PATRONAGE AND SOCIAL MOBILITY
IN THE ARISTOCRACIES OF THE PRINCIPATE

By

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Dissertation submitted to the University of Cambridge
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, June 1978
PREFACE

My debts of gratitude for this dissertation concerning patronage and social mobility in the aristocracies of the Principate are numerous. I wish to thank the Cambridge Faculty of Classics and Jesus College for financial support. Many friends in Cambridge have read and made useful comments about various sections, including Professor M.I. Finley, Mr. C.R. Whittaker, and fellow research students. My deepest appreciation is reserved for my supervisor, Dr. E.D.A. Garnsey, who supplied much needed advice and criticism at all stages of research and composition.

This dissertation is the result of my own work, except where acknowledgement is made in the notes, and includes nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration. Furthermore, no part of it has been submitted for any other degree or diploma or any other qualification either at this university or at any other.
Richard F. Saller, Patronage and Social Mobility in the Aristocracies of the Principate.

The dissertation is entitled "Patronage and social mobility in the aristocracies of the Principate". Patronage is defined as a reciprocal exchange relationship between men of unequal social status (municipal patronage is excluded).

The work falls into three parts. In the first the language of patronage (patronus, cliens, amicus, beneficium, etc.) is defined; the reciprocity ethic implicit in the language is described; and the spheres of social life in which the patronal ideology was applied by Romans are located.

The core of the dissertation is devoted to a description of the patronage networks extending from the emperor through the imperial aristocracy to the provincial aristocracy (in particular, that of North Africa). At each level a description is offered of the economic, social and political goods and services exchanged and the types of people who entered into the patron-client relationships. Further, there is an attempt to show that the fact that Rome remained a patronal society in the Principate has broad implications: the distribution of a variety of offices and honors depended solely on patronage; senators continued to be important patrons distributing their own as well as imperial beneficia to their clients; senators and equites were bound together in a single patronal network; and patronage is perhaps the best explanation for the increasing entry of provincials into the imperial aristocracy.

Traditionally it has been argued that the importance of patronage in the Principate was diminished by increasingly rigid bureaucratic machinery in which appointments and promotions were based on merit and especially seniority. Chapter three provides a demonstration that the influence of these bureaucratic criteria on senatorial and equestrian careers have been greatly overestimated and that there is no reason to minimize the effects of patronage.
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INTRODUCTION

No systematic study of patronage of individuals in the Early Roman Empire has yet been produced. This dissertation is an attempt to fill the gap. For the purposes of this study patronage will be defined as an exchange relationship between men of unequal social status.

We should perhaps begin by pointing out what will not be discussed. As the title indicates, municipal patronage (which has already been analyzed by L. Harmand) falls outside the bounds of this thesis. Further, owing to the nature of the evidence and the need to limit the scope, the group of individuals has been confined to the imperial and municipal aristocracies. Within the aristocracies attention has been focused primarily on political patronage and social mobility. A few remarks have been made concerning economic exchange between patrons and clients: though this kind of exchange may have been important, the evidence for it, as for other economic institutions of antiquity, is relatively meagre compared with the literary and epigraphic sources for political affairs and office-holding.

In anthropological studies of modern Mediterranean societies great stress has been laid upon the role of patronage in the functioning of the state. In the process of debate issues have been defined and ideas developed in a way not found in studies of the Roman Principate. Though assumptions about the relationship
between patronage and the development of the Roman state often underlie such studies, they are usually not brought to the surface in such a fashion that questions can be systematically posed and answers sought.

Patronage probably exists in virtually all states and so simply to point to its existence yields very little understanding of its importance. In order to move beyond banal assertions about existence, Anton Blok has recently suggested a typology in which different kinds of states are related to the various functions which patronage performs.\(^2\) Blok singled out four types of states, characterized by vassalage, brokerage, friendship, and disguised patronage. These "may be conceived of in terms of a continuum on which patronage and bureaucratization (i.e., centralized authority) 'move' in opposite directions. One pole of this continuum is feudal society in which patronage is full-fledged: patron-client ties are the dominant social relations which have a clear public face, while bureaucratic authority is near to zero. On the other pole, authority is fully centralized; patronage is dysfunctional and is likely to be absent."\(^3\) The two intermediate types, characterized by brokerage and friendship, are most relevant to our study here. The former is often found in segmented societies where "large sections of the population, most notably the peasantry, are still far from being actually integrated within the boundaries of the state." Thus broker-patrons are left to mediate between the central administration and sections of the population in the gaps where no formal administration exists to perform the tasks. In the state characterized by friendship, on the other hand, an extensive central organization exists and the patron's main task becomes expediting contact with the bureaucracy. Blok also suggests that
the language and ideology of patronage vary along the same continuum. At the feudal end patronage has "a clear public face" and the language of patronage does not carry immoral or unethical implications; at the opposite end of the continuum "patronage is a bad word" and "in public neither the patron nor the client are allowed to refer to their mutual contacts, let alone take pride in maintaining these relationships..."

I do not propose to devote a great deal of space in this thesis to categorizing the Roman state of the Principate: pure ideal types rarely occur in history and attempts at categorizing are often futile. But it seems to me that Blok's typology allows us to pose the central question of this thesis clearly. In much work on the growing bureaucracy of the Principate it is assumed or argued that the Roman state moved some considerable distance along the continuum toward fully centralized authority which eliminated or minimized the importance of patronage. Further, it is argued that concurrently the ideology changed so that patronage became an evil to be suppressed, losing its "clear public face" of the Republic.

The first chapter about language and ideology will be devoted to testing this latter hypothesis. In the Republic patron-client relations were not an evil and indeed were reinforced by law and religious mores. In order to discover how much this changed in the Principate, it will be asked in which social roles (e.g., emperor, administrative official, father) behavior continued to be shaped by patronal ideals.

In the remainder of the thesis we shall try to decide what impact the growing bureaucracy had on patronage. Clearly patronage did not disappear. The important question is to what extent it changed from a brokerage to a friendship type, becoming no more
than a "lubricant" for the newly created administrative machinery. Chapter 2 will attempt to answer this question with regard to the emperor and his court. Following F. Millar, I will attempt to show how little rational organization developed and how much continued to depend on personal connections.

Perhaps most effort in the search for rational organization has been devoted to discovering the rules and formal machinery governing appointments and promotion of senatorial and equestrian officials. It has been argued that patronage was suppressed or eliminated by basing appointments on impersonal evaluations of merit or a principle of seniority. The degree of structuring and specialization in senatorial careers has recently been challenged, but H.-C. Pflaum's similar views concerning equestrian procurators, set out in his four volume work, have been frequently used and hardly questioned for more than two decades. In Chapter 3 I have tried to test these views systematically by a review of the 350 procuratorial careers known to us. The results cast considerable doubt on any claim that clear organizational rules developed, turning procuratorial service into a professional bureaucracy.

Certainly no attempt was made to control or suppress patronage.

In the networks radiating from the emperor, the next group for consideration is the imperial aristocracy. Chapter 4 will describe who within the aristocracy were linked by patron-client bonds and what was exchanged. The findings again have important implications for perceptions of changes from the Republic to the Principate. It has often been suggested that emperors were in structural conflict with the senatorial order. In order to strengthen their positions, emperors sought to bypass senators by developing an equestrian bureaucracy through which they could administer their
empire. Equestrians, it is said, were antipathetic toward senators and loyal to emperors because they were dependent upon the latter for offices. In this process, Von Fremerstein suggests, senatorial houses were pressed into the background as emperors withdrew the resources necessary for them to maintain their positions as great patrons. As we shall see, serious problems for this interpretation arise from the facts that senators and equites were bound together in patron-client relationships and that emperors distributed offices through senatorial patrons.

At the periphery of the network lay the provincials who are the subjects of study in the final two chapters. North Africa has been selected as the sample area for examination. Owing to the dearth of literary evidence, most of the support for the arguments comes from the epigraphic record comprising some 30,000 inscriptions. In Chapter 5 it is asked how much patronage influenced provincial administration. Chapter 6 is devoted to a description of Africans' patronal ties with Rome. The patronal network may provide the best explanation of the increasing success of Africans in securing entry into the imperial aristocracy. Further, it may have had important implications for the general quality of provincial administration as provincials developed more patronal contacts which increased their ability to influence officials.

In general, then, two themes will run through this study at all levels. First, just as in the Republic, knowledge of patronal networks is indispensible to an understanding of how various goods, services, offices and honors were distributed in the Principate. Secondly, patron-client ties between individual members of different orders and classes supplied an element of cohesion in an empire which possessed only a very limited central administration.
THE LANGUAGE AND IDEOLOGY OF PATRONAGE

There are sound theoretical reasons for starting this study with an examination of the language of patronage. An important first step in the study of a society is to gain a broad understanding of the Weltanschauung of its members, or at least those aspects of it which are relevant. The Roman Weltanschauung related to patronage can best be explored through a careful study of key words. Such a study should enable us to understand the way in which Romans categorized their social activities and to define the meaning which they attached to various types of behavior. These categories and definitions will, in turn, serve to specify and delimit the scope of a study of patronage.

KEY WORDS AND DEFINITIONS

Initially the vocabulary of patronage must be identified. The key words can be divided into two groups: those applied to the people involved in the relationship and those describing the goods and services which passed between them. The first group will include patronus, cliens and amicus, and the second officium, beneficium, meritum and gratia. A great deal of material has been written concerning this language for the period of the Republic and has been summarized recently in works by Hellegouarc'h, Moussy and Brunt. Their work provides a convenient starting point for this study, especially since the basic meanings of the
words changed very little in our period. Furthermore, a brief review of the Republican meanings will allow us to emphasize the continuity of the social contexts in which they were used.

**Patronus and Cliens**

Before undertaking a language study, one might assume that the words *patronus* and *cliens* would be the terms most frequently used to describe patronage relationships. In fact, this does not seem to be the case (perhaps the relative rarity of these words explains the claim of some scholars that patronage of individuals was unimportant or even absent in the Principate³).

The literary usage of *patronus* in the early Empire was restricted to legal advocates, patrons of communities and ex-masters of freedmen: no other usage can be found in the major prose writers of the post-Augustan Principate (Seneca, Tacitus, Pliny the Younger and Suetonius). This seems to represent a continuation of the literary usage of the late Republic. Of the twenty-three appearances of the word in the corpus of Cicero's letters, for example, twenty-one fall into one of these three categories of technical usage, while only two have the more general meaning of "protector" or "influential supporter".⁴ In the same way (though not to the same extent) the word *cliens* was not used freely by authors with reference to any member of an exchange relationship of inferior status. It was usually reserved for humble members of the lower classes. Pliny, for instance, never referred to any of his protégés as *cliens* in his letters.

The reason for the infrequent literary usage of *patronus* and *cliens* lies in the social inferiority and degradation implied by the words. Thus, Seneca, referring to the *cliens'*
duties, scorned those for whom not even their love and hate were under their own control. Fronto never referred to himself as a patronus of his protégés and used the word cliens only once. In a commendatio he explained to the emperor Verus how intimate he and Gavius Clarus, a senatorial protégé, were.

From his earliest years Gavius Clarus devoted himself to me as a personal friend, not only in those officia with which a senator, lesser in age and rank, rightly honors and deserves well of another senator, higher in rank and older than himself. But gradually our friendship reached such a stage that, without dislike on his part or shame on mine, he could pay me the deference of a cliens, the respect that is shown by faithful and diligent freedmen: this is not from any arrogance on my part or servility on his, but our mutual affection and genuine love did away with any reluctance for either of us in the regulation of our duties.

This single occurrence in Fronto of the association of a protégé with the word cliens is the exception which proves the rule: Fronto employs the word to emphasize the mutual affection which makes the normally offensive officia clientium acceptable.

Tacitus used the word cliens more often than any other extant author of the Principate. As might be expected, the connotation of degradation is skillfully exploited to reinforce Tacitean themes. More than once the chaotic effects of civil war are emphasized by scenes of rich and dignified senators compelled to seek refuge from the terror in the houses of their humillimi clientes. Clientes was a potent label for those submitting to the degradation of pandering to Sejanus.

The epigraphic usage of patronus and cliens differs markedly from the literary, and in a way which is partially explicable. In the corpus of inscriptions from North Africa patronus occurs relatively frequently in the general sense of "protector" or "benefactor". For instance, a municipal aristocrat from Lambaesis, M. Sedius Rufus, dedicated an inscription to his patronus, the
the governor of Numidia, Q. Anicius Faustus. Numerous similar dedications could be adduced, but it is enough to say at this point that a notable uniformity among them shows clearly that *patronus* was a term of deference and social superordination.

Though stones were dedicated by friends and relatives to men of all *ordines*, only senators and *equites* of some imperially granted rank or office are called *patroni* in the general sense (others were so called by their freedmen).

How can we account for this difference between literary and epigraphic usages? Certainty is impossible, but the best explanation seems partially to lie in which member of the patronage relationship was using the words. The language of social subordination may have seemed arrogant when used by the patron—a tactless advertisement of his superiority and the relative weakness of his client. The collections of letters which have come down to us were, of course, written by leading men of the Roman aristocracy, i.e., men in the position of patron. On the other hand, the inscriptions were set up by clients. One of the duties of a recipient of a favor was to publicize the favor and one’s gratitude for it; dedications were an important vehicle for such publicity: the use of *patronus* and *cliens* on the stone served to exalt the benefactor by emphasizing his social superiority. This explanation is, however, only partially satisfactory. It may account for the absence of the words *patronus* and *cliens* in Pliny’s and Pronto’s letters, but it does not explain why Seneca, Tacitus and Suetonius never use *patronus* in the general sense found in inscriptions (though they do sometimes use the word *cliens* to describe protégés). We shall have to settle for the...
for the general assertion that there was a divergence here between literary and epigraphic usages.

Amicus

In contrast to the words patronus and cliens, the language of amicitia did not carry any inherent notions of differential social status, since the word amicus was sufficiently ambiguous to encompass both social equals and unequals. This ambiguity was exploited and there was a tendency to call men amici rather than the demeaning clientes as a mark of consideration. The tendency did not produce any levelling effect or egalitarian ideology in the hierarchical Roman society. Quite the contrary--a new grade in the hierarchy was added as relationships with lesser amici were labelled amicitiae inferiores or amicitiae minores. With some aristocratic houses this group seems to have been formally defined. Seneca claimed that the practice could be traced back to C. Gracchus and Livius who divided their friends/followers into three groups: the first comprised peers who had access to the house at any time of the day; the second included those lesser amici allowed into the atrium for morning salutations; the lowliest group was made up of humble clientes. This last group faced the humiliation of being kept out of the house by nomenclatores during salutations.12 Though Seneca disapproved of this practice, several of his dialogues indicate that it continued in his day.13 Pliny implicitly accepted the hierarchical classification of friends, speaking of the need to attend to amicitiae tam superiores quam minores. At the same time, he disapproved of some of the manifestations of arrogance produced by such a classification--for example, the custom of
serving at the same dinner table different grades of food and
wine to amici according to their status. In a less moralizing
mood, Seneca also seems implicitly to have taken the classification
for granted: in a letter to Lucilius it was suggested that
different sets of precepts were appropriate depending on whether
a man was seeking amicitiae regum, pares amicitiae or amicitiae
inferiores.

Despite the differences in various friendships, the basic
precepts of all amicitiae were essentially the same. Since most
of the participants in patronage relationships considered in
this thesis were called amici rather than patroni and clientes,
some attention needs to be devoted to clarifying the precepts of
amicitia. In the analysis we shall need to distinguish the ideal
precepts of the philosophers from the common precepts and expecta-
tions which affected everyday life. This distinction will
enable us to explore the paradox (which is found in other societies):
although friendship was ideally to be based on mutual affection
with no thought for profit, an integral part of friendship was
a mutually beneficial exchange of goods and services.

The ideals concerning amicitia changed very little in the
transition from the Republic to the Principate: Seneca adds
nothing to Cicero. Indeed, Seneca is a good source for the ideals
of friendship in our period because most of his ideas are not
uniquely Stoic, rather they represent the common philosophical
currency of the aristocracy of his day (as shown by their
repetition in the works of orators such as Pliny and Fronto).

True friendship, in Seneca's view, was thought to be one of
the highest goods, reflecting a natural human need. Amicitia
was supposed to be based on virtue (especially fides) and not
utilitas: an amicus tied only by utilitas, according to Seneca,
will abandon his friend as soon as he falls on hard times.18
One assurance of fidelity is that friends should hold everything
in common and should share similar interests and character.19
(This ideal of similarity of character will have interesting
implications for commendationes based substantially on character.20)
One can also find a number of frequently repeated specific ideals:
a friend should be forgiving but frank in advice and criticism;21
a man has an obligation to spread his friend's fame and reputation
(this also carries interesting implications for the objectivity
or otherwise of commendationes);22 a man should attend to a friend
when ill and look after his family, interests and reputation
after his death;23 on the one hand, friends should attend to petty
formalities and expressions of affection, such as vota on birth-
days, congratulations on reaching office and letter-writing; on
the other hand, close friends may be allowed the liberty of dis-
pensing with the formalities.24 Clearly, there is little in
these ideals that the political changes in the Principate would
have altered.

These ideals of common interests and selfless service represent
a philosophical view of amicitia. In the correspondences and
histories, on the other hand, it can be seen that in the common
view amicitia was expected basically to entail reciprocal exchange
of officia and beneficia. Even Seneca admits this exchange to
be a necessary part, though not the goal of amicitia.25 Fronto,
however, drawing on the more common meaning of amicitia, distinguishes
amicitia from amor which is based on affection rather than
mutual services. In a letter to Marcus Aurelius Fronto rejoices that their relationship is one of amor instead of amicitia, because the former continues and grows without tending like the flame of fire logs. Amicitiae by contrast require the constant nourishment of new officia.²⁶

The range of goods and services exchanged will be outlined in the remainder of the thesis. Suffice it to say at this point that the basically instrumental (as opposed to emotional²⁷) nature of Roman friendship was a natural corollary of the under-development of rational, impersonal institutions for the provision of services. Writing about the whole of antiquity, A.R. Hands summarized the point well: "for this aristocratic class of men the need to maintain 'friendships' turned in part on the fact... that even in a money economy there were still a considerable number of services essential to comfort and security which could not be bought for money.... 'friends' supplied services analogous to those provided by bankers, lawyers, hotel owners, insurers and others today."²⁸

In all of the literature the reciprocal nature of the exchange is emphasized. We will discuss this further when considering the meaning of words such as beneficium. At this point we shall simply note that an amicus in receipt of a favor was expected to return it at an appropriate time and to show gratitude. Nothing was baser than an ingratus amicus and the ingratitude was expected to be cause for breaking off the amicitia.²⁹

Even Seneca accepted this reciprocity ethic, which together with the ideal of eschewing amicitia based on utilitas produced the paradox mentioned above: a man was not supposed to form
a friendship or distribute a favor with a view to the return, and yet he knew that his amicus/recipient was in fact obliged to make a return. This paradox does not seem to have troubled men less self-conscious than Seneca: the exchange of beneficia and the cementing of amicitiae were ordinary parts of everyday life—the subtleties of purity of motives were easily ignored. For Seneca, on the other hand, the paradox created problems. The Stoic wise man should not form amicitiae for the purposes of utilitas, yet utilitas inevitably results from amicitia—how can that utilitas not enter into the wise man's thoughts? The answer: what virtue does not have utilitas as a by-product? "But that is said to be desired on its own account which, even though it possesses some outside advantages, would still be pleasing even if those advantages were stripped off and removed."30 Seneca's argument here seems to me to underline the instrumental nature of Roman amicitia: even the self-sufficient wise man would be expected to exchange beneficia and so it requires a logical argument to show that this would not be the aim of his friendships. In short, the Romans could hardly conceive of friendship without reciprocal exchange.

The above description of the role of the amicus in terms of reciprocal exchange has begun to introduce aspects of interest for the study of patronage. But neither the word amicus nor the words patronus and cliens are fully satisfactory pointers to patronage relationships. The latter two were avoided for reasons of politeness except in some inscriptions. The category of amicitia, on the other hand, encompasses a larger group of social relations than we are concerned with in this thesis, including
exchange relationships between men of equal, as well as unequal social status. Where the term amicus occurs with respect to a friendship between men known to be of unequal status, we can assume a patronage relationship. But where the respective statuses are unknown, the relationship cannot be assumed to meet our definition of patronage and so cannot be used evidence.

Since patron-client relationships were essentially instrumental—that is, based on the exchange of goods and services—, the words which describe the exchange are perhaps the best pointers to patronage. The basic words set out for discussion here are officium, beneficium, meritum and gratia. The list could be expanded, but limitations of space require some selection. It seems to me that a discussion of these four basic words will provide a clear idea of the reciprocity ethic which is the sine qua non of patronal societies. Throughout the following section Hellegouarc'h's work on the Republic will be used as a convenient starting point from which modifications can be suggested.

**Officium**

The meaning and social significance of officium in the Republic, according to Hellegouarc'h, can be summarized in the following way. The Romans themselves recognized officium as a basic element in their social relations. Originally officium was the activity proper to a particular category of people (e.g., craftsmen). This developed into an idea of the "rules" or "obligations" proper to certain categories, especially categories of social relationships such as between necessarii and amici. Officium came to be the concrete expression of the fides implicit in such relationships. Like fides, officium entailed an element of
reciprocity--thus an officium from a patron to a client was possible, just as from a client to a patron. The relationship can best be described as a tacit contract, the homme politique supplying protection to a client who repays with his support. "L'officium se présente ainsi comme une sorte de monnaie d'échange que l'on n'accorde à quelqu'un que dans la mesure où celui-ci est disposé à nous payer de la même façon." Cicero in his De Officiis is explicit: "such questions as these must, therefore, be taken into consideration in every act of moral duty in order to become good calculators of duty (boni ratiocinatores officiorum), able by adding and subtracting to strike a balance correctly and find out just how much is due to each individual." From this passage Hellegouarc'h concludes that "l'officium prend ainsi une valeur matérielle, susceptible en tout cas d'être mesurée et évaluée." Further the language of debere is significant; a friend receiving an officium becomes a debtor to his patron or friend. Officium reddere expresses the idea of acquitting oneself of a debt. Hellegouarc'h ends by distinguishing the abstract usage of officium (meaning generally the "support" or "assistance" given to someone) from the long list of concrete favors labelled officia. Hellegouarc'h rightly emphasizes the importance of officium and its core idea of reciprocity. His method, however, raises some doubts. The Cicero text cited above, together with two other passages from the same author, are used to establish the point that officium relationships were characterized by strict accounting and a hard attitude about giving only in the measure of expected return. There is some question about whether one of the Cicero passages is properly construed, but more importantly from
a methodological standpoint it may be doubted whether a few statements by Cicero concerning ideals serve very well to describe the everyday expectations of people involved in the exchange of officia. Indeed, despite Cicero's comment, strict accounting, precise evaluation, and exact repayment of debt were rarely possible in the realm of social favors. We can turn to the Republic for which we have the evidence of Cicero's letters to test Hellegouarc'h's idea. After his defences of M. Annius Glabrio, Cicero asked him for favors for clients and friends during Glabrio's governorship of Sicily. What was one favor—e.g., Glabrio's recognition of Demetrius Megas' citizenship—worth in comparison to Cicero's services as advocate? It was surely impossible for either of them to say with precision. In Book 13 of the Epistulae ad Familiares ten commendationes addressed to Glabrio are preserved: how many favors was Glabrio required to perform before he absolved his debt to Cicero? Because of the fundamentally unquantifiable nature of officia, some ambiguity inevitably surrounded their exchange (except perhaps in the few cases where monetary values could be assigned). Though we do not possess a series of commendationes to a single person of comparable length in the Principate to illustrate the point, the ambiguity cannot have ceased.

The second point is that this ambiguity was probably functional. As Marshall Sahlins points out in his work about the social ramifications of exchange, "the casual received view of reciprocity supposes some fairly direct one-for-one exchange, balanced reciprocity, or a near approximation of balance.... However, in premodern societies, balanced reciprocity is not the prevalent form of exchange. A question might even be raised about the
stability of balanced reciprocity. Balanced exchange may tend toward self-liquidation." A precise one-for-one exchange, that is, a complete, conscious absolution of debt leaves both parties free to break off the relationship without moral recriminations. Ambiguity of the kind illustrated in Cicero's letters to Glabrio generally precludes a clear, exact balance. It is difficult for an exchange partner to opt out of a relationship on the grounds that his debts are paid up, when he cannot be sure whether the repayment is commensurate with the initial favor. It is Cicero once again who offers the clearest illustration of Sahlins' point in a letter to Curio.

If, my dear Curio, there were nothing to be considered but my services to you--services such as you constantly proclaim them to be rather than as I appraise them--I should not be so forward in appealing to you had I some important request to make. A man of any modesty finds it repugnant to address such a petition to one whom he thinks he has put under obligation to himself, lest he should appear to exact rather than request what he wants, and to reckon the granting of it rather as a payment for value received than as an act of kindness. Since, however, on your side, your kindnesses to me are a matter of common knowledge..., and since it is a mark of a generous disposition to wish to owe most to whom you owe much, I have not hesitated to ask the favor... Here the ambiguity of balance and the perceived (or pretended) imbalance proclaimed by each in favor of the other permits each to ask favors of the other without the arrogance of demanding repayment. It also rather commits the other to fulfill the requests, since each pretends to be under obligation to the other. Though we have no passage of such clarity in Pliny's or Fronto's letters, the obligation of reciprocity continued, and so the ambiguity inherent in the exchange must have continued to make people reluctant to break off amicitiae.

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Beneficium and meritum

Beneficium, which basically means "kindness" or "favor", carries much the same force as officium when the latter is used in the context of exchange. Hellegouarc'h distinguishes the two words in the following way. Officia are bound up in obligations of kinship and friendship, while beneficia are not. "Le beneficium est donc un acte purement spontané. Ceci conforme à la définition qu'en donne Sénèque: "Beneficium enim id est quod quis dedit, cum illi liceret et non dare." Il est aussi un acte purement gratuit qui, contrairement à l'officium, ne donne à celui qui l'accorde, aucun droit à être payé de retour." Thus Seneca wrote: "nemo beneficia in calendario scribit nec avarus exactor ad horam et diem appellat." Like officia, beneficia serve to establish the bonds of amicitia, the recipient being beneficio obligatus or obstrictus. How can one further distinguish beneficium from officium? Bernert's notion that beneficium creates an obligation for the recipient to return an officium is too absolute. Both give birth to amicitia. Bernert with much more justification thought that the difference "réside seulement dans la position de celui qui l'exerce: l'officium est imposé par une obligation fondée sur la fides; le beneficium est concédé sans aucune contrainte; c'est ce que nous dit Sénèque: "beneficium est quod alienus det (alienus est qui potuit sine reprehensione cessare), officium esse fili, uxoris, earum personarum quas necessitudo suscitat et ferre opem iubet." Il en résulte que les officia, qui sont imposés par une sorte de contrainte sociale, sont moins prisés que les beneficia, marque d'un coeur généreux." Finally Hellegouarc'h lists and categorizes beneficia, separating those from an individual and those from a collectivity. With respect
Hellegouarc'h is right to underline the obligation of reciprocity established by beneficia and the role that such obligations played in the initiation of friendships. But when he attempts to pin the meaning down further by positing fine distinctions between officium and beneficium, he runs into difficulties. As I understand the explanation, three distinctions are drawn: (1) officia are bound up in the obligations of fides-relationships, beneficia are not; thus (2) beneficia are gratuitous, permitting no demand for return (in contrast to officia); (3) beneficia (unlike officia) imply a superiority of the giver over the recipient. None of these contrasts will stand the test of comparison with common usage. Indeed, Hellegouarc'h admits that officium and beneficium are often used in parallel without clear distinction and are sometimes confused, but in the end he takes the position that there are "différences fondamentales".

With respect to the first distinction, we should note the contexts of the passages cited for support. The first passage from Seneca is part of a reply on behalf of a position with which Seneca disagrees. The second represents the view of an unidentified "some people"--a view which Seneca discards as mistaken. One may suggest again that a few brief, self-conscious statements from an author can only lead to oversimplification. On the distinction itself--between officium as exchange within fides-relationships and beneficium outside fides-relationships--several observations are appropriate. It is not uncommon to find beneficium used of
an exchange in established relationships. At the most extreme, a slave can perform a *beneficium* for his master (in the words of the elder Cato, no less)\(^49\), a son for his father,\(^50\) an allied or subordinate city or state for Rome,\(^51\) or a citizen for his country.\(^52\)

It might be suggested that these are those few confusing cases mentioned by Hellegouarc'h which ought to be set aside. One can go on to point out, though, that the largest concentration of Republican uses of *beneficium* fall into the category of "favors between aristocratic friends". A quick survey of the usages listed in the *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae* shows that for every one use of *beneficium* which might qualify as a "spontaneous favor" three represent exchanges in established *amicitia* relationships. With these two words, then, it is not a question of occasional confusion and overlap: Hellegouarc'h's and others' most basic distinction does not conform to the majority of uses of *beneficium*. Further, if *beneficium* is often found where we might expect *officium*, the reverse occurs as well. In *De Officiis* (1.48) Cicero suggests that a man might initiate a relationship by performing an *officium* in the hope of receiving a *beneficium* in return (a sequence which sets the received Bernert-Volkmann-Badian model on its head).

Hellegouarc'h's second distinction (*beneficia* as purely gratuitous) flies in the face of the evidence. His qualification that the "idée de réciprocité que nous avons reconnue fondamentale de la notion d'*officium* n'est pas totalement absente de celle de *beneficium*" is a serious understatement. In the realm of conscious statements about rules of morality, Cicero and Seneca both make it clear that the *ingratus homo* is among the lowest forms of social life.\(^53\)

Though the social rule of reciprocity may not have commanded universal adherence, its influence in Roman
society can be easily demonstrated. One particularly forceful example out of the many available will suffice here. Asinius Pollio refused to join Octavian's fight against Antony on the grounds that "illius [Antony] in me beneficia notiora [sc. sunt]."54 Apparently Octavian accepted this moral reason as sufficient justification for neutrality. Reciprocity was not just "not totally absent" from beneficium in the Republic; it is expressed or implied in nearly all uses, and the same can be said for uses in imperial literature (with the exception of the Digest).

The third distinction (the superiority of the benefactor over the recipient of a beneficium) requires some refinement. On the one hand, Hellegouarc'h's point about the significance of beneficium-exchange in the dynamics of social ranking is useful for the understanding of certain kinds of behavior (especially the reluctance to accept or to publicize beneficia, behavior remarked upon by Seneca54a). That one man can deliver a needed favor to another may serve as public proof that the former is more powerful than the latter and hence more worthy of cultivation as a patron. But this seems to me to be the case only when the two men are of sufficiently similar social status to make competition between them for social prestige conceivable. Another class of exchange relationships between unequal partners exists: beneficium is used to describe the favors from both sides, but in no way implies that the inferior's beneficium to his social superior proves the former's ascendancy. Provincials can deliver beneficia to their governors and soldiers to their commanders,55 but "une superiorité" of the former in each case is not suggested.

In sum, the distinction between officium and beneficium is far from clear. In his De Officiis Cicero uses the word officium
in the general sense of "duties appropriate to men". One of the duties described is generosity, that is, the distribution of favors. Now these specific favors are also called officia. Clearly, officium in its general sense of duty carries a different meaning from beneficium. But in its specific sense of an act of generosity, the sense in which Hellegouarc'h and we are interested, the meaning of officium overlaps with that of beneficium almost completely. Indeed, Cicero himself uses the two words interchangeably in this passage. For our purposes here we can conclude that both words are used to describe patronage relationships and so are of concern to us when they appear on inscriptions or in the literature.

A third word, meritum, is equally difficult to distinguish from beneficium or officium: "il se confond fréquemment, tantôt avec l'un, tantôt avec l'autre, suivant les nécessités de l'expression." As with officium, passages can be cited in which meritum is used interchangeably with beneficium or in parallel with no clear distinction. In a single passage in his De Beneficiis Seneca uses all three words synonymously.

A benefit (beneficium) is acknowledged in the same spirit in which it is bestowed, and for that reason it ought not be bestowed carelessly; for a man thanks only himself for what he receives from a unwitting giver. Nor should it be given tardily, since, seeing that in every benefit (officium) the willingness of the giver counts for much, he who acts tardily has for a long time been unwilling. And, above all, it should not be given insultingly; for, since human nature is so constituted that injuries sink deeper than benefits (merita), and that, while the latter pass quickly from the mind, the former are kept persistently in memory, what can he expect who, while doing a favor, offers an affront? If you pardon such a man for giving a benefit (beneficium), you show enough gratitude.

What is to be made of this confusion of meaning between the three words? The above arguments are not meant to show that
officium, beneficium and meritum in their senses of "favor" never had different shades of meaning. Individual writers in specific contexts may well have intended certain differences sometimes. But nothing approaching a universal distinction can be pinpointed. Attempts to do so perhaps illustrate the futility of searching for precise literary definitions for words so closely intertwined in basic modes of social behavior. Such language should be defined operationally by an examination of the range and significance of social activities and attitudes in which it is involved. This I shall attempt to do in the second half of this chapter.

Gratia

The primary meaning of gratia, in Hellegouarc'h's view, is "éloge" or "deserved praise". It takes on a sense analogous to favor or voluntas. Gratia was often provoked by a beneficium or officium for which it constituted a kind of repayment. Indeed, the verbs with which it often appears--debere, referre, pendere, persolvere and reddere--indicate that the relationship was thought of as something like that of debtor and creditor. Gratia and officium are closely connected and sometimes confused: "la différence réside avant tout dans le fait qu'officium désigne, conformément à son sens premier, une activité commandée par certaines règles qui régissent les rapports sociaux; la gratia est d'abord une disposition de l'esprit créée par le beneficium et qui conduit à se comporter d'une certaine manière." Cicero considered gratia indispensible to amicitia: "amicitia et gratia sont deux notions très proches l'une de l'autre mais dans la deuxième s'exprime fortement au lien de dépendence. On peut donc dire que la gratia est au cliens ce que l'amicitia est à
In politics the *gratia* of friends and clients was manifested essentially by their votes. Like other words in the *grates* family, *gratia* can have an active and a passive sense. Thus, as well as expressing the active return of a favor, *gratia* can have the passive sense of the "influence" of the man who is dispensing favors and to whom return is owed.

There is little point in repeating the methodological objections raised above. In addition, the comment that *gratia* "s'exprime fortement un lien de dependence" appears to be without foundation. No ancient sources are cited to suggest that *gratia* is more appropriate to a *cliens* than to an *amicus*. A survey of Book 13 of Cicero's *Epistulae ad Familiares*, the collection of his *commendationes*, shows that *gratia* in its active sense is used frequently in *amicitia*-relationships between social equals—in this book, more frequently than in relationships of dependence. The same point can also be made for the Principate with reference to the uses of *gratia* in Pliny's letters.

Having identified and defined the basic language of patronage, we can now proceed in two directions. In the remaining chapters of the thesis the key words can be used as indicators of concrete patronage relationships. For in addition to *patronus* and *cliens*, we have shown that *amicus*, *beneficiwm*, *officium*, *meritum* and *gratia* can also be used as signs of reciprocal exchange relationships which, if the additional qualification of inequality of status is met, can be used as evidence of patronage. Further, in the process of defining the words we have in effect described the Roman ideology of reciprocal exchange (of the kind that Marcel Mauss has written about for other societies).
The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to identifying the main social roles (e.g., parent, advocate, administrator) in which this ideology played a substantial part.

**LANGUAGE AND SOCIAL ROLES**

The political changes brought by Augustus and his successors do not seem to have altered the basic lexical meanings of the key words. Hellegouarc'h implicitly attests to this when he uses Seneca as well as Cicero as evidence for the Republican meanings of the same words. Hellegouarc'h and others working on this language do seem to think, on the other hand, that the words no longer possessed any real force in the ideology of the Empire.

Moussy in his study of *gratia* came to the conclusion that:

> en effet, sous l'Empire, la disparition progressive des institutions républicaines transforme profondément les conditions de la politique, et les relations du clientèle ou amitié ne jouent plus qu'une rôle secondaire dans l'acquisition de l'autorité, de l'influence d'un homme d'État. Cette évolution fait sentir ses effets dans le domaine du vocabulaire politique, jusqu'alors peu fixé: "Avec la disparition de toute vie politique digne de ce nom, ce vocabulaire se stabilisera, il se sclérosera aussi." 64

It should be noted that in coming to this conclusion Moussy does not offer a detailed study for usages of *gratia* in the political context of the Principate. Instead he cites Hellegouarc'h who puts the point more strongly in the conclusion of his book:

>d'un vocabulaire tout rempli de la passion et de l'ambition de ceux qui l'emploient, l'on aboutit peu à peu à un jargon de bureaucrates, de fonctionnaires et de mandarins." 65

Hellegouarc'h and Moussy rightly perceive that the force of the patronal language and ideology is closely related to the administrative structures of a society. With the introduction in modern times of rational-legal bureaucracies, patronage may continue to exist covertly, but the ideal social roles of
administrators and others cease to be defined in patronal terms. Hellegouarc'h and Moussy seem to be claiming that the same sort of development occurred in the Principate, that the impact on society of the ethic implicit in words such as officium came to be overshadowed by rational administrative structures. In the remaining pages of this chapter we shall test their hypothesis by pinpointing the social roles which continued to incorporate the ethic of reciprocal exchange.

Before proceeding to the various social relationships which fall within our definition of patronage, it should be noted that reciprocity continued in the Principate to be a basic element in other types of social relations. Just as in the Republic, the language of exchange was used to conceptualize man-god, family and friendship relations.

The contractual nature of Roman religion, often remarked upon, is reflected in the use of words such as officium, beneficium and gratia, and these words continued to be used in the Principate. For instance, references to prosperity and good luck as beneficia of the gods, Fortuna or Nature are scattered evenly through the literature of the Republic and Principate. As far as can be seen, the feeling that the gods deserved gratia in return also continued with little change. At Claudius' prompting the Senate passed a senatus consultum in order that "benignitati deum gratiam referendam." We do not have the essential demographic evidence necessary to draw precise conclusions about the continuity of behavior in Roman family life. It can at least be suggested that the beneficium-gratia concept remained a part of the mores of kinship.
A new husband, having been given his wife's virginity, was said to be beneficio obligatus. Pliny used the language of exchange to explain how the less-than-praiseworthy Domitius Tullus partially redeemed himself after his death. Although he had courted legacy-hunters, in the end "pietas, fides and pudor wrote his will in which gratitude (gratia) was returned to all of his relatives in proportion to the officium of each, especially his wife." Inscriptions dedicated to kin ob merita or ob beneficia suggest that these words were commonly linked with kinship relations.

With respect to the wider group of the familia it was briefly suggested in the section above concerning beneficium that master-slave and patron-freedman relationships were to some extent in the realm of reciprocal exchange. Though passages from Roman literature were cited, it can be shown that this aspect of familia relationships continued into the Empire. Manumission, for instance, is frequently referred to as the most important beneficium a master might bestow, one which put the freedman under a heavy moral as well as legal obligation. Exchange in the reverse direction also was possible—and not only in the view of the moralizing Seneca. In several cases in the Digest the jurists write on the assumption that a slave or freedman can perform some service (beneficium or meritum) deserving reward. An inscription from Lower Germany (CIL 13.8658) records the dedication of a patrona to her freedman ob merita.

The Roman ideal of friendship between equals has already been explored in the process of defining the word amicus. We may add here that the language of reciprocity continued to be used casually in everyday communication in a way which suggests
that the reciprocity ethic remained basic in shaping the social role of the amicus. Pliny, for instance, was requested by his friend Statius Sabinus to take on a legal case on behalf of Firmum (of which Sabinus was patron). Noting that Sabinus sought his friendship for the sake of "praesidium ornamentumque", Pliny accepted the case: "for I desire to bind to myself (obstringere) both a distinguished town by officium advocationis and you by this munus which is gratissimum to you." In addition to illustrating the use of the officium-gratia language between friends, this passage suggests an element of the ideology which contributed to the extension of networks of mutual obligation: friends not only exchanged personal favors between themselves, but they also exchanged and were bound by favors for clients and other friends. Indeed, judging by the letters of Pliny and Fronto, one of the largest categories of beneficia binding aristocratic friends together were favors for clients and protégés. Further, the client, obligated by the beneficium to both his original patron and his new benefactor, was thought to be in an ideal position to draw the two patron-friends closer together. Pliny again provides an illustration. He apparently recommended an equestrian friend Pompeius Saturninus to another friend Priscus (which Priscus is uncertain). We have three letters concerning the relationship written sometime after the initial introduction. In the first two (7.7-8) Pliny relays expressions of gratitude and affection from Priscus to Saturninus and then back again. In the third letter (7.15) to Saturninus Pliny indicates that Saturninus has been staying with Priscus and enjoying his companionship: "I had known of his (Priscus') frankness and his charming companionship, but I am experiencing now what I was less aware of, that
he is gratissimus, since you write that he has such happy memories of my services (nostra officia)." Saturninus seems here to have strengthened the bond of friendship between his patrons by providing a personal channel of communication for expressions of mutual respect and gratitude.

One final indication of the strength of the reciprocity ethic in the social role of the amicus in the Principate is the use of buried treasure and investment metaphors with respect to beneficia bestowed on friends. Because friends were so strongly obliged to return favors, all beneficia distributed were felt to be insurance against misfortune since in time of need they could be called in. As Seneca says, a beneficium should be stored away like a buried treasure (thensaurs), "which you would not dig up, except from necessity." The recipient, on the other hand, should be content to guard the beneficium until a time of need. He should not contrive a situation to make the return, but should wait: "if the benefactor prefers that the favor should remain in our custody, why do we dig up the treasure (thensaurs)." To other investments (houses, ships, cattle, slaves) about which people are careless, Columella adds beneficia bestowed on friends: "for many destroy by fickleness the beneficium which they had conferred on friends."78

The above evidence seems to me to demonstrate that the language of reciprocity did not become "un jargon de bureaucrates, de fontionnaires et de mandarins" in the Principate, at least not in the Romans' private lives. They continued to use words such as beneficium and gratia to conceptualize social roles involved in man-god, familial and friendship relations. Can the same be said for the social roles in public life? Hellegouarc'h and
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Moussy clearly think not. But to uphold their position it would have to be demonstrated that a dichotomy developed in the language and thinking about *familia* and friends on the one hand and public roles on the other. Even before examining the Roman evidence, comparative material from the Mediterranean suggests that such a dichotomy is unlikely, that a strong reciprocity ethic between family and friends is usually reflected in the expectations of men involved in public life.

There were great obstacles to the development of such a dichotomy, most importantly, the lack of specialized and professional roles for aristocratic administrators. The consequences of this will be further explored in a later chapter. For our purposes here it is important to note that in the Principate, as in the Republic, the aristocratic social roles straddled the public and private sectors, making it impossible to prevent the reciprocity ethic of private life from coming into the role of the official.

The patron-protégé and advocate-client relationships illustrate the point: each has a public and a private aspect which are inextricably linked and which the Romans never tried to separate. The best source for what the Romans thought a patron-protégé relationship should be is Pliny's idealistic description of his friendship with his patron, Q. Corellius Rufus. Clusinius Gallus wrote to Pliny reminding him of his duty to defend the daughter of the dead Corellius in court. In his reply Pliny described his relationship with Corellius which was so intimate that Pliny could never doubt that defense of his daughter was his duty.

I came to love him through admiration, and, contrary to the general rule, when I knew him intimately I admired him even more. For I did know him intimately; he kept nothing hidden from me, whether grave or gay, joy or sorrow. I was
only a young man at the time, and yet he showed me the regard and, I venture to say, the respect he would have shown an equal. When I sought office he gave me his support as sponsor (suffragator), I was introduced and attended by him when I entered upon my duties, and had him for guide and counsellor while I discharged them.... Moreover, when he was dying he told his daughter (it is she who tells the story) that he had made many friends for her in the course of a long life, but none like Pliny and Cornutus Tertullus.

Most of the essential aspects of the patron-protégé exchange relationship are represented in this passage. The patron was intended to serve as a general mentor. He helped his protégé’s career financially if necessary and politically in his capacity as suffragator (i.e., "one who recommends for office"). Once the protégé reached office, the patron accompanied and advised him in his duties. For his part the younger man was expected to praise his patron and so build his reputation; he also provided companionship for the older man in later life. The protégé was supposed to follow the political advice of his elder while in the senate and in office and thus allowed the patron to continue to exercise political influence after his own cursus was completed. Finally, it was the protégé’s duty to protect his friend's family and reputation after his death. It is this last responsibility which Pliny says that he is about to undertake by his defense of Corellia.

Though not in this passage, in various other letters of Pliny all of these duties are described in terms of beneficia, officia and gratia. Clearly, the relationship is being conceptualized in terms of exchange with a reciprocity ethic. This is especially noticeable in a particular subtype of this relationship, that between literary patron and protégé. For example, attendance at recitations of each other's compositions
was a (wearisome) *beneficium* which had to be returned. The generous Pliny, after listening to the works of others, declined to have a formal reading of his own "lest it seem that I was not a listener but a creditor of those whose recitations I attended. For, as in other things, so in the duty of listening (*audendi officium*) the gratitude (*gratia*) is lost if return is demanded."  

Side by side with this private aspect of the exchange is the public aspect: literary patrons attended to the welfare of their less wealthy protégés by using their influence to secure salaried posts in the imperial administration for them. Pliny showed this kind of concern for Suetonius and praised Titinius Capito for promoting the careers of young authors. Here the duties of a benefactor of the arts and those of a recruiter of public administrators are merged into a single social role, that of the literary patron, which is ideally described in terms of a reciprocity ethic.

The second major example of a social role which straddled the public and private sectors is that of the advocate. In the Principate as in the Republic the advocate was called *patronus* and his services continued to be described by *beneficium*, *officium* and *meritum*. Indeed, since, as Quintilian points out, it was not honorable for an aristocratic advocate to set a fee for his services, he depended on the custom of reciprocity from his client-friends.

The orator will not seek to make more money than is sufficient for his needs, and even if he is poor, he will not regard his payment as a fee, but rather as the expression of the principle that one good turn deserves another (*mutua benevolentia*), since he will be well aware that he has conferred far more than he receives. For it does not follow that because his services (*beneficium*) ought not to be sold, they should therefore be unrecompensed. Finally, gratitude (*gratus*) is primarily the business of the debtor.
pliny uses the language of *gratia* with respect to the return for his legal services and indicates that such services were part of the duty of an *amicus*.\(^87\) The entire argument for taking up oratory in Tacitus' *Dialogus* is based on a view of the advocate as patron-friend. In contrast to poetry, effective oratory in court attracts to the advocate *amici* and *clientes* whom he puts in his debt with his *beneficium*.\(^88\) The debt could be repayed in a variety of ways: it might take a financial form (e.g., legacies from wealthy and especially childless clients) or it could be in the shape of political support (so Eprius Marcellus and Vibius Marcellus possessed formidable followings in the senate). The repayment from more humble clients might simply consist of public deference demonstrated by joining the patron's following in public places (*togatorum comitatus*).\(^89\) Concrete instances of the advocate as patron will be taken up in another chapter, but enough evidence has been presented here to warn against overestimating the degree of differentiation of aristocratic social roles in the Principate. Pliny thought of his legal services as one element in the stock of *beneficia* available for exchange with his friends, a stock in which *beneficia* of a public and private nature were not distinguished.\(^90\)

To sum up the argument so far, there is no evidence that the importance of the reciprocity ethic as described by the language of *beneficium* and *gratia* diminished in private relationships in the Principate. Furthermore, we would expect this ethic to be reflected in public life, since aristocratic social roles never became sufficiently differentiated in the Empire to permit a dichotomy to develop between private and public morality (comparable to the dichotomy between the affection expected of parents and
and the impartiality expected of public officials today90a).
So as we come finally to the roles and expectations of officials in the Roman world, we should be suspicious of any view which suggests that when officials used beneficium or gratia they meant something different from private individuals, something banal and without any implication of reciprocity.

