The Common Camp:
Temporary Settlements as a Spatio-political Instrument in Israel-Palestine

By Irit Katz

Camps, whether created by or for refugees, undocumented migrants or ‘war on terror’ suspects, form a central mechanism by which modern societies and territories are managed. While most of us live in permanent built environments which create the stable and predictable settings for our mundane activities, other people are ruptured from such a prosaic reality, living in a situation which is transient and ephemeral. Camps are an inseparable part of this reality of displacement and movement, detention, asylum and refuge. These spaces are often created _ad hoc_ due to an urgent need and later are frequently suspended in time with no clear future, separated from their social, cultural and spatial surroundings.

While detention, transit and refugee camps differ substantially in terms of their functions, conditions and modes of creation and organisation, they are all recognised as various forms of the same ever-present mechanism of modernity that is still an important aspect of how we live today. Over the last decade, much has been written about the ‘return of the camp’, mainly in relation to the camps of the US ‘war on terror’ and the global proliferation of the camps which form part of the current ‘migration age’. Yet the camp has never disappeared since its first emergence in the colonies as early as the 19th century and its extensive use during the 20th century, which will be remembered, as stated famously by Zygmunt Bauman, as the ‘Century of Camps’. In Israel-Palestine, the camp was and still is prevalently used to facilitate the significant geopolitical changes of the last century related to the Israeli nation-building process and the mass displacement it caused.

Camps are extensively employed by both authoritarian regimes and contemporary democracies as instruments of control, custody, care and abandonment. As such, they are mainly analysed as ‘devices of power’, created by, and mostly for, stripped populations which are managed outside society and the normal state apparatuses in order to maintain the ‘national order of things’. However, the camp is not only a space for powerless people: while many camps are indeed inhabited by weak populations excluded by strong powers, others are used by the strong to gain and
extend control over desired territories. In addition, camp spaces are sometimes used by their residents as platforms for their ongoing spatial-political struggles.

‘The Common Camp’ is a term which pulls the camp out of its marginal position, establishing it as a ‘common’ space standing at the centre of the way the modern state is organised. The camp is ‘common’ as a prevalent space; it is common in the sense that it is widespread despite efforts to make it invisible. In Israel-Palestine’s ongoing state of exception, the camp is indeed so common as to almost become an ordinary, typical space.\(^8\) The camp is also ‘common’ in the sense of being a joint phenomenon which influences many, a sort of a spatial ‘common denominator’ that links between varied ethnic groups and political actions. While the meaning of the word ‘camp’ itself indicates separation, the fact that it is used by or for so many groups of population makes it in some sense a ‘common ground’ of separation and exclusion – either generated from within or from the outside – which is common to all. This term could be looked at as the other side of the Hobbesian Commonwealth:\(^9\) while Hobbes’s term means a political organisation of people under one sovereign, ‘The Common Camp’ implies the social and political separation and exclusion frequently imposed by the state. The various types of camps created over the years in Israel-Palestine will enable the spatial vocabulary of the camp to be redefined and conceptualised and allow light to be shed on the global phenomenon of camp spaces, the current proliferation of which makes the subject both relevant and urgent.

‘Today it is not the city but rather the camp that is the fundamental biopolitical paradigm of the West’\(^10\) states provocatively the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben, whose influential theory brought the idea of ‘the camp’ to the frontline of academic research and was also one of the generators of this research. Agamben’s theory of sovereign power and the state/space of exception,\(^11\) presented particularly in his book *Homo Sacer – Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, places the camp at the centre of modern (bio)politics together with the figure of *homo sacer* – a person denied all rights and banned from society, ‘bare life’ stripped of any human and political existence. Following Arendt’s and Foucault’s ideas on modern society and biopolitics,\(^12\) Schmitt’s theory of the sovereign and the exception\(^13\) and Benjamin’s observation on the ‘state of emergency’ becoming the rule,\(^14\) Agamben sees the foundation of the modern political order in the incorporation of bare biological life into the political realm by its exclusion in the camp. The Nazi concentration and extermination camps are Agamben’s core example of the thanatopolitical space of the
camp, however as the fundamental (although not the only) ‘space of exception’, the ‘essence’ of the camp is present each time the structure of the exception appears.\textsuperscript{15}

Camps are created whenever the central nexus of the modern nation-state – land, the state and the nation – enters into a crisis,\textsuperscript{16} whenever there is a gap between the ‘territorial container’ of the state and the ‘nation’ inhabiting it.\textsuperscript{17}

Scholars who study the camp relate to Agamben’s theory in quite different ways.\textsuperscript{18} Some, such as Claudio Minca, who writes extensively on the spatialities, topologies and geographies of the camp and its pivotal role in modern biopolitics, follow Agamben’s line of thinking and use it as a platform to further investigate the camp theoretically.\textsuperscript{19} Richard Ek traces the genealogy of Agamben’s philosophy, examining its useful applications in both analysing camps of intensified sovereign powers and examining metaphoric ‘spaces of exception’.\textsuperscript{20} The theory is indeed adopted by scholars who analyse camps as spaces where ‘bare life’ is produced, such as Jenny Edkins, who analyses famine-relief camps in Africa, NATO refugee camps in Macedonia established during the Kosovo conflict\textsuperscript{21} and the Woomera detention camp Australia, where, together with Pin-Fat, she looks at lip-sewing among refugees as a practice of ‘bare life’.\textsuperscript{22}

However, closer to the approach taken for this research, some scholars also use Agamben’s theory in a more critical manner, carefully identifying and highlighting its various problems. In his examination of terrorist training camps, Stuart Elden argues that in utilising Agamben’s theoretical model it is always essential to interrogate the particularities of a specific situation and question whether the model is appropriate.\textsuperscript{23} In his work on the US camps in Guantánamo Bay, Derek Gregory criticises Agamben’s theoretical nation-state container model, arguing that the transnational spatialities of the ‘war on terror’ goes beyond the frame of a single state.\textsuperscript{24} Due to complex and changing territorialities and sovereignties in Israel-Palestine over the last century and the multiple camp types identified there, the Agambenian theory also appears too rigid and reductive.

Another critical perspective highly relevant to this work is promoted by an increasing number of scholars who, similarly to this research, analyse particular camps as complex spatial and political phenomena, arguing that Agamben’s line of thinking leads us away from a critical and dynamic account of power relations in the camp. Alongside scholars such as William Walters, Patricia Owens, Kim Rygiel, Romola Sanyal, Nando Sigona and Adam Ramadan,\textsuperscript{25} who argue that Agamben’s perspective
offers little space to register the social and political agency of people in the camp, this research examines the camp as a concrete phenomenon and takes into account how politics is re-articulated there. The camp will be looked at as first and foremost a space of modernity, according to what Zygmunt Bauman suggests as the essence of modernity itself – the struggle for order against chaos. However Michel de Certeau’s writings on the power of the practices of everyday life, and Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptualisation of ‘becoming minor’ as a way the architecture of the majority is manipulated to create ‘lines of escape’ from it, will form the theoretical basis for analysing the camp as a political space in itself.

As there is no theory which conceptualises the camp in a manner that includes its concrete multiple forms and functions, the this research defines the camp by identifying distinct characteristics common to all its types that will allow them to be discussed as one spatio-political entity. This definition is based on three main characteristics: the camp is first and foremost a temporary space, although it sometimes becomes an enduring temporariness; it is managed under a particular mode of governance and legal order; and it is a space created by or for populations with a distinct ethnic, cultural, political or other specific identity. These characteristics are common to all the camps that will be explored in this research and also relate to the basic Agambenian nexus of the nation-state – territory (land), order/governance (state) and population (nation). The device of the camp, which is always related to mobility and its containment, may vanish or change significantly after a short period of time. The geopolitical transformations it supports, however, are often irreversible. While defining the camp entails understanding its various manifestations as one spatio-political mechanism, this research also seeks to understand these differences and their meanings. As suggested by Elden, this investigation will be based on the particularities of specific situations and their individual geopolitical and historical conditions.

**The Common Camp in Israel-Palestine**

Camps and temporary settlements are a prevalent phenomenon in Israel-Palestine. Erected ad hoc, for various reasons, by and for different populations and actors in varied shapes and forms, some are rigidly organised spaces of ‘total order’, while others look like chaotic spaces with no identifiable organising principles. However,
the continuous appearance of these camps over the last century in this territory requires further explanation of a situation of which temporariness is a consistent feature. The Palestinian refugee camps erected following the 1948 war which still exist today are probably the best known, yet many other camp types can be identified within these boundaries. The study of camps in Israel-Palestine seeks to explore the camp as an architectural instrument used to manipulate both land and population in order to pursue political interests. This would also allow a crucial aspect of the way the territory was and still is managed, organised and negotiated by the state and by the local populations inhabiting it to be revealed.

The appearance of camps in Israel-Palestine is closely connected to the discrepancy between Israel’s territorial and ethnic boundaries, as well as to its emergence as a modern state for the Jewish people on a territory which was mainly inhabited by Arab populations. Many of these camps form part of the indefatigable efforts of the Zionist movement, followed by the Israeli state, to establish Jewish domination over the territory while destabilising the Arab presence and reducing it to a minimum. The scope of this phenomenon and its particular manifestations show that these camps are not only related to the ‘purification’ of the population by the production of ‘bare life’. Rather, they are mainly connected to Israel’s ongoing drastic geopolitical reformations, the related continuous ‘state of emergency’ of which is tightly bound to what seems to be an everlasting ‘emergence of state’.

At the beginning of the 20th century, tent camps were erected by ‘pioneer’ Zionist settlers in remote frontier areas [Illustration 1]. Under British rule (1917–1948) fortified camps were created by Zionist settlers [Illustration 2] in order to expand the territory of a possible future state, while detention camps were constructed by British authorities to prevent illegal Jewish immigrants/refugees from entering the country [Illustration 3]. Following the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, Palestinian refugee camps were erected in neighbouring Arab countries, while makeshift camps were also created within Israel’s 1948 boundaries by internally displaced Palestinian and Bedouin populations. In the same time, other camps were created by the new Israeli state in order to absorb and later spread the waves of Jewish immigrants entering the country. As the geopolitical map changed, new camps appeared; after the 1967 war, Jewish settler outpost camps were erected in the occupied territories, and later an internment camp was opened to confine the Palestinian population participating in the first uprising against Israel (the first intifada). During the 1990s, a second generation of
immigrant camps appeared in peripheral areas to accommodate the new wave of mass immigration arriving from the former USSR and Ethiopia. In 2005, camps were constructed to temporarily house the Israeli settlers evicted from the Gaza Strip. Most recently, in 2013, a Palestinian protest camp was erected (and rapidly destroyed) in the E1 zone, and later that year a detention camp for African asylum seekers was opened in the Negev desert.

