentences, whether affirmative or negative. According to Diogenes Laertius IX. 53-54 Protagoras was the first to distinguish different forms of sentential expressions.

39. Wiggins (1971) 279. At this point our theory may combine elements of speech-act semantics with truth-value semantics, presupposing the compatibility argued by Kempson (see n. 6 above).

40. The negation of 'Socrates is sitting' is 'It is not the case that Socrates is sitting' and it is this sentence which displays [not(Socrates sitting)]. But 'It is not the case that Socrates is sitting' is equivalent to 'It is false that Socrates is sitting' and this sentence is the truth about our false sentence 'Socrates is sitting', when that last sentence is in fact false. [Socrates sitting] must appear in the nominalisation for 'It is not the case that Socrates is sitting' or else the fact that the second sentence negates the first is left unanalysed [ Wiggins (1971) 282 ].

41. Wiggins (1971) 283. Wiggins is quick to exploit this outcome to discredit our theory, and he is surely correct to do so. But might the paradox be more two-edged than he allows? More than one philosopher has suggested that falsehoods are really just nonsense.

42. For the equivalence of τὸ μὴ ἐδώ with τὸ μὴ ἐδώ compare B2.7-8 with B6.1-2 and B8.7 with B8.10.

43. Jantzen (1976) 14f. takes the view that τὸ μὴ ἐδώ cannot even be expressed, a view with which I take issue below.

45. Wiggins (1971) 277. The constructions in B2 with ὅς and δῶς thus prove to be not merely a matter of convenience.

46. Cf. Wittgenstein (1921/1974) 4.122, 6.12 on 'formal' properties. Cf. also the declarations at B1.29, B8.50f.: Parmenides' subject is also called ἄληθέω, which we take in a similar vein (the references to Parmenides' subject at B2.4, B8.17-18 are relevant here, but more indirect). Kahn (1969) 719-720 takes τὸ ἑν to be both a fact and a thing, but on the basis of a treatment of ἕνων which has not found wide acceptance.

47. The phrase is Wiggins': (1971) 284.

48. For this reconstruction of the history of ἕνων see e.g. Owen (1965), (1971), Kahn (1966), Malcolm (1967), Moravcsik (1962), Frede (1967) 12-72. Also, Anscombe, Geach (1973) 22, 90-92 and Geach (1954) 263f. (for Aquinas).


50. The phrase is Davidson's: see his (1977/1980). It is no part of our present task to defend any preference regarding these strategic alternatives.

51. Jantzen (1976) 14-15 (emphasis added). However, elsewhere (p. 15, n.31) Jantzen refers to Russell's explanation of falsehoods by way of 'negative facts', which reference shows sensitivity to the sentential level of the problem of non-being.

52. We will argue in chapter 5.4 that Parmenides' argument in B9 commits him to treating 'not' as a name; but even here the theory preserves the primacy of sentence-meaning and does not lapse into a general semantic atomism.
Chapter Two: Logic, Language and Reality (Bl.28-32, B2).

2.1 Bl.28-32:

The goddess says to the κόσμος 'You must learn everything: both the immovable heart of well-rounded truth and the opinions of mortal men, in which there is no convincing force. But all the same, you will also learn these things: that the things that appear should genuinely exist, being indeed altogether everything.' This translation conceals solutions to a series of problems regarding the text, syntax and images of Bl.28-32. In line 29 are we to read εὐνυξίας or εὐπεπίδος; and in line 32 are we to read περιστροφή τοῦ ἐδώμεθα, and δότα μέ εἰς ἄλλα ᾑτιμα ἃο ἐνεπεμφανίζομαι; What is the significance of the image of the ἄτρεμες ἢτορ of truth? How should the structure provided by the particles ἔδω ... ἔστι ... ἀλλ' ᾑτιμα καὶ influence our view of what is said? Of special importance: what evaluation is given in lines 30-32 of the θεόν ὀνήμα (this last subsuming some further syntactical issues: the reference of τοῦτος, the force of εὐνυξία in line 32, the function of the ἡσ-clause, the tense and force of κόσμον)? Each of these problems will be treated in some detail in what follows. Their solutions will not only serve to defend our translation of Bl.28-32, but also to furnish an interpretation of these lines which will be an important element of our understanding of Parmenides' treatment of τὸ ἔδω in B2 and B6. Moreover, our interpretation of Bl.28-32 will suggest that these lines are programmatic for the whole poem, and that the program is fundamentally an exploitation of a theory about the relation of language to the world.

With our treatment of B2 we will find the theory closer to the surface of the argument and more fully employed.

A. Text and image in Bl.29.

There are two variants on Simplicius' text of Bl.29: ἄτρεμες for ἄτρεμες and εὐπεπίδος for εὐνυξίας. Both ἄτρεμες and εὐνυξίας have important echoes in the treatment of τὸ ἔδω in B8: the first as one of the σήματα in B8.4 (and proved in B8.26-33), the second in the striking simile of the sphere (B8.43). Since τὸ ἔδω is identified with ἀληθεία (B8.5), the re-appearance of ἄτρεμες in B8 seems to us decisively to favor that reading in Bl.29 also. However, B8.43 does not (so strongly support εὐνυξίας there. For one thing, εὐπεπίδος has considerable support in the nearly uniform association of Truth with περιστροφή and ἀληθεία (and their cognates: see Bl.30; B2.4; B8.12, 17, 28, 50f.; but find them contrasted at B8.39). Jameson, especially, has made much of the fact that the form εὐνυξίας is otherwise unknown, the argument of Diels not withstanding. Others have favored εὐνυξίας simply because it is the more difficult reading. In our view, most of the arguments for and against either εὐνυξίας or εὐπεπίδος are indecisive. For example, two of Diels' desiderata (the avoidance of hiatus and links with other parts of the poem) are satisfied by both words. His other main requirement, that Simplicius' relative authority be preserved, begs the question if relied on too heavily. On the other hand, Jameson's objection regarding the form of εὐνυξίας is also weak. Finally, it is not clear that reading εὐπεπίδος rather than εὐνυξίας greatly alters the force of the image of the ἄτρεμες ἢτορ of truth or the general tenor of the whole
line. Accordingly, while we favor εὐθυμίας, on the strength (such as it is) of Simplicius' authority and of the parallel at B8.43, the choice is admittedly a narrow one.

The image of the ἡτοπ is a peculiarly elusive one. Since truth (or 'reality', ἀλήθεια) is Parmenides' subject (B8.50-51), we might regard the genitive in B1.29 as an appositive or explicative genitive: the motionless heart/core/kernel just in the truth (e.g. the collection of all true statements). Alternatively, the ἡτοπ of truth is some essential core of truth, or some particular truth which is a kernel of all truth, as, e.g. that truth itself is unchanging (ἀτρομητος). It is difficult to make more precise the signification of the image without going far beyond its immediate context. But so much seems clear: the ἥνοικος is to learn something about the nature of truth (or at least, some property of truth). We will have something further to say on this below (section C). He is also to learn something about the ἄστυν ἄθροι, and this brings us to more important textual and syntactical problems.

B. Text and syntax in B1.32.

Our translation contains an apparent contradiction: no reliable truth can be found in the ἄστυν ἄθροι, according to line 50b. But our rendering of the ὥς-clause in lines 31-32 suggests that the things which mortal men believe have some kind of reality. Accordingly, the beliefs of mortal men should (some of them) be true. We will argue in this and succeeding sections that the contradiction is only apparent, but the argument will be long and complex. We begin with some syntactical considerations.

Δοκίμως should be taken to modify εἶπω, the best alternative being for it to modify χρήν. But this latter is very unwieldy, and on such a construe Δοκίμως becomes superfluous, given the modal force of χρήν (on which see further below). It is not a good objection to this construe that the verb εἶπω is probably used existentially. The best argument is to make a more precise signification of the image without going very far beyond its immediate context. But so much seems clear: the ἥνοικος is to learn something about the nature of truth (or at least, some property of truth). We will have something further to say on this below (section C). He is also to learn something about the ἄστυν ἄθροι, and this brings us to more important textual and syntactical problems.

The internal structure of the ὥς-clause thus divides into two units of thought. The first is that τα δοκοῦντα χρήν δοκίμως εἶπα; the second that τα δοκοῦντα δοκίμως εἶπα (or περίπετα). On our view of it, the second unit of thought is offered to explain the first, δοκοῦντα being an ordinary circumstantial participle. As we will show below, the external syntax of the ὥς-clause fulfills a similar
epexegetical function. However, before we can advance to the argument on this point, there are two issues internal to the ἰδων- clause to consider further: the meaning of ὅρῳς and whether to read περὶ δύνα or ἥρωντα at line 32. We have already indicated our views of these matters, but have not provided any argument in their support.

A great deal has been said about the etymology of ὅρῳς. A plausible case has been advanced for taking ὅρῳς to belong to the family of ἰδωνα and on these grounds to mean 'acceptable'. I would like here to enter a series of cautionary notices respecting this suggestion. The first mistake is to take etymology as a sure guide to Parmenides' meaning. For example, Mourelatos quotes J.L. Austin in support of drawing on the etymology of the ὅρῳ- cluster of words to interpret philosophical texts in which those words appear. But Austin is too shrewd for this: continuing the quotation which Mourelatos gives, we read:

Examine such a word [like 'caused'] historically, we may well find that it has been extended to cases that have by now too tenuous a relation to the model case, that it [the model] is a source of confusion and superstition. ... It must be remembered that there is no necessity whatsoever that the various models used should all fit together neatly as parts into one single, total model or scheme of, for instance, the doing of actions. It is possible, and indeed highly likely, that our assortment of models will include some or many, that are overlapping, conflicting, or more generally simply disparate.

Austin knows well that meaning is use, in context, and that while use is seldom wholly unconnected with history of use, etymology is of very little value in the hermeneutical task. Proof of the tyranny of etymology, and of both of the points made by Austin, follows, for the ὅρῳ- cluster stubbornly refuses to be confined to Mourelatos' (and Jantzen's) sense of 'acceptable/acceptance'.

Among the expressions cited by Mourelatos himself, three are particularly apt to escape his interpretation. Thus, τὸ ὅρῳν can mean a decree, and while a decree is what has been accepted by the relevant body that issued it, decrees are meant to be binding on those to whom they are promulgated. Similarly, ὃ ὅρῳντες εἶναι τοῖς have an unshakable (though false) confidence in their own superiority, and once again the key term slips away from the nuance of 'acceptable' or 'acceptance'. Finally, those ὃ ὅρῳμενοι ἀνακατεφάναν are convicted of homicide as the result of testimony and examination, a result which is too strong for the palpable notion of acceptance. In all these cases, the ὅρῳ- cluster carries much stronger connotations than mere acceptance.

This is immediately relevant to the uses of ὅρῳς / ὅρῳς which most closely parallel our text.

The two most frequently cited texts parallel to Parmenides B1.32 are from Aeschylus and Xenophon. At Persae 547 the Chorus says: κἂν ὃ ὅρῳν τὰν ὅρῳμενον αὐτῷ ὅρῳς πολυτεκῆ χάριν ὅρῳς is ambiguously placed and may be taken either with the verb or the adjective. Preferring to take it with the adjective, we translate: 'And I too lament the truly grievous fate of those who have gone.' Here ὅρῳς almost certainly demands the sense of 'genuinely' or 'truly', emphasizing the lamentableness of the ὅρῳν τῶν ὅρῳμενον. Senses like 'acceptable', 'seemly' or even 'apparent' are either too weak to secure the identity in suffering to which the Chorus lays claim,
or they only serve to mock the grief of the women. If δοκιμως goes with the verb, then still the context demands that it support the Chorus' identification with the women in their grief and the stronger sense is required. At Persae 87-88 Aeschylus uses the adjective δοκιμως in a similar fashion: δοκιμως δ ουτως υποτας μεγαλη δεμητρι φατων ξηρωτες ξοκουν εξηγεων διαχω όμως χαλασας. Siddewick's translation is excellent: 'There is no man skilled (enough) to withstand the mighty stream of men, and with strong barriers keep out the sea's invincible surge'. The images of a mighty torrent of men and the irresistible sea are carefully drawn to emphasize the power of the Persian army. They lose their force considerably if δοκιμως means anything less than 'proven skill or testedness'. Here is a test even a δοκιμως cannot withstand.

In the Cyropaedia (I.6.7), Xenophon records Cyrus saying that a man should take pains δις δυ αυτως τε καλες καγαθας δοκιμως γενουτο καλ. ταπεινεια αυτως τε καλ δι εικατε ικανις εξουει, 'that he himself become genuinely good and honourable, and that both he and his dependents should have plenty of the necessities of life'. The force of τε καλες καγαθας δοκιμως γενουτο is lost unless δοκιμως has its strongest sense. Cyrus' point is that the only ικανις εχουον for a man is to become genuinely good and honourable; anything less is reprehensible. There is also a correspondence here between the acquisition of sufficient life-essentials and becoming good and honourable, the correspondence signaled by the echo of δοκιμως γενουτο with ικανις εχουει. Since the former must be an actual acquisition, so also is the becoming likely to be genuine and not merely 'apparent'. Moreover, abundance of επανεπιστευτα will respond most successfully to a vigorous and not merely an 'acceptable' becoming good and honourable.

Further support for our interpretation of the meaning of δοκιμως comes from two other texts. In his Pax 1029-1031, Aristophanes asks this: τι δ' ει δι φρονεις δεκα χρησι άστυ τεν γε συρη δοκιμως ηρευνη τε τελεω ι, 'And what, are you not as wise as is needful for one who is proven for a clever mind, and a resourceful courage?'. Here the estee in which the cunning man is held must have more backing it than mere appearance in order for the irony to have any bite. Pindar, in Nem. 3.11, speaks of his ode as a δοκιμως δίψην, which, in view of the authority that Pindar habitually claims for his poetry, and the confidence he has in his ability to translate adequately to men the inspiration of the Muses, can mean 'an acceptable' song' only as a result of, or in the face of, rigorous testing against the highest standards. In all of these contexts, it is clear that δοκιμως/δοκιμως requires a far stronger connotation than Mourelatos (or Jantzen) has allowed for.

Were additional evidence needed, we could do worse than to appeal to Democritus: δοκιμως ανη καλ δοκιμως ουκ ει δι προνοης μενον, αλλα καλ ει δι θυμωναν. (868: 'A man is known to be genuine or false not merely by what he does, but also by what he intends') and: μη παινω, αλλα τος δοκιμως εκπαινευει τι ζεν ευτυχς, τι δε συμφωνευντος (867: 'Do not trust everyone, but only him who is true; to do the first is foolish, but the second is the act of a wise man'). In the first fragment, two tests of character are conjoined, what a man does having added to it what a man wills. Only the man who passes both tests is considered δοκιμως, 'accepted by test' or 'proven'. In the second
To escape the contradiction Diels offered an attractive emendation, reading δοκεῖσθαι as the elided form of δοκεῖσθαι, the aorist infinitive of δοκεῖ. Coupling this suggestion with the reading of τέρμοντα, Burnet translated the couplet with: 'how passing right through all things one should judge the things that seem to be'. But Diels' emendation creates more problems than it solves. It introduces an elision which is itself nearly unparalleled, for a verb which is itself rare. It forces us to read χρήν as a present tense, which is against normal usage and against a pattern of use of past tenses in Parmenides (see below). To make sense of δοκεῖσθαι εἶναι we have to read περὶ των which is probably not the best text (see below). For all these reasons, the emendation should be rejected. The alternative is to retain the MSS reading, δοκεῖσθαι εἶναι, and with it the meaning we have given for the adverb δοκεῖ: τὰ δοκεύοντα 'genuinely exist'. It will be equally unpalatable to suggest that the ὅς-clause only admits for τὰ δοκεύοντα some less-than-full degree of reality (in the spirit, e.g. of Wilmott's 'probable truth'). For Parmenides reaches a κρύος, at B8.11,15-18, that rules out such half-way houses: the only choice is to ἔχων τελεῖν ... ἢ ὁμίλημα. But provide a way out we must, if Parmenides' project is to get off the ground. Treatment of the remaining textual and syntactical puzzles of the ὅς-clause in B1.31-32 will help to solve the problem.

In recent years there has grown up nearly a consensus to read τέρμοντα at B1.32. Only one of Simplicius' MSS (and it is given to errors) gives περὶ των, all others agreeing on τέρμοντα. This cannot be a decisive consideration, since Simplicius himself may have read a defective manuscript. Nevertheless, he remains our only authority for
this line, and we must give considerable weight to his testimony. On
the other hand, the recently formed consensus faces a prima facie
objection to the form of ἓντα, it being standard epic practice to write
instead ἐντα. 26 It is true that ἓν appears at B8.57, also in the role
of a circumstantial participle, but this text itself is uncertain and
thus insecure ground for reading ἓντα at B1.32. However, we should note
that even if Parmenides did write ἓντα at B1.32, εἰ probably conceals
an established contraction: "In Ionian texts εἰ, εἴ, εἴ, εἰ, εἴ, εἰ represent elements in speech were normally pronounced in one
syllable." 27 On this view, the line's meter will be appropriate whether
we read ἓντα or ἓντα. Such a feature of Parmenides' language and
metric may have been responsible, at an early stage, for the appearance
in the textual tradition of both ἓν ἓντα and ἓντα. It seems to us,
then, very likely that if Parmenides did not write ἓντα he probably
wrote τὸ ἓντα.

Respecting the alternative, ἓντα, Mourelatos objected that it
must mean 'passing through (everything) and going beyond' and that this
makes no sense, whether as a predicate of τὸ ἓντα or, or as an
explanation of ἓντα (existential). 28 In a similar vein,
Heitarch complains that if τὸ ἓντα interpenetrate 'everything'
(πᾶν), it is not clear what constitutes this πᾶν. 29 The first of
these criticisms can be met, for Parmenides need only be using the verb
ἐντα to concentrate on the aspect of penetration (as with the initial
penetration of an edged or pointed weapon: see LSJ, s.v. ἐντα, II).
On this showing, however, τὸ ἓντα pervade everything everywhere and
this leaves us with the second criticism. After all, if 'the things
that appear' are to be found everywhere, how is it that there is
anything else (the 'everything' they are supposed to pervade) left over?
To avoid any difficulty we notice that ὅλα παντὸς means either
'continually' or 'altogether'. 30 In either case, the phrase ὅλα παντὸς
πᾶντα ἐντα has the force of 'exhausting everything'. As will appear,
this sense is equivalent to the sense we give to the same phrase with περὶ
τοῦ. Accordingly, although we agree to read περὶ τοῦ at B1.32, it does
not now seem to us to greatly alter the meaning of the line if it is
read with περὶ τοῦ.

In the half-line ὅλα παντὸς πᾶντα περὶ τοῦ (or ἓντα), we take the
participle to be a circumstantial participle of manner (= 'by being'),
as it is also at B8.57. 31 Its function is explaining ἓντα, which, by virtue of ἄλλοι ἐντος καί and its apparent conflict with line
30, certainly stands in need of explanation. The half-line is further
colored by the combination ὅλα παντὸς and περὶ, the former probably
meaning 'altogether' (see n.30 above), and the latter being intensive. 32
They give the participle-phrase an exhaustive force: 'being indeed
altogether everything'. The point is that τὸ ἓντα ἐντα exhaust and not
merely pervade the totality of things for those who believe in them'. 33
This gives us the explanation for ἓντα: τὸ ἓντα (whether as 'the things that appear' or as 'what is open', what common sense
affirms to exist) 'assuredly exist' in so far as they appear to exhaust
reality. Whose judgement this could represent, and resolution of the
apparent contradiction with line 30, will follow from treatment of our
final syntactical puzzle, the function of the ἓν-clause in the whole
context of B1.28-32.

We may approach this problem by recalling the general structure of
B1.28-32, a structure determined by the particles ἡδὲ ... ἢδὲ ... ἄλλα.
our other particles intervene, insisting that despite these facts about the *brotev ðèxas*, the *kópros* will *tësta* *màthosu*. Kranz argued correctly that *tësta* refers most naturally back to the ðèxas of the preceding line.35 The alternative is for *tësta* to introduce an entirely fresh subject for the *kópros* to learn, a subject coordinate with ðèxas. But then the contrast marked by ἀλλ’ ἔμπνευς καὶ becomes intolerable. Moreover, the concessive force of ἀλλ’ ἔμπνευς καὶ requires that the ðèxas still be in view, only now something is to be said about them, something which is in despite of the claim in line 30b. Accordingly, the clause must be epekegetical, as Owen has argued (see n. 34), explaining what it is that the *kópros* is to learn about the ðèxas.36 What he learns is that τὰ ðoxónta, the deliverances of the senses, as subjects of the beliefs of common sense, do assuredly exist (in the view of the mortals), exhausting as they do the whole of reality.37 There is nothing else than that to which the senses testify, and these ðoxónta are experienced as certainties. (By extension, as B8.34-42 makes clear, the *brotev* believe whole-heartedly, though mistakenly, in the reality of the changes that sense experience seems to affirm, viz. coming-to-be, passing away, local motion, and qualitative change.) The ðè-clause thus gives the general content of the ðèxas together with the claim (by the *brotev*) that they are true.38 In later fragments, Parmenides will impugn the reliance of ordinary men on sense experience precisely because of the dubiousness of the claim to their truth or reality (see further chapter 3.3 on B7).

On this view of the ðè-clause, the judgement that τὰ ðoxónta ... ðoxímas σὲνα is not principally the judgement of the goddess, but rather of the *brotev* themselves.39 Only in their eyes do the things
that appear truly exist, only to them do the deliverances of sense experience seem genuinely real.\textsuperscript{40} It is difficult to see quite how else to hold together the claim of line 30b (τὰς οὐν ἐννιάκας ἀλήθείς) and the claim of line 32 (δοξάως εἶναι). It may be objected that Parmenides gives no explicit recognition that δοξάως εἶναι is a judgement of the mortals. However, two minor nuances of Parmenides' language in line 32 do serve to suggest something of what we need. The first is just the hint, in δοξάως itself, that whatever is δόξα has been or could be subjected to some test, satisfaction of which proves its genuineness. The suggestion is that τὰ δόξανtau satisfy some test of reality at the bar of common sense. Since the goddess rejects them as false, it cannot be she who tests them and finds them real. It must be the mortals whose tests they satisfy. The second nuance of language which serves to insinuate the perspective of the mortals is the use of the verb χρῆν in line 32.

The correct interpretation of χρῆν was given by Reinhardt: '...χρῆν heisst "musste" und drückt eine Notwendigkeit in der Vergangenheit aus'.\textsuperscript{41} Something impelled or required the mortals to hold τὰ δόξαντα to exist δοξάως. [The past tense is explicable on two grounds: first, every time the goddess refers to the assertion of mortals' beliefs it is with a past tense of the relevant verb (B8.38-39, 33 and B19.3 with κατέστη, and with ἔκρυντο ... έστη at B8.55); second, this is either because these aorists set these assertions in the time before the goddess' speech, or because analysis is here cast in terms of conscious past decisions.\textsuperscript{42}] What can justify this sense of compulsion?

It has been argued that the necessity signified by χρῆν reflects 'adaptation, adjustment or accommodation to the requirements of a given context'.\textsuperscript{43} This helps us some for it suggests that the necessity for τὰ δόξαντα to exist δοξάως stems from the basic circumstances of the mortals; that is, τὰ δόξανται had to exist genuinely for the mortals, and not necessarily in any absolute sense. The firmness with which the mortals believe in their reality is a function of their epistemic circumstances. But of course it is the perorative of the goddess to discover and to point out that mortals, due to their circumstances, 'properly' take τὰ δόξαντα to assuredly exist. The force of χρῆν, then, is complex: it represents the point at which the judgement of the goddess encompasses the circumstances of the mortals.\textsuperscript{44} With it, the goddess acknowledges the fact that mortals cannot be expected to believe otherwise than they do so long as their circumstances remain fundamentally unaltered. This is a remark appropriately made to the κόρος who has been brought 'beyond all human ken' (ἀπ᾿ ἀνθρώπων ἐκτὸς τοῦ ἑστού) to hear the divine ἔτος. Moreover, the κόρος will have his epistemic situation permanently altered by the arguments he is about to hear. The goddess delivers to him a single ἔτος, albeit one which is a highly complex, structured whole (a λόγον, as she will call it in B8.50).\textsuperscript{45} The main aim of this ἔτος is to get the κόρος to attend (cf. B2.1, B7.5-6) to the arguments which make it up. Acquisition of the insights which they afford is intended to work a permanent change in the κόρος. He will ever after be inured to the appeal of the ἐρωτάω γνῶμη (B8.60-61). He will have made his permanent possession that point of view which he has been invited to share, viz. the goddess'. At the same time the acquisition of this point of view is a repeatable experience in so far as it rests on the argument of the goddess and these can be
indefinitely rehearsed. The mortals enjoy no such privileges and must limp along as best they can.

C. B1.28-32 and Parmenides' philosophical project.

It may seem now that Parmenides has, in B1.28-32, introduced two distinct subjects for philosophical reflection, namely the nature of truth and the nature of opinion, ἀλήθεια and ἀλήθη. Further, it will seem that ἀλήθη is of interest to him principally because of its falsity (despite the confidence the ἀρνοῦσ place in its truth). At B8.30-32 Parmenides reinforces these impressions: there ends his account of reliable truth and there begins his account of base opinion. It is customary, accordingly, to divide the poem into two parts or movements: the Way of Truth (borrowing the language of B2) and the Way of Seeming or Opinion. It is certain that Parmenides' poem treats truth and opinion as two radically opposed alternatives. Indeed, in many respects the arguments of Parmenides are designed to force the choice between just these two, and to rule out any further alternatives. However, it is possible to make this division of the poem too sharp, both in literary terms and philosophically. If the dichotomy is pressed too hard it will be difficult to grasp the point of re-introducing the ἀλήθη at B8.34-41 (as indeed, their being in view in B6 and B7 also), and of re-introducing truth in B8.53-61 and B9 (on which see further chapter 5.4). Even on literary considerations, the poem does not fall neatly into two distinct parts. That far, Parmenides suggests that Truth and Opinion are both parts of a single project.

On our view of it, B1.28-32 also suggests that the aim of Parmenides' poem is to treat both ἀλήθεια and ἀλήθη, Truth (or reality) and (representative) Falsehood, from a single point of view, namely that of the goddess. Her ἡθὸς is to introduce the ἄθος to both of these things in such fashion that he will grasp firmly the differences between them. Later, the goddess will go so far as to say that her treatment of ἀλήθη will prevent the ἄθος from ever again being taken in by any mere opinions (B8.60-61). The arguments of the goddess, then, are to give insight into both the nature of truth and the nature of falsehood. It is 'in the gift' of the goddess alone to enable the ἄθος to share her point of view. He is to occupy her vantage point, one from which it is possible to know at once the ἄθος ἄθος of truth, the falsity of the opinions of mortals, and also that the mortals cannot help being ensnared in a web of falsehoods. The closing lines of B1, then, go far to desiderate the discovery of this point of view which will secure the philosophical unity of the poem. It is true that B1.28-32 does not itself make clear where we are to seek for this unifying point of view, but a natural candidate is not far to seek.

The goddess, the ἄθος and the ἀρνοῦσ all have at least one thing in common: they all use language to give expression to their judgements about the world. There are no truths to make up the Way of Truth, and there are no opinions to make up the Way of Seeming, without statements. It would therefore be natural for Parmenides to use a view of the relation of language to the world as the foundation of his treatment of Truth and Opinion. Exploitation of a view (or theory) of the relation of language to reality could go to show what is truth (i.e. what range or kinds of beliefs and statements can be true) and what makes them
true. It could also show what is falsehood by showing what range (or kinds) of beliefs and discourse are false and why they must be so. Moreover, in coming to adopt such a semantic theory, we will come to understand why those who lack it also lack the insight it provides into both truth and falsehood. It is not possible to show that B1.28-32 requires such a view of Parmenides' project. But these lines do invite the suggestion that the arguments comprising the rest of the goddess' speech rest on a semantic theory.\textsuperscript{46} We will argue below that in B2 we find arguments which already give evidence of resting on the semantic theory outlined in chapter one above.

2.2 Logic and Language in B2:

The text of B2 is not in any serious doubt, but the fragment teems with syntactical puzzles. On their solution depends our understanding of the argument Parmenides advances, and its philosophical significance. Accordingly, the following translation only serves to introduce the problem which will be treated in the succeeding sections. The goddess addresses the θυγάτηρ with an admonition which quickly turns into an argument:

So come then and I will tell you, and do you pay heed to the account you hear. There are only two ways of inquiry to consider: the one comprising 'that (it) exists' and 'that not to exist is not possible'—this is a persuasive path, for it accompanies truth; the other comprising 'that (it) does not exist' and 'that not to exist is necessary'. I tell you this latter path is a route from which no tidings come, for you can neither know 'what does not exist' nor can you express it, for it cannot be compassed about.

With this fragment Parmenides begins the explicit argumentation that constitutes the philosophical work of his poem. It will be our task now both to defend this translation of B2 and to illuminate the argument. We begin with considerations on its literary structure and its imagery.

A. Structure and image in B2:

The principal guide to the structure of the argument in B2 is the use Parmenides makes of various particles. In B2.7 γε is emphatic and limitative, as it is in e.g. Euripides, Ion 414 (δ' ήμες τ' γε ἔσω, τ' ἐσω δ' αύλος μετέλει) and often. Where the word to be emphasized is preceded by an article, as here, γε normally follows the article and precedes that word.\textsuperscript{47} Accordingly, the emphasis here is on (μη) ἐν. But the limitative force of γε also secures another point. Its usage acknowledges that τ' ἐν can be thought and spoken about, by contrast with τ' μη ἐν which cannot. The same point is put explicitly at B6.1: χρὴ τ' λέγειν τ' νοεῖν τ' ἐν ēmuval. The pair ἐν τοι, though commonly found together, have little cohesion: 'τοῖς brings the point home to the person addressed, while the other particle retains its normal force.\textsuperscript{48} In B2.6 ἐν probably has its customary intensive force, showing that the path which is being considered is absolutely and utterly ἐναντιοῦμαι, redoubling the emphasis given with τοῖς. The color of τοῖς echoes the emphatic command in line 1: είλε τ' Ðνα ... ἐνυμα, κυριακῶν, κτλ. , and also reflects the emphatic (and exhaustive) force of
πέρ in αὐτόν (line 2). All these devices of emphasis serve to mark out the message of B2 as the very pons asinorum of Parmenides' argument. Without this we cannot hope to proceed.

The double οὖτε in lines 7-8 are corresponsive, and thus serve to bring the two optatives (γνώσις/φόρμας) into co-ordination, each applying equally to τὸ ἐδώ. This reduces οὐ γὰρ ἀνωτέρω to the status of a parenthetical remark, as befits the clearly subordinate function given it by γὰρ. The phrase is given to support the claim that one cannot know τὸ μὴ ἐδώ. The balance struck by οὖτε...οὖτε requires that ἀνωτέρω be taken with both γνώσις and φόρμας: it is each of these tasks which is not ἀνωτέρω, i.e. is 'impracticable'. The structure of lines 7-8, then, suggests that Parmenides disregards any distinction between knowing that p and asserting that p. This is appropriate if he here focusses on the semantic character of τὸ ἐδώ and τὸ μὴ ἐδώ, for beliefs and statements are alike propositional in character. τὸ ἐδώ is what makes them true; by contrast, τὸ μὴ ἐδώ is just nothing with respect to the power of thought and language to grasp reality. With this Parmenides advances an argument against the second way that is of great importance: to it we will return below.

The construction with μὲν...δὲ serves several purposes at once. They coordinate the descriptions of the two ways given in lines 3 and 5, and also the evaluations of these ways advanced in lines 4 and 6 (together with their attendant supporting arguments: 4b and 7-8). The net effect is to re-inforce the claim in line 2: there are two ways and two ways only to be considered.

The structure of B2 then looks like this: (a) introduction of the subject: a catalogue of the ways of discourse or inquiry that need to be considered (lines 1-2).
(b) announcement of the first way (line 3): the way of 'exists' and of 'non-existence is impossible'.
(c) i: evaluation of the first way, and
   ii: an argument to support this evaluation (line 4): it is the way of persuasion, for truth is its companion.
(d) announcement of the second way (line 5): the way of 'not-exists' and for which (or on which) non-existence is necessary.
(e) evaluation of the second way (line 6): this is a way from which no tidings come.
(f) argument to support this evaluation (lines 7-8): τὸ μὴ ἐδώ can neither be thought of nor expressed (οὖτε φόρμας) since it cannot be compassed about.

This severely architectonic argumentation, achieved by deft touches with connectives and particles, is entirely typical of Parmenides. It combines the sense of solidity which one expects of a foundational part of his thesis, with the dynamism which one expects of narrative and direct speech. The use of particles μὲν...δὲ, οὖτε...οὖτε and repeated γὰρ not only serves to strike balances in thought, but serves to carry the reader from one thought to the next. Limitativeyε is even serves to reach beyond this context altogether, pointing ahead to the treatment of τὸ ἐδώ in B4, B6 and B8.

There can be little doubt that B2 is meant to be a touchstone: it lays down a test for any candidate as αὖτε ἄλλος ἄλλος... When we meet the 'way' of 'exists' and 'does not exist' in B6, we will expect that it be
subjected to such a test. (In fact, we will be shown that the way of 'exists' and 'does not exist' has no independent validity, and is thus not a genuine rival of the other two ways, precisely because it delivers us straight to the κανακευόμενον ἀναπτυχόν of B2.5-8.) The test is represented in B8.11, 15-18 as a κρύσος: only positive, unqualified existentials can be allowed; and any attempt to secure qualified existence for a thing only serves to introduce τὸ μὴ ᾖ ὅν in another guise. One of Parmenides' central interests in his poem is to perform this test on the ὅπερ ὅν ὅνα.

The image of a way, a path or a road, occurs 13 or 14 times in Parmenides' poem, and there is little doubt that it is one of the most potent of his images.52 Doubtless this usage reflects a well-worn literary convention, chiefly epic.53 However, even if we find all the uses in Parmenides to stem from a single literary paradigm, we must be careful not to deduce the philosophical import of each use from this fact. The ὅπερ in B1, for example, should be interpreted principally in the light of its own literary genre (e.g. as one element in a κατάδεικνυός). This caveat not withstanding, the philological background gives some help to understanding Parmenides' thought.

The image of the ὅπερ / κανακευόμενον has the sense of a goal-directed journeying, the 'course' of a journey rather than a static, pre-determined 'footpath'.54 Thus, in the poetic tradition, a ὅπερ is a common image for a course of behavior (Hesiod, Erga 216, 288) or life which leads to some goal. Pindar uses it for the road to truth (Pyth. 3.103ff.), the path to wisdom (Paean 7b.3-6) and prosperity (Ol. 8.13-14). In this fashion the 'way' is closely associated with its goals.55 Perhaps starting from the notion of a path of words which leads to knowledge or insight, the image comes to be used by Herodotus for an 'account' (1.95) or even an 'opinion' (II.20).56

Mourelatos argued that ὅπερ means 'quest', fitting it in with the meaning of ὅπερ κανακευόμενον.57 Certainly the word has a use very close to our 'inquiry', implying as it does a directed search for the truth of a matter.58 ἀναπτυχός, then, is not the goal of the 'way' but is in apposition to it (as the parallelism of lines 3-8 suggests): it indicates the characteristic activity which constitutes the 'way' (just as Pindar's singing constitutes the ὅπερ of his songs). This is one reason why the first ὅπερ 'accompanies' (ἀκολουθεί) truth, and is a persuasive path. It is the business of inquiry to produce truths, and these will be cast in statements, the contents of which are proper objects of thought and expression. This proposition-producing character of 'inquiry' explains why Parmenides resorts, at lines 7-8, to the language of both thought and speech (ὃς... φθόγγος).59 Believing and asserting are two ways of entertaining propositions, and not significantly different from each other with respect to the semantic properties of the propositions thus entertained. It is the characteristic activity of the first way, then, to deliver statements (whether uttered or thought or both) about reality. The general form of these is given in line 3a (ἕν ὅπερ ἐτύλε), a point to which we return below. By contrast with the first way, the second is said to be a κανακευόμενον... ἄπαθεν, 'a track from which no tidings ever come', and ἀναπτυχός, what cannot be achieved.60 This is a highly paradoxical result: a road which leads nowhere, to a place which cannot be reached or described, which vanished from our questing ken even as we set out on it. Parmenides furnishes us two clues for understanding this highly
paradoxical statement. The first is another aspect of 'inquiry': inquiry can take the general form of affirmations of states of affairs (ὅσις ἐστὶ), but it can also take the general form of their denial (οὐκ ἐστὶν), and it is this aspect of inquiry which characterizes the second way. The second clue is given in line 7, with the introduction of τοῦ μὴ ἐνυ, which must now seem to be the 'object' answering to that form of inquiry which constitutes the second way. We will consider these points further in section C below. But now a series of syntactical issues require attention.

B. Syntactical issues in B2:

The first syntactical puzzle in B2 is ἐστιν νόηνα in line 2. There are three ways to construe it: 61

(a) ἐστιν may be potential ('it is possible') with νόης as complement, yielding: 'which ways of inquiry only can be conceived'.

(b) νόης as datival to ἐστιν: 'the only ways of inquiry that exist for thinking'. 62

(c) νόης as final to ἐστιν, supplying 'one' or 'you' as a subject and τὸ ἢ κρημα as object: 'which ways alone there are for you to think about anything'. 63

The three grammatical alternatives give rise to three different ways of understanding the point of B2.2: (a) only two ways of inquiry are relevant to Parmenides' concerns (allowing that there may exist or be alleged to exist other ways of inquiry); (b) there are only two ways to think; (c) there are only two ways for us to think about any existing thing. The second two ways of taking B2.2 are plainly very similar, while the first is quite a different way of taking the restriction implied by μοναδικὸν νόημα ...

The third construe of B2.2 can be eliminated on two general considerations. The first is that it is an unnecessarily complicated way of producing what is logically equivalent to the second construe. 64 More importantly, it offends against the rest of Parmenides' claims about the second ὅσις. For on this account of B2.2, Parmenides' main interest in both of the ὅσις is in the nature of thought (or 'inquiry', conceived of as thought). But if this is so, and the nature of thinking does not change from one ὅσις to the other, it is very odd of Parmenides to describe the first way as a πειθός κέλευσθαι and the second way (in line 6) as a τοῦτον ἀπαρατίκον. This contrast makes little sense if the two ways have δύος in common and Parmenides' chief interest is in exploring the properties of thought. Also, at B8.17 Parmenides describes the second way as ἀνάπον, which is also rather odd if ἐστιν νόης refers to the activity constitutive of that way (but B8.17 is admittedly tricky, see further below). By contrast, the contrast of the two ways makes perfectly good sense if his interest is in exploring the properties of the deliveries of thought. 65 Mutatis mutandis, this last consideration counts also against the second construe mentioned above. It seems unlikely that Parmenides can be exclusively concerned with exploring the nature of thinking. Moreover, lines 7-8 require that δύος include not only thought but also language (or 'assertion', ἐφασμένος). The common denominator, then, is statements (or propositions), i.e. the deliveries of inquiry, and not the process of thinking. 66
We are left, then, with the first construe of εἰς τὸν ἀοράτον: there are only two ways of inquiry that need to be considered. Kahn objected to this solution because of ἀοράτον at B8.17. But on this showing the second way is also ἄνωθεν, and Parmenides cannot consistently even mention it at B2.5-8. This is only an apparent contradiction, occasioned by the narrative character of the poem: once the criticism of the second way in B2.5-8 (and B6) has been mounted, that way is closed to the μνήμον. It is ἀοράτον ἄνωθεν with respect to taking that route, but not with respect to mentioning it, the distinction of mention from use having escaped Kahn. It may further be objected that our construe of νοεῖν gives the infinitive passive force, while Parmenides wrote an aorist active. But here the infinitive is limiting the meaning of an adjective (νοεῖν) and where this is so, active infinitives often require Englishing as passives. Our construe is thus consistent with the syntax of B2.2. It is likewise consistent with the deep meaning of νοεῖν, as we will now show.

Investigators of νοεῖν have given its meaning as 'penetrating into the real nature of an appearance, perceiving that an object is a specific thing', as 'obtaining a clear conception of a thing', and as 'to realize or to understand a situation'. Of special interest to us are von Fritz's observations that νοεῖν in Homer (Parmenides' linguistic paradigm) never means 'to reason', and that the aorist of the verb has special proclivities for situations surrounded by violent emotion, and for uses meaning 'to attend' or 'to consider'. These interpretations of νοεῖν suit very well two of the general characteristics of B2: first, its urgency. Here is a logical situation to be understood, and understanding it is vital to everything which follows; and second, the repeated attempts, in the modalities of lines 3 and 5, and the expositions and arguments of lines 4,5-6 to give us this vital insight. In this way, our understanding (our νοεῖν) is directed towards grasping not only what two ways there are, but what there is about them that accounts for them only being two worth considering. This latter topic will concern us further in section C below.

There is, finally, a point of logic which our construe of εἰς τὸν ἀοράτον preserves, but which the other construes obscure. The first way says not only 'that (it) exists' but also 'that not to exist is impossible'; and the second way says not only 'that (it) does not exist' but also 'that not to exist is necessary'. Now these two ways are opposed to each other not as contradistinctions, but as contraries: both cannot be true together, but both can be denied together, as with 'it may exist and it may not exist'. In strict logic, then, there is a third alternative to the two which Parmenides insists in B2 are the only ones to consider. Moreover, in B6 Parmenides presents the 'way of mortals' precisely as the way of 'possibly it exists and possibly it does not exist'. So the third way is actually entertained by Parmenides. Now, if by εἰς τὸν ἀοράτον Parmenides means what our second two construes take him to mean, then he has presented the two ways as mutually exclusive and exhaustive alternatives. But, on our construe, he has only claimed that there are only two ways that need to be considered. This is consistent with there being a third (putative) way of inquiry, namely the way of mortals treated in B6. Moreover, it is compatible with what we will later show to be the point of B6: that '...any admixture of ὅν ἑν (any statement of the form ὅν ἑν λέει, is as ruinous as taking the first wrong path [of B2.5] at once'.
so, our construe of ἐκαὶ νοησαῖ is compatible with the literary, lexical, and logical features of B2, where the other two construes are not.

Before pressing on to an account of the philosophical significance of B2, two further syntactical issues call for solution: the force of δῶς in B2.3.5 and the subject(s) of ἐστὶν and ὁδὸ ἐστὶν in the same lines.

It has been argued that, in the use of δῶς and ὡς in lines 3 and 5, we have a clue to the precise force of ἐστὶν and ὁδὸ ἐστὶν. If δῶς and ὡς are adverbs of manner, rather than conjunctions, then ἐστὶν is more likely to carry its incomplete (predicative or identifying) sense than its complete (existential) sense. On this showing, runs the argument, what is said about the two ways in B2 is a comment on the nature of predication: only positive predications are meaningful. Now this is a substantive view and one which promises a philosophically rich interpretation of Parmenides' project; but it faces considerable difficulties. In the first place, the argument involves a logical difficulty: it does not follow from any construe of ὡς or δῶς that ἐστὶν is used here in an incomplete rather than in a complete sense. Indeed, either use of ἐκαὶ is compatible with either a conjunctive or an adversial use of ὡς and δῶς. Moreover, if δῶς ἐστὶν (B2.3a) and ὡς ὁδὸ ἐστὶν (B2.5a) are really concealed predications, then not only has Parmenides left it to his readers to supply the subject(s) of ἐστὶν, but also the complement(s). This only serves to compound the difficulties of interpreting the argument of B2, creating more problems than it solves.

There are undoubted uses of each of δῶς and ὡς as adverbs elsewhere in Parmenides' poem: ὡς in B16.1 (coordinated with τὰς in line 3), and δῶς in B8.47. However, elsewhere these terms introduce the arguments used to establish or support some conclusion which has already been given or is being reported. In these cases, δῶς and ὡς are either not adversial at all, or subordinate their adversial color to their assertoric functions. In B1.31 (ὡς) and B8.3 (ὡς), 11 (ὁδὸς), therefore, it is best to take these terms as conjunctions (as also in B1.16, B8.61). In B10.6 ὡς is ambiguous between the conjunctive and the adversial uses. It is likely, then, that these terms appear in B2.3.5 as conjunctions.

We may add that while it is possible to take ὡς and δῶς in B2.3.5 adversially, this construe is not obviously in keeping with the structure of Parmenides' thought in B2. There can be no doubt that lines 4 and 6 are comments on the two ways from the perspective of the goddess and that she regards the first way as utterly reliable and trustworthy, the second as utterly unacceptable. The goddess' opposing attitudes to the two ways rest on their intrinsic opposition to each other. We have suggested earlier that the statements δῶς ἐστὶν and ὡς ὁδὸ ἐστὶν are in opposition to the two ἄνω and are constitutive of them. By their form alone, these two representations of the two ways require that they be opposed to each other. But if ὡς and δῶς are adverbs of manner, then one way is constituted by a mode of being, the other by a mode of non-being. It is difficult to see that Parmenides can sustain their opposition, as claims that cannot both be true, in this form, for some mode of being is compatible with some mode of non-being. It is really only the conjunctive use of δῶς and ὡς that
will sustain the opposition of the two ways (as logical contraries). This last conclusion also coheres well with the sense we have given earlier for ὑποθήκη, 'inquiry'. For all inquiry will issue in judgments, and the basic form of these judgments will be 'that so and so is the case' or 'that such and such state of affairs obtains', and 'that so and so is not the case' or 'that such and such state of affairs does not obtain', or their equivalents. These basic forms of the results of inquiry will be represented in B2.3,5 only if ὑποθήκη and ὀς are conjunctions. Finally, we should note that if Parmenides were using ὑποθήκη and ὀς as adverbs, some claim 'that such and such is the case' must underlie any claim 'how such and such is the case', and Parmenides must elsewhere treat the case 'that ...' in order to complete his argument. It seems at least more economical to find him treating the more basic claim in B2.3,5 straight away. For all of these reasons, then, we conclude that ὑποθήκη and ὀς at B2.3,5 are used as ordinary conjunctions. Accordingly, ὑποθήκη ὡς καὶ ὀς ὁμοί ὡς καὶ ὡς are statements of the form 'that ... is the case' and 'that ... is not the case'.

But now we have been assuming that in B2.3a,5a ὡς καὶ ὡς is used with existential force, i.e. as 'exists', 'is the case', 'obtains', or their equivalents, and this assumption requires some defense. It is notoriously difficult to find knock-down arguments in favor of any view of Parmenides' use of ὡς καὶ ὡς. Unless one is in the grip of a theory, one is left to judge the issue on the basis of the general impact made by Parmenides' language. We can here only record those considerations which have weighed with us in favoring an existential rendering. It must be acknowledged at the outset that the absolute use of ὡς καὶ ὡς, i.e. without any complements, normally means 'exists', 'is real', 'obtains', or 'is true'. We agree with Hussey and Barnes that very substantial reasons are required to set aside this simple syntactical observation, and that such reasons are hard to find. Moreover, in our treatments of the meaning of ὡς καὶ ὡς and the function of ὡς καὶ ὡς above, we find substantial support for the claim that a simple existential rendering of ὡς καὶ ὡς makes good sense out of B2.3,5. The existential rendering is thus prima facie likely, and in fact fruitful of a sensible interpretation. [On the further issue of the subject(s) of ὡς καὶ ὡς, see below.] The best alternative is that ὡς καὶ ὡς is used in B2.3a,5a in a predicative, copulative mode (the other 'incomplete' use, to state an identity, is clearly excluded). However, if these expressions are concealed predications, then Parmenides appears to be arguing against the possibility of negative predications such as. But such an argument is self-refuting, its very formulation requiring a negative predicate ('not to be is not possible'). It may well be that Parmenides' philosophical project cannot be rescued from the charge of self-refutation (see further chapter six), but charity forbids construing his language so as to guarantee such a result at the outset of his argument. Not until his argument drives us to it should we find Parmenides caught in such a trap (in fact we believe that the only point at which the argument does drive us in such a direction is with B9, on which see further chapter 5.4 below). Therefore, we will continue to treat absolute ὡς καὶ ὡς as 'exists' and 'does not exist', unless compelling reasons to do otherwise present themselves. (Examples of such reasons can be found immediately to hand: in B2.5b normal rules of syntax require that ὡς καὶ ὡς be predicating ἄφενων of τοῦ μὴ
eιναι, and the parallelism of lines 3 and 5 demand that ἐστι in line 3b be taken potentially, as 'is possible'. This brings us to the last of our syntactical problems, and perhaps the thorniest: the subject or subjects of ἐστιν and οὐ καί ἐστιν in B2.3a,5a.

In B2.3a,5a ἐστιν and οὐ καί ἐστιν are apparently without subjects, and this fact has incited various attempts to fill the gaps. This problem requires solution if we are properly to construe the syntax of these lines, but its solution (or solutions) is also determinative for our understanding of the philosophical point which Parmenides is making with the arguments of lines 4 and 7-8 (see section C below). Solutions of the problem tend to pursue one or other of three strategies: to supply the missing subject(s) by emendation or from the context, to derive the subject(s) from the use of eιναι, to treat the expressions ἐστιν and οὐ καί ἐστιν as deliberately subjectless and to derive from this formal fact a leading indicator of Parmenides' philosophical rationale. We will now argue that the third of these strategies is the best and suggest improvements on existing interpretations of this type.

Loenen argued that the subject of ἐστιν is τί: Parmenides' thesis becomes 'something exists' or 'there is something' (and conversely 'something cannot not-be'). The grounds for this view are that 'something exists' is the general thesis of Eleatic philosophy according to Melissus and Gorgias, and accordingly that τί in line 3 should be emended to τί. But the Melissus text itself has to be doctored to get out of it τί ἐστιν (instead of τί ἦν); and neither text should be allowed to outweigh the evidence of Zeno B1 which plainly takes τὸ ἔδω to be the subject of Eleatic philosophy. While Gorgias apparently did start his arguments from premises like εἶ τί ἐστιν or εἶ γὰρ eιν τί (whether we follow the MXG or Sextus), it is far from clear that these premises are distinctively Eleatic. According to both of our sources (MXG 979a 10-980b 21, Sextus AN VII, 65-86) Gorgias proceeded by a series of antithetical arguments. These arguments typically begin εἶ τί ἐστιν, ἐπειξαίρετο τί καί ἦν τὸ ἔδωτα καὶ γενόμενα ... He then proceeds to refute each of the contrasting members of each pair of predications. These predicates being offered as exhausting the possible predicates of any existing thing, their rejection entails the denial of the leading premise, εἶ τί ἐστιν. This form of argumentation doubtless owes something to Eleatic models (though the aim of the strategy reminds us more of the Dissoi Logoi, a text whose antecedents are notoriously elusive). But the lists of predications which Gorgias seeks to refute make it much more likely that his target is the belief of ordinary men in the reality of the world, than that it is Eleatic beliefs. The premise εἶ τί ἐστιν, then, is probably not a distinctively Eleatic one (though we do not otherwise deny Gorgias' considerable debt to Elea). The upshot of these remarks is that if ἐστιν and οὐ καί ἐστιν are to be supplied with a subject, then τὸ ἔδω is a better candidate than is τί. The former is not without its adherents, who represent one way of appealing to the context of B2.3,5 in search of Parmenides' subject.