In nearly all societies officials may sometimes deliver favors to family and friends. What sets Rome and other premodern societies apart from modern bureaucracies is that according to the ideology in Roman society public figures--from municipal administrators to the emperors--were supposed to use their positions to bestow beneficium of friends. This is evident in the longest essay of practical advice to a public official which has come down to us, Plutarch's Praecepta Gerendae Reipublicae. The essay, written for an aspiring young municipal statesman Menemachus, contains a section about the proper use and treatment of friends while in office. When the statesman enters office he should not try to detach himself from his friends, but should call on them to help with public business, utilizing the particular talent of each. In return, the statesman should help his friends acquire honors and wealth. The former can be done by giving the friends a share of the credit for popular acts or by sending them on embassies.91 "There are in public life ways which are not dishonorable of helping friends who need money to acquire it.... Hand over to one friend a case at law which will bring a good fee as advocate in a just cause, to another introduce a rich man who needs legal oversight and protection, and help another to get some profitable contract or lease."92 So what would look like graft to the modern eye is openly recommended to the young
Menemachus as part of the ideal role of the statesman. One other passage may be cited to reaffirm the point made above concerning lack of differentiation of roles: in addition to his public duties, Plutarch advises the good statesman "to show himself a kindly counsellor, an advocate who accepts no fee, and a kind-hearted conciliator when husbands are at variance with their wives or friends with one another." 93

Though Plutarch was writing with a municipal statesman in mind, the same ideals can be documented for officials of the imperial aristocracy. As will be suggested in more detail in another chapter, the governor's role was conceived of partially in paternalistic terms. Like a father, a proconsul was praised for his indulgence toward his subjects, tempering their desires and restraining them with gentle remedies. 94 Most people thought of and appreciated the governor in his capacity as benefactor. Apuleius sets himself apart from the masses in this respect in a speech before the governor of Africa Proconsularis, Servianus:

Philosophy has taught me to love not only beneficium but also to deny maleficium and to attach greater importance to justice than to private interests and to prefer what benefits the community rather than myself. Therefore, while most esteem the profit which they can derive from your bonitas, I esteem your studium. I have come to this position as I watch your moderation in the affairs of provincials, by which you have acted so that those in contact with you should love you on account of beneficium and those not coming into contact ought also to love you on account of your example. For you have favored many with beneficium and have benefitted all by your example. 95

Apuleius disclaims any motivation of self-interest behind his esteem for the governor, but it is not because personal profiteering by the governor's friends is improper (so long as it is kept within certain limitations). On the contrary, Apuleius praises Servianus for his generosity, adding that the generosity is not
the only reason for his esteem. This view of the governor's role was held not only by the provincials who stood to benefit, but even by the emperor. Marcus Aurelius addressed a commendatio to Fronto just before his intended departure for Asia. The letter was written on behalf of a friend of Marcus' philosophy teacher and requested Fronto to extend to him more than just the justice due to all the subjects of Asia, to extend consilium, comitatem and all the things due to friends "which fides and religio permit a proconsul to bestow without injury to anyone else." For their part, provincials were legally entitled to show their gratitude in moderation by gifts (xenia) to the governor (the moderation to be determined by the governor). A description of the variety of concrete beneficia available to provincial officials and provincials is left to the last two chapters. The conclusion to be drawn here is that it would be wrong always to interpret the beneficia as evidence of bribery, graft or injustice. The inscriptions set up in public advertising the governor's patronage make it clear that within certain limitations, provincial officials were expected to play a patronal role.

At the center of the imperial administrative apparatus stood the emperor. The patronal aspect of his role has long been recognized. In the late 1930's Fremerstein and Syme published their classic works stressing the importance of clientele relationships in the maintenance of the emperor's position. The consequences of the emperor playing a patronal role rather one of an impartial administrator have been worked out over the past decades, and last year Fergus Millar published his Emperor in the Roman World in which he documents with massive detail the emperor's personal distribution of beneficia. In his introduction
Millar summarized his view of the emperor's role.

Society demanded from the emperor military protection, and if possible resounding victories over foreign enemies. But when he had leisure from that, it demanded not a programme of change but a willingness to listen; a willingness to respond to demands, to grant gifts and privileges, to give justice, to issue legal rulings. In short, from the very beginning of the empire, there was a demand that the emperor should behave as a basileus who heard the petitions of his subjects and answered them with verbal or written pronouncements which were themselves effective and legal acts... This whole conception of course ran directly counter to that of the emperor as office-holder dependent on the senate and people of Rome... the emergence of the monarchy to some extent transformed those very republican institutions themselves into instruments of patronage: so the 'public horse', membership of the jury-panels, entry to the senate or appointment to a wide range of senatorial offices became things to be petitioned for, and to be granted as a favor by the emperor; while, besides these ranks and posts, there evolved the whole pattern of equestrian office-holding which was from the beginning entirely dependent on imperial patronage... 100

Now it seems to me that the crucial characteristic which gives the emperor his patronal character is that he was expected to distribute beneficia in accordance with particularistic rather than universalistic criteria. 101 That is, the distribution depended upon individual approaches to and relationships with the emperor, who was supposed to be generous to family, friends and those who could personally approach him. In his Third Discourse on Kingship Dio of Prusa speaks of the great pleasure which a king should derive from rewarding his kin and friends out of his great resources of beneficia. Further, the emperor should use these beneficia to bind as friends those men in the state who are talented and have ambitions to be administrators and generals. For "who is more able to appoint governors? Who needs more executives? Who has it in his power to give a part in greater enterprises? Who is in a better position to put a man in charge of military operations? Who can confer..."
more illustrious honors? Whose table lends greater distinction? And if friendship could be bought, who has greater means to forestall every possible rival?"102

Very recently a challenge to the view of Premerstein and more recent scholars such as Béranger and Kloft has been raised by Paul Veyne. It is of particular interest to us at this point because part of Veyne's argument revolves around the understanding of the word beneficium. His essential premise is that "to imagine that an immense State, where the relations between sovereign and subject are anonymous and of obedience, was similar to a band of faithfults is, to speak frankly, to lose sight of historical realities..."103 With regard to beneficium, he rightly suggests that different meanings should be distinguished:

(1) the mechanical application of a rule to an individual case, as when a veteran is given certain rights on his discharge from the army; (2) the individualization of the letter of the law in the name of justice and equity; (3) "an unjustifiable favor, a royal caprice which one embellishes with the label 'grace'...

Practically, the word is used most especially of the most banal administrative decisions, because they are the most frequent: concession of the right of citizenship, admission to the equestrian order, authorization given to a private individual to draw water from an aqueduct."104 In these kinds of cases the phrase beneficio imperatoris means simply "in virtue of a decision of the emperor."

"En somme, la notion de bienfait découle d'une pensée essentialiste. Les bienfaits ne se reconnaissent pas à leur propre nature de grâce royale ou bien de privilège, mais à la personne de celui qui les accorde: étant bon par essence, le prince ne fait que
du bien." 105

Veyne provides a salutary warning here: beneficium cannot be assumed to have the same meaning in every context and there are certainly instances where beneficium is a banal word of administration. 106 But certain problems with Veyne's analysis seem to me to cast doubt on the weight of his objections to Premmerstein (and implicitly to Millar). One possible objection is that Veyne's three categories of meanings for beneficium are not exhaustive. Part of his argument hinges on the claim that very few uses of beneficium fall into the third category of royal caprice and that the first two categories are consistent with the emperor's role as rational administrator. But clearly there is a fourth possibility which falls between the second and third categories--i.e., decisions or favors which are entirely at the emperor's discretion, not being an extension of existing laws on the basis of equity and not being in violation of the law. For instance, appointment to a proconsulship was a gift given at the discretion of the emperor--given not on the basis of firm administrative guidelines, but given to friends or friends of friends (or, to take a more specific instance, to cherished tutors of the emperor). 107 Most of the instances of beneficium principis listed in the Thesaurus Linguae Latinae fall into this category characterized by the emperor's discretion.

Indeed, it is precisely the lack of administrative guidelines and the wide scope for personal discretion which Max Weber cites as one characteristic of patrimonial bureaucracies. In a modern rational-legal bureaucracy management is guided by general rules, relatively stable and exhaustive, which produce abstract
regulation; "this stands in extreme contrast to the regulation of all relationships through individual privileges and bestowals of favor, which is absolutely dominant in patrimonialism..."\textsuperscript{106} While it cannot be claimed that there were no regular administrative mechanisms in the Principate, it is the great merit of Millar's book to have shown in detail the great range of goods, statuses and honors at the disposal of the emperor for \textit{ad hominem} or \textit{ad civitatem} grants.

Millar's careful study stands in marked contrast to Veyne's assertion which, with few citations from ancient sources, seems to be based on his conception of "realités historiques". Veyne, for example, singles out citizenship grants, admission to the equestrian order and permission to tap aqueducts as banal administrative decisions labelled \textit{beneficia}. But then he fails to examine in detail the evidence available for these grants: no specific cases are cited to illustrate the banality, nor is any evidence adduced to show that the emperor was firmly guided by any administrative rules of universal application. The evidence which we have concerning extension of citizenship and water supplies suggests that the grants were not mechanical decisions.

Full discussion of these two kinds of \textit{beneficia} can be left to later chapters. It is enough to show here that the word \textit{beneficium} continued to contain an element of reciprocity in imperial grants, even the most common sort of grants such as citizenship and water rights. Pliny sent three letters to Trajan requesting citizenship for one Arpocras. In the opening lines of the first, he described his motivation: "when I was seriously ill
last year, and in some danger of my life, I called in a medical
therapist whose care and attentiveness I can only reward tuae
indulgentiae beneficio. I pray you therefore to grant him
Roman citizenship." (X.5) Trajan granted citizenship to Arpocras,
but since he was an Egyptian and since (as Pliny was unaware)
Egyptians had to have Alexandrian citizenship to be eligible for
Roman citizenship, a second beneficium had to be requested in
another letter. Pliny explicitly indicates his gratitude (gratia)
in this letter and notes that the extra beneficium would further
obligate (obligarer) him to Trajan (X.6). The emperor in his
response says that he did not intend to grant Alexandrian citizen-
ship indiscriminately, but that in this case he could not refuse
(X.7). Beneficium here is clearly used in the sense of a favor
in a reciprocal exchange relationship. Arpocras received citizen-
ship not because he met any universal qualification, but because
he had provided a service for a Roman aristocrat who was a personal
friend of the emperor. For his part, Pliny uses the language
of gratia and there is no reason to doubt that his loyalty to
Trajan was strengthened by Trajan's generosity on various occasions.

With regard to the privilege of tapping the aqueducts, Veyne
notes the relevant passages in Frontinus about requests to the
emperor and assumes that they were routine administrative matters.
But he fails to cite the only evidence available about the form
of the requests. The form is not an impersonal application in
which an applicant tries to demonstrate that he meets certain
prerequisites; rather it is a poem from Martial of the kind which
he addressed to Domitian requesting other gifts such as money. 109
The poet Statius also sought this munus from Domitian and after
receiving it acknowledged his gratitude.\textsuperscript{110}

Veyne's position seems in the final analysis to rest upon the anachronistic assumption that the emperors could not possibly have distributed such mundane rights to such large numbers of people as personal favors.\textsuperscript{111} But as we shall see in the next chapter, Millar has demonstrated that this is in fact what happened. What is important to note here is that, like Pliny, the ordinary beneficiaries of imperial grants seem to have treated them as matters of the emperor's personal discretion, deserving demonstrations of gratitude in return. On any other assumption it is difficult to explain why people erected the numerous and expensive inscriptions in the provinces which thanked the emperor for various beneficia.\textsuperscript{112} For, as Boissevain points out with respect to Malta, as the role of the official changes from patron to impersonal administrator guided by regulations, the attitude of the citizens towards administrative decisions changes from obsequious gratitude for the official's exercise of his discretionary powers to demands for what is felt to belong to the citizens by right.\textsuperscript{113} The inscriptions leave little doubt that no such change took place in the subjects' view of their emperor.

It seems to me, then, that the anecdote about Titus' generosity recorded by Suetonius ought to be taken seriously. Titus initiated the policy of ratifying all beneficia granted by preceding emperors en bloc.

Moreover, in the case of other requests made of him, it was his fixed rule not to let anyone go away without hope. Even when his household officials warned him that he was promising more than he could perform, he said that it was not right for anyone to go away sorrowful from an interview with his emperor. On another occasion, remembering at dinner that he had done nothing for anybody all that day, he gave utterance to that memorable and praiseworthy remark: "Friends I have lost a day."\textsuperscript{114}
Now it is doubtful whether Titus in fact uttered these precise words, but the passage is to be taken seriously as evidence of the patronal element in the social role of the emperor.

By way of conclusion, a few remarks about the significance and function of the patronal ideology are appropriate. That it did influence behavior will be illustrated in the rest of the thesis by concrete examples. The existence of this type of ideology instead of a universalist ideology meant that Roman officials were not restrained by concepts of the impropriety of all favoritism; they were relatively free to indulge in the natural human propensity to use their official position to aid family and friends.115

Behavior, however, is rarely a simple reflection of the reigning ideology. Sydel Silverman has recently suggested that three distinctions of behavior and thought ought to be made in analyses of patronage.116 First, there is the ideology of patronage—i.e., the ideals of how patrons and clients are supposed to act. But, as Silverman points out, clients are aware that patrons do not live up to the ideal, and so the second distinction to be made is what the patrons and clients thought their relationships were really like. Silverman's fieldwork suggests that even this does not provide an accurate assessment of what was happening and so a third distinction must be added: the observer's description of the actual flow of goods and services between patron and client. Silverman further suggests that one of the most interesting questions growing out of these distinctions is how these three levels influenced each other—for example, what is the function of the ideology in relation to behavior. This last question is
as difficult as it is interesting. Indeed, I would suggest that it is impossible to answer with the ancient evidence alone: we do not possess a single patron-client relationship from the principate for which a complete balance-sheet of the exchange of goods and services can be drawn up. The best that can be offered is an outline of two possible answers suggested by modern studies.

The first stands in the tradition of anthropological functionalism. It suggests that in societies with great differences of wealth and prestige patron-client bonds, cemented in accordance with the reciprocity ethic, provide cohesion between different class and status groups. In the context of a patronal ideology the weak attempt to turn their encounters with the strong into a moral patron-client relationship so that they may lay some claim to the protection and favors of the strong. In return, the clients lend prestige to their patrons by their deference and perhaps also provide labor from time to time—both being commodities which they possess in ample supply. In short, the weak have an interest in propagating the patronal ideology which they then manipulate as an instrument of survival.

Recent articles have been written criticizing the functionalist ideas from a second standpoint, that of the Marxists. In their view, the patronal ideology and the concept of social cohesion have served to distract attention from the basic class structure. Despite patron-client relations cutting across class divisions, in the final analysis the patrons stand together to protect their class interests. M. Gilsenan suggests that "the cross-cutting comes in the realm of the local model and ideology which does indeed speak of the face-to-face, individual relations, and which is significant in the class and status consciousness of both rulers
and dependents. It also comes into the sociologists' model of consensus to which the notion of a patronage glue is fundamental."

In other words, the patronal ideology represents a false consciousness for the client and helps the patron maintain his superiority. Gilsenan's view receives some support from Silverman's observations in Italy: although clients are aware that patrons do not meet the ideal, they still overestimate the goods and services which the patrons distribute. Perhaps the ideology does encourage an overly optimistic view on the part of the clients, helping the patron to maintain his position at a minimal cost.

It seems to me that it is not necessary to choose between the functionalist and the Marxist views. From different perspectives both ask the same question and come up with much the same answer. The question is what provides stability in societies with enormous centrifugal pressures (including unequal distribution of goods and services amongst various classes) pulling them apart? The answer for both is patronage and the patronal ideology. The Marxists, assuming the injustice and instability of the structure, view the ideology as a means of hiding from the weak their own true interests. The functionalists, on the other hand, do not assume that the clients, deluded as to their interests, would benefit from instability, and so view the ideology as one part of the client's strategy for survival.

Neither assumption can be adequately tested for the Roman empire. Nor can a brief, general assertion be made about the indispensability of the patronal ideology to the stability of the empire. But we should keep the question about the function of
the ideology in mind and throughout the remainder of the thesis attempt to identify the many specific social locations (e.g., between the emperor and leading senators) where patronage did provide some cohesion.
The principes of the late Republic were, first and foremost, great patrons—patrons of armies, of the urban masses, of foreign kings and provincial cities, and of senators and equites. After Octavian eliminated his rivals, the princeps' role continued to be defined in terms of a patronal ideology. In the previous chapter arguments were adduced to suggest that this ideology was not an anachronistic survival from the Republic and that the patronal language was not sterile jargon. In this chapter the patronal aspects of the emperor's position will be explored in greater detail in order to elucidate the reality which lay behind the ideology. First, a list of the beneficia at the emperor's disposal can be drawn up. This should help to define the range of imperial activities in which patronage was a factor. Next, the core of the chapter will concern the questions: who was able to secure the beneficia and in what contexts? Then we shall consider how the recipients fulfilled their reciprocal obligations. Finally, attention will be turned to the broad implications and significance of these exchange relationships.¹

Imperial Beneficia

The word beneficium occurs frequently in Pliny's Panegyricus; underlying it was an important theme in the aristocrats' ideology of the good emperor.² The ideology clearly made an impression on
the minds of the emperors themselves. Though the Suetonian anecdote about Titus may not be accepted as historically accurate, we possess documentary evidence of the imperial viewpoint. In an edict preserved in a letter of Pliny Nerva wrote that he had abandoned his quies and assumed responsibility for the empire "in order that I might confer new beneficia and preserve those already granted by my predecessors." In the Panegyricus Pliny uses the word beneficio with reference to consulates, an emergency grain shipment to Egypt, the establishment of courts more sympathetic to the people, citizenship grants, and an extension of immunity from the inheritance tax. In other sources of the period we find beneficium used to describe the grant of senatorial magisteries and governorships, equestrian procuratorships and militiae, priesthoods, and staff positions in the imperial household. Citizenship was one of the several legal statuses granted as favors; freedman status, the ius anulorum, and the ius ingenuitatis were also called beneficia. A wide variety of gifts, privileges and immunities are labelled beneficia, including the right to tap an aqueduct, monetary gifts, the ius trium liberorum, private use of the cursus publicus, and permission to return from exile.

The foregoing list of beneficia is by no means comprehensive, but it gives a preliminary indication of the scope of imperial favors. We cannot be satisfied, however, with a mere list derived from a word study of beneficio, because (as Veyne points out) "beneficio imperatoris" can mean "an administrative decision of the emperor" as well as "a personal favor of the emperor". It is necessary to search through the sources to discover what the emperors distributed and to scrutinize the contexts of the grants.
to show that they were personal favors.

Most prominent in the emperor's storehouse of beneficia were senatorial and equestrian offices. Appointments to the pre-quaestorial posts in the senatorial cursus (legionary tribunates and the posts of the vigintivirate) seem to have been made exclusively by the emperor. Very little evidence is available to indicate what criteria the emperors may have applied when granting them. Patronage was undoubtedly a factor: Didius Julianus received his appointment through the suffragium of Domitia Lucilla who reared him. In the absence of elections or formal institutions for bringing candidates to the attention of the emperor, such suffragatorès with access to the emperor would normally have been indispensable at this stage of the career.

The traditional Republican senatorial magistracies continued to be filled and continued to represent sought-after honors throughout the Principate. Though the emperor's role in the selection was less straightforward than the direct appointments to the pre-quaestorial posts, at least it is also better documented. From the beginning of Tiberius' reign magistrates were elected by the senate. The emperor could play a more or less dominating part: for quaestorships, tribunates, aedileships and praetorships he accepted or rejected candidatures. In addition, he could commend as many candidates (candidati Caesaris) as he liked, thus ensuring their election. At some point before the end of the first century consulates came to be exclusively at the disposal of the emperor: Pliny indicates that after holding the praetorship a senator no longer required help with canvassing among senators for magistracies. Precisely when and how the consulate became differentiated from the lower magistracies in this respect are matters
of dispute. In any case, the emperor's auctoritas even in the early reigns was sufficient to ensure the election of those given his support. 16

Amicitia Caesaris was assumed to carry with it honores et auctoritas. 17 Numerous examples from throughout the Principate show that the assumption was soundly based. In Tacitus' view, it was by amicitia principum that Poppaeus Sabinus (cos. 9 A.D.) moved through all of the senatorial magistracies and held governorships of great provinces. 18 Tiberius' favor ensured that Curtius Rufus would obtain a praetorship despite his low birth and competition from patrician candidates. 19 More than a century later the importance for new men of the emperor's personal favoritism remained unaltered. In the Historia Augusta Marcus Aurelius' enthusiasm for education is demonstrated by the public offices and money which he bestowed on his teachers and fellow students. For instance, Eutychius Proculus, his grammaticus Latinus, Marcus promoted through a senatorial career to a proconsulship. 20 The tastes of Marcus' successors were not so intellectual. Until his death Geta quarrelled with Caracalla over whose friends should be given offices. 21 The contemporary observer, Dio, tells of favors showered on Macedonians by the new Alexander, Caracalla: a military tribune Antigonus, son of Philip, was promoted inter praetorios on account of his Macedonian origin. 22

Senatorial magistracies at all levels could be secured not only through direct, personal friendship with the emperor, but also through the patronage (or bribery) of those among the emperor's amici and entourage possessing gratia. Pliny secured the emperor's support for Eruclus Clarus in his candidature for the quaestorship. 23 In another letter Pliny is found requesting from Irajan a praetorship
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for his friend Attius Sura; the success of the petition is not known. For explicit testimony concerning consulates we can turn to Dio's report that Iulius Ursus was protected from Domitian's anger and received a consulship through the favor of the emperor's niece Julia. Among those most famed for the sale of offices we should include Messallina, Vespasian's mistress Caenis and Cleander.

In addition to the traditional Republican magistracies and promagistracies, a number of new civilian and military posts were established in the Principate and available to senators only through imperial appointment. Some of these, especially provincial posts, could be profitable and so were valuable beneficia to be sought through patronage. The example of Poppaeus Sabinus, governor for twenty-four years owing to his amicitia principum, has been noted. The distribution of military posts through patronage can be documented for later periods as well. Vespasian was said to have received his legionary legateship Narcissi gratia and more than a century later the influence of Aemilius Laetus, Commodus' praetorian prefect, secured a Danubian command for Septimius Severus (despite only limited military experience). With respect to civilian posts Epictetus assumes that appointments depended on patronage: in a discussion with a Roman senator Maximus about to take up the office of curator of the free cities of Greece, the philosopher asks whose hand the senator had to kiss, before whose bedroom door he had to sleep, and to whom he sent gifts in order to win the office.

Finally, we may note that emperors also distributed senatorial ornamenta and priesthoods as beneficia. Marcus Aurelius took advantage of his imperial position to honor omnes propinqui with the ornamenta of various offices—a praiseworthy display of
A letter of Pliny to Trajan supplies an excellent example of how the emperor distributed prebendaryes: "since I know, Sir, that to be adorned with an honor by the decision of a good emperor is a sign of praise of my character, I request that you add to the dignitas to which you have promoted me by deeming me worthy to be an augur or a septemvir..." The priesthood represents an honor to Pliny in part because it was an indication of the emperor's personal favor.

To summarize, all senatorial magistracies, offices and honors were at the disposal of the emperor. We possess examples which show that all were used—either directly by the emperor or indirectly by those close to him—as beneficia in patronal exchange relationships. Unfortunately, these scattered examples cannot by themselves reveal whether patronage was a normal or an exceptional factor in distribution. Several further considerations suggest that patronage was in fact unexceptional and taken for granted. First, the exercise of gratia draws remarks about its impropriety only when it is used either on behalf of or by someone of unsuitably low station in life. Thus Tacitus clearly disapproves of the suffragium of Tiberius on behalf of Curtius Rufus at the expense of patrician candidates. More intense discontent was expressed by various aristocratic authors at the humiliations suffered by senators who had to seek the gratia of imperial women, freedmen and slaves in order to advance their careers. But no hint of discontent survives concerning Marcus' favoritism toward his kin and teachers (with the exception of the philosophers). On the contrary, he was praised for his generosity, in part because he bestowed honores only on friends of suitable station, while those of lower birth were rewarded with money.
Not only was patronage in the right circumstances proper, it was also assumed to be the usual method by which new men in particular secured advancement in a senatorial career. Epictetus sneered at those who sought senior magistracies on the grounds that achieving them required influence won at the expense of kissing the hands of imperial slaves. Epictetus' view of life at the imperial court was certainly something of a caricature, but the assumed need for patronage is confirmed elsewhere. Extended descriptions of the rise of new senatorial families over several generations are usually found only in imperial biographies. When such evidence is available, the role of patronage is apparent.

Of the four contenders for the throne in 69, three were from families which had entered the senate in the imperial period. For all three Suetonius indicates the patronage which helped them along the way. It would surely not be too rash to suggest that if we possessed similar accounts of the rise of all new families, patronal influence would be a factor in nearly all of them.

One last consideration arises from Pliny's letters. For Pliny requests of senatorial offices and honors seem to have been an ordinary part of senatorial life. Pliny was not a special favorite of Trajan and yet his letters requesting a priesthood for himself and a praetorship for a friend show no hint of embarrassment or shyness which might point to their being unusual or improper. Indeed, in the letter concerning the praetorship Pliny reminds Trajan that he has had to make the same request previously: "I know, Sir, that our requests do not escape your memory which is most anxious to confer benefits. Since you have granted me such requests before, I remind you and ask again urgently that you honor Attius Sura with a praetorship..." The tone of the
letter suggests that such requests for imperial indulgentia were sufficiently commonplace to arouse Pliny's expectation that they would be acted upon. The passage also serves as a reminder that the emperor's supply of senatorial and equestrian appointments was very limited. It was in the emperor's interest not to be forced to create ill-will by refusals, but how the number of requests were in practice restricted is a question which cannot be answered with confidence.

One of the most characteristic developments in the Early Empire was the growth of an equestrian administration. Throughout the period an increasing number of posts became available to equites solely by imperial appointment. It can be shown that these offices at all levels and in all periods could be treated as imperial beneficia and distributed through patronage.

Most equestrians pursuing careers began them by serving in one or more equestrian militiae. (At no point did the series of three militiae—praefectus cohortis, tribunus militum and praefectus alae—become so regularized that the majority of those serving went through three.) Some of these appointments were left, at least de facto, to the senatorial commanders in the provinces; other militiae were filled by the emperor. Pliny wrote to Irajan on behalf of Nymphidius Lupus, the son of his friend and assessor of the same name. Pliny says that he counts his assessor's relatives as his own and requests a second militia for the younger Lupus as a personal favor. The use of equestrian military posts as beneficia is even clearer in the case of Martialis: among the marks of favor which the poet boasts of having received from the emperor is an equestrian tribunate. Several later examples have also survived and others may be surmised from careful study.
of the epigraphic evidence. After serving as officers some equites sought procuratorships while others entered procuratorial careers from non-military backgrounds. At this level all appointments seem to have been made directly by the emperor. In his Maecenas speech Dio recommends that such appointments be distributed as profitable rewards for άρετή. The significance of άρετή will be considered in the next chapter; here we should take note of the numerous examples which show that procuratorships were treated as patronal favors.

A procuratorial career could bring with it riches, but even the title alone was an honor worth pursuing through a patron. Fronto in a petition addressed to Pius indicates that the emperor had already bestowed two procuratorships upon the orator's friend, Sextus Calpurnius, who declined them with his dignitas enhanced by the offer. Fronto in Ad Plinum 9 requests for a third time the same beneficium to increase Appian's dignitas, promising that Appian would show similar modestia and withdraw. Pius' initial refusals point once again to a scarcity and competition for offices, though in this case Fronto gives us an idea about how the number of requests was restrained. Pius apparently excluded Greek advocates from consideration for these appointments as a matter of policy in order to avoid a flood of petitions from such men.

Iulius Paelignus benefitted from his office in a more tangible way than an increase in dignitas: he was rewarded for his companionship with Claudius who appointed him procurator of Cappadocia. Similarly, a century later the personal favor of the emperor enabled Nicomedes, libertinus and educator of Lucius Verus, to pursue a remarkably successful equestrian career despite his servile origin: he was promoted rapidly through the sexagenariate and
centenariate levels to the important ducenariate post of procurator summary rationum. 45 Owing to the biographical data preserved by philostratus, we know of several Greek sophists who were rewarded with procuratorships: Dionysius of Miletus secured several beneficia from Hadrian including a procuratorship of an unnamed province, and later Caracalla conceived a liking for Heliodorus upon whom he bestowed the ducenariate post of fisci advocatus in Rome. 46

As with senatorial magistracies, one need not have been a personal client of the emperor to enjoy his favor in the form of procuratorships. Gessius Florus is said to have been made procurator of Judaea by Nero as a result of the friendship which Florus' wife enjoyed with Poppaea Sabina. 47 Inscriptions supply several additional explicit cases of patronage and numerous other instances where patronage can be inferred. We possess three third century dedications to patrons by whose suffragia three procurators secured sexagenariate and centenariate appointments. 48 The career of Sextus Attius Suburanus Aemilianus is one where patronal influence can be plausibly inferred. Suburanus began his career as a praefectus fabrum: Pflaum suggests that he may have made a useful senatorial friend in this office. However that may be, after serving as praefectus alae he became an adiutor for Vibius Crispus in Hispania Citerior and then of Iulius Ursus in Rome and Egypt. Both of these men are known to have been prominent during the Flavian era, and their influence was likely to have aided Suburanus' procuratorial career, as Syme and Pflaum suggest. 49 More vaguely, Seneca ascribed the worldly success of his procuratorial friend Lucilius to "vigor ingenii, scriptorum elegantia, clarae et nobles amicitiae." 50

We began the discussion of procuratorships with Dio's
suggestion that the emperor use these offices as rewards. We can conclude with a remark from Plutarch which reveals the assumption of those seeking procuratorships about how they were distributed. In his *Praecepta rei publicae gerendae* Plutarch says that most provincials used whatever influence they could muster in Rome to secure governorships and procuratorships. Influential amicitiae must have been a normal ingredient in the rise of equestrian families, just as in that of their senatorial counterparts.

During the later first century and early second the Palatine *officia* were increasingly filled by the emperor with equestrians, often those who had held procuratorships. Philostratus provides evidence that the *ab epistulis Graecis* position was sometimes treated as an honor to be bestowed upon favorite Greek sophists. The clearest case is that of Hadrian of Tyre who was honored with the post of *ab epistulis* on his deathbed by Commodus.

At the top of the equestrian career hierarchy were the four great prefectures: of the *vigiles*, of the * annonae*, of Egypt, and the Praetorian Guard. In Tacitus' narrative of the Julio-Claudian era these appointments were subject to patronal influences: Sejanus' rise began with his friendship with Gaius Caesar and then reached its peak in the praetorian prefecture won through the favor of Tiberius; in Nero's reign Faenius Rufus was appointed *praefectus annonae*, C. Balbillus *praefectus Aegypti* and Sextus Afranius Burrus praetorian prefect, all three appointed thanks to Agrippina. For this same period Philo's account of Aulus Avillus Flaccus' career suggests that patronal support was needed not only to secure, but also to remain in these important jobs. One of Tiberius' *amici*, Flaccus was appointed to the Egyptian prefecture when the freedman Hiberus died in 32. Beginning with
Tiberius' death in 37, Flaccus' support at court dwindled as Gemellus and then Flaccus' friend Macro were executed by Gaius. It is to the loss of these friends at court that Philo attributes the beginning of the sequence of events which culminated in Flaccus' downfall and exile.54

Numerous examples, then, indicate that the emperor distributed equestrian posts at all levels to his own friends and to friends of those friends. The passage from Plutarch shows that provincials thought patronal influence to be the natural path to procuratorships. This passage together with the examples cited is suggestive, but the overall significance attached to patronage will depend in part on what alternative criteria existed as factors in making appointments. The analysis of equestrian cursus and related literary evidence in the next chapter seems to show that considerations of seniority and efficiency or merit in a modern sense did not hamper the influence of patrons, as is traditionally argued.

Though the scope of the dissertation is generally restricted to the aristocracies of the empire, it is perhaps worthwhile to give a few brief illustrations which show that patronage can be found throughout the emperor's administration. Vitruvius dedicated his De Architectura to Augustus to whom he was obligated by the beneficium of his position in charge of construction and repair of balistae and scorpiones. More interestingly, Vitruvius says that he continued in his job through the commendatio of Augustus' sister Octavia: here, if anywhere in the administration, one might have expected considerations of technical competence to outweigh patronage.55 Suetonius reports that the money for Otho's bribery of the Praetorian Guard was extorted from an imperial slave for whom Otho secured the apparently very profitable post of dispensator.56
The fact that the imperial slave reportedly paid Otho 1,000,000 sesterces for the dispensatio once again underlines how valuable many offices at the emperor's disposal could be as beneficia. Of course, this group of beneficia was relatively limited in number. The emperor perhaps made something of the order of a hundred senatorial and equestrian appointments each year—a minute number in relation to the total population of the empire. Other beneficia in the emperor's stock were not so limited. In a society highly conscious of status, grants of status such as the equus publicus and citizenship were valued by the recipients but could be distributed widely by the emperor without cost. In this section consideration will be devoted to the main status grants: the latus clavus, the equus publicus and membership on the equestrian juries, and citizenship.

The latus clavus, the broad purple stripe on the toga, symbolized membership in the senatorial order and could be worn by senators and their sons. At some point in the early Principate (during the reign of Caligula or before) emperors began to grant the latus clavus as a beneficium to equestrians desiring to pursue senatorial careers. That it was treated as a mark of favor from the emperor is clear from the fact that some men included the grant in their cursus in inscriptions even though it was implicit in the fact of their elections to quaestorships. The prestige derived from signs of the emperor's favor is underlined by an inscription dedicated to a local notable in Gaul: Q. Valerius Macedo lists among his achievements the offer from Hadrian of the latus clavus and quaestorship as well as his refusal of the honors. Pliny's letters provide the clearest evidence of how the latus clavus was distributed: he indicates that it was through his
patronage that his protégés, Sextus Eruclus Clarus and Iunius Avitus, secured the latus clavus from the emperor. Later in the second century Septimius Severus is said to have received this beneficium from Marcus Aurelius through the support of his uncle. Just how sought-after the latus clavus was is difficult to know. The reluctance of some to enter the senatorial order is attested. On the other hand, the need for patronal support in other periods suggests that the demand exceeded the supply. As far as we know, direct contact with the emperor and patronal influence were the only ways of acquiring the latus clavus.

Inscriptions attesting imperial grants of equestrian status are found throughout the empire. Problems arise, however, when we have to decide just what was granted and what constitutes evidence of a grant. There seems to be general agreement that a census of 400,000 sesterces was a prerequisite for equestrian status and that the equus publicus was an ad hominem grant made by the emperor. The problem is this: was the census (together with the requisite free birth) a sufficient condition for being an eques Romanus or does that title—being synonymous with exornatus equo publico—indicate a special grant from the emperor? Millar has recently argued for the former view, contending that "all our evidence for the conferment of equestrian rank by the emperor relates to the 'public horse' or to the panels of jurors." Duncan-Jones, on the other hand, has claimed that the title eques Romanus indicates a grant by the emperor (except in loose literary usage). There is some evidence for both views. Duncan-Jones appears to have a clear case of a grant of the title eques Romanus: M. Cornelius Fronto Cabinianus is described as "eques Romanus ex inquisitione allectus" in an inscription from Madauros. This seems to be the
only certain example available which indisputably shows the title *eques Romanus* being granted on an *ad hominem* basis. On the other hand, the example adduced by Millar of *M. Valerius Amerimnianus,* "natus eques Romanus", is one of several which cannot be explained on Duncan-Jones' view that the title was always the result of a specific grant. Perhaps the only explanation of the confusion is that, as in the late Republic, the term *eques Romanus* continued to have both a strict and a loose sense (even in inscriptions), sometimes encompassing only those with the public horse and at other times all men with the requisite census and two generations of free birth. It is quite possible that the title *eques Romanus* on inscriptions and elsewhere sometimes indicates a specific grant of the public horse (which Millar does not deny), but we cannot assume that it always did. So it is best to exclude *equites Romani* from the discussion here and in chapter 6.

As Millar points out, "none of the inscriptions recording the public horse gives any concrete indication of how the honour came to be awarded." Nor do we possess any *commendationes* concerning the *equus publicus* or membership in the *quinque decuriae*. A reference in Suetonius makes it clear that the latter was sought by patrons for their friends, and the letters of Pliny to Romatius Firmus suggest (though not explicitly) that Firmus was selected for the *quinque decuriae* as a result of Pliny's patronage. As Duncan-Jones suggests, it is highly probable that both of these honors were obtained through the recommendation of patrons in the same way as the *latus clavus*.

Special grants of citizenship to free peregrines, like the *latus clavus* and the *equus publicus*, were in the hands of the emperor alone. Consideration of citizenship grants is best left
to later chapters about provincial patrons. It is worth pointing 
out in the Roman context, however, that such a grant constituted 
an honor and beneficium not only for the recipient, but also for 
the Roman patron who secured it. Fliny's gratitude and obligation 
to "Trajan for the grant of citizenship to his iatraliptes have 
already been pointed out.\textsuperscript{73} We may also note here Martial's 
pride in having procured citizenship for clients. In an epigram 
to his rival Naevolus (3.95) Martial boasted of his success as 
measured by the praemia received from Domitian: through the 
poet's requests a number of men received citizenship by the munus 
of the emperor. Claudius had a reputation for cheapening citizen-
ship by distributing it too freely, but Domitian did not: the 
fact that a minor figure at the periphery of the court circles 
like Martial could obtain many grants for friends gives some indi-
cation of how often emperors bestowed this beneficium.\textsuperscript{74} 

In addition to the statuses granted to freeborn men, the 
emperor could also grant other statuses to those of servile 
background. We know nothing about grants of freedom to slaves, the 
ius anuli aurei or the ius ingenuitatis, beyond the facts that they 
were called beneficia and the iura were bestowed on imperial 
favorites such as Pallas, Asiaticus and the father of Claudius 
Etruscus.\textsuperscript{75} Clearly these grants were matters of patronal favor-
itism. Whether they were often sought is a question that cannot 
be answered from our evidence.

For all of the above statuses except citizenship and freedom 
the only means of acquisition was by ad hominem grant of the 
emperor. The emperor could also manipulate the administrative 
system and laws to deliver favors. We have already noted one example, 
the grant of access to aqueducts which Martial requested and Statius
Perhaps owing to the importance of inheritance of wealth in the ancient world the most frequently mentioned beneficium of this category was the ius trium liberorum. Augustan legislation had provided for special privileges for those with children and had specified certain disabilities (especially, limitation on rights of inheritance) for those without. Initially the senate granted the privileges to the childless, but at some point in the first century emperors began to treat the ius trium liberorum as a favor for those not meeting the legal requirements. One of Martial's epigrams was written as a request for this ius and two other poems acknowledge that he received it. The letters of Pliny indicate that he too received the ius through the prayers of his consular friend Iulius Servianus, and Pliny, in turn, secured it for his protégés, Voconius Romanus and Suetonius—all despite Trajan's claim that he bestowed this type of beneficium "parce". Of additional interest is the fact that this beneficium was institutionalized in the sense that Trajan received the senate's approval for the bestowal of a certain number of grants. The allotment of a number of exemptions from the law for distribution is as clear a reflection as any of the patronal aspect of the regime.

We have no reason to think that other types of privileges and immunities were regulated by senatorial approval. For instance, use of the cursus publicus was normally restricted to those on official business. When the grandfather of Pliny's wife died, Pliny sent her back to Italy hurriedly by the cursus publicus and then asked the emperor for the beneficium of belated approval. Trajan approved in this case and is also known to have given the Greek sophist Polemo the right of free use among other marks of favor. The casual nature of Trajan's response to Pliny's petition
suggests that this beneficium was not limited by senatorial approval.

The above privileges are the principal ones for which evidence of imperial distribution survives. We know of others, mainly in relation to the sophists, teachers and philosophers of the East. Philostratus reports grants of dining rights at the Museum in Alexandria and immunity from local munera. Bowersock and Millar have discussed these at length and there is no need to review the evidence here since these grants are not of great importance for the understanding of the emperor’s relationship with his court and the senatorial and equestrian aristocracies. 83

The beneficia discussed up to this point cost the emperor little or nothing in real terms. This was not true of another category of favors: gifts of estates and money. As Millar points out, such gifts were thought to be a natural result of personal contact with the emperor. 84 Pliny, for instance, served as an assessor on Trajan’s consilium at Centum Cellae. After several days of hearing cases Pliny left the villa, having received xenia from the emperor. 85 Several sources indicate that emperors participated in the traditional exchange of gifts during the Saturnalia. 86 That gift-giving was not only natural but expected of the emperor is evident from the complaint of Fabius Maximus about the meanness of Augustus’ gifts to his amici. 87 The imperial virtue of liberalitas applied to ad hominem gifts as well as to mass grants to the urban plebs.

One particular form of this type of beneficium were the imperial subventions to senators. Such subventions can be traced back to Augustus. Seneca in his De Beneficiis argued that Tiberius’ subventions were not true beneficia because he humiliated the recipients in the process. 88 A story from Epictetus shows how impoverished senators sought supporters in the emperor's court for
their requests: during the reign of Nero an unnamed senator is said to have begged the imperial freedman Epaphroditus for a subvention from the emperor. 89

In the sphere of monetary gifts more than any other we would like to know the total outflow in the form of beneficia, especially to members of the imperial aristocracy. Of course, such figures are not available: if they were, we might be in a better position to evaluate the hypothesis that systematic impoverishment of senatorial families was an important factor in the high turnover of senatorial families in the Principate.90

Offices, statuses, privileges, immunities and money were expected to be used by the emperor as beneficia for his friends. Paternal influence could also be an important factor in the emperor's judicial decisions, but this kind of favor presents more complex issues. Millar treats the judicial activities of the emperor at length and notes "the indivisibility of the giving of justice and of beneficia... it is possible to discern the essential fact that at least a large area of the emperor's jurisdiction was seen as a form of granting aid and succour to individuals and groups, and to take this as continuous with the related activities of hearing complaints, solving problems, conferring or affirming rights or privileges or making actual gifts."91 It should be added that in one respect judicial activity was different from the emperor's other beneficia. The latter were distributed as ad hominem favors without any restraining ideology of fairness or equality for all. People might object that the emperor was showing favoritism to the wrong people, but they never objected in principle to favoritism. The same cannot be said for the emperor's judicial decisions. Aelius Aristides, for instance, praised the emperor from whose
attention no just claim escaped and who provided equal justice for
the rich and poor alike.\textsuperscript{92}

However unrealistic Aristides may have been—in fact inequality
was institutionalized in the system at this time—, it nevertheless
points to the possibility of a conflict of ideology which was
non-existent for the other imperial beneficia. The conflict took
a concrete form in the two trials relating to Herodes Atticus, an
amicus of Marcus Aurelius. The date and circumstances of the first
in which Fronto spoke against Herodes in defense of Demostratus are
extremely ambiguous: what is clear from Fronto's and Marcus' letters
is that the request for Fronto to restrain his invective created
a tension between the pursuit of justice (in the form of a vigorous
defense) and patronal influence.\textsuperscript{93} The second trial is more rele-
vant here because it took place before Marcus after he had assumed
the purple. Apparently Herodes undertook a prosecution of
Demostratus and his allies before a provincial official. Demostratus
fled to Marcus at Sirmium and levelled accusations against Herodes.
Philostratus reports that Demostratus' oration was a masterpiece
and that poor old Marcus was torn by the account of the misdeeds
and left in tears. Faced with a choice between his obligation to
justice and his obligation to amicitia, the emperor's final
solution was to assign the blame to Herodes' freedmen and to punish
them.\textsuperscript{94} Quite how this constituted a decision "worthy of a philo-
sopher" is not at all apparent, but the conflict between amicitia
and justice is clear—a conflict which does not arise in the
accounts of distributions of other favors to Greek sophists.

A number of other examples are available to show the influence
exerted by patronage on judicial decisions. Cotta Messalinus went
so far as to speak in the senate of the protection he enjoyed by
virtue of his friendship with Tiberius. Messallina and Claudius' freedmen are said to have sold acquittals to the guilty; and in the next reign Nero prolonged the trial of his procurator in Asia, P. Celer, until he died a natural death. The example of Herodes proves that such influence was not confined to the reigns of the so-called bad emperors. Pliny reports another interesting case in one of his letters: the heirs named in the will of one Iulius Tiro wanted to charge a Roman knight and an imperial freedman with forgery of the will before the emperor. The emperor agreed to hear the case, but then some of the heirs decided to drop the charge out of reverentia for the freedman procurator. Trajan resented the implication of influence, but still seems to have been unable to persuade the heirs to press the charge. Once again the conflict between justice and influence is evident, as is the assumption of the litigants that influence would be decisive. In this case, however, Trajan, unlike Marcus, announced that he would not be swayed by patronal considerations.

In the judicial matters so far discussed the cases were contested by two parties. Other judicial matters concerned only one party and for these Millar's comment about the connection between beneficium and jurisdiction can be adopted without reservation. For instance, permission to return from exile was thought a beneficium and such clementia was encouraged as an imperial virtue. We know of several instances where this beneficium was secured through patronal influence. The best known is the case of Seneca who attempted to secure his restoration from Claudius through the intervention of the imperial freedman Polybius and then finally received it through Agrippina's gratia. We possess other instances of restoration from later periods. It should be noted
that, unlike other *beneficia* which could be petitioned directly from the emperor, requests for restoration could never be submitted in person and always required a patronal mediator.

It is beyond the scope of this thesis to pursue the issues of legal ideology and the emperor's judicial role in detail. Moreover, it impossible to determine from the evidence available the overall importance of patronage in the legal processes. We shall have to be content with the general conclusion that the emperor's judicial role provided opportunities for the distribution of favors.

Altogether, it is clear that the emperor possessed an enormous storehouse of *beneficia* on which he could draw: he played a dominant part in distributing Roman offices and statuses, and could alter men's fortunes with the gifts of privileges, immunities and money. What is less clear is the actual frequency of distribution. Perhaps one very rough indicator can be used. As suggested above, Pliny's position was probably "not untypical of that of reasonably well-placed senators as a whole."¹⁰⁰ During a tenure of less than two years as governor of Bithynia we have record of six patronal requests submitted to the emperor—for an unspecified senatorial post, a staff appointment, an equestrian *militia*, citizenship, the *ius trium liberorum*, and approval for private use of the *cursus publicus*.¹⁰¹ These requests may well represent a typical cross-section. If Pliny's rate of petitioning is at all normal, the emperor must have received hundreds of requests each year from consulars alone, most of which, to judge from Pliny's successes, seem to have met with positive responses.¹⁰² Indeed, these requests were such common, everyday occurrences that they rarely deserved any mention in the historical narratives: the author of the *Historia Augusta* dismissed the emperor's appointments and promotions as

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trivial and worthy of no more notice than his diet and clothing.103

Access to imperial beneficia

The preceding discussion produced a long list of names of recipients of imperial beneficia and their patrons. It is now time to analyze these names in order to discover what kinds of people could approach and petition the emperor, and in what circumstances. In short, we want to discover who possessed gratia. Of course, the answer will vary to some extent with the emperor, but much depended on structural features of the court which remained unchanged throughout the Principate.

Perhaps the group closest to the emperor and with unchallenged claim on his favor were the male members of his immediate family. Not all emperors had adult sons or grandsons (natural or by adoption), but when sons or grandsons existed, they and their friends were always natural candidates for the emperor's beneficence. Tacitus notes that Sejanus initially attached himself to Augustus' grandsons and then to Tiberius.104 Sejanus was not the only equestrian to do so: Philo has Flaccus on his way into exile lament his fall in contrast with his promising beginnings as a schoolmate and companion of Augustus' grandsons and then a friend of Tiberius.105

In the letters of Fronto we find much more specific evidence of the circumstances in which the emperor might be petitioned by his son. There survive two commendationes which Fronto sent to Marcus, requesting help to secure beneficia from Pius for clients. In one case, Fronto asks that Marcus extend his benignitas to a conductor IIII publicorum Africæ whose accounts were about to be reviewed by Pius.106 In the second letter Marcus is asked to use his influence with Pius to secure a procuratorship for Fronto's client, the imperial freedman Aridelus.107 At other times Fronto
is known to have written to and petitioned Fius directly. The choice of alternative paths to the emperor for petitions perhaps depended on the nature of the request and the warmth of the various personal relationships involved. A man like Fronto with numerous and close contacts at court must have had alternative methods of forwarding requests to the emperor, and so was able to select the one judged to be most effective at any given time. It is interesting to note that after Marcus became emperor Fronto began to utilize Lucius Verus to forward his requests to Marcus himself. Direct access to Marcus may have become more difficult and members of the family were able to press requests in more intimate contexts.

In the Republic a man's life chances were determined in large part by the power and influence of his amici. This remained true in the Principate and of course the emperor became the most effective amicus available. The amici Caesaris constituted an amorphous group including senators, equites and others who had access to the emperor. The friendships might be strictly formal or warm and personal.

Some indication of the variety can be found in the letters of Pliny and Fronto. Pliny enjoyed a friendly, but not intimate relationship with Trajan. His commendationes are relatively formal and to the point, containing few personal or intimate details. Pliny often gives as a reason for venturing his requests the emperor's past indulgentia. Fronto seems to have enjoyed the same sort of relationship with Fius and the commendatio addressed to him has the same characteristics as Pliny's. Fronto's friendships with his pupils, Marcus and Lucius, on the other hand, were more intimate. In letters to them the language of indulgentia is replaced by the language of amor; Fronto's entire family is seen
to be on friendly terms with the imperial family, particularly Marcus' mother Domitia Lucilla with whom he exchanges letters. Expressions of affection between the families even find their way into letters concerned with recommendations.\(^{113}\) Altogether, we can distinguish Pliny's formal friendship with Trajan, typical of the exchange relationship enjoyed by prominent senators, from Fronto's exchanges with Marcus, which were embedded in a web of close family relationships.