This brief list of examples demonstrates that while these spaces differ significantly in their political objectives and spatial forms, it seems that the reliance on camps is a central paradigm in the way space and populations in the region are managed. What is common to all of these camps? What do their differences mean? And finally, why are they so prevalent in Israel-Palestine? This research attempts to answer these questions while advancing the understanding of the camp itself as a versatile spatio-political mechanism.

Israel is an important example of the nationalist creation and territorial re-definition of states in the 19th and 20th centuries, using different techniques to manage and reorganise populations in space. The vast mosaic of camps in Israel-Palestine is grounded in the particular history and character of the radical geopolitical changes this territory has undergone over the last century. These changes were not a consequence of arbitrary or uncontrollable events; rather, they were part of a political idea which turned into a national movement, then into a grand plan which was eventually turned into an ongoing national project – the Zionist project, the goal of which was to make historic Palestine, or in the Jewish ‘geotheological’ term *Eretz Yisrael* (the land of Israel), the national home for the Jewish people. When this project began to develop in the late 19th century, the territory was mainly inhabited by Arab populations, and camps were one of the primary means to both change this reality and deal with these radical alternations. Similarly to other encompassing state projects of social engineering and territorial ordering, the Zionist project also includes a utopian vision accompanied by a high modernist ideology, which in the case of Zionism was supplemented by ‘modern messianism’, a messianic spirit which was appropriated to achieve national goals. In addition, it is crucial to understand Israel in relation to ‘settler societies’ as a form of colonialism, a form which in the Zionist context is described as colonisation for ethnic-survival.

The initial approach and actions of the Zionist settler society and its national modernist ideology, which used camps from its earliest stages, could be already
identified in the early pre-state period, mainly in the Zionist territorial expansion to ‘the frontier’, the ‘taming’ and settling of which was a central icon in Zionist discourse. The camp was initially adopted during the first and second Aliyah waves (although mainly in the second), when temporary tent-camps were used by idealist Zionist ‘pioneers’ who settled in remote, desolate frontier areas as part of the effort to ‘build the country’ and cultivate the land and thus spread across the territory. As Boaz Neuman shows, this was also accompanied by real passion for the traditional Jewish ‘promised land’. The best known type of such camps were the pre-fabricated ‘Tower and Stockade’ fortified camps, of which over fifty were erected in frontier territories during the years of the Arab revolt. These settler camps were a crucial instrument for extending the boundaries of the future state: ‘There is only one thing we can do in the current circumstances – to change the map of the land of Israel by establishing new [settlement] points Our role now is to grab and settle,’ stated a leader of the Jewish Agency just before the first partition plan was published in 1937. These camps were the first demonstration of both the modernist Zionist attitude to the land and the modernist mechanism for fulfilling it: the land needed to be ‘tamed’, conquered and controlled in order to turn it into a resource and a territory; the camp was the rapidly-erected modern territorial instrument which enabled this goal to be achieved. Similarly to other camps for civilians, settler camps are also deeply rooted in colonial history, evidence for which can also be found in Australia, South America and South Africa; this enables this specific example to be placed in the wider context of settler societies.

In this context it is worth mentioning that while this form of settlement was supported by the British authorities at the beginning of the British Mandate, their attitude changed drastically during the Arab revolt, when strict limitations on Jewish immigration to Palestine were enforced through detention camps to which illegal Jewish immigrants and refugees were deported. This was an additional type of camp which appeared in the area during that period, similar to other examples of internment camps in colonial history.

However, it is only by looking at the period after the establishment of Israel in 1948 that we can see how the camp was widely adopted as a multifaceted mechanism to manage and re-organise the Jewish and Arab populations within and outside the territory. While the pre-state settler camps had a mainly territorial meaning, the intensified role of the camp during the first years of statehood was more complex, as
it was used for two complementary spatial-political purposes. First, it was a territorial mechanism which allowed one population to spread while concentrating and suspending another. Second, it was a mechanism which enabled the implementation of a modernist ideology of creating a planned new order and reducing what was perceived as undesirable chaos.

Camps, created and managed by the Jewish Agency and the state, were used to absorb and then spread mass Jewish immigration, which in Israel’s first three years doubled the size of the Jewish population to 1.2 million [Illustration 4]. This immigration came from two main sources. First, the European Jewry who had survived the war, many having lost their homes, were suspended in Displaced Persons or transit camps, waiting for the gates of the country to open after the closure imposed by the British authorities. Second, Jews from Arab countries wished to come to Israel because of religious aspirations, feared violence due to the Arab-Israeli war or were approached by Zionist emissaries who enticed them to leave their homes and settle in the new state.

The first camps in Israel were the closed ‘immigrant camps’ established in the abandoned British military camps [Illustrations 5-6], followed by smaller immigrant transit camps – the ma’abara – which were constructed across the country including in frontier areas, and were composed of pre-fabricated units placed in a rigid, efficient order [Illustrations 7-8]. Camps were also created abroad by Jewish institutions such as the ‘Joint’ in order to gather together Jewish immigrants before transferring them to their new state in boats and aeroplanes [Illustrations 9-10]. This immigrant transit camp project and the modern frontier development towns that followed have generated an internal Jewish ethnic division in Israel based on territorial ordering: while the founding group of European Jews (Ashkenazim) tightened its hold on the upper social spheres, the Eastern Jews (Mizrahim), who came later from Muslim countries, were marginalised on the state’s periphery.

The distorted mirror image of these camps are the Palestinian refugee camps created by UNRWA in neighbouring Arab countries for those who fled or were forced out during the 1948 and 1967 wars. These camps appeared in the same years as the Israeli immigrant camps and supported a population of about the same size [Illustrations 11-12]. However, while the Jewish migrant camps were liquidated after a few years and many of their dwellers were moved into the government-planned frontier development towns, the Palestinian camps still exist today. Camps were also used by
the Israeli army to detain thousands of Palestinian civilians during the 1948 war.\textsuperscript{61} In addition, makeshift camps were created within the post-1948 Israeli territories by the internally displaced Palestinian and Bedouin populations. Over the years, these makeshift camps have become unrecognised settlements where the Palestinian and Bedouin populations were suspended for decades with no basic infrastructure or state services. Many Negev Bedouins are suspended in these temporary conditions to this day.\textsuperscript{62}

There is still no academic research which analyses camps and temporary settlements as a prevalent phenomenon in Israel-Palestine and hence there is still no work which compares these different camp types and analyses their meaning. The ethnically oriented spatial policies in Israel-Palestine, including the different camps, have indeed been examined by numerous scholars, however most analysis has been in relation to specific spaces, populations and periods,\textsuperscript{63} and not in terms of the phenomenon of the camp itself. Other scholars have identified Israel’s ethnocratic spatial and geopolitical patterns as an ongoing national regime which crosses spaces and periods,\textsuperscript{64} yet the wider role of the camp as a versatile spatio-political tool in the territory has not yet been examined.

We begin to see the complexity of the situation of camps in Israel-Palestine. While all these camps possess the same characteristics defined earlier, they differ substantially. They were created in many forms, either from modern pre-fabricated temporary units or as makeshift camps; they were made by and for different populations and actors; they existed for different periods of time, either for a few years or until today; and they served different purposes, either to spread the Jewish population over the territory or to concentrate and suspend the Arab populations within or outside the territory. These differences are much more complicated and less binary than what is presented here, but the basic characteristics noted here are required for an initial understanding of the situation.

While there was first a need to establish the common characteristics for these camps in order to discuss them as one spatial phenomenon, the additional effort, which is the other central endeavour of this research, is to explore the meaning of the differences between these camps in order to understand how they were and still are used differently as a determining factor in the continuing rearrangement of the territory. These differences help the argument in two ways: they will allow me to assert that the multifaceted instrument of the camp is a prevalent part of space in Israel-Palestine,
encompassing various types, populations and purposes; and they will also allow me to explore the meaning of the camp as a versatile spatial instrument, and thus go beyond its general conceptualisation.

Accordingly, the research focuses on two different camps in Israel, located in the southern Negev desert [Illustration 13]: Yeruham – created in the early 1950s as a ma’abara – a Jewish immigrant transit camp – and eventually converted into a development town, and the neighbouring Rachme, a Bedouin ‘unrecognised village’, created in the late 1950s as a makeshift camp by the indigenous population following their forced relocation by the Israeli army, which is now struggling for government recognition. It is important to stress that the research is not about what Yeruham is like today, but about the camps which were an inseparable part of its establishment and growth; Rachme, on the other hand, is studied as a current, ongoing camp situation. Yeruham and Rachme are two very different examples of the camp on various levels despite their close geographic location. The differences include the reasons for their creation, their spatial formation, their population and the duration of their existence. Yeruham, similarly to other ma’abara camps across the country, was created by the Israeli government and the Jewish Agency in order to rapidly absorb Jewish immigrants and spread them to frontier areas, and was liquidated when the permanent development town was constructed. In contrast, Rachme was created by the displaced Bedouins themselves and developed according to the control and management policies of the Israeli government, which have suspended its residents in a temporary condition until today.

It is important again to emphasise that Yeruham and Rachme were not chosen for this research as mere ‘test cases’ used to prove the main argument about the camp being a prevalent spatio-political instrument in the region and show how it is translated into reality in Israeli space. Rather, these particular camps were selected because of their many diverse aspects, as well as because of their similarities. They are similar not only because the basic mechanism of the camp can be identified in both of them, but also because they are both frontier camps established as part of the territorial actions of the early years of statehood, when weak populations were excluded and manipulated by the state in various ways. Yeruham and Rachme’s similar timelines, their shared geographical location, the fact that they were both created as a result of forceful settlement of vulnerable populations and the way the legacy of the camp is
still part of their present at various levels allows the camp to be studied in two complementary manners.