Diels suggested that the subject of both expressions is understood to be τὸ ἔδω, and some of his followers have taken pains to alter the text to make the subject explicit. In favor of this view is the undoubted fact that τὸ ἔδω is the subject of the proofs in B8. Against this, however, is the fact that elsewhere Parmenides argues for the existence of his subject. But τὸ ἔδω ἐστιν is a tautology and τὸ ἔδω
οὐχ ἔστιν a contradiction, neither of which require any argument. The larger context of B2, then, counts against Diels' suggestion. Also, the immediate context of lines 3 and 5 would never suggest τὸ ἔστω as Parmenides' subject. In a similar vein to Diels, Verdenius conjectured that the subject of ἔστω is ἀλήθεια, where this is read as 'the real world' or 'reality'. But, if we agree to take ἀλήθεια as 'reality', then it is equivalent to τὸ ἔστω, and the same objections to Diels' view apply to Verdenius'. On the other hand, if ἀλήθεια is 'truth', it seems odd to say 'truth exists' or 'truth obtains' and 'non-truth does not exist' or 'does not obtain'. Moreover, on either view, at B2.4 Parmenides says that the first way (for which ἄλθος ἔστω goes proxy) is accompanied by truth, i.e. has truth as one of its properties, not that truth is the subject of this mode of inquiry. As a subject of ἄλθος ἔστω, then, ἀλήθεια is no improvement over τὸ ἔστω. Indeed, if we stick to the immediate context of B2.3,5 the only obvious candidate for the subjects of ἔστω and οὐκ ἔστω is the ὅος themselves. There is no difficulty in Parmenides introducing two paths for our consideration (ἐν τοιούτῳ) and saying of one of these 'it does not exist' and moreover 'it must be that it does not exist', just as we might introduce a subject for discussion (mow, unicorns) and say of it that it is non-existent. But it does seem very odd indeed for him to go on to dismiss this ὅος because it is a ἅπαξ λέξις ἀστράτου (line 6), and because of dissatisfaction with τὸ υἱὸν ἔστω (lines 7-8). Why not simply dismiss it as a mere fiction, i.e. as itself a mere non-entity rather than as involved with non-entity? Moreover, if 'that it is' and 'that it is not' are premises supplied by the paths about themselves (as Hussey suggested: see n.96), then they do not seem to be even self-referentially consistent. It is much better to take the expressions ἄλθος ἔστω and οὐκ οὐκ ἔστω to stand in apposition to the two 'paths', as giving the general form of the judgements which constitute these two ways of inquiry.

Dissatisfaction with attempts to supply Parmenides' subjects from either the immediate context of B2.3,5 or from the wider context of the other fragments, have, in part, given rise to the second type of solution we wish to examine. These solutions recognize that ἔστω and οὐκ ἔστω are deliberately without subjects, the explanation of this fact (and its significance) lying in the special meaning of the verb 'to be'. One such suggestion is that ἔστω is used impersonally, like ἦν 'it is raining', to mean 'being is' or 'there is being'. This has the plain advantage of economy, but is, after all, only equivalent to τὸ ἔστω, the tautology that what exists exists. As such, it suffers the same difficulties as does Diels' original solution.

Calogero argued that ἔστω is nothing more than the logical form of all positive predication. The first ἅος in B2, then, is the way of positive predication and the second ἅος is the way of negative predication. Since ἅος is ambiguous as between its predicative and its existential forces, the second way proves to be self-contradictory: one cannot say 'x is not y' without implying both that x exists (in order to be the subject of the negative predicate 'not-y') and that x does not exist (since 'x is not y' implies that x is not, allowing 'is' to slide towards an existential sense). On this view, Parmenides' denial of non-being and his insistence on the necessity of being, trades on a confusion of negative predication with negative existentials, and ultimately on the confusion of the existential with the predicative use
...if all verbs express truth claims then the verb be will also express truth claims. But it does not follow that therefore its meaning is the veridical idea any more than this follows for any other finite verb.\textsuperscript{102} Kahn's thesis that the principal function of verbs is the veridical idea as such proves too much, the verb 'to be' ceasing on this view to have any special significance for Parmenides' argument.\textsuperscript{103}

In Jantzen's treatment of the subjectless \textit{ἐστὶν} in B2.3 we have an attempt to combine Kahn's veridical sense of \textit{ἐστὶν} and the impersonal construction of its use, in an effort to rescue the latter by adding it to the former:\textsuperscript{104}

"Es regnet" sagt zugleich, dass etwas ist und dass dieses Seiende eben Regen ist. Es ist genau dieser Tatsache, der Ausdruck \textit{διὰ ἐστὶν} formalhaft erfasst. Er entspricht der logischen Formel "(\exists x) \neg x": "es gibt ein \( x \), sodass \( x \) F ist". The sentence \textit{διὰ ἐστὶν} , then, both expresses the fact of a things' existing (where to be is always to be something, to be \( \chi \) and \( \psi \) and the existing thing). Jantzen finds, therefore, that Protagoras' \( 
\) principle and Plato's definition of truth are perfect commentary on Parmenides' \textit{διὰ ἐστὶν} :

\textit{Einen} ist \textit{ἐστὶν} also objectsprachlich verwendet, zum andern meta sprachlich. \( \tau \) \textit{διὰ ἐστὶν} kann heissen "die Wahrheit sagen", aber auch "die Dinge sagen (d.h. nennen, konstatieren)".\textsuperscript{104}

In Jantzen's view, then, the purpose of B2 is to show that thinking and speaking can only express 'what is the case' and never what is not the case (where these locutions imply both what it is that is the case and that it is the case):
Er argumentiert: Wenn man wahr aussagen will, muss etwas der Fall sein und kann nicht nicht der Fall sein. (Hier liegt die, wenn man es will, ontologische Voraussetzung des Arguments.) Denn insofern kann man sagen "es ist der Fall", und eben dies heisst wahr sprechen. 105

Now this is a substantive interpretation, but its foundations are seriously flawed. First, it is a bold anachronism to suppose that Parmenides has available the distinction of 'object-language' from 'meta-language' in the absence of any formal languages at all. Second, Protagoras' ủτρον principle is not a reliable guide to Parmenides' meaning (even leaving aside the chronological problem). The notion of existence employed in the ủτρον is always that of qualified existence (οὐ... τοῦτον in Plato's report in Theaetetus 152a 6-7); but this derives from Protagoras' epistemological relativism, and not from any special insight about ackbar. 106 It is very difficult to see that such a thesis can be any guide to Parmenides' thought, for even if epistemological issues were his central concern, he can in no wise be taken to be a relativist. Third, both Protagoras and Plato gave shape to their respective definitions of truth partly in response to the Parmenidean elenchus. Consequently, their formulae do not afford an independently secure vantage point from which to interpret Parmenides' ACHINE. And finally, even for Plato—indeed, especially for Plato—the interpretation of his truth-formula is not to be simply read off the surface syntax of ackbar, or his uses of verbs of thinking and saying. It must be dug out of the supporting argumentation, especially in Parmenides, Theaetetus and Sophist. This last point raises a general consideration for all attempts to solve the problem of subjectless ACHINE in B2.3.5. It is overworking Parmenides' language to expect to recover his philosophical aim in B2 from general considerations of the history of the development of the verb 'to be' 106 This is especially so given that Parmenides has provided other information useful for the interpretation of B2.3.5, especially in the modal additions at lines 3b and 5b, in the evaluations of the two ways in lines 4a and 6, and in the arguments that support these evaluations, in lines 4b and 7-8. Appeal to this information and to the formality of braska and ăr oón braska are the hallmarks of our third group of solutions to the problem.

These solutions all start on a point of agreement with the previous group: Parmenides has deliberately left his sentence-forms subjectless. They diverge over what this fact signifies. Owen, for example, took braska in B2.3.5 to be simply existential and deliberately subjectless. Noting the requirements of Parmenides' argument (that τὸ μὴ ἐστὶ cannot be talked or thought about, and by implication that τὸ ἐστὶ can be), he suggested that:

What is declared to exist in B2 is simply what can be talked or thought about; for the proof of its existence is that, if it did not exist, it could not be talked or thought about. (On our version of B6.1-2 the subject comes into the open there: τὸ λέγει τῷ οὐκ ἔστι ἐστὶ) ... The subject is quite formal, until it is filled in with the attributes (beginning with existence) that are deduced for it... 107

On this view, the starting point of Parmenides' philosophical investigation is 'the possibility of rational discourse'. 108 This has the advantage of depending on none but the plain existential use of
eλνα, and of agreeing well with the meaning of διναμός as it is explained in terms of thought and expression in B2.7-8. It also coheres well with the fact that in lines 3 and 5 Parmenides interprets the two άνεν διναμός in terms of two general forms of statements or propositions. And, finally, although this interpretation amounts to a resuscitation of Diels' view (that τό έδων is the subject in B2.3, τό μη έδων in B2.5), it avoids reducing B2.3 to a mere tautology and B2.5 to a mere contradiction (the principal objections to Diels). That whatever can be thought or talked about must also exist, and that what does not exist cannot be thought or talked about, jointly constitute a substantive philosophical thesis of great interest. Accordingly, we are in general sympathy with this view. However, it is not without its critics, and indeed not without its shortcomings.

Mourélatos objected that Owen's view makes Parmenides too much the logician. To this it may fairly be replied that Mourélatos' own view does not escape the same criticism. Also, the teacher of Zeno and the probable inventor of dialectical argumentation might well be suspected of having no small logical acumen, albeit of an entirely informal variety. Jantsen has raised two more substantive criticisms of Owen's view, ones with which we have some sympathy. He complains that if the unexpressed subject of διος έστιν is τό έδων, where this is to be understood (by the implication of lines 7-8) as 'whatever can be thought or talked about', and if έστιν is to be taken existentially, then eλνα is made to do a great deal of work, τό έδων covering both 'what there is' and 'the object(s) of thought and speech'. Secondly, Owen's treatment of διος έστιν makes little, or nothing, of the second way, the way of άνεν έστιν τε και άν έχειν έστιν μη eλνα. Both of these criticisms can be sustained, and both stem from a more fundamental shortcoming of Owen's interpretation which we will consider shortly. But first we examine one attempt to improve on Owen's view.

Barnes expresses general agreement with Owen's interpretation, feeling the weight of its philosophical merits. He argues, however, that nothing in the context of B2 would suggest that the implicit subject of έστιν (which he takes to be the same as the implicit object of διναμός) is 'what can be thought or talked about'. Taking the emptiness of the subject position in διος έστιν as a sign of formality, and taking έστιν existentially, he supplies 'something' or 'any given object' as the implied subject of έστιν and the implied object of διναμός. The latter is, further, taken to represent 'scientific inquiry', and the aim of Parmenides becomes 'investigating the logical foundations of the programme of the early Greek philosophers'. Now this is a cogent interpretation, part of which we accept. We agree that if any subject is to be supplied for διος έστιν, it is better to render it as wholly indeterminate, or 'something' rather than as 'whatever can be thought or talked about'. The probable existential force of eλνα, and the deliberate absence of an explicit subject strongly favor such a choice. It might be even better to render διος έστιν as 'that exists', to display the formal character of Parmenides' expression. But the other element of Barnes' interpretation, viz. his treatment of διναμός, is suspect. No more would a reader of B2 readily take διναμός to signify 'scientific research', than he would take the 'subject' of line 3 to be 'whatever can be thought or talked about'. Indeed, both the lexicography of the term and the combination of γνώσει and γνώσατε in lines 7-8 suggest a much more general meaning for it, such as the
usual translation 'inquiry'. It would be better, then, to say that the
subject of ἔστιν is 'whatever you want to inquire into', the point (at
lines 7-8) being that inquiry must be into something (but there is more
to it than that: see below). Moreover, the language of B1.30, B6 and B7
suggests that the opinions attacked by Parmenides are the common sense
views of ordinary men, not scientific or philosophical theses.
Similarly, the catalogue of these opinions given at B6.38-41 includes
items of such generality as serve to represent the views of common
sense. It is true, of course, that where these beliefs are held to be
false, few scientific or philosophical theses will survive either; but
the indications are that Parmenides' target is the stock of common sense
beliefs entertained by his contemporaries. 116

These criticisms of Owen's interpretation of subjectless ἔστιν and
οὐκ ἔστιν serve to point up a fundamental issue for any interpretation
of B2: what is the relationship between τὸ ὑπὸ ἔστιν and the second way,
between τὸ ἔστιν and the first way, and how are these two 'objects' (which
are in sight in lines 7-8) related to the expressions ἔστις ἔστιν and ὲς
οὐκ ἔστιν. By passing from the language of ὲς ... ἀλήθειας in line 2,
to the expressions in lines 3a, 5a, and thence to the mention of τὸ ὑπὸ ἔστιν
in lines 7-8, Parmenides desiderates and exploits some relation between
the quasi-objects τὸ ὑπὸ ἔστιν and τὸ ἔστιν and the propositional expressions
of 3a, 5a, and the paths of inquiry. 117 The last interpretation of B2
that we will consider before passing to our own, was specifically
designed to address this problem. That far, it represents continued
improvement of the 'formal' approach of Owen, Barnes and others.

Graeber has argued that Parmenides' position in B2 depends on two
general principles: (a) that words and sentences alike function as
names of 'complexes in the world', and (b) that verbs of saying and
thinking are treated as Erfolgsverben, 'success verbs'. 118 I take the
notion of a 'success verb' to mean that, like verbs of seeing, pointing
and touching, verbs of saying and thinking meet two conditions: (i)
they always have an object, and (ii) they always 'hit' it, i.e. never
fail to succeed in carrying out their characteristic operation with
respect to that object. 119 On Graeber's view of it, the only meaningful
expressions are those which 'say something', i.e. that name or otherwise
point to some reality or other. Moreover, no expression that seeks to
deny or otherwise negate something will be in court, for such
expressions seek to name the unnameable, viz. what is not. The
interpretation is further pressed to show that ἔστιν combines both
existential and veridical senses. 120 The merits of this interpretation
are considerable, and we believe that it is correct in at least one
fundamental, namely, in suggesting an account of the relation between
the two ὡς ὧς and τὸ ἔστιν τὸ ἔστιν. On Graeber's account, the ὡς ὧς
ἀλήθειας represent two general modes of judgement (hence γνῶντες ...
φάρσας at lines 7-8), appropriately cast as ἔστις ἔστιν ('that
exists') and ὲς οὐκ ἔστιν ('that
does not exist') in lines 3, 5. All other expressions will follow the general form and function of one
or other of these statements, i.e. they will either affirm or deny some
state of affairs. The general form of the state of affairs affirmed by
sentences of the type ἔστις ἔστιν is τὸ ἔστιν, 'what-is' or 'the real'.
The general form of the state of affairs denied by sentences of the type
ὁς οὐκ ἔστιν is τὸ ἔστιν, 'what is not' or 'nothing'. And the relation
between expressions and their corresponding states of affairs is the
same as that between names and their bearers. 121 The aim of B2 thus
begins to appear: to adumbrate a simple semantic theory and to exploit it to show what are the boundaries of meaningful speech/thought and inquiry.122 Moreover, τὸ έδυ and τὸ μὴ έδυ now appear in their fully semantic roles, as the 'objects' which make ἐδυ and ὡς οὐκ ἐπτυ true.

Graesser has seized on a point of great importance for our interpretation of B2, viz. the principal role of τὸ έδυ and τὸ μὴ έδυ is semantic. Also, we agree that Parmenides' model for this semantic function is naming. But, respecting Graesser's two general principles, by which he seeks to work out Parmenides' semantic theory, the first can only be partly right, and the second seems wholly wrong and misleading. The difficulty with the first principle, as stated, is its atomism. It is one thing for Parmenides to regard sentences as names of something; but it is quite another thing to regard individual words as names of something. If words are all alike names, then so are all the negative particles and any expression of negation (whether relative, 'x is not F' or absolute, 'x is not') will be condemned along with the second way. But Parmenides cannot advance his argument, which will abound in negations, without contravening this corollary of the general principle.123 Moreover, what is it that individual words like 'and', 'or', 'some', 'any', etc. are supposed to name? Now, as a matter of fact we believe that Parmenides does not wholly escape the difficulties of this kind of semantic atomism, and that his theory probably included a tendency to atomism (see chapter 5.4 below). But we do not think that this element of the theory is present in B2; and, more importantly, in our view the role of sentence meanings is primary in the theory (that is, our understanding of the meaning of words like 'not', or indeed any word at all, depends on our grasping the meaning of sentences in which they appear). Accordingly, as respects the interpretation of B2, only the sentential element of Graesser's first principle is required (and, generally, its primacy should be preserved). The second principle requires that Parmenides treat νοεῖν and λέγειν (especially in B3 and B6.1-2, on which see further chapter 3) as intrinsically 'successful', and this wrecks one of the main results of B2. If verbs of saying and thinking are inherently 'successful', then to say οὐκ ἔστιν (as Parmenides does at B2.5), and to think it, is to say something. But Parmenides insists that to say (and to think) ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν is to say nothing; it is τὸ μὴ έδυ (≠ τὸ μὴ έγκατέστησα) which is the correlative of the παντιακὸν ἄτακτον. The result of B2.5-6 cannot depend on intrinsic properties of verbs of saying and thinking. We conclude that Graesser has not correctly described the principles of Parmenides' semantic theory as they operate in B2.

It has been the aim of this section to identify a number of the elements of B2 that any interpretation must account for. Several such elements have become prominent: 1. ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν and its relation to the sentence-forms ἄτακτον ἐπτυ λοιπὸν ἔστιν; 2. the association of the two ὡς οὐκ both with these sentence forms and also with τὸ έδυ and τὸ μὴ έδυ; 3. the characterisation of the two ways as παντιακὸν ἄτακτον and τελέσθωσιν ἔτεκθαι; 4. the existential force of ἔτεκθαι in the sentence-forms of lines 3,5; 5. the formal character of these sentence-forms; 6. and the opposition of the two ways. The modal additions at B2.3b, 5b also require explanation. In exploring various solutions to the many syntactical issues arising in B2, and especially solutions to subjectless ἔστιν and οὐκ ἔστιν at lines 3a, 5a, we have also sought to
adumbrate the main lines of our own interpretation of the philosophical purpose of the fragment. A fuller account of this will now follow.

C. Language and reality in B2.

In chapter one we offered a simple theory of sentence meaning as a possible underpinning for Parmenides' arguments. Here we seek to apply this theory to the interpretation of B2, in accord with the results of our syntactical and literary inquiries in the preceding two sections. We thus seek the first major confirmation of our general thesis, namely that the relation of language to reality is foundational for Parmenides' philosophical project and that the relation is understood as our theory describes it. Our interpretation begins where Parmenides begins, with ἄγνωστον.

Parmenides characterizes the second way of ἄγνωστον as a 'path from which no tiding comes', giving as his reason that τὸ μὴ ἔδω, 'what is not', can neither be known nor asserted, neither thought nor talked about. Accordingly, ἄγνωστον must be an activity or process which includes both thought and talk. In lines 3a, 5a Parmenides associates the two ways of ἄγνωστον with two sentence-forms, ἄγνωστον and ἄγνωστον ἔστιν. The process or activity of ἄγνωστον must also make this association intelligible. When the lexical meaning 'inquiry' is understood in terms of the basic form of the judgements arrived at in any inquiry, these associations become fully intelligible. Inquiry will characteristically issue either in the affirmation of some state of affairs or in the denial of some state of affairs, the basic forms of which are 'that ___ exists' and 'that ___ does not exist'. (The conjunctive force of ἄγνωστον and the existential force of absolute ἔστιν combine to require these renderings of ἄγνωστον ἔστιν and ἄγνωστον ἔστιν.) But 'inquiry' has other associations which Parmenides exploits against the legitimacy of the second general sentence-form.  

All inquiry seeks to discover truth, and every ἄγνωστον seeks its goal or objective, its terminus. In so far as the first sentence-form is made true by what is real, by some actual state of affairs, the terminus of the first ἄγνωστον is naturally taken to be ἀλήθεια, 'truth' or 'the real'. The association of the first ἄγνωστον with τὸ ἔδω (an association hinted at by τὸ γε μὴ ἔδω in line 7 and made explicit at B6), then, is a semantic relation. The first ἄγνωστον is comprised of all judgements expressible by sentences of the form ἄγνωστον ἔστιν, and what makes then true is just τὸ ἔδω, 'the real'. Since it is not Parmenides' present aim to explore the further properties of τὸ ἔδω, this subject is kept largely in the background. However, we are told one further thing: the first way of inquiry is not only the way of ἄγνωστον ἔστιν but also of ἄγνωστον ἔστιν μὴ ἔστιν, the way of 'that not to exist is not possible'. The modal addition is explicable on our semantic theory. Sentences of the type 'that ___ exist' or 'that F obtains', where F is the name of some state of affairs, are made true by an actual state of affairs which they seek to display or point to. Such sentences cannot be made true by 'what is not', by non-actual states of affairs, for there is nothing to display or point to in the case of 'what is not'. It must be remembered that the first 'way' takes all inquiry to issue in judgements of the general form ἄγνωστον ἔστιν. This must be a Parmenidean device, and so is the modal addition in line 3b. It represents Parmenides' general view, from within his semantic theory, of what constitutes the
truth-conditions for such judgements; namely, that only existent states of affairs will make them true, not-to-exist being impossible. This brings us to the second way of inquiry and its treatment in B2.5-8.

By contrast with the first ὅς οὐκ ἔστιν, the second comprised the collection of all judgements expressible in sentences of the general form ὃς οὐκ ἔστιν 'that does not exist'. These represent the other most fundamental 'product' of inquiry and it is the principle aim of B2 to argue that they are radically illegitimate. The reason for their illegitimacy is a semantic reason. The first indication that this is the case comes with the modal addition at 5b: the second is the way of ὃς οὖν ἔστιν, but also of ὃς χρείαν ἔστι μὴ ἔρχεται, 'that not-to-be is necessary'. This modal accompaniment of the second way is fully explicable on our semantic theory. For sentences of the general form ὃς οὖν ἔστιν to be true, there must be some state of affairs which they display or point to, which they name. We recall that the second 'way' takes all inquiry to issue in judgements of the form ὃς οὖν ἔστιν. Such a view cannot represent any epistemic practice of ordinary men, but must be a Parmenidean construction made for the sake of (later) argument. (We will show in chapter 3 that B6 seeks to prove that the practices of ordinary men are no better than the second way of B2.) The modal addition in line 5b has the same function as the modal phrase in line 3b, and also has the same source. It represents Parmenides' general view of the truth-conditions for statements of the type given in line 5a, namely 'not-to-exist'. The modality derives from Parmenides' semantic theory: statements can only be made true by actual states of affairs. However, for statements of the form ὃς οὖν ἔστιν, what will make them true is the hypostasisation of not-to-exist, and this is a linguistic oddity: 'the thing ἄδόθι which is no-thing (μὴ ἔδοθι) or 'the state ἄδοθι of there being no state (μὴ ἔδοθι)'. With this linguistic oddity is closely coupled Parmenides' main argument for the illegitimacy of the second way, to which we now turn.

According to the semantic theory outlined in chapter one above, truth-making is a power attaching only to actual states of affairs. True propositions or statements are made so by virtue of their naming or displaying actual states of affairs; truth is thus a property shared by all and only those propositions or statements that grasp some such state of affairs. The difficulty with τὸ μὴ ἔδοθι is that there is nothing to close upon, nothing to grasp: it is ἄνωθεν to all forms of true-statement-making (and hence to both the mind’s judgements and their linguistic expressions). This explains why the second way of inquiry is described as a ποιητική ἀτομική, a path from which no tiding comes. Just because τὸ μὴ ἔδοθι is wholly opaque to the judging mind and its capacities for making true propositions, those judgements of the general form ὃς οὖν ἔστιν fail to say anything (to close on any actual state of affairs). At best they merely 'make as to' say something, aping the semantic properties of the expressions of the judgements of the first way of inquiry. Since τὸ μὴ ἔδοθι is empty, devoid of content, and impotent, incapable of truth-making (or truth-endowing), the second ἄδοθι is itself empty, devoid of content. The path itself is utterly opaque to the truth-grasping capacities of the mind and its language. To tread that path is therefore simply to frustrate the proper functioning of the judging mind. But the core of this problem is not any special property of thought (or inquiry) or of the mind, but a particular view of the
relation of language to the world, a relation fundamental alike to the mind's judgements and their expressions.

We have tried in this chapter to show that the semantic orientation and theory posited in chapter one makes excellent sense of these two early fragments of Parmenides' poem, B1.28-32 and B2. In doing so, we have raised two further issues which will occupy us in later chapters. The first of these is what Parmenides is to make of the 'third way' of inquiry represented by the judgements of common sense (that things might exist and might not exist). This will be the subject of B6 and B7, and is examined in chapter 3. Closely associated with such judgements are the beliefs of ordinary men in the reality of change, which came under attack in B8.34-41, 50-61 and B9, on which see further chapter 5. In these fragments Parmenides will finally discharge the commission of B1.30-32: the νοῦς will learn all he needs to know about the deceptive ἀτελὴς ὁδὸς. The second major issue left over from B2 is the deduction of the further properties of τὸ ἑν, the chief business of B8.1-49, which we treat below in chapter 4. It will be our aim to show in these later chapters that Parmenides' preoccupation with the relation of language to reality is the thread connecting all of the main lines of his argument.

Chapter Two, Notes:

1. Only Proclus gives ἐὐσεγγίς, which no other editor has accepted. It derives from the Neoplatonic doctrine of ἀνεκδοτικόν, as Proclus' own comment makes clear.

2. Ἐστίν is preferred by Jameson (1958) 21-26; Deichgräber (1959) 22; Mourelatos (1970) 154-58; Fränkel (1973) 352 n.11:Jantzen (1976) 35.

3. For Diels see his (1897) 54-57.


5. The crux of his objection is that for adjectives of this period found both in - ἐν and - ὑπ' those in - ἐν are used passively, those in - ὑπ' actively. But, since ἐνυπάλληλος / ὑπ’ describes a shape (used metaphorically in both B1.29 and B8.43) no distinction between passive and active is relevant.

6. Jameson (1958) 26-28, on the basis of archaic literary traditions, argues that ἦτοπ 'is not a word with intellectual associations'. If true, this would partly block the interpretation offered below. But notice that at Il. 1.188 and Pinder, Ol. 2.79 the ἦτοπ is the center of decision making; at Nem. 4.35 it is subject to the Muses' inspiration, which is at least quasi-intellective. The ill-fate of
the masses, who are blind at heart (e.g. Nem. 7.74) presumably depends in part on their lack of understanding.

7. For similar assessments cf. B6.4-7, B7 and B8.50-52 (διόκοτον ἔργον not withstanding; see chapter five below). The associations of πόστες with ἄληθεία are frequent elsewhere in the poem (see above). They serve to reinforce our decision to take πόστες in its lexical sense of 'assurance' or 'guarantee' (LSJ, s.v. II). Parmenides seems to have special regard for the persuasive force of beliefs and/or arguments. Hussey (1972) 80 suggests 'convincing force', which seems to capture Parmenides' nuance very well. Taran (1965) 113 and 210 n.19 is surely right to resist rendering πόστες as 'evidence' or 'proof'.

8. For the use of adverbs with existential εἶναι see Chantraine (1953).

9. The existential force of εἶναι will concern us further in our treatment of B2.3,5 (below). Verdenius (1942) 50 objected to existential εἶναι that it is tautologous with δοκίμως. Taran (1965) 214 n.31 finds a similar tautology in Verdenius' own construction. It seems that if δοκίμως, taken in any sense which has assertoric force, makes existential εἶναι tautologous, then it will also make χρήσιν tautologous. What matters here is not the assertoric force of δοκίμως or χρήσιν, but their suggestion of necessity.

9. So Mansfeld (1964) 159; Verdenius (1942) 50; Deichgräber (1959) 81 and Diels (1901) 60 [for which cf. Owen (1960/1975) n.21]. For a discussion of this alternative (and also our view) see Jantzen (1976) 42-43.

10. We may add that the contrast signaled by δαλ' ἔρημος καὶ (s.v. LSJ, ἔρημος, II and take ἄληθι as at II. 2.296-298) looks for a more startling sequel than copulative εἶναι gives. For discussions of the various solutions regarding the force of εἶναι see Mourelatos (1970) 194 n.1, Taran (1965) 210-216, Mansfeld (1964) 158f.


13. Sidgwick (1903) 32 agrees with us; but Prickett (1917) 92 and Broadhead (1960) 146 support taking it with the verb. Nothing in our argument turns on this decision. (δοκίμως could also be taken with both the verb and the adjective, and then no decision is necessary.)

14. Broadhead (1960) 146, 274f. suspects αἰρετόν is corrupt, and he is probably right. Aristophanes, Frogs 377 (noted by Prickett (1917) 92 and Sidgwick (1903) 32) could give an acceptable sense: ἄληθε έμβα χίτως ἄρετες τὴν ἐστίσαν γεννᾶσκα πὴ φωνὴ μολύσκων where ἄρετες ... γεννᾶσκα ... μολύσκων is something like 'lifting ones voice to paean' (or 'to hymn'), but this text is not itself secure. Broadhead's ἄληθι is attractive (it appears at line 844 and would.
15. Broadhead (1960) 53 compares Smyth's rendering: 'so proved in prowess as can...'.

16. 'Ya here is untranslatable; but serves to intensify the force of δυνάμεις. For its position see Denniston (1952) 146.

17. For Pindar's authority see Bowra (1964) 1-17 and especially fr. 61.18-20; for his confidence: Nem. 5.19-20. In Nem. 3.26 the metaphor of song as a ship with a following wind may give a hint of the degree of severity of the testing. Cf. 01. 9.80-83 for the poet's proving fit (πράσφορος) to ride in the chariot of the Muses.

18. For similar emphasis on willing as a mark of character see 862, 889, 896.

19. The cognate verb, δοκυμέω (to test, or to approve as a result of testing) supports our rendering of δυνάμεις. It is not as clear to me as it is to Barnes (1979a) II, 229 that Democritus has no impulse to systematic thinking about ethics. In 853 the clue to the nature of virtue is not just doing but also knowing: πολλὰ λόγα τὰ μεθόδους τῆς κατὰ λόγαν.


21. What is learned will be true, of course, but this does not entail the truth of the ἀδεξά themselves.

22. Diels (1897) 30, 57ff., Burnet (1930) 172, 185 n.1. Owen (1960/1975) 52 argues that it would be preferrable to take the ἄξον- clause to mean 'approve or admit their [the δοξάτα] reality', which is roughly equivalent to the sense we give it below.

23. Chalmers (1960) 7; reviewed by Jantzen (1976) 41. Chalmers' own solution follows Verdenius (1942) 49 in translating ὁδὸν as 'acceptably', and in reading πρίσμα, neither of which is adequate.

24. A point taken recently by Jantzen (1976) 42. The importance of the point, and the constraint which line 30 imposes on interpretations of lines 28-32, was settled by Owen (1960/1975) 49-55. The κρίσις itself is worked out in 82 and 86, on which see below and chapter three.


27. West (1982) 12. The same applies at B8.57, where ὡς is princeps in the first foot (on one reading of the text: see further below) and thus long, and hence metrically equivalent to τὸν.


30. 'Continually': e.g. Heitsch (1974) 13, 138; Kirk (1962) 390; Taran (1965) 214 n.34. 'Altogether': e.g. Verdenius (1942) 50n.3, Mourelatos (1970) 205, cf. Owen (1960/1975) 53. In Rep. 407d. 4-5 Plato asks whether Aesclepius is supposed to be able to cope with isolated instances of disease (in otherwise healthy bodies) but not τὰ ... ὡς ταῦτα ἐνεπιστήμως ὁμοιαζότα 'bodies diseased through and through'. The expression ὡς ταῦτα (i.e. ἐρωτευόμενον) may well mean 'continually' (as at Sophocles, Ajax 705, Thucydides 1.38.1), but it does so by exploiting the literal sense of ὡς with the genitive: throughout all time (or at every moment of time). The usages examined by Mourelatos (1970) 204f. similarly gives a strong sense of 'carrying through to the end'. Mourelatos also notices the association of ὡς ταῦτα with ὄσχειμαι.


32. For intensive μὲν see Monro (1891) §333, Denniston (1952) 482.


34. Bowra (1964) 190 on περάεσθαι πρὸς ἐκείνουν πλόον.


36. As often, after verbs of learning, ὡς = ὡς τὸν 'that' (LSJ, s.v. ὡς B.1). Taking ὡς as adverbial, 'how', does not fundamentally alter the sense provided we keep the exegetical function clearly in mind.

37. Taran (1965) 211 n.21 objects that mortals would not call their world or their explanatory principles δοκοῦντα. But this depends on finding δοκοῦντα to signify 'appearances' in contrast to 'realities'. This contrast is not yet built into Parmenides' language (e.g. at Euripides, Troades 612-613 (cf. 415 BC) τὰ δοκοῦντα = τὰ δοκοῦντα ἐλέας τι and these are contrasted with τὰ μὴ τὸν ἄνθρωπον). Neither does the claim that τὰ δοκοῦντα 'assuredly exist (or are real)' suit the nuance which Taran's objection requires.

38. Kranz (1916) 1170 takes τὰ δοκοῦντα to simply restate the ὡς τὸν; while Owen takes the ὡς-clause to give the general content of them. The latter is preferable, but we take Parmenides' primary interest to be in the claim that τὰ δοκοῦντα 'assuredly exist'.

39. Taran (1965) 214 n.32 objected to τὸν ὡς at line 32 because it 'would make the goddess assert that the appearances are everything.' This objection is now met; but the goddess is not
wholly divorced from the judgement contained in the ως-clause: see further below.

40. Verdenius (1942) 49-51 [following Fränkel (1925) 190] suggested something similar, but based on a faulty translation of δοκεῖμεν. He is roundly criticized for it by Owen (1960/1975) 51; but Owen's own view is not far from ours, as the phrase 'for those who believe in them' (p. 54, quoted above) shows.

41. Reinhardt (1916) 7; so also Verdenius (1942) 49f.; Taran (1965) 213 n.28; Mansfeld (1964) 161, 217; Owen (1960/1975) 54. Mourelatos (1970) 207 gives 'faithfully right', which is no less strong.

42. The former was recommended by Jantzen (1976) 51, and cf. Taran (1965) 215; the latter by Owen (1960/1975) 54, following Verdenius (1942) 53, 68-69. The latter fits well the narrative context of the argument, but there is perhaps no need to choose between the two explanations.


44. We therefore resist the view of Kranz (1916) 1170, and recently pressed by Mourelatos (1970) 205f., that χρήν is a pure irrealis or counter-factual. This obscures the complex character of the ως-clause as a judgement by the goddess but made on behalf of the mortals and in the light of their epistemic situation.

45. Jantzen (1976) 39 finds the singulars in B8.50-52 (λόγον, κόσμον) significant of Parmenides' reduction of truth to the single sentence έστιν. But λόγον need only serve to represent the whole of B8.1-49 as a single coherent argument or presentation, and κόσμον pays the same complement to what follows B8.52: here, too, is a single cohesive account.

46. Jantzen (1976) 53-65 grasps the importance for B1.28-32 of semantic issues. He argues that what is wrong with the Doxai is that the objects of belief are made to enjoy qualified existence by virtue of the form of their linguistic expressions (which necessarily give them in the form 'so-und-so Seienden'). In consequence, Parmenides' effort is to silence all discursive thought, and also all talk, replacing both with the single sentence έστιν. This interpretation is close to that of Calogero (1932/1970) 32-33 [and pushed to its limits by Furth (1974)]. But it cannot be right: in B8.1-49 Parmenides proves for his subject a series of predicates, showing precisely what he thinks ought to be said about it—it cannot be his consistent aim to achieve by these means a silence into which only one word can be spoken.

47. Denniston (1952) 148-149; cf. also 114-115 (2) and 141 (II.1.11). It is possible that οὐ κόσμον be a conditional participle, 'if it is not' or 'given that (it) is not', with τὸ referring to the subject of the verbs in line 5. This does not alter the sense of the line, which is then that whatever is the subject in line 5 cannot be known when (and because) that thing (τὸ γε) does not exist.
48. Denniston (1952) 548f.

49. For a second γραμμα interrupting a larger argument, as O ούτος ἰδεῖν does here, cf. especially Euripides, Iph. Aul. 424-426: έγνω δ' οὐδεμίας σεις παρασκευής χάριν ήμι' πέπιστοι γάρ στρατός---τοχοῦ γάρ ὑπὲρ οὐλής σφύρη---παρέδω σημάδι θαλάμην (I am but a forerunner, come to prepare you; for the army knows already—for rumour spreads quickly—that your daughter has come).

50. For this sense of πανατευθεῖα see Mourelatos (1970) 23f.; Hölscher (1969) 17,51; Lloyd (1979) 69 n.58; and cf. Od. 3.88,184; Aratus Epicus, Phain. 259. Alternatives are: ' undiscoverable' [Hussey (1972) 83, with which cf. Bormann (1971) 94: 'gänzlich unerforschar'] ; 'wholly unknowable' [Taran (1965) 32]. Purely (1973) 10 gives ' useless ', but this is too weak.

51. It is difficult to know how to translate ἰδεῖν, which is here almost purely modal, suggesting an achievement impossible for the human mind or human language (cf. Hipp. Nat. Puer. 29: οὐ ἰδεῖν ἔρθησαν γνωρίς ). On ὀδὸς see further n. 59 below.

52. ὀδὸς at B1.2,5,27; B2.2, B6.3; B7.2,3; B8.1,18. ἱδεῖν at B1.11; B2.4; B6.9; ἱδεῖν at B2.6; and possible at B1.21, where ἵνα ἰδεῖς either stands for ἰδεῖν ὁδὸς (as at Il. 22.146, and Theognis 599; Herodotus VII.200, etc.) or implies such a ὀδὸς.

53. Havelock (1958) 137-139; Mourelatos (1970) 17-25. 'The Orphic and Pythagorean overtones found by, inter al., Bowra (1953) 50 are too distant, or too insecure, to be helpful.


55. Bowra (1964) 252-253: ὀδὸς stands for 'any purpose which implies movement or advance or direction'; cf. Burkert (1969) 4 and n.9 similarly.

56. Pindar frequently refers to his poetry as a 'way of words': Nem. 7.51, Od. 1.110, Jr. 4.1-3. Mansfeld (1964) 60 is wrong to take ὀδὸς to be 'possibility' at Herodotus II.20, though the word doubtless means this elsewhere (e.g. Pindar, Od.8.13-14, Aristophanes, Plut. 506). Since there are often several ways to reach a goal, this is not a surprising development. But it has only limited relevance to Parmenides B2 since the second ὀδὸς is said there to be impossible.


58. E.g. Herodotus IV.151, VII.142; but not VII.103.2 where δικαιομαι must mean 'I reckon' or 'I reason'. Hussey (1972) 82 suggests that the οὐκ бы λεγεῖν are lines of inquiry the starting points of which are premises; but this requires that ὀδὸς be 'argument', which is unlikely in view of lines 7-8 where γνωρίς ...φράσας seem to require something more general for δικαιομαι.
59. The root sense of φώς seems to be 'to show' or 'to point out' and not 'to tell' [Nouvelatos (1970) 20 n.28]. But the implication of γέ (B2.7) is that το εὖν can be Λόγος and φωςειαν and the parallel with B6.1 is so close that I am inclined to take φωςειαν in B2.8 as essentially linguistic, a sense found as early as Pindar Ov. 2.60: Αὖθινον φώςσειαν ἄνους (c. 476 BC). To be sure, φωςσειαν at B6.2 is 'to think on' or 'to muse on', but nothing prevents this being understood as a fundamentally discursive activity.

60. Cf. δινανος διεσκόμενος at B8.21 and nn. 50-51 above.


62. KR, 269; Jantzen (1976) 117 n.20; and cf. Empedocles B3.12: διςος τορος ἐπι νόκκαλοι, 'by which there is a channel for understanding' (ET by Wright, ad loc.).


64. Cf. Jantzen (1976) 117 n.20: 'unnötig kompliziert'.

65. Loemen (1959) 12-14 [and also Brücker (1958) 428 n.1] emends γέ in line 3 to secure τύρκιον. This is unconvincing, based on an emendation of B8.1-2 and an amended text of Gorgias (see further below, p. 55). Gorgias' position may well represent one very important, and typical, result of Elatic arguments, but his epistemological concerns should not be made central to Parmenides.

66. Considerations of logic and of later fragments combine to make it implausible for Parmenides here to restrict the modes of thought to only two: see further below.


69. Smyth (1956) §2006; cf. especially Plato, Phaedo 90c 8-10: εὖ δυνατόν δὴ τών ἀληθῶν καὶ θεματον λόγου καὶ δυνατόν κατανοημαν ['if there were in fact some true and secure argument, and one that could be discerned', Gallop].


72. Leaving in abeyance the issue of what is the subject of ἐπιλογων and ὁ δὲ ἐπιλογων (see further below). We defend the existential interpretation of ἐπιλογων and ὁ δὲ ἐπιλογων below.

73. The fact that the δυνατός in B2 are not contradictories wrecks Mansfeld's reconstruction of Parmenides' logic (and with it a large part of his general interpretation of Parmenides' project) in terms of the disjunctive syllogism: (1964) 58-62.
74. See especially Owen (1960/1975) 56f. and n.33 (p. 71). I defend this interpretation of B6 in chapter three.


76. Owen (1960/1975) 69f., n.11. See further chapter three.

77. E.g. by Mourelatos (1970) 49-51 (but at pp. 51, 70f. he appears to withdraw the suggestion). For others taking a similar view see Taran (1965) 35.


79. This may explain the apparent tentativeness with which Mourelatos advanced his suggestion: see n.77 above.

80. So intractable is the problem of the complement(s) that it drives Mourelatos (1970) ch.3 to take the predicate slot to be as deliberately open as (on one view of it) is the subject slot. But his notion of 'speculative predication' was decisively criticised by Furley (1973) 11-13.

81. Jantzen (1976) 117 n.21 also recognizes this ambiguous usage, but finds it in a place not obviously requiring it.

82. The parallelism between B2.3 and 5 requires that διαὶ in 5aw δίς in 5a [Taran (1965) 35, 191n.44]; and so δίς does not introduce any special nuance.

83. Jantzen (1976) 117-119 presses for a combination of the adverbial and the conjunctive uses, citing Plato's definition of truth [ Crat. 385b 7: τὰ δὲντα λέγειν ὡς ἔστιν, τὰ μὴ δεντα ὡς μὴ ἔστιν..] and Protagoras' metron principle [ B1: τὰν μὲν δ νταν ὡς ἔστιν, τὰν ἕλ ούδ ἔστιν ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν.]. Our arguments count against the alleged combination, and if Plato's definition and Protagoras' principle are relevant at all, they arguably support (or at very least are compatible with) a simple propositional reading of Parmenides B2.3a,5a.

84. Jantzen (1976) 117 n.21, Hölscher (1969) 78 n.28, Verdenius (1942) 32n.5 correctly take ὡς όμοι ἔστιν at line 3b to be potential, because of its parallel in line 5b: ὡς όμοι ἔστιν. But if the latter is to make any substantive addition to ὡς όμοι ἔστιν in line 5a, it is best to take ὡς to be a conjunction in every use in B2. For without further specification of the 'manner' signified by adverbial-ὡς ἔστιν, the phrase ὡς όμοι ἔστιν makes no clear addition to ὡς όμοι ἔστιν at all.

85. We recognize that 'existential', and the translation of ἔστιν as 'exists', is ambiguous between several meanings. It is our view that nothing in Parmenides' project requires any further resolution of the existential force of ἔστιν, but that neither do any of his
arguments turn on mere confusion of the various existential uses of the same verb. Detailed pursuit of these issues is beyond the bounds of this study, but for the later history of the problems of existential εἶναι see especially Owen (1960), (1965), Frede (1967) 12-72, and Kahn (1973); also: Geach (1954) 263-64 and Anscombe, Geach (1973) 90-92.

86. Barnes (1979a) I, 161 n.13; Hussey (1972) 83. Mourelatos' complaint [(1970) 50] that this is mere prejudice is without foundation.

87. Barnes (1979a) I, 160 presses a similar point.


90. Mansfeld (1964) 52 n.2, and cf. Taran (1965) 191f., n.44.

91. Diels (1897) 33; Reinhardt (1916) 35ff.; Cornford (1939a) 30n.2; Deichgräber (1959) 44. Reinhardt supplies an allegedly missing line to secure the reference to τὸ ἔδω, while Cornford emends line 3 to read: ἵναν ἐξωσ ἔδω ἐστιν, κτλ. Both are desperate remedies.

92. Owen (1960/1975) 55; the argument is in B6 on which see ch.3 below. Barnes (1979a) I,162 claims 'tautologies can, and sometimes should, be proved', but this is likely to mislead. There are determinate methods for showing that some sentence is tautologous, and hence one may argue about such things. But 'being exists' or 'what-is exists' are self-evidently tautologous, and simple recognition (without any argument) of such facts lies at the root of all proof-theoretic procedures [see Smullyan (1968) 11]. It is a different matter that sometimes trivially true (or trivially false?) propositions may need to be vigorously affirmed [Bambrough (1960-61) 215]. Jantzen (1976) 108 adds that if τὸ ἔδω is the subject of ἐστιν at B2.3,5, it is odd that B8,2,16 (we may add B8.9) revert to subjectless ἐστιν ἀδιάκριτο γίνεται. But if Parmenides can understand his subject in B2, he can do the same in B8. Moreover, B8.2,16 at least are very closely tied to B2 and so it is no surprise to find the locutions of B2 re-appearing there.

93. Barnes (1979a) I, 161. However, notice that limitative γέ at line 7 does hint at the presence of τὸ ἔδω (which, by contrast with τὸ μὴ ἔδω, can be thought and talked about).

94. Verdenius (1942) 31, (1962) 237, both times taking B1.29 and B8.55 (ἀνυπλασίες) as his starting points; followed by Woodbury (1958) 152.
95. More recondite candidates such as τὸ έν, τὸ ἦν ὅ and ἦν φύσεως are dealt with by Barnes (1979b) 17,19, and cf. on τὸ έν Owen (1960/1975) 57. They have no better credentials than does τὸ ἤν.

96. Hussey (1972) 82.

97. Moreover, if existence is a property after all, and the absence of this property is itself a property, then we might suppose that it would strictly be false to describe the second path as πανασκευή, for there is something that can truly be said about it after all. But this will mistake what can be said about the path for what can be said on the path.


100. Verdenius (1942) 32n.1 and Jantzen (1976) 111n.12 make much of the difficulty for Calogero’s interpretation of τὸ μὴ ἦν ν at B2.7, which γνώρισι requires to be taken existentially. But since, on Calogero’s view, Parmenides does not distinguish existential from copulative ἐστὶ, how is this a difficulty?

101. Kahn (1973) 191; 'the veridical idea' is traced for Parmenides B2 in his (1969) 707-713.


103. Our argument should not be taken to exclude any veridical force in some uses of εἶναι; we only dispute that εἶναι has exclusively veridical force. The veridical sense will not have been distinguished from the existential use of the verb.


106. Note the relativizing datives at Theaet. 170a, 152b-c, 158a, 166c-167c, 171e-172a (and cf. Crat. 385a-386d). For the central importance of this relativizing formulation of the metron, and Plato’s exploitation of it in his refutation of Protagoras, see now Burnyeat (1976).

107. Owen (1960/1975) 60f., which was accepted by Guthrie (1965) 15 and Stokes (1971) 120-121.


109. It seems to us very likely that Parmenides understood thought to be a kind of discourse, as did Plato (Theaet. 189e 4-190a 9) and Aristotle after him, but direct evidence is hard to find (unless
8.35-36 gives it: see further chapter 5), and so we do not press the point. It is enough for our purposes that Parmenides' interest in δεικνύει, in the light of lines 7-8 and the constructions with conjunctive δέως / ἄκ in lines 3 and 5, should be seen to devolve into an investigation of the semantic properties of statements (or propositions).


112. Ibid., 109.


115. We are aware, however, that arguments from what could be expected of Parmenides' early readers are very weak since we know virtually nothing about his readership beyond what can be inferred from the fragments themselves.

116. The adumbration of an apparently more scientific cosmology at 8.33-39 does not disprove our contention that Parmenides' main target is common sense. That cosmology is notoriously unlike any known to us among Parmenides' predecessors or contemporaries. It represents an Eleatic construct designed to lend to the beliefs of common sense temporary and minimal plausibility solely for dialectical purposes: see further chapter 5.

117. We do not imply that Parmenides' positive philosophy can be reconstructed from the position he attacks. But surely the manner of his attack can be used to reconstruct his position: all of the elements mentioned here are supplied by Parmenides.

118. Graeser (1977a) 147. The notion of an Erfolgsverbot or 'success verb' is borrowed from Nuchelmans (1973) 9, where, however, its use by Parmenides is only conjectured.

119. Wiggins (1971) 275-277 and n.9 (pp. 281-82) finds a similar view in Plato, but for him we have explicit comparisons with verbs of seeing and (especially) of touching, as e.g. Theaet. 188d-189b.

120. Graeser (1977a) 147.

121. Graeser does not explicitly develop his interpretation in this much detail, and I have done so partly with a view to my own interpretation advanced in section C below. E.g. his 'complexes in the world' is too vague and I prefer 'states of affairs'.