Whether warmly personal or formal, amicitia with the emperor was an enormously important fact in an aristocrat's life. As suggested above, an amicus could expect honores for himself, and also auctoritas derived from his ability to influence decisions and secure beneficia for friends. The auctoritas was felt at Rome and throughout the empire. Pliny expressed concern about contesting a legal case with amici Caesaris.\(^{114}\) More telling is an early third century papyrus from Egypt in which the strategoi of Arsinoe are warned to behave with restraint toward a certain Titanianus on the grounds that he was known to be esteemed by Caracalla.\(^{115}\)

An amicus' access to the emperor could be through personal contact or written communication. We have already discussed the latter with regard to Fronto and Pliny. It should be added that written communication was probably the less desirable method of approach. In a commendatio from Bithynia Pliny indicates that he would normally make such requests in person before the emperor.\(^{116}\) The reason is not difficult to understand. We may suspect that a request made in person was less easy to refuse; it was certainly more difficult to defer. Philo says that when the Jews of Alexandria were told by the prefect of Egypt Flaccus that he would send on to Rome their decree of honors for Gaius, they rejoiced because every-
thing sent to the emperor by governors received immediate attention. The implication of Philo's statement is that other written communication sent to the emperor was not necessarily dealt with so quickly. This is not surprising, given the mass of petitions and letters which the emperor was expected to read and answer personally.

Thus face-to-face contact with the emperor was of special importance, even for amici Caesaris. Among Trajan's virtues Pliny emphasized his openness to the "flower of the senatorial and equestrian orders"—in contrast to past emperors who "were attended by a manus satellitum". In other words, access to the emperor could not be taken for granted by leading members of the senatorial and equestrian orders. A cubicularius, for instance, might lock a man out of the emperor's presence and deprive him of the opportunity to govern a province. In a discussion with an equestrian exile returning to Rome Epictetus used admission to Caesar's court as the symbol of participation in Roman political life and access to office. The significance of personal contact is more clearly illustrated by a letter of Pronto to the emperor Lucius Verus. Pronto describes the marks of esteem which Verus displayed towards himself—kisses of greeting, physical support while walking and long conversations. These actions Pronto explicitly interprets as signs of favor which encourage petitions for beneficia, and they must also have given Pronto the physical opportunities for expressing his wishes.

Most amici cannot have been on such intimate terms with the emperor. They probably enjoyed most face-to-face contact in two basic settings: morning salutations and dinner parties. We know that morning salutationes provided the setting for daily contact between Pliny the Elder and Vespasian. Other amici may have attended
less regularly. Whether division of the amici into three cohortes on the Republican model described by Seneca was a constant feature of the salutatio throughout the Principate has been questioned. Whenever they were divided, we would expect those in the second and especially the smaller and more select first cohort to be in a more advantageous position to press their requests. What cannot be doubted is that the morning meetings provided an occasion to deliver petitions.

Like attendance at the salutatio, dining with the emperor was at once an honor and an opportunity. Vespasian is reported to have thanked Caligula for the honor of an invitation in a speech before the senate. During the three days which Pliny spent at Centum Cellae as an assessor he dined with the emperor. After the meal the guests were entertained by recitations or joined in pleasant conversations. Trajan must have been open to informal requests and suggestions at this time. Indeed, it may well be to just such a context that we should assign the conversation between Pliny's patron Corellius Rufus and Nerva about Pliny's praiseworthy character. When Epictetus wanted to highlight the hardships and worries endured by an amicus Caesaris, he singled out lack of sleep owing to the early morning salutationes and the humiliations of dining at the emperor's table as a social inferior—that is, the two standard contexts in which the emperor met his friends. Other Romans without philosophical axes to grind would no doubt have emphasized these settings rather as opportunities to exercise patronal influence.

In addition to these relatively formal and structured meetings, a few amici, especially the equestrian secretaries and the praetorian prefect, worked beside the emperor. We would expect these
men to have enjoyed some special opportunities for influencing imperial decisions. It is possible to show that on occasion the bureaux secretaries obtained beneficia. Pliny praised Titinius Capito, Nerva's ab epistulis, for using his amicitia principis to secure permission to erect a statue of L. Iunius Silvanus Torquatus (executed by Nero) in the forum. The evidence for praetorian prefects is more extensive, allowing us to document their patronage throughout the Principate: the influence of Sejanus, Burrus, Iulius Ursus, Septicius Clarus, Gavius Maximus, Aemilius Laetus and Flautianus is explicitly attested or can be surmised with some confidence. While the impact of the imperial secretaries on decisions is difficult to gage, it cannot be doubted that praetorian prefects, whose very appointments testified to the emperor's confidence in their loyalty and friendship, were among the most influential figures in imperial circles.

So far we have analyzed those people around the emperor on a nearly equal social footing with him. This near equality enabled them to communicate with the emperor by letter. More importantly, they could approach the emperor in person—the more intimate the context, the better. This latter principle is underlined by the role of the emperor's male relatives. Because of their very close personal relationships with the emperor, men like Fronto often preferred to submit petitions through them, even when the petitions could have been submitted directly but in more formal circumstances. In other words, proximity (physical and emotional) was a critical factor in determining the channels through which imperial beneficia flowed. This will be a recurrent theme as we now turn attention to groups of lower social status surrounding the emperor.

The first group in this category includes those who had access
to the emperor on account of their literary or oratorical talents. Such men appear in our sources throughout the Principate, submitting their literary efforts or delivering orations to the emperor. Their names recurred often in the preceding section. They won beneficia not only for themselves, but also for those connected with them, cities and individuals. Hadrian of Tyre, for instance, held the chair of rhetoric in Athens and owing to his reputation got the opportunity to speak before Marcus Aurelius. He was so successful in moving Marcus that he received the right to dine at public expense, a seat of honor at the games, immunity from taxation, priesthods and "as many other things as make men illustrious", including gold, silver, horses and slaves. These signs of wealth Marcus gave to Hadrian and his family as well.\textsuperscript{132} Those especially favored by the emperor could hope to be appointed as imperial secretaries with all of the concomitant advantages.\textsuperscript{133}

A second and related group consists of those educated men who served emperors as teachers and doctors. They enjoyed close personal proximity and benefitted accordingly. Marcus Aurelius' teachers are best known: not all of them were initially of low social status, but one at least, Eutychius Proculus, required financial support for his senatorial career and so seems not to have been born into a wealthy aristocratic family.\textsuperscript{134} Marcus' interest in learning was such that he continued to correspond with his teachers about academic matters after he assumed the purple in 161; the corollary is that his teachers continued to have Marcus' ear from time to time.\textsuperscript{135} This phenomenon of access of teachers to beneficia can be traced back to the beginning of Augustus' rule. Areus, Octavian's tutor and companion during his entry into Alexandria in 30 B.C., was said to have been instrumental in saving Alexandria from punishment.
Later Areus was appointed procurator of Sicily by Augustus.\textsuperscript{136}

Similarly, the access of doctors can be documented beginning in Augustus' reign in the person of Antonius Musa.\textsuperscript{137} The few fragments of evidence show that this group was able to channel benefits to themselves, their cities and their families. The doctors of Claudius and Caracalla (?), C. Stertinius Xenophon and L. Gellius Maximus, received important equestrian offices, while T. Statilius Criton, Trajan's doctor, probably helped along the procuratorial career of his Antiochene relative, T. Statilius Apollinarius. Perhaps owing to the low social prestige of medicine, none of these physicians reached the senatorial order themselves, but Maximus' son of the same name is found as legate of legio IV Scythia when its revolt against Elagabalus was crushed in 219.\textsuperscript{138}

Altogether, doctors and teachers, though of lower social status, were in very special positions in that they were able to provide emperors with personal services which were interpreted as beneficia.\textsuperscript{139} Few other Romans had a similar ability to bestow beneficia upon the emperor and earn his gratia which was expressed in the form of gifts of offices and money.

The social status of litterateurs, doctors and teachers seems to have been sufficiently high for their influence not to have been resented by the imperial aristocracy. The opposite was true for two other groups at court, women and imperial slaves and freedmen. The influence of women is recorded, in one form or another, for nearly every reign (not always with disapproval). Two important categories should be noted: the emperor's female relatives and the Vestal Virgins. The latter came into contact with the emperor in the performance of rituals.\textsuperscript{140} One result of this can be seen in several third century inscriptions dedicated to Vestals.
Q. Veturius Callistratus thanked Campia Severina for her suffragium in securing a procuratorial appointment; she also provided the necessary patronage for Aemilius Pardalas to get two equestrian militiae. Unfortunately, the other dedications are less specific, but they may relate to beneficia procured from the emperor. Flavia Mamillia, for instance, was thanked for her outstanding pietas by her nephews who were appointed to militiae, and other dedications mention honores.

The emperor’s female relatives were surely a more influential group. When Livia died, the senate voted an arch in her honor because, as Dio says, “she had saved the lives of not a few of them, had reared the children of many, and had helped many to pay their daughters’ dowries”—in short, because she had been a great patroness. Some of her patronal resources probably derived from her own wealth, but her ability to save men must have been a result of her influence on Augustus and Tiberius, as the letter from Ovid requesting restoration and the notorious case of Urgulania prove. Dio neglects to mention one other patronal resource which must also have derived from Livia’s influence on the emperor, support for career advancement. The senatorial career of Otho’s grandfather received its start per gratiam Liviae Augustae. Other women in Augustus’ household also enjoyed gratia: Vitruvius thanked his sister Octavia for the continuation of his appointment.

This aspect of Augustus’ reign was hardly unique. Notoriously, one of the features of Claudius’ reign was the influence of his wives and freedmen who were alleged to have sold offices, honors and verdicts. The general accusations may in part be attributed to exaggeration. But some of the evidence, especially Seneca’s request for return from exile addressed to the freedman Polybius,
cannot be dismissed. Specific instances of Agrippina's gratia have been recounted above. What should be emphasized here is that Claudius' reign differed from others in this respect in quantity and the kinds of favors, but not in the fact of female influence. Imperial women are also alleged to have exercised patronage later in the reigns of Nero, Vespasian, Domitian, Trajan, Marcus Aurelius and Caracalla. We should take note especially of the evidence for Trajan's wife Flotina and Marcus' mother Domitia Lucilla. In a letter to Voconius Romanus Pliny promised to deliver his letter to Flotina; the need for Pliny to deliver the letter indicates that Romanus was not a regular correspondent of Flotina and the most plausible suggestion as to the contents of the letter is a petition of some sort. The testimony concerning Domitia Lucilla comes from the relatively reliable Life of Didius Iulianus in the Historia Augusta where she is said to have raised Iulianus and secured a vigintivirate post for him. The significance of these two examples is that they occurred in the reigns of so-called good emperors who kept their households under control.

If the influence of imperial women illustrates the importance of proximity to the emperor, imperial freedmen and slaves make the point more strongly. The imperial bureaucracy initially grew out of the emperor's household administration and so under the Julio-Claudians freedmen were left in charge of the bureaux concerned with financial accounts, petitions and correspondence. Some of these freedmen achieved positions of power thought to be completely unsuitable to their low birth, providing a major source of irritation between the emperor and the aristocracy. As early as the reign of Tiberius Agrippa I is found lavishing gifts upon the emperor's freedmen in the hope of winning their support. In the
next three reigns the power of freedmen was more pronounced, as figures such as Callistus, Polybius, Narcissus, Pallas and Epaphroditus channelled beneficia in the form of offices, money and protection from prosecution to senators and others.

As is often noted, the power of these freedmen resulted not from any official positions, but from their personal contact and influence on the emperor. Though this has been denied, it seems to me to be the only sound conclusion in view of the nature of the senatorial complaints.\(^{153}\) Callistus' protection of Domitius Afer, Narcissus' acquisition of a legionary legateship for Vespasian, his protection of Iunius Cilo, his lethal attack on Appianus Silanus, Pallas' protection of Felix, and the sale of acquittals and citizenship, all of these actions were a result of gratia, not of official responsibilities. Indeed, senatorial writers do not seem to have voiced any resentment about the official powers given to freedmen in their bureaux.\(^ {154}\) Rather the tension arose from the inversion of social roles in which senators had to accept the humiliation of approaching (and bribing) freedmen for patronal favors in order to advance their careers. Epictetus, who was a slave of Epaphroditus at Nero's court, described the source of resentment best when he wrote that senators, forced to cultivate such patrons, became ὅσοι δοῦλοι δοῦλων.\(^ {155}\)

Aristocratic reaction against the influence of freedmen was strong, and a basic element in the ideology of the good emperor became his control of imperial freedmen. It can be found in Pliny's Panegyricus: "Most emperors, though they were masters of their subjects, were slaves of their freedmen, ruled by their counsels and nods... You, however, have the highest esteem for your freedmen, but only as freedmen... For you know that the principal indication
of a weak emperor is the greatness of his freedmen.” ¹⁵⁶ Pius was also praised for maintaining control of his liberti and preventing the sale of “smoke”. ¹⁵⁷ Whether because of the influence of this ideology on emperors or not, freedmen do not appear prominently in accounts of the Flavian or Antonine periods until the reign of Commodus. Nevertheless, because personal contact with the emperor remained important, freedmen continued to exercise some influence. Though Domitian's reign was not characterized by the power of his freedmen, Statius and Martial found it useful to dedicate poetry to Abascantus, Entellus and Parthenius (ab epistulis, a libellis and cubicularius, respectively). These freedmen were wealthy enough to be patrons in their own right, but also they had access to Domitian. One poem from Martial specifically requests Parthenius to deliver the poet's libellus of poems to Caesar at the most propitious moment: "you know the time of Jove's serenity when he shines with that calm look, all his own, that is accustomed to deny nothing to petitioners." ¹⁵⁸ A fragmentary letter of Fronto suggests a similar point about the importance of information about the emperor's mood and schedule. In 161 Lucius wrote to Fronto, gently scolding him for having failed to arrange a meeting at the Palace after four months' separation. Fronto replied that the fault was not his own. Most of the explanation is lost, but it is clear that Fronto wrote to Charilas, an imperial freedman, to enquire about Marcus and Lucius, asking, "is it convenient for me to come to them today? Please tell me as a man of sense and a friend." ¹⁵⁹ Freedmen were never able to control access to the emperor in the Principate to the extent that eunuch chamberlains did in the later empire. ¹⁶⁰ Nevertheless, in every reign freedmen constituted one of the personal communication links to the court and so retained some of
the influence which they enjoyed in the Julio-Claudian era.

The significance of the frequent and close contacts which gave imperial women and freedmen their gratia is best highlighted by a brief glance at the condition of other low status groups. First, within the urban plebs there seems to have been a special group which constituted the emperor's clientes. According to Suetonius, Augustus did not normally interfere with trials, but he did appear at the trials of his clientes.161 A century later Pliny, in his praise of Trajan's open reception of his subjects, spoke of four groups: senators, equites, clientes and the mass of spectators.162 Quite possibly this clientele was a carry-over from the time before he assumed the purple when he would have had a following among the urban plebs like other aristocrats.163 Its precise size and composition we cannot even guess at. Nor do we know exactly what the relationship involved. Perhaps it was to his clientes that Domitian sent prandia during the Saturnalia.164 Finally, we do not know whether this special group of Romans continued to exist throughout the Principate.

In addition to these clientes, every inhabitant of the empire was a potential recipient of the emperor's beneficia. Millar has stressed that ideally the emperor was available to listen to all petitions. But for the unprivileged masses who were not on letter-writing terms the only means of petitioning seems to have been the delivery of a libellus either in person or through an agent. The requirement of being where the emperor was meant that most of the empire was de facto unable to enjoy the emperor's special patronage.165 Moreover, even those within the vicinity of the emperor might face serious obstacles in the delivery of their requests. Tiberius made himself inaccessible on the island of Capri in the later part
of his reign, and earlier during his Campanian trip he ordered the road on which he intended to travel cleared with the intention of avoiding petitions. For the same reason, Tiberius is also said to have delayed embassies from provincial cities.\textsuperscript{166} As one indication of Claudius' quickness to anger, Suetonius notes that he pushed away with his own hand those trying to approach him.\textsuperscript{167} The implication of Pliny's praise of Trajan's openness is that his predecessors were not always so accessible—hence the significance of the proximity enjoyed by imperial women and freedmen.

We have found that throughout the Principate the structure of the imperial court put certain groups in positions to channel imperial beneficia to themselves and their friends and clients. The common characteristic of all these groups was proximity. The relative success of each group varied in accordance with the different attitudes of various emperors, but in no period did the structure of the court or the nature of the patronal network change sufficiently to eliminate the role of any group altogether. Even in the Golden Age of the Antonines freedmen received favors and imperial women enjoyed gratia. Unfortunately, we are not in a good position to chart the shifts in each group's fortunes. No Roman was interested in a comprehensive study of such trivial matters as the means by which people received imperial appointments, and so general statements about the influence of women and freedmen probably derive as much from stereotypes as from precise and trustworthy sources. Indeed, the stereotyped literary evidence for Caligula and Claudius is not nearly as valuable as the casual references in the letters of Pliny and Fronto to the emperor's relatives, amici and freedmen. The latter show that manipulation of networks emanating from the emperor was a normal and essential part of
court life, even for an aging senator such as Fronto who had completed his senatorial cursus.

Reciprocity and social cohesion

For an appreciation of the importance of imperial distribution of beneficia, we should place the foregoing description in the context of the reciprocity ethic described in the first chapter. Emperor and subject alike believed that an imperial beneficium, like any other, created a debt which could be repaid in gratitude and in more concrete forms. Upon assuming the purple, Nerva issued an edict claiming that one of his purposes in so doing was to grant beneficia. He reassured his subjects that he would not do this by nullifying the grants of past emperors in order to be able to grant them again and so oblige the beneficiaries to himself.168 The idea that emperors could manipulate beneficia in order to put people in their debt is also implicit in a remark of Pliny about Trajan. In the Panegyricus Trajan is praised for a blanket extension of an exemption from the inheritance tax (in place of the ad hominem grants of the past) because he thereby selflessly forfeited "tot beneficiorum occasiones, tam numerosam obligandi imputandique materiam,"169 that subjects accepted this reciprocal obligation vis-à-vis the emperor is clear from Tacitus' famous remark at the beginning of the Histories. The historian says that he can be expected to write about Galba, Otho and Vitellius impartially since he did not receive beneficia nor suffer iniuria at their hands; moreover, he aimed to write about the Flavians without amor or odium despite the fact that his career began and owed its promotion to Vespasian and his sons. Clearly, Tacitus' readers would have assumed that beneficia created obligations.170

The exchange relationship between the emperor and his subjects
could hardly be on equal terms, given the disproportionate resources of the former. As Seneca points out, emperors "are placed by Fortune in a position in which they are able to bestow many favors but will receive very few and inadequate gifts in return." 171 Subjects, then, are left to acknowledge their gratitude and inability to repay in kind—in other words, to accept and acknowledge their inferior position. Tension could arise if subjects refused to accept their roles in the exchange and attempted to turn the tables. In Tacitus' view, Tiberius attacked C. Silius because Silius boasted at length that he held his troops on the Rhine loyal to the emperor while others mutinied. "Caesar judged that his position was undermined by such comments and was unequal to repay such a service. For beneficia are welcome so long as they seem to be able to be requited: when they far exceed that, hatred replaces gratitude." 172

Normally the emperor's superiority in this respect was unquestioned, and subjects were left to express their gratia as best they could. First and foremost, this gratia was expected to take the form of loyalty (as Tacitus' preface to the Histories implies). Thus, Seneca wrote: "an emperor, protected by his own beneficium, has no need of guards; he keeps arms for decoration." 173 This idea of winning loyalty through beneficia underlies an anecdote about Vespasian. He was told to beware of Mettius Pompusianus on the grounds that he had an imperial horoscope. Rather than having him executed, Vespasian bestowed on him a consulship so that Pompusianus "would one day be mindful of the beneficium." 174 Whether the anecdote is true or not, it expresses a view about the connection between imperial beneficia and goodwill of subjects found elsewhere. 175

Recipient of the emperor's favors could give outward expression to their gratia in several ways. First and most simply, a Roman
could dedicate a stone to the emperor, as he might to any other patron. The empire was littered with inscriptions such as the one M. Asinius Sabinianus, vir clarissimus, dedicated to Caracalla "ob insignem indulgentiam beneficiaque eius erga se." It seems that a need was felt to exceed the expressions of gratitude used for ordinary patrons, and so religion came to play a role in the exchange. After Caelius Clemens, Pliny's kinsman, was transferred to Pliny's staff in Bithynia, Pliny acknowledged his debt to Trajan "to whom I do not even dare to return gratiam parem, try as I might. And so I have recourse to vota and beseech the gods that I may not be judged unworthy of the favors which you are continually bestowing on me." Pliny's vota amount to a public and sacred expression of gratitude and loyalty, and as such were of symbolic importance in a situation in which even a senator could not hope to reciprocate adequately in real terms. As A.R. Hands explains, the ruler's beneficence, beyond the capacity of his subjects to return, and thus superhuman, naturally deserved reciprocation appropriate to the superhuman. And so the imperial cult performed a useful function in the exchange relationship. In a Narbonne inscription a man, carrying out a promise to dedicate an altar to the numen Caesaris Augusti, added: "if anyone wishes to clean, decorate or restore [this altar], because he has received a beneficium, let it be ius fasque." Finally, there was a more worldly method to repay the emperor's favors. From the reign of Augustus it was customary for imperial amici and beneficiaries to name the emperor in their wills. Millar has indicated that legacies constituted a very significant addition to the imperial income. In addition, they had an important symbolic value as final attempts of subjects to repay their debts.
to emperors. While some emperors attempted to widen the group of those expected to leave them legacies, many refused to accept bequests from subjects whom they did not know, using legacies as a barometer of the goodwill of their friends. According to Pliny, Trajan reestablished the freedom of people to name whom they pleased in their wills; the result was that his amici named him for his merita and strangers passed him over.\(^1\) A number of specific examples of legacies are recorded for the reigns of Augustus and Tiberius, neither of whom would accept legacies from strangers or friends with children.\(^2\) When Gaius Pufius Geminus was charged with maiestas against Tiberius, Dio records, he took his will to the senate and read it out. The fact that Tiberius was named as a coheiir was apparently intended as proof of Geminus' loyalty and goodwill.\(^3\) The case of T. Marius Urbinas reflects the same idea: Urbinas "was raised by the favors (beneficia) of Augustus from a low rank in the army to the highest military offices and was made rich by the abundant profits from them. Not only for the remainder of his life did he say publicly that he would leave his fortune to the one from whom he received it, but the day before his death he said the same thing to Augustus himself, although he had not even mentioned Augustus' name in his will."\(^4\) What is interesting about this passage is not only that Urbinas was thought to have displayed ingratitude by omitting Augustus in his will, but also that including the imperial benefactor was a matter of public knowledge and honor.

In sum, there was a particular group of Romans who enjoyed an exchange relationship with the emperor and were in his debt. Gaudemet notes that all those known to have named Augustus or Tiberius in their wills had profitted from imperial largesses or
Some later emperors, notably Gaius and Nero, attempted to widen this circle and to compel certain groups (primipilarii, imperial freedmen and amici) to leave legacies on the grounds that they were in the emperor's debt. At no point did any emperor attempt to extend the compulsion to the whole population of the empire. Thus, Veyne's view—that every imperial act was good simply by association with the emperor who thus became a benefactor of the whole empire—does not seem satisfactory. There was a defined group of beneficiaries and, judging by the volume of legacies left to Augustus, the number of the emperor's personal clients must have been substantial.

Now we must finally address ourselves to the issue of the functional significance of imperial patronage in the regime established by Augustus. We may take as a starting point Seneca's statement that an emperor could remain safe by the loyalty established by his beneficia. The history of the Principate confirms Weber's suggestion that a patrimonial ruler depends on the goodwill of his subjects: a ruler relying solely on armed compulsion makes himself precariously dependent on the army. Von Premerstein and Syme in the 1930's developed Seneca's statement, suggesting that the emperor's position rested not so much on any legal or constitutional basis as on the social bonds of patronage. Von Premerstein's basic argument was that Augustus and his successors usurped the patronal resources and the clienteles of the great senatorial houses of the Republic. The emperor's patronage relationships were cemented by an oath taken annually by his soldiers and subjects. As the patronal resources of senatorial families were usurped, senators were pressed into the background, and their senatorial and especially equestrian protégés and clients were bound instead to the emperor
by imperial beneficia in the form of offices and honors. Others have taken the argument further and have suggested that emperors, in order to bypass the senatorial order, developed an administration of equites dependent solely on imperial patronage for advancement and hence loyal only to the emperor.

Recently Veyne has argued against Von Premerstein's basic position and concluded in the following way:

Quant aux prétendus rapports de clientèle entre le prince et ses sujets ou ses soldats, ils n'existaient pas davantage; le donativum n'était pas le gage de pareils liens. S'imaginer qu'un immense État, où les relations de souverain à sujet sont anonymes et d'obéissance, ait été assimilable à une bande de fidèles, c'est, pour trancher le mot, perdre le sens des réalités historiques. Ne laissons pas quelques buissons nous cacher la forêt. Premerstein a étrangement exagéré l'importance du serment aux empereurs. Textes, inscriptions et papyrus font voir à l'évidence que les dizaines de millions de sujets de l'empereur, comme contribuables, justiciables, patriotes et soldats, lui obéissaient à la manière de tous les sujets de tous les États du monde: comme à un chef d'État.

The validity of certain of Veyne's criticisms should be admitted. The whole empire did not constitute a personal clientele; indeed, we have seen that there was a specific, defined group of amici and clientes who enjoyed the personal favor of the emperor and were personally bound to him. Further, Veyne is surely right to be sceptical about the binding force of the oath alone. It is impossible to judge its precise effect on Romans, but to place too much emphasis on an oath is to return to a quasi-legalistic interpretation in which it is thought that because an oath existed it must have been obeyed. Finally, we may agree that the relationship between the emperor and the mass of provincial subjects was one of anonymity and obedience.

Von Premerstein's central thesis, however, remains important. Veyne trivializes the whole question when he asserts that Romans obeyed the emperor as a magistrate just as subjects in all ages obey heads of state—in other words, obedience and loyalty to the
emperor do not require explanation, and Von Fremerstein is pursuing a non-question. Surely, however, Von Fremerstein's basic supposition is correct: after a century of civil wars and the murder of Julius Caesar, the stability of the regime introduced by Augustus does require explanation—obedience of the Roman aristocracy and the army could not be taken for granted by the emperor and should not be taken for granted by modern historians.

The history of the Principate shows that emperors faced two threats built into the structure of the administration and the court: first, conspiracies of those in close physical proximity, and secondly, rebellions by those with military commands. In order to maintain his position the emperor need not have had the empire for his personal clientele, he needed only to secure the loyalty of these two critical groups with his patronal resources. This was a realistic possibility in a way that patronage of the entire empire was not, and the previous sections have shown that the emperor did in fact distribute beneficia individually to virtually all leading members of the imperial aristocracy and to his household staff. These men owed their positions and the profits derived from them to the emperor. Marius Urbinas was thought to have personally insulted Augustus when, having enriched himself through imperial appointments, he did not return any of the profits in his will.

Von Fremerstein's model of patronage, however, is inaccurate in one major respect. While it is true that the emperor usurped the most important patronal resources, we cannot agree with him that senatorial families were pressed very far into the background or that senators ceased to be important patrons.

If senators were not excluded from power in the new regime, we must ask how they were included in the new structure in a way
to provide relative stability in comparison with the late Republic. The question can best be answered by utilizing an expanded model of patronage recently worked out by anthropologists. Jeremy Boissevain suggests a distinction between two categories of patronal resources.

The first are resources, such as land, jobs, scholarship funds, specialized knowledge, which the patron controls directly. The second are strategic contacts with other people who control such resources directly or have access to such persons. The former may be called first order resources, the latter second order resources. Persons who dispense first order resources may be called patrons. Those who dispense second order resources are brokers. 193

Given the fact that in most of the examples of exchange cited in the first section the beneficia were secured from the emperor by third parties, this expanded model seems promising. Indeed, the distinction between patron and broker supplies just the concept needed to enable us to accept Von Fremerstein's indisputable statement that the Princeps usurped many of the (previously senatorial) first order resources without following his conclusion that the senatorial order was therefore cast into the background. I would suggest that by permitting senators to remain important as brokers, the emperor accomplished two things. First, he greatly enlarged the group of those who received his personal favors and owed personal loyalty to him in return: by using senators and equites as brokers to distribute his beneficia throughout Italy and the empire, the emperor found the mediators needed to bind to himself through a chain of personal bonds numerous municipal aristocrats and provincials with whom he had no contact. 194 Perhaps more importantly, by allowing senators and leading equites to remain powerful men as his brokers, the emperor bestowed on them a beneficium which deserved gratia in the form of loyalty in return.

Attention to the exchange relationship which Fliny enjoyed
with Trajan illustrates the explanatory value of this model. Von Fremerstein, Syme and others have noted that emperors won the loyalty of senators and *equites* with offices and priesthoods. This is certainly correct, but more in evidence in Pliny's letters is the fact that Trajan secured Pliny's gratitude by granting favors for Pliny's relatives and clients. Book X includes evidence of ten requests for others, including five during his stay in Bithynia. While an emperor might be in a position to grant a senator an office or honor for himself only once every few years, the exchange on behalf of a senator's clients could be much more frequent, almost continuous.

Traqan allowed Pliny to act as his broker in distributing beneficia; in return, Pliny expressed his gratitude as emphatically as possible, as shown in the letter concerning the transfer of Caelius Clemens to Bithynia. In other letters Pliny gives two reasons for his gratitude. First, it is only with Trajan's help that he can maintain his position as patron-broker. One letter opens with an explicit admission of this: "my recent illness, Sir, has put me in debt to my doctor Postumius Marinus. I am able to repay his services adequately by your favor (beneficium), if you will indulge my wishes in accordance with your characteristic benevolence." The favor in question is a grant of citizenship. Secondly, as in the Republic, favors for another man's clients were used as tokens of esteem for the man. Pliny certainly interpreted Trajan's approval of requests in this way and treated them as matters of public prestige. Pliny concluded his petition for senatorial rank for Voconius Romanus thus: "therefore, I ask, Sir, that you make me a participant in my most hoped-for joy and fulfill my worthy desires, so that I am able to be proud of your recognition not only
of me, but of my friend."197 The end of another request on behalf of Rosianus Geminus is more to the point: "I ask, Sir, that you delight me by increasing the dignitas of my former quaestor—that is to say, my dignitas through him—as soon as is convenient."198 In short, these imperial grants not only helped Pliny put his clients and protégés in his debt, but they also served as public proof that Pliny, being in the emperor’s favor, was a man of some importance. The significance of this latter aspect is underlined in one other letter. Pliny boasted to his friend Priscus of his influence with the source of beneficence: on behalf of Romanus "I recently sought from the optimus Princeps the ius trium liberorum which, although he gives it sparingly and with discrimination, he nevertheless granted at my request, as if he had made the selection himself."199 Pliny’s sincerity in the other letters addressed to Trajan could be called into question, but this letter was sent to a friend and shows with unmistakable clarity the pride which Pliny took in securing imperial beneficia for protégés. It would be perverse to deny that they helped to maintain Pliny’s goodwill and loyalty.

Pliny is the broker whose relationship with an emperor can be most fully delineated, but there is no reason to think it unusual. In the first section of the chapter numerous other instances of brokerage were presented. Fronto, for example, played the role of a mediator for requests from a conductor IIII publicorum Africae, an imperial freedman, several equestrians and a junior senator.200 In a passage quoted above, Plutarch indicates that this phenomenon was customary: when provincials went to Rome seeking procuratorships or governorships, Plutarch expected them to go not directly to the emperor, but to the houses of the great Roman aristocrats who
possessed **gratia**. It is noteworthy that even after holding a praetorship, Pliny was not in a position to petition for the *ius trium liberorum* directly; Iulius Servianus mediated the request. Unlike Pliny, Servianus was a consular commander of a large army. Pliny's loyalty to Trajan may not have been vital, but if similar goodwill was inspired by *beneficia* distributed through such men as Servianus, the importance of patronage to any emperor becomes clear—Seneca's statement that an emperor was "suo beneficio tutus" was not an exaggeration.

The discussion of patronage and brokerage has emphasized the social cohesion developed by imperial favors. Some analyses of the emperor's position have in the past emphasized instead the divisive policy of emperors: it has been claimed that the emperor bound the lower orders directly to himself by his patronage and used them in administration to diminish the power of the senatorial order. The evidence for brokerage has a direct bearing on the argument. Clearly, emperors did not as a matter of policy only distribute equestrian and freedmen offices and honors directly (as Von Premerstein supposed); rather they frequently bestowed them through senatorial brokers. In so doing, far from manipulating any alleged antipathy between orders, they positively encouraged "vertical" bonds of patronage between senators and administrators of lower orders.

Marcus Aurelius had a reputation for encouraging harmony and cohesion within the aristocracy. By contrast, certain other emperors, perhaps feeling threatened, pursued a strategy which produced division and conflict (though not between the orders, as we shall see). Here we should note briefly that manipulation of *beneficia* played an important part in the strategy. The emperor could encourage rivalry in the aristocracy by channelling his bene-
ficia through men like Sejanus or Vibius Crispus, thus making them powerful. Tacitus describes the senatorial and equestrian clientele which Sejanus built up and attributes it to public knowledge of the emperor's favor. The 

The eques Marcus Ierentius is supposed to have said in defense of his friendship with Sejanus after his fall: "I will confess both that I was a friend of Sejanus and that I rejoiced at having been taken into his amicitia... His relatives by blood and by marriage were honored by offices; as one was close to Sejanus, so one's friendship with Caesar was strong. On the other hand, those towards whom he was hostile were tormented by danger and suppliants' garments." Whether intentionally or not, through his patronage Tiberius enabled Sejanus to build a faction which produced enormous tensions within the aristocracy.

An emperor could create divisions most effectively by encouraging delatores with rewards of offices and honors. When this policy was followed amicitiae with the emperor and with other aristocrats became dangerous as friendships were used as grounds for prosecution and persecution. To take one instance, according to Seneca many men in the era of Sejanus' power were ruined on account of their amicitia Asini Galli. Later Seneca himself met his death on the pretext of his amicitia with the conspirator Piso. Roman authors emphasize that in such circumstances the fides necessary for amicitia dissolved as emperors created atmospheres in which everyone selfishly pursued his own interests. Two points should be made about this policy. First, it should again be repeated that the struggling factions did not divide along class or ordo lines: senators and equites cooperated in prosecutions. Secondly, it should be emphasized that the strategy of manipulating beneficia to encourage tensions and divisions within the aristocracy was not,
on the whole, a good one for ensuring survival, as the fates of Gaius, Nero, Domitian, Commodus and Caracalla indicate.

The most successful emperors were those who, like Augustus, were able to utilize skillfully the offices, honors, statues and administrative decisions at their disposal to produce cohesion in a web of personal exchange relationships extending out from themselves. Awareness of this led Seneca, Dio Chrysostom and others to point out to emperors that it was not merely a part of their role but in their self-interest to act as good patrons distributing beneficia.\(^\text{213}\) I have argued that it would be an oversimplification to imagine the emperor patronizing each individual in the web directly. Rather it is more accurate to think that the emperor ensured the loyalty of an inner circle of friends with his beneficia and then granted them the resources to build their own clienteles whose loyalty was thus indirectly secured.
SENIORITY AND MERIT: ALTERNATIVES TO PATRONAGE?

It has been suggested that official posts were among the most important beneficia which the emperor bestowed upon Roman aristocrats. But it need not be the case that, simply because the emperor made the appointments, they were treated as personal gifts or favors. Those scholars who view the emperor primarily as a rational administrator have assumed or argued that the appointments were made on the basis of relatively impersonal bureaucratic criteria, for example, seniority or merit. If this view is accurate, the emperor would have been restrained from treating appointments as purely personal favors to be granted on the basis of friendship and loyalty. Indeed, those who have taken this argument to its logical conclusion have minimized the role of patronage in the Principate, labelling it an aberration, significant only in the reigns of the so-called bad emperors.¹

The position taken on this question has broad implications for the historian's conception of Roman imperial government. For one of the distinguishing characteristics of Max Weber's ideal type of a rational-legal bureaucracy is appointment and promotion of officials in accordance with the principles of seniority and merit.² By contrast, in the patrimonial bureaucracy there is no regular system: appointments depend on the
discretion of the ruler who is apt to select on the basis of personal loyalty and friendship. Of course, many concrete historical examples, including Rome, fall somewhere between the ideal types, sharing characteristics of each. But the ideal types remain a useful analytical tool in so far as they draw attention to the two opposing systems of government. And so to the extent that we discover the presence or absence of the rational-legal principles of seniority and merit, we are giving a partial answer to the question of how far Roman imperial government was rationalized in the Principate.

In the following two sections of this chapter the available evidence for the influence of the principle of seniority and then that of merit will be set out. The evidence will not permit completely compelling conclusions, but it does indicate that the role of a seniority principle cannot have been great. Further, the Roman concept of merit is not identical with that of a rational-legal bureaucracy: it did not emphasize impersonal assessment in a way which might exclude patronage.

SENIORITY

In varying degrees modern historians have credited seniority with being a factor in promotion in senatorial and equestrian careers. Professor Eric Birley has argued with regard to the senatorial cursus that three different groups of senators can be distinguished, each having a characteristic type of career structure. Concerning the equestrian bureaucracy Professor M.K. Hopkins has suggested that the
emperors "might have liked to promote by merit but this
would have opened the way to subjective (that is nepotistic
or patronal) and therefore uncontrollable estimates of
talent by subordinates. By and large, therefore, emperors
favored seniority as the principle of promotion...."4 T.F.
Carney, advocating a similar view, has spoken of the "long,
grim, grey haul step by step upwards within the bureaucracy."5

In Professor Birley's view, senatorial careers can
be divided into three groups: first, those senators who never
entered the emperor's service, holding only senatorial
magistracies including perhaps a proconsulate in a senatorial
province; secondly, those "who from the outset sought, and
obtained, appointments in the emperor's service"; thirdly,
those who began their careers in the second group but then
moved into the first group for one reason or another. The
first group has attracted little attention; the third group
is by definition heterogeneous; and so it is to the second group
that historians have devoted their energies in the search for
career patterns. Birley (and others) seemed to have found
them. He argued that senatorial candidates for the emperor's
service were evaluated in their teens with regard to their
military aptitude and at that point their careers were planned.
"The ablest candidates might reasonably be expected to secure
the most rapid passage to the consulate, which qualified them for
those major commands." Thus, before his consular command, the
promising vir militaris as a rule "will have held only two praetorian
posts, as legate of a legion and in some more senior appointment"
(i.e., governor of a praetorian province or prefect of a treasury).6
Now if senatorial careers were as highly structured from an early age as this view suggests, the clear implication is that considerable limitations were placed on the emperor's discretion concerning appointments. The arguments related to the role of specialization will be examined in the next section. Here it is important to note that senatorial careers were not as structured chronologically as one might be led to believe. Brian Campbell has recently set out the evidence which requires considerable modification of Birley's view. We need only review his conclusions. He collected the names of the 73 men who held consular legateships between 70 and 235 A.D. and whose earlier careers are known in detail. Of these only nine had careers conforming to the pattern of the vir militaris (i.e., holding only a legionary legateship and a governorship of a praetorian province between their praetorship and consulate). Further, "43 out of the 73 hold 3 or more regular praetorian posts; several hold as many as 6." The logic behind holding only two praetorian posts was supposed to be that talented military men were hurried through their consulate to make them eligible for the great commands in the prime of their lives. The evidence for this seems to be weak as well. Indications of age during the consulate can only be deduced for 21 men in the list. Campbell points out that 14 of these seem to hold the consulate at a normal age; four were older; and the younger consuls can be explained by other factors, such as membership of the patrician order. In short, Campbell seems to have shown that the chronological structure in senatorial careers was far from firm: the emperor's discretion was not in fact seriously limited.
The procuratorial bureaucracy perhaps offers a more interesting case for testing the hypothesis about the role of seniority. The senatorial cursus continued to be based on Republican institutions, but the equestrian bureaucracy grew up in the first and second centuries and is usually thought to be the most characteristic part of the more rational governmental organization of the Principate. This traditional view provokes the question whether procurators really were recruited and promoted in a more rational way than senators. H.-G. Pflaum in his monumental work about procurators concluded that seniority was the "grande règle" governing the movement of equestrians through procuratorial careers.10 Though it may be necessary to disagree with this conclusion, Pflaum's catalogue of procurators provides an indispensable tool facilitating studies such as the one presented here.11

Initially it must be asked what is meant by a seniority principle. Pflaum uses the word "ancienneté" in relation to both offices and officials. These two usages should be clearly distinguished. The seniority of an office is defined by where it stands in a hierarchy of offices. So the consulate had seniority over the praetorship. The seniority of an official depends on how long he has served in office. Promotion according to a principle of seniority means that the level of an administrator's next appointment is based on the number of years he has already served. The distinction is important because, while promotion according to seniority presumes a hierarchy of offices, the latter does not imply the former as an important criterion for promotion. So, for instance, though the magistracies of the Republic were ranked according to seniority, the magistrates were not selected in accordance with a seniority principle.
Pflaum's work, especially the fourth chapter of the Deuxième partie of Les Procurateurs Équestres, undoubtedly shows that there was a hierarchy of procuratorships which was relatively stable from the beginning of the second century. But if this does not prove that promotion was necessarily governed by a seniority principle, what evidence does so? The literary evidence is confined to a single passage in Fronto's commendatio to Marcus Aurelius on behalf of Aridelus, an imperial freedman. Fronto recommended Aridelus as a "homo frugi et sobrius et acer et diligens. Petit nunc procurationem ex forma suo loco ac iusto tempore." The crux lies in the last seven words which Pflaum translates "conformément à son rang et à son ancienneté." He then concludes his discussion of promotion: "le passage de Fronto ex forma suo loco ac iusto tempore s'est avéré comme la grande règle de la hierarchie romaine." Recently E.J. Champlin has challenged this interpretation. He suggests that the ex forma phrase may qualify not the procuratorship, but the subject of the verb, Aridelus, in the act of petitioning. So he translates: "Aridelus is now petitioning in the proper manner, on his own behalf, and at the proper time." In this interpretation the emperor's patronal role as a receiver of petitions is stressed—a role thoroughly documented by Millar. Both translations seem to be possible and so in the absence of certainty this passage cannot be given much weight in the argument for a seniority principle.

Beyond these ambiguous words no literary evidence can be adduced in support of a seniority principle (for example, no remarks or complaints that a procurator was promoted before his turn). Moreover, one particular omission may be noted as significant.
Cassius Dio inserted into his account of the reign of Augustus a debate between Agrippa and Maecenas about the vices and virtues of monarchy. Millar has suggested that the speech of Maecenas originated as a political pamphlet presented to the emperor Caracalla. "The most important part of the speech concerns the recruitment, training, functions, and status of the two leading orders of the State." 18 For senators Dio gives precise details of the cursus: enrollment as an eques at age 18, as a senator not younger than age 25, appointment as praetor from age 30. 19 With regard to equites, by contrast, in the several pages of discussion about the organization of the prefectures and procuratorships there is not even a hint of a formal cursus structure or a seniority principle. This is not because Dio neglects to mention criteria for appointment: procurators are to be appointed from the equestris and as a reward for service. 20 His silence as late as the third century may not be conclusive, but surely it shifts the burden of proof onto those who think that they can find patterns of promotion according to seniority in the equestrian career inscriptions: the patterns must emerge with some clarity.

In his work on procurators Pflaum explains the hierarchy of procuratorships in the following way: the rank of procurators depended on the level of pay; the salary was in turn attached to the official, not to the office; but particular offices were regularly held by men at a particular salary level; so despite some irregularities procuratorships can be classified in a hierarchy according to salary levels. Early in the Principate three salary levels existed: 60,000 sesterces, 100,000 sesterces and 200,000 sesterces. Under Marcus Aurelius another, 300,000 sesterces was added. Since most procuratorships were included in
the first three levels and since the last applied primarily to Palatine offcia, attention will be focused on the first three. The 100,000 and 200,000 levels are further subdivided by Pflaum into two and four echelons respectively.

Within this hierarchy can sufficiently clear patterns of promotion be distinguished to prove a seniority principle? Pflaum argued that it is possible and illustrated various patterns with individual careers. Campbell's work on senatorial careers, however, has shown that this method of deducing patterns may have its pitfalls. Surely a better methodology would be to suggest some hypothetical seniority principle and then test it against all relevant careers. This Pflaum does not do, nor does he give any clear idea about what he thinks a normal procuratorial career in accordance with "la grande règle" should be.

In the search for such a norm the first step is to sort out and map all of the potentially useful evidence. This is done in Table I on the following pages. Much of the evidence in Pflaum's catalogue of some 350 careers of equites can be excluded for our purposes here. First, careers before the reign of Trajan (falling in group A of Pflaum's tables) are not included since they come before full development of the hierarchy and so should not be used as evidence of irregularity. Secondly, only those from equestrian backgrounds (as opposed to primipilarii) are listed. Careers of those rising from the centurionate follow a different pattern, according to Pflaum, but we do not possess enough clearly complete careers even to attempt to demonstrate promotion through procuratorships by seniority for them. Finally, fragmented careers are excluded; the table includes only those which are complete or complete up to a point. Such strict
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Key: ☑ --office the assignment of which to a subdivision by Pflaum is supported by two or more unambiguous examples; ☐ --office whose assignment is not supported by two unambiguous examples; ☑ --office which Pflaum does not venture to assign; ☐ --office which is assigned but occurs out of order (size of rectangle is unimportant).
selection is necessary in order to prevent circularity of argument
(using a presumed pattern to fill in or order fragmented careers,
and then adducing the same careers as evidence for the pattern).

An initial search through Table I indicates that there was
no close relationship between promotion patterns and the subdivisions
within the salary levels (nor does Pflaum claim any). No
procurator moved up step by step through all six echelons within
the centenariate and ducenariate levels despite the fact that
some held enough offices to have been able to do so. Indeed, the
irregularity is more noticeable than the regularity: a number
of equestrians skipped some echelons and then held as many as
seven offices in the same echelon (see nos. 168, 183, 193, 295 and
331 bis for the clearest cases). (Although not directly relevant
here, the predominance of unshaded and broken rectangles in the
centenariate and ducenariate categories may be noted. These
symbolize offices for which the evidence for inclusion in a specific
subdivision is ambiguous and offices which Pflaum does not attempt
to categorize, respectively. It may be doubted whether the
attempt to subdivide centenariate and ducenariate posts is
entirely justified.)

Setting the subdivisions aside, can we discover any norm
for the promotion of men from salary level to salary level?
Table I would not seem to offer much hope. Consider, for example,
the list in Table II of thirteen men from equestrian backgrounds
reaching the Palatine officia (whose careers are fully known).
Literary men reaching the office of ab epistulis are excluded on
the grounds that they may represent a special class.21

From this table one can say that some careers progressed
more rapidly than others (as Pflaum does)--but that would be

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true whatever criteria the emperor and his friends were using for promotion. It does not prove that the average was thought to be normal promotion by virtue of seniority. It is, of course, difficult to prove a negative generalization. But one can say that whatever might be picked out as a normal pattern of advancement according to rules of seniority, there will be more exceptions than regularities. A man could hold a centenariate post after none, one, two, three or four sexagenariate posts or a ducenariate

\[
\begin{array}{|c|c|c|c|c|} 
\hline
\text{Name} & \text{Career Number} & \text{Number of posts held} & \text{LX} & \text{C} & \text{CC} & \text{Total} \\
\hline
\text{T. Haterius Nepos} & 95 & 1 & 1 & 2 & 4 \\
\text{A. Ofellius} & 112 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 2 \\
\text{Maier Macedo} & 113 & 1 & 2 & 4 & 7 \\
\text{L. Valerius Proculus} & 117 & 0 & 1 & 2 & 3 \\
\text{M. Petronius Honoratus} & 119 & 2 & 1 & 2 & 5 \\
\text{T. Statilius Optatus} & 134 & 1 & 1 & 3 & 5 \\
\text{C. Iunius Flavianus} & 139 & 0 & 1 & 4 & 5 \\
\text{T. Furius Victorinus} & 156 & 0 & 1 & 4 & 5 \\
\text{T. Varius Clemens} & 180 & 0 & 3 & 4 & 7 \\
\text{L Iulius Vehilis Gratus Julianus} & 235 & 2 & 2 & 1 & 5 \\
\text{L. Cominius Vipsanius Salutaris} & 271 & 3 & 1 & 1 & 5 \\
\text{----} & 317 & 1 & 1 & 6 & 8 \\
\text{C. Furius Sabinus Aquila Timesitheus} & 327 & 4 & 2 & 3 & 9 \\
\text{C. Attius Alcimus Felicianus} & \\
\hline
\end{array}
\]

-105-
after one, two or three centenariate posts. The variation in the number of ducenariate posts held before promotion to the Palatine officia is even greater.