**Expanding and holding: Yeruham and the ma’abarot transit camps**

Established in January 1951 as a *ma’abara* transit camp by the Jewish Agency, *Yeruham* [Illustrations 14-16] was formed with the intention to create ‘a city in the Negev, in the desert, in a desolate area which creates passage for infiltrators and smugglers from the Gaza Strip to Jordan’.66 This was the way in which Giora Yoseftal, the head of the Absorption Department in the Jewish Agency presented the reason for its establishment to Rudy Kleiner, a young Kibbutz member who volunteered for the task of creating and managing Yeruham camp. Stated less than two years after the Negev was fully conquered by Israel in March 1949, this quote indicates the unstable territorial situation in the state’s first years. The Negev desert, which covers sixty percent of Israel’s territory, is a frontier area which was almost unsettled by the Zionist movement before statehood due to the difficult climatic conditions; the strategic need to access the Red Sea created the Israeli interest to conquer and settle it. Before Israel was established, the Negev was mostly inhabited by Bedouin tribes that spread beyond the borders with Jordan and Egypt. The description of the Bedouins as ‘infiltrators’ reflects the post-war Emergency Regulations in Israel, designed to firmly control the movement of Arab populations to and within the state’s territories.67

The *ma’abara* transit camps were erected in order to temporarily absorb the Jewish immigrants who came to Israel during the ‘mass immigration’ period (1948-1951), and to spread them across the country. Mass immigration was perceived as a necessary means of securing Israel’s military achievements, as David Ben-Gurion, Israel’s founding father and the Prime Minister in the state’s first year, has stated: ‘we have conquered territories, but without settlements they have no decisive value... Settlements – that is the real conquest! The future of the state depends on immigration’.68 By 1952, more than 257,000 people – a sixth of Israel’s population – lived in 129 *ma’abara* camps which about half of them constructed in remote frontier territories.69

‘There was nothing there’, wrote Rudy in his diary, after allocating an appropriate location for Yeruham camp; ‘not a path, nor a paved road, nothing. Only one water hole which is called by the Arabs Bir Rachme’.70 The Israeli army assigned a military
reserve force to guard the *ma’abara*, and the establishment of the camp was enthusiastically described as a quasi military operation: ‘in a speed of the ‘Tower and Stockade’ days, the new ma’abara in Tel-Yeruham was erected’.\(^{71}\)

The first inhabitants in the camp were Jewish immigrants from Romania and the later mostly arrived from Asia and North Africa. Similar to other Mizrahi (Jews who came from Muslim countries) immigrants, who were settled in isolated frontier areas during the 1950s, they tell a repeating story about an arrival after darkness and a refusal to get off the trucks and busses.\(^{72}\)

The *ma’abara* was constructed out of tents which were later replaced with timber huts and was surrounded by barbed wire for protection. Food was supplied every few days and water was brought from the adjacent well. Similar to other *ma’abara* camps, the camp had no electricity or sewage system and state services were poor: ‘in Tel-Yeruham there is no phone and the nearest doctor is 53 kilometres away [...] garbage is collected once every two weeks’.\(^{73}\) ‘It was a deserted place’ tells S.L. who arrived to Yeruham camp as a child; ‘you could have died there – and no one would have known.’ (S.L., August 2012)

While the poor conditions and spatial temporariness were difficulties common to all the *ma’abara* camps in Israel, the location of Yeruham in the rough and remote desert frontier was experienced as particularly difficult:

> ‘They put people here like in a cage. The desert was the bars of the cage. Some eventually succeeded not to see the bars and to feel at home. But some couldn’t, so they left.’ (A.B., April 2013)

It was not easy for the immigrants, however, to leave the frontier camps; after inhabitants tried to move to more central camps, the authorities adopted radical measures such as preventing the reallocation of work permits and food rationing cards, which were essential in that period, to immigrants who relocated without permission, coercing them to stay in their isolated and remote camp.\(^{74}\) Such relocation approvals, however, were difficult to obtain; in October 1951 over 2,000 families requested the Jewish Agency to permit their relocation from frontier *ma’abara* camps, but only five percent received a positive response.\(^{75}\)

While the main purpose of the *ma’abara* camps was to absorb the Jewish immigrants and to disperse them to frontier territories, another main objective of the *ma’abara*
was to induct the immigrants into the labour force; the inhabitants had to work. Relief projects provided by the government, however, which were based on manual labour, were often the only way the immigrants in the frontier camps could earn their living, entailing dependency of the ma’abara dwellers in the authorities and a process of proletarization. The state also saw manual labour as an educational and ideological mechanism: ‘we consider manual work not only the most important contribution to the construction of our country, but also a step towards the formation of a new Jewish man and character’. The frontier ma’abara camps, therefore, which forced the immigrants to change their occupation according to the demands of the new state, were also used as an educational mechanism, forcing

In order to understand the significant function of Yeruham and other ma’abara camps, it is important to look at them as biopolitical instruments which allowed the state to manage the immigrants separately from the veteran Israeli society. This instrument enabled to force the immigrants, as people with the ‘right’ Jewish identity, to occupy the frontier, while compelling them to transform their foreign character and become ‘appropriate’ proletariat Israeli citizens. However, because the ma’abara camps were erected as only temporary tools, although the immigrants were coerced into occupying Yeruham camp ‘in the institutions there was no plan to develop the place. They saw it as a transitory place which will eventually vanish’. The ma’abara camps indeed enabled the state to quickly absorb and disperse the immigrants, and then to suspend them in space and time in the frontier, until the ‘development towns’ – small modern-designed towns planned mostly in remote regions – were planned and constructed. The planners were not bothered by the poor physical conditions in the camps; any additional investment, in their opinion, might simply prolong their existence and turn them into slums. Yeruham’s second ma’abara erected in 1962, reflects even more faithfully the instrumentality of camp planning; its repetitive prefabricated huts were rigidly and densely placed in a grid at the margins of the marginal settlement, providing a temporary and highly controlled shelter, creating a blunt, binary spatial pattern.

The unequal power relations in the camps which made the immigrants dependent on the institutions in all aspects of life, the spatial and geographical separation of the ma’abara camps from the predominantly Ashkenazi (European Jews) veteran society, and the fact that, among the ma’abara dwellers, Mizrahi (Eastern) Jews formed the majority – have generated a process in which the Jewish Israeli society became
A strong ideology has justified this inequality, presenting modernism as part of an advanced culture required for the creation of a new developed nation, while negating the Mizrahi culture as underdeveloped and primitive. This negation of an entire population was in essence their dehumanisation; this population was perceived as a material to be moulded and used for state interests. This ethnic discrimination was built up deliberately, many scholars argue, showing that the ‘development towns’ like Yeruham – initially formed by the frontier ma’abara camps and later becoming the poorest and most dependant towns in the country – served as an instrument for social engineering that lead to the extreme current ethnic segregation in Israel.

While the Zionist discourse presents the ma’abara camps as improvised, transitory spaces erected following the necessities of mass-immigration, it is clear that the well-being of the immigrants was not the priority of the institutions. The camps had a crucial territorial, social, economical and biopolitical role in the newly established modern state. It forcefully manipulated the immigrants, excluded them from the veteran Israeli society and suspended their status as autonomous subjects, while using them as peons in the state’s struggle over the frontier.

**Expelling and concentrating: Rachme and the unrecognised Bedouin settlements**

Rachme [Illustrations 17-18] is a Bedouin village of about 1,200 people which is currently unrecognised by the Israeli government, located on the north-east and western outskirts of Yeruham, mostly within the town’s municipal border. Before Israel’s establishment, the Sawahana Bedouin tribe used the lands in the area for pasture. Most of this tribe fled to Jordan and Egypt following the establishment of the state in 1948, while the minority remained in the area and based their livelihood on herds and seasonal agriculture. Today, however, most of Rachme’s families are of the Sarachin tribe. They were transferred to the area by the Israeli army during the martial rule at the late 1950s, from an area closer to the Israeli-Egyptian border. Yeruham camp was created in the area during the same period and within a decade was developed into a town, however Rachme was never recognised by the Israeli authorities.

Rachme’s houses are makeshift structures made out of light and cheap materials such as timber frame, plastic sheets, corrugated steel and re-used building parts. The
houses are not connected to infrastructures; there are no paved roads, sewers, or garbage collection system, electricity is mostly supplied by solar panels and mobile phones are used for communication [Illustrations 19-22]. For basic state services such as health and post Rachme residents visit Yeruham, while older children attend school thirty kilometres away in the neighbouring Bedouin local council. Rachme residents are denied any legal right to inhabit the land, even though some of them lived in the area before Israel was established, and most having been transferred there by the state. Currently declared ‘invaders’, with their houses considered illegal, the residents of Rachme are under a constant threat of demolition by the state who is pressuring them to move into a designated town. A ‘building freeze’ policy is being enforced since 2009, and the authorities are preventing any new builds.  

‘Today […] you can’t even build a hut. They immediately destroy it. It is awful. Even if your house is destroyed because of bad weather – they won’t allow you to fix it… they use a lot of force so we can’t resist. They take you to prison. Sometimes [when there are house demolitions] – they have a bus full of policeman waiting by the main road.’

‘Today it is impossible to build, to extend. They look down here from the satellites – and that’s it […] All these house demolitions… so many of them… they came with a large number of police and demolished his [the neighbour’s] house… like we are in Gaza! So many soldiers came – it was a total mess. And for what? I have never seen any state in the world which acts like this to its own citizens. Why? It creates a very bad feeling. A man serves thirty years in the Israeli Defence Force and then they demolish his house. They came and demolished everything. Everything. They came with tractors, their special units, soldiers. They are doing too many horrible things… they push you into a corner.’

While being deprived of any “life supporting” mechanisms such as economic resources, infrastructures or state services, the residents of Rachme are at the same time exposed to direct state violence and being controlled by tight surveillance. Rachme, however, is not an exception. After the 1948 war, the Israeli policy regarding the fractions of tribes that remained in the Negev was based on two basic practices: their concentration in a limited geographical area known as the Siyag (fence) under martial law, where any permanent construction was forbidden, and the declaration of all the land in the Negev as unregistered, which therefore belongs to the state. Although the Negev Bedouin became a sedentary and territorial society before Israel’s establishment, increasingly relying on rain-fed agriculture for their
most did not register their land during Ottoman and British rule, a legal fact which allowed executing the Israeli land policy. A Zionist cultural-political vision, in which the Negev desert is a deserted area which is yet to be redeemed while the Negev Bedouin represent a disappearing primitive culture, guided this policy.

With the end of the martial rule in 1966, the state continued to manage the Bedouins through an administrative patchwork of exclusive systems outside the normal juridical and governmental order that used the law selectively. Ever-changing governmental bodies comprised this special apparatus such as the ‘Authority for the Development of the Bedouin’, the ‘Authority for the Regularization of the Bedouin Settlement in the Negev’ and the ‘Green Patrol’, a government policing body in charge of reserving state lands. These bodies used a range of pressure tactics to coerce this indigenous population into concentrating in seven purpose-built townships that were established since the late 1960s and to which Israel had hoped to transfer all the Bedouins, uprooting them from their land and turning them into city dwellers. For Rachme residents, similar to many of the Bedouins, concentrating in a town would mean giving up their entire way of life, from their everyday livelihood to their basic cultural needs:

‘We need an area for agriculture. They can’t put us in town and say – there you are – now you have to live here. We have goats, camels – that’s how we make our living... it will be very difficult to move to a different place.’ (S.Z. April 2013)

Today the 200,000 Negev Bedouin are composed of three main sub-groups: those urbanised into the townships (around 60%), those living in their ancestral land (mostly in unrecognised localities) and those evicted from their original lands and transferred into a new area where they live in unrecognised settlements, like most of Rachme’s residents. Today, over forty unrecognised Bedouin localities are struggling for legal recognition by the Israeli government while being suspended in an intermediate situation: on the one hand they do not receive state provision for basic needs because they are illegal, and on the other hand the state cannot evict them without their agreement.