123. Craeser (1977a) 147 seems to admit the implication, but does not see how it ruins Parmenides’ argument.

124. We use ‘legitimate’ and its cognates advisedly: ‘unintelligible’ or ‘incoherent’ might suggest that the words ‘it is not’ cannot be understood, which is not Parmenides’ position. The point is that such expressions cannot be true; we go further towards specifying the rules against which they offend below.

125. We do not yet know any of the further properties of τὸ ἔδοξ, it being the business of B6 and B8 to supply them; accordingly, we do not yet know that it is single or logically simple. The singular form is used merely for convenience.

126. See pp. 16f. above.

127. It is Parmenides’ aim to show that τὸ μὴ ἔδοξ is not a genuine object of thought and talk (see further below). Perhaps one reason for the close modeling of line 5 on line 3 is to present the second way as logically parasitic on the first, a kind of simulacrum of the first, and only genuine, way of inquiry.

128. A point Schofield (1970) 117 n.17 has remarked on in connexion with another equivalent (μὴ εἰσώναο, being the other) of τὸ μὴ ἔδοξ, viz. τὸ μὴ ἔδοξ.
A. Syntax and argument in B4:

The first puzzle is whether to read ὄνως (adversative particle) or ὄνως (adverb) in the opening line. Nölse'scher preferred the adverbal reading (and is followed by several); but his arguments are weak. The textual tradition does not decisively favor either accentuation, and so it may seem that neither choice can be defended. However, if we read ὄνως then the meaning of line 1 is perhaps best taken to be that the mind makes no distinction between distant things and near things. This is not far different from the sense of line 1 with ὄνως, and there are a few small signs that ὄνως is expected. Thus, λέξεσε ὃδε looks for a surprise (see below), and gets one in the claim that ἀπεδότα ἔνω ταπεινών ἁμαρτώς. Moreover, the effect of lines 2-4 is to exclude the designation ἀπεδότα as finally valid, which is also surprising. The hints suggest that line 1 should open with a concessive expression regarding ἀπεδότα (despite seeming to be really distant, these are actually near), and this ὄνως supplies. Accordingly, we read ὄνως at B4.1, but recognize that the choice is a narrow one.

The verb λέξεσεν belongs to the λέξεσε family, and Chantillaine says of it: '... ce verbe exprime l'idée d'un flux visual rayonnant des yeux, non de l'objet...'. Homerica usage keeps close to this sense, and it means 'to pick out' or 'to give special attention to' something. For example, at Il. 1.120 it has the force of 'witness': λέξεσέτε γάρ τούς ἡμᾶς, διὸ μὲν γένεις ἐρχεται δι' ἄλλης. In Od. 23.124 the verb approximates to "ponder" or "consider": οὐτώς τούτα γε λέξεσε, κατὰ θέλη, κτλ. In both of these contexts there is an element of surprise, the particle γέ singling out the objects or persons to whom special attention is paid.

The passage from Parmenides opens with the verb in the imperative, followed by ὃδε. This fits very well with the arresting force of the Homeric examples. I take λέξεσε, then to mean "consider" or "attend" or perhaps "look you" (compare B6.2, B7.5).

The second syntactical puzzle is how to construe νῆφ. Its position is ambiguous, and it has been taken in four different ways: (1) with λέξεσε , (2) with both ἀπεδότα and παρεόντα , (3) only with παρεόντα , (4) with both λέξεσε and παρεόντα . Against the first and fourth, four passages, there is known parallel for λέξεσεν+ dative meaning 'look with or by means of'. It seems that ἀπεδότα most naturally goes with λέξεσε as object, with παρεόντα as predicative of the ἀπεδότα . νῆφ can mean 'present to the mind'; and verbs meaning 'to consider' often take a second accusative predicative to the first. In Od. 10.30 we have an exact parallel: καὶ δὲ τυπολεόντας ἐλεύσομεν ἐγώς ἤδην ( 'we looked at men nearby tending fires' ). I take it, then, that νῆφ belongs with παρεόντα the phrase qualifying ἀπεδότα. Only so do we get an explanation of the surprise which is signaled by the imperative λέξεσε and the adversative particle ὄνως : contrary to our expectations, distant things ( ἀπεδότα ) are firmly present to the mind ( νῆφ παρεόντα ἁμαρτώς .) Already, then, these syntactical features of B4.1 raise the issue of what special power of νῆφ can be responsible for this startling outcome. A partial answer emerges from the supporting argument in lines 2-4. Here too, interpreting the argument necessitates preliminary clarification of several syntactical puzzles.

The leading verb in line 2 has been taken as an aorist middle second person singular subjunctive (ἀποτιθέμεν ), or as an aorist active third person singular indicative (ἀποτιθέμεν ) of ἀποτιθήμα. On the
second option, the subject is usually taken to be νοῦς, understood from the preceding line.\textsuperscript{11} This accords best with the reading of B4 offered so far. It is to νοῆς that distant things are firmly present. Accordingly one expects the argument supporting this claim to explain what is or what is not in the power of νοῆς to effect. The other reading opens up the prospect of a new starting point in the argument, destroying the connection with line 1 required by γάρ.\textsuperscript{12} Νοῦς, then, has not the power to effect whatever is meant by τὸ ἑδυ τοῦ ἑότου ἔχεσσαν.

The common view of ἔχεσσαν is that it means 'hold fast', the phrase τὸ ἑδυ τοῦ ἑότου ἔχεσσαν, then, referring to the 'hold' or 'grip' which τὸ ἑδυ has on itself.\textsuperscript{13} This accords well with the spatial metaphor of B8.24f. (ἔδυ γάρ ἑότι πελάτεσσε, and cf. ἔνεσσαν in B8.46). The alternative is to take ἔχεσσα to mean 'to stand apart from' or 'to keep at a distance', as in I. 14.129: κύτος μὲν ἔχεσσα ὑποτητὸς ἐκ βελῶν.\textsuperscript{14} This does not clearly alter the meaning of the phrase, and those who take ἔχεσσα in this way still interpret the fragment as arguing for the unity of τὸ ἑδυ. But now we are pressed to account for this unity of τὸ ἑδυ. One suggestion has been read off the participial phrases in lines 3-4.

The participles σκληνάμενον and συνυστάμενον, used absolutely, signify principally being scattered and being collected over space, the expressions ἀκούσαν ...καρεύτα therefore having principally spatial connotation also.\textsuperscript{15} However, it should be noted that the participles in lines 3-4 will also imply some occasion of scattering or collecting. Accordingly, the spatial distinctions implied by σκληνάμενον and συνυστάμενον will also be accompanied by temporal distinctions: something will be true at one time that is not true at another.\textsuperscript{16} Therefore, while spatial distinctions are the central target of B4, the participles in lines 3-4 do not have an exclusively spatial connotation.

This slightly broader reading of the participles in B4.3-4 fits very well with the meaning of κατὰ κόσμον, which here probably carries its archaic sense of 'in order', and not the later developed sense of 'world-order'.\textsuperscript{17} Similarly, the adverbial phrase κατὰ τῶν τῶν τῶν κόσμον neither demands nor invites anything other than a neutral interpretation, shading off neither towards an exclusively spatial nor towards an exclusively temporal meaning for κατὰ κόσμον. Its meaning is intensive (rather like ἔδυ τοῦ τοῦ τοῦ κόσμον) in B1.32: what is σκληνάμενον is such without remainder.\textsuperscript{18}

The two participles, σκληνάμενον and συνυστάμενον, coordinated by ὅτε...ὅτε as at B2.7-8, are epithets of τὸ ἑδυ, but they must be counterfactual, it being Parmenides' purpose to deny that τὸ ἑδυ can be sundered from itself under either condition. (This can only be so because τὸ ἑδυ τὸ σκληνάμενον / τὸ συνυστάμενον requires some spatial or temporal gap in τὸ ἑδυ and these gaps will be made by τὸ ἔδυ ἔδυ.) The position against which Parmenides argues here must be that of the mortals, for it is they who believe that ἐὰν ἔστων is a necessary ingredient of our descriptions of the world. It is they who treat τὸ ἑδυ as σκληνάμενον and συνυστάμενον κατὰ πάντως κατὰ κόσμον.\textsuperscript{19} Because B4.3 is thus counterfactual, it does not ascribe even conditional reality to any part of the 'world' of mortal beliefs.\textsuperscript{20} Rather, σκληνάμενον and συνυστάμενον represent two extreme views of either the structure or of the history of τὸ ἑδυ as it is envisaged by the ἰδωτός.
It is according to their sensory experience of it that the world is to be divided up into ἀρεία and ἐφεύρα, things ἀρκοῦσιν δὲ και things ὑποστάκτων. The latter distinctions are here taken up into a purely dialectical argument. The point of the argument is to demonstrate the unity of τὸ ἔσεω. Having established the textual and syntactical elements of the fragment, I must now seek to interpret its argument.

B. Logic and language in B4:

The principal reason that the position of B4 in the poem is so uncertain is the incompleteness of its argument. In lines 2-4 γὰρ indicates that Parmenides is indeed arguing for the unity of τὸ ἔσεω and not merely announcing it. But we do not get any further explicit evidence as to why τὸ ἔσεω does not have the power to divide τὸ ἔσεω. Consequently, the interpretation of B4 depends on supplying a rationale for Parmenides' argument. Candidates are not lacking. The phrase τὸ ἔσεω τοῦ ἔσεως ἕξωσαν has been taken to represent a simple tautology: 'what exists, exists'. It can then be disputed whether or not Parmenides accepted the tautology. 21 This seems an ill-founded interpretation which overlooks important features of B4. Here, as in B2, Parmenides is concerned to argue for his position, and so it is as unsatisfactory here as there to reduce the position to the level of a tautology. Moreover, Parmenides apparently found his argument in the nature of τὸ ἔσεω, and this too militates against taking the position to be merely tautological. An equally unpalatable interpretation was advanced by Furth: the universe 'is a single continuous solid mass'. 22 But this is going too far and too fast. It is plausible to suggest that the arguments in B3 and B4 imply that τὸ ἔσεω is both materially continuous and materially homogenous (see further chapter 5), and it is probable that such 'physical' monism was an Eleatic doctrine. 23 But Parmenides himself draws no such conclusions, either in B4 or in B6. These arguments have other business which is logically prior to the establishment of physical monism.

Far more attractive and philosophically serious, is the platonizing interpretation of B4. 24 On this view, the ἀρεία and the ἐφεύρα represent the totality of ordinary human experience, in sum the phenomenological world. Being is a strictly transcendental object of cognition which manifests itself in the phenomena of ordinary experience. In this way τὸ ἔσεω τὸ ἀρκοῦσιν δὲ is Being-in-the-world, and τὸ ἔσεω τὸ ὑποστάκτων is Being-in-itself. Being is thus simultaneously 'scattered' and 'collected together'. The division of Being into two autonomous categories is the characteristic error of mortals condemned at B8.53ff. The reunification of τὸ ἔσεω is achieved by the mind, which apprehends Being in the contingent world of phenomenal experience and which at the same time apprehends the contingency of the phenomena. The unity of Being thus resides in its transcendental necessity, and is the result of a wholly immediate apprehension ('in einer unmittelbaren Erfahrung gegeben ist'). The world of ordinary experience (of ἀρεία and ἐφεύρα) is thus given a partial reality in so far as it provides the starting point for this mystical illumination.

Now this is a subtle and highly suggestive interpretation. However, it has against it two points of grammar, and three more general objections. First, I have argued that ἐφεύρα is predicative to
and so these cannot stand for two mutually exclusive and exhaustive subsets of what-there-is. Neither can they stand for two different aspects of ὁ ἔδω, nor indeed for two classes of any kind whatsoever. Second, the participles in 84.3–4 are coordinated by ὑπό...ὑπὲρ; but their coordination is only for the purpose of denying that ὁ ἔδω is ever characterized by either condition. The rejection of ὁ ἔδω ὑπὸ ὑποστάσεως is particularly embarrassing for this interpretation. A more general difficulty, especially for Mansfeld’s version of this interpretation of 84, is the fact that Parmenides here argues for the unity of Being. He cannot at the same time be recommending an ‘immediate experience’ of that unity. (This fact, that Parmenides argues for the unity of ὁ ἔδω, is of great importance for understanding the argument about νοῦς; see below.) It is difficult to know quite what is meant by affording ὁ ἐπιστήμων ‘partial reality’. If this means that some of the beliefs of mortals are true, then well enough, for Parmenides can hardly expect a hearing for an argument that rejected every ordinary belief. But if, as we suspect, the interpretation requires some notion of degrees of reality, then it is at least doubtful that 81.30, 86 and 87 will allow that the Doxa as a whole approximates to reality. For all these reasons, then, I find this interpretation untenable.

However, we have learned one thing from the platonizers: to value Parmenides’ argumentative instinct. And this will show what is of value in taking ὁ ἔδω τοῦ ἐν ἑγών ἔχειαν to be the tautologous ‘what-is, is’. Part of the reason why νοῦς cannot divide ὁ ἔδω is that νοῦς cannot believe what is self-contradictory, and yet this is just what is required of it if it is to believe that ὁ ἔδω can be χωλονάμενον and συνλοίπαμενον. According to the semantic theory we introduced in chapter one, our statements about the world are true just in case they display or name actual states of affairs. The generalized form of these semantic objects is ὁ ἔδω, ‘the real’. But if ὁ ἔδω is χωλονάμενον or συνλοίπαμενον, then something must be true of it here that is not true of it there, true of it now but not true of it then (or both). The propositions that are not true of ὁ ἔδω, to be expressed at all, must seek to display the non-displayability of some state of affairs, and thus prove to be self-defeating expressions. Accordingly, for νοῦς to believe truly that ὁ ἔδω is either ‘scattered’ or ‘collected together’, it must entertain absurd propositions. But we have still to say what it is in the nature of νοῦς which prevents it entertaining self-contradictory propositions. The platonizers took thought to be a kind of sight, such that νοῦς just seems that the phenomenally varied world is really the sign of unitary and transcendent Being. We have seen that this is not satisfactory. Taran argued that the probable reason why mind cannot separate Being from itself ‘is that to think is to think Being’. But plainly this is not so: to think is to think, among other things, about Being and even to think about dividing Being. Or are we supposed to do something in believing 84 which rules out our taking in the argument of 84?!
of both (cf. Theseev 189e 6-190a 6). The ἄκεδνα are καρέβοια 'to the mind' in so far as they are made the subjects of mental discourse, i.e. are objects of thought. For nothing can be truly described as ἄκεδνα unless there is some gap or discontinuity between it and other things. And these gaps or discontinuities are themselves only the subjects of true statements if τὸ μὴ ἐστὶ or τὸ μὴ ἔστι can function as their semantic correlatives. But only 'the real', only actualities, can so function. Accordingly, no differentiations of things can possibly be truly stated, and not even mind can differentiate ἄκεδνα from the καρέβοια.

There is a difficulty here for Parmenides which we ought not to gloss over. If our account of the argument in B4 is thus far correct, it is difficult to see that mind can ever truly think that things are καρέβοια, this latter involving some differentiation in things. Moreover, Parmenides himself seems to recognize this in lines 2-4, where he rejects both ὑμνόμενον and ὑμναρερευον as predicates of τὸ ἔστι. It is true that in order for Parmenides to mount his argument at all, and especially to secure a hearing for it with the Βροτοκ, he can scarcely avoid making some use of the language of distinctions. But such dialectical requirements do not seem strong enough to vitiate the inconsistency that threatens. Such difficulties will concern us more at later stages in the poem, and we will seek to meet them more directly in chapter six.

Regarding the claim in line 2, mind has no power to loosen the hold of what-is on existence because to make τὸ ἔστι an object of thought is to make it a subject of discourse, of affirmations and denials. But in order for any of this discourse to be true, some reality must be displayed by it, must be named by it. True talk about τὸ ἔστι, the real, is made so only by 'the real' itself. Reality thus holds fast to itself by virtue of its truth-making role. For it to fail to do so it must somehow become τὸ μὴ ἔστι. But τὸ μὴ ἔστι cannot function in a truth-making role, for it does not exist. In so far as thought itself is a kind of discourse, mind can no more think that what-is is-not than it can cease to be mind. Not even a thought experiment in separating τὸ ἔστι from existence can succeed. The principle of unity in B4, then, has its roots in Parmenides' semantic theory; and B4 turns out to be very closely related to B2. Indeed, the thesis of B4.2-4 is the logical equivalent of the thesis in B2.7-8. The argument of B4 thus seeks to exclude from our thought about reality the kind of divisions which ordinary sensory beliefs often entail. We can interpret the unity imputed to τὸ ἔστι in B4 by attending to the main results of our literary analysis. The argumentative weight of the fragment is carried by the participles in lines 3-4, and these serve to exclude from τὸ ἔστι every spatial division (and perhaps by implication temporal divisions as well). The argument is that no such divisions are within our power to conceive. So our conclusion is a strong one: the unity of being is established in B4 precisely in the sense of spatial indivisibility (with a hint of temporal indivisibility). This brings us to the next issue: where in the poem to locate B4.

C. The position of B4:

Mansfeld gave four reasons why B4 cannot go before B8 and ought probably to be taken with B19. First, the plurality of ἄκεδνα and
καιρέως reflects the multiplicity of ordinary phenomenal experience, and this belongs naturally in the second half of the poem. Second, κάντη πάντως is an expression which never appears in the Truth but several times in the Doxa. Third, the article τὸ in B4.2 proves that at least two types of Being are under consideration, and this also associates B4 with the pluralism of phenomenal experience. Fourth, κόσμος cannot refer to the intelligible world, but the Truth belongs to that world. The last argument requires that the platonizing interpretation of B4 be secure, but Mansfeld concedes that that interpretation is only convincing if the connexion of B4 with fragments prior to B8 (especially B2 and B6) is excluded. The argument thus runs in a small circle. The third argument requires of τὸ a demonstrative force that is very doubtful. The first two arguments face the difficulty that in B1.28-32 we find (plural) τὰ δοκείντως and an expression equivalent to πάντη πάντως: δὲ παντὶς πάντα. In general, the (correct) association of B4 with the world of phenomena and opinion does not prove that B4 comes after B8, for the ἄδηλα are clearly in view as early as B1.28ff., and B8.34-41 shows that all of B8.1-49 has a double bearing, both on Truth and on the truth about mortal opinions.

Rösler argued less strongly that while B19 is an attractive locus for B4, B4 could go elsewhere, so long as it is after B8. His reasons were: (a) the plurality of ἄκειντα / καιρέως, (b) the closeness of B4.2b (τὸ ἓν τοῦ ἑκάστος ἑκείνου) to B8.25 (ἐν ὧν γὰρ ἑκάστη κεῖται), and (c) τὰντη πάντως κατὰ κόσμον is necessarily a location proprietary to mortals’ cosmology. Once again, the unspoken assumption is that the poem divides into two self-contained halves which do not intermingle their subjects. The first and third arguments (and the assumption) have already been blunted. The second point is well-taken, for (as we will show below in chapter 4) B8.22-25 is an argument for the general indivisibility of τὸ ἓν. It will be odd for Parmenides to anticipate such an argument with an argument for spatial indivisibility (that also hints at temporal indivisibility).

Bollack preferred to take B4 with B16, on the strength of τὸ τὰλώς (B16.4) as the ‘plenitude de ce qui est’, a plenitude which requires B4 as its ground. But he cannot carry this off, for B4 only grounds the doctrine of plenitude he finds in B16.4 if it is also true that:

les hommes, dans l’univers de leurs propres opinions...peuvent faire l’expérience d’un Être qui unit pensée et choses, qui est τὸ ἓν et qui est τὸ τὰλώς, et devenir sensibles au reflet de l’Être.

And this cannot be true if we are to believe B6 and B7, which deny that mortals opinions can serve as a means to apprehend τὸ ἓν. This solution for the position of B4 falls, then, with the platonizing interpretation.

By contrast with these attempts to associate B4 with fragments in the later half of the poem, Reinhardt’s view was that B4 can only stand after B6 and very close to it. He gave two reasons for this view: (a) τὸ ἓν first enters the discussion at B2, so B4 cannot come before B2; and (b) B4 must be closely associated with B6.8-9: κόσμος (B4.3) signifies the different phases of διακόσμησις of the world edifice in contemporary cosmologies (especially that of Anaximenes) and this use of κόσμος requires τὰτότων...κοῦ τὰτότων to explain it. The first point is doubtless true and can be reinforced in B2 Parmenides first hints at what he proves in B6, viz. that τὸ ἓν exists, and this proof is
logically prior to any proof that his subject is a unity. But
Reinhardt's second point is more suspect. The phrase καθ' ὧναν is not
grounded by τά τάτην ... καθ' τάτην in B6.8-9. The business of B6.8-9 is
to show that mortal opinions are severely confused (see below, section
3.2). These lines cannot serve to ground the ὅλον ὅλον which
Reinhardt finds lurking behind B4.3.

None of the positions for B4 canvassed above is securely
established by the arguments presented. However, it seems very likely
that B4 belongs after B8. As Bölscher notices, the continuity of
Parmenides' subject is argued in B8.22-23 (and its unity in B8.3-13, on
which see further chapter 4). It will have been odd for Parmenides to
mount an argument exploiting the unity of his subject prior to these
arguments in B8. On our view, it is the function of B4 to bring home to
the mortals the point that reality cannot be a spatial (and perhaps also
a temporal) plurality of ὅλον ὅλον. We will argue later that a
similarly destructive strategy informs the argument of B9 (which we take
closely with B8.53-59). Accordingly, it seems to us very likely that B4
belongs after B8 and perhaps in close proximity to B9, but this latter
claim cannot be made more than plausible.

3.2 B6: Reality and Mortal Opinion.

The present section aims to supply an interpretation of B6, with
special interest in the arguments in lines 1-2 and 8-9. These arguments
supply, respectively, an important support for a claim that is only
implied in B2, namely, that what can be thought and talked about must
exist, and a connexion between the opinions of mortals (B1.30) and the
two ways of B2. Our discussion necessarily begins with some
syntactical problems.

A. The syntax and argument of B6.1-2:

Fully six alternatives have been proposed for construing the syntax
of the opening sentence of B6:

(a) To take ἔδω as predicative to the articular infinitive phrase
τὸ λέγειν τε νοεῖν τε, with χρή ... ἐνεμαν γoverning the
predication: 'Speaking and knowing must be a thing that is'.
(b) Make ἔδω the object of λέγειν and νοεῖν, with χρή ... ἐνεμαν
governing the connexion (and taking ἐνεμαν existentially): 'It
is necessary that there be speaking and thinking what-is (or
Being).
(c) As in (b) but take ἐνεμαν predicatively: 'It is necessary to
think and speak Being'.
(d) Take τὸ as a demonstrative pronoun and object of λέγειν/νοεῖν
antecedent to ἔδω ἐνεμαν as a piece of indirect discourse: 'It is
necessary to say and to think this: 'Being exists'.
(e) As in (d), but retain the articular function of τὸ, with ἔδω
ἐνεμαν as indirect discourse, giving the content of the
infinitives: 'It is necessary to say and to think that what-is, is'.
(f) Take the infinitives as potential and τὸ ἔδω as the object of
χρή, with ἐνεμαν existential and the complement of τὸ ἔδω: 'What
can be spoken and thought of must exist.'
Besides the obvious tests of grammatical coherence and their power to sponsor philosophically cohesive interpretations of the fragment, there are two special tests for the adequacy of these construes. First, ἔστι γὰρ εἶναι, ὥστε ἢ ὁ όχ χρηστοὶ gives an argument in support of the opening sentence (which thus appears as the conclusion of an argument given in inverted order): our construe of line 1a must be such as to render it supportable by this argument. Second, the account of B6.1-2 that emerges must make sense in the light of what is said in B6.8-9 about the way of mortals. The links between B6.8-9 and B6.1-2 are clearly drawn: γάρ and the progressive combination αὐτάρ ἐξετάζει requires that the discussion in lines 3-9 be closely tied to lines 1-2. Moreover, since the 'first way' mentioned in line 3 must be the second way of B2 and since αὐτάρ ἐξετάζει is progressive—'that being so, then also from this one...'—the suggestion is that the way of mortals is closely associated with the second way of B2 also. The literary unity of B6, then, requires a single explanation for lines 1-2 and 8-9.

The first of these special tests immediately rules out construes (d) and (e). There is no arguing for the truth of a tautology, least of all provision of a modal argument (taking ἔστι in lines 1b-2a as potential: see below). Equally difficult to accept, in the face of the first special test, are options (a) and (b). If λέγειν and νοεῖν are made the subjects of ἔστι, the argument threatens a very small circle: 'Speaking and thinking must be things—that-are because they exist.' If we reply that the real burden of the argument is the modal deduction [they must exist because they can exist (ἔστι as potential)], then we have the difficulty of making out what it means to say that speaking and thinking exist (as opposed to saying that their objects exist) and of what is the philosophical value of such a thesis. The serious choice, then, is between (c) and (f). The first can be made to succeed very well on our first special test, but founders on the second.

In the style of (c) Jantsen takes τὸ λέγειν τῷ νοεῖν τῷ ἐν ἀλλιώς as the subject of ἔστιν (in ἔστι γὰρ εἶναι), construing ἔστιν as copulative, with complement ἀλλιώς, and ἔστιν as potential: "Notwendig ist das Sagen und Denken (von) ἐν ...; denn dies ist möglich", nämlich das Sagen und Denken von τὸ λέγειν. Taking τὸ ἐν ...—on the model of Protagoras and Plato—τὸ ἐν τὰ ἔστι λέγειν, he advances to 'Das Sagen und Denken dessen, was (der Fall) ist, ist notwendig'. Punctuating with a full stop after εἶναι and reading μὴ δὲ τὸ λέγειν in B6.1-2, he finally reaches this translation for B6.1-2: 'Notwendig ist das Sagen und Denken dessen, was der Fall ist; denn das ist möglich, das Sagen und Denken dessen, was nicht der Fall ist, ist aber unmöglich.' B6 thus exploits 'veridical' εἶναι to secure the modal inference from possibility to necessity, for the subject τὸ λέγειν. B6, then, is a simple repetition of the theses of B2 and B3 together, and here applied to the way of mortals.

This is without doubt a shrewd and suggestive reconstruction of B6.1-2, and one which promises no small philosophical dividend. However, it faces grave difficulties. First, the emendation of B6.2a to read μὴ δὲ τὸ λέγειν is unlikely to be correct. The only substantive reason offered by Bröcker for this emendation is that only so does ἔστι γὰρ εἶναι make any sense. But, as I will show below, this is not the case, and an intelligible meaning can be given to ἔστι γὰρ εἶναι retaining the unanimous reading of the MSS for line 2a, μὴ δὲ τὸ ἔστιν. Neither
Jantzen's text nor his punctuation is required. He is also unable to show that B6.1-2 coheres with B6.8-9. To interpret the former he appeals to Calogero's thesis that ἐστὶν is the form of positive predication—a thesis I examined in chapter 2—, such that every 'is' implies an 'is not', and thus mortals say more than just ἐστὶν on pain of contradicting themselves. But this is not what Parmenides accuses mortals of doing. Their fault is to suppose (ὑποθέσατο, on which see further below) that 'to be' and 'not to be' both are the same and are not the same. That is, they both uphold the contrast of 'is' with 'is not' and deny it. Jantzen's rendering of B6.1-2 can make nothing of this charge.

The point here is not just that Jantzen's interpretation of B6.1-2 misfires in respect of lines 8-9, but that every construe of B6.1-2 of his type will do so. It looks for some doctrine of τὸ ἦδον, or of εἰσοραίων, with which to explain the logical character of φυσικός and λέγειν. But the structure of B6 is the reverse of this, deducing something about mortals' treatment of existence (and non-existence) from the logical character of φυσικός and λέγειν. This fact is fully recognized in construe (f), and it opens the way to a more successful interpretation of B6.8-9 in terms of the semantics of thought and talk.

The translation of B6.1-2 as 'what can be spoken and thought about must exist' is preferred by most English scholars. It has been objected that the translation requires ἦδον to mean 'it is possible' and that this is unparalleled elsewhere. But the modality of Burnet's translation is not drawn from ἦδον. Since the infinitives λέγειν and φυσικός have the value of datives, the modality of Parmenides' thesis is secured by them: what is for thinking and speaking just is what can be thought and talked about. The supporting argument for this claim is 'for it can exist, whereas nothing cannot exist'. Owen took the argument to be a simple fallacy: a de re interpretation of modal statements. This is nearly right, but it requires some expansion to see how the trick is worked.

It is true that Parmenides' argument in B6.1-2 looks very like a de re fallacy. We recall the main elements of the theory: every true statement (and, allowing for the fundamentally discursive character of thinking, every true thought) is made so by some actual state of affairs that is named by it. Accordingly, every actual state of affairs is a proper subject of discourse, is 'there' for speaking or thinking. Moreover, every genuine act of discourse (linguistic or mental) posits some reality or other, i.e. says something. B6.1 (ὡς τὸ λέγειν τὸ νοεῖν τὸ ἦδον) simply claims that whatever 'is there' to be said (or thought) must be actual, and the reason is just that nothing less than an actuality can make our statements (and thoughts) true. Certainly τὸ μὴ ἦδον, 'nothing' cannot do so, for it does not exist at all. Every state of affairs that can be there as the 'something' which gets said (or thought) must 'be there', i.e. must be actual in the fullest sense, on pain of failing altogether to play the semantic role of 'the real'. On this showing, Parmenides' argument in B6.1-2 turns out not to be an example of the de re modal fallacy (i.e. bad reasoning), but a fragment or entailment, of his semantic theory (i.e. good reasoning, though perhaps from bad premises). In this way, the modality of Parmenides' argument in B6.1-2 is made to ride on the back of his semantic theory. This interpretation of B6.1-2 draws it very close to the argument of B2.7-8, where the impossibility of τὸ μὴ ἦδον
contraries exist, and depends on the disjunction of existence from non-existence alone. No such pattern of thought answers to the other half of Parmenides' charge, the indelibility of existence with non-existence, much less to the conjunction τούτοις... καὶ ταύταν. It is not enough to say that Heraclitus' doctrine is one of identity-in-difference, to secure τούτος... καὶ ταύταν. Coincidence of opposites only implies the full existence of opposing things or qualities or phenomena, and not the opposition and identity of existence and non-existence. Coincidentia oppositorum does not even begin to be the same claim as Parmenides'. There is excellent reason, then, to refuse to see B6.8-9 as standing in the shadow of Heraclitus. Indeed, it is doubtful that Parmenides' arguments have as their target(s) any specific philosophical or scientific doctrine, whether of his predecessors or his contemporaries. Instead, his interest is in arguing a position which applies to all men: "Denn "Sein und nicht-Sein also dasselbe und nicht dasselbe" hat sicher kein Philosoph gedacht. Es handelt sich vielmehr um eine Strukturanalyse der menschlichen Denkens, die Parmenides gibt. We can go further than this, for it is the semantics of thought and talk which Parmenides exploits in his argument against the mortals. The description of the ἄροτος which begins at B6.4b is one of a people utterly and profoundly confused. They are ignorant wanderers (εἰσόδες ὀδύν πλάστοντα), with their heads pointing in two directions at once (δισαναφοί), for their bemused minds are controlled by helplessness ἀσυνήμων ὑπὲρ ἐν αὐτῶν στάθεσιν ζώνεις πλαγιάτων νόσου). They are unable to travel securely, in a straight line, in reality as blind as they are deaf, stupid (τεθερικότες). They are, in sum, an ἄμμυτα
This confusion is not just a mistake about the existence or non-existence of some favored class of objects or phenomena. Rather it is a mistake about the ontological implications of speech and thought.

It is well here to notice whence Parmenides draws the two predicates of τοῦτο and τοῦτον (and their conjunction). The first of these is fairly straightforward. Ordinary men 'customarily suppose' (κατατοιχίζονται) that existence and non-existence are non-identical in two ways. The first of these is just that collection of ordinary predicative and existential statements which constitute normal discourse. These statements trade on the distinction of 'to be' from 'not to be' in order to have any sense at all: men exist, mermaids do not; this is green, that is not; this was there and now is here (i.e. not-there), and so on. Parmenides is not here concerned directly with such discourse. But there is another collection of statements he is concerned with. When asked directly if οὐκ εἶναι and τὸ πέλευ are the same, mortals reply that of course they are not the same (since the reply may take a number of forms, Parmenides' argument properly covers the collection of all sentences conveying the proposition 'to be' and "not to be" are not the same'). But, on our theory of sentence meaning, such a claim can only be true if there is an actual situation or state of affairs which makes it true and in which 'not to be' figures as an element. But 'not to be' cannot figure as an element of any actuality, for 'not to be' is not and for it to figure as an element in some actuality it must itself be an actuality. Conversely, the claim that 'not to be' and 'to be' are not the same can only succeed in being true if 'not to be' becomes an actuality. To regard such claims as true, is thus to 'suppose' (to imply, to involve oneself with the claim) that τὸ πέλευ and οὐκ εἶναι are τοῦτον. The identity is the result of applying to a piece of routine discourse of the mortals a simple theory of sentence meaning. The predicate τοῦτον, then, is supplied by Parmenides, on the argument that if οὐ τοῦτον 'holds good' (where holding good is to be understood as Parmenides takes it in his theory), then so does τοῦτον.

The very effort which mortals make to differentiate being from non-being defeats itself because of the semantic properties of the language in which the differentiation is attempted. That is why the way of mortals is ἑλντιγρόνθες, backward turning. We can now understand the connexion made in 36.3-4 between the first wrong 565 of B2 and the way of mortals. On Parmenides' view of the relation of language to the world, mortals' linguistic practices reflect the absurd requirement θρεπν στὸ μὴ εἶναι, and this just is the τονομεσάδι διασάδι of B2. The ignorance and confusion of the mortals is their not understanding the implications, as spelled out in the light of Parmenides' semantic theory, of their linguistic habits. Their prior mistake is in not even inquiring about the relation of language to reality. In 38.5-49 an effort will be made to drive the lesson home. But before we examine the arguments in 38.5-49, some subsidiary arguments must be examined.
3.3: Subsidiary Arguments (B7, B5, B3, B6.1-4):

A. B7: the ἔλεγχος.

We translate B7 as follows:

For it is impossible that this win out: for non-existents to exist. But as for you, keep your mind clear of this way of inquiry, neither let much experienced habit force you along this way, to ply aimless sight, or clangorous hearing and speech; instead, judge by reason the hard-hitting challenge which issues from me.

An effort is sometimes made to drive a wedge between the ἥδες ἔγκεισης treated in B7 and the way of mortals in B6. However, I have argued above that the way of mortals in B6 is there treated as no better than the second way of B2. In Parmenides' view, the third way introduced in B6 is not a serious alternative to the two in B2, which two alone are the only ones of consequence. Attempts to keep both 'exists' and 'does not exist' in play together can only fail. This failure takes two forms: the confusion of B6.8-9, and the systematic refutation, in B8, of mortal claims for the reality of change. B6 shows that the way of mortal belief entails, among other things, that what-is-not exists; and this reductive form is the form in which the way of mortals is introduced in B7: εἶναι μὴ ἔδωκα. In our treatment of B6 we have already given the basic interpretation of this phrase. Τὰ ἔδωκα are those states of affairs to which mortals seek to point in all of the negative existential statements which they make and suppose to be true. For each such utterance there is an attempt to display a non-actual state of affairs, and hence to treat as an actuality what is not so. The phrase εἶναι μὴ ἔδωκα, then, represents a generalization of the results of B6.8-9. But B7 is not merely repeating the lesson of B6. Parmenides continues here to criticize the way of mortals, but now with special respect to sense experience.

In B7 Parmenides contrasts sense experience with 'judging by argument' (κοινων λόγος), a contrast not unrelated to that drawn between ἔδωκα τολμητείρου and the πολύδαμνον ἔλεγχον. These two contrasts require further elucidation. The full interpretation of B7 also requires some comment on the verbs of force used in B7.1,3 (κοινωνo and ἐλάσσω). And finally, it will be useful to compare Parmenides' attack on sensory experience with that of Melissus B8.2-4.

The verbs of force represent the compulsive power of sense experience. That experience forces upon us a certain view of the world, namely that view which sees it as a field of change. In the light of this, ἔδωκα τολμητείρου, 'much-experienced habit (or custom)', is just that habitual manner of ordinary men's description of the world as an infinitely Protean thing. These habits have the weight of experience behind them, the experience acquired daily by means of sight and sound and given expression in language. Over against the ἔδωκα τολμητείρου stands the πολύδαμνον ἔλεγχον which the goddess has been giving (ἐκ ἔνδειον ἐκθέτω). The precise meaning of ἔλεγχον has elicited much comment. It is often translated as 'refutation' or even as 'proof', though the latter is probably too strong, Parmenides having no formal proof-theoretic methods available to him. It can be objected also that the verbal aspect of ἐκθέτω requires that the ἔλεγχον already be complete, and
since only with E8 do we get anything quite like a proof, ἐλεγχὸς in B7 cannot mean 'proof' but should instead mean 'reproach' or 'blame'. 64 But this is too weak. We already possess, in the reductive strategy of B6, the groundwork of the arguments in B8. Since B7.1 casts the way of mortal opinion in terms of this reductive strategy, ἁπάντητα need refer (grammatically) no further back than the sentence which it ends. Probably the best sense for ἐλεγχὸς is just 'test', 'scrutiny', or 'challenge', as in many other fifth and fourth century writers. 65 The term ἐλεγχὸς, then, belongs with the other terms which Parmenides uses to refer to the testing to which common sense beliefs are subjected in his poem, especially terms like δοκήματι, κρίνων and κρίσεις.

The second contrast in B7 picks up this language of testing and judging, playing off against the demands of the senses the demand to κρίνων λόγῳ the 'hard-hitting elenchus' of the goddess. 66 We take λόγῳ to be 'by argument', rather than 'by reason' which is not likely for so early a text. 67 The phrase is slightly ambiguous: one judges the elenchus by rehearsing the arguments that constitute it, with a view to perceiving their structure and feeling their force. But the phrase also hints at a way to reply to the elenchus (see n.72). At all events, the κρίσεις is commanded to stand apart from the clamor of the senses, resisting the pressure of habit, and to use his rational faculty to understand the arguments which he is hearing; he is no longer to be ruled by his senses. 68

It is sometimes said that in E7 Parmenides attacks the senses as epistemically valueless, and that this attack is echoed in Melissus B8.2-4. 69 However, while Melissus B8.2-4 is an excellent commentary on the way in which sense experience entails both 'is' and 'is not', and on how sense experience makes the pair seem necessary, this is not his main point. Melissus argues to secure the (intermediate) conclusions ὅτι οὐκ ἀδύνατος εἰσαγομεν οὐδὲ ἐπεκύρων τολλα ἀδύνατος ἄκειν εἶναι. ('that we do not see aright, nor are these things rightly taken to be many'). It is no part of Parmenides' argument in B7 to draw either of these conclusions. He is not concerned directly to attack the senses as unreliable, but as giving rise to discourse about the world which is absurd. Nor is he principally concerned to show that there is only one thing in existence (Melissus' ultimate conclusion). 70 Parmenides B7 is more centrally occupied with the semantics of the existential claims arising from sense experience or in which men seek to express their sensory experience of the world. 71 As in B6.8-9, where the 'customary usage' of men that is in view is part of their universe of discourse, so also in B7 the principal custom (ἔτος) of men that is in view is their language about the world.

B. B5: an enigma.

With B7.5-6 (κρίνων δὲ λόγῳ τολμὸν ἐλεγχὸν ἡμεθεὶς ἀποκατά) the goddess makes a rare comment on her own way of proceeding: her speech is an ἐλεγχὸς ('challenge') and one which is properly evaluated only 'by argument'. 72 In B5 we seem to have another such comment: 'It is all one to me where I begin: for I will return to that place again.' 73 This fragment has been peculiarly difficult to interpret, and even more difficult to place securely in the poem (an appropriate, but annoying agreement with its literal meaning). The difficulties are so great as to tempt some critics to sate their expectations from the poem.
altogether. However, the great majority of critics have agreed to its authenticity, saving disagreement for its interpretation. A number of suggestions have been made, as that

(a) it is a description of ἃν ἓσον (see n.73),
(b) that it describes the σῆματα of B8 (which are taken to entail each other) 75,
(c) that it describes Parmenides’ reasoning (which is like that of an axiomatized system) 76,
(d) that it describes Parmenides’ manner of proceeding, or method, i.e. the dialectical character of his argument or the fact that the poem is indifferent regarding the order in which it takes up the several ἐνομολογημένα mentioned in B2, and B6-77,
(e) that it is a description of thinking ( νοεῖν) 78.

None of these suggestions has met with even widespread agreement, and all of them face grave difficulties.

Against the first and last suggestions is the fact that ἃν ἓσον does not need a subject, having one provided in ἐνομολογημένα ... ἔγειρε. Neither ἃν ἓσον nor ἃν νοεῖν can be introduced except by guesswork. Against the second suggestion stands the fact that although Parmenides does prove later σῆματα in B8 by recalling earlier ones (or by recalling the arguments which secured earlier ones), nothing shows that he took the earlier ones to be deducible from the later ones. The third suggestion is an anachronism, importing to Parmenides’ argument a concept not arrived at in logic or mathematics until much later (neither has anyone ever offered an axiomatisation of Parmenides’ arguments). Concerning the fourth suggestion, it is very likely true that Parmenides’ argument is dialectical, but this does nothing to show that it returns to its own starting point. Rather, Parmenides’ argument excludes, before it is finished, a number of starting points, viz. all those logically equivalent to the second way of B2 or the second way of B6. The same point counts against the suggestion that B5 marks the order of exposition followed in the poem as a matter of indifference. Even if it is true that the three ways of B2 and B6 can be taken in any order (and even that may not be true: see chapter 2, n.127 above), Parmenides cannot ‘return again’ to two of these starting points, for the way of ὅς ἐφαινομένος ἔτσι and the way of the ἐποτοτοῦ have been decisively excluded by the argument. There is a dynamic quality to Parmenides’ arguments which suggests a linear sequence, not a circular one.

And just this is the main problem for all of these interpretations of B5: they all find in the fragment an image of circularity. But B5 need not describe a circle at all: the claim that ‘I will return to my starting point again’ is true of every journey that describes a continuous closed curve. A circle will be the simplest such curve, but infinitely many others will answer to the description also. We do not suggest that Parmenides seriously intends to impart a lesson in plane geometry in B5. Our point is only that the language of the fragment, though clear as to its literal meaning, radically underdetermines its interpretation. There does not seem to be any way to decisively confirm any interpretation of so enigmatic a remark. Accordingly, it is not possible to say where in the poem B5 belongs. Fortunately for us, interpreting Parmenides’ other arguments does not depend on success in locating or interpreting B5.
C. B3: Thought and reality.

Like B5, there are sharp limits placed on what we can say about B3. It is entirely without a context, and ἐνδεικνύω indicates that it originally played an argumentative role, the point of which we can no longer ascertain. Nevertheless, we can get some help from the grammatical structure of the sentence.

With Zeller, Burnet and others, I take τὸ ἀντίκειται to be the subject of the two infinitives, with ἔστι in COMPLETE and ὑπὲρ and ἐπὶ ἐπί as complements coordinated by τὸ ἐνεμίσθη and having the force of datives: 'The same thing is for thinking and (for) existing'. Attempts to make either or both of the infinitives the subject(s) face the difficulty of the absence of an article with either of them. The same problem prevents taking ἀντίκειται to equate ὑπὲρ with ἐνεμίσθη: 'denn dasselbe ist Denken und Sein'. Burnet's translation is the more natural of these. It has been objected that it requires τὸ ἀντίκειται to be treated actively with ἐνεμίσθη and passively with ὑπὲρ. This is fully answered by taking the infinitives to have the force of datives. Jantzen repeated the objection, in the face of this reply, asking: 'Jedoeh: was ist zugleich für das Denken wie für das Sein?'. Nothing is easier: like the subject of ἐνεμίσθη in B2, whatever can be thought or talked about. The point of B3 is that any subject of ὑπὲρ (the given) is also an existing thing (the inferred). The inference is fully compatible with the theory of sentence meaning we have ascribed to Parmenides. Since thinking is discursive, what is thought is made true by the same thing that makes statements true, viz. reality, τὸ ἐνεμίσθη. Such an inference might have served as part of an effort to clarify the relation of thought to language, and thus have been a corollary of B6.1.

But this does nothing to solve the puzzle of where to place B3 in the poem. Hölscher puts a cogent case for attaching it to B2.7: 'Es ist die Prämisse der vorhergehenden Begründung und läßt sich daher unmittelbar an Fragment 2 anschließen.' This is attractive and has attracted many (see note 80). But a few small points about B2 count against it. First, B2.7a (ἐπὶ γὰρ ἐνγύως τὸ γε μὴ ἐνεμίσθη), if it expects any completion at all, expects a claim that τὸ ἐνεμίσθη can be thought about and picked out in speech. And B3, though plainly closely related to such a claim, does not yet make it. Second, the balanced clauses ὑπὲρ γύως... ὑπὲρ γύως bring B2 to a well-knit close (with the parenthetical ὑπὲρ ἀναφερόμενο ὡς the pivot), and leaves us expecting nothing more, least of all a further argument. Third, ὑπὲρ γύως suggests that any completion to B2 should include the verb for speech as well as ὑπὲρ (cf. B6.1). These three points make it unlikely that B3 attaches to B2. Others take B3 to repeat the doctrine of B8.34 that thought and its object are identical. I treat this suggestion regarding B8.34 below (chapter 5), and here note only that in B8.34 this doctrine (if present there) is argued for (with ὑπὲρ γύως ἄνους εἰς ἐπί τῶν, μηδικ.) while in B3 it a premise in an argument for some other point. B8.34, therefore, cannot act as a guide for the placement of B3.

Our conclusion is that B3 serves to take part of the thesis of B6.1-2 into another argumentative context as a premise. While we recognize that B3 has important affinities with B2, B6 and B8.34, we do not find compelling reasons to attach it to any of these contexts. Since it adds nothing to B6.1, its position may remain moot.
D. B8.1-4: the signs of Reality.

It is widely agreed that the list of σήματα given in B8.3-4 corresponds to the series of arguments which follow. Thus, ἀγέννητον καὶ ἀνάλεκτον is proven for the subject in B8.6-21, ὁδὸν μονογενὲς. in B8.22-25, ἀτρεμές in B8.26-33, and ἀπάλατον (or ὁδὸν ἀνέλεκτον: on the text see below) in B8.42-49. 88 Wiener is doubtless right to argue that the epithets πᾶν, ἀν, συνεχός in B8.5-6 are not part of this list. 89 In the role of program, they would needlessly duplicate line 4 (whether we read ὁδὸν ἀνέλεκτον or ὁδὸν ἀνέλεκτον). We will argue later that these epithets are more closely connected with the arguments of lines 6-25: see chapter 4.III. B8.5a (ὁδὸς τοῦ ἀν ὁδὸν ἐστι) is more closely linked back to the list of σήματα in lines 1-4, the link being secured by ὁδὸς. But the meaning of B8.5a also derives from the arguments in lines 6-25 (see chapter 4.III). Accordingly, we accept the standard limitation of Parmenides' 'program' to B8.1-4. The opening lines of B8, then, serve as a programmatic introduction to the whole of B8.5-49. It is not now our business to explicate those later arguments (see chapters four and five). But since these lines effect the transition from the opening stage of Parmenides elenchus, to the detailed arguments against change, it is very much our business to construe their significance for the semantic interpretation of the poem. I begin with some textual and grammatical puzzles.

The text tradition of B8.4 is extremely convoluted, the first and last of the σήματα mentioned here having occasioned most of the confusion. 90 Regarding the first σήμα, the best text seems to be that of Simplicius, who reads ὁδὸν μονογενὲς. The best alternative is Plutarch who gives ὁδόν μονογενὲς ('completeness'), and argues from this to ἀγέννητον καὶ ἀνάλεκτον. But this is the reverse of Parmenides' argument, which first establishes that τὸ ὁδὸν is ungenerable and incorruptible and draws its further conclusions from this first set of results. Moreover, the immediate further conclusion which is drawn from the argument for ἀγέννητον and ἀνάλεκτον (B8.5-21) is that τὸ ὁδὸν is indivisible and continuous (B8.22-23). This is equivalent to proving that τὸ ὁδὸν is whole (ὁδὸν) and unique (μονογενὲς). 91 If we follow Simplicius' text, then the correspondence between the program and the argument is fully restored. The final σήμα in B8.1-4 is peculiarly difficult, and has incited numerous attempts to improve on Simplicius' ἀν ὁδὸν ἀνέλεκτον. The principal difficulty is that this epithet should answer to the argument in B8.42-49, which, however, proves that the subject is τετελεσμένον εἶναι. Of the many suggestions which have been made, we now find Hopkins' ἀν ὁδὸν ἀνέλεκτον the most persuasive. The meaning is 'everywhere in equipoise', and perfectly answers to the argument in B8.42-49. 92 We therefore take the list of predicates which will be proved in B8.5-49 to include the following: ἀγέννητον, ἀνάλεκτον, ὁδὸν, μονογενὲς, ἀτρεμές and ἀπάλατον.

The grammar of B8.1-2 is our second puzzle. The opening phrase μόνος ὁ ἐτε μόνος ὅδε οὐκ ἔεκται, is typically translated as 'one way only is left to be spoken of...'. 93 Taran challenged this translation on the ground that μόνος modifies μόνος and not ὅδε: the phrase should read 'There is a solitary word still left to say of a way, namely, "exists"'. 94 We have encountered this reductive interpretation of Parmenides before, and the same reply must be given here. If this is
the proper sense of B8.1-2, then the poem should end here, the rest of the argument going to prove a list of predicates for ὑ ἔνθα which have already been excluded. The solution is to take μηθος to signify an 'account', rather than a single word (which is an unlikely sense for it anyway), and to take ὁς ἑστών, as in B2, to designate the ἄδος by giving the general form of its contents rather than by exhausting its content. In B8.1-2 μηθος includes both the programmatic list of σύματα in lines 3-6 and also the arguments which support them. The singularity of the reflects the literary unity of B8.5-49, a unity based on the tightness with which Parmenides draws successive stages of his argument from preceding ones.