By the reign of Commodus the pyramidal structure of the office hierarchy is said to have been developed with an increase in the number of sexagenariate posts. There were now 51 sexagenariate, 48 centenariate, 36 ducenariate and one trecenariate posts. If any, this period from Commodus on ought to provide evidence of regular career patterns. If we ask "how many offices had a man held when promoted to the next salary level?" we arrive at the following table, utilizing all the careers listed in Table I for this period.

**TABLE III**

NUMBER OF POSTS HELD BEFORE ADVANCEMENT TO A GIVEN PAY LEVEL

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<th>Level of Promotion</th>
<th>Number of posts previously held</th>
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As with Table II, no pattern can be discerned here which does not involve more deviation than regularity. And what should be stressed again is that no ancient source comments on the deviation as being special or unfair. As Millar has noted, "at all times men might enter at different points in the scale or might skip a grade, with no trace of expressions comparable to those like 'adlectus' or 'promotus inter praetorios' which indicate exceptional advancement of a senator."
Now Pflaum is aware of the variation and explains it as flexibility: "ainsi la rigueur des règlements que nous avons si souvent invoquée a été heureusement tempérée par la souplesse de leur application et la choix de l'empereur a en dernière instance prévalu sur l'ancienneté la mieux établie." In short, Pflaum advises that we should not expect to find completely rigid patterns because extenuating circumstances might affect procuratorial careers from time to time. But we should still expect to find that at least on average there is an inverse relationship between the number of offices held at lower salary levels and the number required at a given salary level before promotion to the next level. In other words, an equestrian who held more than the normal number of sexagenariate posts should expect to hold fewer than usual centenariate posts before promotion to ducenariate rank, and the procurator who held fewer posts should expect the opposite. While the sample is not entirely satisfactory, with the data now at our disposal it can be tentatively suggested that no such inverse correlation exists. Table IV gives the results.

The table shows that even in the period of full development of the hierarchy those who held more than one sexagenariate post (that is, more than usual) were likely to have to serve in more and not less centenariate posts before promotion than those who held none or only one sexagenariate post. If anything, the averages would appear to indicate a reverse seniority rule. But in fact the deviation from the average is so great that it must be doubted whether length of past service could have strongly influenced the emperor one way or the other in his deliberations over promotions.

To summarize, the evidence for any sort of seniority principle
regulating equestrian promotion seems to be weak. There is no clear literary evidence and, when a rigorous method is applied, the epigraphic evidence for careers which has been traditionally relied upon shows no clear patterns nor even any correlation between years served and promotion to the next rank. There seems to be no real support, then, for the sort of organizational rules of promotion which have been postulated for the equestrian bureaucracy of the Principate—nothing in this respect to set procuratorial careers apart from their senatorial counterparts. It is not surprising that Dio treats the distribution of senatorial and equestrian posts in much the same way, the only distinction being that the former should be awarded to aristocrats of the first rank and the latter to those of the second rank (as judged by the aristocratic virtues of birth, excellence and wealth).25

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The importance of merit as a criterion for appointment and promotion has also been variously estimated by modern historians. While noting some exceptions, A. Stein suggested that normally promotion in the "service aristocracy" was based on "Verdienst und Tüchtigkeit". Thus the Principate opened the way for the "Selfmade man" who made his way "durch eigene Kraft und Tüchtigkeit". E. Birley explained the mechanism for evaluation: "if an initial recommendation secured a first appointment, still more must a man's promotion have depended on the confidential reports by superior officers..." In his *Tacitus* Syme pointed to the potential importance of various factors for equestrian promotion: "the path was open for education, talent, and loyalty to rise under the patronage of the dynasty." By contrast, merit is allotted only a minimal role in the selection process by Ste. Croix and Hopkins. So far as I know, no attempt has been made to evaluate and reconcile the arguments on behalf of these different positions.

It is of importance to a patronage study to decide whether the Romans were interested in developing a system in which appointments depended on an objective evaluation of a candidate's merit and excluded personal factors such as patronage. Two considerations seem relevant. First, it must be asked what the emperors were looking for in an official. Then, what institutional mechanisms were employed in the selection process.

Several sources are available which outline the Roman ideology of how and why a good emperor was supposed to allot offices. Essentially, the good emperor was to promote men of excellence to reward their excellence and to encourage their loyalty. In his
Panegyricus Pliny contrasted Trajan's and Domitian's reigns in praise of the former's.

It is profitable for people to be good (now), since it is more than enough if it is not harmful; upon good men you bestow offices, priesthods, provinces--they flourish by your friendship and judgement. Those like them are spurred on by this prize for integrity and industry, while those unlike them are attracted to their ways; for rewards for virtue and vice make men good or bad.29a

Echoing this theme, Dio of Prusa devoted much space in his first and third discourses on kingship to the emperor's need for loyal friends of high moral qualities to help him govern the empire. Offices should be distributed to virtuous friends to demonstrate that friendship with and loyalty to the emperor carry with them great rewards.30 This holds especially for the emperor's kin.

For he regards his kith and kin as a part of his own soul, and sees to it that they shall not only have a share of what is called the king's felicity, but much more that they shall be thought worthy to be partners in his authority; and he is especially anxious to be seen preferring them in honour, not because of their kinship, but because of their ἀρετή.31

Ideally, then, Roman offices were to be filled with men of excellence. It must then be asked what sort of excellence the Romans had in mind: the answer illustrates the divide between Roman and modern bureaucratic ideology. In the line following the passage cited above Dio indicates that by those with ἀρετή he means τοὺς ὅρθοὺς ζῶντας. Likewise, Pliny's boni are characterized by constantia, rectitude, integritas and industria. These ideal qualities are found not only in panegyrics. In praise of Agricola's governorship of Aquitania Tacitus attributes to him iustitia, gravitas, severitas, misericordia, integritas, and abstinentia.32 Antoninus Pius was thought to have been adopted by Hadrian because during his governorship he showed himself to be sanctum gravisque.33
These characteristics are, of course, nothing other than a list of the ancient Republican virtues. Cato the Younger, the paragon of the antique virtues, was praised by Sallust for his eloquentia, integritas, constancia, modestia, severitas and abstinentia. Caesar's somewhat different but nonetheless Republican virtues included munificentia, misericordia, facilitas and labor.\footnote{34}

In short, far from developing any sort of rational bureaucratic ideology based primarily on expertise, the Romans continued to think of the ideal qualities of the good official as those of the good aristocratic gentleman.

The most forceful single illustration of this is in Cassius Dio's political pamphlet. After a discussion of the structure of the senatorial and equestrian administrations, Dio outlines his ideas for the education and training of senators and equites.

While they are still children they should attend the schools, and when they come out of childhood into youth they should turn their minds to horses and to arms, and have paid public teachers in each of these departments. In this way from their very boyhood they will have had both instruction and practice in all that they will themselves be required to do on reaching manhood, and will thus prove more serviceable to you for every undertaking.\footnote{35}

Not only does Dio see no reason for specialist training, grouping senators and equites together, but, an administrator from the third century, he is still seriously advocating horseriding and practice with arms as preparation for all types of careers. This was meant to inculcate precisely the good character and loyalty described above. "Have no fear that anyone who has been reared and educated as I propose will ever venture upon a rebellion."\footnote{36}

In Dio's view, then, the emperor ideally wants to select his officials on the basis of virtuous character inculcated by the traditionally aristocratic martial arts.
The call for officials with the traditional aristocratic virtues is not perhaps as much a simple platitude as might at first be suspected. The goals of Roman administration were relatively narrow. As Millar has forcefully demonstrated, the emperors were not interested in the promulgation of centrally directed reforms. To the extent that reform might occur, it was thought to be the result of imitation of virtuous behavior. Ideally the emperor's virtues were reflected in the conduct of officials who in turn set examples for the masses. This general principle of government is explained by Plutarch: "the statesman who already has attained to power and has won the people's confidence should try to train the character of the citizens..." For this purpose the confidence of the people in their leader's upstanding character is of great importance. Aelius Aristides applies this principle specifically to Roman governors.

The governors sent out to the city-states and ethnic groups are each of them rulers of those under them, but in what concerns themselves and their relations to each other they are equally among the ruled, and in particular they differ from those under their rule in that it is they--one might assert--who first show how to be the right kind of subject.

Dio of Prusa then carries the point to its logical conclusion with respect to appointments and promotions. Just as the emperor should imitate Zeus, so "among generals and commanders of legions, cities or provinces, he who most clearly imitates your ways and shows the greatest possible conformity with your habits would be by far your dearest comrade and friend, while he who showed antagonism or lacked conformity would justly incur censure and disgrace and, being speedily removed from his office as well, would give way to better men better qualified to govern." From a more pragmatic standpoint, the emperor's basic
objectives in day-to-day administration were to maintain law and order and to collect taxes. In order to accomplish these goals it was thought necessary for the emperor to have senatorial and equestrian officials with some general experience, but not with specialist skills. From his study of the careers of consular commanders Campbell concluded that "in the context of Roman society, ideas of specialization and professionalism are largely anachronistic.... The senatorial career was built around traditional Roman conceptions of office-holding and service of the state. The men who governed the great consular provinces were, in general, all-round amateurs." This conclusion is based on the findings that the consular commanders were not on the whole military specialists, nor were they specialized in any particular regions of the empire. For instance, of the 73 consular legates listed by Campbell, nearly two-thirds (46) held both civil and military praetorian posts; of the remainder 15 held only military praetorian posts, while as many as nine held only civilian offices between their praetorship and consulate.

P.A. Brunt drew a very similar conclusion for procuratorial careers on the basis of his study of the Egyptian prefects. Egypt provides an especially good test case because, if any province had been felt to require administrators with specialist skills, it would have been Egypt. Brunt, however, found that "before taking office most prefects were unfamiliar with government in Egypt. They were seldom men of long military experience, and still more rarely jurists. They had usually held many financial posts, but this would hardly have prepared them for the peculiar complexities of the assessment and collection of taxes, and the maintenance of the irrigation system, in the Nile valley."
Brunt concluded that the imperial freedmen and slaves were the true professional bureaucrats, providing whatever special skills were needed for the complex features of the administration.

One year after Brunt published his study Henriette Pavis-D'Escurac published her work about the prefecture of the annona. She wrote that "compétences et expérience financières ou qualification juridique semblent avoir été les qualités plus particulièrement requises des praefecti annonae..." This seems to suggest, contrary to Brunt's conclusion, that emperors were strongly influenced by qualifications of special expertise (though she acknowledges exceptions). A close examination of the evidence of careers gathered by Pavis-D'Escurac, however, would seem to reinforce Brunt's conclusion: the praefecti annonae do not seem to represent anything other than a cross-section of all procurators. And, as Pavis-D'Escurac points out, only one prefect had held a subordinate procuratorship in the prefecture of the annona in his earlier career.

One other piece of evidence can be adduced to underline the amateurish nature of the top levels of Roman imperial administration: the amount of his working capacity which an official devoted to his office. That senators were amateurish in this regard is not usually doubted, but sometimes equestrians are thought to have been more professional. Two considerations are relevant to the proportion of the procurator's working capacity which was devoted to official business: how many years of his life he was actually holding office and then how much of his day was devoted to duties while holding office. In answer to the first question, it may be noted that most procurators held only a few procuratorial offices during their lives. The fragmentation of our evidence
makes a precise knowledge of years spent in office impossible, but several indicators are available. Of the thirty-four complete procuratorial careers listed in Table I, seventeen held three or fewer offices. This sample of careers, however, is not representative: most of those included in it (two-thirds) reached the Palatine offices or the great prefectures and this usually is the way we know for certain that the procuratorial career was completed. Thus the median of between three and four procuratorships per career must significantly overestimate the median for all procurators. This generalization can be confirmed in another way. By the reign of Hadrian the number of procuratorships in each of the three pay levels was roughly equal (34 ducenariate, 35 centenariate, 35 sexagenariate). This filling out of the bottom of the procuratorial hierarchy has been thought to be a development which permitted smooth promotion up through the ranks. The problem with such a view is that, while equites tended to hold an average of about one sexagenariate post and one centenariate post, at the ducenariate level they held nearly three offices on average (2.7). The clear corollary of this fact is that, unless tenure of the ducenariate posts was significantly shorter than lower posts, there simply were not enough ducenariate posts to allow many equites to pursue their careers beyond the centenariate level. Indeed, it looks as if somewhat less than half of the procurators during the second century and somewhat more than half during the third century could have pursued their careers beyond the centenariate rank. This would usually have meant holding two or fewer offices. In other words, while some equites spent many years in procuratorships, many, perhaps most, held only one or two, devoting just a few
years of their lives to the bureaucracy.

As for the second question about working capacity, while a satisfactory answer cannot be given, a few passages indicate that the offices were not very demanding. In a letter to Baebius Macer, Pliny the Younger explained how his uncle was able to write seven works comprising 102 books while enjoying the amicitia of the emperor and fulfilling officia maxima. The answer lay in Pliny the Elder's daily routine: he awoke in the middle of the night and began his scholarly work by lamplight; before dawn he went to visit Vespasian and then to his official duties (perhaps as prefect of the Misenum fleet); he then returned home to study; after a light meal he read while sunning himself; next a bath, a short sleep and more literary work until dinner during which he listened to a reader. Though the younger Pliny selected Rome as the setting for his uncle's normal day here, since many of the 102 books were written during his uncle's tour of duty in the provinces, Pliny must have intended the reader to understand that a similar daily routine made possible their production. It appears, then, that even for the conscientious elder Pliny a senior procuratorship took up only a few hours of his day and barely impinged on his studies. If volume of time is used as an indicator, Pliny was an aristocratic scholar, not a bureaucrat, despite the number of procuratorships he held.

Much the same thing can be said about Seneca's friend, the equestrian Lucilius, who is characterized as industrious. In the preface to the fourth book of his Naturales Quaestiones, Seneca wrote to Lucilius:

To judge from what you write, my excellent Lucilius, you like Sicily and the duty of a leisurely procuratorship. And you will continue to like it, if you are willing to
keep it within its own limits and not to make into imperium what is a procuratorship. I do not doubt that you will do this; I know how foreign ambition is to you and how familiar leisure and letters...49

Of course, not every procurator will have been as devoted to scholarship and literature as Pliny and Lucilius. But the point is that neither were thought to have been negligent: equestrian officia have to be placed within the context of a continuing aristocratic lifestyle.

If the senatorial and equestrian administrations were not specialized nor professional, then there is no reason to believe that the moral virtues which the sources claim to have been qualifications for office were mere platitudes behind which stood what we today would consider more important qualifications of technical competence.

Moreover, virtuous character was relevant to office-holding for very pragmatic reasons. First, virtuous character implied loyalty and, in view of the continuing possibility of rebellion, loyalty of imperial officials was the foremost need of the emperor. Cassius Dio's proposed education of senators and equites was aimed at inculcating loyalty. Dio of Prusa asserted that the king maintains his happy state, not so much by means of revenues and armies and his other sources of strength, as by loyalty of his friends. For no one, of and by himself, is sufficient for a single one of even his own needs; and the more and greater the responsibilities of a king are, the greater is the number of co-workers that he needs, and the greater the loyalty required of them, since he is forced to trust his greatest and most important interests to others or else to abandon them...50

Dio's assertion is probably not very controversial, but the connection between good character and loyalty ought to be underlined and set in the context of the ethic of reciprocity.

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As pointed out in the first chapter, the man of virtue responds to the grant of an office (a beneficium) with gratia expressed as loyalty.

Secondly, dispensation of justice in the provinces was thought to require good character more than legal expertise. As pointed out above, many senatorial and equestrian officials did not have special legal training. Tacitus points out that it was not necessary: though Agricola lacked the "calliditatem fori", he was able to govern justly owing to his "naturalis prudentia". When dispensing justice he was "gravis intentus severus et saepius misericors". In other words, a good aristocrat was ipso facto a good judge. A passage from Philo's In Flaccum makes much the same point. Before beginning his polemic against Flaccus, the Prefect of Egypt, Philo praised him for his "λαμπροτέραν καὶ βασιλικὴν φύσιν." As features of this οὖν εἰς Philo cited the facts that "he carried himself proudly—for to a ruler pomp is very advantageous—, he judged important cases with those ἐν τῇ δέλτῃ, put down the overproud, prevented a promiscuous mass of humanity from being organized to the danger of the peace," etc. Clearly, in the ancient view aristocratic bearing and character were of direct importance to the first of the government's primary interests—law and the preservation of order.

To the second interest, collection of taxes, good character seems to have been relevant as well. As Brunt points out, few of the equestrian officials sent to Egypt, the most complex province financially, can have had much useful fiscal experience. The best that could be hoped for was that the equestrian official be reasonably intelligent and honest, at least vis-à-vis the imperial government. The implication of Philo's comments about
Placcus is that few prefects knew enough to control effectively the fiscal apparatus of Egypt. It seems to me indicative of Roman values that, while we rarely hear of a senator or equestrian praised for fiscal expertise and efficiency, we hear exorbitant praise for minor displays of honesty. In a letter to Maturus Arrianus, Pliny tells the tale of Egnatius Marcellinus' gloria. As quaestor,

he had in his possession a sum of money intended for the salary of the secretary allotted to him who had died before the day his salary was due; and, feeling strongly that he ought not retain this, he consulted the Emperor on his return, and with his permission the Senate, to know what was to be done with it. It was a small point but a genuine one.

For his honesty Marcellinus won the approbation of the Emperor and the Senate. Praise of honesty might, of course, be found in almost any era, but in the Roman world good character seems to be given precedence over technical competence.

The answer to the question about what the emperor looked for in his officials, then, is that he wanted men with general experience and good character. Neither senatorial nor equestrian careers were designed to produce professionals. Of course, in an emergency on the frontiers an experienced general might be needed, but in general the daily duties of aristocratic administrators did not require any special technical skills. In short, neither the ideology nor the pragmatic needs would seem to have been of a nature to encourage the suppression of patronage and the development of formal, impersonal evaluations of official performance.

How then did the emperor select his senatorial and equestrian officials? What institutional mechanisms did he have at his disposal? It should be said at the outset that the evidence
available to answer these questions is very fragmentary and so the conclusions will be tentative. Now the first point to be made is an obvious one: the emperor cannot usually have had first-hand experience of provincial administrators' performance of duties. So we must decide what sort of secondhand information was available and in what circumstances the emperor made his selection.

It has been suggested (and accepted by some historians) that once each year during the annual appointments period the emperor selected his officials on the basis of confidential files which the ab epistulis kept for every aristocrat in the emperor's service. If this suggestion is true, it carries important implications for both the significance of patronage and more generally the level of rationalization in the imperial government. It would mean, for example, that successful candidates would not have been aware of the source of their success in securing an appointment and hence less likely to treat the authors of their recommendations as patrons.

The evidence for an annual appointments period can be briefly reviewed. Pflaum based this suggestion on the following passage from Suetonius' Life of Domitian,\(^{55a}\)

Domitian presented many extravagant entertainments (spectacula) in the amphitheater and Circus. Besides the usual two-horse and four-horse chariot races he staged a couple of battles, one for infantry, the other for cavalry; a sea-fight in the amphitheater; wild-beast hunts; gladiatorial shows by torchlight in which women as well as men took part. Nor did he ever forget the Quaestorian Games which he had revived... Throughout every gladiatorial show (omne spectaculum) Domitian would chat, sometimes in very serious tones, with a little boy who had a grotesquely small head and always stood at his knee dressed in red. Once he was heard to ask the child: "Can you guess why I have just appointed Mettius Rufus Prefect of Egypt?"\(^{56}\)

From this anecdote Pflaum dates the appointment of Mettius Rufus
to just before the Quaestorian Games and so assigns the annual appointments period to the month of November. But the passage seems to say nothing of an annual appointments period, which is otherwise undocumented, nor does it imply that Mettius Rufus was appointed just before the Quaestorian Games. Suetonius lists the games which Domitian sponsored including the Quaestorian Games and then says that at all of these gladiatorial shows Domitian conversed with the grotesque child to whom he put the question about Mettius Rufus. Suetonius does not intend us to understand that the incident occurred at the Quaestorian Games in particular.

The idea of a confidential file system supervised by the ab epistulis, as expressed by E. Birley, rests on a difficult passage from Statius' Silvae. The poem is at this point praising and glorifying Abascantus, Domitian's ab epistulis. The emperor is said to have placed on Abascantus' shoulders an immense burden, one part of which was the following:

praeterea, fidos dominus si dividat enses,  
pandere quis centum valeat frenare, maniplos  
inter missus eques, quis praecipisse cohorti,  
quam debeat clari praestantior ordo tribuni,  
quism nam frenigerae signum dare dignior alae;  

Adding this passage to several of Pliny's commendationes to Trajan (Epist. 10.85-87), Birley concludes that "such reports [as Pliny's] would inevitably pass through the hands of the Emperor's secretary ab epistulis, and be filed by him; and that explains how in the military sense he came to act as Adjutant-General and Military Secretary, responsible--as we learn from a famous passage in Statius (Silvae 5.1.94f.)--for all military appointments, from direct commissions as centurions upwards..." Birley is not explicit about how he would translate the passage, but his conclusion about the file system would suggest that he interprets it as Millar
(who does not necessarily accept all of Birley's argument) does: this passage shows the ab epistulis "receiving news of events and, apparently, reports on individuals and making them known ('pandere')"—presumably to the emperor. 60

This would seem to be a misinterpretation of the passage. The grammar permits, but does not compel Millar's understanding; the subjunctive valeat can be an anticipatory subjunctive ("to make known who would be capable of controlling a century"), but it can equally be a subjunctive in indirect question ("to make known who has the power to control a century"). On the first hypothesis the emperor is the object to whom the information is made known; on the second, the understood object is the appointee and presumably any other interested party.

Though the grammar is not compelling one way or the other, it seems to me that the passage is better understood by adopting the second translation (which the Budé edition accepts). Statius limits the appointments in which the ab epistulis is involved to relatively minor equestrian militiae and centurionates. Given the interest in glorifying Abascantus, the limitation to minor posts demands some explanation, and no satisfactory answer can be given on the hypothesis that Statius is referring to the receipt by the ab epistulis of confidential reports concerning all officials, senior as well as junior. Birley attempts to explain the limitation: "Statius himself, indeed, seems to confine such appointments to the centurionate and the three equestrian military grades, but it will be recalled that Vespasian owed his command of II Augusta to the influence of Claudius' ab epistulis, the freedman Narcissus..." 61 The implication here is that Statius was simply being arbitrary in his reference to junior military...
posts only, and that the ab epistulis was responsible for files on men as important as legionary legates. But the passage concerning Vespasian and Narcissus will not bear the weight of this argument. It contains nothing about a file: Vespasian got the appointment "Narcissi gratia", just as Otho's grandfather reached the senate "per gratiam Liviae Augustae" or Seneca received a praetorship by the influence of Agrippina. Personal proximity to the emperor in each case, not oversight of a confidential file system, opened up avenues of influence. There is no reason to believe that Statius arbitrarily avoided mention of senior offices, and so we are still left to ask why he included only the group of four minor posts when his goal was the glorification of Abascantus.

The second translation offers a solution to the problem. Pandere here means "make known" in the sense of "rédaction et expedition des lettres de nomination" and has nothing to do with a file system. The reason for including only minor posts is that, according to Vegetius, more senior appointees were notified by codicil "per epistulam sacram Imperatoris".

If personnel files were kept for aristocratic administrators, our ignorance of them is complete. Birley suggests that the files comprised confidential reports of which Pliny's letters 85, 86a, 86b, and 87 are examples. Now the last lines of letters 85, 86a and 86b suggest that such letters were written regularly, but the content does not reveal a serious evaluation of a subordinate's performance and Birley's suggestion that these commendationes were meaningful reports does not seem justified. In letter 85 Maximus, an imperial freedman, is recommended to Trajan as probus, industrius, diligens and disciplinae tenacissimus.
In the next letter Gavius Bassus, the praefectus orae Ponticae, is said to be integer, probus, industrius and reverentissimus mei. Though there is some difficulty in reading the name, it is perhaps Fabius Valens who is described as possessing iustitia and humanitas in letter 86b. In letter 87 an appointment is requested for Nymphidius Lupus who is said to be probus and industrius and whose father was a friend of Pliny. On the surface, these letters would not seem to have the characteristics of confidential reports: nothing is said about performance of particular duties and it is difficult to see anything in the contents requiring secrecy. Indeed, given the banality of the adjectives and the complete absence of anything resembling a critical evaluation, it is impossible to imagine how an emperor, faced with a pile of such recommendations, could have made any appointment on the basis of objective merit. Sherwin-White, nevertheless, argues that these letters can be read as meaningful reports.

Pliny uses stock epithets, but qualifies or varies them, so that Trajan can read between the lines, as in Ep. 85. Maximus /the subject of the letter under examination/ is accorded neither the integritas of Bassus (86a) and Rosianus Geminus (Ep. 26.2), nor the reverentissimus mei of the former, which quality Ep. 27 suggests that he lacked. But he is allowed other qualities. The younger Lupus, who had not served under Pliny, is given the minimum, Ep. 87.3. None of these are recommended as strongly as the subject of Ep. 86b.

Sherwin-White's attempt to transform these commendationes into meaningful reports does not carry conviction. If Trajan "read between the lines", as suggested, then the implication is that every time a commendatio from Pliny came in, Trajan went to his files to find and compare all other recommendations from Pliny in order to judge what adjective was left out of the one under consideration (thus presupposing a fairly elaborate and otherwise
unattested cross-reference system). And then for his efforts Trajan would have been left with puzzles such as "what sort of man lacks integritas but possesses probitas?" or "should I prefer a man who is reverentissimus toward Pliny to one who is disciplinae tenacissimus?" Sherwin-White's feeling is that the strongest recommendation was given to the subject of 86b, yet by the suggested technique of "reading between the lines", this man might be thought to lack integritas, probitas, disciplina, reverentia and industria. Clearly, this technique leads to absurdities—these letters were not intended to be read as critical evaluations of merit.

In sum, it seems that none of the regular mechanisms postulated by historians for selection of meritorious candidates is securely attested. It may have been customary for governors to give their subordinates commendationes to carry to the emperor, but the content of Pliny's recommendations suggests that they were not designed to provide the emperor with a critical and discriminating report. Nor is there any reason to believe that these letters were edited in order to remove any more substantive content.67 This is not to say that the letters were meaningless, but rather that they, like the information received from oral sources, must be understood in relation to the qualities sought and placed firmly in the context of a patronal society.

The difficulties arose for Sherwin-White, it seems, because he did not sufficiently stress the Republican tradition of recommendations on which Pliny was drawing. The language of his letters was descended directly from that found in the book of commendationes of Cicero. In different letters Cicero recommends men for modestia, humanitas and esteem for himself; or for humanitas,
These are but a few of the virtues which Cicero uses again and again undiscriminatingly throughout Book 13. No one would argue from these letters that probitas or humanitas here represent critical judgements of the client's objective merits; rather they are the common language of letters of patronage. So they are also in the commendationes of Pliny and those who came after him. Perhaps the clearest illustration of this is the fact that the same virtues seem to be cited irrespective of the office, honor or privilege requested (except that in the case of senatorial offices extra attention is devoted to noble birth). The message in each case is the same: "this man is a friend or client of mine and hence of worthy character." Indeed, it is this link in Roman thinking between friendship and good character which enables us to make sense of recommendations, both written and oral.

In modern recommendations it seems that the author attempts to persuade the reader of his candidate's objective merit based on some universally recognizable criteria. In Roman commendationes, by contrast, the personal relationship between patron and client is stressed and there is no attempt to be impartial. This is because the aristocratic qualities sought were manifested largely in the context of friendship and patron-client relationships. In other words, the recommender illustrates his client's loyalty, integrity and industry by reference to his display of those qualities in their mutual friendship.

Evidence of this connection between friendship and virtuous character can be found scattered throughout the literature of the Principate. Perhaps the best illustration comes from the commend-
ationes where, juxtaposed with the list of the protégé's virtues, is a description of the personal relationship between protégé and referee; frequently the description of the friendship overshadows the list of virtues. This leads Sherwin-White to comment on what he considers to be the irrelevance of much of what is said in the commendationes to holding office. But this may be to misunderstand Pliny's purpose: by his description of his friendship with Voconius Romanus or the loyalty displayed by Cornelius Minicianus Pliny illustrates his protégés' good aristocratic character.

Beyond what is actually expressed, the commendatio itself was an act of friendship and reflected on the protégé's character because in the Roman view a man's character is reflected in his friends. The clearest statement of this is in Pliny's letter to Minicius Fundanus on behalf of Asinius Bassus. Pliny asks Fundanus to take Bassus as his quaestor when elected consul. Bassus is recommended on the basis of his father's virtuous character, one reflection of which is the father's friendship with Pliny and Tacitus.

He is an exceptional person, the devoted admirer of every good citizen, of whom I hope I may count myself one. He is also the close friend of Cornelius Tacitus, and you know the sort of person Tacitus is. So, if you think highly of both of us, you should feel the same about Rufus [the father], since there is no stronger bond in friendship than similarity of character.

In a context of belief in guilt and virtue by association, the very fact that a man possessed a recommendation associated him with the worth of its author.

One of the few pieces of evidence for oral recommendations to the emperor suggests that the same assumption may have been prevalent in these circumstances as well. Pliny wrote to Clusinius Gallus
about his dead patron Corellius Rufus and his obligation to defend his daughter Corellia in court. Explaining his debt to Corellius, he wrote:

What a reputation he built up for me, personal and public, until it even reached the ears of the Emperor. For there was an occasion when a discussion arose before the Emperor Nerva about the promising young men of the day and several people were singing my praises; for a while Corellius kept the silence which used to give his words such weight, and then, in the impressive tones you will remember, "I must be moderate in my praise of Pliny," he said, "seeing that he has my advice for everything he does." In these words he paid me a tribute far beyond what I could have presumed to hope for, in implying that I did nothing which fell short of the highest wisdom, since I did everything with the advice of the wisest of men.74

The connection between virtue and the patron-protégé relationship is explicit here: Pliny's virtue (and so promise for a good career) was a direct result of his loyalty toward and imitation of a patron who himself had a reputation for noble character. Pliny's story suggests a second way in which the meaning of the recommendations depended on the patronal context. The emperor's evaluation of character references of such a general and subjective nature (being essentially testimonies of friendship) must have depended heavily on his own personal relationship with the referee. Corellius' judgement of Pliny carried weight precisely because he enjoyed the friendship and respect of Nerva. Further, the setting of Pliny's story suggests another way in which friendship between the emperor and the patron was important: amici such as Corellius had access to the emperor. This is especially important, since in another letter Pliny hints that important requests for beneficia on behalf of protégés were normally made in person, not by letter.75 This may well be why only a few letters requesting appointments or promotions to senatorial and procuratorial posts survive: much of the discussion about the character and
worth of men at this level must have gone on in the kind of setting depicted by Pliny--the emperor with a circle of friends discussing promising young men.

Altogether, it would seem that there is no reason to believe that the emperor did not treat equestrian and senatorial offices as gifts in his power to bestow. There is no strong evidence that any attempt was made in the Principate to transcend the particularistic criterion of patronage by the introduction of the universalistic and rational criteria of seniority and merit. Though the emperor no doubt considered merit, the Roman conception of merit was not such as to encourage impartial evaluation. Indeed, both the ideology and the mechanism of reporting, the commendatio, should be placed in the Republican tradition of patronage. The emperor sought officials who, in addition to general experience and energy, possessed the traditional qualities of good character. These characteristics were manifested in friendship and patron-client relationships, and so the commendatio, a testimony to loyal friendship, was a suitable instrument for reporting in a patronal society despite the banality of its objective content to the modern eye.
APPENDIX A: THE PROPORTION OF PROCURATORS ADVANCING FROM
THE CENTENARIATE TO THE DUCENARIATE LEVEL

This appendix is designed to show the steps by which it was
concluded that about one-half of the procurators holding
centenariate posts cannot have advanced to a ducenariate post.
The analysis will be done for the two periods 98-192 A.D. and
193-249 A.D. The one assumption required for the analysis is
that the tenure of office was the same on average at each level.
This seems reasonable: if the tenure of ducenariate posts was
longer than that of lesser posts, my conclusions are strengthened;
only if the ducenariate posts were held for significantly shorter
periods are the conclusions vitiated.

The first step is to work out an average of the number of
posts available at each level for the two periods. This is
done by taking the number of posts at each level by reign and
then averaging them after weighting each number according to the
length of the reign. So to arrive at the weighted average of
ducenariate posts available for the period 98-192, we use the
equation:

\[ \sum_{\text{Commodus}} \frac{\text{no. of CC posts}\text{emperor}\times \text{length of reign}\text{emperor}}{\text{total no. of years in the period}} \]

or

\[ \frac{(34 \text{ CC posts} \times 19 \text{ years})+(34 \times 21)+(35 \times 22)+(33 \times 19)+(36 \times 12)}{94} = 34 \]

So on average there were 34 ducenariate posts available during
the period 98-192. If the same equation is used for centenariate
and sexagenariate posts, we derive the averages 38 and 35
respectively.76

The next step is to calculate the average number of offices
held by each office-holder at a given level. In our period
29 procurators whose careers are shown in Table I held 77 ducenariate posts, or an average of 2.7 posts per man. The averages for centenariate and sexagenariate posts are 1.2 and 1.4 posts per man respectively.

If we then divide the number of posts per man into the number of posts at a given level, we arrive at the average number of posts open to new men being promoted into a given level. Thus in each notional appointment period some 25 sexagenariate posts opened up to men who had not held a sexagenariate post before. Also some 32 centenariate posts, but only about 13 ducenariate posts. The difference between the turnover rate of the sexagenariate and centenariate levels is not surprising, since in this period a significant group of equites went straight into the centenariate level without holding sexagenariate posts. Quite clearly, however, there was a bottleneck between the centenariate and ducenariate levels. Well under half of the 32 men leaving the centenariate level every notional period could have found their ways into the 13 ducenariate posts available. These figures surely underestimate the bottleneck, for in addition to centenariate procurators, primipilarii bis filled procuratorships at the ducenariate level. The conclusion seems reasonable: most procuratorial "careers" stopped short of the ducenariate level and this usually entailed holding only two or perhaps three procuratorships.

The parallel figures for the period 192-249 A.D. are as follows: 36 ducenariate, 57 centenariate and 75 sexagenariate posts; an average of 1.8 ducenariate posts per holder, 1.8 centenariate posts per holder and 2.0 sexagenariate posts per holder. The situation has changed from the second century.
about the same number of offices is held by each man at each level. But since the number of offices at the lower levels has increased, there is still a bottleneck. An average of 20 ducenariate, 32 centenariate and 38 sexagenariate posts are opening up in each notional appointment period. It would look as if the bottleneck were less severe except for the fact that Pflaum's catalogue suggests an increase in the number of primipilarii bis advancing to ducenariate posts in this period.

The figures in this appendix are not meant to be exact, but the conclusion nevertheless emerges with some clarity. In the earlier period ducenariate procurators held significantly more posts at this level than procurators at the lower levels. There were not more ducenariate posts available and so unless the tenure of ducenariate posts was much shorter than others, most procurators cannot have gone on from the centenariate to the ducenariate level.
IV

THE ROMAN IMPERIAL ARISTOCRACY

Seneca devoted the longest of his moral essays to the subject of beneficia—that is, reciprocal exchange. Concerning the importance of exchange to the fabric of society, the philosopher noted that it was a custom "which more than any other binds together human society." Seneca's typology of beneficia comprised three categories: the protection of life and liberty of oneself and one's kin; pecunia and honores—less vital, but nevertheless "useful" for a full life; and favors which can be described as frivolous luxuries.

Studies of patronage in the Republic have concentrated on the political arena, especially the voting assemblies. Thus, when the selection of magistrates and the passage of legislation were effectively taken out of the hands of the assemblies, it has been thought by some that patronage should have disappeared. But this view does not take account of two facts: political competition shifted to another arena but did not disappear, and political support was only one type of beneficium, as indicated by Seneca. Indeed, during the late Republic political patronage is less prominent in the commendationes of Cicero than economic and social beneficia. As A.R. Hands has pointed out, the exchange of these latter favors often performed functions which are the concern of more formal institutions in the modern world. For patronage to have disappeared, the entire nature of Roman society (not just politics) would have had to undergo a radical transformation.
In this chapter I shall attempt to show that the exchange of economic and social goods and services within the imperial aristocracy continued largely unchanged from the end of the Republic. Further, our study of the imperial court has made it clear that political patronage also continued, though in a somewhat modified form. It has been left to this chapter to describe the resources of political patronage which remained in the hands of the imperial aristocracy. To some extent, the division between economic, social, and political is artificial: the upward mobility of municipal aristocrats and others seeking to make their ways in Rome required various combinations of economic and political aid. Nevertheless the analytical distinction is worth preserving for the sake of clarity and in order to emphasize the pervasiveness of reciprocal exchange in all walks of life. The remainder of the chapter will be devoted to an analysis of what kinds of people were bound together in patron-client relationships and in what contexts these relationships grew.

The economic aspect of patronage can be described under four headings (not mutually exclusive): loans and debts, gifts, legacies, and property transactions. It is a commonplace that during the late Republic aristocrats, especially senators, frequently faced liquidity problems. Owing to the fact that most of their wealth was invested in land, senators could have serious difficulties raising the cash required for lavish games or electoral bribery. The problem was partially solved by loans (often without interest) between amici, which created social and political, as well as financial obligations. The letters of Cicero show that patronal and amicitia bonds were useful for aristocrats in their roles both as borrowers and as creditors. The orator seems to have turned to friends and clients
for cash more frequently than bankers, the most famous instance being the 800,000 sesterces loan from Caesar. What is perhaps less often noted is Cicero's need to exercise influence as a creditor. Taking an aristocratic debtor/friend to court in order to compel repayment was an extreme and unpopular solution which entailed disgrace for the debtor and the end of the friendship. Cicero rarely mentions it as an option in his many letters concerned with debts. Instead, the creditor could turn to the debtor's kinsmen and mutual friends to apply social pressure; alternatively, he could attempt to transfer the debt to another creditor in a better position to exert pressure.

The heat of the political competition in the late Republic may have magnified the necessity for loans to advance senatorial careers. Though the competition may have cooled in the Principate, the need for financial help from friends remained. Tacitus reports that Curtius Rufus, a new man said by Tiberius to be "ex se natus", pursued a successful career with the financial help of friends. Many of the expenses of a career remained: the conspicuous consumption grew more extravagant in the first century A.D., games still had to be paid for, and even bribery, though it may have declined, did not disappear altogether. Seneca tells of Iulius Graecinus who, when receiving money from friends to meet the expenses of his praetorian games, refused to accept anything from Fabius Persicus and Caninius Rebilus on the grounds that he did not want to be under obligation to men of such infamia. Graecinus' action illustrates the importance attached to the social bond created by financial beneficia. That such beneficia were expected from patrons and friends is suggested by a letter of Fronto. Gavius Clarus, Fronto's senatorial protégé, was compelled by financial need to travel to Syria.
in order to secure a legacy. Fronto wrote a commendatio to Lucius Verus, then on campaign in the East, requesting all possible help for Clarus. If his own fortune were more abundant, Fronto claims, he would obviate the need for the trip by providing Clarus with the required assistance in performing his "senatoris munia". 14

This sort of generosity contributed to an aristocrat's honor: it is noted in the Historia Augusta in praise of Antoninus Pius that before reaching the throne he used his fortune to help others by lending at the low interest rate of 4%. 15 Pliny lent money to the father of an otherwise unknown Calvina. When the father died, Pliny informed Calvina that he would pay off all other creditors and then write off the debts so that Calvina could take up the inheritance without hesitation—an "adfinitatis officium". 16 In this case a loan was eventually turned into a gift. The distinction between loan and gift is not always made clear in the sources cited above. In view of the general obligation to repay beneficia, we may suspect that the nature of the financial transactions between close friends may not always have been specified and firm: whether the money became a loan or a gift depended upon the friend's eventual ability to repay, as well as his reliability. Thus Martial in several poems satirizes the way in which his friends invent excuses to avoid loans which may turn out to be gifts to himself and others of doubtful ability to pay and without security. 17

If social relationships provided avenues of approach to lenders, they also continued to be used to apply social pressure on debtors for repayment. For example, Pliny's protégé, Atilius Crescens, loaned an unspecified sum of money to Valerius Varus. The latter died leaving his estate to a certain Maximus. Pliny undertook to meet his patronal obligation of protecting Crescens by writing to
priscus, a mutual friend: "Varus' heir is our friend Maximus, and, as you are closer to him than I am, I ask, or rather demand in the name of our amicitia, that you see to it that Atilius recovers not only the principal but also the interest accumulated over the years." Default on the loan by Maximus would be understood as an insult to Crescens and also to Pliny as his protector. On a larger scale, loans by Roman aristocrats to provincials continued in the Principate. It seems reasonable to assume that amici and protégés in provincial posts were exploited for aid in enforcing repayment, just as Brutus attempted to exploit his friendship with Cicero to secure the extortionate interest from Salamis. All of this evidence suggests that an aristocrat's financial success, or even survival, could depend on the wealth and influence of his friends and patrons.

Closely linked with loans, gifts were another form of status-raising generosity expected of aristocrats. Pliny's letters permit us to document for private individuals what public buildings and monuments attest for communities. Romatius Firmus, Pliny's family friend, received a gift of 300,000 sesterces which quadrupled the value of his estate and gave him equestrian status. Here the connection between patronage and the prospects for social mobility is clear; since Firmus' new status was a gift from Pliny, Pliny warned him to enjoy it with discretion. This is only one of several examples of Pliny helping clients achieve higher statuses or maintain them with gifts. Metilius Crispus obtained a commission as a centurion with Pliny's support and also received 40,000 sesterces to purchase the necessary equipment. On at least two occasions Pliny provided large monetary gifts for dowries to enable daughters of friends to enter into prestigious marriages in style. These substantial gifts should be understood in a social context in which the
Priscus, a mutual friend: "Varus' heir is our friend Maximus, and, as you are closer to him than I am, I ask, or rather demand in the name of our amicitia, that you see to it that Atilius recovers not only the principal but also the interest accumulated over the years." Default on the loan by Maximus would be understood as an insult to Crescens and also to Pliny as his protector. On a larger scale, loans by Roman aristocrats to provincials continued in the Principate. It seems reasonable to assume that amici and protégés in provincial posts were exploited for aid in enforcing repayment, just as Brutus attempted to exploit his friendship with Cicero to secure the extortionate interest from Salamis. All of this evidence suggests that an aristocrat's financial success, or even survival, could depend on the wealth and influence of his friends and patrons.

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honor of a man's kin, friends and dependents reflects on his own standing.\textsuperscript{24}

Pliny's gifts worth tens and even hundreds of thousands of sesterces cannot have been normal, daily occurrences (though there is no reason to believe that the letters preserve evidence of all his large gifts).\textsuperscript{3} Martial's poems yield a glimpse of the ordinary gift-exchange which was part of Roman aristocratic life. Patrons and friends sent out gifts, especially during the Saturnalia and on birthdays. Advocates, poets and others who supplied services without fixed fees looked forward to these occasions for their reward.\textsuperscript{25} The variety of gifts seems to have been enormous: Martial himself speaks of receiving,\textit{ inter alia}, an estate, a carriage, roof tiles, a fine cloak, silver plate, and a cup which he ridicules.\textsuperscript{26} After the death of Domitian Martial returned to his native Spain—the travelling expenses being paid by Pliny "in recognition of their friendship and the verses which he composed about [Pliny]."\textsuperscript{27}

Gift-exchange is so pervasive in human cultures that its existence cannot in itself tell us anything very significant about Roman society. What is interesting is that the living standard of a number of people in Rome depended on gifts. For others, gifts (of, for example, ordinary foodstuffs) were of more symbolic than real value, expressions of clients' loyalty. The constant exchange of such gifts with friends and dependents beyond the kinship group served as a reminder and reinforcement of differences of status, as we shall see later.\textsuperscript{28}

As we have already noted with respect to the emperor, legacies constituted the final gifts in exchange relationships. In Cicero's day legacies made important contributions to men's fortunes.\textsuperscript{29} After the end of the lucrative conquests they must have become
relatively more important: most aristocrats could no longer make their fortunes by the capture of booty and they turned instead to the capture of legacies. Notoriously, Seneca accumulated enormous wealth after his return from exile. Suillius Rufus levelled the accusation that this fortune derived from usury in Italy and the provinces, and from inheritances from the childless in Rome—-an accusation not at all implausible for an associate of the emperor. Most would not have been as successful as Seneca, but legacies nevertheless made notable contributions to their estates. Fliny was named in a number of wills; one inheritance alone was valued at the senatorial census requirement. It will be remembered that Cavius Clarus travelled to Syria to collect an inheritance which Fronto suggests he needed to keep up his senatorial lifestyle.

A man "captured" legacies by seeking to enter into amicitia or patron-client relations with the wealthy, and especially the childless. When Aper lists the advantages of advocacy in the Dialogus, he suggests that the effective orator can develop a following of people of all ranks owing to his talent and not to his wealth or lack of children. The implication is that amici and clientes naturally congregated around the childless hoping for a legacy. The practice was widely condemned. Seneca wrote: "I call the man ingratus, who sits at the bedside of a sick man about to make his will and finds room for any thought of an inheritance or a legacy. He should do everything which a good friend mindful of his duty ought to do: but if hope of gain haunts his mind, he is a fisher of legacies who is dropping his hook." Fliny later echoed these sentiments about generosity in the hope of final profit. Apparently not even the imperial family was immune from it: Marcus Aurelius' great aunt Matidia disappointed all those paying court to
her fortune by leaving it to others.36 Such legacy-hunting provided rich material for the humor of Martial: in one epigram, for instance, Charinus is asked to stop opening his will and rewriting it since the poet can no longer afford to send gifts each time; and in another Oppianus is chided for sending a gift to Salanus after the death of his only son and heir.37

Paradoxically, to hunt legacies was base, yet to receive legacies was an honor, an expression of esteem from friends and kin. Thus Seneca, only a few pages after condemning legacy-hunting, suggested that gratitude for services rendered was expressed most selflessly in testamenta, since there could be no ulterior motives.38 Pliny's pride in being named in wills along with Tacitus is unmistakable:39 As proof of Antoninus Pius' pietas towards his family, it is noted that he was honored by legacies from distant, as well as close relatives.40

One final financial aspect should not be overlooked: the use of patrons, clients and friends in property transactions. When Cicero sought an estate upon which to build a memorial to Jullia, he used Atticus to contact friends who might be persuaded to sell.41 In his role as protector of Suetonius Pliny similarly helped to locate an estate suitable for a literary protégé, and then used his influence to ensure that it was sold at a reasonable price. Later, the sister of Pliny's patron, Corellius Rufus, indicated to Pliny that she wanted to purchase an estate near Comum. When Pliny inherited a suitable piece of property, he sold it to her as a favor at 20% below the market price.42 In addition to beneficia such as these, amici seem also to have provided a kind of fire insurance for an aristocrat's property.43

Altogether, this evidence suggests that loans, debts, gifts
and property transactions should be understood in the context of aristocratic exchange relationships and Roman values of honor and prestige. Unfortunately, these examples cannot show just how embedded financial affairs were in the social milieu. Thus, any suggestion about the overall effect of patronage on the economy must be somewhat conjectural. But it may be useful to keep in mind the hypothesis of Pitt-Rivers regarding early modern Spain. He has pointed out that the development of "the spirit of capitalism" (i.e., a mentality interested in capital accumulation and productive investment) is antithetical to and hindered by patronal values which encourage the utilization of wealth primarily as a means of social domination in personal relationships. 44

The preceding discussion makes the artificiality of separating economic and social exchange obvious. As we have suggested, the patron's economic beneficia were often repaid by increased social prestige. These social aspects of patronal exchange deserve fuller consideration.