‘Villages’, ‘encampments’ or P’zura (scattering), is how the unrecognised Bedouin settlements are named by different political bodies. While ‘villages’ reflects a more permanent spatiality, ‘encampment’ and ‘scattering’ implies a nomadic context, with
temporariness which is culturally imbedded. However what seems to be a spontaneous and independent form of settlement are *de facto* camps, which, similar to other provisional makeshift camps around the world, were built by their own dwellers with their temporary status enforced by the state authorities. Rather than being chaotic, the spaces of Rachme reflect the deep social and cultural Bedouin traditions according to which they are built and developed; the cloisters in the camp follow the divisions of the nuclear and extended family and tribal divisions, and the makeshift houses themselves are built according to traditional spatial organisations and patterns. Their spatial temporariness, however, is enforced by the state.

These camps are naturalised by the state as part of the Bedouins’ past nomadic culture, while their inhabitants are abandoned outside the normal order, with their traditional sources of livelihood constantly diminishing together with their territory. The current ‘building freeze’, accompanied by heavy surveillance and house demolition, deeply constrains the Bedouin space, affecting their everyday lives, including the postponement of marriages and houses becoming overcrowded with children. The biopolitical mechanism of the camp, therefore, enables Israel to suspend the Bedouins outside the spatial, legal and governmental order until they surrender to the demand and move into their designated space, giving up their land and their traditional way of life, as part of Israel’s efforts to de-Arabise its territory.

The durable reality of dislocation followed by institutionalised suspended temporariness is a systematic Israeli policy which was not inflicted only on the Negev Bedouin. Many camps created by the internally displaced Palestinian population were also denied government recognition, infrastructures and services. This group was also banished from sight, history and future after loosing their original homes following the 1948 war, and became ‘phantom people dwelling on ghostly ground’. Similar to other Negev Bedouins and to camp dwellers elsewhere, Rachme residents still struggle against their oppression ‘through ‘producing spaces’ both physically and politically’. These radical spatial actions and counter-actions related to the camp, which are sometimes lawless, make an integral part of the ongoing struggles over the frontier.

**Between Expansion and Exclusion: the Versatile Mechanism of the Common Camp**
Israel’s ‘camp legacy’ was and still is very strong. Camps mentioned here expose the multifaceted yet common role of the camp in re-shaping and manipulating the lands and populations of Israel-Palestine. This variety of camp types is not coincidental but relates to political and territorial logics which correspond to the very basic conditions of modern biopolitics, functioning in different ways as mechanisms of control in the service of nationalistic and state-building enterprises. However, the development of camp spaces over the years has been influenced by various factors that do not always work according to the interests of the state which initially created them. This complexity, manifested in the two very different examples of Yeruham and Rachme, shows that Agamben’s theory of the camp is not sufficient. The camp cannot be analysed only as a dehumanising space of bare life, but also appears as a temporary flexible platform where spatio-political actions of struggle and resistance may be conducted and where new political subjectivities can emerge.

Yeruham and Rachme are two very different examples of the camp. Their temporariness endured for different time periods. Their populations are of different ethnicities: Yeruham’s being Jewish immigrants originating from various countries, desired by the state, albeit in a conditioned way, while Rachme’s Bedouin-Arabs were rejected by the state due to their ethnicity. The spaces of these two camps were created and developed by various methods and actors. In addition, the populations of these two camps have very different relations to their surroundings – the Jewish immigrants were completely alien while the Bedouin are indigenous to the area. Nevertheless, in both of these settlements the basic mechanism of the camp has a very similar purpose: both camps were created to manage, suspend, manipulate and change the character of specific populations for the sake of the nationalistic project to build the modern Israeli state and nation in a very specific image. While the Bedouin were supposed to be transformed into an ‘urban proletariat’ which ‘would not live on [its] land with [its] herds’, Jewish immigrants were supposed to be transformed through ‘manual labour’ from diaspora Jews with traditional ‘Jewish occupations’ into ‘a new Jewish man and character’. Both of these camps’ inhabitants function as the human ‘raw material’ in the process of an inevitable change. The differences between Yeruham and Rachme allow one to see the way various types of camp served in various ways as the physical in-between space one had to be suspended in order to be moulded according to the needs of the ‘national machine’; to become part of a strong modern nation or to be suspended away from it.
The different camps I have studied indeed show multiple perspectives which expose the varied spatialities and functions of the camp, but in the end this research can be crystallised in four main arguments about the camp:

The first argument is that the mechanism of the camp serves as a multifaceted spatio-political tool which is prevalently used in Israel-Palestine to separately manage different populations in territory. Although this mechanism has varied spatial manifestations, it has distinct common characteristics which make it a device that is closely related to the creation and function of the modern state and to the way the nation-state-territory triad is modified in it.

The second argument makes a claim about the camp that goes beyond its common understanding as a ‘space of exclusion’, contending that the camp is used for two complementary territorial purposes: one is indeed territorial exclusion, while the other is territorial expansion. While this dual role of the camp is tightly connected to the formation and development of Israeli space in particular, it is deeply rooted in colonial history. Furthermore, this new conceptualisation of the camp allows it to be examined as a complex territorial instrument which belongs to the variety of radical spatio-political practices.

The third argument is related to the multifaceted spatial characteristics of the camp, claiming that the camp’s spatiality is an outcome of the various powerful forces which influence its creation and alternation. While the camp’s ‘ordered’ layout hides a very ‘thin’ violent order, the camp’s ‘chaotic’ layout is in fact an expression of a much deeper cultural order.

In line with these findings, the fourth argument maintains that the camp is not only an Agambenian space of de-subjectivation and thanatopolitics where people are stripped of their humanity, but can also be a space were new political subjectivities emerge through the way inhabitants negotiate, cooperate and strive to change a political reality through their own spatial and political resourcefulness.

Governed by the same frontier mentality of the state involving fierce control alongside legal, material and social abandonment, Yeruham and Rachme are distinctive yet complementary examples of camps, each exhibiting the same defining characteristics together with different spatial manifestations and territorial uses. While their differences allow the versatile forms and roles of the camp to be explored, their
unique political initiatives\textsuperscript{106} serve as an additional example which refutes the idea of the camp being only about ‘bare life’. These four main arguments will add to a new perspective on the camp, exposing it as a mechanism of radical spatio-political changes which facilitates varied territorial and demographic alternations, while sometimes being in itself a flexible tool which allows the emergence of new political practices.

**The Instrument of the Camp**

Camps, as we have seen throughout this research, take various forms and have various purposes. Nevertheless, they all share specific characteristics which enable them to be perceived as a distinct spatial mechanism. First, the camp is created and managed as a *temporary space*,\textsuperscript{107} although its temporariness may linger for decades. In Yeruham and Rachme we have seen very different examples of this spatial temporariness, in aspects of the camps’ materiality, territorial objectives and durability. Yeruham was created by the state and its related Jewish institutions as a temporary camp, constructed from modern pre-fabricated units (tents and huts), as part of a project to spread Jewish immigrants to frontier territories and suspend them there until the ‘national plan’ and its ‘development towns’ were ready.\textsuperscript{108} Rachme was also created as a temporary arrangement by Bedouin transferred to the area by the army. However, while Yeruham was stabilised long ago in the form of an Israeli town, Rachme Bedouin were and still are suspended in their self-built makeshift settlement until they agree to concentrate further. While these examples of spatial temporariness are very different in their form and purpose, they both show the role of the camp as a space erected *ad hoc* to answer an urgent territorial need, only to later be suspended as an in-between space until a permanent spatial arrangement is achieved, usually according to the interests of the state. It is important to mention that both Yeruham and Rachme residents objected to their temporary status at different times, as a continuous state of temporariness takes power from the subjects and transfers it to the sovereign and its arbitrary and ever-changing decisions.\textsuperscript{109}

The second characteristic is that the camp is a space created and managed in a *specific mode of governance* outside the state’s normal juridical order.\textsuperscript{110} Both Yeruham and Rachme were created in the ‘emergency years’ of Israel’s early statehood and were managed by specific bodies which were not part of the state’s regular governing institutions. Rachme was first created by the Israeli army and managed under martial law, and was later controlled by various bodies such as the Bedouin Authority and the
‘green patrol’, while Yeruham was created and managed by the Jewish Agency. These modes of governance, working outside the democratic state order, often involve increased use of violence as part of their control methods. It is important to note that neither Yeruham nor Rachme were unique one-off camp spaces but were both part of encompassing camp schemes and policies: Yeruham was part of the ma’abarot project while Rachme was formed in a similar way to other unrecognised Bedouin villages, and like them it is still managed according to ever-changing state policies. These closed camp systems function as spatial and juridical archipelagos within the state.

This leads us to the third characteristic of a camp as a space created by or for specific populations. Whether created by or for immigrants, Bedouin, refugees or settlers, camps are inhabited by people with a specific ethnic, cultural, political or other distinguished identity: either one inherent to a population, like ‘Bedouin’, or an ‘external’ identity defined according to their specific situation, like ‘immigrants’. Yeruham was created for, and inhabited by, Jewish immigrants from various countries, mostly from what was seen as Mizrahi origin, while Rachme’s residents are all Negev Bedouin. The camp overrides similarities and differences: it overrides similarities between the camp’s inhabitants and the ‘normal’ citizens outside, and it overrides differences among the people within the camp, who are treated en masse according to a one-dimensional identity. One of the main differences between Rachme and a traditional Bedouin encampment is that its residents belong to more than one tribal group. Likewise, the immigrants brought to Yeruham camp originated from a variety of African and Asian countries, but they were concentrated there under the unifying label of Mizrahi immigrants. Thus, the camp may impose on its residents a simplistic identity based on prejudice and ignorance, ignoring cultural, traditional and other crucial differences between its individual inhabitants and thus stripping them of their humanity, turning them into a group of anonymous, identical and easy to manage people.