What, then, is the significance of the σύματα? Boeder translated the term σύμα with 'bewise', but the σύματα cannot themselves be proofs (συμέα at Melissus B8.1 notwithstanding), for they are themselves subjected to proof in B8.5-49. They are instead 'markers' or tokens which serve to identify, sign-posts which mark out the ἄδος which is called ὁς ἑστών. Being the means by which one knows one's way or steers a course, they are virtually identical with the way itself. They cannot therefore be simply discarded once the appropriate use has been made of them. To discard the σύματα would be to see the κίλευος itself vanish and to lose one's way.

Mansfeld picked out 'omen' or 'portent' for the sense of σύμα in B8.2. But he is mislead by his thesis that B2 is a disjunctive syllogism. Looking in B8 for such syllogistic arguments and finding that none of the arguments can be given this form without supplying various 'suppressed premises', he appealed to the Stoic argument-form τοποσευμενον to justify the omissions. Moreover, and this is the central issue, he argues that the truth of a disjunctive syllogism cannot be proved without some appropriate guarantee of the key premise. This guarantee is provided in the authority of the goddess (both in B2 and in B8). Her revelatory speech is thus the bedrock on which Parmenides founds his arguments. And this is why the σύματα are 'omens' or 'portents', having their roots in the 'Offenbarungskaracter' of a divine revelatory discourse.

It is true that the effect of B2 and B6 is that the two ways of B2 appear as exhaustive alternatives. But Parmenides does not achieve this effect by means of a disjunctive syllogism (in which the conclusion depends on treating the two premises as contradictories). He gets his effect by arguing that the way of mortals reduces to (or is logically equivalent to) the second way of B2. That second way is, in turn, absurd and impossible. The argument against the way of mortal opinion, then, does not depend on any of the three ways being taken to be the contradictory of any other. Moreover, it is anachronistic to interpret Eleatic arguments in the light of Stoic rules of inference. Such rules are only possible after the development of logical syntax overseen by Plato and Aristotle. While it is true that Eleatic arguments do follow logical rules (what else would it be to argue?), and the following of logical rules is as old as thought, following a rule in no way implies explicit systematic knowledge of the rule or of the axiomatic system to which it belongs. The Stoic argument-form τοποσευμενον is certainly part of such a system. Parmenides is not in a position to argue in this self-consciously formal mode. For these reasons, we do not find Mansfeld's treatment of the σύματα convincing. However, he is right to
try to identify the bedrock on which rest Parmenides’ dialectical arguments. But, in view of B7.5-6 (νοοποι...λόγωι, κτλ.), it seems to us very unlikely that Parmenides has founded his arguments on a revelation. In our view, the foundation for Parmenides’ arguments is the very thing which is necessarily common ground to the goddess and the κόσμος (and eventually the mortals): their use of language. 102

The σήματα, then, not only mark out the way, but constitute that way, the way of truth. Not only so, they also serve to show how the κόσμος (and the reader with him) is to walk the path. It is by means of the arguments in B8.5-49 which prove the σήματα, that the κόσμος walks the true road of discovery (δύνασθαι). What he discovers is precisely the semantic insight under which his linguistic habits are examined but the full implications of which escape him until he has grasped the arguments which the goddess propounds. There is a sense, then, in which Parmenides’ poem, though not performing a semantic ascent (having available no form procedure for doing so), is effecting the discovery of a plane of reflection higher than that first-order use of language by which the κόσμος seek to have access to the world. It is the σήματα, with their arguments, which are the tools of discovery.

But this leads to the most fundamental problem for Parmenides’ elenchus. It has been observed since antiquity that Parmenides characteristically propounds theses that are apparently self-refuting: he denies the possibility of οὔ μήλῳ, but freely uses negative predicates (which are logically equivalent to some negative existential claim about some states of affairs). He uses tensed language to exclude tense, and the language of mutability to exclude the possibility of change. Owen tried to justify these practices by way of an ancient image: ‘Parmenides’ argument is a ladder to be climbed up and thrown away.’ 103 But this will not do: no more than one can discard the σήματα (on pain of losing the κόσμος they constitute) can one ascend the chain of Parmenides’ arguments and then discard them. It is true that one might come to see the inapplicability of certain terms or distinctions, and the falsity of some beliefs, as a result of traversing Parmenides’ δόξα. In this way one might use language initially that will eventually be discarded. But the image of the discarded ladder is more problematic at a deeper level. To ascend a ‘ladder’ of argumentation is to acknowledge the arguments to be sound; to discard it will be to acknowledge them to be unsound. How can the same arguments be both sound and unsound?

This does not address the problem of self-refutation constructively, and I will return to it in the final chapter. Before I do so, it is necessary to explicate the arguments which give rise to the problem and which are the demonstrations of the σήματα of B8.3-4. Like the opening movement of Parmenides’ poem, these arguments too are fundamentally controlled by his views of the relation of language to reality.
Chapter Three: Notes.


2. Stein (1867) proposed emending line 1 in order to secure a good sense for όμοια: όμοια ἢτεν ὑπὸ νομοφαρείον τε στερεάττως, but this was widely criticised [Bergk (1886) 80; Diels (1897) 64; Taran (1965) 45; Hölscher (1968) 122]. Such a reading allows for the very possibility that lines 2-4 reject, viz. that something genuinely be distant from the mind. Alternatively, Stein takes it that mind makes no distinction between what is distant and what is near. But this is equivalent to one way of taking line 1 with όμοια and without the emendation, which thus proves to be otiose.


4. Without the immediately prior context, the precise force of δὲ must remain uncertain, but it may only serve to introduce a new stage in the argument [as often in e.g. Theognis: Denniston (1952) 173].


6. Empedocles B17.21 (τὴν ὑπὸ ὡφρον δέρκειν) though close is not yet precisely parallel.

7. Hölscher (1956) 389 protests that καρδοντα cannot be predicative, but his own explanation of the second participle as 'erlauternd und begründend' of the first, itself casts it in a predicative role.

8. Smyth (1956) §1613; for τὸ καρδον as 'what is present' see LSJ s.v. καρδοντα. II and especially cf. Empedocles B106: πρὸς καρδον γὰρ μήτε αὐτής αὐτοκαθολου ('for craft grows in men according to what is present'). Alexander, in Met. 306.17 paraphrases with πρὸς τὸ καρδον γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἢ φράσιπνος γύνεας.

9. The comparison with Heraclitus B34 (καρδοντας ἀπεκκαλεῖ) is irresistible. Both passages draw on the proverbial καρδον ἂνοματες which also appears at Aristophanes, Eq. 1119-1120: ὅ ὡθες δὲ σοῦ καρδον ἄνοματε ('the wit you have is absent').

10. The alternatives are reviewed by Taran (1965) 46f.


12. Burnet (1930) 173 and Bollack (1957) 58 take the subject in line 2 to be τὸ ἄνω, effectively rendering the argument otiose: would anyone ever suppose that τὸ ἄνω could ever, in any relevant sense, divide itself?
13. Whether we take τοῦ ... ἔχων to be an articular infinitive or, with Diels (1897) 65f., insist that 'ἔχων' is an articular infinitive attached to 'ὑποστάντων'.


16. Compare συνεστάτω ταύτην ἄλλα at Empedocles B35.6, marking a stage in the ascendancy of Love in the cosmic cycle; and συκώνων ἐν στήθεσιν ὀργής ... at Sappho 27, marking a point in a personal history.

17. Bollack (1957) 61, Jantzen (1976) 90, Kirk (1962) 311-315; and see also Kerschensteiner (1962) 5-10 on the Homeric usage, and her p.122 on B4 as following it.

18. Cf. Plato, Tim. 29c 5, Parm. 160b 1, Phaedrus 246a 4; and Empedocles B22.8: καίνη συγγόνος τοῦ ὀργῆς ('being altogether unaccustomed to unite...'; Burnet; or 'quite inexperienced in union', Wright).

19. Jantzen (1976) 90 comments on κατὰ κόσμον in a similar vein: 'Er bezieht sich vielmehr auf die Meinungen der Menschen; die Ordnung der Stoffe in der Welt, wie die Menschen sie setzen.'

20. Pace Bollack and Kerschensteiner, on which see further below. The stumbling blocks for such a concession are in B6 and B7.


23. The inference from σοφά to μόρα in Melissus B9 only succeeds if the term τάχος there means 'solidity' (or the like). For this point and links to Parmenides B8.44-48 see Owen (1960/1975) 67-68.


25. Mansfeld (1964) 211. The role of νοῦς is emphasized by Bollack (1957) 59, Kerschensteiner (1962) 120.


27. Taran (1965) 50.

28. It is a further question whether thought must be discursive. Plotinus apparently believed that non-discursive thought was
possible; but the concept is a difficult one: see A.C. Lloyd (1969-1970).

29. We cannot preserve this result if Parmenides' semantic theory admits second- and higher-order predications; but in the absence of even a good first-order formal language, even Parmenides' opponents are unlikely to press this difficulty successfully.


31. The second point is also made by Kerschensteiner (1962) 121, and Jantzen (1976) 88-89.


33. Ibid., 70f.


36. We treat B3 below in section 3.3.c.


38. For progressive àoròp see Denniston (1952) 53, and note p. 55 on àoròp éisè'.
44. If fallacy it is: see Kneale (1962) and Mackie (1974) for lucid and vigorous arguments that all de re modalities are elliptical forms of de dicto modalities.

45. That only those λέγοντα and νοηματα that are true are also canonical was established in B2: see chapter 2.2C above. With 'proper' and 'genuine', Parmenides begs various issues against his opponents. A larger problem also threatens, for it is doubtful that Parmenides' position is self-referentially consistent, his own denials suffering equally with those of the mortals'. Parmenides is able to elude such problems on occasion (see n.55), but not indefinitely. We offer some defense for his apparent indifference to them in chapter six.

46. We take ἢςον γὰρ ἔλεγον to point back to λέγειν and νοεῖν: what can 'be there' for thinking and speaking. One consequence of Parmenides' semantic theory is the elimination of merely possible states of affairs (and properites?) in favor of actual states of affairs. This is consistent with his denial (to the mortals) of the truth of locutions like 'it might exist and it might not exist' (on which see further below).

47. E.g. Kullman (1958) 162-63, Taran (1965) 69-70, and cf. Burnet (1930) 165. The attempt is seldom made any longer to find a point of immediate contact between Heraclitus B51 (ταλαντροτος άλονυμη [but Kirk (1962) 210-216 and Marcovich (1967) 127-129 agree to read παλάτωνος here] ) and the ταλαντροτος κέλευθος of Parmenides B6.9. For the image of a ταλαντροτος κέλευθος see Sophocles, Phil. 1222-23. We get an excellent sense for ταλαντροτος as 'turning back' at Anth. Palatina IX.61: the Laconian woman sees her son not just returning from war ( ταλαντροτον ἐν τολέμοι παῖς ἐδώ ἐν κέφαλαι) but returning disgraced, having turned his back on the demands of the πάλος (hence the frightful response).

48. Jantzen (1976) 125f., n.12 has the main point.

49. As Aristotle testifies at Met. 1005b 23-25: ὀδύνατον γὰρ ὀντόν αὐτοῦ ταύτῃ ἐκλαλομάζουσιν εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, καθάπερ τυχεῖ ἄταντα λέγειν ἵππαλετον.

50. Jantzen (1976) 124. Against the suggestion of a Pythagorean target see Taran (1965) 68f. and Jantzen (1976) 124 n.10. Mansfeld (1964) 31-32 compared B6.8-9 with the existential interests of Pindar, Pyth. 8.95f. ( ἐκμετάλλευτος τὸ ὅτι τοῖς τὸ ὅτι ἐν τοῖς σπάζει δεσμὸν ἀνθρώπος ) and Heraclitus B49a ( εἶδον τοίς καλ. οὐκ εἶναι). But the Heraclitean phrase is 'a worthless gloss' [Kirk (1962) 373f., Marcovich (1967) 211]. If there is any parallel between Parmenides and Pindar, Pyth. 8.95f., it lies in B16, Parmenides' τολαβληταν νῦν answering very well to the sense of Pindar's ἐκμετάλλευτο [see Fränkel (1968) 31 and Empedocles B2]. The value of Pindar for understanding Parmenides' poetic language is demonstrable, but Pindar makes a poor guide to his thought.
51. Cf. Clytemnestra in Aeschylus, Agam. 593: λόγος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου πλαγιτὸς ὡς' ἐραυτήση ['Such talk made me appear as one astray', Fränkel (1950) 127].

52. Taran (1965) 63 takes ἐκρίτα to mean 'that they are unable to distinguish', i.e. to distinguish εἶναί from οὐκ εἶνα; but καὶ τῶν ταύτων shows this is mistaken.

53. For the construction with double accusative see Herodotus 3.16: ἦδον νομίζοντων εἶναι τὸ πῦξ ['They (the Persians) hold fire to be a god', after Rawlinson]. Also cf. Empedocles Bl7.22: ἄτοις [i.e. οἰκλῆσι] καὶ ὄντος ἠμνήτων ἑρμηνεῖς ἀφοῦς ... ('she is reckoned to be inborn in the bodies of men').

54. Translation of νομίζειν is difficult, combining as it does here elements of 'use by custom' and 'customary belief'. Heinemann (1945) 73-78 takes νομίζειν to mean 'bei der Menge gelten' und daher 'falschlich' gelten' (p. 77). The inference is very doubtful [though it is repeated by Rassbaum (1979) 74], but the sense of 'gelten' as 'obtains' or 'holds good' is excellent [cf. Hölzer (1968) 102f., (1969) 87f. also]. There is a useful parallel in Xenophanes Bl.13-14: ἀλλ' εἰκόνι ἀλήτωσ τοῦτο νομίζεται, σὺδὲ δικαίως προκυκλοῦμεν μᾶλλον τῆς ἀγαθῆς σοφίας ('But this is an utterly feckless and unjust judgement: to prefer bodily strength over goodly art'). Heraclitus τὸ νομίζειν ματ' ἀνεφάστος μυστήρια (Bl4) is closer to the sense of 'customarily practiced', which also gets something of the right nuance, as between what is done and what is implied in what is done. For the force of custom among the mortals cf. B7.3 (ἐδοθεῖ τολμαίνουν) and perhaps as a nuance of κατατείχεσα at B8.19, 53.

55. Nor can he be without immediately suggesting that orindary denials of any kind are unintelligible or self-defeating, which would put his own denials at risk also. (He is not so careful to avoid this problem in B8.1, see below.) Whether Parmenides can stave off such risks indefinitely is the concern of chapter 6 below.

56. Since παλάντιμος is not a comparative, πάντων cannot refer to all possible βοῦς. Only two references are possible for πάντων, then: (a) 'things' (ἀντικ) or (b) the βοῦς (taking πάντων as masculine). Champions of coincidentia oppositorum are quick to adopt the former [e.g. Jantzen (1976) 127, Taran (1965) 66-68]. But the argument in B6.8-9 probably has nothing to do with the coincidence of opposites, and everything to do with the common beliefs of ordinary men. Therefore the masculine construe of πάντων is the more likely one: see also Mouralatos (1970) 78 n.7, Stokes (1971) 116-117. Our translation of B6 thus runs: 'What can be spoken and thought about must exist, for it is there to be (thought and spoken about), and nothing is not there. I urge you carefully to consider these facts. For from this way of inquiry first I bar you, which being so also from this one: the very one the mortals fabricated, knowing nothing and (being) two-headed. For helplessness controls a wandering mind in their breasts. Moreover, they wander along, dumb and blind, astonished, a tribe of confused
men; among whom it holds good that to exist and not to exist are both the same and not the same—the path of all of them is backward turning'.

57. For the text of B7.1 see the discussion in Taran (1965) 73-75. The evidence of Plato decisively favors ταύτα διαφώς εἶχειν μὴ λέγεια; see Sophist 237a 3-6, 241d 5-7, 258d 5-6, e 6-7; also: Aristotle, Met. 1089a; and Simplicius, in Phys. 135.21, 244.1, 143.31.

58. Parmenides' own denials can be made proof against a similar reduction only if second-order predication is allowed; but then the nefarious τὸ μὴ λέγεια can also be rescued and with it the language of change. We suggest in chapter 6 below some ways to mitigate the charge that Parmenides' strategy is self-refuting.

59. Mansfeld (1964) 92 n.2 argues that B6 and B7 belong closely together on the strength of Empedocles B2. But the parallels are tenuous and Parmenides B7 is at least as closely related to Empedocles B3 (see n.61), while Empedocles B2.8-9 also resembles the motif of Parmenides B1.3, 27, 30. The text and interpretation of Empedocles B2 and B3 are especially difficult to establish, making dubious any appeal to them to clarify Parmenides.

60. The force of ὅπως, then, is pure coordination, the ὅπως in line 3 being precisely the same as the ὅπως in line 2, but seen now from a fresh perspective.

61. Cf. especially Empedocles B3, which has several verbal echoes of Parmenides B7: αὐτóστοι, line 1; ἀκολὺ ἐρείδουκον and τρανύματα γνάσσης, in line 6. However, Empedocles gives credence to sense experience, missing the Eleatic claim that logically the senses can only give rise to confusion. For the translation of διάφώς see LSJ, s.v. IV and especially cf. Pindar, Pyth. 8.79ff., Ἡρας τῇ ἀγώνι ἐπιχώλοιν νῦκας τρικτάς, ἀκρατομενες, δάμαισας ἔργα.

62. Γλάσσαν is thus appropriate as one component of the ἔθνος. Taran (1965) 80 takes the absence of any qualifying adjective with γλάσσαν (parallel to δόμωκον and ἔγις) to make exempt from the argument the language used to talk about ἢ ἔδω, but this overworks the text.

63. Lloyd (1979) 71. Boeder (1962) 150-151 has to appeal to Aristotle, Soph. Fr. 165a 2, etc., for this sense.

64. On the common assumption that B7 is immediately prior to B8; so Mourelatos (1970) 91 n.46. For Epic use see Il. 11.314, Od. 21.329; and cf. Pindar, Nem. 3.15.

65. All such senses are not far from the technical legal use as 'cross-examination' (with a view to refutation). The phrase εἰς ἔλεγχον ἔχειλασαν means 'brought to the test' or 'put to the test': in Sophocles, OC 1295-1298 it cannot signify proof by argument, which is there ὡς ναυτικὸς λόγος; but must signify some other test, namely τελεῖς οὖν ἔργα λαλῶ. The phrase is the equivalent of εἰς
That monism is not the main point of Parmenides' poem is one conclusion of Barnes (1979b) with which I agree. See further chapter 5, n.15.

Empedocles B2 attacks the senses because of their limited access to the world and because of the fragility of man (cf. Pindar, Pyth. 8.95f.). This also is quite different from Parmenides and belongs to a separate literary tradition.

There is a hint here that the only way to reply to her ἐλεγχος is by force of countervailing arguments, a point we take up again in chapter 6.

The translation depends on two decisions: (a) that ἤνως is predicated of the 'place' implied by ἐπεδεχόμηται and τὰ θεία and not of τῷ ἔόν [as e.g. Diels (1897) 67, Reinhardt (1916) 60; Hölsher (1969) 77; contra Bormann (1971) 180-181]; (b) that ἤνως ...μου forms a single unit of thought: ἤνως + dative is not found in Homer, but is as early as Archilochus Fr. 110 (West): ἐρωτεύετον γὰρ ἤνως ἀναχώλος Ἀρης, Hesiod fr. 1.6-7 (Merkelbach-West): ἵνα γὰρ τούτῳ δαίμονι ἤνως, ἤνως ὁ δὲ θάνατος ἀνανίκως τε θεοί τοὺς καταθέντας τί ἀναρρέως, and cf. Herodotus 7.53.1: ἤνως γὰρ τὰς τούτο ἀγαθὰς σπεύστηκα. For ἤνως as 'common' (ἐκοινῶς) see Bormann (1971) 180.

Jameson (1958) 16-21 chief among them, but on the grounds of a non sequitur, viz. that it is three times as long as any other fragment.
quoted by Proclus (our only source), who therefore could not have quoted it from memory.


76. Cornford (1939b) 102.

77. Præmkel (1973) 364: 'every statement in the double system of doctrine [viz. Doxa and Truth] coheres with every other', and cf. Barnes (1979a) I, 331 n.2. The dialectical nature of Parmenides' arguments was fully seized by Furth (1974) but with unfortunate effects: Parmenides' thesis is reduced to the one-word sentence ἐστιν, the evidence of B8 not withstanding.


80. It is an attractive suggestion, but no more, to attach B3 to B2: so Mansfeld (1964) 80-83, Furley (1973) 11, Hölscher (1969) 81, following Burnet, Calogero, and Diels. But see Taran (1965) 42 and below for some cautions. Owen (1960/1975) 60 makes as strong a case for B6 providing the context for B3.

81. Burnet (1930) 173 n.2; Hölscher (1969) 17; Taran (1965) 41; Cornford (1939a) 34 n.1; KR, 269; Graesser (1977) 148; Owen (1960/1975) 60. A similar sense emerges if ἐστιν is taken existentially, meaning 'is there (for) ...'.


83. Mansfeld (1964) 63f.

84. Cf. also Furley (1973) 11 n.35: 'The infinitive is functioning as a verbal noun, and at that level distinctions between active and passive disappear.'

85. Jantzen (1976) 119. His own interpretation [pp. 95, 120 and also Taran (1965) 44], that to think is to think being, besides resting on a dubiously reconstructed text, flies in the face of the evidence that Parmenides is prepared to say and think a great deal about τὸ ἔστι, e.g. as that it is ἔγερτον, etc., that is not merely logically equivalent to its existence.

86. They also may explain why many commentators who favor the association find it necessary to supply various missing links: e.g. Mansfeld (1964) 82 interjects μεθον τὲ τὸ ἔστι τὸ κατὰ τὸ κατὰ νοθαλ ἡδὲ λέγετο; while Calogero (1932/1970) 20 tags onto the end of B3 Ἰοντα νοτές ὄραται. The necessity for such remedies counts against the alleged association.
87. Kahn (1969) 721f. called it the 'obvious rendering' of βας and 
βας 34. The original suggestion is in Calogero (1932/1970) 10-14; 
cf. Woodbury (1958) 150 and Jantzen (1976) 95, 120.


90. For reviews of the problems see (exhaustively) Taran (1965) 88-93; 
also Owen (1960/1975) 76f.; Wiesner (1970) 3 n.8, 4 n.9; Guthrie 

91. Barnes (1979b) 9 distinguishes two senses for μονογενής: 'unique 
of its kind' and 'belonging to only one kind'. For reasons to be 
given below (chapter 4.iv.b) only the first of these is 
Parmenides'.

92. Cf. Empedocles B17.19 (άτθλον ατήτη) and Plato, Tim. 52e 3-4 
(άλλ' ἄνωμαλοι κάτω τάλαντομιλίων σεί σθαι μὲν ὑπ' ἑκείνων ὑπὼν, 
κτλ.). This solution is also adopted by Schofield (1970) 115 n.16. 
Owen (1960/1973) 77 misses the close connexion between 
μεκοδέον 
σωματίδαν and τετελεσμένον πάντωσθαι (B8.42-44), a connexion driven 
home by πάντοθεν Ἰκνον in B8.42--and only because of this oversight 
does he set aside Hopkins' solution.

Rede von dem Weg...'.

94. Taran (1965) 87-88.

95. With μονογενός a verbal noun, δόον is an objective genitive and the 
expression μονογενός δόον resembles μονογενὸς ὁλομ (Sophocles, Ant. 11: 
'tidings about friends') and (perhaps) σοῦ...μονογενός [Sophocles, 
Oc 1161-62: 'speech with thee' (Jebb; and see his note ad loc.)]. 
Cf. Hecataeus of Miletus (FHS I.1, pp. 7-8) for μονογενός as telling 
a true account over against the false λογος of the Hellenes; so also in 
Hesiod, Theog. 24 and Erē 10. Cf. the Homeric formula 
ἀλλ' ἄνωμαλοι μονογενοῦσαν: e.g. II. 6.382; Od. 14.125, 17.15, 18.342.

96. Boeder (1962) 154. We do not exclude finding the σήματα as 
preamises or conclusions in the later proofs (e.g. οἷον Ἀθηναῖοι 
tτε at B8.38).

97. 'An ihnen muss man seinen Weg orientieren...': Jantzen (1976) 105 
n.9. Cf. a similar identity in its use as the sign of a burial 
mound: σήμα comes to be another term for the tomb or grave 
itself, as at Hesiod, Scutum 477; τὸ δὲ τάφον καὶ σήμα ὄψες 
τοίησαν Ὁμήρου.


99. Mansfeld (1964) 103-105 (on the σήματα), and on B2 pp. 56-62.

100. Mansfeld (1964) 98 nn.3-4; and cf. further Frede (1974) 100-101.

102. Jantzen (1976) 105 claims that the στάτα of Being 'schliesst jegliches Sprechen über das Seiende in der Art, in der die Doxai sprechen, aus'; but this view depends on Parmenides' ability to make a semantic ascent into a meta-language, and this is not a technique that is open to him.


Chapter Four: Reality and Change: B8.5-25.

I. Introduction:

The long central fragment of Parmenides' poem, B8, is largely taken up with a series of arguments against the reality of change. It has been recognized generally that these arguments represent the central thrust of Parmenides' philosophical project. The arguments are given as proofs of the στάτα which appear in B8.3-4 (and probably including B8.5a; see further below), the proofs occupying lines 65-49. It has also been generally agreed that lines 5-21 are foundational for the rest of B8, and this in several respects. The earlier lines furnish arguments for the properties (of τὸ ἔσον ἀγέννητον καὶ ἀνάλεγον), and these results furnish premises for later arguments, whether explicitly or implicitly. Moreover, in lines 5-21 Parmenides establishes a pattern of argumentation (what I will later analyse as an 'embedded' pattern of argument) which re-appears in later lines. Also, in lines 5-21 Parmenides exploits semantic properties of τὸ ἔσον in order to secure his results, and this strategy will be reflected later in the central fragment also. Accordingly, the main purpose of this chapter is to provide an exegesis B8.5-21, and to show thereby the relevance to this part of the poem of the semantic theory outlined in chapter one. For reasons which will be given later, it will be necessary also to extend the discussion to include lines 22-25.

B8.5-25 gives rise to a large number of exegetical problems, solutions to which are offered in the pages which follow. Given the
number and severity of these problems, it will not be possible to explore in detail every alternative solution which has been advanced in the literature. Nevertheless, some space is devoted to alternative solutions. Recognizing that lines 6-18 give the arguments securing the epithets ἅγιον καὶ ἅμαλιθον, and that lines 5a and 19-21 set a kind of framework around this argument so as to secure a temporal characteristic of ὅ ἔστη, we take up the exegetical issues in the following order. 2 Section II treats the arguments in lines 6-18, addressing five main problems: (1) what are the arguments in lines 6-10 and what is their relation to one another? (2) since line 11 is marked (by ὡθεῖ) as a conclusion, how does it follow from lines 6-10 and how far (in the text) does this conclusion reach (does it include lines 12-13, and if so, why?)? (3) the text and sense of lines 12-13 and the reference of ἀνὲρ there. (4) since Parmenides repeatedly links destruction with coming-to-be (B8. 3, 13-14, 21, 27-28, 40), but never gives any explicit argument for doing so, how is this connexion to be explained? (5) the sense of lines 13b-18, and their function in connexion with lines 6-13a. Section III begins to take up the question of the temporality (or atemporality) of ὅ ἔστη. We observe that the construction ἐκτεὶ... ἔγραϕε B8.6-18 as proving the epithets in line 5a by way of those in 5b-6a, which observation gives rise to three further issues: the meaning of the ἐκτεὶ-clause in line 5b and of its associated epithets (ὅμοιος, ἄνω, ἐν, συνεχεῖς), the precise mode of temporality which Parmenides hereby ascribes to ὅ ἔστη. Section IV takes up two pieces of unfinished business: exegesis of lines 19-21 (which confirms our interpretation of the temporality of ὅ ἔστη), and of lines 22-25 (which secures an important element of the argument in lines 6-18). Throughout the ensuing discussions, our aim will be to discover the philosophical rationale for Parmenides' arguments. It is our view that the arguments of B8.5-25 can be significantly illuminated by attending to the semantic dimensions of Parmenides' subject.

II: The arguments against γενεσία (B8.6-10).

I begin with a translation of lines 6-10 of B8, a translation I defend in the notes and the commentary which follows:

For what birth will you discover for it? How and from what did it (begin to) grow? 3 I will permit you neither 4 to say nor to think "from what is not", for "that it is not" can be neither expressed 5 nor thought. And 6 what requirement 7 impelled it, later or sooner 8, beginning from nothing 9, to begin to be?

This passage contains two arguments against the possibility of coming-to-be. The first of these is contained in lines 6b-9a, and two issues arise in connexion with it: what, precisely, is the argument and does ἦν πάντων ἀυξάνεις introduce an issue separate from that of coming-to-be? The second issue will occupy us first; out of our treatment of it will issue an analysis of the argument contained in lines 6b-9a.

Calogero first gave serious attention to the possibility that ἦν πάντων ἀυξάνεις introduces a phenomenon different from coming-to-be, namely: growth (Zunahme). 10 This view yields a distinctive
alternative to the way we organize the argument of lines 6–18, an alternative which focuses on τὸ ἔδων apart from its role as a semantic entity. Accordingly, we will discuss in detail the reasons that have been offered for Calogero’s interpretation of line 7a. Of particular importance for us is the suggestion that the question about growth (or increase) is answered in lines 12–13. It will be our view that τῇ κόσμῳ αὐτήν does not introduce an issue different from and coordinated with the question about coming-to-be (τὸν ... γένναν διηγομέναν αὐτόν;), and that Parmenides does not in these lines consider the question whether τὸ ἔδων can increase by growth. The question in line 7a is probably only a stylistic variant of the one posed in 6b.\[11\]

Our view will occasion no surprise, since there are prima facie indications that in 88.6–10 Parmenides uses the language of growth as a stylistic variant for the language of coming-to-be. In the first place, in lines 6 and 10 Parmenides uses γένναν (birth) and φέου (to grow or become), each time emphasizing the origin of the process in τὸ μὴ ἔδων. For him, coming-to-be is a process which begins in nothing, and so is whatever is described by φέου. But ‘to grow’ is not normally regarded as starting from nothing unless it is regarded as equivalent to coming-to-be. In the second place, the expression that opens line 7, τῇ κόσμῳ serves to set up the two arguments which follow, κόσμῳ having its answer in ἐκ μὴ ἔδων, and τῇ finding its response in ἐκτὸς ἐπιφνεῖσθαι ... τοῦ μνήματος ἀρχήν.\[12\] That is to say, line 7a serves to sharpen the question posed in line 6b, by asking under what conditions coming-to-be can take place.\[13\] Finally, we will argue below (III.b) that 88.12–13 does not argue against ‘growth’ in τὸ ἔδων. Parmenides’ argumentative scheme, then, does not posit any target in line 7 distinct

from coming-to-be. We conclude that the expression τῇ κόσμῳ αὐτήν; probably does not introduce any issues separate from coming-to-be. But this prima facie case faces a measure of stiff opposition, and we must now advert more closely to the grounds for Calogero’s view of 88.6–10.

Calogero appealed to the MXG 974a 5–9 as supporting his claim that Melissus argued against ‘totale und teilweise Entstehung in Sinne einer Antithese’ and that Melissus learned the argument from Parmenides.\[15\] I give Diels’ text and the Oxford translation (Apelt’s text gives only minor differences):

ἀπὸ τῆς γὰρ γνωσμένης αὐτῆς ἐκπαράκεκλη· εἰτ’ ὅταν τῶν ἰσαρχῆς ἐπιστρέφοντα, τίλειν ἐν καὶ μετον τὸ ἐν γεγονότω χάρι χαλ καὶ μετον, τοῦτο γεγονότα ἐν ἐκ ὁδοιποιη·

(ἐν) τῇ γὰρ ἐλάττων τὸ τέλος, οὗτ’ ἐν τῷ μετοντεῖ στὸ μετον, αὐξ ὁπάρχειν.

For if all things come into being, then nothing can pre-exist; whilst\[16\] if somethings were ever and others are added, that which is must have become more and greater, and that by which it is more and greater must have arisen out of nothing; for the more is not originally existent in the less, nor the greater in the smaller.

We need not here concern ourselves at length with the authenticity of the MXG, since even supposing it is authentic, the text does not support Calogero’s interpretation of it.\[17\]

The argument of MXG 974a 5–9 aims to prove that if anything exists it must exist eternally (where this apparently means always in the past and always in the future, i.e. omnitemporality). If this were not so,
then something must come into existence from nothing (or non-existence).
Since this latter is impossible, nothing comes to be, and hence
everything exists eternally. The central argument is in the form of a
dilemma: either everything (that exists) comes to be, or only some of
them do (εἰ τὰ έστων must allow for more than one thing ). In either
case, at least one thing comes to be from nothing (which is impossible).
The first limb of this argument needs no further analysis, except to
notice that (a) apparently no allowance is given for the possibility
that every existent thing has come to be from other existent things,
some of which no longer exist, such that at no time did anything come to
be from nothing and yet everything has come to be, and that (b) a
comparable argument, which seems to depend on a similar assumption (that
all generation is from nothing), can be found in Melissus B1: εἰ γάρ
έγονεν, διὰ γαρί οὐ μη νεωθαίκα εἶναι μπούν. In the second limb
Melissus treats of the case in which something (s) exist and other things
come to be, adding to the stock of existing things (έτερα προσγέννημα).
These έτερα jointly constitute τὸ γένος (or τὸ μετέξον ). For these
things there will be absolute generation, i.e. from nothing: if X
comes larger by Y, then Y comes to be absolutely. Hence, growth,
'teilweise Entstehung', is indeed regarded pair-wise with absolute
generation, with 'totale Entstehung'; but the former is rejected as a
casuality of the argument against absolute coming-to-be. Melissus makes
this point very clear by arguing that the έτερα also would have to come
to be from nothing. It is the ban on absolute coming-to-be which
underlies the rejection of προσγέννημα. All that we can recover from
ΜΕΧ 974a 5-9, then, is evidence that the Eleatics rejected generation
from nothing and extended this to cover προσγέννημα. The passage does
nothing to show that Melissus or Parmenides regarded partial generation
antithetically with total generation: partial generation is merely a
special case of total generation.

A similar point is made by Melissus in one of the fragments. In
Β7.2-3 Melissus argues against the possibility that what exists can
become greater (τὸ έδώ μετέξον γένοτο ) and for the thesis that nothing
comes-to-be-in-addition (προσγέννημα μπούν ). It is not clear that the
arguments here are on all fours with those in the ΜΕΧ: for here
Melissus is treating cases of alteration in existing things (έτερα... τὸ έδώ μη ἐνωσάν εἶναι ), rather than the coming to be of separate
things (έτερα ). Nevertheless, in Β7 Melissus still treats his subject
as a special case of absolute coming-to-be: alteration is just ἀπλο-
λιθοῦ τὸ πρόσθεν έδω, τὸ ἄδε έδω γένοσθαι . Once again,
Melissus does not need to generate an entirely new argument to exclude
alteration: it suffices to extend to it the ban on generation from
nothing. Here, as in the ΜΕΧ, if we learn anything about what to expect
in Parmenides, it is to expect a similar strategy: if growth is to be
treated at all, it will be by way of an extension of the arguments
against generation simpliciter. But we find in Melissus nothing to show
that Parmenides must generate an argument against growth as a companion
piece to his rejection of generation.

Such light as Empedocles sheds on the Eleatic project tends further
to confirm our view. Empedocles is prepared to use the language of
generation and destruction while agreeing also that such language is at
best misleading. Things do not come-to-be nor do they pass away, for
both of these are impossible. At Β8 he argues that mortal things have
no coming-to-be (νός υπό), but in reality only undergo mixture and
separation; it is merely the conventions of men that call these 'birth' (φόνος).

While Empedocles is himself prepared to follow the conventions (B9: νῦν δ' ἐκφάνη καὶ ἀφόσα), he knows that, strictly speaking, there is no truth in it. In seeking to replace the language of coming-to-be and destruction with that of mingling and separation, Empedocles generates, at B17.30-35, an argument against epigenesis. Of this argument it has been complained: 'Why argue specifically against epigenesis when you have a general argument against generation as such?'. But perhaps all that Empedocles intends by his argument is a statement of the uniqueness of his elemental substances. The point is reached at lines 34-35: ἂλλα σωτ' ἕστων ταῦτα, δὲ ἀλλὰς δὲ ἁθεόντα γίγνεται ἄλογα ἅλλα καὶ ἄκεκλος ἀλλὰ ἄμετα [ 'No, these are the only real things, but as they run through each other they become different objects at different times, yet they are throughout forever the same' (Wright)]. The point here is that although the elementals may participate in various apparent changes, these changes do not represent any genuine coming-to-be for the elementals. Empedocles only keeps his paragraph coherent if the epigenesis which is ruled out in lines 30-33 is additions to the stock of existing elementals. Such additions are rejected precisely because they represent cases of absolute generation, i.e. from nothing. So, when Empedocles asks, at line 32, τοῦτο δ' ἐπαναγίγνεθε τὸ πᾶν τῇ θε, καὶ πάντων ἡλικιον; ('and what, then, will cause this whole to increase, and whence will it come?'), the question must be rhetorical. There is no place from which such additions can come, for they must come from nothing. Here the language of growth clearly goes proxy for the language of generation, and as in Melissaeus, so also in Empedocles, the argument stays firmly centered on the impossibility of generation from nothing. Growth, then, is treated like any other alteration in existing things: as a case of coming-to-be. With the denial of coming-to-be goes the denial of growth.

It is generally difficult to use the evidence of Melissaeus, Empedocles or MKG to illuminate Parmenides; accordingly we take Calogero’s move in this direction only to supply suggestions for interpreting Parmenides. That far, the texts examined above suggest that if Parmenides were to argue against 'growth' (in τὸ ἐκ) he would do so by bringing to bear general arguments against coming-to-be. We will argue in III.b that such a pattern of argument can be found in lines 12ff., but that the target there is not growth. Only the alleged presence in B8.12ff. of an explicit argument against growth has prompted interpreters to take the questions in lines 6-7 to introduce two topics. It seems to us more plausible to take both questions to deal with only one phenomenon: coming-to-be. But it remains to us, having cleared this ground, to say what is the argument against coming-to-be in lines 6b-9a.

The core of the argument is at lines 8b-9a: οὐ γὰρ ζωτὸν οὐδὲ νοη-τὸν ἔστων ἐκούς ὡς ἔστων. This ban on the legitimacy of the sentence ἐκούς ὡς ἔστων is familiar to us from an earlier context (B2 and B6). According to the nominal theory of sentential meaning, the sentence could only be true if there is a situation (or state of affairs) of there being no situation (or state of affairs). But it is not possible for there to be a state of affairs which is just the state of affairs named by ‗there is no state of affairs‘. The semantic object required to make ἐκούς ὡς ἔστων true is an impossible object; the semantic operation of displaying such an object is a self-defeating
operation (the attempt to display the non-displayability of some state of affairs).\textsuperscript{25} In lines 6b-8a Parmenides extends the ban on ἐστὶ ὑμῖν ἔστιν to a ban on generation from nothing. Now, this will constitute an argument against the possibility of every instance of coming-to-be only if all coming-to-be is from nothing. That such an assumption underlies Parmenides' first argument against coming-to-be has been recognized before, but it is difficult to find in his text any direct evidence that Parmenides held the assumption.\textsuperscript{26} We are helped here by a point made by Schofield regarding the logic of generation:

The option Parmenides considers at lines 7-11, 'Can it come to be from not being/existing?', is surely most naturally interpreted as the idea which we all ordinarily accept as part and parcel of our concept of coming into being, namely that what has come to be did not exist before it did so. Now we allow no rivals to this idea. The likelihood that what comes to be comes from something which exists is certainly no rival to it, and indeed the two ideas co-exist comfortably in our minds. So it would be a sign of serious confusion in Parmenides if he had erected this latter idea into an alternative to that considered at lines 7-11.\textsuperscript{27}

Parmenides, then, does not need to make explicit his crucial assumption (that all generation is from nothing); it is built into the concept of generation itself.\textsuperscript{28} Whatever might be the mechanism of generation or the origins of a generated thing, that particular individual, before it came to be, simply was not, or was nothing. We may add that Melissus' argument in B1 at least proves that such a view was Eleatic: εἰ γὰρ ἐγένετο, ἀναγκαῖον ἐστι πρὸς γενέσθαι ἐστὶν μὴδὲν. We have seen, also, that both Melissus and Empedocles characteristically regard all acts of generation as generation from nothing.

Parmenides' first argument against coming-to-be, B8.6-9a, is complete, then, with the appeal to the result secured earlier in B2 and B6: the sentence ἐστὶ ὑμῖν ἔστιν is unintelligible. We will show below that his second argument, B8.9b-10, does not stray far from this center. Since the results of B2 and B6 flow directly out of the nominal theory of sentence meaning, we may anticipate that the whole of Parmenides' attack on generation will rest on his semantic theory. This latter result will be of no small importance for our understanding of the temporal character of τὸ ἐδώ which Parmenides establishes in B8.5-6. But now we are running ahead of our argument, the next stage of which is an analysis of Parmenides' second argument against coming-to-be.

The general sense of B8.9-10 is largely undisputed and is given by our translation: 'And what requirement impelled it, later or sooner, beginning from nothing, to begin to be?'. Parmenides asks what would be sufficient to cause τὸ ἐδώ, coming from nothing, to begin to be at any particular time. The expression τὸ ... ἔκδοσις is, admittedly, vague between 'what thing ... ?' and 'under what conditions ... ?'. This ambiguity is probably deliberate (see below), but in any case, as we will try to show, Parmenides' argument does not depend on attending to possible agents of generation but on attending to possible circumstances, and especially to the times for generation.\textsuperscript{29} This latter consideration will be valuable in settling one item of persistent debate: the force of τι in line 10.

When the argument of B8.9-10 is carefully and separately treated by modern commentators, it is commonly taken to rest on an appeal to the principle of sufficient reason.\textsuperscript{30} If X comes to be, it does so at some time or other, for some reason or other. This reason picks out circumstances, or state of affairs, which are severally necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for X's coming-to-be. Everything that exists or happens does so for some determinate reason or other; hence
for any generative event there is available some similar explanation for why it occurred rather than not occurring. \(^{31}\) We believe that this strategy for analysis of B8.9-10 is fundamentally correct, but that there is more to the argument than the principle of sufficient reason. Moreover, what more there is is important for explicating the content of line 5a. But before exploring these matters further, there is a challenge to be faced.

Barnes has recently offered a very different interpretation of our argument. Let \( \theta \) be any object, \( \alpha \) any rational agent, \( \tau \) any time, and (1) be the following principle: \(( \forall \alpha \exists \tau ) \) if at \( \tau \) \( \alpha \) thinks that \( \theta \) exists, then \( \theta \) exists at \( \tau \). Then Parmenides' argument can be paraphrased: 'If \( \theta \) does not exist at \( \tau \), then nothing can "rouse" it into existence, for it is not there to be "roused". And if we soften "rousing" into creating we are no better off: \( \alpha \) cannot create \( \theta \) at \( \tau \) unless he can think of \( \theta \) at \( \tau \). And since, ex hypothesi, \( \theta \) does not exist at \( \tau \), then by (1) \( \alpha \) cannot think of \( \theta \).' \(^{32}\) This is admirably economical and clear, and depends not at all on the principle of sufficient reason. However, for several reasons it seems doubtful.

In the first place, the focal point of Parmenides' argument seems not to be the non-existence of \( \tau \) \( \mu \hbar \) \( \lambda \dot{\omega} \nu \). With the phrase \( \tau \) \( \epsilon \sigma \nu \delta \upsilon \upsilon \epsilon \nu \delta \upsilon \delta \nu \varsigma \) \( \alpha \rho \delta \mu \epsilon \nu \sigma \nu \), "beginning from/as nothing", he gives his interlocutor that much. But he goes on to ask 'under what further conditions will the non-existent come to be'. In order for Parmenides' argument to work as Barnes supposes it does, Parmenides must deny that there are any possible such conditions because \( \theta \) does not exist. However, it does not follow from the fact that \( \theta \) does not exist (at any time) that no conditions can then obtain which are sufficient to produce \( \theta \). Neither does it follow from ' a cannot think of \( \theta \)' that no such conditions can obtain. In some sense, human parents cannot think of their non-existent progeny, since there is no individual for them to think about, but this does nothing to show that conditions do not (much less cannot) obtain for their coming-to-be. Finally, while Parmenides can allow, as a premise or starting point of the argument, that \( \theta \) does not exist, he cannot finish the argument with this premise still in place without rehabilitating in lines 9-10 what he denied in lines 8-9 (namely, that no negative existential claim is legitimate). This last point is made the more telling by the use of \( \delta \) in line 9: its effect is to look back to lines 8-9 and thus to join the two arguments together. By doing so, Parmenides has not left it open to him to shift the ground of his argument so radically that the earlier result can just be ignored. It does not yet appear, then, that our initial appeal to the principle of sufficient reason is mistaken. But there is a further, and logically stronger challenge to be met.

Supposing that the principle of sufficient reason does undergird Parmenides' argument in B8.9-10, is not appeal to it utterly vacuous? What is to prevent his interlocutors from giving a straightforward answer to the question \( \tau \) ... \( \chi \rho \delta \sigma \dot{\omega} \alpha \nu \dot{\omega} \varsigma \) ... \( \nu \upsilon \dot{\omega} \) ? We have not far to look for attempts to do just that, in appeals to a more or less divine intelligence which decides to create the world under determinate conditions answering to the desires or nature of the creating agent. Such explanations for the origins of the world are very old, and may even actually have been prompted by Parmenides' question. \(^{33}\) In one of his fragments, Anaxagoras tells us that the cosmic whirl or motion was initiated by the divine reason: \( \chi \alpha \lambda \tau \varsigma \nu \epsilon \epsilon \nu \chi \rho \lambda \alpha \delta \rho \upsilon \nu \sigma \upsilon \nu \sigma \)
appearance of new things. Nevertheless, there is still a strong sense that intentional actions lie at the root of such events and give the most satisfactory explanation for their occurrence.

As is well known, the theme is played out most fully in Plato’s account of the creation of the world in *Timaeus* 31a-b, 41a-b, the latter passage especially emphasizing the will of the creating agent: ἐσθ’ ἔσθ’ ἐσθ’, ἐν ἐγκεκρίτικές πατήρ θέρην ... ἔλαυν ἐμᾶς γε μὴ ἐθνάντως ... We cannot follow further the many exegetical and philosophical points which arise in connexion with Plato’s appeal to the creative will of a god, much less its ramifications in the ancient history of the exegesis of the *Timaeus*. It is enough for our purpose to notice that among several of Parmenides’ successors, and especially those who attempt to revive cosmogony, there is a persistent tendency to ground coming-to-be in the intentionality of creative agents. Moreover, if Parmenides is demanding, at 88.9–10, a sufficient reason for any act of generation, would not appeal to an agent’s intentions at least *prima facie* meet the requirement? While some further explanation could doubtless be demanded for the agent’s desires, such an explanatory regress is not vicious and does nothing to mitigate the sufficiency of the opening move.

However, this is moving too fast, for there is available another account of Parmenides’ argument in 88.9–10 which takes it to depend on a principle close to, but not identical with the principle of sufficient reason, and which will shut off even the line of reply sketched above. We have already noted that Parmenides’ question has a special interest in the temporal conditions for coming-to-be, and it is with his little phrase ὅστερον ἀπράξιν that we have now to deal. In what follows we seek to show that Parmenides’ argument in 88.9–10 does not exploit the
principle of sufficient reason, but its close relative, the identity of indiscernibles. Among its other advantages, this interpretation will serve to illuminate the connexion between this argument and Parmenides’ first argument against generation (88.6-9).

The phrase δοτερον ἐπὶ τὸ ἐσπέρεν is usually translated in one of three different ways. It may be taken to be a ‘polar expression’, equivalent to ‘never’. This translation seems to be the least likely to be correct. Elsewhere, Parmenides uses τότε for ‘for any t, at t’ (87.1; 8.5, 12, 21) and it is odd that variation from this usage should have no bearing on his argument, as it has none for Stokes or Barnes. Indeed, this translation simply leaves us with either the plain appeal to the principle of sufficient reason with which we began our analysis of the argument, or with the appeal to non-existence (Barnes). On this showing the temporal clause serves to generalize the point at issue, but does not illuminate the argument any further. The polar translation also has against it the evidence of Simplicius who takes the phrase as a simple disjunction: καὶ διὰ τὰ δὴ τότε, ἀλλὰ μὴ καὶ δοτερον ἐπὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τὸ ἐσπέρεν; (In Phys. 78.26-27). While it is not possible simply to rule out the polar translation of δοτερον ἐπὶ τὸ ἐσπέρεν, it seems to be the least likely of our choices. Simplicius introduces the second version, and the one which we regard as most likely to be correct.

It is perhaps the most common rendering to translate our phrase as a simple disjunction: ‘later or sooner’. Since we regard the third version (see below) as yielding an interpretation of Parmenides’ argument that is equivalent to that yielded by this second translation, we will here explore the ramifications of the second version in detail. On this present view of the temporal phrase in line 10, Parmenides’ argument may seem to go like this: supposing X comes into existence at time t, then, in the absence of any good reason to the contrary, we have as good reason to suppose that it came into existence at t−n or at t+n (for arbitrary n units of time), as that it did so at t. Since the argument is perfectly general, the conclusion must be that all times have equally good claims to be the time of the generation of X and thus X came to be at no particular time at all, either having always existed or never having existed. But, now, surely this is going too fast, for reasons cannot be offered for preferring one time over any other as the time of generation: e.g., if we know that a creative agent willed that X should come to be at a particular time. So far we have only succeeded in making Parmenides’ argument into a kind of counter-assertion that no sufficient reason can be found to distinguish one candidate time from all others.

We can improve our interpretation of Parmenides’ argument at 88.9-10 by looking more closely at the times. Suppose that we possess a sufficient reason to select some time t as the time for the generation of X, over against either t−n or t+n (for arbitrary n units of time). Then something must be true of t which is not true of t−n or t+n, again for arbitrary n. Indeed, therein lies the claim for any reason to be a sufficient one: it is some truth that suffices to distinguish one time from all others either sooner or later. What can be Parmenides’ objection to our offering such a sufficient reason? It will be just that any such differential claim entails the truth of the sentence ὅπως ὅπως ἑπιτοῦ where the subject of ἑπιτοῦ can be left unspecified. In order for t to be differentiated from all other times sooner or later, t must have some property (whether logically simple or complex) which no other
time has. If we call the property \( \psi \), then our differential claim is just equivalent to '\( \psi (t) \) is true', and this requires that \( \psi (t-n) \sim \psi (t+n) \) be true. In order for this latter statement to be true, some negative predication must be true. This can be recast as a negative existential (that such and such a property is not instantiated), and Parmenides' semantic theory rules this out as illegitimate. Indeed, the illegitimacy of such claims was recalled in the lines immediately preceding our argument, and our argument has been directed back to those lines by the particle \( \delta \) in line 9.