The most basic premise from which the Romans started was that honor and prestige derived from the power to give what others needed or wanted. 45 Competition for honor and the resulting social subordination were natural parts of life. This is apparent in Pliny's letters to his clients. Sherwin-White comments upon the "Roman lack of delicacy" displayed in Pliny's letter to Calvina concerning his loans to her father and his gifts to her. 46 While Pliny's language may shock modern egalitarian sensibilities, it is much less clear that it would have been offensive to Calvina living in a patronal society in which no pretense was made about equality. 47

The social consequences of patronal exchange are made clear by several corollaries of the above premise. First, in return for

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beneficia one of the client's duties was to publicize it, along with other honorable acts by the patron.48 While quaestor in Asia Egnatius Marcellinus performed an act of financial honesty which the emperor and senate thought noteworthy. Since the equestrian Maturus Arrianus had previously commended his amicus Marcellinus to Pliny, Pliny sent news of the glorious deed back to his protégé in Northern Italy. Pliny recommended that Arrianus add his congratulations to the rest: "everyone who is influenced by thoughts of fama and gloria takes great pleasure in words of praise and appreciation even from lesser men (minoribus) [like yourself]."49 In one of Fronto's letters we find an even clearer example of reputation-building as an element of exchange. After Avidius Cassius' successes on campaign in the East about 165, his tribune Iunius Maximus returned to Rome with news of the victory. In addition to the public announcement, Maximus fulfilled his officium to his amicus by making the rounds to private houses with word of the exploits in order to build Cassius' reputation further. In a commendatio Fronto told Cassius of this and concluded: "he is worthy to enjoy your esteem and to be enhanced by your patronage (suffragiis). You will add to your own glory in the measure that you build the dignitas of your eulogist."50

A client, by publicizing his patron's beneficia, also advertised his own inferiority. If the client was not attempting to compete for honor as an equal, the acknowledgement of subordination need not have presented any problems (Aristaeus seems to have had no qualms about writing verses about his dependence). On the other hand, the response of amici in competition might be quite different. Aristocrats sometimes rejected gifts altogether from those whose equality or superiority they refused to concede, as the action of Iulius...
Graecinus illustrated. If compelled by need to accept, Seneca tells us, some men refuse to acknowledge their debt publicly, and so show themselves to be ingrati. Such men may also attempt to repay their debt immediately and absolve themselves of any obligation. Finally, Seneca indicates that some benefactors preferred to forego repayment rather than accept the return and hence sacrifice the symbol of their superiority. These passages make it clear that, given the basic premise above, the exchange of beneficia had a direct bearing on the dynamics of social status in aristocratic circles.

In the Republic the client's presence at the morning salutation was a symbol of respect for his patron and a means of honoring him. Seneca, Martial, Tacitus and Juvenal attest that this most public manifestation of honor and prestige continued in the Principate. Attending a patron at the salutatio and throughout the day during his public business was one of the four ways listed by Martial in one epigram for a municipal migrating to Rome to earn his subsistence. In his day the going rate for attendance at the salutation was 100 quadrans. Pliny tells of how two of his nomenclatores were paid three denarii each to add their applause in a legal hearing. Clientes were also paid to attend their patron's dinners and suffer his abuse as entertainment. Martial would have us believe that the life of a client was a rough and tiring one.

Discussions of salutationes at aristocratic houses usually concern the lower-class clientes. What is rarely noted is the attendance of aristocrats paying their respects. Martial writes of a senator out in the early morning "treading innumerable thresholds" in the hope of securing a consulship. Both he and Juvenal complain of the unfair competition created by senators for the ordinary
These passages might be attributed to comic exaggeration, were it not for other evidence. In a letter to Lucilius Seneca casually mentions that a distinguished eques Cornelius Senecio customarily called on him early in the morning. Plutarch, with reference to provincials seeking governorships and procuratorships in Rome, talks of men who "grow old haunting the doors of other men's houses"—clearly a reference to salutations. The survival of the custom into the third century is proven by an unambiguous passage from Dio: before his fall in 205 the praetorian prefect Plautianus invited friendly senators into his house in the morning "in advance of the general throng of those who came to pay Plautianus their respects." This attendance was used as proof of association which proved painful or even fatal for some of the senators. Clearer evidence could not be hoped for of the continuation not only of patronage but also of the basic customs associated with it.

In our discussion in the first chapter we noted that legal services constituted part of an aristocrat's stock of beneficia. Aper's review in the Dialogus of the profits accruing to a successful orator must be placed in the context of a patronal society: effective oratory allowed one to protect amici and clientes and to build a prestigious and financially profitable following. Paternal help with a legal hearing could also take the form of influencing the judge. Tacitus criticized Tiberius' interference in the courts which limited the influence and so the libertas of the potentes. In theory, then, emperors could use their powers (e.g., of hearing appeals) to usurp the legal beneficia of the aristocracy. But without the means of systematically reviewing the bulk of cases heard by governors and magistrates in Rome, the emperor's real capacity to suppress this sort of patronage must have been limited. Moreover
there is doubt about just how serious was the emperor's interest in suppression: there seems to have been no special policy of selection of appeal cases towards this or any other end. To the extent that the emperor spent his time listening to cases characterized by their "routine nature and often insignificant subject-matter", he infringed little on the sum of the legal jurisdiction exercised by Roman aristocrats throughout the empire. As we shall see in our study of provincial patronage, Fronto's letters written in an attempt to influence governors in their judicial capacities differ very little from Cicero's.

Even if he had wished to do so, the emperor was not in a position to usurp most of the aristocracy's economic and legal patronage resources owing to the lack of adequate centralized, hierarchical administrative machinery. Obviously the situation was different with regard to political patronage because of the discontinuity between Republican and imperial political institutions.

The emperor did not usurp all of the political beneficia: senatorial and equestrian officials were often left (de facto or de iure) to appoint subordinate officials. Ordinary consuls were apparently allowed to select their quaestors from the group of those elected. On the (mistaken) guess that Minicius Fundanus would be appointed consul the following year Pliny wrote to him, asking that his friend's son Asinius Bassus be appointed consul's quaestor. Pliny described the rank and character of Bassus' family so that Fundanus would know that by the beneficium of the appointment he would "put under obligation" a large and numerous family whose prestige would make it an honor to have a member as his quaestor. Consuls and praetors also had a more junior position at their disposal: they, like governors, appointed praefecti fabrum
during the first and second centuries. While the duties of the post are uncertain, its nature as a *beneficium* is clear from the fact that some of the appointments were honorary sinecures.68a

Most of Fliny's commendationes concerned with appointments were sent to provincial governors (both equestrian and senatorial). Though the emperor's formal approval was required, these officials were permitted to select their own civilian staff, including legates (in the case of proconsuls), assessors, *praefecti fabrum*, and *adiutores*.69 Fronto gives some indication of the kind of people which governors selected: after being chosen proconsul of Asia, "I took active steps to enlist the help of my friends in all that concerned the ordering of the province. Relations and friends of mine, of whose loyalty and integrity I was assured, I called from home to assist me." Fronto also called upon *familiares* from Alexandria, Cilicia and Mauretania.70 He had no sons, but other proconsuls with sons seem typically to have taken them out to their provinces as legates.71 This patronal custom of provincial government remained unchanged from the Republic.

As Ste. Croix points out, the letter of Fronto shows "what a vast amount of patronage a high official such as a provincial governor had it in his power to bestow."72 But great as his resources may have been as a proconsul, Fronto did not possess as large a stock of *beneficia* as governors with army commands who were able to fill equestrian military positions. Fliny wrote bluntly to his friend Priscus: "your command of a large army gives you a plentiful source of benefits to confer and your tenure has been long enough for you to have provided for your own friends."73 Thus Fliny suggested that it was only reasonable for Priscus now to bestow one of his *beneficia* on Fliny's friend Voconius Romanus. The tone of
the passage suggests that equestrian militiae were assumed to be patronal resources to be dispensed first to protégés and then to friends of friends.

The way in which these appointments could be used as rewards for clients is best illustrated by the Gallic inscription known as the Thorigny Marble. The stone was erected in 238 in honor of T. Sennius Sollemnis by the tres provinciae Galliae and was inscribed on three faces. The main face contained the dedication to Sollemnis with an account of his benefactions and honors, which included being the cliens of two governors of Lugdunensis—Claudius Paulinus, a leading senator, and Aedinius Iulianus, later praetorian prefect. On the other two faces were inscribed letters concerning Sollemnis written by these two men. From the letters we can reconstruct the sequence of events which led to Sollemnis' appointment as tribune under Claudius Paulinus during his governorship of lower Britain.

The first is a commendatio sent by Iulianus, now praetorian prefect, to the current equestrian governor of Lugdunensis, Badius Comnianus. Iulianus recommends Sollemnis as a useful friend for any governor with the following explanation: during Iulianus' administration accusations against the previous governor Paulinus were discussed in the provincial assembly with a view to a possible prosecution; Sollemnis announced that as a delegate he was not authorized by his city to initiate charges against Paulinus—on the contrary, his fellow citizens had only praise for the former governor; as a result, the charges were dropped; "this man I began to love and to approve of more and more." As might be expected, Sollemnis' reward from Paulinus was much more concrete. In the other inscribed letter Paulinus, now governor Britain, notified Sollemnis of his appointment as tribunus semestris, which he could take up when the position
became vacant. Paulinus sent ahead the salary of 25,000 sestertes, together with numerous luxurious gifts (the association of which is very suggestive).

The influence of patronage on the distribution of militiae seems often to be overlooked in discussions and comparisons of equestrian careers where comments about patronage in early careers are largely reserved for praefecti fabrum. In his catalogue of procuratorial careers, for example, Pflaum often remarks on the special senatorial patronage signalled by the latter office.75 Jarrett, in his study of African equites, wrote: "prospects for the man appointed as praefectus fabrum appear to have been extremely good, due no doubt to the senatorial patronage implicit in the appointment."76 The implication seems to have been drawn that praefecti fabrum were somehow specially favored with regard to patronage. Yet Jarrett's own figures for Africans show that praefecti fabrum were hardly more successful in proceeding to higher offices than the whole group of equestrian officers.77 Moreover, if the careers of the praefecti in Pflaum's catalogue are compared with other procuratorial careers, it becomes clear that the praefecti constitute a representative cross-section—no more and no less successful than other procurators.78 In short, just as the office of praefectus fabrum, equestrian militiae and other offices should be understood as signs of favor in as much as they were obtained through patronage.

At first sight these first-order resources left to senators and equestrians by the emperor might seem relatively unimportant owing to the subordinate nature of the positions. But their significance should not be underestimated. The single most common request in the corpus of commendationes extant from the Principate is for equestrian
militiae. More than half of those pursuing equestrian procurational careers in the first and second centuries began as equestrian officers; as a result of distributing militiae, senatorial governors (and their senatorial friends who sent the commendationes) established patronage bonds with potentially influential equites very early in their careers. Even those equestrians who held only one militia and then returned to their provincial cities could be useful clients, as the case of Sollemnis shows. Moreover, the commendationes suggest that the appointment of a client constituted a beneficium for his recommender who was also put under obligation. Thus, it is one more type of favor whose exchange cemented amicitia bonds between leading aristocrats. In his recommendation of Faustinianus for an equestrian post under Claudius Iulianus, Pronto wrote: "if I had had any children also of the male sex and these were of age for the discharge of military duties at this particular time, when you are administering a province with an army, my children should serve under you. This that each of us would desire will almost be fulfilled. For I love Faustinianus, the son of my friend Statianus, not less, and I desire him to be loved no less, than if he were my own son." It seems, then, that the exchange of such favors for clients was thought to play a role in aristocratic friendships.

These subordinate appointments (the first-order resources) were only part of a leading aristocrat's political beneficia. Often a patron's efficacy depended more on his second-order resources, i.e., his connections with those who directly controlled the appointments. It has already been suggested that, though the emperor took control of many political resources, he permitted his senatorial and other friends to act as his brokers for the distribution of
Needless to say, the most important single criterion governing a patron's power was his influence on imperial grants. The commendationes cited above indicate that another element in a patron's second-order resources were his links with other leading members of the aristocracy. While a senator could at most hope to be of direct assistance to his clients in one province at a time for only part of his life, through powerful amici who could be called upon for favors he could influence decisions throughout the empire. Fronto perhaps never enjoyed any first order political resources, yet he was able to secure appointments and to influence judgements from North Africa to lower Germany, and so was cultivated assiduously by a clientele.

With their economic, legal and political resources Roman aristocrats bound to themselves large clientes of men from all orines. The composition of the lower-class clients who were kept outside the doors of the great houses is impossible to determine. Fortunately, since the commendationes contained as a standard element a description of the patron's relationship with his protégé, we are able to describe how this part of the clientele was composed. From Pliny's and Fronto's letters emerge several main social groups from which patrons frequently drew their protégés: kin, fellow municipes, literary colleagues and students, and contubernales in military service.

Exchange between kin is normally excluded from patronage studies by anthropologists on the grounds that it is governed by a set of mores different from those of patronage relationships. This rationale is justified in the case of Rome for close relatives: a father bestowed beneficia on his son qua father, not qua patron. On the other hand, as the kin became more distant and their obligations
as kin less strong, close relationships between distant relatives may have been conceived of in terms of the roles of patron and protégé. To discover at what degree of kinship this change may have occurred would require a full study of kinship roles and exchange which lies outside the scope of this thesis. However, because of our interest in the distribution of beneficia and social mobility, the importance of kinship ties deserves a few rudimentary remarks.

A number of successful, prominent aristocrats of the Principate are known to have benefitted from the help of relatives, especially affines. A common avenue of entry into the Roman aristocracy for municipals was by marriage links with aristocratic families. Seneca and his brothers enjoyed the support of their aunt's husband, the Egyptian prefect C. Galerius, and the initial impetus for the younger Pliny's career came from his maternal uncle. Parallels to these two examples can be discovered in the epigraphic evidence. With entry into the aristocracy secured, families might hope for further marriage ties which would provide "decus ac robur"—the words of Tacitus for Agricola's marriage which could also have described his own. In Stein's Der Römische Ritterstand appear other examples of marriage bonds successfully negotiated by equestrians with senatorial families. We would like to have quantitative evidence to assign a relative importance to this type of bond in the patronage network, but it is, of course, lacking. These examples, however, should warn against the overemphasis on common literary and cultural interests found in some recent work.

Syme in his discussion of the entry of new families into the aristocracy lays stress on the patronage ties formed between men of common municipality or region. A survey of Pliny's clientele indicates that the emphasis is properly placed.
Romatius Firmus announcing a gift of 300,000 sesterces opened: "you and I both come from the same town, went to the same school, and have been friends since we were children. Your father was a close friend of my mother and uncle, and a friend to me too, as far as our difference in age allowed; so there are sound and serious reasons why I ought to try to improve your position." That Pliny took his patronal responsibility toward friends of common municipality or region seriously is seen clearly in a list of other such protégés: Maturus Arrianus, a Transpadane commended for an Egyptian staff position; Varisidius Nepos, a relative of a Comum friend and commended for a militia; Atilius Crescens from nearby Milan; Metilius Crispus, a decurion of Comum commissioned as a centurion at Pliny's request; Cornelius Minicianus, described as the "ornamentum regionis meae" and also recommended for an equestrian militia. Thus, the largest single group of Pliny's protégés were able to place themselves under his patronage as a result of the geographical proximity of their origins. Pliny himself had earlier reaped the benefits of this custom, enjoying the patronage of two leading Transpadane senators, Verginius Rufus and Corellius Rufus (a family friend of Pliny's mother).

Several of his local friends were also linked with Pliny by common literary and educational interests, and in Fronto's commendations literary students and friends are predominant. Education and literary culture supplied several different contexts for the development of patron-protégé relationships. During childhood schoolmates formed close friendships which could endure for life. Explaining his obligation to help promote Voconius Romanus' career, Pliny wrote in a commendatio to Friscus: "he was my close and intimate friend when we were students together, my contubernalis
inside the city and out of it; with him I shared everything, work and play."98 This passage illustrates why schools were conducive to the development of close amicitiae.

Many of Fronto's protégés were students who lived with him and studied oratory. After their education Fronto continued to take an interest, helping to promote their careers and interests. One particular aspect of this aid was the introduction of his students into the law courts of the forum: for instance, Sardius Lupus, "having been instructed in the noble arts" was introduced into the forum from Fronto's house and contubernium.99 It was not always the teacher who took responsibility for the introduction, and sometimes the apprenticeship involved in the introduction provided a context in which patron-protégé relationships grew as the protégé accompanied his patron in public.100 Pliny wrote to a legal client requesting permission for Cremutius Ruso to appear with him at the hearing: "this is my usual way of treating young men of distinction, for I take special pleasure in introducing promising young people to the courts and setting them on the path to fame."101 In another letter Pliny claimed that the past tradition of the need for an introduction into court by a consular was declining, but clearly this patronal custom had not entirely died out by Fronto's day.102

In addition to oratory and the courts, literary culture and circles provided common interests out of which grew friendships. We have already noted in the first chapter that men like Pliny and Titinius Capito assumed patronal responsibility for the young literateurs in their circles.103 The sum of the evidence, especially from Fronto, has led to strong statements in recent studies about the importance of literary education and talent for social mobility.104 While their significance should not be underestimated, several
qualifying remarks should be added. It may be admitted that a certain minimum of Latin education was necessary for entry into the aristocracy, but that does not by itself warrant singling out literary cultivation as a chief determinant of success. Pflaum began his study of Fronto's correspondents with a warning that the composition of his friends and clients should not be thought typical owing to his position as leading orator and teacher of oratory of the day. In Pliny's descriptions of his protégés learning and eloquence are somewhat less prominent. Iulius Naso, for example, in a typical commendatio is praised for befriending Pliny, for using him as a model of behavior, for accompanying his patron in court and to literary readings, and for reading Pliny's literary efforts. Naso's own literary talent receives no mention, and literary culture apparently plays a role in the patronage relationship to the extent that it allows one among several opportunities for Naso to display his loyalty. In view of Pliny's strong literary interests, even his group of protégés is probably not representative. Pliny himself indicates that many aristocrats' interests in literature were less intense than his, and Tacitus' report of Suillius' attack on Seneca may suggest the existence of resentment in certain circles towards the arrogant bookishness of some senators. The importance of literary culture in Rome should not be denied, but it would be a mistake to lose sight of the fact that our evidence for aristocratic society has been observed almost exclusively through the eyes of litterateurs.

Through commendationes young aristocrats secured military and civilian staff positions under governors with whom they may have had no special relationship previously. During their service it was expected that a friendship would develop from their contubernium
and the young man would enjoy the patronage of his superior in his later career. Avidius Cassius' responsibility for promoting the career of his tribune Iunius Maximus has been discussed. Similarly Iunius Avitus' service with Iulius Ursus Servianus in Germany yielded a friendship with the result that Avitus accompanied him to his next command in Pannonia.108

The above account of situations in which patronage flourished is, of course, not comprehensive: every contact between Romans could develop into a reciprocal exchange relationship. Flautianus, for example, is said to have taken notice of Macrinus' πρὸς τὸν προστάτην while the latter was pleading a friend's case before him in court; as a result, Macrinus was taken on as Flautianus' personal procurator.109 Nevertheless, the four basic contexts discussed recur in a way which attests to their importance both for the Roman aristocracy and (as we shall see) for the provincial aristocracies as well.110

Having described the web of personal relationships in Roman aristocratic society, we can give some consideration to its political and social consequences. Obviously, it would be impossible in the space available to discuss each political event in which patronage can be documented or conjectured. Rather, the aim is to point out some of the general implications for approaches to understanding the history of the Principate.

In chapter two it was suggested that the notion of the emperor exploiting antipathies between ordines to secure his own power faces serious objections in as much as the emperor used senators as brokers for the distribution of equestrian offices.111 However we evaluate the emperor's intentions, the possibility remains that class (or ordo) interests and consciousness existed. The evidence adduced in this chapter, however, suggests that they did not constitute

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a strong force directing the course of imperial history.

The bonds between the senatorial and equestrian orders were so numerous that it cannot be doubted that they were fully integrated socially and culturally. In addition to the numerous kinship ties, documented by Stein, there was a constant exchange of beneficia between senators and equites. As we have noted, large numbers of equites depended on senatorial patronage for their first appointments, the equestrian militiae. It is revealing that even as important an equestrian as C. Calvisius Statianus (about to be appointed ab epistulis Latinis and then Egyptian prefect) turned to Fronto to secure a militia for his son Faustinianus. In Fliny's letters we can find a reversal of the situation with a leading senator putting himself under obligation to the Egyptian prefect, Vibius Maximus, with a request for a staff position for a protégé.

These are but two of the many amicitia and patronage relationships which can be documented between leading senators and equites. Praetorian prefects from Sejanus to Flautianus are known to have had senatorial followings, and one of Fronto's letters of gratitude was addressed to the prefect Cornelius Repentinus. Perhaps the best single example of the unity of the aristocratic network concerns Fronto's friend Niger Censorius. Owing to the abuse expressed in Censorius' will toward Gavius Maximus, Censorius posthumously fell out of favor with Pius. In defense of his friendship with Censorius Fronto felt compelled to write an apology to the emperor. "When I first came to be his friend, his strenuous achievements, civil and military, had already won him the love of others. Not to mention his other friends, he was on the most intimate terms with Marcius Turbo and Erucius Clarus, who were both eminent men in the front rank, the one of the Equites, the other of the Senators."
lying this passage is Fronto's assumption of two paths to high honors, but a single network of amici and a single set of values concerning honor and friendship. In view of this unity, it seems to me that any historical explanation relying on attitudinal differences or hostilities between the senatorial and equestrian orders will require concrete evidence of divisions along ordo lines for justification.

In explanations about the development of the familia Caesaris (similar to those about the equestrian bureaucracy), it is frequently claimed that the emperors turned to their freedmen for administrators because their loyalty could be trusted. This may be true on the whole, but imperial freedmen were not completely isolated from the web of aristocratic social relationships and hence independent. Fronto in a letter to Marcus Aurelius described his attachment to the imperial freedman Aridelus and recommended him for a procuratorship. Whether this sort of patronage was a strong influence on careers in the familia Caesaris is difficult to say and requires further study. Certainly patronage relationships between aristocratic officials and liberti Augusti cannot be thought unusual. In a dedication to the procurator C. Postumius Saturninus Flavianus, Victor, a libertus Augustorum, described himself as a cliens. The inscription does not indicate whether Victor was serving in a subordinate post, but other Imperial freedmen who dedicated stones to aristocratic officials clearly were. If, as Dio indicates, emperors were motivated to appoint freedmen (and equestrian) assistants in order to have watchdogs, the efficacy of the policy must have been partially undermined by such patronal ties.

In general, then, it seems to me that we should be wary of structural interpretations of the Principate which are based on interactions between what might be called horizontal groups (that is, •157-
groups of people of similar class or status backgrounds, or with common interests and consciousnesses). In ancient society the personal vertical bonds between individuals of different orders were usually predominant, discouraging the development of any class consciousness or horizontal group action. This has been increasingly emphasized in Republican studies with regard to the so-called conflict between senatorial and equestrian orders, and in recent work in political science it has been argued that the "group theory of politics" is in principle of limited value for the understanding of patronal societies. But these views do not yet seem to have made an impact on traditional ideas about the Principate.

Finally, we can turn to the political and social significance of patronage within the senatorial order. During the Republic a senator's political effectiveness was related to the strength of his clientele and the power of his amici. With the emergence of a single princeps this was changed and proximity to the emperor became the most important single determinant. While lower-class clienteles lost most of their relevance to political power after 14 A.D., a man's senatorial following continued to have political value. Some senatorial magistracies continued into the second century to be filled by free elections in the senate, and a senator's amici and protégés could be decisive for his own promotion or that of his protégés. Julius Naso's career suffered a setback when he lost his father and his father's connections. But in Pliny Naso found a patron who would call on his friends for help with canvassing for Naso's election.

Perhaps more important than elections, political trials in the senate could be decisively influenced by the extent and power of a man's amici. In many trials, of course, the emperor's attitude was
the critical factor, but when the emperor abstained from intervention, a man's amici could protect him from prosecution or secure his acquittal.\(^{125}\) When Pliny threatened to prosecute Publicius Certus, he was warned against it partially on the grounds of the danger from Certus' powerful amicitiae.\(^{126}\) We have suggested that childlessness produced clienteles of legacy-hunters. To such a clientele Tacitus ascribes the acquittal of Pompeius Silvanus, accused by Africans of maladministration. (Tacitus adds ironically that Silvanus outlived the fortune-hunters who voted in his favor.)\(^{127}\) Conversely, the support of amici could help to convict enemies.\(^{128}\)

The senate under the emperors continued the tradition of factional infighting which it inherited from the Republic. More generally, senators and equites can be said to have perpetuated Roman aristocratic culture—something which calls for explanation in view of the rapid turnover of senatorial families and the entry of provincials from diverse parts of the empire.\(^{129}\) Much of the cause should be attributed to the education of the provincial aristocracies in Graeco-Roman culture. But with regard to conservative senatorial mores in particular some of the responsibility should be ascribed to the patron-protegé relationship. During the Republic the traditions were learned as sons of the great senatorial houses accompanied their fathers in their public affairs. The great senatorial families died out in the Empire, and the function of enculturation was fulfilled in the patron-protegé relationships, as Pliny's letters show. As a young man Pliny attended his patrons and was introduced into the forum, just as his protégés served a sort of apprenticeship with him a generation later.\(^{130}\) When Pliny sought office his patrons supported him and then accompanied him during his tenure of office, giving advice and guidance.\(^{131}\)
respect to matters arising in the senate, Pliny always sought the advice of his patrons (with one exception). In return for this support, Pliny performed many filial officia for Corellius Rufus and Verginius Rufus in their old age and after their deaths. The description given by Pliny of his relationship with his own senatorial protégés is very similar. Its quality of fictive kinship is underlined by the fact that Pliny performed in his home the ritual normally carried out by the father in the Republic, the assumption of the latus clavus. In Pliny's letters we can see the senatorial aristocracy reproducing itself in its own image through three generations without the appearance of a natural son.

Municipal aristocrats were coopted and then tutored, promoted, and advised by their patrons, just as Republican senators had done with their sons. Thus, I think we must believe that the institution of patronage made a considerable contribution to the conservatism and continuity of traditions in senatorial society.

In this chapter we have found reason to reaffirm the conclusion which Fustel de Coulanges reached nearly 100 years ago with regard to bonds of dependence: "la substitution de l'Empire à la République n'a pas été cette révolution complète et radicale que plusieurs historiens modernes se sont figurée. Le pouvoir a été seulement déplacé; les lois ont été peu modifiées, et les moeurs ne l'ont pas été." We have been able to find no reason or evidence to suggest that the importance of patronage and amicitia declined substantially in the day-to-day economic, social and political affairs of Roman aristocrats. And so it is not surprising to find that patronal officia remained a standard element in discussions and complaints about the duties and drudgery of aristocratic life in the city.
In the task of tracing the patronage networks stretching from the emperor out to the periphery of the empire, we come finally to the provinces. Literary testimony for provincial patronage is meagre, and so it has been necessary to turn to inscriptions for evidence of patronal exchange. I have chosen to study the epigraphic evidence of one area of the empire intensively rather than providing an incomplete survey of the evidence for the whole empire. Roman North Africa has seemed the best choice for the sample owing to the volume of useful preliminary work already done for the area. The literary testimony for the empire and the epigraphic evidence for Africa provide a coherent, if somewhat incomplete, picture of provincial patronage. At times the picture will be admittedly conjectural because of the elliptical nature of the inscriptions. But the conjectures are not without foundation: their plausibility derives from the general patronal ideology described in the first chapter.

A. Weingrod in his recently published essay, "Patronage and Power", has pointed out that authors of patronage studies today usually adopt one of two approaches. The first is the functionalist approach of the anthropologist: he is interested in the broad effects of patronage for the whole society (e.g., cohesion, integration or schism) and tends to pass over an
analysis of the specific locations of power and decision-making. The second approach is that of the political scientist: his interests are precisely the reverse, concentrating on power politics and ignoring the social implications. Weingrod concludes that the two approaches should be integrated.

At the outset of this study I had hoped that such an integrated approach would be possible. In particular, 30,000 African inscriptions seemed to offer the data necessary to trace patronage networks down through the levels of provincial society. A priori, such networks would be expected: glimpses of them can be caught in the literary evidence for Rome in the Principate, and they are still pervasive throughout Mediterranean society today. With the help of inscriptions it should (theoretically) have been possible to reconstruct networks based on kinship and patron-client ties. Unfortunately, the low rate of survival of inscriptions has made this impossible. The nature of the evidence has limited the scope of these chapters in two ways: first, it will be necessary to concentrate almost exclusively on the approach of the political scientist; secondly, the discussion will primarily concern the provincial aristocrats who left sufficiently detailed inscriptions to be of use to us.

Drawing on what is known about provincial society and administration, I will try to locate the positions of power in the African provinces. Then the available literary evidence and, more importantly, inscriptions will be adduced to confirm that patronage bonds are found where we would expect them—that is, radiating out from these loci. As an analytical tool for organizing these chapters, two different types of patronage will be distinguished. The present chapter will examine patrons with what
we have called first order resources, i.e., patrons with direct control over the distribution of certain favors. Since a provincial seeking a favor did not always enjoy a relationship with the appropriate patron of this kind, he often had to find friends or other patrons through whom he could approach the man in control. This latter group comprises what can be described as mediators, and they will be analyzed in the next chapter. Some individuals such as governors will appear in both chapters since they both possessed first order resources and also acted as mediators between, for example, provincials and the emperor.

Before proceeding with the study, a few remarks about the inscriptions may be appropriate. On the following pages is a table of all private patronage inscriptions from North Africa which I have been able to find (excluding dedications from liberti to ex-masters). "Patronage inscriptions" here include (1) all private dedications with the word patronus, (2) private dedications with the word amicus reflecting amicitia between social unequals, and (3) inscriptions which indicate an exchange relationship by language such as ob beneficium or ob meritum. Inscriptions dedicated to patroni by curiae and collegia have already been collected by G. Clemente and there is no reason to repeat his list here.

The table comprises fifty-four inscriptions. At first sight such a small number out of the 30,000 inscriptions from North Africa may seem to argue for the insignificance of patronage. Further thought, however, suggests that such a conclusion would be unwarranted. The proportion of the total number is unimportant since by far the greatest number are funerary dedications. The absolute number is also not significant: the number of surviving
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<tr>
<td>1. Q. Aelius Q.f. Rufinus Polianus, trib. mil.</td>
<td>T. Attilius P.f. Iuvenalis, praef. coh.</td>
<td>amico et municipi fraternae adfectionis dilecto</td>
<td>VIII.4292 (Batna)</td>
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<td>2. M. Aemilius Macer Dinarchus, son of legatus pr. pr.</td>
<td>P. Iulius C.f. Iunianus</td>
<td>patrono</td>
<td>AE 1946, 64 (Thamugadi)</td>
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<td>3. Q. Anicius Faustus, cos.</td>
<td>M. Sedius Rufus, adv., fl. pp., IIvir</td>
<td>patrono</td>
<td>AE 1911, 99 (Lambaesis)</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. M. Annaeus Maximus Aquila Fulvianus, c.p.</td>
<td>Fulviani maiores</td>
<td>patrono</td>
<td>VIII.12065 (Muzuc)</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Armenia Paulina, c.f., coniunx Anni Flavius, proc tract Kart.</td>
<td>C. Vibius Marinus, centurio leg. III Aug.</td>
<td>amicus et municeps mariti eius</td>
<td>Pflaum, Carr. #202, 2 (Thamugadi)</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Annius Postumus, proc. a byblio.</td>
<td>Horatius Marcianus</td>
<td>amico indulgentissimo ob beneficia quae in se contulit</td>
<td>VIII.20684 (Saldae)</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. C. Annii Titianus, fl. pp., IIvir, eq.R.</td>
<td>Bennius Rufus Pacatianus, aed. des. and Gallius Renatus Tessellius</td>
<td>amico rarissimi exempli</td>
<td>AE 1955, 151 (Hippo Regius)</td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Arrius Antoninus, praetor</td>
<td>C. Iulius Libo, trierchus (sic) classis novae Lybice</td>
<td>patrono</td>
<td>ILS 1119-VIII.7030 (Cirta)</td>
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<tr>
<td>10. C. Arrius Longinus, c.p., son of C. Arrius Honoratus</td>
<td>L. Magnius Saturninus Sedianus Junior</td>
<td>patrono amantissimo</td>
<td>AE 1915, 23 (Thuburbo Maius)</td>
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<td>12. Aurelius Cominius Cassianus, leg. pr. pr.</td>
<td>L. Valerius Optatianus, adv., eq.R.</td>
<td>patrono...ob insignem eius erga se dignationem</td>
<td>AE 1917-18, 73 (Lambaesis)</td>
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<td>13. M. Aurelius Cominius Cassianus</td>
<td>C. Iulius Rogatianus, dec. al. Fl.</td>
<td>ex corniculario proiectus ab eo</td>
<td>AE 1917-18, 74-74 (Lambaesis)</td>
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<td>15. Aurelius Zeno Ianuarius, c.v.</td>
<td>Iulius Antoninus, a militis</td>
<td>ob merita</td>
<td>VIII.10982 (Caesarea)</td>
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<tr>
<td>17. L. Calpurnius Fidus Aemilianus, trib. pl.</td>
<td>P. Sicinius Pescennius Hilarianus</td>
<td>candidat. eius amico incompar.</td>
<td>VIII.25382 (Utica)</td>
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<td>19. M. Cocalinus Sex.f. Quintilianus, c.v., quaest. des.</td>
<td>Florus, princeps et undecim primus gentis Saboidum</td>
<td>amico merenti de suo...</td>
<td>ILAlg. II.1.626 (Cirta)</td>
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<tr>
<td>20. M. Cornelius Octavianus, proc. Mauret. Caes. and family</td>
<td>...Saturninus dec. alae et...candd. eorum</td>
<td>candd. eorum patronis dignissimis</td>
<td>AE 1954, 136 (Chercel)</td>
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<tr>
<td>21. P. Curius P.f. Servilius Draco, scrib. q., func. eq. pub.</td>
<td>Servilius Primus</td>
<td>patrono</td>
<td>IILTun. 15 (Gigthis)</td>
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<td>22. C. Fabricius Felix Salvianus, pract.</td>
<td>Maurelius Marcus (?)</td>
<td>incomparabili viro</td>
<td>IILTun. 83 (Thaenae)</td>
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<td>24. T. Flavius Serenus, praeses of both Mauretanias</td>
<td>Iulii Sabinus, a militiis, et Pontianus ex decurione adiutor et strator eius</td>
<td>patrono incompar.</td>
<td>VII.9002 (Rusuccurru)</td>
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<td>25. Ti. Flavius Umbrius Antistius Saturninus Fortunatianus, c.v.</td>
<td>Aemilius...</td>
<td>patrono</td>
<td>VIII.61 (Hadrumetum)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. Vergilia Florentina, coniunx Iuli Fortunatiani, leg. pr. pr.</td>
<td>Aemilius Florus, domicurator</td>
<td>patronis</td>
<td>AE 1917-18, 52 (Lambaesis)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. Ti. Iulius Pollienus Auspex, leg. pr. pr.</td>
<td>C. Publilius Septiminius (sic), centurio</td>
<td>candidatus eius</td>
<td>AE 1917-18, 50 (Lambaesis)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. Ti. Iulius Pollienus Auspex</td>
<td>Sinicci Rufus et Fortunatus, advocati</td>
<td>patrono</td>
<td>VIII.2743 (Lambaesis)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31. T. Iulius Tertullus Antiochus</td>
<td>L. Valerius Optatianus, eq.R., advoc.</td>
<td>cliens eius...ob insignem in se dignationem</td>
<td>VIII.2393 (Thamugadi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33. T. Licinius Hierocles</td>
<td>Servianus</td>
<td>patrono dignissimo</td>
<td>VIII.20995 (Caesarea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PATRONUS</td>
<td>CLIENS</td>
<td>DEDICATION</td>
<td>REFERENCE</td>
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<tr>
<td>34. L. Maecilius P.f. Nepos, fl. pp., eq. pub. exornatus, omnib. honoribus functus in IIII col.</td>
<td>P. Paconi Cerealis</td>
<td>amico optimo et merenti</td>
<td>IIAAlg. II.1.690 (Cirta)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35. C. Memmius C.f. Fidus Iulius Albius cos.</td>
<td>C. Annius Iulius Secundus</td>
<td>amico rarissimo ob eximiam erga se benivolentiam</td>
<td>VIII.12442 (Vina)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memmius C.f. Messius Pacatus, fl. pp., honoribus in patria functus</td>
<td>fulloes eius domus</td>
<td>optimo patrono</td>
<td>IIAfr. 22 (Gigthis)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36. C. Memmius C.f. Fidus Iulius Albius cos.</td>
<td>Sex. Volussius Maximus</td>
<td>patrono (filius patroni)</td>
<td>VIII.610=11773 (Mididi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memmius C.f. Messius Pacatus, fl. pp., honoribus in patria functus</td>
<td>C. Maecius Titianus Junior, eq.R.</td>
<td>patrono incomparabil.</td>
<td>IIAAlg.I.7 (Hippo Regius)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37. C. Memmius C.f. Fidus Iulius Albius cos.</td>
<td>L. Sallustius Saturninus, omnib. honoribus functus</td>
<td>iusto viro ob notissimam omnibus in se bonitatem qua in perpetuum est reservatus</td>
<td>VIII.1646 (Sicca Veneria)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memmius C.f. Messius Pacatus, fl. pp., honoribus in patria functus</td>
<td>C. Cerficius Victor</td>
<td>patrono ob eximiam Eruciani patris in se benignitatem qua sunt in perpetuum reservati</td>
<td>VIII.15885 (Sicca Veneria)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38. L. Naevius Flavius Iulianus Tertullus Aquilinus, c.p.</td>
<td>Plotius Thallus, alumnus</td>
<td>patrono benignissimo</td>
<td>VIII.2394 (Thamugadi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39. Q. Octavius Rufus Erucianus, e.v.</td>
<td>C. Papirius Fortunatus</td>
<td>amico simplicissimo</td>
<td>VIII.2408 (Thamugadi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40. Q. Octavius Q.f. Erucianus Stella Stratianus, c.i. (son of above)</td>
<td>P. Geminius Gallonianus, domicurator</td>
<td>patrono incompar...promotus ab eo</td>
<td>AE 1917-18, 76 (Lambaesis)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PATRONUS</td>
<td>CLIENS</td>
<td>DEDICATION</td>
<td>REFERENCE</td>
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<tr>
<td>44. Pomponius C.f. murianus, proc. tract. Kart.</td>
<td>L. Valgius..., fisci advocatus</td>
<td>ob eximiam condisc... ratus adfection- em</td>
<td>VIII.11341 (Sufetula)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47. C. Postumius Saturninus Flavianus</td>
<td>Victor, lib. Augg.</td>
<td>cliens</td>
<td>VIII.11175 (Segermes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50. Q. Sallustius Macrinianus, proc. of both Mauretania, Q. Sallustius Macrinianus, c.v., son, commilito, and Q. Sallustius Macrinianus, nepos</td>
<td>Anullius Geta</td>
<td>ob insignem eorum erga se humanitatem</td>
<td>VIII.9371 (Caesarea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51. L. Titinius Clodianus, proc. and praeses of Numidia</td>
<td>C. Vibius Maximus, eq.R., fisci adv.</td>
<td>candidatus eius patrono rarissimo</td>
<td>AE 1917-18, 85 (Lambaesis)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52. M. Valerius Maximianus, leg. pr. pr.</td>
<td>Aquili Restutus, fl. pp., IIvir qq., praef. i.d. et Marcius, IIvir</td>
<td>patrono</td>
<td>VIII.4600 (Diana Veteranorum)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
patronus inscriptions from the Republic (excluding those from liberti) can be counted on one hand and no one doubts the importance of patronage in that era. If the survival rate estimated by Duncan-Jones is close to the mark, these fifty stones represent some 1,000 originally erected in the provinces of North Africa—a number from which we could construct a comprehensive and persuasive picture of the importance of patronage. Finally, these "patronage inscriptions" represent only the tip of the iceberg. Behind the hundreds of other simple dedications there may stand patron-client relationships, but the stones do not provide sufficient information for us to be certain.

Finally, a few words about the meaning of the inscriptions might be useful. The dedicator of the stone rarely indicated precisely why he put it up (though there may be clear hints) and so some might be inclined to think of the stones as banal formalities. It is impossible conclusively to disprove this assumption, but two considerations militate against it. First, the stones were too expensive to be frivolous. Duncan-Jones gives £400 as the price of a relatively inexpensive statue base with an inscription of fourteen lines. This represents something of the order of several weeks' income for a decurion. Secondly, these dedications need to be placed in the context of the reciprocity ethic of Roman patronage and amicitia. As stressed in the first chapter, exchange of concrete beneficia was an indispensible ingredient of these relationships. There may not have been a precisely equal quid pro quo, but we would expect that there would usually be a substantial beneficium from the patron to merit an expensive dedication in return. The wording of inscriptions suggests three occasions on which a dedication
might be appropriate: (1) the death of the patron calling for a memorial stone;\(^{11}\) (2) after a *beneficium* as a sign of gratitude;\(^{12}\) (3) the promotion of a patron-official when congratulations were in order.\(^{13}\)

**Officials as Patrons of First-order Resources**

It should come as no surprise that the most prominent group of patrons in the table of inscriptions consists of provincial governors: they must have had the greatest resources for patronage at their disposal. In this section I wish to consider (1) what sorts of *beneficia* governors distributed, (2) how patronage bonds with governors might be formed, and (3) what form reciprocity from the client might take. Proconsuls, *legati pro praetore* and praesidial procurators will be treated together. All of the dedications to Numidian legates of concern to us here come from a period when Numidia was a province *de facto* or *de iure*.\(^{14}\) So all three types of officials shared the responsibilities and patronage resources that any governor would have. To the extent that the legate of III Augusta and the procurators of the Mauretaniae had extra military and, in the latter case, fiscal responsibilities, they possessed correspondingly greater resources for patronage, as will be noted. Work on this section of the chapter has been greatly facilitated by Graham Burton's study of provincial governors.\(^{15}\) His outline of their activities and duties is suggestive as to the places where patronage was likely to prosper. We would expect to find patronage wherever the rules concerning the governor's conduct were ambiguous and where he was allowed wide discretion: Burton's thesis documents how thorough-going the ambiguity and discretion were.

In a speech cited in the first chapter, Apuleius said that
in contrast to the philosopher who loves the governor for the public example he sets, "most people esteem the fructus of his bonitas." What form might this fructus take? What were these favors appropriate to friends? Here the African evidence, literary and epigraphic, provides little help. The net must be cast wider to include all literary evidence of the Principate. Even then there is not much hope of drawing up a complete list since the literary evidence for provincial administration is not adequate for this purpose.

As Burton has pointed out, most of a governor's time in civilian administration was likely to be taken up with legal cases, and it is in this sphere that we have most evidence for patronage. The governor's favor was important for both the advocates and the parties to the case. Though outside the chronological limits of this study, Libanius' autobiographical oration gives a more vivid account of patronage related to the courts than anything surviving from the Principate. I see no reason to think that in this particular respect anything changed substantially from the second to the fourth century and that the evidence of Libanius should not be admitted. Bits of literary evidence and some inscriptions from Africa provide a few hints that Libanius' description is applicable.

Libanius describes his life as a series of peaks and valleys, his good fortune depending largely upon whether he was in the good graces of the current governor. When he was known to be in favor, people with court cases and other problems flocked to Libanius: "those people who had suffered injury at the hands of men of greater influence, those who, indicted in anger, now needed the governor for their deliverance, and those desirous of a speedy
trial—and many other favors, too, a governor can grant without harm to the law—all these, either in person or through their wives, begged me to approach him on their behalf. Libanius' friendships with other governors benefitted himself and his friends in similar ways.

Of course, the people for whom such visible friendship and favoritism in the courts would be most valuable would be advocates. And so it is not surprising that they erected a significant proportion of the patronage dedications to governors in our table. One, T. Flavius Silvanus, was quite explicit in his gratitude to the governor of Numidia: "M. [Au]lre/ro/10 Comi/ny/la jas/siano, leg. Augg. pr.pr. c.v. patrono, T. Fl. [S]ilvanusq.R. [ad]vocat., Q. Pin/ar/us Urbani/10 Ilvir et L. [Car]gilius Fel/iq fl. pp. qui iu/dicia/ eius for/i iustitiamque/ tot/les admirati sunt." (no.14) (Though Mommsen's complete restoration here may not seem certain, the references to the advocate and the legal decision are clear enough.) Another advocate, L. Valerius Optatus, erected dedications to two consecutive legati pro praetore of Numidia, T. Iulius Tertullus Antiochus (attested for 242) and M. Aurelius Cominius Cassianus (c. 244-249). Perhaps these stones advertised what became known about Libanius by word of mouth—that the man had a personal relationship with the governor and so might bring favorable results in law cases. Altogether, there are five inscriptions in the table dedicated to governors by advocate; clearly it benefitted them as well as the parties to the cases to have a personal relationship with the governors.

In more specific terms what were the legal favors which might be granted "without harm to the law" (a familiar phrase echoed in a letter of Marcus Aurelius to be cited below and in a
The favor specified by Libanius and found again in Apuleius' Apologia was the scheduling of the trial. This could represent a considerable beneficium. Burton has stressed the absence of a set schedule for cases and the importance for many people of receiving a court hearing quickly and in a town close to their homes. "In general it was precisely the absence of any formal structure for the preliminaries to the hearings themselves that ensured the effective operation of the informal social influences of status (honos) and bribery (improbitas)" which Ulpian mentions in a passage in the Digest. Apuleius thought that the speed with which his case was heard was of great importance, preventing the forgery of documents by his accusers. Indeed, Apuleius thanked the proconsul Claudius Maximus for the beneficium in his speech.

Another traditional and legitimate favor defended and utilized by Fronto was the acceptance of letters of recommendation as character references for the parties involved. The commendandimos according to Fronto's explanation "grew up even on behalf of those who were involved in public or private lawsuits to the actual judges or their assessors--and nothing reprehensible was seen in the practice. This was not done, as I see it, in order to tamper with the fairmindedness of the judge or to cause him to depart from giving a true judgement. But as there was a time-honored custom in the courts of bringing on witnesses to character, after the case had been heard, to declare what they honestly thought of the defendant, so these letters of recommendation were treated as fulfilling the function of testimonials." The claim here that the commendatio is just a character testimonial is not quite true: it is a testimonial which is efficacious because
it comes from a friend of the judge. The accuser or defendant becomes credible because he happens to be a friend of a friend, and so the favor really requested may sometimes be nothing less than a favorable verdict. We would very much like to know what impact Apuleius' letter from his friend Lollianus Avitus, the previous proconsul of Africa, had in his trial before Claudius Maximus, who was said also to be a friend of Avitus. After reading the letter (not a commendatio) Apuleius asked his accuser: "will you attack with accusations of magic and the black art the man whom Avitus describes as a good man, and whose disposition he so warmly praises in his letter?" 25

The modern ideal of strictly impartial court hearings differs from the Roman ideal of limited favoritism or favoritism "without harm to the law." The more vague the law and its procedures, the more patronage could be exercised without clear violation. In addition to this legitimate patronage, illegitimate patronage in court cases requires some consideration. Most of our evidence centers on intrigues, convictions and acquittals at Rome owing to gratia. There is every reason to think that this went on at the less well documented provincial level as well. Fliny prosecuted a case against Marius Friscus, former proconsul of Africa, in the senate. Friscus pleaded guilty to having accepted bribes from two provincials for harassing their enemies, including equites Romani, with flogging, exile and execution. 26 In Fliny's account it is not clear whether the provincials' relationship with Friscus had been established before the bribery and so would qualify as patronage under our definition. In any case, the point remains that in the Principate, as in Libanius' time, one of the governor's potential beneficiaria was harassment of enemies. At the other extreme,
friendship with the governor or his powerful friends at Rome could provide protection from prosecution. So far as I know, we have no direct evidence for this from Africa. Lucian, however, relates a tale which may have had parallels in Africa. Lucian waged a continuing battle with a certain Alexander who claimed to have magical and oracular powers. A senator named Rutilianus allegedly came under Alexander's influence. At one point in the struggle Alexander was supposed to have tried to kill Lucian. This naturally provoked Lucian to undertake a prosecution, "but the then governor of Bithynia and Fontus, L. Lollianus Avitus, checked me, all but beseeching and imploring me to leave off, because out of goodwill to Rutilianus he could not, he said, punish Alexander even if he should find him clearly guilty of crime." This story illustrates how powerful patrons at the center of the empire-wide patronage network in Rome could provide protection from legal accusations for their provincial friends. Although Lucian may have exaggerated the bluntness of Avitus' response, Aulus Gellius even in a thoughtful and detached mood concluded that protection of a friend by a judge should sometimes take priority over strict justice should the two conflict in a court case before him. All of these details seem to me to add up to a potentially considerable role for patronage in a governor's activities as judge.