These three salient characteristics of the camp relate to the functional nexus of the modern nation-state, and to the way the state/subjects/space triad is recalibrated in it: the camp’s spatial temporariness relates to land (territory), its existence and control outside regular state laws and institutions relate to its specific mode of governance (state) and its specific population relates to life managed within the state (nation). As we have seen in Yeruham and Rachme, the camp is used to achieve the ‘maximum overlap’ between the state’s territory and its desired nation, facilitating the
expansion of the state by spreading one population (Jewish immigrants) and concentrating and suspending the other (the Negev Bedouin).

The decision over who will be included and protected within the state order and who excluded is the central task of modern biopolitics. Rachme is indeed excluded from the Israeli/Jewish national body, its population abandoned by the hegemonic state order: it was left with no life-support system, shrinking traditional sources of living and no alternative economic resources, while its residents are exposed to violent state action. Rachme’s residents were also disconnected from their previous tribal body, most of which was expelled or escaped to Sinai and Jordan after the 1948 war. In Yeruham camp, as in other frontier ma’abarot camps, the (mainly Mizrahi) immigrants were also suspended outside the state’s order in a desolate area, disconnected from their previous communities and places of origin. In both cases, the two different populations were excluded from the central state order and disconnected from their previous communities. In both cases, the camp’s population was to be included within the state order under certain conditions and with certain reservations, only after a process of cultural assimilation, i.e. modernisation, was completed, and the state’s ethnocratic nomos enforced.

The camp is therefore a spatial tool of segregation and separation, the prevalent approach of Israeli authorities, both socially and spatially, towards different populations, especially Jews and Arabs. While territorial and spatio-ethnic segregation is a common phenomenon in world history, Israel’s active role in generating segregation was inscribed in the Zionist movement’s basic ambition: to establish a nation-state for the Jewish people in a country inhabited by an Arab majority. In this manner, the camp continues the legacy of other projects of colonial segregation and separation according to ethnicity, functioning as a device of biopolitical ordering which facilitates the sovereign decision over who is in, who is out and who is suspended for decades.

Camps are enclaves within the state’s territory, and their separation mechanism is used in two complementary ways. First, they force a specific population to stay in a specific location, thus separating them from the rest of their society, as when immigrants were made to stay in Yeruham or the Bedouin compelled to stay in the Siyag zone. Second, the camp separates its inhabitants from their immediate surroundings, whether it is the landscape or the various populations around them. It is not a coincidence that, while Yeruham was surrounded by a real barbed wire fence,
the area designated for Bedouin in the days of martial law was called the Siyag (the fence).

The camp is a space which disciplines the movement of people; however, it is not limited to administering only movement across national boundaries, but also works within them, enforcing the spread or concentration of specific populations. The camp is therefore created in relation to mobility and the force applied to facilitate or prevent it. The prevention of motion, and in our case also its enforcement, often requires direct, unmediated violence, which is another characteristic inherent to camp spaces, where, frequently, ‘power confronts nothing but pure life, without any mediation’.

As an instrument of dynamic and radical spatial changes and interventions, the camp often functions as a space of the frontier. Contested frontiers, such as various parts of the Negev at different times, are not well-balanced places of exchange but are destinations for territorial penetration and expansion that ‘incorporate the breakdown of laws and institutions’. As places to be tamed, frontiers are highly controlled and controlling, but their embedded lawlessness, which is sometimes accompanied or substituted by an intentionally-created ordered-disorder, is not only subject to increased control and surveillance, but is also used as a tool by the different sides.

Despite their significant differences, the common characteristics of the camp which Yeruham and Rachme share show that they are both part of the same distinct spatio-political mechanism connected to the formation of the modern nation-state: they were (and Rachme still is) temporary spaces; they were created and function as enclavistic spaces of separation outside the state’s normal juridical and governmental order; and they were created for or by specific populations. As instruments of territorial struggle, these camps are spaces related to enforced mobility and violence, conditions which are also related to the struggle over the frontier, where indigenous and new populations fight to control the land.

**Spaces of Exclusion, Spaces of Expansion: The Territorial Roles of the Camp**

Understanding the varied spatial manifestations of the camp as part of one multifaceted spatio-political mechanism allows us to identify this spatial entity in all of its various forms and functions. However, there is still a need to define the ways it is used as a versatile instrument to facilitate radical geopolitical change. Here, I wish to present a perspective on the camp which goes beyond the Agambenian theory and
its related discussions, suggesting a new conceptual framework to examine its complex territorial role in Israel-Palestine and beyond.

**Camps of exclusion**

Agamben’s theory of sovereign power and the state/space of exception, presented in his *Homo sacer* trilogy, analyses the camp – where, by its exclusion, ‘bare life’ is included in the state territory and political order – as the centre of modern (bio)politics. The Agambenian camp is a biopolitical machine where people are transformed into exposed biological bodies, a space of thanatopolitics historically related to the concentration camps of late 19th century colonial wars, incarnated in Europe in Nazi concentration camps and linked to the actual or metaphorical camp spaces of today, created each time the state of exception is materialised. Thus, Agamben reduces the very general notion of ‘the camp’ to a very specific theoretical, spatial and geopolitical meaning as a ‘space of exclusion’, grounded in a particular historical perspective.

We have already seen that the camp has various political and territorial uses which are much broader than the exclusion of unwanted populations. While Rachme can indeed be analysed as a space of exception and exclusion, the interpretation of Yeruham and the other frontier ma’abarot camps, whose one of its main national role was to expand the Jewish population across the territory, requires a different approach. This approach, I argue, is also deeply grounded in colonial history, which is reflected in the early stages of the Zionist settlement in Palestine, when camps were not used for territorial exclusion but for territorial expansion.

**Camps of expansion**

In *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, Hannah Arendt examines the central role played by European imperial expansion in the development of totalitarianism. Arendt writes about the dichotomy between expansionism and the principles of the nation-state, explaining that expansion, as the central political idea of imperialism, could not bring national laws with it and impose them on other peoples. ‘The inner contradiction between the nation’s body politic and conquest as a political device,’ writes Arendt, ‘has been obvious since the failure of the Napoleonic dream’. Indeed, colonial expansion, as history tells us, leads quickly to exclusion, creating a ‘laboratory of modernity’, where new forms of power mechanisms, including the camp, were tested.
within the colonial matrix. However, the camp, I suggest, had a crucial role long before it was used as a ‘space of exclusion’ to violently enclose weak populations chased by colonial occupiers, as described by Agamben. This role is inherent to colonial expansion itself as an immediate means of penetrating and inhabiting frontier territories. While the ‘camp of exclusion’ enabled populations to be excluded within colonial and later national territory, the ‘camp of expansion’ allowed the territory to be penetrated in the first place, and later facilitated territorial control over it. Historically speaking, colonial ‘camps of expansion’ preceded ‘camps of exclusion’; only after the settlers arrived and settled in the new country were ‘camps of exclusion’ invented to concentrate the resisting locals. This points to a symbiotic, complementary relation between expansion and exclusion, with one action often leading to the other.

Similarly to the camps of ancient Rome, which sometimes became civic settlements, many colonial settlements also began as provisional outpost camps, or as what Paul Gilroy calls ‘fortified encampments of the colonizers’. These fortified frontier camps, such as the improvised Spanish military nuclei in Río de la Plata, today’s Argentina, later developed into cities like Buenos Aires. These provisional fortified frontier camps were the best response to the constantly changing colonial boundaries: they could be rapidly built in strategic places in order to secure the conquered territory and then easily abandoned when occupation was advanced to new areas. The Australian ‘settler camps’, created in the late 19th century by/for European settlers and later deserted and wiped off the map or becoming permanent settlements, are another example of how the camp was used as an instrument of colonial expansion and settlement [Illustration 25]. But while in Australia these camps are currently studied as archaeological remnants, in Israel-Palestine they were and still are used as an active territorial instrument.

**Camps of expansion in Israel-Palestine**

Camps and temporary architecture were used by Zionist settlers from the early days of Zionist settlement. The first Zionist communal settlements were composed of small agricultural groups of young pioneers who tended to work and erect tent camps in remote, desolate and temporary locations. Tents were the first dwelling units in Degania, the first kibbutz, and in Beit-Hashita kibbutz two timber huts and a few tents served the settlers for the first ten years. Timber huts were gradually constructed in those kibbutzim which settled in a specific place, although these were mainly public
structures. This form of settlement also seemed to suit the basic principles adopted by the kibbutz movement of frugality, equality and rejection of private property, a mixture of ‘Tolstoyan ideas about closeness to nature, with the addition of Marxist revolutionary fervour’. 132

In *Land and Desire in Early Zionism*, Boaz Neuman shows the intense relations of desire which blurred the boundaries between the land and the pioneer ‘who moistens the soil and senses himself as part of it’. 133 However, this action also created boundaries: ‘the pioneer moistens the land, thus making it “Jewish”, constituting a boundary between Jewish land and Arab land’. 134 Neuman argues that the pioneers’ desire for the land ‘allows us to see the pioneer-Zionist act not only as political, economic, ideological, historical, or religious but first and foremost as existential’: 135 ‘through labor, the halutzim [pioneers] “unite” and “merge” with the land, are “assimilated” and “soaked up” by it’. 136

It could be argued that the tent-camps allowed an unmediated relation between the pioneers and the soil, an almost physical connection with the land, to develop. In addition, as many of the first pioneer groups moved their camps frequently, to wherever they could find work, the physical temporariness of the tent-camps, the fact that they could be easily moved to different locations, meant that a specific temporary space could potentially occupy other spaces almost simultaneously and that the pioneers were potentially everywhere – in many spaces at the same time. Thus, one group of people in a camp potentially occupied a much larger territory than it actually occupied at a specific moment. As the agricultural and building activity of the pioneers changed the land itself, and their temporary camps meant that they could easily move in space, this spatial temporariness meant that they could leave as many marks as possible, until the land was fully occupied and ‘owned’ through its cultivation.

This form of temporary camp was enhanced, improved and changed during the pre-state, early-state and later periods, becoming more and more territorial. One of the most famous types is the ‘Tower and Stockade’ method, adopted during the Arab Revolt, which allowed the construction of several pre-fabricated fortified kibbutz-camps in one day. These civic settler camps, of which more than fifty were erected in three years, used military tactics in their design and construction, and significantly changed the map of Jewish settlements in Palestine. Interestingly, the way Yeruham was first erected was compared to this frontier settlement mode. 137
Similar to pre-state settler camps, the *Nahal* camps (the Hebrew initials for ‘pioneer combatant youth’), initiated by Ben-Gurion in the first year of statehood, also blurred the distinction between security needs and territorial settlement objectives [Illustration 26]. Each Nahal camp was called *He’ahzut* (Hebrew for ‘holding on tightly’), and combined military service with the creation of new agricultural frontier settlements. The soldiers in a Nahal group erected a camp ‘in an area too exposed, dangerous or difficult for normal civilian habitation’, and at the end of three years’ military service the Nahal group became civilian; either the soldiers remained there to live their civilian life or other civilians arrived to replace them. More than 90 such camps were created between 1950 and 1980 in frontier areas like the Arava region, the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights, many of which eventually became permanent kibbutz and moshav settlements. In accordance with the semi-military character of these ‘camps of expansion’, their surroundings were perceived as a potential threat against which protection was needed – either through a stockade or barbed wire – and always with weapons. Thus, while other types of camp are used to exclude specific populations from society, these ‘camps of expansion’ excluded themselves from their surroundings, which were still not entirely in their control, while creating a sequence of settlements which redefined the territory. In addition, while violence is usually inflicted on the inmates/dwellers of other camps, the ‘camps of expansion’ produce violence in relation to their exterior by their invasive territorial actions.