On this view of it, Parmenides' argument in 88.9-10 turns out to be an appeal to the identity of indiscernibles, with times rather than objects as the points of application of the principle. \( ^{41} \) The point of the argument, then, is that no time can be offered as the time at which \( X \) comes to be without the description of this time entail the legitimacy of language that Parmenides has ruled incoherent by way of his semantic theory. So long as every answer to the question \( \tau' \ldots \chi\rho\sigma\iota\theta\varsigma \) \( \epsilon\rho\omicron\alpha\nu \ldots \rho\omicron\nu \) must ascribe to times some differentiating properties Parmenides can invoke his theoretic ban on negative existentials to rule out the attempted differentiation. \( ^{42} \) We can now see why Parmenides ties his second argument against coming-to-be to his first: the second argument is not complete without the rule in lines 8-9. We can also understand why so many commentators find the principle of sufficient reason at the root of the argument, for the identity of indiscernibles is logically a near neighbor to the principle of sufficient reason. \( ^{43} \) But appeal to the principle of sufficient reason leaves unclear the role in Parmenides' argument of the phrase \( \delta\omicron\tau\rho\epsilon\omicron\omicron \) \( \chi\rho\delta\sigma\epsilon\nu \), and fails entirely to illuminate the link between this second argument against coming-to-be and the first argument in lines 8-9. The principle of indiscernibility seems to us to provide a much more satisfactory account of both of these details of Parmenides' presentation. \( ^{44} \)

It will be seen readily that the third translation of \( \delta\omicron\tau\rho\epsilon\omicron\omicron \) \( \chi\rho\delta\sigma\epsilon\nu \), as 'later rather than sooner', yields an equivalent expansion of Parmenides' argument. \( ^{45} \) If \( X \) comes to be at \( \tau \), then \( \tau \) can be distinguished from all earlier times \( \tau-n \) (for arbitrary \( n \)) only if something is true of \( \tau \) that is not true of any earlier time. The inference to \( \delta\omicron\nu \chi\rho\alpha\omicron \) \( \epsilon\omicron\tau\omicron\nu \) follows at once, and with it the dismissal, again on the grounds of indiscernibility, of every specimen time. Consequently, \( X \) never comes to be and can never come to be. \( ^{46} \) Both the emphasis on times and the link to lines 8-9 are preserved on this interpretation of the temporal phrase. But the translation of \( \delta\omicron\tau\rho\epsilon\omicron\omicron \) \( \chi\rho\delta\sigma\epsilon\nu \) as 'later rather than sooner' is grammatically suspect. Standardly, \( \chi\rho\delta\sigma\epsilon\nu \) only appears with the force of 'rather than' in conjunction with other expressions of comparison, e.g. in phrases like \( \mu\omicron\epsilon\tau\zeta\omicron \), \( \mu\epsilon\lambda\lambda\omicron \), with \( \chi\rho\delta\sigma\epsilon\nu \) only where it carries comparative force, or with verbs of choosing or wishing. \( ^{47} \) On this showing, then, \( \chi\rho\delta\sigma\epsilon\nu \) can take on a comparative color from surrounding expressions, but it is very difficult to see that \( \delta\omicron\tau\rho\epsilon\omicron\omicron \) \( \chi\rho\delta\sigma\epsilon\nu \) will have comparative force. It is preferable, then, to translate the phrase as a disjunction, 'later or sooner'.

Parmenides' position, at 88.9-10, then, is that no specification of the beginning of anything can succeed without also entailing the legitimacy of \( \delta\omicron\nu \chi\rho\alpha\omicron \). With \( \delta\omicron\nu \chi\rho\alpha\omicron \) banned, no time can be given
for the generation of anything just because times cannot be
differentiated from one another, and where all times are alike all times
are the same time.48 The strategy of this second argument against
coming-to-be is recognizably related to the ancient argument form ὡς
μᾶλλον, exploited in this case with regard to a failure of identity.
Arguments very similar to Parmenides' can be found elsewhere and its
connection with identity claims also has some striking ancient parallels.
We can complete our treatment of the arguments against generation,
and perhaps further allay the charge that our interpretation of 88.9-10 is
merely speculative, by advertizing briefly to these parallels.

At Physics 252a 14-19 Aristotle argues regarding a first beginning
of motion, that if its beginning at a particular moment of time rather
than any earlier time (μᾶλλον οὖν πρῶτου) is of no importance (γεγονός
ὅτι ἐντὸς ἡμερών ἐννοεῖν ἔλεγον), i.e. if it is all one whether the motion
begins at the specified time or any earlier time, then there is no
natural explanation for this origin of motion (οὐκέτα φύσεως ἔργον).
Unless the origin of motion is to be a mere λογική φύσις, it cannot be
merely a matter of indifference whether it begins now rather than at any
earlier time. Our ability to rationally explain the origin of motion
thus rests on our prior ability to identify possible times and to
distinguish them from one another. Should we fail to be able to
distinguish the times from one another, then no rational account of such
origins of motion can be given.

At De Caelo 283a 11-14 we get an argument about the generation and
destruction of the world, which begins by asking why either event should
be supposed to happen at one particular time rather than any other time
(τὸ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τῶν τῶν οὐκετοῦ ... ἐφαδίμ). By exploiting
distinctively Aristotelian notions of modality, the argument shows that
where all specimen times are alike, neither of these events (generation
or destruction) is possible. In this argument, as in the previous
example, if the putative events are to be intelligible at all, the times
at which they occur must be distinguishable from all other times, such
that it is not all one whether the events happen now or at some other
time. In the event that times cannot be fully individuated, the events
in question become unintelligible. It will be enough to show that the
times cannot be individuated if nothing can be said truly of one time
which is not true of any other.

Our third example is also found in the De Caelo at 295b 10-16, but
this argument is reported to have been used by Anaximander and others
who are unnamed (a very similar version appears in Plato, Phaedo
108e-109a). Aristotle is quick to disavow the cogency of the argument,
on the ground that it proves things which are contrary to fact. The
argument seeks to show why the earth keeps its place at the center of
the universe. The explanation is sought in the ὑμοῦσιν ἐγὼ that the earth
bears to the rest of the world. Having no impulse to move in any one
direction rather than in any other (opposed) direction, and simultaneous
motion in opposite directions being impossible, it remains balanced at
the center. This argument is not, now, about times, but it still
depends on connecting the possibility of motion with differences among
the relational properties of the moving thing. Since the earth's
spatial relational properties are indifferently alike, the earth does
not move. This argument testifies to both the antiquity of arguments of
the οὐ μᾶλλον kind and their extension to what we regard as relational
properties.49 It also shows the intimate link between οὐ μᾶλλον
strategies and questions of identity and the differentiation of properties.

Οὐ μᾶλλον strategies became well-known and widely used after Aristotle, despite the tendency, when full generalized, for such arguments to self-destruction. ⁵⁰ Our interest in such arguments is solely in their early connexions with problems of identity. Where a thesis depends for its intelligibility on offering (or being able to offer) differentia for the times and places of events, or for properties (monadic or polyadic) of things, failure to provide uniquely identifying predicates for these properties gave grounds for rejecting the thesis in question. If our analysis of Parmenides' argument in B8.9-10 is correct, then he also has availed himself of something very similar to an οὐ μᾶλλον strategy, and in close connexion with problems of identity and discernibility. In arguing thus, he has very neatly tied together both of his arguments against coming-to-be, and has done so around the semantic theory which has been informing his argument from the beginning. The centerpiece, then, of the arguments against generation in the claim in lines 8-9: οὐ ... φατὶν οὐδὲ νοητὴν έστιν ήταν οὐδὲ έστιν. He has applied it alternately to one condition for generation (being nothing) and then to another condition (occurring at a particular time). It remains for him to collect his conclusions, beginning in line 11. It will be convenient for us to discuss all of B8.11-18 before returning to the problems of lines 5-6a and 19-21.

III. B8.11-18:

(a) B8.11: the fullness of Being.

The arguments in B8.6-10 showed that generation from nothing is not possible, and that there is no time at which any existent thing comes to be. The immediate conclusion is drawn in line 11: 'It is thus necessary either fully to be or (fully) not to be' (οὖν οὐδέν τὸ τελέσθων χρείαν έστιν οὐκέτ' ). In view of the arguments which Parmenides has used to reach this conclusion, we take the expression τὸ τελέσθων to represent a temporal exposition of the completeness of Parmenides' subject, τὸ έδώ. ⁵¹ There is no time at which it comes to be, and this is just equivalent to there being no deficiency in the existence of τὸ έδώ, no degrees of reality. The alternative is for τὸ έδώ to be totally or fully non-existent, there being no time for it to come to be out of non-existence. Since τὸ έδώ just is 'the real', the disjunct οὐκέτ' is not possible. The real, then, turns out to be necessarily fully real on pain of being nothing at all. ⁵²

With this first conclusion, Parmenides begins to draw some dividends from his two arguments against generation. For several reasons, it is difficult not to take line 11 with the two succeeding lines, and probably we should punctuate with a comma at the end of line 11. ⁵³ In the first place, οὕτως, after the combination ἢ ... ἢ, has continuative force and, on almost any reading of the content of lines 12-13, introduces a thought which carries on from line 11. In the second place, line 11 has a modal force, supplied by χρείαν έτυπ', and this is also carried over in lines 12-13, with οὕτως κατ'. In the third place, the point reached in lines 12-13 is secured by the strength of πίστε ('conviction' or perhaps 'true conviction'). Now πίστε is an accomplishment of the way of truth (B1.30, cf. B2.4), and its 'strength' or 'power' derives not only from the fact of its truth, but also from
the arguments which display this truth. Parmenides makes this clear at B8.28: it is πρότετος ἄληθες that drives out γένεσις καὶ διέλευσις, and this can only refer to the arguments propounded in B8.6-10. Mention of the force or strength of πρότετος in line 12, then, directs our attention back to these same arguments. For all of these reasons, then, it seems best to link lines 12-13 closely with line 11 as a continuation of Parmenides’ effort to draw out the implications of his two arguments against generation.

With the introduction of lines 12-13 we arrive at another interpretative crux in B8. These lines have occasioned intense discussion, some of which we have already anticipated in our earlier treatment of line 7 (τῆς πάθεως ἀληθείας; ), but which must now be treated in full.

(b) B8.12-13: the completeness of Being.

In the light of the preceding comments, our preliminary translation includes line 11:

It is thus necessary either fully to be or (fully) not to be, and moreover never will the strength of true conviction allow anything additional to what-is to come to be from nothing.

This translation begs numerous questions of text and syntax, all of which will be treated in due course. The first such is a challenge to the traditional text of line 12.

It is often felt that Parmenides’ argument against generation is asymmetrical, failing in B8.6-11 to deal with generation from what already exists. If Parmenides is to secure for τὸ ἐὸν the epithet ἀληθεύοντος then surely he must exclude both generation from nothing and generation from what is. This view of the logical requirements of Parmenides’ argument is often reinforced by ancient reports of arguments against generation which come in the full dilemma form (i.e. rejecting generation from nothing and from what is). It appears from these sources that Parmenides could have argued in the same fashion. Finally, it is also often felt that οὖν in line 7a signals the first limb of a dilemma, demanding a corresponding second limb which is found in lines 12-13 by a simple emendation of line 12. The most commonly accepted emendation of this line is Heinhardt’s: to read οὐδὲ τοῦτ’ ἐκ τοῦ ἐόντος, κατ. instead of οὐδὲ τοῦτ’ ἐκ μὴ ἐόντος, κατ. With this emendation we appear to satisfy at once the demands of logic, grammar, and tradition. But we must now ask whether any of these demands are justified and whether a cogent reading can be given for lines 12-13 without emending the text. We will begin our reply with the requirements of logic.

The common view is that there are three possibilities: there is no coming-to-be, or there is coming to be from nothing (ἐκ μὴ ἐόντος), or there is coming-to-be from something (ἐκ ἐόντος), and if Parmenides is to prove the first disjunct true he must prove both of the others false. But there are good reasons to suppose, on the contrary, that the dilemmatic interpretation distorts the grounds for and structure of Parmenides’ thinking about generation. In the process, the dilemma also misses an important set of characteristics of his subject, τὸ ἐὸν.

According to B8.6-10 Parmenides’ thesis is that τὸ ἐὸν never undergoes generation, where generation is expressed as γένεσιν ... ἐκ μὴ
Parmenides is right to regard all generation as 'from nothing'. Parmenides' worry is precisely with whatever it is that is generated: that thing, or that state of affairs once was-not. But to say that something once was not is to introduce (or seek to display) an empty state of affairs about which we can neither discourse nor think. For Parmenides every generation is like this, and surely he is right: if generation occurs something new appears, some addition is made to the stock of things (or state of affairs) and that new thing once was not. It now appears that the introduction into Parmenides' argument of generation ές ἔδωκε misconstrues his argument on several levels. It misconstrues the formal character of the argument in the direction of the material or causal conditions for generation. More importantly, it suggests a topic which Parmenides can take up as of equal importance with generation ές μη ἔδωκε only if Parmenides misunderstands the force of his own analysis. For even if there is generation from previously existing things or stuff, what is generated once was nothing. Parmenides quite properly neglects generation ές ἔδωκε because it presupposes generation ex nihilo. To treat the two dilemmatically will represent a distinct failure to grasp the logic of generation.

The demands of logic not requiring the dilemma, as is commonly supposed, we must now pass to a consideration of the ancient parallels to Parmenides' alleged dilemma. A fresh look at the testimonia suggests that ancient comment does not support the view that Parmenides argued against generation by a dilemma.

Aristotle, in the Physics 191a 24-31, reports that 'those who first investigated the world philosophically' ( ἐποιήσαντες δὲ κατὰ ἑλεόσουσιν ηγομένου ) had argued that generation must be either ές μη ἔδωκε or ές
Certainly Simplicius thought that it was an Eleatic argument, for he variously ascribes it to Parmenides or Melissus on several occasions, though not always with perfect consistency. 64 It is singularly curious, however, that Simplicius never points to the dilemma in Parmenides’ text, and never offers to emend B8.12 in order to produce the dilemma. Neither does he ever by direct quotation show that Melissus had used the dilemma. Indeed, the best that he can do with Melissus is to quote Bl as evidence that Melissus used ‘the common axiom’ of Anaxagoras (that nothing comes to be from nothing) to disprove γένεσις τούτων (in Phys. 162, 23-24: τὸ ἀρχαῖον τὸ δύστος ἢκέλεξεν τῇ κοινῇ τοῦτον χρόνους ἀδύνατον). But as we have seen earlier, Melissus Bl supports the view that all generation is from nothing, and not the dilemma. There is, then, a certain looseness in the evidence from both Aristotle and Simplicius. We are not required by their reports to assign the dilemma to Parmenides (or indeed to Melissus). Now, then, shall we account for especially its appearance in Aristotle in such close association with the Eleatics?

According to the MXG (979b 26-33) Gorgias the sophist argued against the possibility of generation in the form of a dilemma. A similar argument is recorded for him by Sextus Empiricus, but this later report is pretty obviously under the influence of Aristotle and the earlier MXG is preferable as a source for the original argument. 65 Gorgias uses the argument within a larger dilemma, to deny that anything exists. This is not an Eleatic thesis, but what of the argument itself? In the MXG version the negative limb is defended by appeal to the dictum that nothing comes to be from nothing (and if τὸ μὴ ἢν were something, then we revert to the positive limb). The positive limb is given the
following rationale (I give the Oxford translation): '... nothing could come to be out of either Being or Not-Being. For if Being were to change, it would no longer be Being...'. We are not told why, if τὸ ἄν changes, it must cease to be what it was, but judging from the general tenor of the context, Gorgias probably regarded this as obvious. At all events, this account of the positive limb illuminates the one we find in Aristotle, Physica 1.8. There the point is that nothing comes to be from τὸ ἄν because τὸ ἄν already is, i.e., already exists and exists as itself. The suggestion seems to be that were τὸ ἄν to generate something it would no longer exist as what it once was, having, ex hypothesi, turned into something new. The emphasis on generation as substantial change is compatible, then, with the argument as Aristotle gives it. This does not, of course show that Aristotle had the argument from Gorgias (by however an indirect route). But it does allow us to say that he could have had it from Gorgias.

At the very least, then, the ancient testimony to the use of our dilemma does not constrain us to suppose that Parmenides argued against coming-to-be in similar fashion. If the ancient sources were our only guide, then a choice between supplying Parmenides with the dilemma or settling for the argument as our MSS deliver it at B8.12-13 would be perilous indeed. But they are not the only consideration. In conjunction with the logical argument developed earlier, it seems to us best to firmly reject the suggestion that Parmenides argued for ἄνέκουσιν by means of a dilemma. But this still leaves it open precisely how we should interpret B8.12-13, and to this task we now turn.

We are left with the following text for B8.12-13: οὐδὲ τὸν ἴ ἐν ἄν ἐντὸς ἔφη σὺν τὸ ἄν καὶ ἄν ἔχει ἄντος ὁμοίως. There are two main lines of interpretation open to us, depending on how we take the last phrase, τὴν παρ’ αὐτῷ. Our sentence can be taken to mean that from what-is-not never comes anything except what-is-not. On this view, the referent of αὐτὸ in τὸ ἴ ἐνν and the whole sentence restates the thesis of B8.6-9: nothing comes to be from nothing. The best alternative to this view is that γινεσθαι τὴν παρ’ αὐτῷ refers to the generation of something alongside of τὸ ἴν, i.e. αὐτό (as at B8.6) refers to τὸ ἴν. On this view of it, these lines prove an important corollary of the arguments in B8.6-10, the corollary serving to complete Parmenides' conclusion to those arguments: τὸ ἴν, because it never suffers coming-to-be, also does not suffer any addition from not-being, its existence is complete. Since not both of these interpretations can be true for B8.12-13, we must now decide which is the more cogent.

The first of these two interpretations probably should now be regarded as a minority view, though not therefore a negligible one. Much of lines 12-18 is repetitious of lines 6-11 and it would not be especially surprising for Parmenides to repeat his judgement that nothing comes to be from nothing. Moreover, lines 12-13 stress the necessity for (with οὐδὲ τὸν) as well as the grounds for, the ban on coming-to-be. (This latter is true if the phrase παρὰ τούτῳ refers to the arguments in lines 6-10.) Stress on the modality of Parmenides' conclusion is cogent as prudent underscoring of a conclusion reached by an obscure and difficult argument (i.e. B8.9-10). There can be no cogent objection to this reading of B8.12-13 on the ground that it posits the existence of non-being, for as we have seen ἐκ ἴ ἐντὸς
only signal the replacement of one state of affairs by another. So far as it goes, then, our first interpretation is plausible.

Nevertheless, it seems to me that the second interpretation of B8.12-13 is preferable. In the first place, it seems to be the most natural way of taking γένεσθαι το παρά τοῦ to say that it signifies the coming-to-be of something alongside of τὸ ἔσῳ. This is especially so in the light of B8.36–37: οὕτως γὰρ ἦ τὸ ἵππος ἦ τὸ ἔσῳ ἄλλο πάσης τοῦ ἅλατος. Not only is the language of this later passage very close to that of B8.13, but Parmenides' argument here is that τὸ ἔσῳ is all there is to refer to (see further chapter 5.2). Accordingly, αὑτό in B8.13 ought to refer to it also. In the second place, as Schofield has noted, it is natural for Parmenides to add to the ban on generation the corollary that the stock of existing things does not increase by any additions. This is readily taken to be a further elucidation of πᾶσαν κτίσιν in line 10: τὸ ἔσῳ is complete in the sense of suffering no external additions. Moreover, we have seen this pattern of reasoning before.

As we saw earlier, Melissus argues against a whole class of phenomena (έτεροι), including 'coming-to-be-more' (ἐκτείνεται) on the ground that such phenomena represent absolute destruction (of τὸ πρῶτον ἔσῳ) and generation (of τὸ ὕπατον ἔσῳ. MXG 974a 1–9 ascribes to Melissus the same pattern of reasoning: προσγενέσθαι is excluded precisely because it represents an absolute coming-to-be of τὸ πλήθος. Once again, additions to (or changes in) the stock of things are excluded by extending to them the ban on absolute generation. Empedocles' argument against ἐκγενεσθαι (B17. 30–35) follows the same strategy. The argument is that nothing increases the stock of existing things because they are all there is and anything else would only come to be from nothing, which is impossible. Nothing prevents there being an apparently multiform and ever-changing array of existing things, on Empedocles' view, but in reality there exist only the four roots and Love and Strife. We are farther away from Parmenides here, but still the fundamental strategy is to extend the ban on generation from nothing to a ban on additions to what-is. The pattern of argumentation found in two of Parmenides' followers goes to further support our interpretation of B8.12-13.

The first of the two interpretations of B8.12-13 canvassed above has two other shortcomings. On that view, lines 12-13 are entirely repetitious, making no advance in the argument of B8. While Parmenides does occasionally recapitulate his arguments (on almost any showing, lines 15-18 recapitulate earlier points), it is unusual for him to do so without the added aim of further elucidating old results or of extending them. Finally, lines 11 and 13-15 (see further below) make advances in Parmenides' argument, so should we not also read lines 12-13 in such fashion as to secure a similar argumentative advance? It will be our view, then, that B8.12-13 concludes the argument begun in line 6, and does so by taking a dividend of the arguments in lines 6-10. The dividend is just the exclusion from τὸ ἔσῳ of any external additions or accretions. This mood of dividend-taking carries over into line 13b, by way of τοῦ εἴκοσι, and Parmenides there establishes an important advance on his earlier results: the exclusion of διαλύσθαι. Precisely how Parmenides achieves this advance is more than a little problematic, and so we turn now to consider B8.13-15.
(c) B8.13-15: the argument against destruction.

We translate B8.13-15 as follows: 'Therefore Justice allows neither coming-to-be nor perishing (as if she were releasing her fetters), but holds them fast.' This translation begs a number of philological and syntactical issues, which will now be treated in some detail. Their treatment will open the way to a philosophical commentary on this part of Parmenides' poem.

The first issue is the meaning and force of τοῦ εὖνεκεν. Standardly in Epic usage this phrase means 'therefore', and we will need especially strong reasons to depart from this rendering. None such are to hand, so we take it in the usual way. [Loenen suggested that τοῦ referred to τὸ ἐδο (as also αὐτὸ in line 13a), τοῦ εὖνεκεν having the sense of 'for the sake of which'. This is grammatically possible, but an unusual usage and one which obscures the argumentative connexion between lines 13-15 and what precedes then. But lines 13-15 require such a connexion, for, as we will see, they seek to adduce a new conclusion from Parmenides' earlier arguments.] What is new in B8.13-15 is the exclusion, together with coming-to-be (γενόσθαν), of destruction (Δλησθαν). This exclusion is secured by way of the arguments which precede line 13. But since it does not follow from lines 12-13 that both coming-to-be and destruction are impossible, we must attach lines 13-14 to the arguments in lines 6-10, τοῦ εὖνεκεν reaching back to the arguments which opened this section of the poem and lines 13-15 being parallel to lines 12-13 (in their dependence on lines 6-10). A more careful account of the derivation of lines 13-15 from lines 6-10 will follow in our philosophical commentary below. We must first complete our budget of syntactical issues.

At four other places in his poem Parmenides uses repeated οὐτε, and in all of them their use is either clearly or at least arguably coordinating. It is likely, then, that repeated οὐτε in B8.13-14 (οὐτε γενόσθαν οὔτε Δλησθαν) serves simply to coordinate the denial of Δλησθαν with the denial of γενόσθαν. It is tempting to take οὐτε ... οὐτε to effect a more complex coordination here, as meaning 'just as ... so ...'. Then the argument is that perishing is excluded for the same reasons that coming-to-be was excluded earlier. That this is the point of Parmenides' argument, however, does not rest on this simple (and disputable) syntactical observation. The link drawn between lines 13-15 and lines 6-10, by τοῦ εὖνεκεν, already makes it very likely that Parmenides moves to the impossibility of destruction by way of the arguments against coming-to-be. That this is his argument is also suggested by line 15: ἂ δὲ κρασὺς περὶ τοὺς νυ, ντι. The point of lines 15-18 will concern us more later, but the opening phrases are enough to show that Parmenides regards Δλησθαν to fail for exactly the same reasons as does γενόσθαν. But now I have both translated lines 13-15 and begun to interpret them as if the infinitives Δλησθαν and γενόσθαν were the objects of the finite verb αὖνε and this requires some defense.

The central syntactical issue in B8.13-15 is supplying the objects of the verbs αὖνε and ἔχει. There are two possibilities: either the infinitives γενόσθαν and Δλησθαν, in their capacity as verbal nouns, are the objects of both verbs, or else τὸ ἐδο is to be understood as their object. Not all of the arguments against the first choice are
cogent. For example, Frankel objected that the infinitives cannot be objects and also anarthrous, but this is false. Bormann complains that this construe lends reality to the processes of coming-to-be and passing-away, and thus runs contrary to Parmenides' own argument. But this is a non sequitur. There can be no objection to mentioning coming-to-be and perishing, and this is all that Parmenides' syntax need be taken to effect. Moreover, if the objection is upheld here, then it is also a problem elsewhere (e.g. B8.21 and 27-28), and hence is not specific to the syntax of lines 13-15. But these are not yet the main reasons for taking τὸ ἔδω to be the (unexpressed) object of the finite verbs in lines 13-15.

The image of 'bonds' or 'fetters' (πέδραν) recurs elsewhere, with slight variations of vocabulary, and in those other contexts it is always τὸ ἔδω which is bound or fettered or shackled and shackled by necessity. This has lead many commentators to suppose that it must be τὸ ἔδω which is fettered in B8.13-15 also. The image conveys the impossibility of τὸ ἔδω ever suffering either coming-to-be or passing-away. But Parmenides is also prepared to use similarly forceful language about coming-to-be and passing-away themselves: at B8.21 they are both 'extinguished' (ἀπέσβησαν), and at B8.28 they are 'driven far away' (τὴν μάλιστα ἐκλαγέσαν). This being so, there can be little objection to the claim that Parmenides might describe the ban on coming-to-be and destruction in the language of bondage also. Moreover, since B8.6 the explicit subject of Parmenides' arguments has been coming-to-be, the process itself, and not τὸ ἔδω which remains in the background. It would be odd for Parmenides now to shift his ground to a treatment of τὸ ἔδω and not make the shift more explicit. I conclude that Diels' construe of the verbs in B8.13-15 is the better one. This being so, we take it that in these lines Parmenides has introduced a new task: the exclusion of destruction (or passing-away). The association of this task with ὑς may represent the modality of the argument: that passing-away is necessarily excluded, i.e. is impossible. However this may be, we must now give some attention to the logical form of this new stage in Parmenides' argument, and thus complete our analysis of B8.13-15.

At B8.3 Parmenides prepares us for the exclusion, with coming-to-be, of destruction, by announcing ὅτι ἀγέννητον ἔδω καὶ ἀνάλεξον ἐστίν. At B8.21 he takes it that both coming-to-be and destruction have been excluded. Moreover, at B8.27f. and 40 he recapitulates their joint exclusion as an established result from which further conclusions may be drawn. For such references to destruction to be plausible he must suppose that one or more of the arguments between B8.3 and line 21 serves to exclude destruction. But nowhere in those lines can we find an argument which explicitly and directly treats of ἐλέεσος. It is commonly supposed, therefore, that Parmenides regards the arguments against coming-to-be in B8.6-10 also to bear against ἐλέεσος, and that B8.13-15 reflect the equal efficacy of these arguments against both processes. But how is this to be analysed? The impossibility of coming-to-be (whether from nothing or from something or both) does not obviously involve the impossibility of ἐλέεσος. However, once we recall the rationale for the two arguments in B8.6-10, the implication comes into clearer focus. As we have shown, the arguments in B8.6-10 both depend on the view that ὅτι ἀγέννητον ἐστίν is
unintelligible (οὐ... ὁταῦτο οὐκ ἔχειμο). Now, the claim that what-is does perish will be equivalent to the claim that τὸ ἔνων becomes τὸ μὴ ἔνων. If X, which exists, is destroyed, then X is not, and a state of affairs 'that X is not' has come to be (true). But if no claim ἐστιν ὁταῦτο ἔστιν can be true, then neither can there be any true claim that any existent thing has become non-existent. (Moreover, such a becoming will represent an instance of coming-to-be.) So the argument against ἔλεκτρος is the same as the argument against coming-to-be, and indeed destruction is just another kind of coming-to-be, namely of negative states of affairs, or τὸ μὴ ἔνων. It is right to say that Parmenides excludes passing-away by the arguments in B 6.6-10, and that lines 13-15 record this further implication of the earlier arguments. But we will not clearly uncover the implication without recalls the rationale for the earlier arguments, a rationale we have shown to be firmly grounded in Parmenides' theory of sentence meaning. This point is driven home by Parmenides in the lines which follow (B 8.15-18) and to them we now turn.

(d) B 8.15-18: the philosophical rationale recalled.

B 8.15-18 may be translated as follows:

The decision about these matters rests in this: (it) is or (it) is not. In fact, it has already been decided, as was necessary, to leave the one (path) inconceivable and unnameable (for it is not a true path), and that the other (path) both should be and should be true.

We take it that with these lines Parmenides reminds us of two things. The first is that the simple dichotomy 'is or is not' allows us to pronounce decisively on the possibility of three different things: anything being added to τὸ ἔνων (lines 12-13), as well as τὸ ἔνων coming to be absolutely, or perishing absolutely (taking all three to fall within the scope of τοῦ ἔλεκτρον). In so far as each of these three possibilities entails that something not-be, they are deliverances of that path of inquiry which was declared unintelligible in B 2 and B 6. We are further reminded that the decision has already been taken (νένομιτο). One of the paths, that one the success of which rests on the cogency of coming-to-be, destruction and addition, has been shown to be impossible. Moreover, with the epithets ἀνώποιον ἀναφυσε μοι have been reminded of what was intrinsically wrong with that path: its deliverances answer to no possible state of affairs, and hence are inconceivable and inexpressible. That they are also ἀναφυσεμοι reminds us that the statements comprising this path will achieve canonical status only if they succeed in naming some state of affairs.

In this way Parmenides completes the argument begun in B 8.6 with a recapitulation which reaches back to the earlier results of B 2 and B 6, which underscores the unity of his argument in B 8.6ff., and which serves to make the whole of B 8.6-18 pregnant. That is, the rationale of the argument of lines 6-18 is rooted in Parmenides' semantic theory, and invites expansion beyond even what has been drawn from it thus far. Not only do the three possibilities examined in B 8.6-18 depend on ἔστιν ἀνώποιον ἐστιν, but so do others. In the paragraphs following B 8.25 Parmenides will draw out of his semantic rationale further dividends and corollaries. Before he goes on to do so, however, there is a major
transformation of the argument to be examined: the application of it to the temporal character of τὸ ἔν. This transformation is effected in lines 5-6a and recapitulated in lines 19-21. Also, the argument of lines 22-25 is required to secure two of the epithets in 5-6a (ἐν, συνεχὲς). The rest of this chapter will be devoted to these last three contexts.

IV. The temporality of the Real (R8.5-6a).

We translate R8.5-6a thus: 'Nor yet was it ever nor will it (ever) be, since it is now, all of it together, one and continuous' (οὐδὲ τὸ ἐν οὐδὲ ἔσται, ἐκείνῳ ἡμῶν ἄμως τὰν, ἐν, συνεχὲς). This translation needs little defense, being almost universally accepted. More nuanced versions derive from giving τῷ a sense it probably cannot bear: 'at some particular time by contrast with others', and this suggestion has not persuaded many. Attention has naturally focused on line 5 where Parmenides appears to offer a characterisation of the temporal properties of τὸ ἔν. This carries on from the list of ὅμισθα in lines 3-4, the link being secured by οὐδὲ. The characterisation has been interpreted in either of two ways. It has been taken to ascribe to τὸ ἔν an atemporal mode of existence, by way of a tenseless 'is' (ἔστων), and with the elimination of 'was' and 'will be'. This amounts to the claim that there cannot be any tensed discourse about τὸ ἔν, i.e. that the only appropriate discourse about it is tenseless in just the sense that we regard mathematical truths as tenselessly true. On this view, the function of οὐδὲ ... οὐδὲ ... ἐκείνῳ is to sever the connexions between 'is' and the tensed expressions 'was' and 'will be'.

While this is grammatically possible, it is not the most obvious way of taking lines 5-6a, and certainly the syntax of these lines do not demand this interpretation.

The alternative is simply to take line 5a to deny of τὸ ἔν that it ever existed in the past (but not now) nor ever will exist in the future (but not now). This reading is consistent with emphasizing the contrast between ἔν /ἔσται, on the one hand, and ἔστων (or νῦν ἔστων) on the other. There can be little doubt that Parmenides wishes to eliminate 'was' and 'will be' but to retain 'is', οὐδὲ ... οὐδὲ ... ἐκείνῳ guaranteeing this emphasis. But ἔν may only go proxy for 'was (but now is not)', in keeping with its verbal aspect, while ἔσται may only go proxy for '(is not now but) will be some day'. The linguistic features of our passage admitting either of these two interpretations, we must search the context for clues as to which interpretation should be adopted.

One way to proceed here is to notice that since the structure imposed by οὐδὲ ... οὐδὲ ... ἐκείνῳ emphasizes the contrast between ἔν ... ἔσται and νῦν ἔστων ὤμως τὰν, ἐν συνεχὲς, we might explicate the temporal phrases in line 5a by way of these later epithets. The ὧδε in line 6 requires that some of these epithets be proven in lines 6-18. These later arguments, then, may serve to interpret ὤμως τὰν, ἐν and συνεχές these in turn interpreting line 5a. Probably ὤμως τὰν should be linked with τῶν ἄνω κτέναν in line 11. The meaning of ὤμως τὰν, then, derives from the arguments in lines 6-10, for which arguments line 11 furnishes an important conclusion. As we have seen, these arguments prove that τὸ ἔν suffers no temporal starts and are extended, at lines 13-15, to prove that it suffers no temporal stops. τὸ ἔν enjoys an
existence entirely uninterrupted by coming-to-be or passing-away. The epithet ὄμοι νὰν, then, like ἁμαρτάνειν, signifies the completeness of τὸ ἔδω in the sense that it is utterly without any temporal discontinuities. As we will show below, the argument is generalized in lines 22-25 to prove the absolute indivisibility of τὸ ἔδω.

If we look in the 'program' of B8.1-4 for an equivalent of ὄμοι νὰν the obvious candidate is ὁδόν. Moreover, B8.37-38 shows that ὁδόν has been proven, and since lines 26-33 cannot plausibly be taken to do so, the proof must be found in lines 5-25. Lines 22-25 prove the general indivisibility of τὸ ἔδω (i.e., a specific interpretation of σωματείς), and hence are unlikely to be the proof of ὁδόν [for to be a whole in the sense of being continuous requires being a whole of parts (cf. Aristotle, Met. 1023b 26ff.), and it is the business of lines 22-25 to deny that τὸ ἔδω can have any parts]. The only part of lines 5-21 that readily suggests a proof of ὁδόν is 6-11. Aristotle gives a meaning for ὁδόν which suits the arguments of this section very well: a whole, or what is whole, is that from which nothing is wanting. Such a meaning will cover the case of that which is a whole of parts, but will also apply to that which is without parts, i.e., is logically simple. Parmenides will not have shown τὸ ἔδω to be logically simple until the proofs of ἔν and of σωματείς are in place, but the proof of ὄμοι κὰς = ὁδόν, in lines 6-11 (plus 13-15) goes part of the distance.

The epithet ἔν is considerably less tractable and readily invites over-interpretation, especially in the light of its importance for the history of Greek philosophy after Parmenides. Since the ἔν mentioned at line 6a must find its proof (if anywhere) in lines 6-25, we should require of it no more complex interpretation than those arguments demand. There are only two contexts that can plausibly be construed as relevant to this last task: lines 12-13 and 22-25. Lines 12-13 prove that τὸ ἔδω has no external competitors, that nothing stands over against it. That far, it is proven to be single, though it remains open whether τὸ ἔδω admits any internal differentiations or plurality. Clearly, having proven that τὸ ἔδω is 'one' in one sense of the term, Parmenides has invited further exploration respecting the internal structure of his subject. Moreover, if ὁδόν = ὄμοι κὰς points toward a logically simple subject, then an argument for the absence of any internal plurality will be in order. Such will be given with the proof of σωματείς (in terms of indivisibility) at B8.22-25. As we will show below, that proof takes its rise from the semantic strategy underlying the original arguments against coming-to-be in lines 6-10. That strategy is an expanding one which furnishes the dynamic informing the argumentative development of the whole of lines 6-25. It is proper, then, to take Parmenides eventually to exclude from τὸ ἔδω every plurality; but the epithet ἔν at line 6a probably should be construed most directly in relation to the argument of B8.12-13, and hence to mean that τὸ ἔδω is single.

On our showing, the force of the epithets ὄμοι νὰν, ἔν, σωματείς is to exclude from τὸ ἔδω every form of plurality and incompleteness or discontinuity. However, until we complete our treatment of especially lines 22-25, we will not be able fully to take advantage of these results to interpret line 6a. Nevertheless, we already have generated two points which may serve to guide our choice between the two interpretations set out above. First, the arguments which support the epithets in 5b-6a are simply the arguments against generation and
perishing (the latter an extension of the former). Second, these arguments center on an appeal to the illegitimacy of claims of the form ἐὰν τῶς ἐστὶν an appeal which we have taken to rest on Parmenides' theory of sentence meaning. This suggests that line 5a simply stands for the ungenerability (and indestructibility) of ἔτευ. It will be our view that ὅπερ τοῦ ἐν ὅπερ ἐστιν represents principally the ban on coming-to-be, but that it allows for a more ambitious philosophical thesis, viz. the atemporal thesis. In what follows I will seek to fill out and defend this view of 5a and thus to offer an interpretation between those of the strict temporalists and the strict atemporalists. The suggestion is that the latter are fundamentally correct but that the position is only latent in Parmenides' arguments. But first we must raise a challenge to the very possibility of an atemporalist interpretation of line 5a.

It has been argued that Parmenides' language elsewhere necessarily implies that τῶς ἔτευ has a thoroughly temporal character and therefore that Parmenides cannot (consistently) intend at line 5a to exclude every ascription to τῶς ἔτευ of tensed existence. Prünkel, for example, argues that the use of μένειν at B8.29-30 requires that Parmenides preserve the reality of passing time. Only if τῶς ἔτευ experiences duration does it make sense to describe it as 'remaining the same'. Owen puts the same point: 'to say this [B8. 29-30] is to say that it still is what it was, and will continue to be what it [now] is'.

In a similar vein, Schofield argues that πέλαντει in B8.25 'must imply that the subject is possessed of distinct temporal stages'. On this showing, we ought to interpret συνεχές in B8.22-25 as the temporal continuity of a whole of temporal parts (οἷον, in B8.4, having the more customary of Aristotle's several meanings). However, to the second of these arguments for the temporal nature of τῶς ἔτευ there is a decisive reply, and this reply opens the way to a general reply to both arguments. The net result, as we will now show, is that we are not constrained by any of Parmenides' language to deny the possibility of an atemporal reading of line 5a.

In B8. 26-28, on his way to explicating the property ἀνθέου, Parmenides argues that his subject is ἀνθέου ἀρχήν (see further chapter five). Whatever else this might mean, it must exclude temporal stages from the history (if so it is) of τῶς ἔτευ. The ground for ἀνθέου ἀρχήν is just the old ban on generation and perishing established in lines 6-18 (the ἐν - clause in lines 27-28 makes this certain). At the very least, then, τῶς ἔτευ suffers no temporal starts and no temporal stops. We will argue below that one effect of the proof of συνεχές in lines 22-25 is further to exclude from τῶς ἔτευ every temporal differentiation. This makes it very difficult to ascribe to τῶς ἔτευ any 'distinct temporal stages'. But what, then, shall we make of Parmenides' use of κελάνει and μένει in B8.25, 30 respectively?

Owen argued that Parmenides might indeed reject all tense distinctions for τῶς ἔτευ and still use tensed language or language that implies such distinctions, such inconsistencies being essential to his project: '... to repeat that memorable image from Wittgenstein, Parmenides' argument is a ladder to be climbed up and thrown away. Such arguments are not, to put it picturesquely, horizontal deductions; if they parade as deductions they are patently self-defeating.' I am uncertain quite how to construe Wittgenstein's image, for since Parmenides is arguing to whatever point he is making, it suggests that
arguments can be taken to be at once sound (how else to ascend the ladder?) and unsound (why else throw it away?). Such a view of arguments might have pleased Sextus and other sceptics (who also use the image of the ladder), but seems at odds with Parmenides' otherwise insistent pursuit of truth by way of arguments. A more plausible view is suggested by a comment of Hussey. He notes that in order for Parmenides to put many of his arguments at all he must strain the resources of his own language. Among other things, Parmenides uses words and images to state arguments the logical force of which is to strip their very statements of many of their most ordinary meanings or implications. The point will be that if enough arguments are given, the reader will know how best to use the words and images in which they are cast.

Our point, then, is that μένει and σελάζει cannot require temporal stages in τὸ ἐστὶν if the argument of B8.26-28 is to be retained. The use of language which may in other contexts carry such implications is compatible with Parmenides' aim to exclude from τὸ ἐστὶν every differentiation, provided only that he is allowed some freedom to strain the normal limits of language to do so. Thus far, then, there is no sufficient reason to exclude an atemporalist interpretation of τὸ ἐστὶν and its description at B8.5a.

Nevertheless, it remains true that the language of B8.5a may only represent the ban on coming-to-be and passing-away (the latter understood as a corollary of the former). It is plausible to take lines 6-18 to secure nothing more, and the language of 5a can plausibly be construed to that end. ὁδὸς ποτ' ἢν ὁδὸς ἔστωσι may only mean 'what-is cannot have enjoyed an existence (now terminated) in the past nor can it enjoy an existence in a future span not yet begun'. Moreover, Parmenides may only intend by συμεχάζει that τὸ ἐστὶν is temporally seamless, a view consistent with his effort to strip 'was' and 'will be' of their punctiliar overtones. And finally, as we will show later, lines 19-21 can be plausibly read in such a way as to require nothing further of line 5a. In sum, while we may have shown that an atemporalist interpretation of B8.5a cannot be ruled out, we have not yet shown that anything so ambitious is required.

But while the language of B8.5a does not demand an atemporal interpretation, the philosophical rationale which drives it may be taken to do so. No matter how we approach it, the notion of duration entails that times be differentiated from each other. Something must be true of one time which is not true of another; even if infinite in expanse, time will be semantically differentiated, for it will be a whole of parts. But so long as Parmenides presses his argument against the legitimacy of o ún ἔστωσι, and especially so long as that argument is based on such general considerations as constitute his semantic theory—it is not open to Parmenides to impute to τὸ ἐστὶν any duration whatever. It may be purported that τὸ ἐστὶν exist always in the past and will always exist in the future; but such will not be the case. We have taken B8.5a over against the meaning which Parmenides' arguments in lines 6-13 require for the epithets in lines 5b-6a. And these arguments, in turn, have been taken to exploit his semantic theory. The whole aim of B8.5a, on such a view will be to mark out a sense of ἔστωσι (as over against both ἤν and ἔστωσι) which is consistent with Parmenides' semantics. This can only be an atemporal sense which severs every link between 'is' and 'was or 'will be', precisely the
stemporal sense which we commonly ascribe to the truths of mathematics and of logic. It will not be possible, then, to insist on an atemporalist account of B8.5a. But in our view the philosophical context of B8.5a prevents us insisting on a strictly temporalist account also. We have here an example of Parmenides' straining of ordinary language. Moreover, it is the force of his arguments that is causing the strain. The arguments he is using (on our view of them) are headed in the direction of timelessness, but the distinction is not yet clearly being made.

It may be asked whether ἁμοῦ τῷ, ἐν, συνεχῆς ascribe to τὸ ἐδυ temporal properties, spatial properties, or both. Since the arguments which support them are, in the first instance, arguments against coming-to-be and passing-away, these properties must be at least temporal. But in view of the more general rationale which supports the arguments in lines 6-18 and 22-25, we take the epithets in 5b-6a to exclude from τὸ ἐδυ every differentiation, including spatio-temporal differentiations. Indeed, it seems to us that the aim of B8.5-18 is more properly to ascribe to τὸ ἐδυ a mode of existence which excludes the possibility of assigning to it any spatial or temporal character whatsoever (on the understanding that space and time are divisible: see further n.112 above). For this reason, the properties named by ἁμοῦ τῷ ἐν, συνεχῆς are probably neither temporal nor spatial. Rather, they are properties designed to exclude ordinary spatio-temporal characterizations of τὸ ἐδυ. If this is so, then Parmenides is driving his subject in the direction of what will later be the ontological category of abstract entities. Perhaps aware that he is breaking new ground, Parmenides will recapitulate the main outlines of B8. 5-18 in lines 19-21. The analysis of these lines, as well as of lines 22-25 (the results of which we have anticipated above) will be our next concern.

V. Unfinished business (B8.19-21, 22-25).

(a) B8.19-21: Reality and time.

The exegesis of B8.19-21 depends especially on two factors: its connexion with the preceding lines (5-18) and its internal structure. However, we must first recognize that the text of line 19 is disputed. In place of τῷ ἐν ἔκτα ρηματ τῷ ἐδυ; a number of interpreters have read τῷ ἐν ἔκτα ἄπλοτο ἔδυ; 115 I follow the first alternative, for three reasons. First, it is the traditional text, all of the MSS agreeing to read it so. As in the case of B8.12, the burden is on the emendators to show that the traditional text admits no cogent interpretation. Second, the emendation disturbs a carefully crafted chiasmus: a-b-b-a, where a= the futurity of Parmenides' subject ( τῷ ἐν ἔκτα μέλοτ τῷ ἐδυ ... ὀῦ τῇ τοῦ μέλλει κατακλημί), and b= its generation ( τῷ ἐν ἔκτα γενετο ... ὀῦ τῇ ἔγεντο). 116 It has also been noted that "If the first question is changed to "How could what is afterwards perish?", it finds no answer in the succeeding line, which, however, would then answer a question never asked."117 If we preserve the chiasmus, both questions in line 19 are answered in line 20. Third, emendation commonly follows from an attempt to find in B8 a pattern of antitheses (e.g. generation from nothing vs. generation from something, generation vs. destruction, generation vs. addition) such
that in line 19 the first half of the line answers the second half antithetically (perishing vs. generation). But the first putative antithesis disappears on a correct reading of lines 12-13 (see above), and the others are not treated by Parmenides antithetically. Generation and destruction are both rejected and for the same reasons, but without being set against each other in antithesis. There is no pattern of antithetical argumentation in B8. For all of these reasons, then, we retain the MSS reading of B8.19a.

We translate B8.19-21 as follows: 'How could the real exist hereafter? How indeed could it come to be at all?' For if it came to be, it is not, as also if it were ever about to be. In just such fashion coming-to-be has been extinguished and destruction made unheard of. There can be little doubt that line 19a will remind Parmenides' readers of οὐδὲ ἔστι in line 5a, for nowhere else has he even mentioned the futurity of his subject. But, is line 19a just equivalent to 5a, and if so should it also be taken to present τὸ ἔσιν as a timeless entity or as merely 'ungenerated'? Taken by itself, line 19a can refer either to the continued existence of τὸ ἔσιν into the future, or to an existence begun in the future, and so is compatible with either of the two construes of 5a introduced in section IV above. The connexion of 19-21 with 5-18, then, will not by itself settle this issue. The internal structure of 19-21, on the other hand, more clearly tips the balance in favor of an atemporalist interpretation.

As will already be apparent, the structure of B8.19-21 is dominated by the chiasmus between 19a=20b, and 19b=20a. There is, however, a nuance of the chiasmus which has not yet been treated. The combination of the particles ὅν and καὶ ἔσιν is rare, and its sense obscure. But the best view seems to be that these particles each carry a distinctive force, with ὅν the more emphatic of the two. Following the hint in Gildersleeve's discussion, we take ὅν καὶ ἔσιν to yield something very like an οὖν μὴν ἔσων argument: to the question "How could the real exist hereafter?", 19b replies "in the same way as it could come to be", viz. not at all. No more can τὸ ἔσιν enjoy a future existence than it can come to be. (The reference to the results of B8.6-10, and even to the form of one of those arguments, is unmistakable. But such reference does not show that 19a is only asking after the possibility of future coming-to-be.) How Parmenides interprets the futurity of τὸ ἔσιν emerges from the reasoning in line 20.

In line 20 Parmenides argues by parity of reasoning: responsive νὸν serves to coordinate and balance ἐν γὰρ ἔγεντο with ἐν καὶ μᾶλλον ἔσωσθαι, the point of balance being οὐκ ἔστιν which is taken to be the result of each of the longer clauses. This is obvious in the first case (for what comes to be does not yet exist), the inference having been well-rehearsed in earlier arguments. In the second case, futurity implying οὐκ ἔστιν will suggest, prima facie, that futurity is the enjoyment of an existence not yet begun. Lest the point escape us, Parmenides drives it home in line 21: 'in just such fashion (and not otherwise or on other grounds) were generation and destruction extinguished'. The combined effects of the demonstrative adverb τὸς and the perfect tense of ἔσωσθαι throw us back onto the arguments in lines 6-15. The pattern of arguing by parity cannot succeed without this reference back to the earlier arguments against coming-to-be and destruction. But reference back to B8.6-15 also refers us to the rationale which underlies those arguments, and, as we have seen, this
rationale is of such a generality as to suggest for τὸ ἔσω more than its ungenerability and indestructibility. While prima facie lines 19-20 can be taken to be equivalent to the claim that τὸ ἔσω suffers coming-to-be neither in the past nor in the future, this cannot be all of its work. Each of the three lines 19-21 refers us back to the arguments in lines 6-10, and these arguments alone serve to ground Parmenides' thought here. The force of those arguments must be the same for 19-21 as for lines 5-6. Consequently, lines 19-21 are best taken to press on us one half of the thesis of 5a (the half represented by ὁδ' ἔσται): τὸ ἔσω enjoys no continuity of existence into the future, for the reason that the future cannot be distinguished from the present. Of course, it will follow also that τὸ ἔσω never comes to be in the future, since there is no future for it to come to be in. But the direct business of lines 19-21, is to reflect the stronger thesis.