The other main civilian administrative duty of the governor was oversight of the provincial communities. Here the opportunities for exercise of patronage were great because, as Burton has shown, there were no detailed rules regulating the relationship between cities and the governor. As a result, Flutarch in his advice to a young man intending to pursue local political offices
recommended that the young man cement friendships with important Romans: "not only should the statesman show himself and his native State blameless towards the rulers, but he should also have always a friend among men of high station who have the greatest power as a firm bulwark, so to speak, of his administration; for the Romans themselves are most eager to promote the political interests of their friends; and it is a fine thing also, when we gain advantage from the friendship of great men, to turn it to the welfare of our community." So it was important for the local notable to possess a means of tapping the patronage of the Roman rulers. This need not mean that he must be a friend of the current governor, but rather that he have access into the proper network of friends at Rome. As we shall see, once he gained access he could be passed along a chain of contacts until he could introduce himself to the governor as a friend of a friend. Fronto claims that once his friendship with Arrius Antoninus, iuridicus per Italian regionis Transpadanae, became widely known, "as a result of this public knowledge I was approached by many people who desired [Antoninus'] gratia." The letters show that these people were municipal aristocrats passed on to Fronto by friends with requests concerning local administration which will be discussed below. Fronto had become a funnel at Rome through which such requests were routed.

Such friendships, however, could be a danger as well as a boon to the community. Though he does not specify particular issues or quarrels, Plutarch notes that it is all too tempting for a local aristocrat entangled in a municipal dispute to resort to his powerful Roman friends to settle the matter, rather than settling it internally in a way to preserve community autonomy.
and dignity as far as possible. Whatever the dangers, some African municipal leaders seem to have taken Plutarch's advice quoted above. Inscriptions let us name four municipal magistrates, including two brothers, who possessed the patronage of governors. Of course, the inscriptions do not reveal how the local magistrates used their links: whether they used them for the benefit of the community or for personal advancement is uncertain, though the latter was the more common course of action according to Plutarch.

What specific forms might a governor's influence in municipal affairs take? Burton outlines three main spheres of gubernatorial interference—municipal elections and honors, finance, and building—and in each of these we can document patronage, though not in Africa. In the Digest is recorded Ulpian's suggestion that "the provincial governor should see to it that obligations and offices in cities are distributed equitably (aequaliter) by turns according to age and dignitas in accordance with the prestige of the obligations and offices which have long been established, in order that without danger and the frequent oppression of some the cities not be deprived of their men and strength." Aequaliter of course involves a value judgement and great influence might be exerted in the process of coming to a "fair" decision. There is no need to repeat here Bowersock's account of how Aelius Aristides summoned all the influence at his disposal, including that of the emperor himself, in order to persuade reluctant proconsuls of Asia to confirm his immunity from office-holding and the munera involved. Influence was not exercised only for purposes of escaping public honors. In a letter (to be discussed below) Fronto tried to exert influence on Arrius Antoninus to reinstate Volumnius Serenus on the municipal council of Concordia.
there is no evidence to indicate whether Fronto's effort was rewarded. Dio of Prusa claims to have refrained from using his influence with proconsuls or even the emperor to his advantage in Prusa's quarrels over the election of municipal decurions. At a lower level, teaching positions in provincial cities seem to have been allocated through patronage channels. Fronto sent a commendatio on behalf of Antoninus Aquila to Aufidius Victorinus, his son-in-law and legatus Germaniae superioris, requesting him to exert his influence in order to secure a public teaching position in one of the German civitates. In none of these cases concerning public positions does the evidence come from Africa, but there is every reason to think that they represent typical examples of what probably occurred in Africa with its many municipia.

By discussing the governor's oversight of the distribution of honores we have already in effect discussed one aspect of his intervention in the financial affairs of the cities: involvement in distribution and enforcement of munera afforded opportunities for patronage. Another aspect was his oversight of public building projects. Because the same municipal leaders proposed, planned, financed and carried out the projects, and then were responsible to themselves and other municipal aristocrats, there were obvious possibilities for financial mismanagement and fraud. In order to restrain misconduct and prevent financial chaos governors might intervene from the time a project was proposed.

Various African inscriptions attest to such involvement in building projects: L. Claudius Honoratus, for instance, in accordance with a promise by his dead father to the populus Cuiculitanorum built a hall in Cuicul with a statue and marble
columns "ex decreto Fontei Frontiniani legati Augusti pro praetore". 42 Now such intervention seems to have been haphazard and subject to the governor's discretion, 43 and so a governor's favor might be useful. Pronto once again supplies an example of influence being brought to bear: his letter on behalf of a certain Baburiana to Arrius Antoninus is badly damaged, but it can be discerned that in order to oblige his friends Pronto was asking Antoninus for some favor "de opere extruendo". 44 Of course, a few scattered examples do not prove the significance of the governor's patronal influence in municipal finance and public building. All they can do is illustrate the range of possibilities which might have provoked the dedications by municipal magistrates to governors. Perhaps the only hint of significance available is Pronto's use of plurimi to describe the number of people approaching him alone to contact a single iuridicus in Italy concerning local affairs. 45

Epigraphic evidence for the last gubernatorial resource--appointments and promotions--is more explicit, allowing this kind of patronage to be documented specifically for Africa. The resources varied according to the type of governorship; in particular, from the reign of Gaius the proconsul no longer commanded a legion and so no longer was able to distribute army posts. He, like the other governors, continued to make appointments to his staff for civilian administration. The staff of a governor comprised three groups: the staff which the governor took out to the province with him, the military officium, and the slaves and freedmen of the familia Caesars. 46 The group of aristocratic friends and protégés which accompanied governors to their provinces has been discussed in a previous chapter. As for the clerical and
sub-clerical staff which accompanied the governor—for example, the scribae and lictors—, little can be said. In theory, at least, these men were probably selected by lot in Rome, so that the posts were not in the gift of the governor. Jones, however, notes the case of Verres' scriba in the Republic who accompanied Verres on too many tours of duty to have been selected by a random process. The lack of evidence for the Principate does not allow us to draw any conclusion.

Appointment to the governor's military officium represented a substantial promotion from the ranks. The Egyptian papyri show governors making these appointments, and, further, indicate that in addition to commendationes bribery was thought to be needed to secure such posts. The patronal relationship between these beneficiarii and the governor is attested by relatively numerous dedications. For instance, T. Flavius Serenus, praeses of both Mauretaniae, received an honorary inscription from Iulius Sabinius and his brother Fontianus, "adiutor et strator eius" (no. 24). The words "patrono incomparabili" in the inscription specify the nature of the relationship more clearly than in most other dedications. We also find patronal dedications from domicuratores (nos. 27 and 43), one of whom explicitly attributes his promotion to his patron, the governor of Numidia.

Command of an army provided more appointments for the Numidian legates and the governors of the Mauretaniae—as Pliny implies, the larger the army, the greater the number of beneficiia at the commander's disposal. The appointment of aristocratic protégés to equestrian militiae has been described elsewhere. Here we shall briefly survey appointments at a lower level (though by no means offering a comprehensive discussion of the topic). The
governor was responsible de iure for appointments below the grade of centurion and often de facto for appointments to the centurionate though the emperor was formally responsible. E. Birley has outlined the evidence for patronage in the appointment of both civilians and soldiers from the ranks to centurionates. In some instances the evidence for patronage is clear: Ti. Iulius Pollienus Auspex, legate of Numidia c. 217-220, received a dedication from the centurion C. Publilius Septiminius (sic) candidatus eius (no. 29). For other cases the evidence is indirect: Birley has noticed the promotion and movement of centurions which are parallel to the movements of senatorial legates and hence are suggestive of patronage relationships. At a lower level we find several dedications to African governors by decuriones alae (commanders of the turmae of the auxilia). A commander of III Augusta, M. Aurelius Cominius Cassianus, was thanked by a decurio alae, "ex corniculario provectus ab eo" (no. 13). These examples cannot indicate the frequency of patronal influence in these appointments, but it is clear that the placement of loyal clients in positions of responsibility (especially centurionates) could be of considerable importance. Tacitus reports that upon arriving in Syria Cn. Fiso replaced the serving centurions with his clientes. Vitellius also appointed centurions loyal to his cause in the British legions.

Governors also recommended provincials for high equestrian and senatorial offices filled by the emperor. The description of this mediation is left to the next chapter. A letter of Fronto indicates that mediation is not the only type of patronal resource left out of the basic list given in this chapter. Fronto wrote to Caelius Optatus, possibly the Numidian legate, on behalf of
Sardius Saturninus. He requested help for Saturninus with his negotium. The nature of the help is not specified. It seems unlikely that it falls into the categories discussed above. Perhaps Saturninus required assistance in the collection of a debt or rent (beneficia known from Cicero's letters). Such speculation is, however, not very persuasive in the absence of any specific African evidence, and perhaps we must be content with the suggestion that governors provided other services in their patronal roles for which no evidence survives.

It seems reasonable to conclude that in all gubernatorial administrative activities provincials could profit from patron-client bonds with governors. How, then, were these bonds established? What avenues were open to the governor's favor? The variety of ways in which a governor might be contacted and a patronage relationship established must have been almost limitless. The African evidence permits documentation of only a few. From the time the governor entered his province he listened to orations in the provincial capital and in each of the cities that he passed through on his assize circuit (Sabratha and Utica are documented for Proconsularis). The speeches offered orators opportunities to shower praise on the governor and so win his favor. In an oration before the proconsul Severianus in Carthage Apuleius expressed his regret that he could not read out his complete works. It was his desire "to offer all of my works and to enjoy your praiseworthy testimony to all the offspring of my muse! Not on account of lack of praise, which has long been preserved fresh and brilliant up to you through all you predecessors, but because I wish to be praiseworthy to no one more than the man whom I myself esteem for virtue above all others." Reference to Severianus'
antecessores suggests that Apuleius regularly gave such orations, and we have part of another to a second proconsul, Scipio Crfitus, in which Apuleius also speaks of seeking the proconsul's amicitia. As Apuleius points out (and Libanius vividly confirms), praise of the orator was a sign of amor on the governor's part. Apuleius claims to be different from the rest of mankind on account of his total lack of self-interest in his friendship with the governor. He is no doubt right that other orators were willing to exploit their amicitiae with governors; his own selflessness may be open to doubt after reading his Apologia. However that may be, the point is that the literary culture of the empire provided common interests and common grounds for amicitiae between orators and educated governors. Just as Greek sophists were thought worthy of imperial friendship and rewards for moving rhetorical displays before the emperor, so a provincial orator in Africa might thrust himself into the good graces of the governor and so benefit.

Most of the governor's time in civilian administration seems to have been devoted to hearing legal cases. This provided advocati with a number of opportunities for contact, as the patronal dedications from them (cited above) attest. Moreover, for some governors the greater part of the year was spent travelling around the assize circuit. During the rounds the governors apparently stayed in the houses of local notables. It is possible to document hospitium bonds between governors and North African cities and also to show the link between hospitium and individual patronage during the Republic and in other areas during the empire. While no specific illustrations of this latter link survive from North Africa, it is impossible to believe that the route of the assize circuit and the custom of hospitium did not have an impact on the distribution.
of patronage. On the one hand, those cities off the assize circuit might rarely receive gubernatorial visits and so opportunities for contact with the governor and hence for his patronage were rare. On the other hand, families with a hospitium relationship with a senatorial or high equestrian official must have been prime candidates for beneficia while the governor was still in his province, and also for opportunities arising later from contact with an aristocrat in Rome. These conjectures, it seems to me, find support in evidence from the Later Empire, when patronage came to be considered an abuse and a threat to imperial administration. Part of the campaign to suppress certain aspects of patronage included laws prohibiting governors from staying in or even visiting the houses of private individuals. 53

Occasions on which a town's leading citizens contacted governors on municipal business probably also provided opportunities for the cementing of personal bonds. Philostratus indicates that this occurred in meetings between emperors and ambassadors from Greek cities. 54 We know from cases such as Frontinianus' involvement in the Cuicul building project that governors were in contact with municipal aristocrats in matters of local administration. Since no direct evidence survives for personal patronage relationships growing out of these contacts, we are left to inference from indirect evidence. 54a Governors constituted the single largest group of municipal patrons; one would expect that in this capacity governors would have been open to the initiation of personal friendships by the towns' leading citizens. This may have been the background for the patronage relationships between two Numidian governors and municipal aristocrats from Lambaesis. Both Q. Anicius Faustus (197-201) and M. Aurelius Cominius Cassianus (246-47)
were patrons of Lambaesis and inscriptions suggest that they
were involved there in local affairs, especially building activities. It was perhaps through these activities that the municipal leaders who dedicated inscriptions to them as patrons came into contact and established bonds with them (nos. 3 and 14). Of course, the reverse sequence is also possible: personal friendships with local leaders may have involved governors in municipal affairs and led them to accept positions as municipal patrons. Whatever the sequence, the existence of a link between private and public patronage is likely owing to the personal nature of the governor’s administration.

Direct contacts with the governor provided provincials with opportunities for developing patronage relationships. In addition to these, and perhaps more important, were indirect methods of contact. Several of our patronage inscriptions are dedicated to wives or sons of governors. Typical is AE 1946, 64 from Thamugadi: "M. Aemilio Macro Dinarcho M. Aemili Macri leg. Aug. pr. pr. cos. desig. filio patrono P. Iulius C.f. Papiria Junianus." Unfortunately, such an opaque inscription cannot give us a clear idea of what was happening. The main unanswered question is whether the relative of the governor was a patron in his or her own right or whether their patronage consisted mainly of influencing the governor. At the imperial court at Rome women seem to have been important mainly in the second way (or so our sources lead us to believe). There is every reason to expect governors’ wives to have been a source of patronage in the same way. On the other hand, sons of proconsuls often possessed their own patronage resources in their capacity as legates with delegated responsibility for dealing with legal and administrative matters.
Apuleius praised Severianus' son Honorinus in the same way as the father: there was "paternal fairness in the son, the prudence of an old man in the youth and consular authority in the legate"—and also, we might add, patronal resources comparable in some respects with the governor's. Wives may also have had some independent resources, such as money. In addition, in Aemilius Florus' dedication to Vergilia Florentina (wife of Iulius Fortunatianus) Florus' position in the household as domicurator (a post in the governor's officium) suggests that he may have been able to benefit directly from Vergilia.

Finally, the method of contact for which we have most evidence is the commendatio. Jeremy Boissevain has described a modern parallel phenomenon in southern Italy and Sicily—the professional calling card. In these areas an individual wanting any sort of action from a government official must try to find a chain of relatives, friends and patrons through which he can approach the official. He goes to a friend and is passed on to a friend of a friend and so on until he reaches the official in question; at each stage he picks up the calling card of the friend to carry on to the next stage in order to identify himself as someone worthy of consideration. The calling cards are indispensable to his progress because "the non-kin with whom [the official] deals in his official capacity, unless they are introduced by a third party who is a kinsman, friend, patron or client, receive short shrift. He is not only impartial, he is so detached as to be remote."

In many respects the function of the commendatio resembles that of the calling card. Consider, for example, the three fragmentary recommendations of Fronto addressed to men probably governing in North Africa at the time (two to proconsuls and one to
a legatus pro praetore). All three are letters of introduction in the same tradition as Cicero's commendationes, varying in length but with the same essential components. First come a few lines describing Fronto's relationship with the man and then a request for the governor to take the man into his amicitia and give him help in every possible way. Though more verbose than modern Italian calling cards, these commendationes were similar in purpose. In none of these letters (nor in many of Cicero's) is the favor spelled out. In the letter to Lollianus Avitus, Fronto says that Licinius Montanus "in accordance with his modesty has asked nothing except what is right and honorable both for you to give and for him to ask... Since I love him as I do very few other men, please enjoy the company of one dear to me, receive him when he comes, embrace him with kind concern and give him the best counsel appropriate to friends." It is possible that something more concrete was in the gaps in the manuscript; nothing in the tone of the letter seems to suggest it. The other two commendationes are equally vague. Fronto wrote to Aegrilus FlarianianuS nothing more specific on behalf of Iulius Aquilinus than "it is right that a man learned as well as cultured as Aquilinus is should not only be protected but also promoted and honored by a man as serious and wise as yourself." In the third letter Fronto asked Caelius Optatus simply: "if any of Sardius Saturninus' negotium brings him to you, you should judge him a man worthy of every honor, a man dear to me, and should protect him with all your power." The message in each case is the same: not a specific favor, but a request to add the protégé or client to the governor's group of kin, friends and friends of friends who because of their personal links deserve special
consideration and favor.\textsuperscript{79}

he letter of Optatus deserves a brief remark for another reason. Fronto's \textit{familiaritas} with Sardius Saturninus arose \textit{per filios suos} who were students of Fronto. It is quite possible that Fronto never met Saturninus; in another recommendation Fronto admits that he was not personally acquainted with the beneficiary of the letter.\textsuperscript{80} The point is that here we see the chains of friends of friends which Boissevain found in modern Sicily. As Boissevain points out, the links in the chain can be vertical (up to a higher status group) or horizontal. So Saturninus made the vertical ascent through his sons--the shortest, most intimate path possible--to Fronto in the highest aristocratic circle in Rome, and then Fronto supplied the horizontal link back to Africa and the governor.

Fronto supplies three examples of the network being circuited through Rome. This need not happen: Apuleius indicates that he wrote a letter of recommendation to Lollianus Avitus in Carthage on behalf of his stepson Sicinius Pontianus. The precise nature of the request is not clear: all that is said is that Pontianus was going to Carthage and "tirocinio orationis suae fuerat a me commendatus."\textsuperscript{81} The subsequent account is interesting because, if Apuleius' account bears any correspondence to the events, it underlines that \textit{commendationes} were not simply polite formalities that a man could just as easily dispense with. After the initial recommendation was sent to Avitus, Apuleius fell out with Pontianus over the question of inheritance. This apparently generated much bitterness and Apuleius wrote another letter to Avitus about the quarrel--the essential message being, no doubt, that Pontianus is not "one of us" after all. When Pontianus later came to
Apuleius on his knees, tearfully begging forgiveness, his most prominent request seems to have been getting another favorable letter from Apuleius to reverse his standing with Avitus again. What exactly Pontianus hoped to gain from the good graces of the proconsul we do not know, but it is clear that his favor was of paramount concern.

I have concentrated here on commendationes related to North Africa. These, together with the other surviving commendationes and evidence of other ways of contacting the governor, suggest that from the time a governor took up office he faced a barrage of requests to take orators, friends of friends, local notables, etc. into his amicitia. The requests came from every quarter, from the emperor down to humbler local friends, and no doubt every avenue of approach was exploited to win a share in what Marcus Aurelius himself described as "the things appropriate to friends which faith and scruples of conscience allow a proconsul to distribute without harm to others."  

Since patron-client relationships in the Roman world were reciprocal, we must ask finally how a provincial who approached a governor would display his gratia. Of course, evidence for patronage has survived in Africa precisely because one of the expressions of gratia was a dedication inscribed on stone. The gratitude took other forms as well. Beyond the ordinary expressions of gratitude between private individuals discussed elsewhere (e.g., legacies), two are specific to governor-provincial relations and so deserve comment here. The first group consists of gifts given to governors. These could range from small xenia to large-scale bribes: the latter were clearly illegal and the former expressly legal by the Severan period. Marius Priscus did
not seem to be in doubt that his acceptance of a total of 1,000,000 sesterces for the exile and execution of equites Romani and others were illegal. On the other hand, Ulpian devoted a paragraph to the problem of xenia, which shows that the strict rules of the early Principate were formally modified at some point. He cites Septimius Severus who said: "in so far as xenia are concerned, hear what we think: there is an old proverb: οὔτα πάντα οὔτε πάντοτε οὔτε πάρε πάντων (not everything, not everytime, not from everyone). For to accept gifts from no one is exceedingly discourteous, but to do so indiscriminately is very base and to accept everything is most greedy." The limitations on xenia thus were nebulous and Ulpian could not provide any clearer definition than Severus. Though governors were left in some doubt as to where this line between illegal and legal was to be drawn, they were apparently expected to profit from their sojourn in the province. The salarium paid out to them was supposed to be for travelling and living expenses. And yet senators who asked to be excused from service traditionally requested the salarium despite the lack of expenses. The implication may be that, despite its purpose, governors expected legally to clear at least their salarium as profit by (at the minimum) living off provincial xenia and other income and hospitality.

Because the law concerning bribery and xenia as well as other administrative rules was vague, prosecution by provincials often was a matter of discretion. Consequently, patronage ties with leading provincials might be very useful for a governor after his tour of duty. For this the most explicit evidence comes from the Thorigny marble from Gaul. The sequence of events described in Julianus' letter illustrates the kind of impact a leading
provincial could have on efforts to prosecute a governor and therefore the importance of a governor developing a clientele among such men. The traditional idea that Rome supported municipal aristocracies across the empire and in return benefitted from their allegiance has its parallel here at the personal level.\(^9\) Just as at the imperial level the emperor distributed his stock of beneficia to buy the loyalty of the Roman aristocracy, so the governor built up a loyal and useful clientele among the provincial aristocracy both by favoring clients in local disputes and by supplying the patronage needed to enter the imperial aristocracy.

The above discussion dealt with praesidial procurators in their capacity as governors. We must now turn to their financial responsibilities and to non-praesidial procurators. The expectation is that their financial powers provided them with resources for patronage; it is borne out by the epigraphic evidence. Brunt has described the ebb and flow of procuratorial jurisdiction from the reign of Claudius.\(^9\) For the most part procurators were limited to hearing cases related to the fiscus. Some of these cases might require "the procurator's interpretative judgement."\(^9\) Procurators were accused of sometimes favoring their patron and employer.\(^9\) We might also suspect, then, that they could also be "lenient" (or "fair" depending upon the viewpoint) when other, closer personal ties outweighed their concern for the emperor's interests. Needless to say, people were not keen to leave dedications to patrons explicitly indicating that by their favor cases were won at imperial expense. As a result, we should not be surprised that no epigraphic evidence survives to confirm the suspicion.
An invaluable piece of evidence does survive to document patronage by procurators of imperial estates. The vast tracts of imperial land in Africa, administered by equestrian procurators, were leased to conductores who in turn subleased plots to coloni. A lex Hadriana set out the obligations of the coloni on the saltus Burunitanus to the conductores, such as six days per year of corvée labor. The procurator had soldiers at his disposal to enforce the obligations as he saw fit. In this situation a patronage relationship between the procurator and his conductores presented opportunities for mutual profit at the expense of the coloni. In the reign of Commodus the coloni took their complaints about the collusion to the emperor through a representative, Lurius Lucullus. The coloni alleged that Allius Maximus, a conductor, enjoyed the favor of a series of procurators partly on account of his largitiones to them. As a result, the procurators not only refrained from investigating alleged violations of the lex Hadriana, but even sent soldiers to enforce the illegal demands for extra labor by violence. Now if this were a simple case of bribery, then it would not meet our definition of patronage. But the coloni imply that the relationship consisted of more than isolated exchanges of money: in their view the conductores won support from the officials not only by the largitiones, but also because the conductores were personally known "to each of the procurators on account of the contract." (ll. 20f.)

How much the tenants exaggerated the pervasiveness of this patronage is difficult to know. In addition to another inscription complaining about similar abuses, a dedication survives testifying to an open and friendly relationship between conductores and patrimonial procurators: "T. Flavio T.f. Quir. Macro IIvir,

To summarize, we have sought out the loci of official power in the provinces of North Africa. For each locus the nature of the beneficia at the official's disposal has been outlined and then the influence of patronage in the distribution documented. Often the epigraphic evidence has permitted us to illustrate the radiation of patronage links out from the centers of power specifically for Africa; at other times it has been necessary to conjecture on the basis of evidence from other areas of the empire. The chapter has concentrated on the highest senatorial and equestrian officials of North Africa. This focus is not meant to imply that they were the only men enjoying official power, but rather that they are the only ones for whom our African sources provide enough evidence to conjecture with some confidence. To the extent that official staffs shared in or were delegated the power to make decisions, they also shared patronal resources. This was briefly suggested above in relation to legates with legal and administrative duties delegated by proconsuls. The suggestion seems to be confirmed by the fact that they undoubtedly had the resources to act as municipal patrons. Jones and Burton have inferred from non-African
evidence such as a wealthy dispensator of the imperial familia in Gaul and the lack of clearly structured pre-trial procedures that clerical and sub-clerical staff also had opportunities to exercise influence on behalf of clients.97 Their inferences almost certainly apply to Africa, but the African evidence adds nothing to our vague image of who was able to exercise influence in what matters at this level of administration, and in what way.

This study of patronage by provincial officials has not been entirely satisfying owing to the fragmentary nature of the sources. It is impossible to prove its importance by positive evidence alone. But I think that we may conclude that patronage was probably pervasive as it has been in other societies with patronal ideologies: not only were patron-client relationships with officials not suppressed in the Principate, they were openly advertised in every major African city by inscriptions erected in public by proud clients. Furthermore, if the common view is accepted that interference in local affairs by the emperor's officials increased as time passed,98 then it seems quite likely that the opportunities and motivations for developing ties with governors and procurators also grew, as both the ruling power and provincial aristocrats attempted to manipulate one another for their own benefit. The consequences of this will be discussed at the end of the next chapter.
VI

PATRONAL MEDIATORS: THE CASE OF NORTH AFRICA

In his speech before Scipio Orfitus, proconsul of Africa, Apuleius poured scorn on those provincials who gathered subserviently around the governor, men who "gloried in the pretended expressions of your friendship." Apuleius, by contrast, had moved in Orfitus' circle of friends at Rome. His connections and reputation were such that he could confidently tell the governor "that my amicitia ought to be eagerly taken up by you no less than yours ought to be desired by me." This passage provides an example of a provincial's connections with private circles of Roman aristocrats. The importance of such contacts is illustrated by the boldness with which Apuleius addressed the governor, treating him more as an equal than as a superior. In the previous section these Roman connections were introduced as one means of establishing patronage relationships with provincial administrators. In this chapter I want to consider what other beneficia a provincial might seek through the patronal mediators which linked him with Rome. Then, after consideration of the contents of the exchange will follow an examination of how provincials established the personal bonds with their mediators.

The list of benefits which an African could hope to obtain in Rome through effective influence included citizenship, equestrian honors, the latus clavus, various offices and administrative decisions. In his recent book Millar has set out a full treatment
of citizenship grants, having collected the "sporadic individual instances" from the first and second centuries. Those who mediated the provincials' requests included provincial officials and private individuals. Pliny is found submitting requests for citizenship to Trajan in both capacities. For instance, as governor of Bithynia he forwarded a centurion's libellus requesting citizenship for his daughter. We possess African evidence for this phenomenon of forwarding libelli in the form of the Tabula Banasitana. In Banasa inscribed on bronze were found copies of the imperial replies to requests from tribal leaders for citizenship for their wives and children. In each case the emperors' letters make it clear that the procurators of Mauretania Tingitana did more than simply forward the libelli: the governors also played the part of suffragatores providing letters testifying to the merita and fides of the two leaders of the Zegrenses ("suffragante ... per epistulam"). It seems likely that in backward areas of North Africa such as this, imperial officials would have been the only men available capable of supplying the necessary mediating link with the emperor.

By contrast, in the better developed areas boasting native-born senators and equites private mediators must have been relatively more important. Though we have no specific examples of patrons in a private capacity requesting citizenship for African individuals, the tone of Pliny's letters to Trajan (written before his governorship of Bithynia) indicates that such requests were routine. As Millar points out, "the very randomness of the examples of individual grants is some indication of how general a form of beneficium this was." It is possible to speculate from nomenclature about the patrons who secured citizenship, as Birley does for the ancestors
of Septimius Severus. But the uncertainties involved are such that we cannot progress much beyond Millar's generalization.

It is worth mentioning briefly in this context the kind of patronage that falls between municipal and personal. Duncan-Jones has discussed the use of influence to secure civic statuses. Grants of full citizenship to whole communities do not fall within our topic. But when Latium Maius or Latium Minus was granted to a city, the patron benefitted a small group of leading citizens and no doubt enjoyed their personal gratitude in return. CIL 8.22737 was set up to a local man from Gigthis for securing Latium Maius for the city on his second attempt in Rome. Duncan-Jones concluded his article with the remark that "given better backing, M. Servilius Draco Albucianus of Gigthis might have achieved Latium Maius for his town without travelling to Rome twice on that account." It might be added that for all we know Albucianus may have taken the precaution of securing some influence on the second time around.

The uncertainties raised by the grant of the equus publicus and membership in the quinque decuriae were discussed in the context of imperial beneficia. What is of interest here is their distribution to African notables. Duncan-Jones in his article about African equites maintains that "it is very rarely possible to make any suggestion about the identity of the officials to whose help particular knights may have owed their promotion." There are, however, more plausible examples of patronage than Duncan-Jones lists. He notes that the relatively large number of men exornati equo publico in Cirta is the result of patronage by their fellow municipes in the Roman senate. Men from smaller towns, such as Cuicul and Castellum Tidditanorum, held magistracies in the Cirtan confederation and quite possibly benefitted from the
friendships made there to gain the public horse.11

Patronage can be conjectured with more assurance in those cases in which an inscription ties together a man with some equestrian honor and an imperial aristocrat: both C. Didius Maximus and Q. Asturnius Lappianus had senatorial brothers-in-law; Q. Cornelius Rusticus was a teacher of a clarissimus vir; and C. Volumnius Marcellus Caecilianus expressed his pietas to the memory of the son of P. Forcius Optatus Flamma, a senator of praetorian rank.12 These examples will be discussed further in the next section.

For the vast majority of men with equestrian rank we do not know enough to make plausible guesses concerning the personal networks through which the awards were secured. Duncan-Jones suggests that there exists a correlation in the evidence to indicate that more than the requisite census and effective patronage were factors in the distribution. "Although most of the inscriptions are uninformative or inconclusive about access to equestrian rank, some clearly show a sequence in which municipal activities, including the tenure of magistracies or priesthoods, were followed by promotion to equestrian or juror rank. It is reasonable to see a causal relationship between the two parts of this sequence, since the promotion of obscure provincials was probably closely related to paper qualifications, and can have depended little upon direct assessment of personal ability."13 If Duncan-Jones' view is right, it introduces some universalistic criteria into Millar's image of a very particularistic process of petition-and-response. What is the evidence for such a view? First, there is the sequence of municipal offices, followed by equestrian rank. He holds that only one certain case of the possession of equestrian rank before local magistracies can be adduced.14 This is not as persuasive
as it might at first appear for several reasons: the twenty-seven examples come from a total sample of nearly 200 local equestrians; further, the almost complete lack of contrary cases is not surprising because of the very exacting conditions needed to prove the priority in time of the equestrian grant. If the mention of the equus publicus comes at the end of the inscription, then Duncan-Jones treats it as proof that it followed the tenure of the magistracies; if, however, the equus publicus precedes the magistracies in ascending order, then "it is impossible to say whether equestrian rank has been placed at the head of the inscription simply because of its importance, or whether it was actually conferred before the local career took place." Duncan-Jones is right to note this ambiguity, but the result is that only in the unique circumstance where a man already possessing equestrian rank was designatus for his first magistracy can we be sure that the former preceded the latter. In short, Duncan-Jones' ratio of twenty-seven "after" to one "before" may reflect nothing more than the assignment of many "before" cases to the category of "ambiguous". Duncan-Jones also points out that the number of local equestrians with records of municipal office outnumbers that of those without. This comparison as it stands indicates nothing about a causal link: if most wealthy locals held municipal office then they should constitute the more numerous group of local equestrians, given a random distribution of the rank. It is possible that local magistrates had a better chance of securing equestrian rank—not because the emperor intended it to be "a recognition of local eminence which had not so far received any institutional expression" (for which there is no evidence), but because, as we shall see, participation in civic life afforded opportunities to initiate.
potentially profitable relationships. 18

The grant of the latus clavus completes the basic list of promotions into higher legal ordines available from the emperor through patronage (with the exceptions of grants of the ius anulorum and the ius ingenuitatis for which there is no African evidence). The grant of the latus clavus and entry into the senate through patronal support have been considered with special regard to Pliny's protégés. 19 There is every reason to think that the same process was at work, especially in the second century, drawing Africans into the senate in great numbers. 20 Two passages yield direct evidence of Africans receiving the latus clavus through mediators. During his proconsulship Vespasian is said to have obtained the latus clavus for a young man for the sum of 200,000 sesterces, and Septimius Severus received the broad stripe with the help of his consular uncle of the same name. 21 The paternal tone of Fronto's letter to the Cirtan Arrius Antoninus (quoted in the previous chapter) is suggestive of the possibility of a similar relationship. 22

After promotion into a new order Africans sought procuratorial and senatorial offices with the help of patrons. These careers have been analyzed in an earlier chapter; it remains here only to summarize briefly the epigraphic evidence for offices going to Africans through patronage. In two cases the term candidatus leaves little doubt about the patron's role in securing offices. The first case concerns the office of fisci advocatus, established by Hadrian and serving as a civilian antecedent to a procuratorial career. 23 Philostratus indicates that the office was used by emperors as a reward for men winning their favor. 24 An African inscription suggests that it is one more type of beneficium in which the emperors allowed others a share. L. Titinius Clodianus
served as procurator provinciae Numidiae partes praesidis agens sometime between 238 and 253. Later, when Clodianus was in Rome as procurator ludi magni, C. Vibilius Maximus, eques Romanus, flamen perpetuus, fisci advocatus and candidatus eius, dedicated an inscription to him (patrono rarissimo) in Lambaesis, Maximus' native city. Though not indisputable, it seems very likely that this relationship was a result of Clodianus' governorship. The second inscription (CIL 8.25382) illustrates a patronage relationship between two men from Utica: "L. Calpurnio Fido Aemiliano c.v., quaest. Cret. Cyr., trib. pleb., P. Sicinius Pescennius Hilarianus candid. eius amico incomparabili." There is no way of deducing for which office Hilarianus might have been a candidate and so it is not certain that it was an equestrian or senatorial post. Because of the absence of the phrase candidatus eius in other inscriptions, the exercise of patronage to secure equestrian office can only be guessed at in several other cases: several procurators from leading Lepcitane families erected dedications in Lepcis Magna to their fellow townsman, the emperor Septimius Severus, and Valgius Mauricus dedicated an inscription to his condiscipulus, the ducenarian procurator, Pomponius L[...].murianus to whom he may have owed his post as fisci advocatus.

Up to this point we have concentrated on the beneficia distributed ad hominem by the emperor. This distribution has been characterized as a petition-and-response process. Here personal networks and personal petitions were, so far as we know, the only means of acquisition for provincials, not merely an alternative to some formal, impersonal administrative structure. We should not lose sight of the fact, however, that as a "predatory state" Rome and especially the emperor had two vital interests in the
provinces--order and taxation. To secure these two interests an administrative system existed and patrons, in turn, can be found exerting influence within the system on behalf of Africans.29

Given the severe limitations on our knowledge, it is impossible to present compelling evidence for the pervasiveness of this patronal influence. We can only present the two examples available to show that it existed. The first concerns tax-collection. Fronto sent a recommendation to Marcus on behalf of his friend Saenius Pompeianus, the conductor IIII publicorum Africae (an official in charge of tax collection, occupying an "intermediate position between tax-farmers and procurators"30). Pompeianus' accounts were to be scrutinized by Pius, and Fronto asked Marcus that he be shown **benignitas**. Marcus wrote back that he had befriended Pompeianus and that he desired that everything turn out in accordance with Pompeianus' wishes "ex indulgentia Domini mei patris".31 These letters seem to raise more questions than they answer. Clearly Fronto was trying to exert influence on behalf of the tax collector; his letter seems to be a veiled request for Marcus to intervene with his father. Marcus' response is wholly ambiguous: it is not clear whether he intends to become involved or to leave the matter to his father's kindly disposition. We would perhaps most like to know whether there existed some regular mechanism for reviewing suspect accounts which involved the emperor as a matter of course and so regularly required patrons close to the emperor. The letter gives no hint about how well defined the rules and procedures concerning such reviews were--that is, how much was left to the emperor's discretion and beneficence without violating rules or customs. If Marcus' ambiguity is a sign of reluctance to intervene, perhaps this is a hint of
the existence of some rules which he was unwilling to bend? All that can be concluded with assurance is that tax collectors in Africa could hope to benefit from friendships with men in the inner imperial circles such as Fronto.

The second example concerns both taxation and public order. Permission for the holding of periodic markets in the provinces had to be obtained in Rome from the senate or the emperor. The imperial government's interest stemmed from the revenues to be derived and the opportunities for breaches of public order afforded by market-days. A letter of Pliny concerning Italy shows that there could be a conflict of interests over the establishment of new nundinae on senatorial estates for example. As a result, the decisions might be contested and so it was useful to have friends in Rome to influence the decision. Lucilius Africanus, a senator who owned land in the territorium Musulamiorum of the regio Beguensis, possessed such friends, as the senatus consultum granting permission for the nundinae tells us. In 138, after the consuls spoke "de desiderio amicorum Lucili Africani c.v.", the senate decided to permit Africanus to hold nundinae on his estates provided that the markets take place "sine injuria et incommodo cuiusquam". Strictly this case may not fall under our definition of patronage, since the amici could have been friends on equal terms with Africanus rather than patrons. Nevertheless, it points up the sorts of decisions taken in Rome which required Africans to have friendly connections to present and defend their cases.

Altogether, a wide variety of beneficia were available to the provincial who had patrons or friends with influence in Rome. Most of the favors derived ultimately from the emperor and their
distribution, as Millar has shown, must be understood in the context of petition-and-response. We may now turn finally to the question of who served as mediators linking African provincials to Rome.

We have already briefly noted the mediating role of public officials. On the whole the contacts with governors and the other officials probably constituted short-term relationships, the active exchange lasting for the duration of the official's tenure. This was not always the case. As Cicero's letters show, from the time of the Republic friendships cemented while an official was in his province might last and entail the writing of commendationes later. The third century dedication of L. Titinius Clodianus was noted above as an example of an ex-governor helping a former subject: it appears that Clodianus supported C. Vibius Maximus as candidatus eius for the position of fisci advocatus only after Clodianus had returned to Rome to take up a position as procurator ludi magni. This instance, however, is the exception rather than the rule. Virtually all other inscriptions to provincial officials were dedicated during their tenure of office, that is, during the period when they had resources of beneficia directly related to provincial life. The fact that very few of the inscriptions thank ex-governors for beneficia or merita after their tenure suggests that, though ex-officials might remain patroni in name, active exchange normally broke off when the official left his province. This is what we might expect: it would have been impossible for a senator or equestrian who had served in several provinces to continue an active exchange with all or most of the contacts that he had made.

The relationships which come under consideration in this section form a contrast to the short-term relationships of officials. They lasted (or were intended to last) a lifetime or even several
generations. From the African evidence emerge the same four types of relationships discussed with regard to the imperial aristocracy in Rome: kinship, communicipes, contuberales (or commilitones) and condiscipuli. Of these the first two types can be described as ascriptive, that is, they were normally part of a provincial's lot at birth. The second two, by contrast, were part of what he could achieve by joining the army or pursuing an education. This dichotomy is of some importance for interpreting the social mobility of provincials and their movement to Rome.

In this discussion of kin and communicipes we are interested in the Janus-figures who rose from the municipal to the imperial aristocracy, mediators who looked toward Rome and back toward their families and friends in their patria. The figure is a familiar one from the Republic. Cicero, for example, in two letters to M. Iunius Brutus requested help for a group of equites from his home town Arpinum who were in Gaul to take care of business concerning their municipal estates there. In other words, Cicero was supplying the necessary mediation between the municipal aristocracy and the Roman rulers to allow the former to claim some benefits from the rulers. This phenomenon became more important in the Principate as provincials from across the empire were integrated into the imperial aristocracy.

The African epigraphic evidence provides only a static picture of the kinship ties between the Roman and provincial aristocracies. To understand the dynamics that lie behind the inscriptions we must turn to the literary evidence for the Septimii from Lepcis Magna. So far as I know, this is the only African family for which we have sufficient evidence to trace gradual entry into the imperial aristocracy over several generations. Unfortunately, even the
Evidence for the Septimii is problematic, and it is not possible to construct a certain stemma for the family.\textsuperscript{40} All that can be said is that the emperor's grandfather was a municipal magistrate at Leptis and a \textit{iudex selectus}.\textsuperscript{41} Of the same family, probably of the same generation as the grandfather, and possibly identical with the grandfather, is Statius' friend, Septimius Severus.\textsuperscript{42} Statius' friend made his way from Leptis to Rome and into a circle of literary friends which included at least one consular. Nothing is known of the emperor's father except his name, P. Septimius Geta. The two alternative stemmata are shown below.\textsuperscript{43}

\begin{tikzpicture}
  \node (A) at (0,0) {C. Claudius Septimius Aper};
  \node (B) at (2,0) {L. Septimius Severus};
  \node (C) at (2,-1) {Septimia Polla P. Septimius Geta Fulvia Pia};
  \node (D) at (0,-2) {P. Septimius Geta L. Septimius Severus};
  \node (E) at (2,-2) {Septimia Octavilla};
  \node (F) at (2,-3) {P. Septimius Geta L. Septimius Severus};
  \node (G) at (2,-4) {Septimia Octavilla};
  \node (H) at (0,-4) {L. Septimius Aper cos. ord. 207};
  \node (I) at (0,-3) {P. Septimius Geta L. Septimius Severus};
  \node (J) at (2,-3) {Septimia Octavilla};
  \node (K) at (2,-4) {P. Septimius Geta L. Septimius Severus};
  \node (L) at (2,-5) {Septimia Octavilla};
  \node (M) at (0,-5) {L. Septimius Aper cos. ord. 207};
  \draw (A) -- (B);
  \draw (B) -- (C);
  \draw (B) -- (D);
  \draw (B) -- (E);
  \draw (B) -- (F);
  \draw (B) -- (G);
  \draw (H) -- (I);
  \draw (H) -- (J);
  \draw (H) -- (K);
  \draw (H) -- (L);
\end{tikzpicture}

The fact that we cannot place Statius' friend in the stemma with certainty is not important to the argument here. Wherever he is placed, it is clear that members of the Septimii family went to

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Rome over several generations while others remained in Lepcis. Contacts were maintained between the two lines and, as certain members achieved positions and made contacts of importance, they used their influence to help advance relatives from Lepcis.

For the relationship between the future emperor and his patruus we have the testimony of the Historia Augusta: "after going to Rome to pursue his studies, Septimius sought and received the latus clavus from divus Marcus, enjoying the support of his affine Septimius Severus, already twice consul." A dedicatory inscription from an arch in Lepcis informs us that this same uncle then took Lucius along with him as a legate during his term as proconsul of Africa--a customary form of patronal support for relatives.

 Patronage relationships between earlier Septimii are more uncertain. Statius dedicated Book IV of his Silvae to Vitorius Marcellus, an equestrian who married the daughter of the consular Cn. Hosidius Geta and then was promoted to consular rank himself. In Book IV is a lyricum carmen ad Septimum Severum, whom Statius describes as a friend and condiscipulus of Marcellus. It seems quite likely that the value of these connections to the Septimii became evident in the next generation when both P. Septimius Aper and C. Septimius Severus rose to consulships in the 150's. Whether Statius' friend supplied the connections in his capacity as father or uncle remains uncertain. What is important is that here we see an extended family from the African municipal aristocracy capitalizing on the increasingly influential contacts of kin at Rome.

Literary testimony for the rise of a provincial is usually available only for emperors, but the pattern outlined for the Septimii must have been a normal one for the other successful provincial families. The low survival rate of African inscriptions
usually leaves us with only fragments of the pattern. There are, however, a few exceptions. Owing to a series of seven inscriptions found at the baths in Lambæsis, a stemma covering three generations can be constructed for the family of P. Aelius Q.f. Lem. Menecratianus Zita which settled in Lambæsis. Zita, a centurion, had a daughter and three sons, one of whom was responsible for the series of inscriptions. The daughter, Aelia Menecratilla, was probably the link which permitted the family upward mobility. She married P. Maevius Saturninus Honoratianus, a procurator Augusti and a clarissimus vir, probably also from Lambæsis. Their son, P. Maevius Saturninus Honoratianus, proceeded to a senatorial career, receiving the latus clavus and holding a tribunate in legio XI Claudia. Aelia's three brothers probably enjoyed the benefits of having a member of the imperial aristocracy as a brother-in-law. D. Aelius Menecratianus passed through the equestrian militiae and then between 197 and 202 went on to hold a legionary tribunate.

Of Aelius Procles Menecratianus we know neither his praenomen nor anything else about him. The third brother, P. Aelius Menecrates Florianus, was responsible for setting up the series of inscriptions in 197 and is described as exornatus equo publico. The following stemma can be constructed.

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{P. Aelius Q.f. Lem. Menecratianus Zita (centurion)} \\
\text{Aelia Menecratilla} \rightarrow \text{P. Maevius Saturninus Honoratianus (proc. Aug., c.v.)} \rightarrow \text{Aelius Procles Menecratianus} \\
\text{P. Maevius Saturninus Honoratianus (trib. latuscl.; cl. iuv.)} \rightarrow \text{D. Aelius Menecratianus} \rightarrow \text{P. Aelius Menecrates Florianus (eq. pub.)}
\end{array}
\]

Given the brevity of the inscriptions, it is impossible to prove conclusively that Aelia's husband was responsible for her
two brothers receiving offices and honors from the emperor. But Honoratianus' patronage seems very likely: he and his senatorial son are the most prominent figures in Florianus' series of dedications and the chronology of the marriage and offices is consistent with this suggestion. N. Weydert, who published the inscriptions, made another interesting suggestion: "il convient de rappeler le nom de Aelius Florianus, vir perfectissimus, qui fut préfet de vigiles entre 226 et 244. Ce personnage pourrait être un fils de P. Aelius Menecrates Florianus." The suggestion seems plausible from a chronological standpoint and the name of Aelius Florianus is not common. If Weydert is right, we have here a situation parallel to that of the Septimii with patronage links between collateral lines. However likely this conjecture, the certain part of the stemma illustrates a kinship pattern found elsewhere in which families of the imperial aristocracy are linked by marriage to families from their patria.

The next illustration of the pattern comes from a leading family of Cuicul and Cirta. Probably in the early second century C. Iulius Crescens was the first man from Cuicul to hold the post of flamen Augustalis provinciae Africae. His daughter, Iulia Ingenua, married Q. Iulius Crescentianus of whom we know nothing more than the name. Their son, C. Iulius Crescens Didius Crescentianus, was flamen perpetuus of both Cuicul and Cirta and became tribune of a cohort. His wife, Naevia, and he had three children: one of their daughters, Didia Cornelia, married into a senatorial family (clarissima femina) and their son, C. Didius Maximus, was exornatus equo publico. I have reproduced the stemma from PIR².
C. Iulius Crescens (Cornelia)  
Iulia Ingenua (Q.) Iulius (=Q. Didius)  
Crescentianus  

(NAEVIA) C. Iulius Crescens Didius Crescentianus  
fl. pp. of Cuicul and Cirta, trib. coh.  

Didia Cornelia  Didia Cornelia Ingenua  C. Didius Maximus  
c.m.f.  exorn. eq. pub.  

In some respects the pattern here is similar to that of Menecratianus and his family—a daughter marrying into a family (unnamed in this case) of the imperial aristocracy. But here the situation is complicated by the fact that there may have been another source of patronage for the family. Jarrett has suggested that the positions of influence of Q. Lollius Urbicus and Fronto explain "the fact that three men from Cuicul obtained equestrian commissions under Pius. The connection between Cuicul and the four colonies of the Cirtan federation was extremely close, many men serving as decurions and magistrates in both places."53 One of these three men is our C. Iulius Crescens Didius Crescentianus. He certainly held magistracies in both cities and it may have been the Cirtan connection which yielded the equus publicus and tribunate. But the chronology does not allow Jarrett's precise interpretation. CIL 8.8318 and 8319 were erected in 159 when Urbicus and probably Fronto were dead54: these inscriptions give full details of Crescentianus' magistracies and his equus publicus, but give no hint that he had held the tribunate at this point. A more likely source of patronage is the senatorial family of Didia Cornelia's husband (who could have been from Cirta for all we know). The chronology of this conjecture is more plausible. Crescentianus' tribunate came after his daughter's marriage (and her death, which would not necessarily have broken up the relationship between the
two families). Didia Cornelia in her will stipulated that an honorary inscription be erected to her brother, Maximus; perhaps the same concern for his dignitas motivated the successful petition to the emperor through her husband’s family for the equus publicus. There is no chronological reason why her father’s public horse could not have come through the same channels, although it is quite possible that a leading provincial family like the Crescentiani would have had other connections. In any case, the Jarrett conjecture gives warning against facile association of the award of honors with the few big men whom we know about from the same area. We are dealing here with an enormous web of kinship, friendship and patronage relationships: only a fraction of it is visible to us and so there were many more links available to provincials trying to influence decisions at Rome than we can know about.