In *Barbed Wire – an Ecology of Modernity*, Reviel Netz describes two very different yet complementary control mechanisms from early modernity – the mass-produced *blockhouse* and the *concentration camp* – both invented by the British colonial powers in South Africa in their fight against the Boers at the turn of the 20th century. These two mechanisms used barbed wire in its two alternative spatial roles – to prevent motion *from* the outside and to prevent motion *to* the outside.

The blockhouse of the Boer War was a mass-produced and rapidly erected fort used to protect British railroad infrastructure from Boer guerrilla fighters. These small guard posts were placed along the railroads, which were also fenced by barbed wire, enabling an area to be controlled with the minimum manpower. This mechanism is similar in its principles to the fortified ‘Tower and Stockade’ camps, which were also built a relatively short distance from one another and were eventually ‘transformed into total Israeli control over the land as a whole’. In his work on settlements and outposts in the West Bank, Ariel Handel also shows how the system of connected
fortified Jewish settlement ‘points’ is used to divide and better control the Palestinian landscape, as these outposts are mainly located on hilltops, they enable vast spatial control over their surroundings [Illustration 27]. ‘Look how absurd it is, the issue of timber forts’, says Shlomo Gur, the architect of the ‘Tower and Stockade’ camps 64 years after their ‘invention’; ‘All the Wild West is made out of it. The outposts of the barbaric Americans who went to the Indians’ territories were all built in the shape of [fortified] wooden cloisters with towers’.

Thus, these rapidly erected camps/outposts facilitated the movement of settlers to the frontier, their control over it and their territorial expansion as a whole. It is not coincidental that many of the frontier ma’abarot camps, including Yeruham, were also protected by barbed wire, as they were used for territorial expansion in a similar way.

Concentration camps also appeared during the Boer War with the opposite spatial role, in which barbed wire was used to confine a population in order to ‘protect’ a specific territory from them [Illustration 28]. The threatening ‘outside’ was enclaved and surrounded by barbed wire – its barbs this time pointing inside – coercing people into a specific controlled area, making them ‘passive recipients of violence’.

The ma’abarot camps: a hybrid of expansion and exclusion

The early closed ‘immigrant camps’ were first conceived as a useful mechanism, as a form combining custody and care in order to control, order, support and absorb the masses of immigrants who it was planned would come to the country as part of a rescue project combined with state-building and nation-building projects. These camps were similar to other models for refugee and internally displaced person [IDP] camps designed for the separation of immigrants from the rest of the civic population in order to support and control them before they became part of their new society. British military camps built in pre-state Mandatory Palestine were viewed as the best spaces for such camps as, like all military camps, they allowed many to be accommodated in a relatively small space with maximum control. When during the first years of the state it became clear that this model was not working for financial, political and territorial reasons, the familiar ‘settlement camp’ model was adjusted to its new mass-use. Combining the Zionist established expansionist values of ‘conquering the frontier’ and ‘redeeming the land’ with government-arranged manual labour, it also allowed the ma’abara camps to be created on a smaller scale so as to control and
order immigrants, who were strangers to the established and mostly Ashkenazi Israeli society.

Thus, we can say that the ma’abarot camps were a kind of hybrid of ‘immigrant camps’ and the earlier Zionist ‘settler camps’, combining camps which controlled people with camps which control the land. Ma’abarot camps were a combination of ‘camps of expansion’ and ‘camps of exclusion’: the Israeli government invited immigrants to Israel, arranging their transportation to and absorption in their new state so as to enhance Israel’s image as ‘the ingathering of exiles’, its demographic power and its territorial abilities, yet they excluded these people and their form of life once they got there. Immigrants were excluded from their home countries because they had emigrated, but were again excluded from Israeli society and resources, despite their role in forming Israel’s image, territory, economy and military power.\(^{147}\)

In combining the two types of camp, the ma’abarot seems to be a unique spatial phenomenon, an Israeli invention which enabled the modern Israeli project to be realised. It is worth asking to what extent the frontier ma’abarot camps did the job for which they were created. Did these camps in isolated locations and the people sent to them actually make a difference, contributing to Israel’s territorial strength? If so, was the social and personal price worth it? Did it actually help to forcefully spread the Jewish population by settling people on the frontier, or was the superficial demographic-territorial balance merely an excuse for intra-Jewish racial separation? The answers to these questions are beyond the scope of this paper. However, defining ‘camps of expansion’ as being complementary in their objectives and functions to Agamben’s ‘camps of exclusion’ and understanding ma’abarot camps as a hybrid of both types enables us to better understand the varied roles played by the camp throughout its history and in the radical changes made to the lands and populations of Israel-Palestine.

**The Multifaceted Spatiality of the Camp and its Meaning**

The identification and definition of camps of ‘expansion’ and ‘exclusion’ has enabled us to examine the camp as a versatile tool which facilitates territorial reformations and biopolitical ordering in distinct yet complementary manners. However, within these distinctions there is still a crucial need to understand the multifaceted spatialities of the camp. After all, the camp is not a mere technology but is a space in itself, the varied forms of which are not only linked to its function in the state’s modern spatial
apparatus but also to the camp’s own unique characteristics and the way it is variously created, used and altered. Within each category there are camps with very different spatialities – for example ‘camps of exclusion’ include both rigidly-built detention camps and self-built makeshift refugee camps with a very different spatial formation. Thus, the multifaceted spatialities of the camp are clearly not directly related to these categories, meaning that there is a need to analyse them separately.

The camps of Yeruham and Rachme not only play the complementary territorial roles of expansion and exclusion, but also represent almost completely contrasting architectural types, which enable us to examine their meaning. Yeruham’s two camps were rigid spaces formed of repetitive structures placed in a functional and rational order. Rachme’s spatiality is inherently different; at first glance it looks arbitrary and chaotic, yet this informal appearance is built according to specific cultural rules reflecting a form of deep order.

The extreme rigid and chaotic spatialities of Yeruham and Rachme seem to reflect the respective control and abandonment of the camp dwellers: while the rigidity of Yeruham suggests that camp dwellers were subject to strict and total control by the state, the chaos of Rachme suggests complete abandonment of the inhabitants. The reality, however, is more complex; both Yeruham and Rachme were exposed to radical relations with the state involving both control and abandonment, which together with additional factors created their very different spaces.

**Deciphering the multifaceted spatialities of the camp**

The three salient characteristics of the camp which distinguish it from the hegemonic built environment are spatial temporariness, a specific mode of governance and a specific population. However, how these characteristics are manifested varies between camps. The way camp spaces are formed, managed and altered is crucially influenced by the duration and nature of their temporary status, the character of their legal exclusion and the characteristics of the specific population suspended in them, whether it is a genuine ethnic identity such as ‘Bedouin’ or people from several ethnic backgrounds unified by an external definition such as ‘immigrants’.

The Yeruham camps were initially erected as rigid spaces of repetitive pre-fabricated units placed in a rational order, either in a dense grid or according to topography. Behind this order stands an institutional instrumental thinking which adopted the most
efficient way to place temporary structures in order to save money, ensure the camp’s
temporariness and create an ordered space which was easy to control and manage.
The rigid form of Yeruham camps is similar not only to other ma’abarot camps but
also to other familiar repetitive camp types, an efficient layout which can be traced in
the earlier settings of refugee camps, detention camps, settler camps and others in
Israel-Palestine and worldwide. This is a typical space of modernity in its total design
and order which attempts to eliminate in two ways the chaotic reality that followed
national reordering and state creation: the first way is to re-organise the Israeli
territory itself by spreading the Jewish population in it, and the other way is by the
creation of total order in the space of the camp itself, allowing it to be easily erected
and managed. ‘We can say that existence is modern’ says Bauman, ‘as far as it is
effected and sustained by design, manipulation, management, engineering’; the
ma’abarot camps, and Yeruham among them, are spaces of modernity both in relation
to their internal instrumental design, organization and management and in facilitating
the organization of the Israeli space as a whole.

Besides minor spatial actions by camp dwellers, the spatial form of the camps in
Yeruham did not change significantly during their several years of existence for
various reasons. The camps existed for only a few years, after which their inhabitants
were moved into permanent housing. Opportunities for changing them were thus
limited. In addition, immigrants in the Yeruham camps were completely dependent on
state institutions and could therefore only minimally accommodate the camps to their
needs: they did not have access to local building materials (except for mud, with
which they built outdoor ovens) and the camp was completely controlled by the
Jewish Agency, which also owned the huts, possibly forbidding changes to them.
Another point is that camps and the later development town were formed according to
the state’s modernist ideology aimed at erasing the cultural traditions of the
immigrants, who in many cases made an effort to assimilate to their new state’s
culture, trying to accommodate to their given space rather than changing it.

The rigid repetitive modern template itself possibly also had an intimidating effect;
the standard anonymous huts left no ‘loose ends’ to be differently accommodated and
utilised, creating an order which resisted any stamp of individuality. If we compare
these rigid camps to other high-modernist projects such as James Holston’s work on
Brasilia, it is possible to assume that this systematic rationality of architectural
uniformity with no visual and sensory differences was alien to the immigrants, many
of whom came from vivid urban environments in Asia and North Africa. The total order, legible to planners and administrators, may have been experienced as a confusingly repetitive environment of indistinguishable units with no distinctive landmark, creating problems of orientation for the residents, or what Scott called ‘mystifying disorder’. But one of the most important factors which probably affected the immigrants’ ability to alter the camp was the fact that they were a ‘shocked population’. Immigrants were taken away from everything familiar, and this rupture within their own life made them incapable of changing their new lives.