On our view, then, B8.19-21 serves to recapitulate the point established by lines 5-18: the theory of sentence meaning not only serves to exclude from τὸ ἔσω coming-to-be and passing-away, but also every other differentiation, including temporal sequence. The recapitulation is by way of only one of the disjuncts of 5a, namely ὁδ' ἔσται, the ban on futurity. If we ask why this disjunct and not the other, the answer will be simply that past and future are asymmetrical in a respect which is peculiarly relevant to Parmenides' argument. The past cannot be changed (on any ordinary view of it), while the future can be, and thus it is the future which is the field of change. Reflection on the implications of the arguments against change in lines 6-18 for the temporal character of τὸ ἔσω naturally focuses on futurity rather than on pastness. Even in this respect, Parmenides is anxious to press home the connexion which he has drawn in lines 5-18 between the changelessness of τὸ ἔσω and its temporal character. (We would agree, also, that with lines 19-21 Parmenides has continued to press closer to an atemporal conception of τὸ ἔσω; but such a conception is not yet in his grasp.)

With this we have almost completed our treatment of B8.5-25, excepting only the demonstration of ὑπερχές, which follows. We hope to have shown already that there is a high degree of unity in B8, and that this unity rests squarely on the semantic theory which he is exploiting at each major turn in the argument. Our analysis of B8.22-25 will also seek to display this unity.

(b) B8.22-25: the indivisibility of the Real.

It is generally recognized that B8.22-25 constitute Parmenides' proof of ὑπερχές, line 25a making this certain. It will be our business in this section to analyze the arguments by which Parmenides reaches that conclusion and to show their connexion with B8.5-21, a connexion we have already exploited. But B8.22-25 also are the proof for one of the σύματα in B8.3-4, viz. ὑπογενεύς. Accordingly, we have also to show what is the sense of this predicate and how it is proven in these lines. To do so, we must first consider the probable meaning of the term, a consideration which provides a convenient point of entry to our other problems.

The lexical background of ὑπογενεύς has not been thoroughly investigated, but such parallels as can be found easily strongly support the sense 'unique (of its kind)'. At Aeschylus, Agamemnon 898
Clytemnestra calls Agamemnon μοιογενεῖς τέκνων ματέρας, and, as Taran has argued, this almost certainly refers to his unique role in the fortunes of his family and does not mean 'only begotten'.

Similarly, in Herodotus VII.221 and II.79.3 we must infer that the sons described as μοιογενεῖς are the sole surviving sons of their fathers, irrespective of whether other sons (or daughters) were born. Hesiod has a similar point to make at Works 376–78: the μοιογενεῖς παῖς is specifically conceived of as the sole heir of his father. In Timaeus 31b 3 (cf. 92c 8–9) Plato must mean by the term 'unique', in view of the sequel (especially κατὰ τὴν μόναςκον καὶ ὀδὸν ὁδὸν ἀπεριόντως ἄλλα εἰς ὁδὸν μοιογενὸς ὀφράντος νεογένες, κτλ.), as 'only begotten' it is a mere pleonasm.

Neither is it at all clear (to us anymore than to his later exegetes) that Plato meant by that subject literally came-to-be. This last point is of some importance for Parmenides also, since in view of ἄγνωστον in B5.3, Parmenides cannot mean by μοιογενεῖς 'only begotten'.

The other sense that μοιογενεῖς might have is 'belonging to only one kind', but this is not very plausible for Parmenides. For what sense is there in affirming that τὸ ἦθος is of only one kind? Everything and anything is such, under some description or other, relative to some property or set of properties...unless, of course, by 'kind' we mean natural kind, but Parmenides is unlikely to be pressing into service any notion of natural kind. Two further pieces of evidence (the first much weaker than the second) support our view that μοιογενεῖς means 'unique (of its kind)'. Simplicius paraphrases the term with ἄνθρωπον, 'whole' or 'complete', and this is closer to our sense than it is to either 'only begotten' or 'belonging to only one kind'. Finally, at B5.36–38 Parmenides will show that τὸ ἦθος is ὀδὸν in the sense of being unique, and ὀδὸν is unlikely to have acquired such an overtone unless μοιογενεῖς (paired with ὀδὸν in B8.4) is supplying it. It seems to us, therefore, that all of the evidence supports for μοιογενεῖς the meaning 'unique (of its kind)' and that none of the evidence favors either of the other two senses commonly supposed to be available for it. This being so, it remains for us to show how B8.22–25 proves that τὸ ἦθος is both σωματικός, 'continuous', and also μοιογενεῖς, 'unique'. As often with Parmenides, the chief guide to understanding the argument is its structure, to which we now advert.

B8.22–25 has a structure characteristic of Parmenides' other 'embedded' arguments: ὃς διαλαβέτω λέγει ἂν τὸν ἔκεφαλον. It lays down the thesis which is to be proved, and there follows an argument in support of the thesis. The argument is given in the ἔκεφαλον-clause which begins at line 22b and which includes two supporting arguments of its own in lines 23–24. In line 25 it is inferred from 22b–24 that τὸ ἦθος ἐστὶ σωματικός. We will examine this inference and its supporting argumentation (ἔκεφαλον γὰρ ἐστὶ σωματικόν) later. The whole of 22b–24 resumes important elements of the arguments of B8.5–21 (see further below), the ἔκεφαλον serving to mark off 22b–24 as drawing on earlier arguments. The force of this ἔκεφαλον-clause is crucial for our interpretation of the opening thesis, ὃς διαλαβέτω as also of the concluding inference τὸν ἔκεφαλον ἔστω σωματικόν.

Owen argued that ἔκεφαλον in line 22 should be understood adverbially, and for two reasons this seems to be right. First, the ἔκεφαλον-clause recalls an earlier result, which here furnishes the basic premise of a new argument. The only previously established result that Parmenides can plausibly draw on is τὸματασα πελώματα, the conclusion
reached from the arguments against coming-to-be in B8.6-10: τὸ ἐδῶν exists without qualification, i.e. uniformly, without any differentiation whatever. This strongly suggests that ἐστὶν ἐδῶν at B8.22 also represents uniform existence, and that ἐδῶν should be an adverb, ἐδῶν. This is made more probable by the second point: ἐστὶν ἐδῶν is parallel to τὸ πᾶλλον ... (τὰ) χειρότερον in lines 23a and 24a, the parallelism guaranteed by the construction with double-οὖν.138 The verb to be supplied for 23a and 24a must be existential ἐστὶν, and accordingly we should construe ἐστὶν in 22b existentially also, καὶ ... ἐδῶν being adverbial: 'the subject exists uniformly, not somewhat the more in one part or somewhat the less'.139 Lest the point escape us, it is hammered home in the two supporting arguments of lines 23b and 24b: τὸ χεῖρ τὸ συνεχεῖται ... καὶ τὸ ἐπεξεργάζεται ἄνωτερος. These are equivalents, οὖν being purely connective, and each serves to iterate the main point: τὸ ἐδῶν exists with perfect uniformity, admitting no degrees of reality. It is very probable, then, that ἐδῶν in B8.22 is an adverb. The best alternative is to take it as predicative of τὸ ἐδῶν, but this threatens to disconnect B8.22-25 from the preceding context (the thesis of the ἐπεξ-clause finding no representative there), and also threatens reduction of the argument to a petitio. For if ἐδῶν is a predicate, then its sense must be gathered from what follows line 22, and the subject is ἐδῶν just in the sense that it is συνεχεῖς, and line 25 can signal an inference (with τὸ ...) which is justified only by argument in a circle.140 This alternative thus failing to generate a plausible account of the argumentative structure of B8.22-25, we take it that ἐπεξ τὸν ἐστὶν ἐδῶν advances the uniform existence of τὸ ἐδῶν and draws on the resources of lines 5-21 to do so (the connexion is already suggested by οὖν in line 22).

A further, less convincing, alternative was suggested by Mourelatos, who argues that the meaning of ἐδῶν in line 22 is determined by the argument at line 25, ἐδῶν γὰρ ἐδοτεν τελάθει (what-is draws close to what-is) which is equivalent to the proverb ἀξίλ τὸν ὄντον ἔχει ἔδει τὸν ὄντον .141 But this reverses the order of explanation determined by the structure of B8.22-25: τελάθει gets its sense from the ἐπεξ-clause and not the other way round. And while τελάθει carries a spatial connotation on its sleeve, in B8.22-25 it is forced to abandon its superficial connotation and to become a metaphor for the general continuity of τὸ ἐδῶν .142 B8.25b thus introduces no new argument but simply iterates the point which Parmenides has been laboring since line 22: τὸ ἐδῶν admits no discontinuities.

B8.22-25 thus emerges as another corollary of the arguments in lines 6-10, arguments which derive their generality from the semantic theory on which they rest.143 Since ἐνεργος ἐὸν ἐστὶν is illegitimate, so is every proposition which entails it or which is logically equivalent to it. By extending the argument Parmenides ruled out διάθεσις as well as γίνεται , showed that τὸ ἐδῶν suffers no external additions, and even suggests that it will not admit the distinctions of tensed existence. In B8.22-25 the fundamental rationale is extended once again to show that Parmenides' subject is absolutely undivided, whether spatially or temporally or in any other sense. For what, after all, must be true if τὸ ἐδῶν is to be divided? Then there must be some discontinuity in it, that is to say, something true of it in one respect that is not true of it in another (τὸ τὸ πᾶλλον ..... τὸ χειρότερον ). But such
discontinuities are possible only if ἐὰν οὐκ ἔστιν is legitimate
discourse, and it is not. Accordingly, there cannot be any
degrees of reality, any diminution or aggrandizement of the real. There can be no
'gaps' in the real, neither can there be any gaps in its semantic
field. The repeated adverbial use of the adjective τὸν (ὡς ἔστιν
ἔμοιον ... τὸν δ' ἐμπεῖν ἔστιν ἔδνος ... τὸν ἐνεκέξ ὡς ἔστιν )
serves vividly to underscore the main point: τὸ ἔδν exists absolutely
uniformly, every possible discontinuity being excluded. It is this
absoluteness which is the real advance in lines 22-25, and it requires
that οὐδὲ διαλεγεῖν be taken to signify the indivisibility of the
real. Only so does the move from οὐδὲ διαλεγεῖν to ἐνεκέξ ... ἔστιν
avoid an empty tautology. Τὸ ἔδν is διάλεγεῖν in the sense of being
altogether ἐνεκέξ.

By means of this argument for the indivisibility of his subject,
Parmenides has completed his treatment of issues which arose in earlier
parts of B8. For one, we now have the proof for ἐνεκέξ desiderated by
B8.6a. Moreover, we have an interpretation of ἐνεκέξ of such
generality as to be compatible with his pressing the thesis of line 5a.
For another, to the proof (in lines 12-13) that τὸ ἔδν suffers no
external additions, and is thus ἐν in the sense of 'single', he has now
added a proof that τὸ ἔδν suffers no internal pluralities either, and is
thus ἐν in a new sense. Indeed, this is just the sense which we
found for ὑποψηφία (B8.4), which epithet has now been secured: τὸ ἔδν
is 'unique (of its kind)'. The proof that τὸ ἔδν lacks every
internal plurality will also give new depth to the epithet ὑποψηφία: τὸ ἔδν
is a whole not of parts, but of what cannot have parts at all. With the
argument of B8.22-25, then, Parmenides completes

the initial expansion of his semantic rationale, an expansion signaled
by lines 5-6a (and 19-21). As we will go on to show in the next
chapter, however, he has not finished taking all of the dividends
afforded by the relation he posits between language and reality.
1. It will be recalled from chapter one that B8.5-21 plays no role in Jantzen (1976), an omission we are peculiarly concerned to remedy.

2. Whether 5a, 19-21 represent a re-direction (or even a mis-direction) of the argument in 6-18, as Schofield (1970) argues, will be discussed below.

3. If αὐτοῦ ἔργον has an inceptive force, it probably derives from its context rather than from its syntax. At all events, this probably does not require that growth be distinct from coming-to-be (see further below). Pindar, fr. 127.3-5 (OCT) uses a passive of αὐτοῦ ἔργον in a metaphor signifying birth or coming-to-be.

4. I follow the MSS. here, reading οὐκετε, but take the coordination to be οὐκετε ... φάσαν ... οὐδὲ νοετον. It is sometimes felt that οὐκετε in line 7 lacks a complement, with the result that line 12 is emended to οὐκετε to provide it (and with it a form of argument which Parmenides does not need and should not use: see further below). Alternatively, we can emend line 7 to read οὐδετε. But the MSS. readings for lines 7-8 (οὐκετε ... οὐδετε) present no difficulty: see Denniston (1952) 193 for the construction. So also Taran (1965) 101 (and others cited there), and Stough (1968) 97 n. 15. The point of οὐκετε ... ἐδοσαν φάσαν οὐδὲ νοετον is just the converse of B6.1: χρὴ τὸ λέγειν τε νοετον τό ἑδ οὐκετον (and cf. B2.7-8).

5. The adjective χρόνος often connotes what is 'beyond the power of words to describe' (Merry): cf. Aristophanes, Αὔξες 1189, 1713-15; Hesiod, Σκαῦτον 20; Pindar, Οἶ. 6.37, Τ. 7.37.

6. Αὐδ is here almost purely connective; but often, when following an interrogative it will express impatience or indignation [Denniston (1952) 173f.], nuances which cannot be translated. It is very difficult not to take the particle to require that lines 9-10 look back to lines 8-9 to find part of their rationale (see further below).

7. I render χρόνος after Mourelatos (1981) 652, noting that if lines 9-10 look back to the earlier context, such a rendering captures the general force of πο ἡχόνια, i.e. a search for circumstances or conditions; Bormann (1971) 76f. traces the history of usage from 'debt' to 'necessity'; and surely he is right thus to suggest that χρόνος carries some modal force [but I cannot follow his surmise (p. 77) that by B8. 9-10 'Möglichkeit, Wirklichkeit, und Notwendigkeit implizieren einander']. The construction τί ... χρόνος should not be confused with the question τί χρόνος; often used in tragedy to ask τί χρόνος; 'what is the matter?': Fränkel (1950) 53; Dover (1968) 96.

8. This translation of οὔτε οὔτε ... χρόνον begins several issues which receive fuller treatment in the main text below. Two alternatives are: 'later rather than sooner' or as equivalent to 'never'. 
9. Plainly, τὸ ἰσόπως ἀξιόλογον is equivalent to ἐκ τῆς ἐνδοτος (αὐξη-θέου) in line 7. Possibly, Schofield (1970) 117 no. 18 is right to take τὸ ἰσόπως as a pointer to Parmenides' meaning: 'that (thing) which is not a thing', but τὸ ἰσόπως is also just equivalent to τὸ


11. So also Barnes (1979a) I, 184; Rollack (1969) 76.

12. See Barnes (1979a) I, 187 for a similar suggestion.

13. On one view of the argument in lines 9-10 the conditions are further strengthened to sufficient conditions for coming-to-be.


15. The first two clauses are only balanced, despite the absence of ὅτι in the first one (on which see Denniston (1952) 505f.; Smyth (1956) §2675 b.n.2). The translation is slightly hampered by this and by the presence of the difficult τὸ γὰρ in the opening clause.

16. It seems very likely that the MXG is a good source for Gorgias' original arguments, at least preferable to Sextus. In this we agree with Newiger (1973) and Bröcker (1958). Kerferd (1955) tried to harmonize the MXG with Sextus, but his (1981) 96 prefers MXG for at least one part of Gorgias' original treatise. However, the chapters on Xenophanes are almost certainly not authentic: comparison with the fragments makes it clear that the MXG writer has interpreted Xenophanes as an Eleatic (note especially the references to Melissus and Zeno at 977b 23, 979a 5, respectively). The section on Melissus seems less problematic (Inter al. the quotations from Empedocles at 975b 1 ff. are no barrier to the authenticity of 974a 1-974b 4, for in the later passages the author clearly speaks in his own voice). Its substantial authenticity was defended by Reinhardt (1916) 90-91, and we are inclined to agree with his judgement.

18. However, both here and at B1, Melissus may only mean by the assumption that what comes to be was nothing before it came to be, a view that seems quite reasonable: see further below. This view of Melissus' assumption draws some support from the second limb.

19. Plutarch, Adv. Col. 1112a takes φθονος here to be equivalent to γένεος and he is followed by many modern commentaries, but not without controversy: see Wright (1981) 175. The contrast with φθονος in line 2 seems to us decisively to support Plutarch (and cf. B9). For the general ban on γένεος see especially B12 and B104. In view of the textual difficulties of B12 it is probably fruitless to try to reconstruct from it Empedocles' argument against coming-to-be [see Wright (1981) 173].
20. For a useful discussion of Empedocles' ambiguity about γένεσις see now Solmsen (1975).


22. "τάτα at line 20 may require that τοῦτο in line 27 and τοῖς in line 30 refer to the four cosmic masses plus Love and Strife. But this does not affect our argument. Neither do the uncertainties over ὅτε at line 30 [defended by Maas (1962) 73 and Bollack (1969) 76; but see contra Wright (1981) 171ff.].

23. For the language of growth going proxy for γένεσις cf. B17.1 (ἐν ἡμέραις ... ἐν πλείονοι) with line 3 (δούχ ... γένεσις), and note the use of τότε in line 4.

24. Parmenides might, of course, introduce a phenomenon later denied without explicit argument (e.g. color changes in B8.42). But what cannot be denied of B8.42 can be of B8.7a.

25. Always provided, of course, that we do not have recourse to second- and higher-order predication.


28. I will argue below that the attempt to find Parmenides entertaining the possibility of generation ἐν τοῖς ἄστοις, by emending line 12, is wrong-headed (Gorgias' remarks at MXG 979b 28 notwithstanding).

29. Mourelatos (1981) 652 argues that if γένεσις is really from nothing there cannot be any agents or other causes in view, but this is a non sequitur: τοῦ ὑπένων need only signify that what comes to be once was nothing. There might be other existing things on which some cause bears so as to 'bring' into existence what once was not.


31. The Principle of Sufficient Reason received its classical treatment by Leibniz: see Parkinson (1965) 62-69 and Ishiguro (1972) 113, 143. Hill (1982) argues that the Principle can only apply where what comes to be is not the totality of the actual world or of any other possible world, i.e. that the Principle cannot be applied to the world as a whole.

32. Barnes (1979a) I, 188.

33. Although it seems very likely that the three examples that follow were trying to meet Parmenides' question, our point does not depend on these actually being responses to Parmenides. All we are seeking is the logical type of an answer.
dιαπέτοι το εὖξη, κτλ.

35. See, e.g. the discussion in Barnes (1979a) II, 116-124.

36. It is an especially important notion for e.g. Albinus, Didasc. X.3,
p. 59.5-8 Louis, and Atticus, fr. 4.60-64 des Places (and cf. his
fr. 25.6f.); also Moderatus and Simplicius, in Phys. 231.6ff.
Atticus will perhaps have had the notion from Plutarch, whom he
follows closely (but not slavishly), but it is hard to find in what
survives of Plutarch's work on the Timaeus.

37. Mourelatos (1981) 653 n. 10 complains of appeals to such intentions
that 'It is precisely this recourse to the arbitrary fiat of a
demiurge that arguments via the Principle of Sufficient Reason, as
classically conceived, are intended to block.' But he does not
show just how the Principle can do so, and he misses the point of
such explanations in calling the will of a demiurge arbitrary.

38. Stokes (1971) 254; Barnes (1979a) I, 188.

Schofield (1970) 116. Hussey (1972) 88 translates with 'sooner or
later' and paraphrases (p. 92) with 'at some time rather than at
another', perhaps recognizing the Parmenides' argument remains the
same under either of our second or third translations (see below).

40. Or, as Mourelatos (1981) 653 points out, X may exist atemporally, a
possibility we treat further below in our discussions of B8.11 and
B8.5a.


42. We are well aware of the problem of self-refutation which lurks
beneath the surface of this strategy; see chapter six.

43. The Indiscernibility of Identicals is, indeed, the contrapositive
of a restricted Principle of Sufficient Reason: see Wiggins (1963)
193-194; Feldman (1970) 511. The discussion of the range of
application of the PSR continues; for its application to material
objects and other individual substances see Parkinson (1965)
130-132; for states of affairs Hill (1982) 236f. Leibniz denied
that it could be applied to times and places since these are not
individual substances, but relational properties of substances [see
argued that the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals
does not apply to relational properties, but it is unclear to me
that this rules out its application to times, for while space seems
clearly to be constituted of the relations to each other of
material objects, times are not so clearly relational. But our
point here does not depend on Parmenides having been even partially
right.
44. Schofield (1970) 128 complains that appeal to indiscernibility is an unnecessary 'piece of speculation'. It is true that neither the indiscernibility of identicals, nor its cousin the principle of sufficient reason, enters Parmenides' argument explicitly. We offer the principle of indiscernibility as a heuristic device to account for explicit features of Parmenides' argument which otherwise remain puzzling.

45. This translation is preferred by Calogero (1932/1970) 68, Burnet (1930) 175 and Owen (1966/1974) 279f. Our reconstruction follows Owen.

46. It will be apparent, then, that Stokes and Barnes were right to find a modal force in B8.9-10; but this modal force is generated by the argument and should not simply be read into the language in which it is cast.

47. Chaintraine (1952) 152; Debrunner-Schwyzer (1950) 565; Stokes (1971) 340 n.1.

48. The implications of this result for our understanding of the temporality of τὸ ἐδώ, will occupy us further below.

49. According to a report in Simplicius, in Phys. 28, 4ff. = DK A8, Leucippus also extended an οὐ μᾶλλον strategy to what we regard as states of affairs, i.e. to 'being such and such' (τὸν ἄντικον ἡ ποτέ ἔστω).

50. For its history see de Lacy (1958), (1964), Luria (1964) and Barnes (1979a) II, 251-57. For self-destructive tendencies see Aristotle, Met. 1062a 23-30, b 2-7, 1063b 26-35, and de Lacy (1958) 62,69.

51. So also Barnes (1979a) I, 188; completeness in a more general sense will be proved in B8.42-49. Lloyd (1966) 105 takes τὸ ἐδώ as 'unalterable', but in the light of lines 6-21, 26-33 and 34-41, which is reaching too far. Taran (1965) 177f. and Schofield (1970) 118 n.24 take τὸ ἐδώ to explicate διότι λέγει in line 5, but in our view line 11 cannot be so easily separated from the whole of lines 6-18, and this whole context should be brought to bear on line 5.

52. In view of the semantic role of τὸ ἐδώ, as what makes true sentences true, Parmenides' conclusion adumbrates the notion that all truth is necessary truth, as also two common ways of understanding necessary truth: as omnipresent truth and in terms of eternal objects.


54. Their extension to the exclusion of οἷος in lines 13-15 will be treated below.

55. For reviews of the problem see especially Stough (1968), Wiesner (1970), as also: Taran (1965) 95-102, Höltscher (1969) 90-93.
56. Gorgias apud HMG 979b 26-33 and Sextus, AM VII.71; Aristotle, Phys. 191a 23-31; cf. Simplicius, in Phys. 78.24-29, 103.15-20, 162.11-30 Diels. All of these are treated further below.

57. Reinhardt (1916) 40-44. Taran (1965) 101 reads οὔτε for οὐδὲ, but against this see (decisively) Wiesner (1970) 9 and n.29. Hölscher (1969) 20 reads ἐκ δὴ ἐννοοῖ which is orthographically more economical. Diels (1897) 76f. sought to supply the positive second limb by positing a lacuna in line 7 and supplying οὔτε ἐκ τεῦ ἐννοοῖ ὑπὲρ γὰρ ὄν ὅλην ἐπὶ; but almost no one has accepted the suggestion and it seems at best arbitrary. Wiesner (1970) 1-14 discusses other possibilities, none as convincing or as economical (in thought) as Reinhardt's. Barnes (1979a) I, 188ff. accepts Reinhardt's solution but without the dilemma, but he does so seeking in lines 12-13 an argument against δεηθός, against which I argue below (see further below on lines 13-15).

58. This 'straining' of ordinary language is probably due to the fact that Parmenides has no second- or higher-order predication theory available for use: see chapter one, p. 17 and n. 44 above. Hussey (1972) 79 finds Parmenides' straining of language inoffensive.

59. For the many senses of ἔκ see Aristotle, Met. V.24, 1023a 26-1023b 11 and Barnes (1979a) I, 39-40 for discussion.

60. But they could not demand that this was Parmenides' view of generation without anachronism: Barnes (1979a) I, 185 is more sanguine than I about their authority for our interpretation of Parmenides.

61. Confusion over the force of ἔκ may have exacerbated early tendencies towards 'completion' of the argument with the second limb, ἔκ ἐννοοῖ.

62. It will seem odd to us to group Anaxagoras with Anaximander and not with Empedocles, but perhaps Simplicius' rationale is just that Empedocles does occasionally allow use of ἔννοοῖ for what he believes to be merely alteration. But then grouping Empedocles with Democritus seems odd. Such difficulties serve to heighten prima facie suspicions as to the value of Simplicius' comments.

63. Cherniss (1933) 61-62, n. 254. In the middle of his discussion, Aristotle describes his opponents as those who deny all coming to be ( ἀνελκεῖ τάσσον ἐν χεῦν , 191b 12-13).

64. In Phys. 78.24ff. (commenting on Parmenides B8.1-14) assigns it to Parmenides, while 103.15-20 assigns it to Melissus, 162.11-30 assigns it to both (quoting first Parmenides B8.6-10 and then Melissus B1). There are slight discrepancies in the explanations.
offered for Melissus’ rationales in both limbs, while Parmenides’ argument is analysed consistently [these discrepancies are also noticed by Stough (1968) 103 n.20].

65. Sextus, AM VII.71. The resemblances to Aristotle are especially close in the first limb, though the second limb’s rationale (ἀλλ’ ἔν ἀνάφυκεν ἄρείζειν ὑπόθεσις μετέχειν τὸ γεννυταιχνὸν τελος) is not far from Aristotle’s version (ὑποθέτον γὰρ τοῦ λόγου). Newiger (1973) 64 expresses similar reservations, but Kerferd (1955) 21 sought to harmonise the two accounts, and Reinhardt (1916) 40-42 preferred Sextus to the MXG. We cannot follow the discussion further, but here recall our general agreement with Newiger that MXG is likely to be closer than is Sextus to Gorgias’ original treatise (see n. 17 above).

66. Apelt (1888) 190 gives a fuller text: ἐν γὰρ (ἐν δύοις γένοις, μετακεκλεῖν δὲν, δ’ ἀραυνῶν· ἐν γὰρ) τοῦ δὲν μετακεκλείσθη, ὡς ἄν ἐτέρναι σώματος ἄντι ἄν τὸν ἄντι. But the addition adds nothing to the sense of the argument, and ἄντι δὲν is not supported by the parallel Gorgias strikes between τὸ δὲν and τὸ μὴ δὲν: ἄντι γὰρ ἔτι καὶ τὸ μὴ δὲν γένοις, ὡς ἄν ἐτέρναι. To read ἄντι δὲν also reduces the argument to a tautology.

67. If, of course, Sextus is closer to Gorgias’ original treatise, then we would be nearly driven to say that Aristotle had the argument from Gorgias. Wiesner (1970) 16-17 and Calogero (1932/1970) 195f. n.23 argued that at least the positive limb (ἐν δύοις) is original to Gorgias.

68. See, e.g. Stough (1968), Guthrie (1965) 26-27, Burnet (1930) 175, Diels (1897) 37, 76f. Hussey (1972) 88 translates in agreement with Stough but gives no discussion beyond noting that all of B8.12-21 is a recapitulation of earlier arguments.

69. Schofield (1970) 116 n.18, Wiesner (1970) 21; Calogero (1932/1970) 70f. n.5; Mansfeld (1964) 95; Gadamer (1952) 63; KE, 275; Cornford (1939a) 37 reads ἐν μὴ δύοις but refers αὐτὸ to τὸ δὲν. It is not clear to me, however, that Gadamer is right to say that αὐτὸ must refer to τὸ δὲν. As Wiesner correctly points out, τὸ μὴ δὲν is certainly the subject in line 7, and so τὸ δὲν is not ‘das regierende Wort des Ganzen’ in any exclusive sense. Note further that we are not now admitting an equivalent to ζυνάνει, for τὸ δὲν does not grow here, i.e. there is no change in it, but additions to it.

70. In line 12 οὐδὲ may also be apodotic as would befit a conclusion: see Denniston (1952) 197f. for this usage.

71. Stough (1968) 95 and n.13.

72. Melissus clearly is prepared to lump additions to τὸ δὲν and internal changes in τὸ δὲν into one category, namely, ἔτερον...
Parmenides will consider internal changes later, in lines 26-49 (see further, chapter five).

73. It is a further issue whether ὁ ἥν ἦν must, even for Parmenides, be single. Wiesner (1970) 23-25, following a hint in Cornford (1939a) 37ff., argued that B8.12-13 proves that ὁ ἥν ἦν is ἦν (promised at B8.6a). We are in substantial agreement with Wiesner, but ἦν probably is meant to cover more ground than that encompassed by B8.12-13 (see further below, p.203).

74. Wiesner (1970) 10 takes the first interpretation canvassed in our text to be 'ein völlig überflüssiges, nichts neues enthaltendes Argument'.

75. B8.12-13, then, are not simply equivalent to the dictum that nihil ex niliō fit, as Stough (1960) 92-96 takes them to be. Neither are they 'presented as axiomatic, an indisputable truth...having the force of a final and conclusive demonstration of the thesis asserted in lines 7-8' ( ibid. 94). They are firmly rooted in the arguments of lines 6-10. Mourelatos (1981) 649-655 takes the view that nihil ex niliō fit was already well known to Parmenides' contemporaries, but this seems very doubtful. Certainly it does not follow from the evidence presented by Mourelatos; it seems much more likely that Parmenides is the originator of the dictum.


77. (1) B2.7-8: αὐτὸ ... γνοὺς τὸ γι ἢ ἔνα ... αὐτῷ ἀρισταῖς; with which cf. αὐτῷ ... φθορὰ ... αὐτῷ νοεῖν in B8.7-8 and οὐ... φατόν αὐτῷ νοοῖν in B8.8. (2) B8.44-45: αὐτῷ τι μεῖζον αὐτῷ τι θαλαττορεύν, with which compare αὐτῷ τι τῇ μάλλον ... αὐτῷ τα χειροτερον at B8. 23-24. (3) B8.46-47: αὐτῷ γὰρ αὐτῷ ἔδω ἵπτε ... αὐτῷ ἔδω ἔτεν, ἢτα. (4) B4.3-4: αὐτῷ σκληρόμενον ... αὐτῷ συντόμα-μενον.

78. Taran (1965) 104; Monro (1891) §331; and cf. Denniston (1952) 515 especially for similar usage of coordinated negations in Pindar. Elsewhere Parmenides repeatedly links destruction with generation, by simple coordinating καὶ (B8.3,21,27) and once by τε καὶ (B8.40), but this last may only be a stylistic variant on simple καὶ, occasioned by its appearance in a list.


80. Fränkel was fully answered on this point by Verdenius (1962) 35-36; and cf. Loenen (1959) 101 n. 204.

82. Fränkel (1975a) 7-8 presses this point especially; the parallels are B8. 26-27, 30-31, 37-38, 42 and 49.

83. It is not possible here to make a full tradition-historical study of the term δική. It appears in the proem (Bl. 14, 28), though it is not clear that both appearances signify the same personage [almost certainly the figure of δική is not the same as the δικαίωμα of Bl. 3, as Mansfeld (1964) 242ff. supposes]. In the proem δική is probably a figure with principally mythological associations [so Burkert (1969) 10-11]. Wider associations with an emerging notion of natural regularities were exploited by Anaximander (Bl) and Heraclitus (323, 828b, 880, 894) [see Diels (1897) 77-78]. It seems unlikely that the identity of δική survives the passage from the literary genre of the proem to the argumentation of the later fragments. Fränkel (1975a) 8 and Mansfeld (1964) 243 emphasize that the function of δική in B8.13 is similar to that of ὁμορ 'αι and ἀνάθρικτη in B8.30f., 37f. respectively, that is, to furnish the modal force of the arguments. Alternatively, δική may represent more generally the logical force of valid arguments.

84. So also Stough (1968) 92 n.7, 99 n.16.

85. E.g. Diels (1897) 78f.; Schofield (1970) 126; Taran (1965) 104; but many commentators overlook the issue completely.


87. Stokes (1971) 132 takes a similar view of Parmenides' strategy for excluding destruction, but furnishes a separate argument for it (see next note).

88. It is unnecessary, then, to amend line 12 just to provide an argument directly against ἀλογισμοῦ, as do Taran (1965) 104, Barnes (1979a) I, 189, and Stokes (1971) 310 n. 84.

89. For this rendering of ὡ ὀξύ see Denniston (1952) 463.

90. For ἡαι and double accusative adjectives cf. Sophocles, Ant. 29:

91. I take διέκτε plus infinitives ἔλην and εἶναι as equivalent to two clauses of result governed by ἐκπτυχα [for comparable translations see Taran (1965) 104, Guthrie (1965) 26, Hussey (1972) 88, Bormann (1971) 41]. Diels (1897) 37, 80 takes διέκτε with ἡαι [also Mourelatos (1970) 153]; but his parallel, Sophocles' Phil. 656 is inappropriate (see Jebb's note ad loc.). Calogero (1932/1970) 38 n.39 complains that the opposition here (τὴν μὲν ... τὴν ἕ) requires that one path μὴ ἔλην and that this is absurd. But the description of one path as existing and true (or reliable) is compatible with describing the other path as existing and not true, i.e. as a possible but unreliable path.
92. Parmenides' point will go through, of course, only if he further assumes that the path 'it might be and it might not be', i.e. the path that the mortals take, does not represent a genuine alternative (because failure to be without qualification is tantamount to not-being).

93. Asclepius, in Met. 42.30, 38. 17-18, 202.16 (and cf. Ammonius, de Interp. 136.24-25) reads ὁ γὰρ ἐλπὶν οὐκ ἦταν ὡμοῦ καῦ, ἐστὶ δὲ μοῦνον ἁλοφοῦς. His text is followed by Philoponus, in Phys. 65.9 and Olympiodorus, in Phld. 75.9, and chief among modern editors Untersteiner. But this choice has been decisively criticised: see the discussion in Taran (1965) 158f. and n.37 as also Bormann (1971) 142. Simplicius' affirmation of ὧμοον πάνω is much more plausible, being echoed at line 11 with τάσαν τέλειον, and furnishing an important premise for the argument of lines 22-25 (viz. ἐστὶν ὑμοῦν).

94. Schofield (1970) 122-123 gives a full discussion. This not withstanding, the line may still be interpreted as Taran and Fränkel (authors of the suspected translation) took it. Mourelatos (1970) 95 n.4 takes ὧμοον πάνω adverbial to ἔτη, but this is unconvincing and gives a sense equivalent to ours anyway.


Mourelatos (1970) 103-111 advances an atemporalist interpretation, but by a curious argument from silence.

97. Among many who have taken this view, perhaps the most thorough analysis is given by Schofield (1970).

98. Prior (1968a) 19-23, (1968b) has shown that 'now' is redundant with the present tense of the verb, and so the logical weight of B8.5b must be carried by the finite verb alone and not by its modifiers. Schofield (1970) 123f. is right to stress the contrast with ἐστὶν alone.

99. Aristotle, and others, deny that we can conceive of a use of 'is now' which does not imply a duration also encompassing 'was' and 'will be': Phys. 219b 33- 220a 6, 220a 11-24; Owen (1976), Miller (1974), Kretzmann (1976), Prior (1970). These philosophers would prefer our second interpretation.


101. ὡ τὰν ἐξετάσει: Phys. 207a 9-14, a use he says is very close to the sense of τέλειον. Cf. Parmenides B8.32 (ὠν ἐτελεῖς) and B8.48 (τὰν ἐστὶν ἀνάλογον).
102. Cf. Plato, Parm. 137c–d, especially c7–8, 157c–d, Theaet. 203e–205c. At Soph. 244d–e Plato’s claim that Parmenides’ use of ὁλόν implies parts, is plausible only if we agree to treat the simile in B8.42–44 as postulating a real shape for τὸ ἐδώ (with a center and extremities), but this is an improper use of the simile (see chapter five). Bormann (1971) 153 treats ὁλόν as ‘die Unentstandenheit und Unvergänglichkeit des Seienden’, which is nearly right: ὁλόν derives from the ungenerability and indestructibility of τὸ ἐδώ, but it is not equivalent to it. For further resistance to the Platonic interpretation see Bormann (1971) 152–153.

103. This sense of ἔν corresponds to Aristotle’s ‘numerical’ sense: Met. 1016b 31ff. Omission of this sense of ‘oneness’ vitiated the discussion of Eleatic doctrines in Phys. 185b 5ff. On the issue of Parmenides’ ‘monism’ see chapter 5 n.15.

104. Aristotle also is aware of the links between numerical unity (ἕν), continuity and indivisibility: see Met. V.6 (see previous note) and the expression τὸ καθ’ ἐκαστὸν ἄλλοαρματον at Met. 1.1, 1052a 32.

105. Hussey (1972) 91 usefully points out that the singularity of τὸ ἐδὼ cannot be read off from the meaning of the phrase, but must be argued.


108. Owen (1966/1974) 275, cf. his (1960/1975) 62 and n.52. Woodbury (1958) 154 is sensitive to the same point regarding σκάδους (and cf. ἐκείνους εἰς ὑμᾶς at B8.46 and συνεχεῖς at B8.23). The image of the ladder can be found at Wittgenstein (1921/1974) § 6.54 and before him by Sextus Empiricus, AM VIII. 481.


110. A similar procedure in Plato may be illuminating. He describes his changeless Forms as μονής καὶ συνεχός (Tim. 29b), as ἀσ κατὰ τὰ τὰ τὰ (28a), as τὸ κατὰ τὰ τὰ καὶ ἑκαστὰς ἐκαστὸς (29a) and as μέινουσας αὐξομενῆς ἐν ἑν κατ’ ἀρίθμον (374). Nevertheless, at 37e–38a he establishes the timelessness of these entities by excluding ‘was’ and ‘will be’ from what is ἀπανθίτως because it never experiences coming-to-be or passing-away. Can it be doubted that this last is modeled on an Eleatic original?


112. Of these, συνεχός, construed as absolute indivisibility and controlling the meaning of ἔν (and to some extent ὑμῶν ἄν), is arguably the most important. Perhaps for this reason, Parmenides supplies a separate proof for it at B8.22–25, though the arguments there depend on those of 6–10 and its semantic rationale (see further below). The result is untidy, perhaps, but intelligible.
113. The same goes for ὅν ἐστὶν, pace Taran (1965) 177f. n.7, who argues that ὅν is as much a part of time as past and future. But if ἐστὶν can be the timeless 'is', so can be ὅν ἐστὶν.


115. The first reading is followed by Diels (1897) 80, Corrard (1939a) 37 n.2, Burnet (1930) 175, Taran (1965) 104, Stough (1968) 98-99 and n.16, Schofield (1970) 117 n.19, Bormann (1971) 40, Mourelatos (1970) 96-97, Barnes (1979a) I,190. The emendation was first offered by Karsten (1835) and Stein (1867), and is accepted by Guthrie (1965) 27; DÉ; KR, 273; Hölscher (1969) 20,53.

116. Indeed, on grounds of syntax alone, μὲλλει ἐσέχθαι (a simple periphrastic future) is the exact equivalent of πέλεσιν, which is what the chiastic suggests. For the construction cf. Xenophon, Anab. 1.9.28: καὶ δὲ ὁ πατὴρ ἡμῶν μὲλλειν ἐσέχθαι τροσκαλῶν τοὺς μύθους ἀποφοβολογέστω ... ['If ever Cyrus was on the march and many were likely to catch sight of him, he summoned his friends and engaged them in earnest talk'], trans. Smyth (1956) 436.


118. E.g. Hölscher (1968) 91f. and nn. 71,73.

119. The nuance imported by δὲ ἐκείνος will concern us further below.

120. δὲ ἐκείνος at 20b plainly means to carry over the apodosis of 20a: οὐκ ἐστὶν.

121. Elegance in English is difficult to achieve here largely because of the privative force and proleptic construction of ἀποτελεῖται. For preparatory μὲν followed by copulative καὶ see Denniston (1952) 374; and for τὸς see main text below.

122. So also Schofield (1970) 125.

123. Van Leeuwen (1887) 77 finds only two secure instances of our usage in Homer: Ἰλ. 13.127 and Od. 9.334. The debate on their equivalence is summarized in Chantraine (1953) 345-350 and cf. Debrunner, Schwyzer (1950) 305 n.4. Monro (1891) §333 and Gildersleeve (1882) 448 argue for their distinction and for the sense which we have given for δὲ ἐκείνος. The best alternative is to take the combination to be equivalent to Attic double-ὁ, which gives the same emphasis we find in δὲ ἐκείνος.

Wiesner (1970) 27 worries that τάκ in line 21 reverses the order of inference found at lines 5ff. and that therefore 19-21 cannot be parallel to lines 5-6. This problem disappears on our view of the function of τάκ.

125. Stough (1968) 100 apparently thinks that 19a and 20b refer to generation in the future because the grammar of τάκ ε' ἔνυ 'κε γένετο requires that it refer to generation in the past. But this does not seem right: ε' with the optative makes a simple tenseless supposition, and ε' with the indicative (line 20) has no connotation of tense either, but only carries verbal aspect.

126. Stough (1968) 100 n.17 links lines 19-21 to the earlier arguments against γένεσις, but sees less reason than we do to draw lines 5-6 into the same context. Schofield (1970) 126 associates 19-21 with 5a-6a, but not with 6b-18; but again, we doubt that these contexts are so sharply distinct. Kahn (1968) 128 finds full atemporalism in 5a-6a and 19-20, which goes further than we find warranted. Barnes (1979a) 1, 191-194 misses any connexion at all between 19-21 and lines 6-13.

127. None of the variants to οὐοογενεκες recommend themselves and we follow Simplicius' text: see the discussions in Taran (1965) 88-92 and Wiesner (1970) 3-4, n.8. Barnes (1979b) 8f. is unnecessarily hesitant.

128. Taran (1965) 92.

129. For the topos of it being better to have a single heir see, e.g., Plato, Laws 740b-4, 923c-d; Xenocrates, fr. 97; Aristotle, Pol. 1274b 3.

130. See Owen (1960/1975) 76 for this argument.

131. So also Barnes (1979b) 8.

132. Pace Mourelatos (1970) 113-114. His appeal to Hesiod's use of γένος at Works 11-13 is blocked by Parmenides' use of ἀγορά at 8.3, for γένος carries a generative overtnote: it is explicated (in lines 17-26) in terms of the genealogy of Night (who has two daughters, and not just one as Theog. 125-132 might lead us to suppose). For γένος as 'race' or 'family' see further Theog. 33, 44, 50 et passim. West (1978) 143 has the main point. Also, Mourelatos gets his meaning for οὐοογενεκες by exploiting dubious parallels with other οὐοο- compounds, setting aside, e.g., Plato's use of οὐοογενεκες itself.

133. Mourelatos' comparison with οὐο ῥοηθ at 8.53 makes room for such a notion, but it depends on taking οὐοογενεκες as equivalent to μονολήπες , which is very doubtful [though Barnes (1979b) 9n.24 finds it apt].

134. Simplicius, in Phys. 144.18; but, as Taran (1965) 91 is quick to note, this is under the influence of Plato's over-literalistic reading of the sphere image in 88.42-49 (Soph. 244e) as also is
Simplicius' ὁλομελές at 137.15. Accordingly, Simplicius' evidence is not especially impressive.

135. Russey (1972) 92 makes a similar point.

136. So also Bormann (1971) 141.


138. Pace Taran (1965) 108, lines 23a and 24a are not coordinated to the first ὁδός in 22a, which has, rather, the function of connecting the whole of 22-25 to 5-21.

139. Owen (1960/1975) 58. Stokes (1971) 134-137 objects that Owen's construe depends on emending τῇ (B8.23) to τῇ, but this is a misunderstanding: Owen mentions the emendation as plausible, but does not follow it. Nor need he do so, since τῇ is readily equivalent to τῇ, as Empedocles B26.10 (cf. B17.11) shows (and cf. LSJ, s.v. ὀ, A.VIII.1.c). Owen goes on to argue (n.62, p.75) that τῇ ... (τῇ) can be read strictly temporally, given Aristotle's interpretation of Empedocles B26.10-12. This is certainly true as regards syntax, but Aristotle is an unreliable guide to Empedocles' meaning [see Cherniss (1935) 175 n.130]. A more neutral reading of τῇ ... (τῇ), as 'in one respect ... in another respect', is more suitable for both Empedocles B26.10-12 and also Parmenides B8.23-24. Empedocles is pressing the point that the four cosmic elements are subject to coming-to-be in one sense, but not in another. The force of Parmenides' argument will require a more general sense for τῇ ... (τῇ).

140. Bormann (1971) 146, 161-63 persists in adopting the alternative; but his argument is weak, amounting only to citation of Hülischer (1969)53, who in turn cites Mansfeld (1964) 100 n.3, which turns out to be a flat assertion.


142. We have earlier argued that it is generally unwise to construe Parmenides' arguments in the light of the common lexical force of his language, for often his arguments are pressing his language in entirely novel directions.

143. Schofield (1970) 118-119 complains that the argument of 6b-21 is 'a sort of duckrabbit', since it is made to prove ἀγένητον καὶ ἀνάλεξον and also (with lines 22-25 added, the conclusion being anticipated in line 6a) ἀπαξεκέξει, and hence both is and is not principally a proof of ἀγένητον καὶ ἀνάλεξον. On our view, this feature is not offensive. Parmenides is not using a single-valued argument in B8.6-10, but a semantic theory which supports a wide range of implications, some of which are drawn in 6b-18, some in
5a-6b + 19-21, and some in 22-25. Further implications will be drawn out in lines 26ff. (see chapter five below).

144. Diels (1897) 82-83 takes τὸ at B8.23b to refer to τὸ μὴ ἐστὶ, thus introducing an explicit reference to the banned semantic object and with it to just such 'gaps'. But this is improbable, and τὸ is more likely to be demonstrative, referring to the fact or state of affairs entertained at 23a (viz. τὸ τῆς μακροχρόνης).

145. Face Owen (1960/1975) 59, B8.22-25 is not pressing a strictly temporal thesis. Vlastos (1975) 326 and n.27; and Fränkel (1975b) 110, 132 n.36 waver between spatial and temporal interpretations of οὐδὲ διαρκετόν, perhaps sensing that the argument is after larger game. Calogero (1932/1970) 208 n.38 finds an echo of B8.22-25 in Gorgias apud MGX 980a 3-8. But Gorgias' argument there depends on motion in space, as the comment at 980a 7-9 makes clear. This might more plausibly be taken to echo Parmenides B8.26-33.

146. Those who take B8.22-25 to prove ἄν (as opposed to expanding on its meaning), are not far off the mark: e.g., Schofield (1970) 118; Tugwell (1964) 39; Furley (1967) 61n.3; Owen (1960/1975) 97; Guthrie (1965) 34. Attempts to find here proofs for οὐλὸν [e.g. Diels (1897) 80-83, Barnes (1979a) I, 210] or for δὴμον νὰ [Deichgräber (1958) 677 n.1] are farther astray.

147. Owen (1960/1975) 63 finds two dividends in B8.22-25: 'the real' admits no succession of separate entities, and no internal change (of state). The second of these was vigorously disputed by Tugwell (1964) 38, but for reasons that I cannot accept. (His own view that B8.22-25 proves τὸ ἄν to be material plenum requires premises not advanced by Parmenides). Owen's first dividend was in fact drawn in lines 12-13, and the second is the business of lines 26-33 (see chapter five below).

The preceding chapters have introduced the hypothesis that Parmenides' poem puts to the test a set of considerations about the relationship of language to reality, in sum, a theory of sentence meaning. I have tried to show that this hypothesis is especially valuable for understanding B1.28-32 and B2, B4 and B6. The last chapter found the semantic interpretation to make excellent sense out of the arguments in B8.5-25, a passage neglected in recent investigations of the problem of language and reality in Parmenides. But B8.5-25 is part of a program of arguments extending down to B8.49, a program which proves for τὸ ἔδω the list of predicates in B8.3-4. We can show that B8.26-49 is closely integrated with the results of the arguments in B8.5-25. Indeed, each of the three blocks of argumentation in B8.22-49 (i.e. 26-33, 34-41, 42-49) can be interpreted as extending and drawing corollaries from the argument of B8.5-25. This being so, it will not be surprising to find that Parmenides' semantic assumptions have a bearing on B8.26-49. Moreover, B8.34-41 not only serves as an interim summary of results (from B8.5-33), but also begins an analysis of the beliefs of mortals. The analysis is continued in B8.50-61, B9 and B19. We may expect that this analysis, too, will reflect Parmenides' theory about language. I will argue below that Parmenides' semantics are especially close to the surface of his argument in B8.34-41. There they play a direct and crucial role in his treatment of mortal opinions.

5.1: B8.26-33: the immutability of Reality.

We translate these lines as follows:

Moreover, it is immutable, without beginning or ending, (held) in the limits of mighty bonds, since coming-to-be and destruction have been driven far away, driven back by the force of truth. Remaining the same in the same, it also rests by itself and so remains firmly as it is; for powerful necessity holds it fast in the bonds of its limits, which bonds constrain it all round. Wherefore, what-is is necessarily complete, for it lacks nothing, for if it lacked anything it would lack everything.

This begs numerous issues, one ancillary purpose of what follows being to justify this translation. But our main aim is to clarify the argument of this pericope.

The arguments in B8.5-25 go to show that τὸ ἔδω is temporally and spatially indifferenced, and that this is necessarily the case. As a result, there can be no change of state for τὸ ἔδω. This being so, we can expect that not only will Parmenides exclude every possible partition of τὸ ἔδω (B8.22-25) but that he will go on to exclude every 'external' change of state (i.e. local motion) and every 'internal' change of state (i.e. every alteration or change of qualities). Both of these exclusions are made in B8.26-33, which thus proves to be a further set of corollaries drawn from B8.5-25.