The reverse of the above pattern can also be found, that is, a provincial male marrying a senatorial sister or daughter and so benefitting. Q. Asturnius Lappianus from Rusicade was a municipal magistrate at Cirta (III vir IIIII coloniarum and praefectus IIII coloniarum) and received the public horse. The latter honor may be explained by the fact that he had the good fortune to marry Claudia Gallitta, sister of Tiberius Claudius Claudianus, a consular who had served as imperial legate of the two Pannonias. Given the possibilities for benefit, it is not surprising to find local people dedicating honorary inscriptions to their important affines and so advertising their own importance by association while publicly keeping up the exchange relationship with their relatives. CIL 8.8934 is probably another example of the same phenomenon. P. Blaesius Felix, a centurion and very possibly from Saldae, dedicated an inscription to his adfinis Sextus Cornelius Dexter,
a high-ranking procurator of the Antonine period, also from Saldae. He set up a stone to Dexter ob merita, perhaps out of gratitude for his centurionate. (It is easier to believe that a woman of an important equestrian family married a well-off local who received his commission by patronage than a soldier who had worked his way up through the ranks.)

One other variation on this kinship theme appears in the African evidence—a provincial sister and/or her children advertising the maintenance of contact with a senatorial or procuratorial brother. Egnatuleia Sabina, L. Egnatuleius Sabinus and Calidius Proculus dedicated a stone to their procuratorial brother, tutor and maternal uncle, respectively. Later another family of the municipal aristocracy, this time of Lepcis Magna, set up an inscription in honor of one Fulvius, procurator XX hereditatium. The family included Fulvius' sister, husband and their two sons. The relationship between the people named in a damaged stone from Madauros (later third century) is less clear: "T. Iulio Sabino Victoriano, eq. R., fl. pp., centenario viro gloriosae innocentiae, probatae fidei, Q. Calpurnius Honoratus fl.pp., /T. Fl/avi/us/ Victorianus, /T. Fl/avi/us/.../ianus fl. pp....Iulius Ve/nustus.../Cornel. Salvius Cha/e/re/as p/arentes laudibil/i...a/vo et /avunculo.../". Given that no other evidence is available concerning the relationships among these men, I cannot see why avunculo should be a persuasive restoration (though it seems to be repeated without question). But that is unimportant for our purposes: it still illustrates the continuing connections between the parentes at home and centenarius vir probatae fidei. Unfortunately, there is no hint of what form any officia, the expressions of familial fides, might have taken.

To complete the description of kinship relationships found in
the African evidence, we should include fictive kinship. Two dedications to M. Plotius Faustus illustrate a pattern in Africa which is familiar from Pliny's passages about fictive and adopted sons. Faustus, a municipal aristocrat and local priest from Thamugadi, passed through the tres militiae about the beginning of the second century. It seems that he and his wife Cornelia Valentina Tucciana did not have children and instead adopted one or perhaps two sons, Plotius Thallus, an alumnus, and M. Pompeius Quintianus, an eques Romanus who describes them as parentes. Leschi makes an interesting and plausible guess about the relationships. "Ne voyons-nous pas le flamine et la flaminique donner leur nom à un personnage Plotius Thallus qui se dit leur alumnus et qui, avec sa fille Plotia Faustiana, les appelle ses patroni. Alumnus désigne l'enfant étranger recueilli en basâge et élevé dans la famille. Thallus était sans doute d'origine humble, sinon servile. Il n'en était pas de même de Quintianus. Sa promotion au rang de chevalier romain, alors que son père n'était qu'un veteranus, laisse croire qu'il a été richement doté par les généraux Thamugadiens à qui il a tenu à temoignes sa reconnaissance." The suggestion that Faustus gave Quintianus the requisite wealth for equestrian census is attractive and reminiscent of Pliny's relationship with Romatius Firmus. Unfortunately, no later inscriptions inform us whether Quintianus was able to draw on Faustus' connections to obtain some sort of commission or honor from Rome.

Neither the kinds of kinship links described above nor the fact that they served as channels for the distribution of offices and honors will come as a surprise to anyone. It would, of course, be a mistake to assume that all kinship relationships were warm and entailed patronage. When Apuleius' relationship with his wife's
family turned sour, he dispatched a letter to the governor in order to sabotage any goodwill that Pontianus might enjoy. At this point, the very existence of the honorary inscriptions, though they tell us very little, is important: they are evidence of continuing contact and goodwill between relatives left back in the patria and aristocrats enjoying influence in the circles at Rome.

A wealthy African was born not only into a kinship network, but also into a relatively small aristocratic circle in his city. As a natural part of his activities he would maintain family friendships and develop new ones. These friends might have useful contacts in the imperial aristocracy or might themselves be promoted by grant of an equestrian or senatorial office, in either case providing links in a chain which allowed provincials to influence decisions at Rome. The most that could be hoped for was that one's hometown would give birth to an emperor. This of course became the case for Lepcis Magna in 193. T.D. Barnes (following R.N. Haywood) has shown convincingly, I think, that Septimius Severus did not pursue a policy of favoritism toward all of Africa. But his roots and those of his praetorian prefect Plautianus in Lepcis gave Lepcitanes special connections which can be seen to have produced benefits for the local aristocracy. Though the total number of equestrians in the emperor's service from Africa did not increase in the Severan period, Lepcis, which had not previously produced a procurator whose name has survived in our evidence, suddenly produced three in the reign of Septimius. All three, Q. Marcius Dioga, M. Iunius Punicus and D. Clodius Galba, probably came from aristocratic families of Lepcis and so are likely to have long been on friendly terms with the Septimii and Fulvii, themselves leading Lepcitane families. Galba and Punicus are known from dedications which they
set up to the emperor, perhaps as expressions of gratitude. In another inscription it is Plautianus who is in effect thanked:

"C. Fulvio Plautiano praef. praet. M. Cornelius Bassus Servianus e.m.v. fieri iussit Cornelia Servianilla c.f. filia et heres posuit."72

Behind this dedication may well lie another procuratorship (egregii memoria viri) going to a Lepcitane, this time through the agency of Plautianus. The stone points up the fact that we should not view the success of the Lepcitanes as a result of some generally favorable policy of Septimius toward Lepcis; rather Lepcitanes enjoyed the benefits of being very close to the source of favors in the network of personal ties. Some Lepcitanes enjoyed direct familial friendships with the Septimii; others were somewhat more removed, having to approach the emperor through Plautianus.73

The case of Lepcis Magna introduces the issue of differential access of African towns to imperial favors. While an emperor would be the best fellow municeps as patron, influential senators or equites could also be effective. Duncan-Jones has pointed out a general pattern in the distribution of equestrian rank in Africa: the large cities, Cirta and Carthage, began producing senators and equites earlier and in greater numbers than smaller towns.74

Unfortunately, the epigraphic record for Carthage is badly preserved, but the evidence for Cirta in comparison with other Numidian cities seems to corroborate Duncan-Jones' suggestion. His explanation of the pattern is partially that Carthage and Cirta "were assize towns and as such they would automatically receive visits from the proconsul or his legates, which small secondary towns could not expect."75 Later in the third century "differentiations between availability of equestrian rank at major and minor towns seem to have been less marked."76
Duncan-Jones' explanation of the distribution is useful: in
the first and early second centuries governors were probably the
most prominent of the few available patronage links to Rome. But
as the second century progressed and more and more towns placed
leading citizens in the aristocratic circles at Rome, gubernatorial
patronage became relatively less important. Prominent African
senators and equites provided the necessary patronage for their kin
and municipes from home so that the success of municipal aristo-
crats became "almost a self-generating process". Though we cannot
show patronage in action for all or even most Africans who received
offices and honors (the evidence is too scarce), we can argue that
patronage by Africans of municipes and kin provides the best explana-
tion of the patterns documented by Duncan-Jones and that the specific
eamples from the literature and inscriptions illustrate the
explanation.

On this "patronage" explanation the differential success rate
for large and small cities is simply an epiphenomenon of differential
access to patronage, as the exceptions to the pattern show. As
citizens of Carthage and Cirta began to find their way into the
imperial aristocracy in the first century, the patronage opportunities
increased mainly for their fellow citizens. As more and more
Africans entered, the network gradually penetrated to the smaller
towns. If this model is correct, then we would expect small towns
whose citizens had close links with the centers of patronage to be
exceptions to the large-small pattern. This is precisely the case, as Duncan-Jones points out. Thugga, for example, started
producing equites and senators relatively early owing to its close
contacts with Carthage, which are demonstrated by the fact that
four men from Thugga—A. Gabinius Datus, adlectus in quinque decurias
and granted the public horse, and the three Marcii brothers, adlected in quinque decurias--held magistracies at Carthage before rising to equestrian rank in the early and mid-second century. In Numidia two towns with close connections with Cirta, Rusicade and Cuicul, produced equites in the first half of the second century. "Close connections" here at a concrete level means amicitia bonds between aristocrats of the cities derived from participation in another city's civic life.

In the literature and inscriptions survive only traces of the broad networks. Fronto, for example, had no interest in passing on much information about his continuing ties with Cirta, but they did exist. Champlin cites three examples of younger Cirtan friends whom Fronto probably had a hand in helping to consulates. The Iulius Celsinus whom Aulus Gellius accompanied to the house of Fronto for an erudite discussion is probably the Cirtan landowner and consul designate, P. Iulius Proculus Celsinus. "Marcianus noster" appeared with Fronto before Marcus in the prosecution of Herodes Atticus--probably the Cirtan P. Iulius Geminius Marcianus who held a suffect consulship in 167. The patron-protégé relationship between Fronto and C. Arrius Antoninus (suff, cos. 170) is directly attested: Fronto himself says that Antoninus esteemed him "non secus quam parentem". Altogether, Fronto's protégés illustrate clearly why citizens of Cirta had better chances of securing beneficia at Rome than other Numidians: through Fronto their requests had a short, direct route to the emperor.

Of course, this Cirtan phenomenon was repeated--usually later and in a smaller way--in other African towns. Again and again we find dedications by locals to senators and equites from their patria, sometimes with the phrase amico et municipi. By the
Hadrianic period Saldae in Mauretania Caesariensis, for example, could boast two citizens in procuratorial service. The benefit which the kinsman of Sextus Cornelius Dexter derived was discussed above. The other, Annius Postumus, who held at least four procuratorships, received a dedication from Horatius Marcianus, a fellow municeps, to an "amico indulgentissimo ob beneficia quae in se contulit." Whatever the precise nature of the beneficia, Marcianus clearly profitted from the continuing relationship between Saldae and its successful municipes.

It would be tedious to describe in detail all the dedications by Africans to their fellow municipes in the imperial aristocracy since few of them give any more than names and careers. But the very fact that they were set up at considerable expense and in significant numbers is evidence for the continuity and strength of private exchange relationships through which were channelled imperial beneficia. The emphasis here is on private bonds as opposed to any sort of imperial policy with universalistic criteria: the result is that an understanding of the patterns of distribution must ultimately rest on understanding the nature of the private network which has been described above.

By far the largest group of non-official patrons in our table comprises kin and communicipes. A few African inscriptions, however, remind us that a provincial's life chances were not completely defined at birth. The institutions and culture of the empire provided contexts in which a provincial could meet a variety of people and cement new and potentially important friendships. The two most important were the army and literary education.

We have already discussed the African evidence for patronage within the army. What is of interest here is how the army supplied
a setting conducive to the formation of friendships which then continued after the tours of duty were completed. That Africans thought of amicitiae as one of the natural byproducts of military service is suggested by a metaphor of Apuleius. Concerning his relationship with the consular Aemilianus Strabo he said "between us the bonds of amicitia began honorably a commilitio studiorum under the same teachers."§7 Pliny's recommendation to Trajan on behalf of Nymphidius Lupus is a good illustration of how this might work.§8 Pliny had served with Lupus' father, a primipilares, in Syria some 30 years earlier.§9 When Pliny took up his governorship in Bithynia he called the ex-centurion to be his assessor. The continuing friendship profitted the son when Pliny wrote to Trajan requesting an equestrian militia.

Two examples from Africa show the importance of military friendships. M. Sempronius Liberalis from Acholla pursued a very successful equestrian career in the mid-second century, reaching the Egyptian prefecture in 154.§0 Other than this, nothing is known of Liberalis' career except his service as praefectus alae about 130. The military diploma from Banasa which names Liberalis also names M. Cavius Maximus as his commander, the procurator of Mauretania Tingitana.§1 Pliny's letter indicates that commanders became patrons of their subordinates, writing recommendations for them later. And so, as Pflaum notes, it is surely not an accident that Liberalis was enjoying great success in his career precisely when Maximus was a very influential figure at Rome as Pius' praetorian prefect from 139 and then sole prefect from 143.§2

For the second African example more direct evidence of the relationship survives. Anullius Geta, an ex-praefectus alae, dedicated an inscription in the reign of Septimius Severus to
Not only is the nature of the humanitas here impossible to know, but also Geta's relationship with the family cannot be reconstructed with assurance. He was apparently a commilito of the senatorial son and then a subordinate of the grandfather procurator. Might Geta have used his friendship with the son to secure the position as praefectus under the Mauretanian governor? Might this have been the manifestation of humanitas? The latter seems somewhat unsatisfactory as a whole answer since Geta waited until after his tour of duty to set up the inscription. In any case, the expense of the three statues which accompanied it suggests that the relationship was much more than casual.94

Annullius Geta was probably not from Africa, but Sempronius Liberalis was, and is a good example of how army service afforded Africans opportunities for friendships with important men whose patronage might subsequently be useful. Such patronage may well have been of critical importance to Liberalis' career, since (so far as we know) his patria Acholla had not yet produced any potential patrons of its own.95

Education performed a similar function of promoting social mobility in the empire. A son of a provincial aristocrat might begin his education in his hometown, and then later move to more important provincial centers of learning. In the fourth century Augustine started his schooling in his patria Thagaste and went later to Madauros and then finally to the most prestigious African center of learning, Carthage.96 In pursuit of further education
the African provincial could then move on to the centers for the empire, Rome and Athens. At each stage along the way, opportunities were offered for cementing friendships between master and pupil, and between fellow students. As shown in an earlier chapter, the recipients of Pliny's patronage were frequently condiscipuli or literary protégés.97 Certainly more than one African can be seen to have benefitted in a similar way from his school and literary friends.

The first teachers in a student's career, the grammatici, were likely to be of lower social status than the student and so were in a position to profit from the patronage of the student's family or the student himself later in life. Apuleius in an explanation of how he used his inheritance says that he bestowed gifts on his magistri.98 Similar circumstances may be the background for an African inscription dated to the beginning of Caracalla's reign: "Q. Cornelio M.f. Quir. Rustico, eq. pub. exorn., Q. Geminius Q.f. Quir. Marcianus c.v., quaestor candidatus a domino nostro invictissimo Imp. designatus, magistro fidelissimo ac karissimo posuit."99 Here we have a young senator from Thibilis at the outset of his career dedicating an inscription to his teacher back at home, possibly (we may speculate) on the occasion of securing the equus publicus for him.

A dedication from Sufetula illustrates the lasting friendships formed by condiscipuli.100 The poorly preserved inscription is dedicated to Pomponius L.../murianus, a ducenarian procurator dioceseos Hadrumetinae, by L.Valgius Mauricus, vir egregius and probably fisci advocatus (though Dessau seems less certain of the restoration than Pflaum).101 Mauricus set up the stone "ob eximiam condiscipulatus adfectionem". Both men seem to have come from

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Sufetula, and so it is impossible to know whether they were fellow-students there early in their educational careers or perhaps later at a larger city such as Carthage (which, surprisingly, is otherwise unrepresented in the few pieces of evidence available for condiscipuli). In any case, since the office of fisci advocatus was often filled through patronage, it seems a reasonable guess that Pomponianus displayed his affectio by securing the office for his fellow-student.

Our best evidence for the importance to Africans of educational and literary centers concerns Athens and Rome. Several examples have already been mentioned. Apuleius met his future stepson and protégé Fontianus as a condiscipulus in Athens where he may also have begun his amicitia with the senator Aemilianus Strabo who is said to have studied under the same magistri as Apuleius.\textsuperscript{102} At Rome Fronto enjoyed the rewards of having served as a teacher of Latin rhetoric for the future emperors Marcus Aurelius and Verus. Fronto was not Marcus' only African teacher: Eutychius Proculus, a grammaticus Latinus from Sicca Veneria, according to the Historia Augusta was promoted as far as the proconsulate by Marcus, who shouldered the financial burden of the career.\textsuperscript{103} Other Africans followed Fronto to Rome both to study under him and also to enjoy his patronage. We have already discussed the commendatio on behalf of Sardius Saturninus whose sons studied with Fronto and lived in his house.\textsuperscript{104} This latter custom must have provided a context for especially close personal relationships. The last and most important example from the standpoint of Roman history is, of course, Septimius Severus (friend of Statius) who moved from Lepcis and became a member of Statius' literary circle in Rome. As pointed out above, one of the most prominent members of
the circle was the senatorial M. Vitorius Marcellus from Teate, specifically named by Statius as a condiscipulus and friend of Septimius. This is an excellent illustration of how literary education provided opportunities for an African to cement friendships with powerful aristocrats from other parts of the Roman world and so to overcome whatever drawbacks his provincial origins may have entailed (at least in the early Principate).

At the beginning of this discussion of the four types of patronage relationships, I remarked upon their long-term nature. It is worth concluding the discussion with a brief consideration of how provincials kept up personal relationships with the imperial aristocracy and then of the evidence for the inheritance of patron-client bonds. The patronal relationship could be renewed both when Africans travelled to Rome and when the imperial aristocrats returned to their native communities in Africa. With respect to the first case, hospitium, an important element in relationships between provincials and Romans in the Republic, continued to be a part of the exchange in the empire. Fronto wrote a letter to Lollianus Avitus, proconsul of Africa, on behalf of Licinius Montanus, a native of Cirta. The letter is damaged and it is not clear what Montanus wanted from the governor. At the beginning of the letter, in order to impress upon Avitus how close he was to Montanus, Fronto wrote that he shared his house and table with Montanus when he came to Rome. Further, Montanus was second in his affection to none of those "quiscum mihi hospitii iura sunt". This last clause suggests that a Roman aristocrat, especially a recent migrant who still had numerous ties with his patria, was expected to host provincial visitors as a routine duty, and so renew and strengthen his bonds.
with them.

On occasion imperial aristocrats returned to their patriae, either temporarily or permanently in retirement. When this happened, they had opportunities to become involved again with fellow municipes in local politics. Their prestige made them valuable patrons for the influence which they could exert locally as well as in Rome. The inspiration for some of the dedications cited above may have come from patronal help in local affairs. Direct evidence for prestige of Roman senators back in their provinces is found in Apuleius' Florida. The consular Aemilianus Strabo, a long-time friend of Apuleius, proposed in the Carthaginian curia and ostentatiously gave his vote to a measure honoring Apuleius with a prominently-placed statue. Strabo said that he was going to erect another statue to Apuleius at his own expense. And so, according to Apuleius, the Carthaginian senate postponed the vote until the next meeting so that "out of veneratio and reverence for their consularis they would seem not to imitate his deed but to follow it." When it came to the vote, "all followed his auctoritas". It seems quite likely that Strabo's intervention in local affairs here yielded opportunities for his acquaintances not only to renew their friendships with him but also to lay some claim to his gratia by supporting the motion.

The best proof of the durability of these patron-client ties is evidence for their inheritance. Of course, by their very nature kinship relations were inherited and so the concomitant patronage relationships were as well. It is less obvious that the other types of patrons and clients need be passed on from generation to generation. The epigraphic evidence confirms that they were, at least in the case of comunicipes (there is very
little epigraphic evidence for *condiscipuli* and *commilitones*). The best illustration of this is CIL 8.610 from Mididi: "C. Mevio Silio Crescenti Fortunatiano c.p. patrono, C. Iuli Fortunatiani e.v. patrni filio, Sextus Volussius Maximum cum liberis posuit." This inscription seems to show both clients and patrons being passed on from father to son. Two stones from Thamugadi also show clients passing from father to child. The dedication of one is more explicit and interesting than usual: "Valubi: Flaviae Severineti Petronianae M. Virri Fl. Iugurthae eq. R., fl. pp. filiae Pompeii Fuscus et Felix fidem paternae amicitiae ista memoriae perpetuitate testantes l.d.d.d."110

Finally, there is one other patronage inscription which probably reflects inheritance of patrons and clients and deserves comment in any case because of its uniqueness in Africa. "Memoriae patronis et dominis meis, Q. Bullatii Sabini patris /.../vi et QQ. Bullati(orum) Sabini et Donati filiis eius et Bullatiis Sabino et Honoratae nepotiblius eius, Q. Bullatius Sabinus tribunus cohortis I Syrorum."111 Jarrett has plausibly explained the tone of the inscription (especially "meis dominis") and the fact that the client is a homonym of the patron by the suggestion that the tribune was the son of the eldest Sabinus' freedman.112 This would of course mean that the tribune inherited his father's patron. Further, this case represents a higher degree of social mobility than nearly all others discussed in this chapter, which have involved the patronizing of men who were already part of the relatively wealthy municipal aristocracy. (The other noticeable exception was the son of the veteran who, aided by Plotius Faustus, reached equestrian census.113)

To summarize, I have tried to provide as complete a description
as possible of the role of patronage in linking the provinces of Africa with Roman administration and the aristocracy. The lacunae have been large and quantitative evidence for frequency of patronal contacts completely absent. But it has been possible to demonstrate from the literature that in a qualitative sense patronage permeated the links. All types of regular judicial and administrative decisions taken in Rome and by officials in the provinces seem to have been subject to patronal influence. For other grants (statuses, offices, etc.) personal contacts, either directly with the emperor or through patrons, were the only means of acquisition. We have found these personal contacts to have been what anthropologists call "multiplex" or "multi-stranded"—that is, the relationship was not narrow or for a single purpose, rather the patronal element was an integral part of other forms of relationships (e.g., kinship).\(^{114}\) The literature and especially the epigraphic evidence have enabled us to illustrate these kinds of relationships along which patronal influence flowed. In doing so, we have glimpsed a fragment of the web of personal contacts between the municipal and imperial aristocracies which bound North Africa to Rome. As Millar summarized with a touch of understate-
ment, "the whole nature of the assumptions within which the government of the empire worked gave an advantage to individuals from the provincial aristocracies whom a network of ties bound to the emperor and his circle."\(^{115}\)

**Historical Implications for the Provinces**

The descriptive material just presented was very fragmentary. It is notoriously difficult to use such evidence to demonstrate historical trends or see the empire as an integrated, functioning whole. But we can turn to comparative evidence for help in form-
ulating the general implications of the system described. In particular, I want to concentrate on two historical trends, one which clearly was present, the other which has been postulated but seems overstated in light of the patronage evidence.

The first trend, developing over more than a century from the mid-first century, is the increasing number of Africans in the imperial aristocracy having links with their patria. The trend is obvious, but its causes and consequences in the context of the personal network ought to be pointed out. First, there is the question of how Africans were initially introduced into the Roman aristocracy, and especially what role was played by the emperor. Duncan-Jones has contended that "if the success of Africans in public life was to become almost a self-generating process from the late second century onwards, it cannot have been so from the outset. The entry of Africans into the Senate may have owed its origin to definite central initiatives, akin to Claudius' admission of the Aedui."116 The phrase "central initiatives" here may imply too much. In the case of the Aedui Tacitus says that the initiative came from the Gauls who asked for the "ius adipiscendorum in urbe honorum."117 The nature of the ius is unclear (that is, whether it had any formal legal status), but it is certain that as a result of Claudius' speech the ius (and not actual entry) was extended to the Aedui.118 It is possible that at some point some similar right was formally extended to Africans, but this does not explain in any way how individual Africans took advantage of the opportunity with increasing success. The validity of Duncan-Jones' suggestion seems to rest on a false dichotomy: either Africans patronized other Africans in a "self-generating process" or there were "central initiatives". As we have seen, however, there were other
sources of patronage. First, as Duncan-Jones implicitly acknowledges in his later comment about assize centers, governors and other officials from the time of the Republic had become patrons of leading provincials and instrumental in the extension of citizenship and other rights to them. Romans in their private capacities (e.g. the senators who owned African estates) may also have had contacts with Africans and patronized them. In short, we can explain the gradual entry of Africans with a model of patrons approaching an essentially passive emperor on their behalf. This has the advantage of avoiding references to "central initiatives", which are out of character on Millar's view and which even in the case of the Aedui are misleading. 119

Millar also emphasizes the role of the emperor in the trend: "the fact that senatorial rank, virtually confined to Italians at the beginning of the period, was steadily extended to men from all the more civilized provinces in both the Latin west and the Greek east, and thence to their descendants, was entirely a function of imperial patronage." 120 Of course, Millar is right to the extent that the emperor was formally responsible for the grant of the latus clavus. But perhaps he has emphasized the emperor too much at the expense of the mediators. Unless we believe that the latus clavus was granted in the main to brave provincials who physically approached the emperor unaccompanied and unintroduced, then we must assign the primary role in the selection of new men to the patrons such as Pliny who brought Voconius Romanus to the attention of Trajan (whether successfully or not in this case is unimportant). 121 After all, it would be a mistake to see the gradual expansion of Roman rights as a phenomenon confined to the Principate. As Claudius himself noted, the process of patrons introducing new men
from increasingly distant regions and lower status groups into the Roman state and senate had deep roots in the Republic. On the other hand, it is true that the pace of the process quickened in the Principate: by putting the final decision in the hands of the emperor, the obstacles of developing popular support in the assemblies and overcoming opposition from other senators were removed. The emperor did not have a vested interest in limiting the roll of those eligible for senatorial office in the way that Republican senators did.

Our description of the various types of patronage bonds helps to add concrete content to the frequently expressed idea that provincial areas received citizenship and higher honors when they became Romanized. Romanization entailed participation by the local elites in imperial culture, which in turn provided opportunities for initiating personal friendships with influential senators and equestrians. Once the entry of Africans into the imperial aristocracy got under way, what was the relative importance of the cultural institutions as opposed to ascriptive relationships in providing access to honors and offices? Modern Mediterranean studies emphasize the importance of education and the army in opening alternative avenues of access. In recent years on Malta, for example, better education of villagers has broken down the dominating role of the priest as the only broker in the village capable of dealing with the central government. Twentieth century Jordan supplies another illustration: the patronage networks used to be strictly hierarchical, monopolized at each stage by one man and allowing no alternatives; army careers after 1923 began to offer opportunities for opting out of the old hierarchy. It is tempting to see army and education playing

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a similar role in the Roman empire, and to some extent they did. Millar has heavily emphasized education and literary culture in the initiation of personal contacts. With regard to the "complex network of relationships which bound the emperor to the educated bourgeoisie of the cities,...cultural factors were of all-embracing, though not exclusive, importance. It was the rhetoricians, the poets, grammarians and philosophers of the provincial cities who, after his senatorial 'friends', had the easiest access to the emperor... it was from these educated provincials that, apart from a brief moment of glory for the imperial freedmen, the emperor's assistants and secretaries were drawn; and it was they who were most successful in channelling benefits to their protégés and native cities. The eventual detachment of the emperor from the social context of the city meant on the one hand closer attachment to the army, but on the other his capture by the educated provincials, mainly Greek, who now staffed his court."¹²⁵

It may be argued that Millar's emphasis here derives partially from his thorough use and heavy reliance on the Greek literary sources. Our African epigraphic evidence supplies a useful counterweight. Our findings indicate that by far the majority of inscriptions to non-official patrons in imperial circles were dedicated to men with ascriptive ties (kinsmen and fellow townsmen). Though I would not want to argue that this is fully representative of the network and patterns of distribution of favors, there is possibly one test (not foolproof) to help decide between the emphases—the distribution of procuratorships. It is a reasonable good test in so far as procuratorial service was in no sense hereditary and so constantly involved fresh distributions to new families. Now Millar's claim is that the mainly Greek litterateurs were "most
successful in channelling benefits to their protégés and native cities." This is certainly what we would expect if education were the most important feature in the network, but in fact even in the Severan period, as far as we can tell, provincials from the Latin-speaking part of the empire still were far more successful in securing procuratorships. According to Pflaum's figures for 193 to 260, fifty-four came from the west (including twenty-four from Africa) in comparison with only twenty-three from the Greek east. While the descriptions of the Greek sophists' successes by Philostratus may attract more attention, it seems that the personal relationships described on the banal African stones may be somewhat more representative of the personal networks which extended from the emperor to the provinces, drawing new families into the imperial aristocracy.

Perhaps this is not surprising, given that our comparison between the Roman aristocracy and modern Mediterranean peoples has one major flaw: the Jordanian army and Maltese education permitted their participants to break out of the hierarchy economically with sources of income other than their inherited family plot. Since land continued to be the major source of wealth for the Roman aristocracy, required in large quantity for promotion into higher ordines, ascriptive ties seem to have remained of paramount, though by no means exclusive, importance. A man normally had to keep in more than just casual contact with his kin (with whom he was involved in the maintenance and inheritance of family estates) and his patria (where he continued to hold the estates which supported him).

Finally, as more Africans entered the imperial aristocracy, what were the implications of the historical trend for provincial
administration? In an important article about the early Principate Brunt argued forcefully against the stereotype of the Principate as a period of vastly improved provincial administration. After carefully reviewing the evidence of maladministration under the emperors up to Trajan, he concluded that "in truth the most conscientious Emperors could hardly maintain generally high standards of administration. Augustus reformed the state; he could not reform society. Public morality remained what it had been under the Republic." Arguing from a handful of examples to general historical trends is extremely problematic, but the problem becomes much worse in the second century after the evidence of Tacitus and Pliny, who are the sole sources for three-quarters of Brunt's examples, runs out. We are left essentially to our a priori generalizations (such as Augustus "could not reform society").

There seems to me at least one a priori reason for suspecting that provincial administration in Africa was less rapacious in the second century. In a recent article S. Khalaf pointed out the difference between government in Lebanon and that in other parts of the Ottoman Empire. In most areas a multazim from outside was sent in to govern a district. "He developed little interest in the welfare of his subjects and tried instead to enrich himself at their expense." In Lebanon, by contrast, governing was left to the mugata'ji (local feudal chieftain) who lived in and administered his own village; his "power and economic well-being depended on the continuous support and loyalty of his atba'. Accordingly, he was less likely to be oppressive and rapacious towards them." Here Khalaf presents a theme which in a general form runs throughout patronage studies: patronage relationships give the weak a means of influencing the powerful. In "predatory states" where officials...
are sent in from the outside, they are not linked to their subjects by any sort of bonds which permit the latter to influence or limit the arbitrariness of the former. The influx of Africans into the imperial aristocracy not only meant that Africans began at times to govern Africa. Perhaps more importantly, Africans entered networks of the imperial aristocracy so that even non-African officials were no longer governing complete strangers, but kin and friends of their African senatorial and equestrian colleagues. Fronto's commendationes to governors in Africa on behalf of his friends illustrate the way in which provincials could influence Roman officials. As more Africans entered the imperial aristocracy, more influence could be brought to bear by more people.

Two qualifications need to be added to this suggestion. The first is that most of the links between the imperial aristocracy and provincials were with the municipal elite. They were the ones most likely to benefit from greater opportunities for influencing officials: the saltus Burunitanus case illustrates with great clarity how patronage or collusion between Roman officials and wealthy provincials could lead to increased oppression of the weak. The second qualification derives from Gilsenan's warning in a recent essay that emphasis on "vertical" patronage networks which cut across classes should not be allowed to blind us to the basic structure of exploitation. With reference to a study of a Sardinian village he wrote: "the most important element...is the cementing of ties between the favour givers who have a common interest (and structural position) in excluding favour seekers and keeping them dependent.... In other words, we are dealing with the crystallization and consolidation by the dominant group of shared class position at either end of the stratification scale. There
is a reinforcement of the horizontal dimension rather than a cross-
cutting." A careful weighing of the effects of vertical patronal
ties against class interests for the Roman empire would require
another study of this size. But the example of the Thorigny Marble
indicates that Gilsenan's warning must be taken seriously. There
we saw a case of a senatorial and an equestrian governor closing
ranks to protect the senator from a threatened prosecution by
leading provincials. The tone of the former equestrian governor's
letter leaves little doubt that he perceived the common interests
of the ruling class as overshadowing any benign vertical ties with
the subjects. Both of these qualifications indicate that it
would be a mistake to think of Roman provincial administration as
altogether fair and equitable. Nevertheless, it seems likely that
the arbitrariness was partially limited by the increased ability
of Africans to bring social pressures to bear on their officials.

Finally, I want to give very brief consideration to findings
in the comparative material of the effects of bureaucratization on
patronage. There seems to be general agreement that increasing
bureaucratization in various parts of the Mediterranean has not
eliminated patrons and clients (as it did not in the later empire),
but it has altered the form of the relationships and the types of
patrons needed. Government in many areas is expanding and
making itself felt to a much greater segment of the population in
a greater variety of ways. With expansion has come a more formally
developed hierarchy with more decision-making by committees rather
than single powerful individuals. This process, together with
modernization, has entailed specialization. These changes in
government have introduced great changes in the kinds of patrons
needed. Gone (for the most part) are the days of the single
powerful brokers (e.g., priests) who mediated in all contacts between villagers and the outside world. Villagers need to approach government more often now for a greater number of favors (e.g., water and electricity supplies). They require a variety of specialist brokers who know the technicalities of how to negotiate with various branches of a specialized and complex bureaucracy. This comparative material highlights how little Roman patronage changed and how limited was the degree of bureaucratization in the Principate. The only important specialization of organization came with the separation of financial from other gubernatorial duties. This did not introduce sufficient complexity to require specialization of patrons; the traditional multi-purpose patron remained entirely adequate, as demonstrated by Fronto's patronage of the conductor IIII publicorum Africae.133 Not only the form, but also the contents of the exchange relationships remained essentially unchanged from the Republic. Cicero's and Fronto's commendationes to provincial governors look very much alike: both request favorable judicial decisions, help with their client's negotia, etc. Provincials increasingly sought higher statuses and more offices, but this represented a quantitative, not a qualitative change and certainly did not require any change in the type of patron needed.

The comparative material with its emphasis on increasing governmental provision of goods and services also highlights the relatively limited degree to which imperial government was involved with the mass of provincials. This means that the kind of patronage we have considered in this chapter—that between the municipal and Roman aristocracies—represents only the thin, upper crust of patronage relationships in Africa. By all criteria which a recent
collection of studies has listed as conducive to patronage between landowners and the laboring classes, conditions were ripe in North Africa for patronage links to permeate the society from top to bottom. We can catch only the briefest glimpses of patronage relationships with the lower classes—for example, a dedication to M. Asinius Rufinus Valerius Verus Sabinianus from his cultores domus ob merita. That is unfortunate, because it was these relationships which provided the crucial economic and social infrastructure for the elite patronage which we have studied here.
CONCLUSION

In studies of modern Mediterranean societies the importance of patronage is frequently stressed. For reasons which are not entirely clear, patron-client relations have been a basic element in the social life of the area throughout recorded history. I have attempted to show in this thesis that the Principate forms no exception.

The function of patronage in the Mediterranean has changed with the evolution of other social, economic and political institutions. Of particular interest to historians is how personal networks and bonds of dependence complement more formal, impersonal institutions. An entirely satisfactory explanation cannot be given for our period. Patronage can be documented in the financial affairs of the aristocracy, but its precise significance cannot be assessed. Much the same thing can be said for the tax and judicial administration of the empire. It is certain, at least, that a central administration for the collection of taxes and the distribution of justice existed: thus, patronage may have been important for lubricating the machinery, but it did not play an indispensable part in the basic structure.

By contrast, no formal, impersonal machinery developed for the distribution of offices, statuses and honors: social mobility remained largely a matter of securing effective patronal support. Comparisons with the administrations of the later Empire and China
suggest that this reflects an important structural difference between Rome of the Principate on the one hand, and the later Empire and especially China on the other. Brief consideration of the Chinese case may be useful since it has been used as a paradigm for the interpretation of Roman history.

Much of China's past has been interpreted as a struggle between the centripetal force of the emperor and the centrifugal force of the great landowning aristocracy. Basically, the emperor's interest was in centralization and the tapping of the resources of the whole empire, while the great landowners had an interest in withdrawing their lands from imperial exploitation. In this struggle one of the emperor's strengths lay in a highly organized and effective bureaucracy capable of compelling the great landowners to submit to the central administration. Its efficacy depended on recruiting able men and eliminating widespread patronage by which the great landowners could fill the ranks of the administration with their own people and hence enjoy immunity from government measures. 2

To meet the goal of a strong central administration, the Chinese developed over the centuries elaborate mechanisms governing appointments and promotions in the context of an ideology of equal opportunity. Of the several avenues of entry into the civil service, the most famous was the examination system. The examinations leading to the chin-shih degree were rigorous, requiring years of study, and highly selective (approximately one percent of the candidates succeeded). 3 Once in the bureaucracy, the civil servant's promotion through the nine grades was regulated by a number of factors--"the length of tenure of office, a system of merit ratings, special examinations of specific assignments, and the sponsorship
of higher officials. The Chinese recognized that sponsorship, if unchecked, would tend to deny equal opportunity to all of equal merit, and so a number of regulations were introduced: the sponsor could not recommend kinsmen; court officials had the privilege and obligation to recommend one and only one man each year, but higher provincial officials were allowed more recommendations in order to overcome the bias of the system against provincials; finally, the sponsor took legal responsibility for the official conduct of his candidate. Thus "the play of personal influence was brought into the open, and subjected to rules and standards."

The Chinese model for the development of a bureaucracy has been abstracted and applied to "historical bureaucratic empires" in general, including Rome during the Principate. But in view of the conclusions outlined in this thesis, it seems to me that the comparison with China highlights the differences—that is, the very rudimentary nature of Roman administration and the importance of patronage. Though the Chinese examinations may not have tested the skills required of an official, it did represent a formal and impersonal method of initial selection which provided an avenue of entry for talented but unconnected commoners. No such mechanism existed in the Principate and without connections few Romans could have hoped to have come to the emperor's attention, much less to have had their talents recognized. With regard to promotion, the Roman system possessed none of the Chinese regulative mechanisms—no merit ratings, no rules of seniority, no examinations, no restraints on sponsorship—and kinsmen were positively expected to aid their relatives. While the Chinese argued about how to make sponsorship an institution to promote equal opportunity and merit, the Romans in the Principate did not conceive of patronage.
as problematic on the grounds that it offered unfair advantage to some.

This fundamental difference between the sophisticated Chinese arguments reconciling patronage with equal opportunity and the unquestioned Roman acceptance of patronage is important for deciding how influential we should expect patronage to be in Roman society. It is easy to see how, as in the Chinese case, a society might not live up to its professions of equal opportunity. But it is difficult to imagine how the inverse might occur, that is, how in the absence of any ideology or institutions encouraging equal opportunity a society might promote men in its institutions primarily on the basis of impersonal, rational factors. The general assumption of both the ancient Chinese and modern sinologists has been that where formal mechanisms did not restrain it, patronage became a primary force influencing the distribution of appointments. If this assumption is applied to the Principate, the conclusion must be that in the absence of formal institutions, patronage played a fundamental role in social mobility achieved through grants of offices, statuses and honors.

The cause of the contrast can be traced back to one fundamental difference between the early Roman Empire and China. The motivation for the development of the Chinese bureaucracy was the emperor's desire to tap the financial and manpower resources of the great landowning aristocracy. This basic source of conflict was largely absent in Rome of the Principate; Italy was exempt from taxation and slaves were not eligible for service in the army. Of course, these conditions changed in the later Empire, when the great rural patrons struggled to secure de facto immunity from taxation and army recruiting for the land and clients under their
protection. It is not a coincidence that it was during this period that legislation aimed at suppressing certain aspects of patronage began to appear. During the Principate emperors had no reason to suppress a deeply entrenched social custom which served them well, complementing the administration in important ways and supplying social cohesion which lent stability to the regime.
NOTES TO INTRODUCTION


3. The historical example closest to the ideal type of fully centralized authority is perhaps modern Scandinavia. It has been pointed out to me that the word "patronage" cannot be translated into the Swedish or Norwegian languages.

4. See below, p. 92.


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1. Bryan Wilson ("A Sociologist's Introduction", Rationality, ed. by B. Wilson, (Oxford, 1970), p. xvii) makes this point, but emphasizes that it is only a preliminary step and not sufficient in and of itself. The observer must attempt to supercede the actor's understanding and pose his own questions.


3. E.g., Paul Petit in La Paix Romaine, (Paris, 1967), p. 232 wrote: "Il est évident que l'extension de la clientèle of the Princeps/ à l'ensemble du monde romain a provoqué un relâchement des liens personnels; en s'institutionnalisant au service du princeps unique, la fidélité du client s'est confondue avec la loyauté du citoyen envers le chef de l'État." (m.i.) L. Harmand takes a more extreme position, claiming that "cette clientèle 'privée', à forme individuelle, n'est pas plus qu'une relique sous l'Empire: elle se réduit à de pure formalités qui ont excité la verve de Martialis et de Juvenal, et dont la plus célèbre consiste... à 'assister au lever de son patron, en échange de quoi recevait la sportule'.” (Le patronat, pp. 475ff.)
The two usages in the general sense are Ad fam. 7.29.2 and Ad Att. 1.16.10. Both passages illustrate the point to be made below concerning the use of patronus. In neither of these passages does Cicero use the word to describe himself: in the first, Curius, Cicero's banking friend from Patrae, uses the word to describe Cicero—a sign of Curius' deference; in the second, Cicero applies the label to C. Scribonius Curio in a sneer at Clodius' relationship with him. In both cases, then, the connotations of social subordination and/or degradation are clear. See Walter Neuhauser, Patronus und Orator, (Innsbruck, 1958) for a complete description of uses of patronus in Republican and Augustan literature (pp. 54-118).

De Brev. Vitae 19.3; a comparison between this statement and Seneca's plea for help in securing return from exile in De Consolatione ad Polybioum leaves little doubt about Seneca's hypocrisy in this respect.

Ad Verum 2.7: "sed paulatim amicitia nostra / Fronto and Gavius Clarus/ eo processit ut neque illum pigeret nec me puderet ea illum oboedire mihi, quae clientes, quae liberti fideles ac laboriosi obsequuntur: nulla hoc aut mea insolentia aut illius adulatione; sed mutua caritas nostra et amor verus ademit utrique nostrum in officis moderandis omnem detrectationem."

Hist. 1.81; 3.73, 74 and 86.

Ann. 4.2; 4.34.

AE 1911, 99.

Patronus appears in the following inscriptions in the Table of Patronage Inscriptions on p. 154 below: nos. 2, 3, 9-12, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28, 30, 32, 33, 36, 37, 38, 40, 41, 43, 45, 46, 48, 49, 51, 52.

Seneca, De Ben. 2.23; see P. Veyne, Le pain et le cirque, (Paris, 1976), p. 698 for a similar point.

De Ben. 6.33.3-4.

E.g., De Tranq. Animi 12.6-7; De Brev. Vitae 14.3.

Ep. 7.3.2; 2.6.2.

94.14.

J. Pitt-Rivers, in The People of the Sierra, 2nd ed., (Chicago, 1971), describes this paradox in the context of contemporary Spain: "For friendship to be real must be disinterested. The language echoes the point continually. People assure one another that the favor they do is done with no afterthought, a pure favour which entails no obligation, an action which is done for the pleasure of doing it, prompted only by a desire to express esteem. On the other hand, the suggestion that someone's friendship is 'interested' is a
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grave one. Honourable people fight shy of accepting a favour which they will not be able or will not wish to return. The other may wish for one’s friendship in order to exploit it. Yet having once accepted friendships one cannot refuse to fulfil the obligations of friendship without appearing oneself the exploiter, for one has entered falsely into a contract... The paradox, then, is this: that while a friend is entitled to expect a return of his feelings and favour he is not entitled to bestow them in that expectation." (p. 138f.)

17 Epist. ad Luc. 109. Many of these precepts are not uniquely Roman: Aristotle conveys many similar ideas in Books 8 and 9 of his Nicomachean Ethics.

18 Epist. ad Luc. 9.7f.; 48.2-4; Pliny, Ep. 9.30.1.

19 Pliny, Ep. 4.15, 5.14; Seneca, De Prov. 1.5; Epist ad Luc. 6.3.

20 See below, p. 125f.

21 Seneca, De Ben., 6.33.1f.; De Ira 3.13.3-4; Epist. ad Luc. 25.1; 112.1f.

22 Pliny, Ep. 3.11.1 and 19; 7.28.

23 Pliny, Ep. 1.12.7f; 1.17.2; 2.10.5; 3.5.3; Tacitus, Ann. 2.71; 15.62 and 71; Seneca, Epist. ad Luc. 78.4, 85.29.

24 Pliny, Ep. 9.37.1; Paneg. 61.8; Pronto, Ad M. Caes. 3.9; 5.31; Ad amic. 1.17. See Michel, Gratuite en droit romain, (Brussels, 1962), pp. 534ff.

25 De Ben. 1.5.5. Michel (Gratuite, pp. 502-529) emphasizes the two threads in the thought of the Latin moralists: (1) pragmatic reciprocal exchange, pervasive in the society; (2) selfless, spiritual friendship.

26 Ad M. Caes. 1.3.4f.


29 Seneca, De Ben. 7.31.1. See Michel, Gratuite, pp. 589ff. for the sanctions enforcing reciprocity.

30 De Ben. 4.20: "Sed id propter se expeti dicitur, quod, quamvis habeat aliqua extra commoda, sepositis quoque illis ac remotis placet."

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32 Here Hellegouarc'h is rightly correcting Bernert, Volkmann and Badian who recognize only the latter possibility.

33 De Off. 1.59: "Haec igitur et talia circumspectienda sunt in omni officio, ut boni ratiocinatores officiorum esse possimus et addendo deducendoque videre, quae reliqui summa fiat, ex quo, quantum cuique debeatur, intellegas."

34 De Off. 1.47 and Ad fam. 5.7.2.

35 De Off. 1.47, which is used to show that a man should distribute officia in the measure that the recipient is disposed to make a return, is taken out of context. A few paragraphs later (1.59) Cicero says that another consideration should be the recipient's need--something likely to be in conflict with the criterion of expected return. Other considerations suggested by Cicero include bonds of affection and relationship to the benefactor.

36 Ad fam. 13.36.

37 The unquantifiable quality of officia in my view makes much modern exchange theory (as described by A. Heath, Rational Choice and Social Exchange: A Critique of Exchange Theory, /Cambridge, 1976/) useless for the study here. How can one demonstrate that Romans were naturally manipulating the officia exchanges to maximize their gains when there was and is no means of precisely measuring the gain?


39 Cicero, Ad Fam. 2.5.1-2: "Ego, si mea in te essent officia solum, Curio, tanta, quanta magis a te ipso praedicari quam a me ponderari solent, verecundius a te, si quae magna res mihi petenda esset, contenderem. Grave est enim homini pudendi petere aliquid magnum ab eo, de quo se bene meritum putet, ne id, quod petat, exigere magis, quam rogare et in mercedis potius, quam beneficii loco numerare videatur. Sed quia tua in me vel nota omnibus vel ipsa novitate meorum temporum clarissima et maxima beneficia exstiterunt, /I will ask the favor/.

40 De Ben. 3.19.1.

41 Hellegouarc'h, La vocabulaire, pp. 163ff.

42 De Ben. 1.2.3.

43 Repeated by Volkmann and Badian.

44 De Ben. 3.18.1.

45 Hellegouarc'h, La vocabulaire, p. 165.

46 Ibid., p. 167

47 This third distinction is emphasized by Föschl and Wistrand.
The passages from Cicero are particularly interesting because of his position that a man's foremost obligation is to serve his state (De Off. 1.57)—the fulfillment of the obligation can be a *beneficium*.

*Cicero, De Off. 1.47ff.* Seneca, *De Ben.*, passim, esp. 1.10.4.

*Vell. Pat.* 2.86.3.

*Seneca, De Ben.* 2.21.5 and 2.23.1.

*Cicero, Verr. 2.3.44; Caesar, B.C. 2.32.1f.* To support the same point one could add the references in notes 49 through 52 above.

*De Off. 1.42ff.*

*Hellegouarc'h, La vocabulaire,* p. 170.

For example, *Cicero, Domo 74f.*; *Post red. in sen. 1; Mil.* 100.

*De Ben.* 1.1.8: "eodem animo beneficium debetur, quo datur, et ideo non est neglegenter dandum; sibi enim quisque debet, quod a nesciente acceptit; ne tarde quidem, quia, cum omni in officio magni aestimetur dantis voluntas, qui tarde fecit, diu noluit; utique non contumeliose; nam cum ita natura comparatum sit, ut altius iniuiriae quam merita descendant et illa cito defluant, has tenax memoria custodiat, quid expectat, qui offendid, dum obligat?"

*Hellegouarc'h, La vocabulaire,* pp. 202-208.


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64. Roussy, Tratia, p. 390f.; quotation from Hellegouarc'h, La vocabulaire, p. 570.