As we have already established, although it looks as if Rachme’s makeshift houses are assembled and scattered across the landscape with no apparent order, its ‘chaotic’ spatiality is actually organised according to specific Bedouin cultural and social traditions and customs, constrained by limitations imposed by the Israeli authorities. In contrast to Yeruham, Rachme was not only created by its own dwellers, who were indigenous to the area, but it has also existed for many decades, changing over the years for a variety of reasons, such as natural population growth and ongoing changes in its form of life. The camp’s houses, constructed and developed according to traditions and modernisation processes specific to the Bedouin, were altered over time through the use of varied materials and building methods according to changing needs and available resources [Illustration 24]. These changes and adaptations were and still are violently restricted by the state, which also enforces the camp’s temporary status and restricts resources such as land, while abandoning the Bedouin with no or minimal services or connection to infrastructure. As a space of enforced temporariness, the spatiality of the camp often forms part of the resistance to this enduring temporary situation. This spatial resistance takes many forms; while the Bedouin use the building of houses to force the state to acknowledge their camps and villages, Palestinians use the space of their refugee camps in various ways to resist Israeli occupation with the aim of changing the political situation of the Palestinians as a whole.

As with any built environment, factors related to the location of the camp, such as climate, topography, natural resources and proximity to other built environments may have significant influence on its spatiality, as can factors related to scale and size. The ma’abarot camps themselves differed substantially in their location and scale, as well as in the services and public institutions they possessed, such as schools and synagogues. Another significant factor influencing the spatiality of the camp is the
nature of their basic structures, whether they are tents, huts or barracks. The relation between private and public also differs between camps; in some there is no private or family space and inhabitants are completely exposed in their most intimate moments, affecting both the level of control in them and the human identity of those who live there.

Thus, the rigid order of Yeruham’s camps was in fact a very ‘thin’ order covering the violent disorder of immigrants’ lives in their new location, where they inhabited a strange and confusing ‘total order’ in a desolate desert landscape together with others from different countries and cultures. In contrast, behind Rachme’s chaotic disorder it is possible to identify a deep spatial order, based on a traditional cultural and social order. These ‘ordered’ and ‘chaotic’ spatialities reach such extremes due to the extreme and violent modes of governance of control and abandonment in the camp. We may return here to Zygmunt Bauman’s theory of modernity’s violent quest for order and its dialectic relations with chaos and disorder, or we can use the words of poet Wallace Stevens, who expresses this accurately in *Connoisseur of Chaos*:

A. A violent order is a disorder; and
B. A great disorder is an order. These Two things are one.

As we have seen, the form a camp takes is dependent on a combination of multiple factors according to which it is created, changed and managed by the sovereign and/or by its inhabitants. Once created *ad hoc* as a temporary space, the camp evolves in different ways, creating different spatialities, all included in the category of the camp, and it changes according to the capacities of the inhabitants, not just those of the sovereign. Rendering these different spatialities as one abstract entity limits understanding not only of the spaces of the camps themselves but also of their complex and changing political role. There is a need, therefore, not only to discuss ‘the camp’ in general but also to discuss particular camps, and understand their changing roles in their particular historical and geopolitical contexts.

**From ‘Bare Life’ to ‘Everyday Life’**

The analytical approach Minca offers for the camp is in line with other critical scholarly work on refugee, transit and detention camps created by sovereign powers, which, based on Agamben’s writings, analyse the camp as a site that transforms people into mere biopolitical bodies. However, a growing scholarly literature based
on empirical studies of different camp spaces has developed a different theoretical
approach which criticises the Agambenian generalisation of the camp, arguing that
Agamben’s theory of the camp does not provide an appropriate analytical tool for
understanding the complexity of social and political relations in the camp, proposing
that camps be analysed as political spaces of struggle and contestation and of human
agency.

For example, in her work on an informal migrant camp in Calais, Kim RygIEL158
analyses the camp as a social and political lived space in which people ‘on the move’
negotiate, cooperate, fight, resist and practice citizenship through their own
resourcefulness. In her study of informalised refugee camps in the Middle East and
South Asia, Romola Sanyal159 shows how people recover their political power by
spatial actions.160 Adam Ramadan analyses Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon161
as spaces of agency and struggle, arguing that ‘[i]f we accept a formulaic Agambenian
reading of the camp as a space of exception in which political life is suspended, then
[…] acts of resistance and struggle might be rendered outside politics, as silent
expressions of bare life or illegitimate acts of terrorism’.162 Nando Sigona proposes
the concept of ‘campzenship’ to capture the specific form of political membership
produced in and by the camp, acting as ‘a social and political terrain where rights,
entitlements and obligations are reshaped, bended, adjusted, neglected and activated
by and through everyday interactions’.163

Similarly, many of the camps discussed throughout this dissertation which were built
and altered by their own dwellers were used at different levels as instruments for their
political, national, cultural and territorial struggles. The ‘pioneer’ settler camps used
for Zionist national expansion or Bedouin camps, some of which are still being used
as instruments of territorial and political struggle, are two very different examples of
the camp being used as a political instrument which begins a new political order or
resists an existing one, and not only through the forceful manipulation of certain
populations by others.

Michel de Certeau’s famous perspective on the practice of everyday life164 is very
visible in the camp. The usually ‘thin’, often rigid space of the camp’s initial layout
makes it easy to identify the additional layers of the varied spatial alternations and
contributions of its dwellers. By bringing to light ‘the clandestine forms taken by the
dispersed, tactical, and makeshift creativity of groups or individuals already caught in
the nets of “discipline” […]which] compose the network of an antidiscipline’,165 de
Certeau detects not only the poetic but also the political dimension of everyday practices. The creation of space in the camp does not need to have a pure political or territorial purpose in order to be political; as the camp is by its very existence a political space, every space created in it for the most basic needs of everyday life is always already political.166

It is important to distinguish here between the major and minor uses of the camp as a political device and the architecture related to these uses. These terms are borrowed from Deleuze and Guattari’s vocabulary, initially presented in A Thousand Plateaus167 and developed in their book on ‘minor literature’.168 While for them majority implies a state of domination, not in a manner of quantity but of quality,169 minoritarian (not to be confused with minority) is a state of becoming or a process, involving deterritorialisation of the characteristics of the majority. This process implies two simultaneous movements: a withdrawal from the majority and a rise from the minority: ‘[b]ecoming-minoritarian is a political affair and necessitates a labor of power (puissance), an active micropolitics. This is the opposite of macropolitics […] in which it is a question of knowing how to win or obtain a majority’.170 As Jill Stoner writes, ‘A minor architecture is political because it is mobilized from below, from substrata that may not even register in the sanctioned operations of the profession’.171 The camp is often a tool of the majority, used by it to expand or exclude, to gain or maintain political power. However, camps may also be the platform or the instrument for a minor micropolitics of becoming which changes and manipulates the architecture of the majority, whether they are camps created for refugees, indigenous minorities or immigrants and changed by them as in Rachme or the Palestinian refugee camps,172 or they are the makeshift migrant/refugee camps being erected today in the heart of cities.173

Thus, it is clear that rather than being only ‘a political technology […where] de-subjectivation is made operational’,174 the camp increasingly appears, in this research as well as in other studies, as a complex space of major and minor political action and resistance, in which not only ‘bare life’ but also ‘everyday life’ is produced. While Agambenian theory is effective in analysing some coercive camp spaces, it seems that camps created and changed by their own inhabitants require a different analytical approach.

**Conclusion**
As a control mechanism created for the expansion or exclusion of different populations in territory, the story of the camp is also the story of modernity and of how lands and people are utilised and classified with control over them concentrated in a few dominant centres. In this manner, the camp is also very much rooted in colonialism and nationalism and closely linked to settler societies, national creation and state building in the way that spaces and populations are controlled, managed, shifted and manipulated on a large scale for social engineering and biopolitical ordering – on local, regional and global levels. This is also why camps are so common in Israel-Palestine, being a crucial instrument of the constant geopolitical changes this contested territory has been through over the last century, changes which are inseparable from global geopolitical attitudes and events.

The four main arguments established in this research, show that the multifaceted mechanism of the camp is a versatile spatial instrument which is used in many forms and by many actors, and is altered over time in relation to different periods, locations and populations. As we have seen, this tool, which combines space and action, movement and its restriction, is much more complex and multi-dimensional than that presented by Agamben. On the one hand, the main characteristics of the camp recur in all of its various forms, but on the other hand its varied manifestations and uses expose it as a mechanism that, similarly to its spatial role, is ever changing.

As has been seen throughout the history of Israel-Palestine, camps are architectural entities inherently related to the movement of people in space: to its suspension and limitation, its facilitation, absorption and ordering. The story of the camp is the story of mobility and its restraint, of change and of the fear of change. Thus, the camp can be regarded as a shadow which constantly follows modern politics, as a space where people are dehumanised by other people; but it should also be looked at as a beam of light which indicates where new political subjectivities and changes may emerge. ‘The meaning of politics is freedom’, 175 Hannah Arendt reminds us, arguing that it is ‘the freedom of movement’ which is ‘the substance and meaning of all things political’. 176 While the movement Arendt refers to here is that of speech and its diversity, physical movement from place to place is also crucial to freedom. The camp, as a space which limits mobility and in other cases facilitates it, is a crucial mechanism related to the practices and policies of movement and thus of politics as a whole. In a world where the movement of people in-between spaces and territories is heavily supervised and restricted, and the ability to settle in a different place is dependent on what documents and money one possesses, camps signal a rupture in this tight order. Studying the camp therefore means studying changes as they
happened or currently happen, and its concrete manifestations may suggest the beginnings of new spatial and geopolitical orders that we still cannot fully imagine.

Illustrations – please see PDF

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1 Minca (2005).

2 E.g. Butler (2004); Elden (2006); Gregory (2006).


5 Bauman (2001: 266).

6 See for example Kozlovsky (2008); Ramadan (2013); Katz (2015b).


8 On typicality related to architecture see Carl (2011).


13 Schmitt (2006 [1922]).

14 Benjamin (1968 [1940]: 257).


18 Agamben’s theory was also studied and criticised by numerous other scholars in ways which are not directly related to the camp, including Prozorov (2014); Calarco and DeCaroli (2007); Murray and Whyte (2011); Norris (2005) and Svirsky and Bignall (2012).


20 Ek (2006).


22 Edkins and Fin-Pat (2005). Also see Perera (2002); Rajaram and Grundy Warr (2004); Schinkel and van der Berg (2011); Diken and Laustsen (2005).

23 Suggesting that in Islamism places are exploited when there is an absence or weakness of sovereign power rather than an intensification of it (Elden 2009: 61).


25 Sigona (2014); Rygiel (2011); Walters (2008); Owens (2009); Ramadan (2013); Sanyal (2014). See also: Steane (2007); Czajka (2008).


27 de Certeau (2002 [1984]).