Parmenides announces his new result with οὐκ ἂν προς ἄνω θεῷ... ἢ δὲ τὸ ἔδω ἄναρχον ἀκαταστάτου. As in B8.22-25 the result is given first, the argument afterwards. Two problems emerge at once: how are we to
construe ἀκίνητον; and what are the ἐκπατα which hold τὸ ἑν in bond and whence come their force? The first problem will yield to careful analysis of the structure of the opening sentence of 88.26-33.

The sense of ἀκίνητον can be gathered in part from its apposition with ἀναρχον ἀξιωστον. Τὸ ἑν exists without the specific qualification of having a beginning of existence or an ending of existence. It is ἀκίνητον in just this sense. On the understanding that to have a beginning of existence or an ending of existence is just to have something true at one time but not true at another, this ἀκίνητον can cover both local motion and internal changes. That this is Parmenides' meaning can be gathered from three other sources: the evidence of Melissus, the ἐπεζ -clause in lines 27-28, and the suggestion of 88.40-41.

Two of Melissus' fragments treat the subject of κύνης. In B7.10 he argues that τὸ ἑν is necessarily 'full' (πλέων εὐνοου, i.e. fully real, suffering no degrees of reality) since it cannot be 'empty'. He further argues that if it is fully real it ὁ χνευτων. Although this last could exclude changes of state, it need only refer to local motion. Indeed, the close association with B7.9 suggests that πλέων and κύνην are spatial terms, in which case the deduction in B7.10 is likely to exclude only local motion. But in B10 Melissus argues in such a way as to require a broader view of κύνην. Here the inference is that τὸ ἑν cannot be divided, for if it were divided it would be κνευτων and the κνοῦμενον ... οὐκ ὑπὲρ. This seems to require that κύνης means 'change' in a very broad sense. For it does not follow from its division that a thing is locally moved. But it could follow from its division that a thing is changed: something will be true of it after the division that was not true of it before, and accordingly something about it has changed. Thus, if the argument of B10 is to go through, Melissus must mean by κύνης (and its cognates) 'change' in a quite general sense. This being so, we must at least allow that some Platonic arguments about κύνης are not about local motion, but about change (though we are otherwise aware that Melissus cannot be used to interpret Parmenides directly). We can go further and show that the argument of Parmenides 88.26-33 invites the wider sense of the term κύνης, especially in the light of the ἐπεζ -clause in lines 27-28.

The ἐπεζ -clause in 88.27-28 explicitly recalls the results of 88.5-21: both γένεσις and ἐλεφάντων are excluded by that ἥ τοὺς ἀληθὲς. But that argument is one which very generally excluded coming-to-be and passing-away, the generality deriving from Parmenides' semantic theory. We have to ask, then, what is the most appropriate corollary for Parmenides to draw from the earlier context, respecting κύνης. We have shown in chapter 4 that the foundation of the argument against generation and destruction is laid in the arguments in lines 6-10 for the illegitimacy of ἡμῶν ὅπως ἐπεζυ. Recalling the resulting exclusion of generation and destruction at lines 27-28 thus draws also on the wider argument of lines 6-10. But this wider rationale serves not only to exclude local motion, but all forms of change (including local motion, but not excluding qualitative change). The connexion of ἀκίνητον with the exclusion of generation and destruction thus invites the wider sense of 'changeless' for the new epithet.

Finally, we must notice that at 88.40-41 Parmenides takes it that he has excluded by his earlier arguments not only generation and destruction, but also τὸν ἀλλὸσεστὶν and χρὴ φανὲν ἀμετέρων. There
does not seem to be any way for this latter pair of results to have been secured unless the argument at lines 26-33 is taken to cover both local motion and qualitative change. This it will do only if ἀξιωματος means 'changeless' (for what is immutable does not move in space or undergo any other change, while what does not move in space may change in other respects).

For all of these reasons, then, I take ἀξιωματος in B8.26 to be a unitary term for a complex idea: change, including local motion but not excluding any other change of state. No more than we can restrict the scope of B8.22-25 to temporal continuity, can we restrict B8.26-33 to local motion. The first advance in the argument, marked by B8.26-33, then, is simply an addition to our stock of corollaries drawn from B8.6-10: τὸ ἔδω is immutability, both with respect to local motion and with respect to any other change of state. We can further support this reading of B8.26-28 by way of an analysis of the very complex argument in lines 29-33.

The section 29-33 opens with a restatement of the thesis of ἀξιωματος; now more clearly explicat in both of its leading senses: ταύτων τ’ ἐν ταύτων τε μένου καὶ εἰστὶ τε ἐν ταύταις τοῦ ἔργου ἀξιωματος (29-30a). 'Remaining the same in the same it also rests by itself and so remains firmly as it is.'8 This thesis is supported by an appeal to the ἐπίσταντα of Reality: κατεστημεν ὡς ἀνάγκης ἐπίσταντας ἐν ἐκμεταλλήξει ἔχει, τὸ μὲν ἀέρις ἔργον (30b-31). I will return to the sense of ἐπίσταντα below. Line 32 serves a double purpose: it draws an inference from lines 29-31, and the inference makes an advance in Parmenides' argument. The inference drawn from lines 29-31 is marked by ἀνεκεῖν, which here probably means 'wherefore', the reasons being just lines 29-31 and especially 30b-31, i.e. from the presence of the ἐπίσταντα it is inferred that τὸ ἔδω is complete or perfect (ὁμ άτελεστην). Moreover, ὡς ἀνάγκης qualifies the inference further: τὸ ἔδω is necessarily complete or perfect, only so does the modality signaled by ἀνάγκη get carried over from premises to conclusion. The inference of line 32 serves to restate and interpret the thesis of lines 29-30a and also 26a (ἀξιωματος): τὸ ἔδω suffers no alteration of any kind and is motionless. In B8.25 ἀνεκεῖν acquires its meaning from the arguments that it recollected, and so it is here: ὡς ἀτέλεστης is a new epithet of τὸ ἔδω, and its sense is just that which the arguments in 26-31 require. The point is driven home with the final supporting argument in line 33: ἦσον γὰρ ὃ ἂν ἐπίσταντας. ἔδω δ’ ἐν ταύταις ἔστη.10

The argument is that if τὸ ἔδω lacks anything at all then it lacks everything. This reminds us of the principle of B8.11,15-18: what exists exists fully, on pain of being nothing at all. The rationale for the argument at B8.33 is a subtle one and it depends on recognizing that the (counterfactual) claim 'τὸ ἔδω lacks something', τὸ ἔδω has itself been made a subject of discourse. But, by our theory of sentence meaning, such a claim could only be true if there is an actuality represented by 'lacking something'. But lacking something is itself not the presence of some positive quality but the absence of it. For it to be true that τὸ ἔδω lacks something, we must suppose that this sheer negativity is an actuality. This is akin to the mistake attributed to the mortals in B6.8-9: to treat what is not as though it were an actuality, to take τὸ μὴ ἔδω for τὸ ἔδω. Because this cannot consistently be done, τὸ ἔδω must be supposed never to lack anything, i.e. to be ὡς ἀτέλεστης, perfect or complete in every respect.
We may summarize our analysis of B8.26-33 by noting its triadic structure:

   —argument: 27b-28 (recalling B8.5-21).

2. thesis (29-30a): τὸ ἑόρτον is altogether at rest.
   —argument: 30b-31 (the κροτάτα).

3. thesis (32): τὸ ἑόρτον is (necessarily) perfect or complete.

B8.26-33 thus gives a three-fold repetition of essentially the same point, though on each occasion the thesis is given a different phrasing: τὸ ἑόρτον is immutable. Moreover, two of the arguments given to support the thesis of immutability are clearly drawn from B8.5-21. It is plausible to suggest, then, that we should understand the argument in lines 30b-31, and with it the meaning and function of the κροτάτα, by reference to the other two arguments, and thence to B8.5-21.11

The κροτάτα which Parmenides refers to in lines 26 and 31 principally suggest the force of necessity. Repeated associations with bondage and force, the specific reference to ἐνέκχεια in line 30b and the use of ἄνθρωπος ἐναλια in line 32, combine to make this certain. Moreover, the κροτάτα cannot be literal boundaries, the argument in B8.22-25 having ruled out any literal boundaries for τὸ ἑόρτον. Recalling B8.5-25 we can make good sense of the κροτάτα as the signs of that logical necessity which governs the application to τὸ ἑόρτον of the φήμες which Parmenides is proving for it. The argument in B8.5-25 not only taught us that there is no change, it also taught us why: statements made about τὸ ἑόρτον are never true at one time and false at another. Whatever can be said about the real is the truth and the truth is invariant over time. The semantic theory which Parmenides is pressing to the limit itself sets limits which truth cannot transcend: all truth is necessary truth and τὸ ἑόρτον is held in the mighty bonds of a mastering necessity which is a broadly logical necessity. The κροτάτα are the signs or marks of this logical necessity, and they draw their power from Parmenides' fundamental principle that true statements are names which everywhere and at every time refer to some reality.12

I conclude this discussion of B8.26-33 noticing that the advances made in the argument of B8.5-25 are both parallel to the advances made in lines 22-25. First, Parmenides adds to his stock another corollary of B8.6-10, the thesis that τὸ ἑόρτον is generally immutable. Second, the epithets ἄμισον and ὅμων ἀπατευτήρας have been proved as essential properties of τὸ ἑόρτον. The first of these results serves to complete that part of Parmenides' argumentative program which called for a proof that τὸ ἑόρτον is ἀτεφελές (where we must now construe that ἀτεφελές as broadly as we have ἄμισον). The second serves to remind us that Parmenides has not moved far from the basic philosophical strategy he laid down in B8.5-25: to derive the properties of τὸ ἑόρτον from his fundamental assumptions about the relation of language to reality. But Parmenides is not yet finished with drawing corollaries from the arguments of B8.5-25. In B8.34-41 we get one further corollary and an important application of it to the question of the status of mortal opinions. We also will find that Parmenides' semantic commitments are especially close to the surface of his argument in B8.34-41.

5.2: B8.34-41 on Reality and mortal opinions.
By general agreement, B8.34-41 falls into two parts, the first of which (34-38a) proves the thesis stated in line 34. The first problem for us is what is this thesis? The second half (38b-41) gives a treatment of mortal opinions, and our second problem is to determine what is the treatment. Two larger problems emerge from these first two: what is the relation between the two halves of B8.34-41, and what is the role of B8.34-41 in the larger context of B8.1-49. This pericope, B8.34-41, is as controversial as any part of Parmenides' poem and poses as difficult a series of syntactical and textual puzzles as does any other part of the poem. Our account will turn on two procedures: a close analysis of the structure of the argument, and appeal to the semantic theory underlying the arguments of B8.5-25. We begin with an analysis of the structure of lines 34-38a.

Line 34 states the thesis to be proved in lines 35-38a: ταύτ' ἐστι νοεῖν τε καὶ ὀνυκτεῖν ἐπτώ κόμια. It is generally agreed that this is an identity claim, and this can be reinforced by syntactical analysis (see further below). I defer to later a statement of the terms of the identity. Lines 35-36a give an argument for the thesis in line 34: οὐ γὰρ ἐκεὶ τοῦ ἑνότος, ἐν δὲ τεφτυσθέντον ἑστιν, εὑρήσεις το νοεῖν. This argument is only slightly less difficult to understand (and especially the ἐν-clause) than is the thesis it supports: see further below. Lines 36b-38a gives the grounds (again marked by γὰρ) for the position taken in lines 35-36a: ὅσσον γὰρ ἡ ἐστιν ἢ ἐστιν ἀλλο πάρει τοῦ ἑνότος, ἐκεῖ το γε μοιρ' ἐπτοῖου ἐκοῦν ἦκτον τ' ἐμεναὶ. This statement itself contains an argument, the ἐπεί-clause in 37b-38a giving the grounds for the claim advanced in 36b-37a. The resulting structure is typical of Parmenides' embedded argumentation, the initial thesis being supplied with an argument which is itself supplied with an argument, and so on until we strike, with the ἐπεί-clause, the firm footing of an established result. Since we can give a reasonably clear interpretation of the ἐπεί-clause, the structure of the pericope itself suggests a way forward regarding our other problems. Starting with the final argument of the ἐπεί-clause, we may re-ascend the chain of argumentation, assigning to earlier stages of the argument that sense which seems to be required by the next later stage. Our interpretation of the whole of 34-38a, and our answer to its relation with 38b-41, must therefore begin with a treatment of the ἐπεί-clause in lines 37b-38a.

With ὀδον ἀκοῦντοι τε, lines 37-38 appeal explicitly to the results of B8.22-25 and 26-33, respectively. We should probably therefore take τὸ to be demonstrative (as it often is with γὰρ), referring τὸ ἐν, the subject of the immediately preceding clause and the bearer of these epithets in the earlier sections. The force of γὰρ can be rendered by the following translation: 'since that very ἐν we have (already) shown to be whole and unchanging'. The particle is thus not without some importance, for it serves to remind us that Parmenides is not pressing the vacuous claim 'what-is exists', but rather the more substantive claim that τὸ ἐν exists in a quite specific manner, i.e. ὀδον ἀκοῦντοι τε, complete and immutable. The location μοιρ' ἐπτοῖου recalls the theme of logical necessity which we found governing the results especially of B8.22-33. With this interpretation of the ἐπεί-clause in hand, we can now move to elucidate the content of the next link in the argumentative chain, i.e. lines 36b-37a.

The statement in 36b-37a is 'neither is there now nor will there be anything else beside (or alongside of) reality (τὸ ἐν)'. That is to
say, neither in the present (as a result of past partition or alteration, the phenomena excluded in B8.22-33), nor in the future (as a result of present partition or alteration) will there be any plurality of entities.\textsuperscript{13} Parmenides here treats changes in τὸ ἑὖν as the generation of the states of affairs which he is excluding.\textsuperscript{14} With this intermediate stage of the argument in B8.34-38a Parmenides draws the final corollary from B8.5-25: τὸ ἑὖν is not only absolutely indivisible, and absolutely immutable, it is also single.\textsuperscript{15} With this additional result of our analysis in hand, we may move on to consider the next link in the chain, the argument in lines 35-36a.

The main difficulties in lines 35-36a are the interpretation of τὸ (with νοεῖν) and ἑὖν ὡς περάσαμενος. Important clues for the solution of both problems have already been supplied by lines 36b-38a. The subject of 37b-38a is τὸ ἑὖν, as we have seen, and τὸ ἑὖν picked out or characterized in a particular way (as ὀδον ἀνωτὰ τὸ). The subject of 36b-37a is likewise τὸ ἑὖν, it being argued in 36b-38a as a whole that τὸ ἑὖν is single. In so far, then, as the argument which supports lines 35-36a aims to exclude any other subject besides τὸ ἑὖν, we may expect lines 35-36a to offer a very general subject covering possible alternatives to τὸ ἑὖν. This expectation is fulfilled if we read τὸ as a demonstrative and νοεῖν as a potential infinitive: 'what is for thinking' (compare B3). The point of 35a+36a (for the present leaving on one side the intervening ἑὖ-clause), then, is that there is nothing else to think about than τὸ ἑ}/#{terms}. That is to say, τὸ ἑ_BUSY is all there is 'for thinking', and this explains why one does not find the subject of thought without also finding τὸ ἑ_BUSY. On this showing, ὡς should also refer to τὸ ἑ_BUSY (as its position suggests that it does), but then we have to find a way to construe the ἑ_BUSY-phrase.

Like Mourelatos, I find the oddity of ἑ_BUSY ὡς περάσαμενος to lie with the preposition and not with the participle. If we follow Parmenides' usage elsewhere (B8.60) περάσαμενος will mean 'expressed' or 'uttered' or 'addressed', and none of these gives a cogent sense to a literal construe of ἑ_BUSY. In what sense is anything expressed or uttered in reality? There does not seem to be any other likely referent for ὡς, and so something must be made of ἑ_BUSY or περάσαμενος. Mourelatos' solution is to take the latter to mean 'promised' or 'committed' and the former, after a Homeric usage, to mark out τὸ ἑ_BUSY as that 'to which' thought (the antecedent of περάσαμενος is νόμος from line 34) 'stands committed'.\textsuperscript{16} We prefer a slightly different solution: take περάσαμενος (antecedent νόμος) to mean 'expressed' and construe ἑ_BUSY ὡς as a simple dative of respect: τὸ ἑ_BUSY is that in respect of which any thought is expressed.\textsuperscript{17} The primary aim of expressing a thought is to express something that is true, and this necessarily involves τὸ ἑ_BUSY, 'the real'. The point of ἑ_BUSY ὡς περάσαμενος ἐστὶ, then, is that τὸ ἑ_BUSY is that to which thought refers. The point of singling out τὸ ἑ_BUSY as the sole possible referent of thinking is just that according to Parmenides' theory τὸ ἑ_BUSY is the actuality which makes any thought (as also any proposition or statement) true and there is nothing else which has this power. With the locution περάσαμενος we are also reminded that τὸ νοεῖν is fundamentally discursive in nature. We thus continue to find that B8.34-36a presses the claim that τὸ ἑ_BUSY is the only subject of thought and talk. This brings us to the thesis in line 34.
If the thesis of line 34 is to be consistently construed with the arguments which support it, then the terms of the identity claim must be 'thoughts' on the one hand, and τὸ ἑὐ ν on the other. The point of the thesis would then be that τὸ ἑὖ ν is identical with the object of thought. Such a construe of line 34 is consistent with (if indeed not demanded by) the syntax of the sentence. The position of τὸ makes it unlikely that it is merely postponed, and τὸ ἑὖ ν should accordingly be taken to be a single unit coordinating the two phrases τοῦ τὸν ἐν ἐστὶν νοεῖν and ὁ ὅνεν ἐντὸς νόημα . The first of these phrases is a familiar construction, the infinitive having the force of a dative: 'the same thing is for thinking'. The completion of the identity statement plainly lies with ὁ ὅνεν ἐντὸς νόημα , a phrase which has been much disputed. The best solution seems to be that of Diels: ὁ ὅνεν refers to the goal of the νόημα , that object at which the νόημα aims or to which it refers, that 'for the sake of which' there is a thought. This solution recognizes the explanatory force of ὁ ὅνεν , a force not distant from its usage in Homer to signify the rational motivation for something. The best alternative is to take ὁ ὅνεν to mean 'because'. But nowhere has Parmenides prepared us for the notion that τὸ ἑὐ ν or anything else, has the property of causing thought(s), nor is it easy to see how this would serve his argument. However, he has prepared us (in B3, B6.1, and B8.35-38a) for the suggestion that τὸ ἑὐ ν should be the ultimate referent for every thought. While it is not possible, then, to give a knock-down argument for this interpretation of line 34, the context and syntax of the sentence strongly suggest that the identity in line 34 is between the object of thought(s) and τὸ ἑὐ ν, i.e. that τὸ ἑὐ ν is the sole object of thought. More strictly, we ought to say that τὸ ἑὐ ν is that which all of our discourse, linguistic and mental, intends in so far as our discourse aims at truth. This more closely captures the force of ὁ ὅνεν: τὸ ἑὐ ν is what our thought 'aims at' in so far as our thoughts are intended as true. Parmenides thus brings to completion an idea begun at B2, B6.1 and B3: not only is it true that what is for thinking and speaking exists, but also τὸ ἑὐ ν is all there is to make true the statements that comprise our speaking and thinking. Accordingly, it is not possible to speak or even to think about non-existent things like unicorns, a thesis made the sharper by what else Parmenides has proved for τὸ ἑὐ ν thus far. We are less likely to be disturbed to learn that 'the real' is what all of our discourse aims at, than we are to learn that 'the real' is ungenerated, indestructible, absolutely indivisible, immutable, single and so on. What might be the general upshot of such a thesis for the beliefs of ordinary men will be our next concern.

With this I conclude my treatment of the first half of B8.34–41. We must now turn to consider the second half, B8.38b–41. The structure of these lines is quite simple. Lines 40–41 list a series of phenomena which line 39 characterizes as things which mortals believe to be real: coming-to-be and passing-away, change of place and change of color. The pair ἔνας τὸ καλὸς ὅψε is included not because its misuse is basic to the others , but because Parmenides is summarizing the results of earlier arguments. The list fills our ἄνας from line 38b, ἄνας being the antecedent of the relative ὅνεν . We know that despite their confidence to the contrary, all of these beliefs of the ἄνας are false. Parmenides has gone to considerable lengths to disprove them in B8.5–33. Moreover, in B2 and B6.8–9 he had attacked the more
fundamental distinction of being from non-being. All of this is quite straight-forward; what is puzzling is how to construe B8.38b: τὸν ἴδεν’ ὄνοματι ἐστι. τὸν δὲν’ ὄνομα ἐστιν.

It is often argued that since Parmenides aims to exclude from mortal opinions any truth whatsoever, B8.38b must mean that these opinions are 'mere' or 'empty' names. On this view, we should take τὸν inferentially (rather than as a relative) and read ὄνομα ἐστι rather than ὄνοματι. The text is thus an early example of the widespread use of ὄνομα/ἐργον to signify the contrast between appearance and reality.²³ On the other hand, numbers of recent commentators have defended the reading ὄνοματι taking τὸν as a relative (antecedent τὸ ἐδώ): all of these mortal beliefs 'name' (i.e. refer to) τὸ ἐδώ. 'The names that mortal men give must be given to what—which-is, because there is nothing else to which they can refer.'²⁴ For reasons that will emerge more fully below, it does not seem as important to settle either the textual question (whether to read ὄνομα ἐστι or ὄνοματι) or the syntactical question (whether τὸν is relative or inferential), as it is to decide whether Parmenides can admit that there are any 'empty' or 'mere' names, that there can be stretches of discourse which have no reference at all.²⁵ There are substantial (and jointly decisive) reasons to deny it.

There need be no doubt that, so far as his language goes, Parmenides could intend with ὄνοματι (and why not with ὄνοματι;?) that mortal beliefs are only empty names (i.e. lack all real referent), for (on one view of it) the antithesis of ὄνομα/ἐργον probably originated in the sixth century and was therefore probably already available to him.²⁶ Neither does there seem to be any objection in the fact that B8.38b does not make explicit the other side of the comparison, i.e. reality. This will be supplied by the repeated mention of τὸ ἐδώ in lines 34-38a and will be understood by his reader. However, the evidence collected by Heinemann (see note 26) also shows that Parmenides worked at a time when the use of the terms ὄνομα/ἐργον to mean appearance versus reality was only just emerging as a literary convention. Problems of chronology aside, it would be a mistake to move immediately to supplying the full antithesis with the bare appearance versus Parmenides of a description of mortals' beliefs or ὄνομα, or their believing as ὄνοματι. The decisive factor must be the requirements of Parmenides' argument.²⁷

I have argued above that B8.34-38a secures the thesis that every thought has τὸ ἐδώ as its actual referent, as Woodbury put it, 'because there is nothing else to which they can refer'. We have further refined Woodbury's point, in seeking to account for the peculiarities of ὅθεν καὶ τον κύκλον, by arguing that τὸ ἐδώ is the sole referent of thought by virtue of its truth-making power. We can add to this that the textual evidence is strongly in favor of reading ὄνοματι rather than ὄνομα ἐστι.²⁸ Since ὄνοματι with a plain dative (without εἰς) is unparalleled, we should probably take τὸν to be inferential.²⁹ If we do take τὸν inferentially (i.e. meaning 'wherefore', lines 34-38a supplying the reasons), then it seems almost certain that ὄνοματι does not refer to 'empty' names. The subject of the verb is τὸ ἐδώ, understood from the previous line (a construction also found in 89): 'wherefore, it [τὸ ἐδώ] is named everything which mortals posit, believing them to be true'.³⁰ It is of some importance to realize that here Parmenides is not concerned with the misuse of singular terms (as e.g. in Empedocles; see below). No one believes simply 'comes to be' or 'passes away', but
rather that this or that comes to be and passes away. That is, what is believed is propositional. Accordingly, the misuse of language by the mortals is misuse with respect to the leading semantic properties of propositions and their linguistic expressions, viz. their truth. The best alternative to our construe is to take τὸ ἐδω to be the dative of the relative, despite the absence of parallels, and then we get the same result, but without a clear indication of Parmenides’ reasons for taking τὸ ἐδω to be the referent of mortal opinions. (In that case, we should presumably understand 34-38a to supply them.) The requirements of its immediate context, then, strongly support the contention that in B8.38 Parmenides does not make use of an ὄνομα ἔργον contrast, and hence does not endorse the notion that mortal opinions are 'empty' names.

I will argue below that in B8.53-59 + B9 Parmenides gives an argument against the possibility of mortal cosmologies being true, and that the success of this argument depends on our taking ὄνομα ἔργον to mean that what is named also exists. This context reinforces the judgement drawn above: for Parmenides there is no genuine discourse that does not have an actual referent. Moreover, it hardly seems even plausible for Parmenides to argue that all mortal opinions can fail to be given a referent. If each and every utterance of the ἄροτρα were so to go astray, Parmenides would not share with them enough common ground (of discourse) to secure a hearing for his own elechnus. It is, however, open to him to argue that certain foundational or central bits of mortal discourse fail to find their proper target. ‘On this construal mortals continue to talk about something, viz. the only thing there is to talk about, but what they say about it is wrong and contradictory.’

contradictory statements is something like ‘making as to think and talk about the real’. There is a close parallel to this use of ὄνομα ἔργον in Empedocles B8 and B9. The ᾑώς (ἃ γένεσις) by which men refer to the changes in things (ἐὰν τοὺς ὀνομάτας ἀναφόρατο ) does not refer to any real coming-to-be, but to a μάζεις τε διαλλαγές τε μεγάλους. The terms which men use are systematically misreferenced, so what people say is wrong, but the poet will conform to custom (a practice Parmenides roundly condemned in his B7) and use them himself (B9).22 Parmenides also treats mortal language with some degree of charity: what is intelligible in their speech is whatever can be canonically ascribed to τὸ ἐδω. The canons have been laid down in the σύμπα of being which Parmenides has proved. But since mortal language very quickly makes use of the notion of non-being, or coming-to-be and passing-away, change of place and change of bright color, most of mortal discourse fails the test.

Parmenides has now prepared the philosophical ground on which he will treat in detail of mortal opinions; and this treatment is shortly to follow. It will work out the basic line of criticism adumbrated in B8.34-41. Before he reaches that full critique, however, there is one further stretch of argument (B8.42-49) which brings the ἐτος of the goddess to its climax.

5.3: B8.42-49 and the perfection of Reality.

In keeping with his program (B8.3-4), Parmenides has furnished proofs that τὸ ἐδω is ungenerated and incorruptible, single, indivisible, and immutable. The argument for unity (B8.22-33) is
extended to cover both temporal and spatial continuity, and all aspects of change. We have found signs in it also of the semantic basis on which the argument in B8.5-21 is built. B8. 34-41 further extends the proof of unity into an explicit argument for the singleness of τὸ ἔδω. This additional corollary of B8.5-21 is immediately exploited to generate an assessment of the beliefs of mortals. B8.34-41 thus acknowledges the fact that the δρόμοι and the goddess meet on ground which is to some extent common, namely, their use of language. However, mortals, in their ignorance, profess beliefs which the sole possible referent of language—τὸ ἔδω as characterized in B8.3-4—cannot support. All this suggests that Parmenides is preparing to turn his attention towards a detailed application of his πολύθημα ἐλεγχόμενο the beliefs of mortals. But he has to carry out a final element of his program: proof that τὸ ἔδω is also ἀπόλογτον. B8. 42-49, then, will serve to complete the program of the elenchtic argument and also to bring that argument to a climax.

We translate the pericope as follows:

Moreover, since there is a final boundary, it (τὸ ἔδω) is everywhere perfect, like a well-rounded spherical mass uniformly balanced around its center. For it is not right that it (τὸ ἔδω) exist more or less in this respect or that. For neither is there any non-existent thing which would prevent it (τὸ ἔδω) from being unified; nor is there any existent thing such that there might be more or less of it, in one respect or another, since it is absolutely inviolable; for it is everywhere equal to itself and meets its limits uniformly.

This translation will be defended below in the course of our analysis of the literary and argumentative structure of these lines.

Parts of the argument correspond very closely to the argument in B8.22-25. Two theses are advanced in 46-48 which have exact equivalents in the earlier passage:

(a) οὐκ ὁμοίως (B8.22) corresponds to αὕτη ... αὐτῷ ἔδω ἐστι in line 46 [and note ἔστιν διὸ τὸν εἶναι (ἐννεῦςδια) ]; since the last is just the claim that what-is-not does not exist to divide up what-is.

(b) neither are there any degrees of reality: αὕτη ἔδω ἐστὶν διὸς καὶ κεν ἐκτὸς τῆς μᾶλλον τῆς ὧν ἀπύθου corresponding to B8.23-24. The arguments given to support these theses also echo the arguments given to support the corresponding theses in B8. 22-25. The explanatory clause τὸ κεν τοῦτο μὲν ἐννεῦςδια in lines 46-47 is almost a verbal duplicate of B8.23b: τὸ κεν εὐρύχως μὲν ἐννεῦςδια. There is one slight variation: the ἐννεῦςδια-clause in B8.22-25 attaches to thesis (b), while the ἐννεῦςδια-clause in B8.42-49 attaches to thesis (a). Despite this variation, it is clear that lines 46-48 repeat the argument of B8.22-25, and the degree of resemblance is so close that this repetition must be deliberate. The literary function of the repetition (as also of the recall of B8.32 noted below) is to reconnect the reader to the main line of argument, broken off at line 34 for the programmatic treatment of the opinions of the mortals. What might be the further philosophical aim of the repetition will emerge in due course.
The whole of B8.42-49 is a carefully constructed chiasmus, and the structure itself reinforces the explicit theme: equilibrium. The first unit in the chiasmus has three parts:

A1: the thesis: τὸ ἐδώ is τετελεσμένον, complete or perfect (an epithet recalling ὁ θεός ἀνελεσθήσαν in B8.32). As often, ὥστε marks a new stage in a narrative, but περίπατος τόπων must get its sense from lines 26-33, and not from 34-41. The statement of the thesis need not include the simile in line 41, ἐν τοῦτον marking the precise shift from thesis to illustration. Mourelatos punctuates so as to take περίπατον with εὐνοῆλον instead of as part of the predicate in line 42, but grammar is against him. Normally, adverbs modify adjectively from an attributive position and do not modify adjectives directly at all. ἐν τοῦτον should be taken with τετελεσμένον ἄστιν.37

A2: lines 43-44a gives the interpretative simile of the spherical mass. The point of this simile is discussed below.

A3: lines 44b-45 give an argument supporting the point made with the aid of the simile, and thus in support of the thesis τετελεσμένον ἄστι τοῦτον: 'it is not right that τὸ ἐδῶ exist more or less in this respect or that'.38

The second unit of the chiasmus (lines 46-48) opens with two arguments (together with their supports) in support of A3:

B1: (a) what is not, is not, else it prevents the continuity of what-is.

(b) what-is cannot be such as to exist more or less, in this respect or that (τῇ μάλλον τῇ ἐν ἴδιᾳ), since it is τὰς δουλοὺς 'absolutely inviolate' (recalling the thesis of B8.26-33, δουλοῖς neatly capturing the images of being bound and hedged about by the τεράτα so as to prevent any disruption).

B2: A restatement of the thesis in line 42: τὸ ἐδώ is ὥστε...περίπατον ἵκον, ὅπως ἐν περίπατοι κύρει.39 I render ὥστε as the dative of the reflexive pronoun.39 Kύρει could be either existential or copulative, as usual in Homer, either of these giving a good sense.40 If κύρει is copulative, it takes ἐν τοῦτον ἵκον as complemen, and ὅπως ἐν περίπατοι modifies κύρει. If it is existential, then we should probably understand ἵκον in the opening clause of line 49 (from the preceding line), and perhaps we should also find in κύρει the connotation of 'turns out' or 'proves to be true'. We have preferred the more dynamic sense (common with the dative) of 'hit upon' (echoing ἐνεπέλεξαν in line 46): 'for it (τὸ ἐδώ) is everywhere equal to itself and meets its limits uniformly'.41

The structure of the whole pericope is chiasmatic: the argument of A2-3 (including, for the purpose of a structural analysis, the explicating simile, A2) corresponds to the argument of B1, and the thesis of B2 restates the thesis of A1.

From this analysis of the literary structure of B8.42-49 emerge two corollaries which we should control our interpretation of the passage. The simile in lines 43-44 is part of an argumentative unit which corresponds, in the chiasmus, to the arguments in lines 46-48. These last, in turn, echo the indivisibility argument of B8.22-25 and, with
its extension, in B8.26-33, into a general argument against all kinds of change. We may expect, then, that the simile will have a logical force of the same generality. If so, then it will not be a mere repetition of the arguments in B8.22-33, nor will it give a spatial application of B8.22-25. (We have earlier argued that lines 22-33 already apply in both temporal and spatial senses.) The second corollary concerns the phrase πέλεις πώματον. Since the theses of lines 42 and 49 correspond to each other, and both to B8.26-33 ([i.e. τετελεσμένον πάντοθεν = πάντοθεν ἡσυχ = ὁ ἡσυχάστεθον], the πέλεις in B8.42,49 must be the same πέλεις which in B8.26-33 excluded all changes from τὸ ἐδώ. We found that the 'limits' in B8.26-33 were signs of that broadly logical necessity which attached to the properties of τὸ ἐδώ. The πώματον, then, is just the sign of the necessity of invariance in τὸ ἐδώ.42 This recall of the semantic basis for Parmenides' arguments against change places another constraint on our interpretation of the simile in lines 43-44. The 'limit' which makes τὸ ἐδώ to be τετελεσμένον πάντοθεν is the limit of logical necessity, and this necessity is ultimately based on the semantic theory which Parmenides has been pressing through-out B8 thus far. We may expect, then, that the simile in lines 43-44a will illuminate both the perfection/ completeness of τὸ ἐδώ and also the necessity which attaches to these properties.

The meaning of the simile εὐκύκλων σφαίρης ἐναλλάγμων ἔγιρσ is governed principally by a single consideration. In B8.22-33 Parmenides argued that τὸ ἐδώ cannot border on nothing (whether internally or externally, in any respect). It is therefore forbidden to interpret B8.42-49 as imputing to τὸ ἐδώ any literal boundaries, spatial or temporal, and especially spatial. 'If Being had a boundary, then outside this boundary, next to and outside Being, there would be a second Being, or a not-Being.' Moreover, such a result was explicitly excluded in B8.36-38. If τὸ ἐδώ is possessed of any literal boundaries, then the whole argument from B8.22-49 will be wrecked. But we have already seen that the άκρατα in question are plausibly construed as marking the logico-linguistic character of τὸ ἐδώ, and that πώματον need not carry a literal connotation. Further indication that the simile should not be taken literally is furnished by the point of the comparison. Parmenides himself singles out the one feature of the 'well-rounded spherical mass' which interests him: it is μεσοσθέν ἐσο- καλὲς κάντη, uniformly balanced around a center.44 The uniform balance of a spherical mass is not only a potent symbol for the equilibrium of τὸ ἐδώ, it is also a vivid picture of the necessity which attaches to the existence of τὸ ἐδώ because it first attaches to the truth about τὸ ἐδώ. A spherical mass balances around its center by virtue of the kind of thing that it is, with the necessity deriving from its specific nature. It can no more cease to be a spherical mass (on the assumption, of course, that no external force intervenes).

Despite the agreement of this interpretation of the simile in line 43 with the requirements of Parmenides' argument, and despite the abundant structural and linguistic cues he has given to suggest that agreement, literal interpretations of the sphere simile persist. Jameson takes B8.42-49 to prove that reality is spherical; but this is based on an interpretation of B8.22-25 as solely spatial, and ignores both the guidance offered by μεσοσθέν ἐσοκαλὲς κάντη and the
Tugwell went even further in the same direction, arguing that B8.22-25 proved reality to be a material solid, to which B8.42-49 adds a speculation on the size and proportion of the solid. He has correctly grasped the notion of balance in ὡς ἀνάλογός, and has, like Jameson, taken the point that B8.42-49 is closely linked to B8.22-25. But both of these interpretations fall in the face of Frankel’s objection to the spatial interpretation of the σύμπατα in B8.26-33.

A more subtle approach is taken by Mourelatos, who takes the simile to signify the spherical shape of reality, from which spherical shape he goes on to derive, by theorems of solid geometry probably unknown to Parmenides, the claim that B8.42-49 proves the self-identity of Being. This has the virtue of pressing the simile into the service of logic, but the derivation is unlikely for Parmenides. He probably has no access to the requisite geometrical theorems; in any case it is not clear that reality can have any shape at all without implying literal boundaries which have already been excluded. Taran also finds B8.42-49 to prove the homogeneity of τὸ ἐδών on grounds of its self-identity. But we have argued that the σύμπατα which ground the continuity and invariance of τὸ ἐδών derive from the role given to τὸ ἐδώ in Parmenides’ semantic theory, rather than from the necessary but trivial truth of its self-identity. Nevertheless, Mourelatos and Taran have both recognized that Parmenides’ argument should be taken to surround τὸ ἐδώ with the constraints of broadly logical necessity rather than physical necessity.

Owen argued that B8.42-49 affords a treatment of space which is parallel to the treatment of time in B8.22-25: ‘... to the ἄλεσεν of temporal invariance Parmenides has added the ὄνομα of invariance in space. So Parmenides’ treatment of space exactly matches his treatment of time; there is no place in it for boundaries or a spherical universe.’ Now this looks like a slip; if Owen means that Parmenides makes space and time themselves the subjects of his investigation. The spatio-temporal properties of τὸ ἐδώ are his target, and not the properties of space and time themselves. More importantly, there is no need to find Parmenides balancing an earlier treatment of the temporal properties of τὸ ἐδώ with a treatment of its temporal properties. The arguments in B8.22-33, as we have argued, apply indifferently to both spatial and temporal properties.

It is quite unnecessary to interpret B8.42-49 either in temporal or in spatial terms. If we press the simile in line 43, and language like ἐννεύοντας, τὴν ... τὴν, τελεσι τύμπανον, κατοδεῖν ἵππον and τετελεσμένον κάντοθεν in the direction of a spatial interpretation of B8.42-49, then Parmenides’ argument will be inconsistent. Such an interpretation will imply that τὸ ἔδω has real boundaries. How, then, to substitute a temporal interpretation without generating the same implication? The signs are that Parmenides is making a summary statement of the invariance of τὸ ἕδω, an invariance which has its roots in his semantic theory, and which resists the imputation to τὸ ἔδω of every kind of change. The arguments he uses serve to recapitulate the main themes of B8.22-33, and through them those of B8.5-21. The main theme is carried by a simile which compares the leading property of τὸ ἑδω (τετελεσμένον κάντοθεν = κάντοθεν ἵππον = ἀτάλαπου (B8.4)) to the equilibrium of the balance of a sphere about its center. This is the perfect image for the property of absolute invariance, itself a property the possession of which excludes spatial and temporal boundaries, but which is itself not
Spatial or temporal. B8.42-49 does not draw corollaries from B8.5-21; rather it is the general conclusion of the argument which began in B8.5.

With B8.42-49 one of the lines of argument begun in B1.28-32 is brought to completion, namely the examination of the ἀληθείας εὐνυκλῆς ἀριστής ἁρτον. We have, indeed, now seen worked out the full connotation of that remarkable image. What is more, we have begun to get, in B8.34-41, the promised treatment of the ἁρτον ἔδειξα. But this second strand of the goddess' ἔδειξις has yet to reach its term. It does so in B8.50-61 and B9, to which fragments I now turn.

5.4: B8.50-61, B9: Parmenides and the Boxa.

With B8.42-49 Parmenides brings to a close his ordered deduction of the σομα. With it he has deduced from the invariance of truth, all the predicates announced in B8.3-4 of τὸ ἐδών. He has also demonstrated what is the nature of the confusion into which most men fall when they use the language of change. Mortal men have failed to understand the logic which governs the relation of their language to the world, even though their language trades on this relation for such little sense as it may contain. (Parmenides never tells us which mortal beliefs it is that constitutes the common ground between them and the goddess. His concern is destructive: to show what beliefs are unacceptable.) In these respects, Parmenides has fulfilled the first commission undertaken in B1. 28-32: to unfold the ἀριστής ἁρτον of Truth. He has begun to carry out the second commission also: to show why mortals should believe their opinions to be true, despite the fact that beliefs which require τὸ μὴ ἐδών to make them true cannot succeed in being true. After all, mortal opinions can give a very persuasive account of the world of ordinary experience, and the ἁρτον have not had the advantage of hearing the ἔδειξις of the goddess. But this argument is not yet worked out in full, and to its completion we now turn.

A. B8.50-61:

B8.50-52 explicitly recognizes a shift of focus for the argument, from a reliable account (whether in word or thought) of reality (πρὸς ἄδηλον ἄδηλον νόημα ἄμετρος ἀληθείας) to a presentation of mortal opinions. The new exposition will be by means of a κόσμος of words, a κόσμος which is ἄπαθης, 'deceitful' or 'misleading'. The κόσμος to which Parmenides refers here is probably just the arrangement of words according to the rules of syntax, and possible also the rules of poetic composition.51 In this way Parmenides warns us that the mortals do no more than 'make as to' talk and think about reality. The deceitfulness of mortals' use of language is just its appearance of truth-telling, an appearance which reality does not support. Parmenides thus gives explicit recognition to the fact that the goddess and the ἁρτον employ a common language to describe the world, only the description which is given by the ἁρτον is necessarily false. That description is of the world as a field of change, and has already been shown to be impossible. But just here we encounter a slight obstacle, for in B8.60 Parmenides describes his account of mortal opinions as a διάκοσμον ἔλεκτρα τίνα, and this may be taken to lend them more legitimacy than we have allowed.

For several reasons we should probably take διάκοσμον ἔλεκτρα τίνα in line 60 to signify an 'entirely fitting exposition' (i.e.
arrangement) of mortal opinions, rather than an account which has some plausibility to it. It is suggested by some that ἐξολοθρεῖα here means 'plausible' in the sense of 'approximating to the truth', a sense found in the proverbial formula ἰδιός ἐξολοθρεῖα λέγειν ἐπιμονοῦν ὑμῶν (cf. e.g. Od. 19.203; Hesiod, Theog. 27). But, for ἐξολοθρεῖα to have this sense some such complement as ἐπιμονοῦν would seem to be required, εἴποις by itself as 'likely' not being evidenced before the middle of our century, in Sophocles and Herodotus (LSJ s.v. ἐξολοθρεῖα IV.3). It is more likely, then, that ἐξολοθρεῖα in our passage has the meaning of 'fitting' or 'suitable'. Moreover, according to Mansfeld the use of ἐξολοθρεῖα in Homer, to mean 'fitting' or 'seemly', regularly suggests that a thing is fitting relative to some concrete situation or purpose. This exactly matches the construction in Parmenides B8.60-61, with the ὅποιον ἁγιασμὸν is fitting or suitable. The objective of Parmenides' offering the ἀποτελέσεις is to ensure that the κόσμος who hears it should not be 'overtaken' or 'outstripped' by any mortal opinion (τὸ... βρῶναι γνώμη). We will return to this clause later (p. 285 below); for the present we only note that the goddess can hardly prevent the κόσμος from being taken in if her exposition of mortal opinions lends them genuine plausibility. Finally, the meaning of ἐξολοθρεῖα should be consistent with the rest of Parmenides' presentation of the ἀποτελέσεις in lines 50-61. Having announced in line 52 that what follows is a κόσμῳ ἀπατηλόν, Parmenides cannot consistently maintain at line 61 that the same account is reliable. Accordingly, we render ἐξολοθρεῖα as 'fitting' or 'suitable', and the whole phrase ἀποτελέσεις ἐξολοθρεῖα ἔργα as 'entirely fitting exposition (or account).'

Now, γὰρ in line 53 requires that lines 53-59 be an argument explicating and defending the description of this account as ἀπατηλόν. How we interpret the argument in B8.53-59 depends largely on how we take the first two lines. Their interpretation, in turn, rests on solutions to a number of textual and syntactical problems.

The first of these problems is the text of line 53. Only one of Simplicius' MSS reads γνώμας, the others agreeing to read γνώμαι. Furley has argued cogently that the latter is the more natural text. Taking μόρφαι with κατέθεντο (the model is B8.39: δοκεῖα βρῶναι κατέθεντο; and B19.3: δοκεῖα... κατέθεντο), we may translate with "they posit in their judgements two forms for naming". It may be objected that κατατάσσω does not normally take the dative and that κατατάσσω + accusative standardly means "decide". But a plural accusative object is unusual in this idiom, and κατατάσσω with an accusative object and a dative complement is also found. Even the volitional idiom (κατατάσσω as "decide") is given with a (locative) dative complement in Pindar, Nem. 10.89: οὐ γνώμαι διήλθαν ἔργα βουλὴν. Grammatical considerations, therefore, do not generate a clear decision about the text of B8.53. However, there is nothing against our reading γνώμαι, and the textual evidence and the parallels at B8.39, B19.3 strongly support Furley's solution. Moreover, on the interpretation of B8.34-41 offered above, what is wrong with mortals is not their thinking alone, but their thinking seen in the light of the semantic requirements of their thought. If we read μόρφαι... κατέθεντο δοκεῖα γνώμαι εὐπρεπείᾳ B8.59, then 53-59 begins with echoes of the earlier passage. It would not be surprising if this later passage were to resume the argument begun in B8.34-41.
The second problem is how to construe τὸν μῦρον οὐ χρείαν ἔχων, a phrase which has baffled commentators since antiquity. Discussion of the problem has given rise to three different solutions:

(a) Take τὸν μῦρον as equivalent to οὐ ὑπάρχειν and to mean 'not one of which': neither μῦρον is correct or legitimate. Parallels can be found in Aristophanes, Thesm. 549 (for μῦρον οὐκ + genitive = 'not (even) one of...') and Xenophon, Anab. 5.6.12 (for ξύλον μὴ = μῦρον...οὖν). Demosthenes 30.33 and Herodotus 8.119 (for μῦρον οὐκ = 'not (even) one').

(b) Take τὸν μῦρον to reject one μῦρον and retain the other. This alternative is often supported by appeal to B1: the journey of the κόσμος is a journey of enlightenment about Being, φῶς acting as a symbol for Being. The error of mortals is their failure to grasp that they should only posit one μῦρον, namely Light/Being.

(c) As a variation on (b), take the error of the mortals to be their failure to name or posit a unity of the two μῦρον.

We base our choice on close consideration of the opposition which is dealt with in lines 55-59.

According to these lines, mortals posit τῶν μῦρων, two 'kinds' of things, and this means that they distinguish as opposed to one another the δήμας and the σῆματα of these 'kinds'. The precise meaning of δήμας and σῆμα is not obvious, but an acceptable sense can be gathered from what follows in lines 56-59. We learn there that one μῦρον, the φλογᾶς ἀλάσθων κύρ (‘flaming fire on high’), is open-textured (ἀραιοῦν), very light weight (μεγ’ ἐλαφρῶν), homogeneous (κατὰ τὰ ἄνωτρα τὰ ἀνωτέρω), and dissimilar to the other μῦρον (τὸν δ’ ἐκτέρυμ χρούτον). By contrast, the other μῦρον, Night, is unknown or obscure (ἀδεών), densely textured (τοῦλον δήμας) and heavy (ἐμπιθέντα). The sense of δήμας here seems to be 'physical appearance', with a strong overtone of the physical structure of a thing. The σῆματα, then, will be the properties which make up the δήμας. In that case, μῦρον ... κατέχοντο ὧδε γνῶσις is equivalent to τὰντα ... ἐκφέντο δήμας, σῦματ᾽ ἔθεντες will correspond to ὁνομάζεσαν, and lines 55-59 simply spell out more fully what is meant by lines 53-54. The emphasis here is on the opposition of the two ordered sets of properties of the two μῦρον. Each set is made intelligible in opposition to the other; and rejection of one side of the polar conception will necessitate rejection of the other. In such a polar conception, the intelligibility of one side collapses with the withdrawal of the other.

Parmenides does not call here for a unity to replace these oppositions, nor does he have any interest in dissolving the antithesis, into the unity of τὸ ἕν. The first strategy is not open to him because each δήμας is linked with the other in an antithetical definition, and the definition would cease to be meaningful were the antithesis to be dissolved. The second strategy is not open to him because it would require that the antithetical properties of lines 56-59 be predicated of τὸ ἕν. Such predications, in order to be true and also preserve the opposition essential to our understanding of the predicates, must be self-contradictory: e.g. τὸ ἕν will be both ἄραιον and also ἄραιον (i.e. not-ἀραιοῦν). Accordingly, the only response which is open to Parmenides is to reject the entire antithesis of the mortals' scheme. This last consideration strongly favors Cornford's construe of τὸν μῦρον
in line 54a: mortals err in naming a duality; neither μορφή should be named. It can be objected to this that 'no [cosmological] system known to us held just this view' (i.e. that there were just two cosmic ἀρχές, Light or Fire, and Night). But this overlooks the fact that Parmenides is out to reject every cosmological scheme which depends on the reality of change. The positing of a duality is the minimal error of every cosmological system known to us. Such opposition is also the minimal precondition for change, and the reality of change is the main target of Parmenides' argument. Parmenides' aim is not an historical one, but a logical one. Were he to argue against some particular cosmological system or other, then he might be taken to imply that some cosmology could be offered which would escape the argument. As it is, the defeat of his economical representation of a systematic account of a changing world will undercut every such offering. Parmenides thus contrives to do cosmology at least as well (and with as much originality?) as any of his predecessors or contemporaries, while on his way to disallowing all such cosmologies. His presentation also specifies the fundamental error of all cosmologies.