28 Deleuze and Guattari (2002; 2006); Katz Feigis (2010); Stoner (2012).

29 Arendt (1998); Katz (2015a).

30 Charlie Hailey (2009) wrote a guidebook to 21st century camps. However it is more of a catalogue than a theoretical framework.

31 Ramadan (2013: 69).

British control over Palestine began in 1917 with the conquest of the territory, which until then had been under Ottoman control. Established at the San Remo Conference in 1920, the mandate system divided the Middle East between Britain and France as a ‘sacred trust of civilization’ under the guardianship of (Western) ‘advanced nations’ (Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations of June 1919, in Krämer 2011: 164–5). Palestine was under the British Mandate until Israel was established in 1948.

In 1850, of a population of 340,000 only 13,000 were Jews (Krämer 2011: 135). These were mostly Orthodox Jews living mainly in Jerusalem, Safed, Tiberias and Hebron.


Shafir (1989); Stasiulis and Yuval-Davis (1995); Yiftachel (2006).


‘Aliyah’ (‘ascent’), a basic notion of Zionist ideology, is the immigration of diaspora Jews to the Land of Israel. The opposite action, emigration from Israel, is referred to as Yerida (‘descent’). Anti-Jewish laws, persecutions and economic problems were the main causes of Jewish immigration from Eastern Europe during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. There were six Aliyah waves before Israel was established.

Kahana (2011: 261). These lands were mainly purchased by the Jewish National Fund (JNF). Many of the Zionist ‘pioneers’ were part of Gdud HaAvoda (Work Battalion), whose diverse works included draining swamps, paving roads, agriculture, construction, and establishing several Kibbutzim.

The camp was comprised of a wall made of pre-fabricated wooden moulds filled with gravel, enclosing an area of 35 by 35 meters and surrounded by two fences of barbed wire that protected the civilian ‘conquering troops’. The camp was completed with four shacks to accommodate forty people and a pre-fabricated watchtower with a projector to overlook the surrounding area, enabling the settlers to cultivate the land and gradually build a permanent settlement (Rotbard 2003: 42).

(1936-1939) – The nationalist uprising of Palestinian Arabs against British colonial rule and mass Jewish immigration was aimed at British forces and Zionist targets (Norris 2008).

‘Settlement points’ was the term used to describe the ‘Tower and Stockade’ outposts and the frontier settlements which followed, a term that implies that a ‘point’ on the map had more importance than the ‘settlement’ itself (Rotbard 2003: 48).

Moshe Shertok, head of the political department of the Jewish Agency. Quoted in Raichman (2008: 263).

All quotes in this thesis from Hebrew original are translated into English by the author.
Eliav (1986: 337). The first partition plan was published in 1937 by the British Peel Commission, established following the Arab revolt, and recommended for the first time that the territory be divided: into an Arab state linked to Transjordan, a small Jewish state (20% of the territory) and a Mandatory Zone connecting Jaffa and Jerusalem (Krämer 2011: 280-283).

The Balfour Declaration of November 1917, which stated that ‘His Majesty’s Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people’ – was the most important document expressing British support for Jewish settlement in Palestine (Krämer 2011: 149).

The Atlit camp near Haifa is the best known example. The British also had detention camps for rebellious Palestinian Arabs and Jews which opened during the ‘Arab Revolt’ (Norris 2008: 40). In the last two years of the British Mandate, about 56,000 Jewish immigrants were deported to camps in Cyprus (Karmi 1992: 81), sixty percent of whom were holocaust survivors who had come from the DP Camps in Europe, including thousands of children who had lost both parents during the war (Ofer 1996: 1-23).

For example, on the day Israel was established, more than 22,000 Jews were detained in the camps in Cyprus (Naor 2010: 26). Another known example is the ship Exodus, which in summer 1947 sailed to Palestine with over 4,500 migrants. After it was seized by the British Navy 40 km from Palestine, the passengers, mostly Holocaust survivors, were sent to detention camps in Germany.

The Hebrew term ma’abara (מָעָבָרָה), ma’abarot in plural, is etymologically derived from the word ma’avar (מָעָבָר), meaning ‘transit’.

Or the JDC – American Jewish Distribution Committee.


During the first years of statehood, around 685,000 Jewish immigrants entered the country while about 700,000 Palestinians became refugees (Kozlovsky 2008: 159; Morris 2005: 11).

Abu Sitta and Rempel (2014).

Falah (1989); Swirski and Hasson (2005); Yiftachel (2006, 2009); Abu-Saad and Creamer (2012).

Such as Palestinian refugee camps (Ramadan 2013; Sanyal 2014; Chatty 2010; Weizman 2007), ma’abara camps (Bernstein 1981; Kozlovsky 2008), Bedouin ‘unrecognised villages’ (Falah 1989; Swirski and Hasson 2005; Yiftachel 2009), settlements in the occupied territories (Ophir et al. 2009; Weizman 2007), and the state of exception in the Golan Heights (Ram 2015).

Kimmerling (1983); Yiftachel (2006); Tzfadia and Yakobi (2011).


The criminalizing term ‘infiltrators’ was used to refer to every Arab person who has entered Israel without permission after November 1947 (Korn 2000: 582).

David Ben-Gurion, quoted in Kozlovsky (2008: 143).


Davar Hashavua, 20 February, 1951.


Quoted in Kozlovsky (2008, 151). The ma’abara camps significantly contributed to the doubling of the national child mortality rate in the early 1950s.


See Katz (2016).

Hacohen (1994: 216). On another solution to quickly absorb the Jewish immigrants in Israel while avoiding the use of camps see Katz (2016: 151-152).

In 1952, the Mizrahi immigrants in the camps reached 82 percent (Bernstein 1981: 29).


Khazzom (2005); Sharon (2012); Yiftachel (2006).
Many of these frontier territories were populated by Palestinians and Bedouins prior to the 1948 war, and the result of the counter-flow of the Jewish and Arab populations was the simultaneous appearance of two parallel, although politically opposed, temporary camp spaces: the Israeli ma’abara camps and the Palestinian refugee camps; between the years 1948-1951, 685,000 Jewish immigrants entered Israel and approximately 700,000 Palestinians became refugees Kozlovsky (2008: 143, 159).

It is important to acknowledge the inherent imbalance in the fieldwork and the empirical findings regarding the two camps analysed in this paper. Yeruham was studied as a historic camp and the archive work and interviews were mainly related to personal memories and historical material, which, being an official part of the Israeli nation-building project, is well-documented. Rachme was studied as a current camp and it is therefore mainly examined as an ongoing situation of enduring temporariness confronting violent state practices.

ARBSN (2011: 5). The transfer and relocation of Bedouin and Palestinian communities by the Israeli Army is a repeating practice from the states’ early years until the present, as part of its effort to gain control over frontier territories (Hass 2012, Pfeffer 2014).

The Goldberg Commission (2008) was set up by the Israeli government in 2007 to end the long-running land disputes between the state and the Negev Bedouin. The report recommended recognising most of the 46 ‘unrecognised villages’, on condition that they suit Israel’s development plans. Since then a ‘building freeze’ policy has been imposed. In 2011, the Prawer Plan suggested how to implement the Goldberg proposals, involving the transfer of 30,000 villagers to government townships. In December 2013, the plan was cancelled due to strong Bedouin resistance (Rinat 2011).

The policemen are waiting by the road, ready to act in case violent riots erupt following the demolition. Interview with J.A., Rachme, 6 April 2013.

Interview with S.Z., Rachme, 10 April 2013.

Twelve tribes were relocated during the 1950s and joined the existing population of six tribes in the Siyag, an area of 1,600 square kilometres in the northern Negev (Ben David 2004).


This is due to a variety of reasons, mainly the existence of a well-functioning customary land system and a historical view that foreign rulers would prove temporary (Ben David 2004, Falah 1989).


Swirsky and Hasson (2005).

Falah (1983). The Bedouin had a dual response to this policy; those who did not own any land moved to the planned settlements which were not attractive to the land owners, who built their own villages (Kliot and Medzini 1985). In a 2003 study by the Israeli Center Bureau of Statistics, all seven of the planned settlements were placed at the bottom of the list of the poorest settlements in Israel.


See the concept of ‘gray space’ (Yiftachel 2009).

The Bedouin pasture and agricultural areas were drastically limited following changes in land use to Nature Reserves or military Firing Range Zones.

de Muynck and Shoshan (2005: 5).

Sanyal (2014: 558); and also Katz (2015a); Ramadan (2013); Yiftachel (2009).


For Agamben (1998: 17), ‘the exception is a kind of exclusion’. I specifically use ‘exclusion’ to distinguish these camps from the general ‘spaces of exception’, which the camps of ‘expansion’ also form part of.


See chapter 6 in my complete dissertation.

Diken and Laustsen (2005: 17); Ramadan (2013: 67); Rygiel (2012: 807).

See Katz (2016) for more details.


113 Alsayyad and Roy (2006: 13).


116 Nightingale (2012).


120 Pullan (2011: 16).

121 See Katz (2016) about the meaning of this term in the Israeli context.


123 Mainly those created by the Spanish in Cuba and by the English in the Boer War. See Agamben (1998: 166).

124 Agamben (1998: 175). This approach is adopted to study many contemporary camp spaces of custody and care by various scholars, including Edkins and Fin-Pat (2005); Rajaram and Grundy-Warr (2004); Edkins (2000); Perera (2000).


128 Calvo et al. (2005: 22, 32).

129 Burke et al. (2010).


131 Shlomo, one of the first settlers, quoted in English in Lieblich (1982: 25).

132 Amir et al. (2005: 149).

133 Neuman (2011: 1).

134 Ibid.

135 Ibid.: 3.

136 Ibid.: 50.
See p. 113 in this work.


Handel (2014).


Quoted in Azoulay (2000: 35).


More on these camps and on the pre-state Zionist One Million Plan which precedes them see Katz (2016: 146-148).

See Katz (2016).


Holston (1989).


Ibid.: 256.

See Ramadan (2013); Sanyal (2014); Katz Feigis (2010).


Rygiel (2011).

Sanyal (2014).


Ramadan (2013).

Ramadan (2013: 74).

Sigona (2015: 1).

de Certeau (2002 [1984]).
165 Ibid.: xiv-xv.

166 See Katz Feigis (2010).


168 Deleuze and Guattari (2006), mainly chapter 3.

169 For example – ‘the majority in a government presupposes the right to vote, and not only is established among those who possess that right but is exercised over those who do not, however great their numbers; similarly, the majority in the universe assumes as pregiven the right and power to man. In this sense women, children […] are minoritarian.’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2002: 291). Refugees, Bedouin and immigrants would of course also be included in this category.


172 Katz Feigis (2010).

173 See for example Chazan (2015).


176 Ibid.: 129.