The basic error exposed in B8.50-61 is the belief of mortals in two reciprocally opposed μορφά and therefore in the error exposed in B5. We can see how this works by advertting to the theory of sentence meaning we have attributed to Parmenides. Consider, for example, the two predicates ἀρχή and πολύς. If these are made intelligible by virtue of their opposition then (letting F= ἀρχή and G= πολύς) the claim of the mortals is that 'there is F' (that is, there is something that F's, namely the ἀλήθεια τῆς) and 'there is G' (that is, there is something that G's, namely πολύ). But, since G= not-F, then it must also be true that 'there is F' and 'there is not-F'. Now, these propositions are made true only if there are corresponding situations which they display, namely [F] and [not-F]. Now, if the negatedness of [F] by [not-F] is to be intelligible, then F must have the same naming role in both designations. In that case, [not-F] is equivalent to [not[F]]. But [F] commits the speaker to the fact that a certain situation or state of affairs can be picked out or identified, and [not[F]] commits the same speaker to the fact that the same situation or state of affairs cannot be picked out or identified. The upshot of this contradiction is simply that either F is not the name or designation of anything, or there is no true polarity between F and not-F, and hence not between F and G. Consequently, F and G cannot be 'for naming' and also be antithetically defined. But, ex hypothesi, these predicates were offered 'for naming' (ἐν ὁμαθείᾳ), and hence it is their duality which must be rejected. But with the rejection of their duality goes also the intelligibility of their respective μορφά (or at least the claims advanced for them by the mortals). The positing of such μορφά thus delivers the πρῶτο straight into a path of inquiry that is no better than the ἀρματα ἀπός of B2.74 We argued earlier that in B8.34-41 Parmenides' rejection of the mortals' beliefs turned on the semantic requirements of genuine thoughts. In the present passage we have already been reminded of the linguistic element in mortal opinions: mortals posit two μορφά for naming (ἐν ὁμαθείᾳ). The positing is construed as the assignment to each μορφή of antithetical sets of properties (σφάλματ.). By Parmenides' semantic theory, such an antithesis cannot be true, but at best merely 'makes as to be' true. Accordingly, the claims made in lines 55-59 are not genuine examples of discourse at all. It is vital to the
achievement of the κούραστε that he understand this fact. In discovering
that the ρομπέτος γνώση is merely a simile of genuine discourse, he
frees himself altogether from its attractions. Accordingly, he will no
longer be 'outstripped' by any mortal opinions. But the error posited
in B8.53-54 is not the only reason the goddess has to offer to this end.
There is a second line of argument germane to her purpose here and
closely related to the argument we have reconstructed above. The
objective outlined in lines 60-61 is not achieved without this other
argument, and hence not with B9.

The first problem is the reference of τα. There are three
possibilities: (a) it refers to φόβος καὶ νύξ; or (b) it stands for τα
ἄνδρατα (understood from άνωθεν), the names 'Light' and 'Night'
which mortals ascribe to everything else; or (c) it is part of a unitary
expression, τα κατὰ φημέρας ονόματες and stands for τα δυν- 
things according to their power'.

The third alternative seems unlikely, since it either makes the distributive phrase ἐν τῷ τόπω τε καὶ τὸς
to close, or it suggests some other rule or principle of distribution
parallel to the one signaled by the ἐν- clause. The first two
alternatives are obviously closely related. In view of the fact that
the main verb has not been supplanted by any other, if τα refers back to
φόβος and νύξ at all, it does so with respect to the names 'Light' and
'Night'. It is more natural, then, to construe τα as in the second
solution: the ἐν- clause makes mention of τα τόντα ('things') and τα
draws into view the two elements mentioned in line 1. This being so,
φημέρας probably refers to the 'powers' of Light and Night, though it
might refer forward to the δυνατα of ἐν τῷ τόπω τε καὶ τὸς .
The latter choice gives a similar force to line 2, but alters the angle of vision
slightly. We translate line 2 thus: '...and these (names) have been
assigned according to their powers (or capacities), to the individual
things'. We now begin to see what advance is being made in the
argument. Line 1 needs an explanation of τόντα ... άνωθεν, and line
2 gives the explanation in the relative clause. However, we can only
interpret this explanation further on the basis of some construe of
φημέρας ονόματες.

The ονόματες are probably the ονόματα of Light and Night referred to
in B8.55-59. These 'powers' are the properties or attributes of the
two cosmic principles Light and Night, and they are responsible for the properties which all other things have, according as the pure θυμόμενον are intermingled, in fixed proportions, among the things that are. Parmenides thus calls on the cosmological scheme he introduced at the end of B8 on behalf of the mortals. The entirety of πᾶν γὰρ ... καὶ τὸν (lines 1-2), then, is a summary of the earlier account. It is picked out as the leading premise of an argument, by οὔτως ἐξελεύθερον (or ἐξελθεῖν). The conclusion of the argument is given in lines 3-4a, together with a brief supporting argument in line 4b. Analysis of these lines will give us Parmenides' argument against the pattern of explanation used by the mortals and which he first mentioned in B8.53-54.

I translate B9.3-4 thus: 'Everything is full at once of Light and obscure Night, both equally, for what is not (or nothing) is not present in either'. Our interpretation of Parmenides' argument in B9 is governed by four main considerations. First, the use of θυμόμενον in line 3 elsewhere we have always taken this to be signal that Parmenides is about to apply his semantic theory to the language or thought of mortals. Second, line 2 seems to be adumbrating a simple physical theory of mixture whereby individual items in the world are differentiated by the proportions of Light and Night which comprise them. Third, the inference in lines 3-4a is very odd and even paradoxical: τὸν ... ὅμοιο ... ἐπουράρχον requires that each object be 'full' of Light and also 'full' of Night, both elements being present in the same degree. How this can be so and the mixture doctrine of line 2 still obtain remains to be examined. Fourth, the function of line 4b is to offer grounds for a new claim (as standardly with Parmenides' use of ἐξελθεῖν-clauses). We have to show why such a reference to τὸ ὑπάρχω (= τὸ μὴ ἔχων) can serve to ground the inference at lines 3-4a. These four basic features of B9 combine to suggest the pattern of Parmenides' thought. The first two features require that Parmenides have some sentences to apply his semantic theory to, and that the mixture doctrine supplies them. This it will do quite readily, for every individual thing x will be described by a formula of the general form 'so much Light and so much Night', or, where F is just the conjunction of all of the properties of Light and G the conjunction of all of the properties of Night, and, for the sake of simplicity, leaving out any quantitative expressions of the proportions, F(x) & G(x). But, by the definitions advanced in B8.55-59, Light and Night are opposites, and F= not-G. Accordingly, the physical theory trades on the alleged truth of sentences of the general form (∃x) (F(x) & not-F(x)). The truth of such sentences involves the existence of a situation in which [not-F] plays a role. The opposition of Light and Night was exploited in B8.53-59 where Parmenides attacked it directly. In B9 he focuses not on the opposition of Light and Night, but on the 'not' in 'not-F', and especially in [not-F]. It is difficult to see how else τὸ ὑπάρχει can have the role which line 4b gives it. What we are suggesting here is that (τὸ) ὑπάρχει at B9.4b is the semantic representative of 'not' in the designation [not-F] (or [not-G]). Parmenides' semantic theory does not recognize any difference between sentences and names, nor between the things for which sentences stand and those for which names stand. Moreover, if a sentence is a designation of some 'thing' or other, some state of affairs, then so are its parts designations of something. The functional word 'not' (and its equivalents) must designate 'nothing',
but 'nothing' conceived of as a thing which is there to be designated, in sum our odd object τὸ μὴδέν. The point is, of course, that there is no such object, 'nothing' being just that which is non-existent. But the withdrawal of τὸ μὴδέν means that 'not' in [not-F] does not designate anything, and hence [not-F] does not either. But if [not-F] thus has no meaning, then (by parity of reasoning) neither does [not-O], and sentences of the form required by the mixture doctrine cannot be true.

Furthermore, none of the properties of Light or Night can be predicated of anything with less than full force, since 'not' cannot attach to any of their predicates, nor can it attach to those complex predicates that represent the conjunction of the properties of Light and Night as they are found in individual things according to the theory in line 2. Accordingly, if anything bears the predicates appropriate to the properties of Light and Night, it must bear them without diminution. In sum, whatever is called both 'light' and 'night' must be both Light and Night. But it must be these fully, without stint, i.e. it must be identical to Light and also identical to Night (τὰ ἀληθεύον ... ὀρθῶν ... τὸν ἄφθορον thus has existential force and not quantitative force). Therefore, any individual thing which allegedly is a mixture of the ὑποθέσεις of Light and Night (ἐὰν τὸ φῶς τε καὶ τὸ σκῦλον) actually turns out to be an impossible object, like something which is both green all over and also red all over. There will be nothing of which this is not true, since the physical explanation on which the argument is based is perfectly general and seeks to explain the properties of each and every individual thing that goes to make up the world. What began in B8.53 as an attempt to differentiate everything in the world ends up unable to differentiate anything. This is the same kind of confusion which was drawn out of mortal opinions in B6.3-9; and here, as there, the argument can be interpreted as hinging on Parmenides' semantic theory.

Parmenides' argument in B9, then, turns out to be a dialectical argument, its dialectical character being marked by the re-appearance of the verb ὑποθέσεως (as also at B8.38 and 53). In allowing that the beliefs of ordinary men 'name' anything, Parmenides entertains the possibility of the truth of these beliefs within the framework of his own semantic theory. The argument of B9 (as also of B8.34-41 and 53-61) hinges on this dialectical move. The language of mortal opinions is given temporary legitimacy, but only for the purpose of drawing out the confusions that lurk beneath the surface. In order to do so, Parmenides has also provided the mortals with a quasi-technical explanatory schema, in the two-element mixture theory outlined in B8.53-59 and B9.1-2. (He does the same for elements of astronomy, biology, and physiology in other fragments, all of which we take to be strictly dialectical offerings.) He thus contrives at once to present the beliefs of mortals in their strongest, most defensible form, and to further illustrate the charges in B6 and B7 respecting the confusions of mortal minds.

Throughout these arguments, as we have tried to show, Parmenides' strategy is to exploit his theory of sentence meaning at the expense of the belief of ordinary men in the reality of change. However, Parmenides' strategy is not without its own difficulties. In so far as the argument of B9 turns on an element of semantic atomism (respecting 'not' and thus negation in general), it brings very near the prospect of self-refutation. It will be the main concern of our concluding chapter.
to evaluate the philosophical merits of Parmenides' project in the light of this problem.

Chapter Five, Notes:

1. Aστάνο is probably purely progressive, marking a new stage in the argument [as ουκ αστάνο άσει often marks a new narrative stage in epic; see Denniston (1952) 55 and cf. B8.42].

2. Taras (1965) 180 takes διαφορον δειον to imply duration and thus that τό έδω exists omnitemporally. But it is not clear that διαφορον δειον must be taken to imply duration, for the timelessly eternal is also without a beginning and without an ending.

3. Mourelatos (1970) 117 takes the point that B8.41 requires an interpretation of B8.26-33 that includes more than just local motion. Others have held that Parmenides could not distinguish locomotion from change, despite B8.41: e.g. Kirk, Stokes (1960) and Fränkel (1975a) 32.

4. Zeno, then, is probably the earliest clear surviving evidence (e.g. the Arrow) for Eleatic arguments which concentrate on the single type of χύνθος local motion.

5. Plato, Theaetetus 180e 3-4 (especially note ουκ εξον χάραι έν διαφορον ) is sometimes compared with B8.26-33. On the strength of it, Burnet (1930) 181 takes B8.26-33 to prove the immobility of τό έδω. Something like the Theaet. argument is certainly Eleatic (e.g. Melissus B7.7), but the Platonic argument should not so confidently be ascribed directly to Parmenides. Kirk, Stokes
motionlessness could be covered by the general condition.

9. For οὕνεκεν as 'wherefore' see Diels (1897) 39 and Mourelatos (1970) 121 and n.18. Mourelatos appeals to the pattern of inference in B8.42 where τετελεσθέντος is inferred from the τετεληκα and this seems decisive. Others take οὕνεκεν as 'because': e.g. Taran (1965) 118f., Owen (1960/1975) 75 n.64, Fränkel (1975a) 30f.
   This gives a similar sense to line 32 if we keep Owen's comment in view: οὕν άτελεστόν is the conclusion to 26-31 and the premise of the argument in 33 (i.e. οὕν άτελεστόν = οὕν έπλοκες).
   But if line 32 concludes 26-31, Diels' rendering of οὕνεκεν seems to be better: it more clearly marks line 32 as an inference.

10. I follow those who read οὕν έπλοκες and excise μή: e.g. Diels (1897) 84, Burdet (1930) 175 n.2, KR, 276; Guthrie (1965) 39, Taran (1965) 114-115, Bormann (1971) 42,147. However, the alternative, to retain the best-attested reading in Simplicius [Coxon (1968) 72] of οὕν έπλοκες μή, has substantial support: Fränkel (1975a) 31, Verdenius (1942) 77, and for synizesis of έκε as common in Ionic texts see West (1982) 12. Μή ἐδώ almost certainly either is copulative or stands for τὸ μὴ ἐδώ [Fränkel (1975a) 31 objects to copulative ἐδώ that ἐδώ must at every occurrence stand for ἐδώ or τὸ μὴ ἐδώ, but B8.57 (on all widely accepted readings of that line) is against him]. We prefer the copulative reading, finding the introduction of τὸ μὴ ἐδώ to jar, and to make the argument more complex than it needs to be. These distinctions are fine ones,
however, and ὁ ἔθνες + μὴ ἐδώ (= τὸ μὴ ἐδώ) can be made to give a sense very close to ὁ ἔθνες + ἐδώ (copulative) [Owen (1960/1975) 69 n.11, Mansfeld (1964) 100 n.3].

11. The τεῖρας are first mentioned in line 26, with the first statement of the thesis of immutability; but I take it that their use in an argument is more likely to illuminate their meaning.

12. In the main, therefore, I agree with Owen (1960/1975) 64-65 that τεῖρας is the mark of invariance. Mourelatos (1970) 120 has the point regarding logical necessity. Taran (1965) 117, Mansfeld (1964) 99; Kirk, Stokes (1960) trace the necessity to self-identity; but I cannot see that Parmenides has any interest in arguing from self-identity.

13. Parmenides thus re-introduces what on our reading he at least tended to exclude at 88.5-6, viz. tensed discourse about τὸ ἐδώ. But he cannot cast his thesis so as to exclude the suppositions of the ἄποστολει without using tensed language.

14. This exclusion will also cover increments or additions to τὸ ἐδώ, which Wiesner (1970) tries to find excluded in 88.5-21.

15. I take it that 88.36-38 together with the earlier results it subsumes is an argument for monism (though the precise sense in which τὸ ἐδώ is single is under-determined by the argument). The construction with ἐτείνει clearly marks the monistic thesis as an implication of earlier arguments. I cannot agree with Barnes (1979b) and (1979a) i. 205-207, 210-212, that we have no good reason to believe Parmenides to have been a monist. However, I agree that the establishment of 'real' monism was not Parmenides' central concern; it is only one of several corollaries which Parmenides drew from his central argument. The center of his philosophical project is the denial of change. But Parmenides rejects change by way of arguments which exclude every possible pluralization of τὸ ἐδώ, and it is consistent with such a strategy that he should also argue for monism. I will argue below that the subject right through 88.34-38 is τὸ ἐδώ, paece Barnes (1979b) 13-14.


17. For ἐν + locative dative to mean 'in respect of' see LSJ s.v. ἐν A.1.7.

18. See Denniston (1952) 512 for redundant τε with corresponsive καί; cf. also 88.40: γύνειον τε καὶ ἕλλειψαν.

19. Furley (1973) 11 and n.36; Mourelatos (1970) 167 n.10 take ἔστιν λοιπῶς νοεῖν to be equivalent to νοεῖν ὑπὲρ.

(1945-1946/1974) 46, Debrunner, Schwzyer (1950) 622. Simplicius, in Phys. 87.17-18 takes οὕκειν in our sense: ἑνεκά γὰρ τοῦ υόσευ, ταῦτα δὲ εἰκεῖν τοῦ υόσευ, ἐστι τὸ νοεῖν τὸ δάος ἢν αὐτὸν. Calogero (1932/1970) 11, Taran (1965) 122, and Jantzen (1976) 98 assume that the word order is so loose that οὕκειν ἢν εἰκεῖν is equivalent to νόημα οὕκειν ἢν εἰκεῖν. Taking ἢν εἰκεῖν existentially and οὕκειν as 'that' (= δάος as often in Homer), they translate with 'the thought that it (the object of thought) is'. But it is very doubtful that the word order is so loose, and this construe is only compelling if we accept the reductive thesis that ἢν εἰκεῖν is the sole content of all genuine thinking.

21. Cf. Vlastos (1953) 168. Pace Verdenius (1942) 40 τὸ δάος is not the ultimate predicate of νόημα. B16 presents a series of difficulties of its own, which merit a more detailed treatment than can be given here (not least with respect to how much of Theophrastus' interpretation can be followed). However, the fragment plainly draws its conclusion by way of a doctrine of πάθος. Whether the χρῆμα μελέων πολυτλάγητων refers to elemental mixture or some other kind of mixture doctrine, this can only be a doctrine ascribed to the βροτος. The γὰρ in B16.1 indicates that the fragment serves an argumentative purpose, but what that purpose is we can no longer determine, having lost the context. It seems best to take B16 to argue that as the bodily χρῆμα of a man changes, so will his thoughts (especially if ἢν εἰκεῖν is the subject of γρηγέρ and refers back to νόημα); and it is possible that the fragment once served as part of a reductio ad absurdum similar to that which I take B8.53-59 + B9 to produce (see below). In view of its uncertainties, however, it is unwise to try to construe B8.34-38 in the light of any reading of B16.


23. Verdenius (1942) 53; Coxon (1968) 74 n.2; Guthrie (1965) 41; Taran (1965) 129-136; Mansfeld (1964) 101, 141-142; Kirk, Stokes (1960) 2.


25. It is not clear that Parmenides will distinguish 'empty' references from references to τὸ δάος that misfire.


27. Heinimann (1945) 49-51 mentions Parmenides B8.38 and B9.1 but gives no analysis of the arguments.

28. To the discussions cited in note 25 add also the evidence of B9.1, for the text of which Simplicius' prose paraphrase (in Phys. 180.8) of B8.35-59 and Empedocles B8.4 are also relevant. The evidence of Plato, Theat. 180c 1 (ὁ λογος ἰδεῖν τὰ πάντα ἐν τῷ καὶ τῷ οὐ) is very doubtful attributed to either Parmenides or Melissus. The form of citation (ὅλος Παρμενίδης τε καὶ Μέλισσος)
as also the introduction of the subject τὸ τῶν, makes it very likely that this is a later digest of Eleatic philosophy.


30. Cf. Burnyeat (1982) 19 n.22. The verb may have the connotation of 'to pick out', as e.g. in the Homeric formula ὄνομα λέον ὄντα ἔχωντον (II. 10.68, 22.415; Od. 4.551: τοῦτον μὲν ὅλον ὅξσα· ὅλος ὅλον ὅλον· ὅλος ὅλος· ὅλος ὅλος· εὐθ. ). Jantzen (1976) 102f. suggests for ὄνοματι τὸ "intendieren" which as a paraphrase is useful (but note that the verb is passive).

31. Burnyeat (1982) 19 n.22; cf. Woodbury (1958) 149-150. Our translation of B8.34-41 is now complete: 'What is for thinking and that for the sake of which there is a thought, are the same; for not without the real (τὸ ἔδο), in respect of which the thought is expressed, will you find what is for thinking, for there is not now, nor will there be, anything else alongside of the real (τὸ ἔδο), since that very thing fate has constrained to be complete and immutable. Wherefore it (τὸ ἔδο) is named everything which mortals posit, believing them to be true: coming-to-be and passing away, existence and non-existence, change of place and alteration of (or respecting) bright color.'

32. Mourelatos (1970) 189 n.56 notes that if Empedocles B8 is parallel to Parmenides B8.38-41 then ὄνομα are never empty names but always have some reference.

33. For what follows see Owen (1960/1975) 62.

34. The text of line 46a is in disarray, but most recent editors agree to read οὖθε γὰρ οὖν ἔδο with the Aldine edition. The variants in Simplicius are readily explained as due to a simple scribal error: see Taran (1965) 146f. The translation of 46-48 is difficult; but the parallels with B8.22-25 are some assistance (without threatening mere circularity). Given the force of 46b (guaranteed by its similarity with B8.23), οὖν ἔδο is probably equivalent to τὸ μὴ ἔδο, in which case ἔστω is existential ('there is'). The parallelism between οὖθε γὰρ οὖν ἔδο ἔστω and οὖθεν ἔδο ἔστων in line 47 requires that ἔδο there be equivalent to τὸ ἔδο with ἔστω existential once again. We take ἔστω + optative + ἔδο to introduce a final clause, but with something of the conjunctions' old adverbial flavor, the optative conveying a counterfactual inference: 'neither is there any non-existing thing, which would prevent it (τὸ ἔδο) from being unified [see next note], nor is there any existing thing such that there might be more or less of it (τὸ ἔδο), in one respect or another, for it (τὸ ἔδο) is absolutely inviolable'. Similar translations can be found in Taran (1965) 86; Barnes (1979a) I,202; Hussey (1972) 89.

35. The resemblance suggests for ἅνερθον ἐκ ὄνομα, 'being unified', cf. DK: 'gelangen', and Hussey: 'being joined together'; and cf. Empedocles B62.6 (πᾶρ ... ἄλοιρ πρὸς ὄμοιον ἴκνοθαλ').

37. As Mansfeld (1964) 102, et al. As for the objection that this creates an enjambment, enjambment is frequent throughout Parmenides' poem.

38. For χρόνον as 'proper', 'right' or 'fitting', rather than 'necessary', see Mourelatos (1970) 277-78. I take τὴν ἐν τῷ neutrally (as between temporal or spatial interpretations) as in B8.22-25, and cf. below on lines 47-48.


40. Chantraine (1953) 6: in Homer κύρει is never used to mean 'to reach' to something (but cf. LSJ s.v. κυρέω I.1 for our sense), and it is only occasionally copulative. Mourelatos (1970) 124 n.24 suggests an interesting alternative: κύρει means 'is present', as at Euripides, Phoen. 1067 (ἐν τῇ κυρεί, δημόστιν κύρει = "is present at the palace gates"). See further next note.

41. So also Mourelatos (1970) 127 and Taran (1965) 8. B8.49b may also be taken to use ἐγκύρων in tmesis [see Fränkel (1975a) 32, Hussey (1972) 89], in which case the verb still probably means 'hit upon' [cf. Owen (1960/1975) 63; Fränkel compares Archilochus fr. 68 (Diehl) and Heraclitus B14]. This makes excellent sense of the dative τῇ κυρεί and yields a translation like Hussey's: 'it meets its limits in a uniform way'. I can see no objection to this, but neither does it materially alter the sense we give to B8.49b.

42. οὐκάσατο is standardly used in epic for the absolute or final boundary, rather than the last item in a series: 11.22.203 (with Leaf's comment, ad loc.), Od. 4.685, 20.13, etc. Two passages in Sophocles are especially illuminating. In OC 1675, ἐν κυρέω answers to ἀλώνια καρασομεν, a statement with a two-fold paradox (that what is beyond reason should be nonetheless expressible, and that its 'outermost' boundary could be picked out). At OC 663 ὡς τοῖσον διδασκαλον answers to being ἄδηλος δείλος 'beyond the succour of men and the gods', a condition aptly described as 'at the extremity'. In none of these uses can οὐκάσατο refer to a literal boundary, whether temporal or spatial.

43. Fränkel (1975a) 35; and cf. Owen (1960/1975) 62. It is not in court to interpret B8.42-49 by appeal to Parmenides' alleged concept of space [e.g. Guthrie (1965) 45-49, answered by Owen (1960/1975) 78-81]: Parmenides has no concept of space at all.


45. Jameson (1958) 15 and n.3.
46. Tugwell (1964) 39-40. Parmenides' monism will only imply physical monism if he adds the premise that τὸ ἔσον is material; but no such premise can be found in Parmenides.


48. Taran (1965) 159. Elsewhere (p.154) he takes Parmenides to infer homogeneity from the spatio-temporal infinity of τὸ ἔσον (proved, respectively, in B8.42-49 and 22-25). But one could have a spatio-temporal infinity of separate discrete entities. Also, it is not clear that temporal infinity will prevent τὸ ἔσον from having temporal parts: what is required is indivisibility.


50. Even at B8.41 (τὸν ἀλλοδαπον) Parmenides' interest is in change of place and not in the nature of place itself.

51. Taran (1965) 221 n.50; Guthrie (1965) 50. For κόρος as poetic technique see especially Solon fr.2.2 Diehl; Findell, QL. 11.13-14 and the Orphic fragment cited at Plato, Philebus 66c8-9; Democritus 321; Thucydides III.67.6. The deception is not palliated by the origin of the κόρος in the goddess.

52. Cornford (1939a) 46 n.2; Taran (1965) 226 n.59; Cf. Hölsher (1969) 106, Owen (1960/1975) 54 for a more nuanced version: the διάκομη is as plausible as it can be made to appear. Diels (1897) 41 translates with 'wie sie erscheint', which is very unlikely (see Bormann (1971) 127 for discussion and a list of initiators).

53. Mansfeld (1964) 146 n.3; cf. also Bormann (1971) 128 and Jantzen (1976) 85.

54. We should keep the literal sense of παρελαμβάνει 'to drive past' or 'overtake': Long (1975) 95 n.45, Verdenius (1942) 48, Diels (1897) 101. Mourelatos (1970) 226 n.15 translates with "decisive", taking it to be equivalent to παρέχομαι τόνδ', as at Od. 13.291f., but the equivalence is far from secure.

55. With Verdenius (1942) 51 and n.1; Jantzen (1976) 84ff.; Mansfeld (1964) 146 n.3; Bormann (1971) 127f. Mourelatos (1970) 231 and Guthrie (1965) 50f. take ἐνθάδ' to mean both 'fitting' and 'seeming', in the spirit, if not the letter, of our solution. We have taken κάτω adverbially with ἔσοντα [with Fränkel (1946) 170, (1973) 359 n.26 ]; but it could go more closely with διάκοσμον ('a complete account'), as Taran (1965) 227 n.59 and Mourelatos (1970) 230 suggest. This does not materially alter the interpretation of lines 60-61, but does answer handily to τίς in line 61.

56. Fucley (1973) 5; Coxon (1968) 74 n.2 preferred γνώμος.

57. It is probably best to keep 'judgements' ambiguous as between acts of judging and the results of such acts. The dative is probably locative.

59. E.g. Theognis 409: ὁδὲ οὐδὲν ἡσυχαίρυνε, οὐδὲν ἀκατάθηκεν ἄμεσως ἀδιάλειπτος, and cf. Xenophon, Anab. 1.3.3, 7.6.34.

60. Only two μορφαί are posited probably because two is the minimal number needed for plurality, and to suggest opposition; and it is opposition which is central to the argument in lines 55-59 [cf. Jantzen (1976) 75]. It is irrelevant that none of Parmenides' predecessors or contemporaries known to us ever constructed a cosmology out of only two such elements. Parmenides is not criticizing any specific cosmological system. It is the possibility of any cosmological system which is his target (see further p. 283). Ironically, he sets up his target with at least as much economy as his opponents can display in their cosmological systems, in that respect playing the game better than they do themselves.

61. See Guthrie (1965) 50 for a review of the possibilities.


63. Reinhardt (1916) 69; Burnet (1930) 176; Deichgräber (1959) 54 n.1; Fränkel (1973) 359-360. Long (1975) 90-91 fills out the scheme by taking νός to be a symbol of non-being [cf. also Coxon (1934) 141]. This pattern of interpretation of B1 is an ancient one: Aristotle, Met. 986b 31-987a 2.

64. E.g. Dials (1897) 93, Taran (1965) 218-220, Hourelatos (1970 85; Guthrie (1965) 55. This has the virtue of recognizing that for Parmenides φάσον have no such favored position as (b) requires.

65. The usual translation of μορφή is 'form'. Jantzen (1976) 77f. and Hölscher (1969) 103 give 'external appearance'. Long (1975) 92 gives 'nature'. For μορφαί as 'kinds' see Euripides, Ion 381-82: τοις γε τοις νόμισμα καθορισμένοι, μορφαὶ δὲ διὰ διαφέρουσιν. To press μορφή either in the direction of 'element' or 'natural kind' is probably to dissolve a unity of meaning which should be preserved. Taran (1965) 217 n.39 correctly construes τάντα adverbially: 'contrariwise' or 'antithetically'.

66. I read οὖ [or ὦ] μεγ' ἄρατον, ἐλάφον, ἐμπνεύσας τώτων ἐστιν in line 57, instead of ἐρωτοῦ ὦ, κτλ., following Verdenius (1947) 285-87, and Guthrie (1965) 51. But notice that - οῦ in Ionic is commonly pronounced as a single syllable and that the first syllable of the line is normally long [West (1982) 12, 35], so that the metre can be preserved without reading οῦ instead of ὦ. Then ἄρατον answers to τοιχον [as in Anaxagoras B12, and Melisseus B7.8 (where, however, both are denied of το οὖν, perhaps in direct reply to Anaxagoras)], and ἐλάφον answers to ἔμπνευς as Parmenides' argument requires them to do. Then the homogeneity of Light/Fire is contrasted with the unknowableness of Night (which is ἀληθή; cf. ἄγωντος at B9.3), a contrast which makes sense if homogeneity
is meant to be a paradigm of an intelligible property." Diels (1897) 94 (he is followed by Reinhardt (1916) 69; Hölscher (1969), 26,105; Bormann (1971) 131-32; Mansfeld (1964) 132f., and cf. Jantzen (1976) 53) preferred to athetize ἄραλῶν, securing ἄνωυ by reference to a faulty text for Empedocles B78. Notice also that at B106 Empedocles uses ἄραλῶτα [re. air and fire: see Wright (1981) 237 and B98], the superlative form of which could reflect Parmenides' μεγ' ἄραλῶν.

67. In keeping with its basic lexical meaning as 'bodily frame'; and cf. Burnet (1936) 176 ('form') and KR, 278 ('appearance').

68. With perhaps an emphasis on the expression of these properties in some appropriate linguistic forms. But σήματα cannot just mean 'predicates'. In B10 σήματα refer to heavenly bodies, as in II. 22,30.

69. Face Taran (1965) 224.

70. Long (1975) 90.

71. Aristotle, Physics I.5, especially 188a 30-188b 26 establishes the opposition of two contradictories as the minimal precondition for change, and says this was universally recognized.

72. Aristotle's reference at Physics 188a 20-22 (cf. Met. 984b 1-4) to Parmenides' cosmic ἄρχαῖ must be a misunderstanding. Parmenides offers no cosmology of his own, only a target for hiselenchus.

73. See Wiggins (1971) 282, 283-84 for this point and what follows.

74. Furley (1973) 8. Compare the emphasis on dualities in B8,40-42.

75. Mourelatos (1970) 8 and Mansfeld (1964) 154 read ἐκεῖ ὃς rather than ἐκεῖνος in which case ἐκεῖ will give the link with what went before and ὃς will serve to draw the reader's attention to the new stage which is opening here [Denniston (1952) 238-240].

76. There is also an echo with B8,38, τόλ τότε ὄνοματα, but this will concern us more fully below. For the identity of φῶς (in B9) with the φῶςος ἀλλήλων πάρ (in B8,56), see Taran (1965) 231 n.1.


79. Πᾶν = πᾶτα from lines 1-2. To introduce a "totality" (das Ganze) or "the universe" as the subject requires το πᾶτα (for the suggestion see, e.g., Mansfeld (1964) 150-156; Schwab (1968) 410-411 and Jantzen (1976) 82-85). But this is solely motivated by a desire to
show that Parmenides allows, at some level, legitimacy to the discourse of nortals, which is a very doubtful thesis.

80. Franke (1975a) 59 n.43 and Verdenius (1942) 6 n.5 take ἐμφανίζει as 'together', while Taran (1965) 162 offers 'at the same time'; my translation seeks to combine these. ἐμφανίζει is perhaps a faint echo of ἅβας, ἐκτὸς τῶν ἔστιν ὄμοι τὰ αὐτοῖς; it is more certainly a deliberate echo of ἅβας (Ἐπιμέλεια ἄπειρον ἀποστερεῖ καὶ ἐπ' ἀθρετοῦ τελέον), a doctrine repeated as recently as ἅβας.44-49.

81. As at Pindar, Nem. 8.34-36: ἡ [καὶ] the kind of ἐν αὐτὸς listed in line 33] τὸ μὲν λαοῦ κλέαρα, τὸν δ' ἀφήνων νόσει ἀνευφορ. The meaning of ἐφ' ἀντίκαμον here is determined by the ironic comparison with μὲν λαοῦ Cf. also Od. 1.46, Pyth. 11.30, I. 4.33 and fr. 207 (for ἡταρίαν ... ἐφ' ἀντίκαμον). Cf. also Epimenides BII: ἐν ἀθρετῷ ἐστὶ, θεὸς ὡς ὀρλός, θυτοῦ τε ἀ' ἐφ' ἀντίκαμον.

82. Guthrie (1965) 57 takes ὅσον quantitatively, citing Hesiod, Theogony 126-127 (where the equality of earth and sky must be spatial) and Diogenes Laertius 8.28; Sophocles, Electra 87 for ἀλλάξεις (equal shares, which is taken to be quantitative). So also Reinhardt (1916) 31 n.1 and Diels (1897) 41. Franke (1975a) 21 cites Empedocles BII.27 for ἄλλα τὰ τάστο as 'qualitative equality and essential similarity of function'. So also Taran (1965) 163. If, as I argue below, the equality is existential, then this debate misses.

83. This construe of line 4b is shared with Hussey (1972) 128-129; Schwabl (1968) 410; KR, 282; Mansfeld (1964a) 136; Mourelatos (1970) 85; Hölzcher (1969) 131; and others listed by Taran (1965) 162f. It is the most straightforward rendering of the phrase, especially in the light of the equivalence of μεταχείρισθαι ἃπειρον (at ἅβας.7,10 and cf. ἅβας.1-2), and the use of μέταχειρίζεσθαι with the dative. Diels (1897) 41, 101-102 offered 'benn keinem kommt ein Anteil am andern zu' and was followed by Cornford (1939a) 48; Burnet (1930) 177; Reinhardt (1916) 31 n.1. But this requires that μεταχείρισθαι, which is improbable (Jantzen (1976) 81; Mourelatos (1970) 85).

Franke (1975a) 22 renders with 'for neither of the two belongs to nothing', which simply means that there is nothing which is not composed of Light or Night or both [cf. Calogero (1932/1970) 48 n.47; Verdenius (1942) 77; Taran (1965) 164; Jantzen (1976) 81-82 and 84]. But this reduces the argument to circularity (everything is composed of Light and Night because there isn't anything that does not share in either or both of them).

84. Parmenides thus embraces a certain degree of semantic atomism, and with it the risk of self-refuting failure of his own denials (see further chapter 6). But this does not threaten the primacy of sentence-meaning in his semantic theory: see Wiggins (1971) 303 n.17.

85. Our interpretation is compatible with Hussey (1972) 129; but we find the importance of semantic considerations to be greater, and accordingly do not support the strictly quantitative interpretation for lines 3-4a.
87. Chalmers (1960) II objects that even, and hydrogen is used in 80 to require
for it more than a merely dialectical or dialectical function.
However, these words (as also 4,10, at line 4) should not be

8. Chalmers (1960) II objects that 7, and 11 objects: so 10 requires

87. Chalmers (1960) II objects that even, and hydrogen is used in 80 to require
for it more than a merely dialectical or dialectical function.
However, these words (as also 4,10, at line 4) should not be

8. Chalmers (1960) II objects that 7, and hydrogen is used in 80 to require
for it more than a merely dialectical or dialectical function.
Chapter six: Parmenides' Self-refutation.

We have attempted throughout this study to treat the fragments of Parmenides' poem as the literary remains of a serious philosophical investigation. In our view, the poem constitutes a philosophical achievement of the first order. However, as we pointed out at the end of the last chapter (and earlier), Parmenides' arguments are not without serious shortcomings. His is, therefore, a philosophical program which can be naively vindicated. Accordingly, it is incumbent upon us to justify our attitude towards Parmenides' poem, drawing up a balance sheet of its value as a contribution to philosophy. There are two areas that interest us in this connexion: Parmenides' ideas, and his manner of proceeding. The latter is of special interest because it is just in his manner of proceeding that Parmenides makes the most valuable contributions and also involves himself in the most serious difficulties. Indeed, it is not difficult to show that Parmenides' project is self-refuting. Nevertheless, we will argue, even in its central difficulty lies the germ of its success. But first we treat of the minor virtues of the project.

Ryle suggested that two things were characteristic of philosophical genius. It succeeds in giving 'a new direction to thinking ... amounting to a new method of thinking.' And it introduces some 'philosophical cardinal ideas, those, namely, the logical unraveling of which leads directly to the unraveling of some complex tangle of interconnected ideas'. The first of these characteristics will be our concern later. For the second, we are able only to suggest that Parmenides has generated or otherwise brought to the surface several concepts which have proved of considerable value to later philosophers.

Our hesitancy here does not reflect doubt as to Parmenides' achievement in this respect. Rather, we are aware that the poem is not principally a direct exploration of metaphysical subjects. Its main concerns are more formal. Even the attack on change is principally aimed at the possibility of change, and not at any particular view of how change works or what constitutes change. Nevertheless, Parmenides' arguments serve to adumbrate notions which later metaphysicians will regard as seminal. To the degree that he has done so, he has a fair claim to meeting the first of Ryle's desiderata for philosophical genius.

In B4 and B5, 22-25 Parmenides approaches the notion of continuity in terms of indivisibility. What is continuous is simply what cannot suffer divisions or discontinuities of the relevant kind, whether spatial or temporal. The connexions of this treatment with later explorations of space and time, as also of the concept of infinity (not least that of the ἀόρατον in Melissae and Zeno), cannot be traced here. But we may suppose that Parmenides' arguments were highly suggestive to later metaphysicians. We have here not only an explicit development of spatial and temporal concepts as suitable candidates for αἴσθησις, but also a specific orientation to that inquiry.

If our interpretation of the philosophical strategy underlying B5.5-6 is correct, then Parmenides has at least adumbrated the notion of temporality. Moreover, if we are correct in our view of the generality of the arguments in B5, 22-25, Parmenides presses his subject to οὗ τὸ εὖ in the direction of an abstract entity. That this entity should play a semantic role in the Elastie universe (as that which makes true statements true), suggests a philosophical motivation for the postulation of abstract entities that has enjoyed a distinguished history in later philosophy, down to and including our own period.
However, we recognize that the direct exploration of metaphysical (and metalegal) concepts is not the principal business of Parmenides' poem. The category of 'seminal ideas' is not the best one under which to estimate its philosophical merits. Ryle's other category, the introduction of new methods of thinking, is distinctly more appropriate. We may approach this matter by way of two features of the poem that have more to do with method and less to do with seminal ideas.

It has been recognized for some time that the remarks which hold Being in the tight bonds of necessity — excluding from it as impossibilities all changes — represent broadly logical necessity (Bob. 26-33, 42-49). Parmenides does not, however, secure this necessity by exploiting a tautology like self-identity; rather he is arguing from premises established earlier in the poem, to new conclusions about the properties of Being. Ultimately, as we have argued, those premises have their footing in his semantic theory. But in B8.26-33, 42-49 what is recognized is that given the premises, the new conclusions cannot fail to be true. It is the characterization of the results of arguments as necessities which just is the discovery of the informal notion of a necessary truth. Having embedded these truths in a series of deductive arguments, Parmenides is very close to grasping the formal notion of logical truth.\(^2\)

Furthermore, it has been suggested that Parmenides belonged to 'a stage of thought at which men did not distinguish the properties of statements from the properties of the things they are about'.\(^3\) However, I have argued in this study that Parmenides' ontological deductions arise from an approach to the nature of truth. If this is true, then Parmenides' ontology represents an exploitation of his understanding of some of the properties of statements. It is not, then, confusing ontology and semantics, for the latter is prior to the former. In that case, Parmenides has succeeded in distinguishing between the properties of statements and the properties of the things they are about. Moreover, it then appears that Parmenides is proceeding in a fashion which has been paradigmatic for philosophical method since his day. He has simply attempted to argue out consistently the consequence of a set of assumptions, here one about the relation of language to the world. He then quite properly demands that anyone who does not accept his results seek to answer him by argument.

These last observations touch on what might have been the general impact of Parmenides' manner of proceeding on his contemporaries. Commenting on the literary style of Heraclitus, Democritus and Anaxagoras, Dennistoun said: 'These writers made little attempt at organized structure. And the cause of this lies in the quality of their thought. They expound truth in oracles rather than proceed to it by the ordered march of logic. Hence their writing gives the effect of stiffly piled-up masses: it is static, not dynamic. And it is safe to say, though no continuous passage of any great length has survived, that its unit was the sentence rather than the paragraph.'\(^4\) Dennistoun is describing philosophical prose, both before and after Parmenides. But this only heightens the impact of Parmenides' new style. With Parmenides' arguments are deployed steadily and in a carefully organized fashion. It is especially clear in B6, but no less true elsewhere (e.g. B6) that the unit is now the paragraph and not the sentence.\(^5\) The clearly marked stages of the arguments in B8, together with identification of resumed premises, and succinct summaries of results achieved—all contribute to an effect which is at once that of a severely architectonic structure and of a dynamic progression of
thought. This, too, is utterly unprecedented among Parmenides' predecessors and contemporaries. Moreover, by comparison with, say, Heraclitus, with whom we are constantly searching for the argument beneath the literary surface, here very much more is made explicit. The careful craftsmanship and the explicitness of Parmenides' arguments are vital to the achievement of a particular goal which is also new.

Parmenides' poem represents a new kind of διαγωσι or 'challenge'. The substance of the challenge is new enough: no one had ever argued that reality was one, indivisible in every respect, utterly unchanging, motionless. But the form of the challenge is also new. Parmenides advances his claims respecting τὸ ἐνν by way of a series of arguments, and lays it down that his hearers κρίναν ὧν ἄγων ἔχουσιν διαγωσιν ἔναν ἑνετὸν (87.5–6). We are to 'judge by argument the hard-hitting challenge'. It will not suffice to respond to Parmenides' themes in the abusive fashion of Aristotle: 'to say that all things are at rest, and to seek arguments for this, disregarding the senses, is a sign of weak intelligence' (ἀρνητικὸ τὸ ἑνετὸ διαγώσιν ; Physica 253a 32–34). Neither will it suffice to respond to Parmenides' claims with counter-assertions. One must reply with arguments. Anything else will fail to shift the burden of Parmenides' own arguments. Among those who responded to Parmenides' arguments with arguments of their own, Plato found the most effective reply, and this will concern us further shortly. It represents an early response to the most serious shortcoming of Parmenides' new style of thinking. To complete our assessment of the philosophical merits of that style of thinking, we must examine the difficulty.

In a section of the Physica from which I quoted earlier, Aristotle abuses the Elatic thesis that nothing moves, as contrary to the testimony of the senses, the sciences, and common sense (253a 32–b 2). Modern readers are unlikely to disagree with Aristotle: Parmenides' rejection of change (and with it of motion) is flatly unbelievable. Moreover, to philosophers trained in modern analytic techniques none of Parmenides' arguments are likely to seem particularly impressive. But we must seek to exercise some historical imagination. Parmenides set, for his time, a new and wholly salutary standard of rigorous reasoning, and we must learn to appreciate its value largely by comparison with what else was available at the time. Nevertheless, a decisive counter-argument is not far to seek, for the central thesis of the poem is self-refuting. Plato already has the main point: 'The notion of non-being involves even him who would explode it in such paradox that, at every attempt to dispose of it, he is forced into self-contradiction on the subject' (Soph. 238d 6–7). The same charge was put by Owen this way: 'The very proof which rules out all variation in time and space has to use language which implies temporal and spatial distinctions. It has to say that what exists is continuous, ἐν τῷ ἄνω καὶ ἑντὸν ; and that it remains the same; and this is uniform in all directions. Just as Parmenides can only prove the unintelligibility of ὅπως ἔστω by himself denying the existence of certain states of affairs, so he can only show the vacuousness of temporal and spatial distinctions by a proof which employs them.'

To some extent this charge can be mitigated. I have argued that much of Parmenides' language only apparently implies spatio-temporal distinctions. In fact it has had its literal connotations strained off by the force of his arguments. Examples are the introduction of the τετράδα in B8.26–33 and the simile of the sphere in B8.42–49. Moreover, I have argued that Parmenides struggles actively against the conventional uses of language in order to
make room for concepts the effects of which are to eliminate those uses. For example, when he introduced the mode of temporality of Being it is by means of a present tense of the verb 'to be' shorn of its connexions with the past and the future, an effect of Parmenides' argument that at least opens the way to a conception of the 'timeless present'. Similarly, in the treatment of continuity, verbs like τελείως, ἔννοικος and διωκόμαι are made to present a notion of indivisibility which strips them of their more literal connotations. But the central difficulty remains.

Parmenides has argued that (a) there is no coming-to-be and no passing-away, (b) that there is no division in reality, spatial or temporal (and hence no plurality of entities), (c) that there is no local motion and indeed no change of any kind. Moreover, he argues (d) that belief in the reality of any of these phenomena is radically incoherent (§6.0-9), and (e) that no common sense explanation of the world (and, a fortiori, no cosmology) can even be possibly true (§6.30-61 § 89). The targets of these arguments are all those assertions which ordinary men make in describing and explaining a multi-form and changing world. Because any such assertion implies that something, or some state of affairs, is not, and because non-being is absurd, all such assertions are necessarily false. The argument is perfectly general, and it does not depend on confusions about the uses of εἶναι or about the difference between negative predications and negative existentials. Instead it proceeds directly from Parmenides' conception of the relation of language to reality. And just here is the central difficulty. To say 'there is no γενόμενοι' will also imply ἕκαστον εἶναι.

δή, for it implies that some state of affairs, namely coming-to-be, is-not (i.e. cannot obtain). Moreover, if Parmenides denies are necessary, then he himself not only implies ὡς ἦν ἐστιν, but also ὁ μὲν ἔννοικος ἐστιν ὦ τε εἶναι. His own argument, then, sets out on the tautologous ὀμολογεῖν of 82; i.e. it is self-refuting.

This problem is especially acute at 89, where Parmenides involves himself, on our interpretation of the argument, in a denial of the legitimacy of 'act'. At this stage of the argument (but not, we think, earlier), Parmenides threatens to deny the possibility of negation altogether. Such a denial is immediately fatal to itself and threatens also the intelligibility of the properties of reality proven in 88 (e.g. such terms as ἄγενμον, ἄνθρωπος, ἄρασις, ἤκτην). On our view, Parmenides, sooner or later, was bound to fall into this trap, since the nominal display theory of sentence meaning has so few resources that it virtually requires a degree of semantic atomism, despite the primacy in it of sentential expressions. But the theory can make nothing of a word like 'not' (and other equivalent negating expressions) without implying precisely what Parmenides wishes to deny (and accuses the mortals of falling victim to), viz. that ἕκαστον ἐναι (= τοῦ ἐναι) is an actuality.

The difficulty is part of a larger problem besetting the nominal-display theory of sentence meaning. Wiggins describes the problem this way (allowing that 'p' stands for any indicative sentence which names something if and only if it is true, and where the square brackets mark the state of affairs designated by the sentence in question):

If 'p' is a name and 'not-p' is a true negation of 'p', then 'p' must have the same naming role in both [p] and [not-p]. Otherwise the negation of 'p' by 'not-p' will not have been explained. Now if (absurdly) the theory makes 'p' commit the speaker to identifying something whose identifiability 'not-p' commits the speaker to denying, then 'p' cannot have the same
kind of occurrence in both 'n' and 'not-p'. But it was this which was required to explain the polarity of negation.

Thus there emerges a deep incompatibility between the nature of negation and the nominal conception of sentences. Since the incompatibility is perfectly general, the theory must be abandoned. If we are correct to find such a theory informing Parmenides' main arguments, then the project is doomed to failure, for the theory is logically unfitted for the work to which it is put. But just here we must be careful to avoid drawing the wrong conclusions from this fact. Parmenides' arguments deny that non-being (or non-existence) is coherent. But Parmenides cannot coherently assert that non-being is not coherent unless some non-being is coherent, namely that non-being which was given coherent expression in his own coherent assertion of the incoherence of non-being. But if some non-being is coherent, then non-being is coherent. Since Parmenides has committed himself to arguing his position, he cannot present his denial of non-being except by way of 'coherently asserting' it. But there are no resources in the language for arguing that non-being is impossible without making coherent use of non-being. Parmenides' thesis itself is false; but this alone does not show that it is impossible, and therefore that its contrary is a necessary truth. It is still possible that 'nothing is not', but neither Parmenides nor any one else can coherently assert that nothing is not. A fortiori, they cannot argue for it either. The opponents of Parmenides do not occupy an impregnable position solely by virtue of having shown his argument to be self-refuting. More importantly, in order to answer Parmenides' elenchus, they must take two routes both of which play into Parmenides' hands. They must, first, answer him by argumentation, both to show that his results are self-refuting, and to present and to defend their own position. But second, it will be difficult for Parmenides' opponents to answer his challenge without penetrating to the deep philosophical notions which inform that challenge, namely to the level of his semantic assumptions. The elenchus thus invites at least rudimentary reflection on the relation of language to reality, with a view, now, to 'going one better' on this problem than does Parmenides himself. But this is already to take the first steps along the same path of inquiry that Parmenides pioneered. To answer Parmenides, then, we must first imitate him.
Chapter six, notes:


2. For a discussion of the relation between the informal notion of validity and the formal notion of logical truth see Haack (1978) 14–15.

3. Owen (1966/1974) 271. This is not unrelated to the claim of Bunge (1977) 29 that Parmenides identified ontology with logic.


5. Modern editions punctuate B2, B4 and B9 as single sentences, but the thought of each of these periods is more readily taken in as a series of sentences. The effect is of well-balanced paragraphs.


ABBREVIATIONS

AGP Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie.
AJP American Journal of Philology.
APF Acta Philosophica Fennica.
CP Classical Philology.
CQ Classical Quarterly.
D Dialectica.
FL Foundations of Language.
G Gnomon.
H Hermes.
HSCP Harvard Studies in Classical Philology.
JHS Journal of Hellenic Studies.
JKP Jahrbücher für klassische Philologie.
M Mnemosyne.
MH Museum Helveticum.
N Nous.
NJADB Neue Jahrbücher für Antike und deutsche Bildung.
P Phronesis.
PAS Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society.
PPQ Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
PQ Philosophical Quarterly.
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