65. Hellegouarc'h, La vocabulaire, p. 570.

66. Fliny, N.H. 12.1; Quint. Deci. 268; Seneca, Epist. ad Luc. 8.3. In a recent essay ("When the saints go marching out: reflections on the decline of patronage in Malta" in Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies, edited by E. Sellner and J. Waterbury, (London, 1977), p. 81f.) Jeremy Boissevain has used recent changes in Malta to emphasize the connection between the conceptualization of man-god and patron-client relationships. In past ages the saints played a crucial part in the Catholicism of Malta as mediators. But with the recent modernization in Maltese society and the gradual disappearance of the powerful patrons mediating between villages and central institutions, the role of the saints has also diminished and the religion has become more Christocentric. It thus seems that "religious and political patronage reinforce each other. Each provides a model of and a model for the other." That such a change did not occur in Roman religion argues against any major changes in social relations away from patronage.

67. Seneca, Epist. ad Luc. 119.16.

68. Acitus, Ann. 11.15.

69. Apuleius, Apol. 92.

70. Ep. 8.18.7: "pietas fides pudor scripsit [sc. testamentum], in quo denique omnibus adfinitatibus pro cuiusque officio gratia relata est, relata et uxori."

71. E.g., CIL 3.6833, 7644; 7.189.

72. Often in the Digest, e.g., 38.2.1.

73. Dig. 24.3.54.5; 38.2.47.2.


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76 De Vita Beata 24.2: "beneficium conlocetur, quemadmodum thensaurus alte obrutus, quem non eruas, nisi fuerit necessae."

77 De Sen. 6.43.3: "si illud apud nos custodiri mavult, quod thensaurus eius erimus?"

78 De Re Rustica 4.3.2: "multi etiam beneficia quae in amicos contulerunt, levitate destruunt."

79 The observations of anthropologists in Mediterranean countries today suggest that such a dichotomy is not to be expected. Jeremy Boissevain suggests that in Sicily the strong family morality is reflected in official administration: "the non-kin with whom /an official/ deals in his official capacity, unless they are introduced by a third party who is akinsman, friend, patron or client, receive short shrift. He is not only impartial, he is so detached as to be remote." ("Patronage in Sicily", Han, n.s. 1 (1966), p. 18) In The Peoool of the Sierra (pp. 126ff.) Pitt-Rivers describes a system of friendship strikingly similar to the Romans' (see note 16 above). No dichotomy existed between the morality expected from officials and the morality of reciprocity expected from family and friends. Officials could not be integrated into the community and expect to remain impartial when they performed their duties. The local officials assumed patronal roles with no pretenses of impartially enforcing the laws. Outside officials who interfered to enforce laws strictly had to remain aloof, refusing offers of hospitality which might require reciprocation (unlike Roman officials). Altogether, a heavy burden of proof rests with those who want to argue that a rational-legal bureaucracy can coexist with the kind of values outlined.

80 Two important recent articles which will be heavily relied upon in later chapters for this assertion are Brian Campbell, "Who were the 'Viri Militares'?", JRS, 65 (1975), p. 11, and in the same volume P.A. Brunt, "The Administrators of Roman Egypt", p. 124.

81 Ep. 4.17.4f.: "Obversatur oculis ille vir quo neminem astas nostra graviorem sanctiorem subtiliorem tulit, quem ego cum ex admiratlonem diligere coepissem, quod evenire contra solet, magis admiratus sum postquam penitus inspexi. Inspexi enim penitus: nihil a me ille secretum, non ioculare non serium, non triste non laetum. Adolescentulus eram, et iam mihi ab illo honor atque etiam (audebo dicere) reverentia ut aequali habebatur. Ille meus in petendis honoribus suffragator et testis, ille in incohannis deductor et comes, ille in gerendis consiliator et rector, ille denique in omnibus officiis nostris, quamquam et imbécillus et senior, quasi iuuenis et validus conspiciebatur.... Quin etiam moriens filiae suae (ipsa solet praedicare): 'Multos quidem amicos tibi ut longiore uita paraui, praecipuos tamen Secundum et Cornutum.'"
82 G. E. M. de Ste. Croix has constructed an excellent essay about patronage around the changes of meaning in the word suffragium ("Suffragium: from Vote to Patronage", *British Journal of Sociology*, 5 (1954), p. 33).


84 *Ep.* 1.13.6: "ne videar, quorum recitationibus adfui, non auditor fuisse sed creditor. Nam ut in ceteris rebus ita in audiendo officio perit gratia si reposcatur."

85 *Ep.* 1.24, 3.8, 8.12.

86 *Inst.* 12.7.12: "Nihil ergo acquirere volet orator ultra quam satis erit; ac ne pauper quidem tanquam mercedem accipiet, sed mutua benivolentia utetur, cum sciat se tanto plus praestitisse. Non enim, quia venire hoc beneficium non oportet, oportet perire. Denique ut gratus sit ad eum magis pertinet qui debet."

87 *Ep.* 3.4.7; 6.18.1; 7.33.3.

88 *Dial.* 9.4.

89 *Dial.* 5ff.; the advocate's receipt of legacies seems to be the point of mentioning the childless at the head of the list of important clients (6.2).

90 In *Patronus und Orator* Neuhauser shows how patronus and orator came to be used interchangeably for the barrister of the late Republic. This conclusion is interesting and his summary of work on various aspects of Republican patronage is useful, but his concluding remarks about the word patronus in the Empire seem dubious (p. 205f.).

The claim that the word advocatus completely replaced patronus after Tacitus' age is demonstrably false. A younger contemporary Suetonius used patronus as often as advocatus in his Lives of the Caesars to designate barristers (*Claud.* 15.2, *Iul.* 55.1, *Nero* 7.2). Early a half century after Tacitus Apuleius actually preferred patronus to advocatus when referring to legal representation in his *Apologia*. The paucity of Latin prose literature extant from the next century makes speculation about trends in usage hazardous.

The claim that technical legal argument replaced oratorical persuasion in the courts is more difficult to assess. Certainly, professional jurists came to be prominent in the emperor's consilium, but the examples of Pronto and Apuleius prove that the orator still had a place in legal hearings in the mid-second century. Indeed, we possess a request from Marcus Aurelius to Pronto that the latter restrain his oratory and suppress his invective in his legal confrontation with Herodes Atticus (*Ad M. Caes.* 3.2-6).

Finally, the assertion about the danger involved in patronage as a result of political changes would, if true, have broad conse-
quences for this thesis. Two points should be made: (1) while there were some legal cases with dangerous political consequences (as there were in the Republic), the majority of them must have been of an ordinary nature unaffected by the institution of the Princeps or imperial politics; (2) politically inspired trials, far from discouraging patronage altogether, encouraged leading aristocrats to build up a clientele in the Senate (see below p. 158f).


90 Moralia 808Bf.
91 Moralia 808ff.: "εἰσι ὁ εἰς καὶ πρὸς χαριματισμὸν ὁμίληφες ἐν πολεμείας τοῖς κοινοῦσι τῶν ψιλῶν αἱ συλλείψεις... τῷ μὲν ἐγκείρῃσιν συνηγοριαν ἐμισθὸν ὑπὲρ τοῦ δικαίου, τῷ δὲ σύντησιν πλούσιον ἐμπελείας καὶ προστασίας δεόμενον ἀλλὰ διὰ εἰς ἐργαλείαν τινά σύμπραξεν ἡ μίσθωσιν ὑφελείας ἐχούσαν."

92 Moralia 823B: "ἐπείκετα σύμβουλον ἵνα χαίρωσιν καὶ συνήγορον ἐμισθὸν καὶ διαλακτινὴ ἐμπελεία πρὸς γυναῖκας ἀνδρῶν καὶ ψιλῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους παρέχων ἑαυτῶν."
93 Apuleius, Flor. 17.
94 Flor. 9: "Sed philosophia me docuit non tantum beneficia amare, sed etiam maleficia negare magisque iudicio impertire quam commodo inservire et quod in commune expediant malle quam quod mihi.igitur bonitatis tuae diligunt plerique fructum, ego studium, idque facere adortus sum, dum moderationem tuam in provincialium necotiiis contemplor, qua effectisisti ut te amare debeat experi propere exemplum beneficium, expertes propere exemplum. nam et beneficio multis commodasti et exemplum omnibus profulisti."
95 Ad M. Caes. 5.36: "quae amicis sine ullo ciusquam incommodo propria impertire fides ac religio proconsulis permittit..." 96 Dig 1.15.6.3. See below p. 190.
98 See the Table of Patronage Inscriptions (pp. 164ff.) which contains dedications to governors.

100 Emperor, p. 11.
101 J. Béanger notes the personal nature of the tutela in the ideology in Recherches sur l'aspect ideologique du Principat, (Basel, 1953), p. 259.
102 Third Discourse on Kingship 132, 110, 120: "τις οὖν διὰν ὑπάρχουσα μᾶλλον ἁρετοῦται ἀποθετηκαί; τις δὲ πλείωνων δεῖται τῶν ἐπιμελουμένων; τις δὲ κυρίως μειζόνων μεταδοῦναι πραγμάτων; τινὶ δὲ μᾶλλον
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The benefactor ideology is found in many other sources--e.g., Dio's report (71.34.3) of Marcus Aurelius' dedication of a temple to Εὐεργεσία and in Philo, Legatio ad Caesar, passim.

103 Le pain, p. 620.
104 Ibid., p. 622f.
105 Ibid., p. 624.

Examples where beneficium is used with regard to the universal application of a favorable rule or imperial decision include Dig. 35.2.18 and 22.pr; 35.1.63; 23.2.48.1. Outside of the Digest, the great majority of uses of the word in our period listed in the Theaurus Linguae Latinae carry implications of personal reciprocity.

107 R.A., Marc. 2.5. For further discussion of distribution of governorships see below pp. 47f.


109 Epig. 9.18. Friedländer denies that Martial received the water supply because there is no poem of gratitude for it (Roman Life and Manners under the Early Empire, 7th ed. trans. by J.H. Freese, v. iii, p. 59); Kiliar (Emperor, p. 496) comes to the opposite conclusion on the grounds that Martial published the request. Neither argument seems compelling. For the request for money, see Epig. 6.10.

110 Statius, Silv. 3.1.61f.

111 Space is not available to deal with all of Weyne's other peripheral arguments concerning this issue in detail here. He devotes several pages to a discussion of Seneca's De Clementia (p. 625f.). His argument that Seneca was concerned with true Platonic justice rather than mercy in the ordinary sense does not carry conviction. Weyne is forced to explain away Seneca's plea for mercy instead of deserved punishment as a tactic designed to persuade the unphilosophical. M. Griffin in her recent Seneca: A Philosopher in Politics, (Oxford, 1975), p. 159f. offers a much more plausible resolution of the difficulties which does not require believing that Seneca did not mean what he said.

112 E.g., CIL 6.1067; ILS 9399, 9400.

113 When the saints go marching out", p. 87f.

114 Suet., itus 8: "In ceteris vero desideriis hominum obstinatissime tenuit, ne quem sine specemitteret; quin et admonentibus domesticis, quasi plura polliceretur quam praestare posset, non oportereavit quemquam a sermone principis tristem discedere; atque etiam recordatus quondam super cenam, quod nihil cuique tota die praestitisset, memorabilem illam meritoque laudatam vocem editit: 'Amici, diem perdiidi.'"
The universality of this propensity seems to be demonstrated by its continued existence in communist societies despite the highly developed egalitarian ideology. See G. Ionescu, "Patronage under Communism" in Patrons and Clients, pp. 97ff.

"Patronage as Myth", Patrons and Clients, pp. 7ff.

"Against Patron-Client Relations", Patrons and Clients, p. 182.

"Patronage as Myth", p. 11.

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116 "Patronage as Myth", Patrons and Clients, pp. 7ff.

117 "Against Patron-Client Relations", Patrons and Clients, p. 182.

118 "Patronage as Myth", p. 11.

NOTES TO II

1 This chapter owes much to P. Millar's The Emperor in the Roman World for ideas and especially for its collection of evidence.

2 Beneficium appears fifteen times in the Panegyricus.

3 See above, p. 38.

4 Ep. 10.58.7-9: "ut et nova beneficia conferrem et ante me concessa servarem."

5 Paneg. 91, 31.5, 36.5, 37.3, 39.3.


7 Citizenship: Pliny, Ep. 10.5.1, 10.6.2, Paneg. 37.3-4; Seneca, De Ben. 3.9.2; CIL 8.20682. Freed status: Dig. 48.19.6.12. Ius anulorum: Dig. 27.1.44.2; 40.10.1-2. Ius ingenuitatis: Dig. 40.11.3.


9 This list does not include the various imperial grants to cities which were also labelled beneficia (see Suet., Nero 24.2).

10 This section about senatorial offices owes much to Millar, Emperor, pp. 300-313.

11 H.A., Iul. 1.4. Professor E. Birley suggests an alternative to patronage. Noting that III viri captales and IV viri monetales show a better rate of success in the future careers, he argues that "grading for posts in the vigintivirate, when candidates were still in their teens, took into account their aptitude for service in key appointments in another ten or twenty years' time..." (" Senators in the Emperor's Service", PBA, 1953, p. 202) There is no literary
testimony for this view, nor is it easy to see what means the emperor would have had for testing the aptitudes of boys in their early and middle teens. The statistical correlation can be explained in other ways: for example, those with effective patronage in their early careers often had sufficient influence to carry them to consulates and army commands. See chapter 3 for a full discussion of career structure and merit or aptitude.

12 Tacitus, Ann. 1.15.1.
13 Millar, Emperor, p. 303, citing Fliny, Ep. 2.9.2 concerning the tribunate.
14 Millar, Emperor, p. 303f.
16 Millar seems to date imperial control of the selection of consuls to the reign of Tiberius (Emperor, p. 307). In Levick's view ("Imperial control of the elections under the early Principate: commendatio, suffragatio, and 'nominatio'," Historia, 16 (1967), p. 226f.) the situation was less clear-cut. The precise nature and chronology of the evolution of imperial control are far from clear. Dio (58.20.2) and Tacitus (Ann. 1.81) indicate that Tiberius was already playing a dominant part.

17 Pronto, Ad Fium 3.
18 Ann. 5.39.
19 Tacitus, Ann. 11.21.
20 Mart. 2.5 and 3.8-9; see below p. 222.
21 Herodian 4.4.1
22 Dio 77.8
23 Ep. 2.9.2.
24 Ep. 10.12; for another example concerning a praetorship, Tacitus, Ann. 12.8.2.
25 Dio 67.4.2; see R. Syme, Tacitus, (Oxford, 1958), App. 7.
26 Dio 60.17.8; 66.14.3 and 72.10.2.
28 Diss. 3.7.31; see Millar, "Epictetus and the Imperial Court", JRS, 55 (1965), p. 145.
29 H.A., Mart. 16.1.
30 Ep. 10.13: "cum sciām, domine, ad testimonium laudemque
morum meorum pertinere tam boni principis iudicio exornari, rogo
dignitati, ad quam me provexit indulgentia tua, vel auguratum vel
septemviratum, quia vacant, adicere digneris...

31 Ann. 11.21.

32 H.A., Marc. 3.9.

33 Diss. 4.1.148; see Millar, "Epictetus", p. 145. Starr
("Epictetus and the Tyrant", Cl. Rh., 44 (1949), p. 20) points out
that Epictetus' views were formed by his experiences in Nero's
and Domitian's courts.

34 Suet., Otho 1-3, Vit. 2-3, Vesp. 1-4.

35 ep. 10.12; for an evaluation of the language see Sherwin-
White, Letters of Pliny, p. 578. "Scio, domine, memoriae tuae, quae
est bene faciendi tenacissima, preces nostras inhaerere. quia
tamen in hoc quoque indulsi, admoneo simul et impense rogo, ut
Accium Suram præstuta exornare digneris, cum locus vacet."

36 For what follows about equestrian appointments, see Millar,
Emperor, p. 284ff.; equestrian militiae receive a fuller discussion
from E. Birley, Roman Britain and the Roman Army, (Kendal, 1953),
pp. 133ff. See also below p. 145.

37 See Table I in the next chapter.

38 ep. 10.87.

39 epig. 3.95.9.

40 Other examples include Pertinax (Dio 73.3.1), Aemilius
Pardalas (ILS 4929) and L. Tusidius Campester (ILS 2735).

41 H.G. Pflaum, Procurateurs, Deuxième Partie, Chapitres 2 and 4.

42 Dio 52.25.4-5. For the profitability of an equestrian
career, see Tacitus, Ann. 16.17 and Epictetus, Diss. 1.10.5; see
also Pflaum, Procurateurs, pp. 165ff.

43 See E.J. Champlin, An Historical Study of Fronto of Cirta,
(Oxford D. Phil. diss, 1975), chapt. 7. For the scarcity of
equestrian appointments, see note 57 below.

44 Tacitus, Ann. 12.49; note also the case of Campester, note
40 above.

45 ILS 1740 and H.A. Verus 2.9.

46 Philostratus, V.S. 524 and 626.


48 ILS 1191; CIL 6.1418, 2132.
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49 PIR² 530 for Ursus; Syme, Tacitus, p. 100f. for Crispus. For Suburanus' career see AE 1939, 50; see Flaum, Carrières, p. 128 for the remainder of the testimony concerning Suburanus. For the significance of the staff positions of adiutores and praefecti fabrum, see below p. 146. Other probable examples of patronage include the following: (1) L. Camnius Secundus, procurator Augusti, who dedicated a stone to his amicus, the praetorian prefect M. Gavius Maximus (CIL 3.5328; cf. Flaum, Carrières, p. 259); (2) T. Appalius Alfinus Secundus, who pursued a successful procuratorial career also with the paternal help of Gavius Maximus who came from the same town (Firmum Piceni) and adopted Appalius' son (Flaum, Carrières, p. 341f.); (3) C. Censorius Niger, who held senior procuratorships in Noricum and Mauretania Tingitana; a letter of Fronto informs us that he enjoyed the amicitia of Marcus Turbo and Ercius Clarus (Ad Pium 3; see Flaum, Carrières, p. 226f.)

50 Epist. ad Luc. 19.3 (see chapter 3, note 26); one of Lucilius' amici was the senator Ch. Cornelius Lentulus Gaetulicus, executed by Caligula.

51 Moralia 814D; Syme, "Fliny the Procurator", HSC 73 (1959), pp. 201ff. stresses patronage instead of bureaucratic criteria for promotion of procurators.

52 Philostratus, V.S. 590; see Millar, Emperor, p. 91f.

53 Tacitus, Ann. 4.1; 13.20-22.

54 In Flaccum 2, 11f.

55 De Arch. 1.pr.2-3.

56 Suet., Otho 5.2. For an anecdotal example, see Suet., Vesp. 23.2

57 We can come no closer in our guesses than rough order of magnitude since the proportion of senatorial magistrates and military filled by the emperor is unknown and probably varied. The number of equestrian procuratorial appointments gives an indication of the smallness of the numbers: if the average tenure of each procuratorship was three years, only 30 procurators at the end of the first century and 60 in the early third were appointed each year.

58 For discussions of the latus clavus see Millar, Emperor, p. 290f. and A. Chastagnol, "Latus clavus et 'adlectio'", Rev. hist. de droit, 53 (1975), p. 380. According to Suetonius, Vespasian (from an equestrian family) secured the latus clavus before his quaestorship under Tiberius, but perhaps the account is anachronistic. Chastagnol relies on a passage from Dio (59.9.5) for his argument that the grant to equestrians began only in 38. In the passage Dio indicates some uncertainty, and so it seems impossible to select between the testimony with assurance.


60 ILS 6998.
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61 Ep. 2.9 and 8.23.
62 H.A., Sev. 1.5.
63 Suet., Claud. 24.1.
64 Emperor, p. 280.
66 I.LAlg. I.2145.
67 See Millar, Emperor, p. 281, n. 15.
68 ILS 1318.
69 T.F. Wiseman, "The definition of 'Eques Romanus' in the late Republic and early Empire", Historia, 19 (1970), pp. 67-83. Wiseman claims a change between the reigns of Vespasian and Hadrian from the situation postulated by Millar to that postulated by Duncan-Jones when censorial powers became inherent in the position of Princeps. The justification for this is not clear: some sort of equestrian rank continued to be granted by the emperor himself (the implication being that it was more than just a result of census-taking) and there is no reason to suppose that the loose usage of eques Romanus was suppressed.
70 None of the rest of the evidence is conclusive proof of either view: for example, the letters of Pliny to Romatius Firmus (1.19 and 4.29), adduced by Millar (p. 279f.), are dismissed by Duncan-Jones for sound reasons (p. 150); and the Ostian equestrian (adduced by Duncan-Jones, p. 150), who is posthumously described alternately as eques Romanus and equo publico, is hardly proof that eques Romanus was always used in the strict sense of an ad hominem grant.
71 Emperor, p. 282.
73 See above p. 36f.
74 Dio 50.17.5f.
75 For a full discussion and a list of known instances of the grants, see A.M. Duff, Freedmen in the Roman Empire, (Oxford, 1928), p. 85f.
76 See above p. 37f.
77 Dio 55.2.5.
78 Epig. 2.91, 92; 3.95.
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79Ep. 10.2.1; 2.13.8; 10.94; 10.95. See Sherwin-White, Letters of Pliny, p. 558.

80Pliny, Ep. 10.95.

81Pliny, Ep. 10.120.

82Ep. 10.121.


84Emperor, pp. 138, 496f.; see also H. Kloft, Liberalitas Principis, (Bohlau, 1970), chaps. 3 and 4 for a full treatment of the evidence.


86Suet., Aug. 75; Martial, Epig. 5.49.

87Quint., Inst. 6.3.52.

88De Gen. 2.8; see Millar, Emperor, pp. 298f. for imperial subventions.

89Diss. 1.26.11-12.


91Emperor, p. 466f.; for discussions of appeals, criminal and civil cases, see pp. 507-537.

92Dig. 43.4.38f. For the issue of inequality before the law, both in theory and in practice, see F. Garnsey, Social Status and Legal Privilege in the Roman Empire, (Oxford, 1970). Millar (Emperor, p. 516f.) notes the conflict between the emperor's roles as dispenser of justice and dispenser of clementia--the latter not being identical with the personal patronal role.

93Fronto, Ad M. Caes. 3.2-6; I follow the reconstruction of events by Bowersock, Greek Sophists, pp. 92-100. For dating the trial see also E.J. Champlin, "The Chronology of Fronto", JRS, 64 (1974), p. 142.

94V.S. 559ff., esp. 561. In addition to their appeal for justice, the Athenians also drew support from Marcus' wife and daughter.

95Tacitus, Ann. 6.5.

96Dio 60.16.2; Tacitus, Ann. 13.33.1.

97Ep. 6.31.7.
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98 Cons. ad Polyb.; Tacitus, Ann. 12.8.

99 Garnsey, Social Status, pp. 36ff and Millar, Emperor, p. 539f.; Seneca, De Bcnn. 2.25.1 may be another instance.

100 Millar, Emperor, p. 114.

101 Ep. 10.26, 51, 87, 94, 104 and 120. The second, fourth, fifth and sixth of these are known to have been successful, while the outcome of the request on behalf of Seminus is uncertain (see Syme, "Pliny's less successful friends", Historia, 9 (1960), p. 358f.)

102 The average life expectancy for a senator after holding the consulate was probably about 15 years. If something like eight new consuls were appointed each year, then about 120 consulars were living at any given time. If each of these was sending three petitions per year like Pliny, then the emperor received an average of one each day. In Ep. 10.94 Pliny implies that important requests such as for the ius trium liberorum would not normally be made in writing, but in person. It should be added that the success rate depended on the beneficium requested: we know of no failures of senators to secure citizenship, an abundant beneficium, for clients, while failures are known for senatorial and equestrian offices.

103 H.A., Macr. 1.4.

104 Ann. 4.1.

105 In Flaccum 158.

106 Ad M. Caes. 5.34.

107 Ad M. Caes. 5.37.

108 Ad Pium 9.

109 Ad Verum Imp. 2.8.

110 For amici Caesaris, see J. Crook, Consilium Principis, (Cambridge, 1955), chapt. 3, and Millar, Emperor, pp. 110-122.

111 Ep. 10.4, 8, 11-13, 26, 94, 120.

112 Ad Pium 9 on behalf of Appian. In Ad M. Caes. 2.1 Fronto describes the difference between his relationship with Hadrian and Pius. The former Fronto tried to propiate as he would a god, but could not love because of a lack of fiducia and familiaritas. By contrast Fronto says that he loves Pius.

113 The amor theme runs throughout the letters; see especially Epist. Graec. 7 and Ad M. Caes. 1.3; see above p. 7. Letters illustrating the relations between the two families include Epist. Graec. 1, Ad M. Caes. 2.8 and 4.6.

114 Ep. 1.18.3.

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115 F. Gen. 1; see Millar, Emperor, p. 114. Note also Epictetus, Diss. 4.1.95.

116 Ep. 10.94.

117 In Flaccum 100.

118 Millar, Emperor, pp. 203-228. Note Marcus' letter to Fronto (Ad Anton. Imp. 2.3) where Marcus indicates that he is overworked and has had to postpone reading material sent to him by Fronto.

119 Paneg. 23.3: "neque enim stipatus satellitum manu, sed circumfusus undique nunc senatus, nunc equestris ordinis flore..."

120 Diss. 1.10.2-6.

121 Ad Verum Imp. 2.8.

122 Fliny, Ep. 3.5.9.

123 Compare Crook, Consilium, p. 23f. and Millar, Emperor, p.111. The problem of formal categories is not very important here: the division or lack of it would not alter the fact that some amici were closer to the emperor than others.

124 Millar, Emperor, p. 241f.

125 Suet., Vesp. 2.3.

126 Ep. 6.31.13.

127 Ep. 4.17.7; see below p. 127f.

128 Diss. 4.1.47f.

129 Ep. 1.17; see Millar, Emperor, pp. 83-110 and also below p. 229 for an evaluation of Millar's remarks concerning the importance of educated provincials in secretarial posts for the distribution of imperial beneficia.

130 acitus, Ann. 4.74 for Sejanus; for Burrus, see Syme, Tacitus, p. 591, and also pp. 55f. and 501 for the influence of Ursus and Clarus; for the patronage of Gavius Maximus, see above note 49 and below p. 219; for Aemilius Letus, see above note 27; for Flautianus, see below p. 144 and p. 215. For a discussion of emperors and their prefects, see Millar, Emperor, pp. 122-131.

131 Millar, Emperor, p. 469f.

132 Philostratus, V.S. 589. For a fuller account, see Millar, Emperor, p. 91f. and 491-506, and Bowersock, Greek Sophists, chapt. 4.

133 Philostratus, V.S. 592 concerning Diogenes of Amastris.

134 H.A., Marc. 2.5.

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135 E.g., Fronto, Ad Anton. Imp. 1.2, 2.4.

136 Flutarch, Moralia 207Af; see Millar, Emperor, pp. 9, 85.

137 Millar, Emperor, p. 491f.


139 Seneca, De Gen. 3.3.4 and 6.16.

140 Inez Scott Ryberg, Rites of the State Religion in Roman Art, (Memoirs of the American Academy at Rome, 1955), pp. 43, 51.

141 ILS 4929 and 4928.

142 CIL 6.2133. Others: CIL 6.2130, 2134, 32414 (=ILS 4930), 32415 (=ILS 4932), 32416 (=ILS 4931), 32417, 32418 (=ILS 4933).

143 Dio 58.2.3: "καὶ προσέπτε καὶ αὐτήν αὐτήν, ἐν μηδεμίῳ ὄλλῃ γυναικί, εὐπρεποῦς, δι' τι τε σοῦ δόλιον σου ἔσπευξε, καὶ ὅτι καλὸς περί οὐκ ἔστρωσεν κόρος τε κολληθεὶς ἀμεμβέλεως..."

For Roman women, see Balsdon, Roman Women, (London, 1962) and Finley, "The Silent Women of Rome" in Aspects of Antiquity, (London 1967), pp. 129-142. Balsdon's book provides little help in understanding the structural importance of women in the imperial court. Finley's essay is suggestive as to why the influence of women, when it surfaced, took such a vicious form (p. 141f.).

144 Ovid, Ep. 3.1.131; Tacitus, Ann. 2.34.

145 De Arch. 1.pr.2.

146 Suet., Claud. 25.5 and 29; Dio 60.17.8.

147 Cons. ad Polyb.

148 "Poppea Sabina under Nero; Josephus, Ant.J. 20.11.1; Caenis under Vespasian; Dio 66.14.3; Iulia under Domitian; Dio 67.4.2; Plotina under Trajan and Domitia Lucilla under Marcus, see below; Iulia Domna under Caracalla; Philostratus, V.S. 622.

149 Fliny, Ep. 9.28; see Sherwin-White, Letters of Fliny, p. 510.


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152 Josephus, Ant. J. 18.6.1 (145).


154 Dio 59.19.5ff.; Suet., Vesp. 4; Dio 60.33.6; Dio 60.14.2-3 and Suet., Claud. 37; Tacitus, Ann. 12.54; Dio 60.16.2; Suet., Claud. 29.

155 Diss. 4.1.148 other passages describe the humiliation of begging freedmen for support: Diss. 3.7.31, 4.7.19f.; see Millar, "Epictetus".

156 Paneg. 88.1-2: "Plerique principes, cum essent civium domini, libertorum erant servi: horum consiliis horum nutu regebantur... tu libertinus tuis summum quidem honorem, sed tamquam libertis habes... scis enim praecipuum esse iudicium non magni principis magnos libertos."


158 Statius, Silv. 5; Martial, Epig. 8.68; quotation from Epig. 5.6.9-11: nosti tempora tu Jovis sereni, cum fulget placido suoque vultu, quo nil supplicibus solet negare.

159 Ad Verum Imp. 1.3-4:"Αριστή τούτου γνώμην διαφανέσταται μετέπειτα τῶν ἵππων ἐνομισμένων καίνων ψιλοὶ: καίνωι οὖν..."


161 Aug. 56.

162 Paneg. 23.1.

163 See below p. 143.

164 Martial, Epig. 5.49.

165 Millar, Emperor, chaps. 1 and 8, esp. p. 3 for ideology and p. 475f. for de facto limitations.

166 Suet., Tib. 40; Josephus, Ant. J. 18.6.5 (170-1).

167 Claud. 38.2.

168 Pliny, Ep. 10.58.7f.

169 Paneg. 39.3; for a similar view see Seneca, De Benef. 5.19.2.

170 Hist. 1.1.

171 De Benef. 5.4.2: "Principes... eo loco fortuna posuit, ex
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152 Josephus, Ant. J. 18.6.1 (145).


154 Dio 59.19.5f.; Suet., Vesp. 4; Dio 60.33.6; Dio 60.14.2-3 and Suet., Claud. 37; Tacitus, Ann. 12.54; Dio 60.16.2; Suet., Claud. 29.

155 Diss. 4.1.148 other passages describe the humiliation of begging freedmen for support: Diss. 3.7.31, 4.7.19f.; see Millar, "Epictetus".

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157 H.A., Pius 5.4, 11.1.

158 Statius, Silv. 5; Martial, Epig. 8.68; quotation from Epig. 5.6.9-11: nosti tempora tu Iovis sereni, cum fulget placido suoque vultu, quo nil supplicibus solet negare.

159 Ad Verum Imp. 1.3-4: "Αριά σύμμορον εὐκαρπόν ἐστιν ἀφικέσθαι μὲ κρός αὐτοῦς; οὐ μοι δῆλωσον ἑαυτῷ ἐμφρων κάμοι φίλος, κάμοι οὖ..."


161 Aug. 56.

162 Paneg. 23.1.

163 See below p. 143.

164 Martial, Epig. 5.49.

165 Millar, Emperor, chaps. 1 and 8, esp. p. 3 for ideology and p. 475f. for de facto limitations.

166 Suet., Tib. 40; Josephus, Ant. J. 18.6.5 (170-1).

167 Claud. 38.2.

168 Tlmy, Ep. 10.58.7f.

169 Paneg. 39.3; for a similar view see Seneca, De Ben. 5.19.2.

170 Hist. 1.1.

171 De Ben. 5.4.2: "Principes/ ex loco fortuna posuit, ex
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quo largiri multa possent paucu admodum et imparia datis recepturi."

172 Ann. 4.18: "destrui per haec fortunam suam Caesar inparem-
que tanto merito rebatur. nam beneficia eo usque laeta sunt, dum
videntur exsolvi posse: ubi multum antevenere, pro gratia odium
redivitur."

173 De Clem. 1.13.5: "Hic princeps suo beneficio tutus nihil
praesidiis eget, arma ornamenti causa habet."

174 Suet., Vesp. 14: "spondens quandoque beneficii memorem
futurum."

175 E.g., Philo, Leg. ad Galium 268, 283f., 328; Fliny, Paneg. 85.8.

176 CIL 5.1067 dated to 214.

177 Ep. 10.51: "cu refferre gratiam parem ne audeo quidem,
quamvis maxime possim. Itaque ad vota confugio deosque precor, ut
iis, quae in me adsidue confers, non indignus existimer."

178 Charities and Social Aid, p. 55.

179 CIL 12.4333: "si quis tergere, ornare, reficere volet,
quod beneficii causa fiat, ius fasque esto."

180 Emperor, p. 154f. (M.K. Hopkins has pointed out in seminar
that there is an error in Millar's calculations: the income from
inheritances (accepting Suetonius' figures) amounts to 70,000,000
sesterces--nearly equal to the income from Gaul and Egypt rather
than nearly twice the income from the provinces, as Millar suggests.

181 Paneg. 43.1f.

182 J. Gaudemet, "Testamenta ingrata et pieta Augusti", Studi
emperors' refusals to accept legacies under certain conditions.
See also R.S. Rogers, "The Roman Emperors as Heirs and Legatees",
TAPA, 78 (1947), p. 140.

183 Dio 58.4.5.

184 Valerius Maximus 7.8.6: "Neque aliis dignus fuit T. Marius
Urbinas, qui ab infimo militiae loco beneficiis divi Augusti
imperatoris ad summos castrensis honores perductus eorumque
uberrimis quaestibus locupes factus, non solum ceteris vitae
temporibus si se fortunas suas relinquere, a quo acceperat, praed-
cicavit, sed etiam pridie quam expiraret idem istud ipsi Augusto
dixit, cum interim ne nomen quidem eius tabulis testamenti adiecit."

185 Gaudemet, "Testamenta", pp. 131ff.

186 Peyne, Le pain, p. 659. Gaudemet further argues in his
article that some emperors did not limit the circle from whom they
would accept legacies on the grounds that all of their subjects
owed them pietas. But there was still a special group of subjects who could be said to be ingrati if they neglected the emperor in their wills.

187 Veyne's remarks about the insignificance of imperial beneficence (Le pain, p. 559) seem untenable in view of this evidence.

188 *Economy and Society*, p. 1020.


190 *Vom Werden*, esp. p. 113 for the conclusion.

191 See below p. 156.

192 *Le pain*, p. 620.


195 *Ep*. 10.4-5, 11, 12, 26, 51, 87, 94, 104.

196 *Ep*. 10.11: "proxima infirmitas mea, domine, obligavit me Postumio Marino medico; cui parem gratiam referre beneficio tuo possum, si precibus meis ex consuetudine bonitatis tuae indulseris.

197 *Ep*. 10.4.6: "rogo ergo, domine, ut me exoptatissimae mihi gratulationis compotem facias et honestis, ut spero, adfectibus meis praestes, ut non in me tantum verum et in amico gloriari iudiciis tuis possim." The best single Republican expression of this can be found in Cicero's letter to C. Antonius, governor of Macedonia (Ad fa. 5.5); in the letter Cicero expresses his intense annoyance at Antonius' insults and lack of esteem, suggesting that Antonius could make amends by being of service to Atticus ("si quid in te residet amoris erga me, id omne in Pomponi negotio ostendas.")


199 *Ep*. 2.13.8: "nuper ab optimo principe trium liberorum ius impetravi; quod quamquam parce et cum delectu daret, mihi tamen tamquam eligeret indulsit."

200 *Ad M. Caes*. 5.34, 37; *Ad Pium* 9; *Ad Verum Imp*. 2.7.

201 Moralia 814D.

202 *Pliny*, *Ep*. 10.2; for Servianus, see Syme, *Tacitus*, p. 17 and App. 7.

203 *Fronto*, *Ad M. Caes*. 4.1, and also *Ad M. Caes*. 1.6 and *Epist.*
Graec. 3 for Marcus encouraging Fronto's friendship with Herodes Atticus.

204 See below p. 155.
205 See Syme, Tacitus, pp. 4f. and 100f.
206 Ann. 4.74.
207 Ann. 6.8: "fatebor et fuisse me Seiano amicum et ut essem expetisses et postquam adeptus eram laetatum... illius propinqui et ad fines honoribus augebantur; ut quisque Seiano intimus, ita ad Caesaris amicitiam validus; contra quibus infensus esset, metu ac sordibus conflictabantur."

208 Dio notes that Domitian and Caracalla encouraged informers in this way (67.1.3 and 78.21.5). See Syme, Tacitus, p. 100f.
209 Pliny recounts the danger which he faced by visiting the philosopher Artemidorus who was abandoned by his other amici (Ep. 3.11).
210 Epist. ad Luc. 55.3.
211 acitus, Ann. 15.60.
212 Pliny, Paneg. 42.2 and Tacitus, Hist. 1.2.
213 Seneca, De Clementia; Dio of Prusa, On Kingship 1.30 and 3.86f.

NOTES TO III

1 Pflaum, who labels patronage "un mal", in his discussion of the influence of the great functionaries on behalf of their protégés concludes: "l'influence de ces derniers ne l'emportait pas sur la forma toute-puissante." He then qualifies these words by suggesting that under bad emperors certain coteries could monopolize access to office (Procurateurs, p. 206).

3 "Senators".
7 "Viri Militares", p. 11.
8 Ibid., p. 12.
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9 Ibid., p. 16f.


11 Les Carrières.

12 Millar comes to this conclusion after suggesting modifications in his review of Carrières in JRS, 53 (1963), p. 198.

13 Ad M. Caes. 5.37.


15 Ibid., p. 295.

16 Fronz of Cirta, chapt. 7.

17 Emperor, passim.


19 Dio 52.20.

20 Dio 52.25.4-5.

21 For this suggestion, see Millar, Emperor, p. 102f.

22 Review of Carrières, p. 198.

23 Frocurateurs, p. 296.

24 The exact figures for the statistical correlation are 0.07 for the second century and -0.15 for the third--both figures so near zero as to indicate no significant relationship (on Pflaum's view the figures ought to have approached -1.0).

25 Dio 52.19f.; both senators and equites, according to Dio, should have some experience for particular kinds of offices, but neither is treated as more or less professional than the other.

26 Der Römische Ritterstand, (Munich, 1927), pp. 226, 229, 235, 369 as examples. Lucilius, the friend of Seneca, is one of the examples. In a letter to him Seneca wrote: "you are an eques Romanus, and to this ordo you have brought yourself by your own industria." (44.2) On the basis of this passage Lucilius has been called a "self-made eques" who rose "durch eigene Kraft und Tüchtigkeit zu prokuratorischen Ämtern." (Griffin, Seneca, p. 91 and Stein, Ritterstand, p. 369) Such a characterization with its modern individualist connotations is misleading, for elsewhere Seneca enlarges on what he meant: "ingenii vigor, scriptorum elegantia, clarae et nobles amicitiae" brought Lucilius into the midst of public life (Epist. ad Luc. 19.3).
Roman Britain, p. 142.
28"Suffragium"; Hopkins, "Elite Mobility", p. 22f.
29a-Parerg. 44.7: "Prodest bonos esse, cum sit satis abundequ, si non nocet; his honores, his sacerdoria, his provincias offers, hi amicitiua tua, hi iudicio florent. Acuntur isto integritatis et industiae pretio similis, dissimiles alliciuntur; nam praemia bonorum malorumque bonos ac malos faciunt."

30 Discourse on Kingship 1.30 and 3.86.
31 Ibid. 3.120: "ός γε τοὺς οἰκείους καὶ τοὺς συγγενεῖς μέρος νενόμικε τής αὐτοῦ ψυχῆς, καὶ προνοεῖ γε τού μόνον ὡς μετέχαι τῆς λεγουμένης εὐδαιμονίας, πολὺ ἐξ μάλλον ὡς ἄξιοι ὥρκων καταστάνουσι τῆς ἀρχῆς, καὶ τοῦτο ἑσπευδέχειν ἐξ ἀπαντος, ὡς μῆ ὑιὸς τὴν συγ- γένειαν αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν φαίνεται προτιμῶν."
32 Aerec. 9.
33 H.A., Fius 4.3.
34 Sallust, B.C. 54.
35 2.26.1f. (for a discussion of the passage, see Millar, Cassius Dio, p. 115): "ἔνα ἐως τε ἐτί πιῦδος εἰσίν, ἐς τον διδασκαλεῖα σωματικῶς, καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἐς μεταφάι κυρίατων, ἐπὶ τοὺς ἵππους καὶ ἑτί τά ὁπλα τρέπονται, ὣς ἀκολούθους ἑκατέρων ὁμοσεύηντος ἐμπύθεσθαι ἕχοντες. οὕτω γὰρ εὐθὺς ἐξ παιδῶν πάνθ' ὀς ἄνδρας αὐτούς γενομένους ἐπιτελέιν καὶ μᾶθοντες καὶ μελετήσαντες ἐπιτυχεῖσθον σοι πρὸς τάν ἄρχον γενομένων."
36 Dio 52.26.5: "Μήτε οὖν περίδοτος ποτέ τοῦτο προχείνει, μήτ' αὖ δείσθς ὅτι τραφεὶς τέ τις καὶ καιδεθείς ὡς ἐγώ λέγω νεωτέρον τι τολμῆσαι."
36a Emperor.
37 Moralia 800Af.: "τὸ μὲν οὖν τῶν πολιτῶν ήθος ἵσχύοντα εἰς καὶ πιστεύωμεν ἕνη πειρᾶσθαι νυμφίζειν ἁπλώς ἐκόρδων υπάρχουν καὶ πρῶς μεταχειρίζεσθαι..." (See also Vell. Pater. 2.126.4).
38 Sic Romer 31. "ὅτι οὲ ἄρχοντες οἳ πεμπόμενοι ἐτί τὰς πόλεις τε καὶ τὰ ἐθνὶς τῶν μὲν μιᾷ ἐφάρμοσαν ἔχαστοι ἀρχοντες εἰςι, τα ἐς πρὸς αὐτοὺς τε καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὁμοίως ἐκαντες ἁρχόμενοι, καὶ ὅτι καὶ τοϋτον ραίτη τοὺς ἀν αὐτοὺς ἑκατέρων ὄντες ἐκαιριοῦν, ὡς πρῶς δεινούντος ῥωμαῖος ἐρχόμενοι προσήκει." 
39 Discourse on Kingship 1.44: "ὡσπερ οὖν ὅσοι στρατηγοὶ τε καὶ ἀρχοντες ἅρματοπαδοῦν καὶ πόλεων καὶ ἐθνῶν, ὡς ἀν τὸν σον μάλιστα μιμήσαι τρόπον τε καὶ ποτὲ τοιδ' ἡθεὶν ὄμοιον αὐτοῦ ἡ δύνατον σαίνειν ταρέχουν, οὕτως ἐν εἰς ὁρὶ πάντων ἐταιρίστατος καὶ προσφιλέστατος: εἰ ὡς τὶς ἐναντίος καὶ ἀνόμοιος γίγνοιτο, δικαιῶσ καὶ τὸν ἄλλον μέμψέως..."
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40 Campbell, "'Viri militares'", p. 27.

41 Ibid., pp. 17ff.

42 "Administrators of Roman Egypt", p. 141. Recently Ramsay MacMullen has reasserted the idea of regional specialization in Roman Government's Response to Crisis, (New Haven, Conn., 1976), p. 55. He states that "equestrians were more often than not stationed near their homes." As evidence he first cites Jarrett, Historia, 14 (1963), p. 223. Jarrett's statistics, however, concern equestrian militiae of Africans (not procurators) and show that far less than half of them were stationed in Africa. The four procuratorial careers cited from Pflaum's catalogue of 350 hardly amount to a pattern.

43 La préfecture de l'annone, service administratif impérial d'Auguste à Constantin, (Rome, 1976), p. 79. The assertion that the praefecti annoneae were selected for financial expertise can be tested with two questions: were those who held financial procuratorships favored over those holding military procuratorships and were the secretaries a rationibus favored as is asserted (p. 70)? The ratio of prefects with military background to those with civilian background is 1:2, but the same comparison for all those reaching Palatine officia or the great prefectures gives a ratio of 5:18 and for all procurators it is 25:86. So in fact those with military experience are proportionally overrepresented in the prefecture of the annona. As for the second question, it is true that most prefects were secretaries a rationibus, but it is also true that most men who reached the other great prefectures also held the office of a rationibus. In neither case can any special selection be demonstrated nor a group of financial specialists be singled out. Note that in Seneca's tendentious passage about the prefect's duties, he does not seem to think that they required any special mental skills and likened the work to that of plodding oxen (De Brev. Vitae 18).


45 M. Griffin, for example, in her recent book (Seneca, p. 356) suggests that "De Tranquillitate Animi and De Otio, like De Srevitate Vitae, envisage the life of officia civilia as full-time activity in public office..." A careful reading of these dialogues indicates that Seneca thought that officia civilia infringed on otium, as they did no doubt in the case of Pliny the Elder cited below. But that need not mean that the officia constituted full-time jobs in the modern sense, and Seneca does not say anything specific to support such an implication.

46 See Appendix A.

47 Ep. 3.5.
NOTES TO III

48. F. Leather, Carrières, p. 110; also see Syme, "Pliny the

49. praef. 1: "Delectat te, quemadmodum scribis, Lucili
virorum optime, Sicilia et officium procurationis otiosae delect-
abitque, si continere id intra fines suos volueris nec efficiere
imperium, quod est procuratio. Facturum hoc te non dubito. Scio,
quom suis ambitioni alius, quam familiaris otio et litteris."

50. Discourse on Kingship 3.86ff.: "philian ge μην ὑπάντων γενόμεικα
tων αυτοῦ κτημάτων καλλιστον καὶ ευρίσκον. οὐ γὰρ οὕτως οἴχρον
εἰνα τοῖς βασιλεύσαν οὐδὲ ἐπιχιώναν κυριμάτων ἐπορεύν ὡς φίλων,
οὐδ' αὐτος τῇ χορηγίᾳ καὶ τοῖς στρατόπεδοι καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ δυνάμεις
dιαφιλάττειν τὴν εὑραλυμογίας ψε ψ. τῇ πίστει τῶν φίλων... μόνος μὲν γὰρ
οὐδεὶς πρὸς οὐδὲν οὗδεν ἢκανέ έστι· τοῖς δὲ βασιλεύσαν οὐσω
πλείω τε καὶ μείζω πράττειν ἀγάπη, πλεῖστον ὡς καὶ τῶν συνεργοντών
καὶ μετέχοντος πλείονος. ἀνάγκη γὰρ τις μέγιστα καὶ σπουδιότατα
tῶν πραγμάτων ή πιστεύειν ἐτέρας ἡ προσέδωθαι."

51. Agric. 9.

52. In Flaccum 4: "οἰον σεμνότερον ἤγεν αὐτὸν—диρκντι δὲ λασιτελέ-
σατον δ' τύσοις--; ἑδίκαιε τὰ μεγάλα μετὰ τῶν ἐν τέλει, τούς ὑπερακύνη
καθῆτει, μιγάδων καὶ συγκλύων ἀνθρώπων ὅχλον ἐκώλυε τῆς

54. Flaccus is praised by Philo as an intelligent amateur, but
even this intelligence was thought by Philo to be secondary to his
kingly nature.

55. Ed. 4.12: "Cum in provinciam quaestor exisset, scribamque
qui sorte obtigerat ante legitimum salarii tempus amisisset, quod
acceperat scribae daturus, intellexit et statuit subsidere
apud Se
cnon oportere. Itaque reversus Caesarem, deinde Caesare
auctore
senatum consuluit, quid fieri de salario vellet. Parva quaestio
sed tamen quaestio."

56. Procurateurs, p. 204.

57. Dom. 4: "Spectacula assidue magnifica et sumptuosa edidit
non in amphitheatro modo, verum et in cirto, ubi praeter sollemnes
bizarum quadrigarumque cursus proelium etiam duplex, equestre
pedestre, commisit; at in amphitheatro navale quoque. Nam venae-
tiones gladiatoris et noctibus ad lychnuchos, nec virorum modo
pugnas, sed et feminarum. Fraetera quaestorii munerebus, quae
olim omissa revocaverat, ita semper interfuit... Ac per omne
gladiatorum spectaculum ante pedes ei stabat puellus coccinatus
parvo portentosque capite, cum quo plurimum fabulabatur, nonnum-
quam serio. auditus est certe, dum ex eo quaeve; "equid sciret,
cur sibi visum esset ordinatione proxima Aegypto praeficere
Mettium Rufum."

58. Roman Britain, p. 142.

59. Silv. 5.1.94f.
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59 Roman Britain, p. 142.
60 "Emperors at work", p. 15.
61 Roman Britain, p. 143 with reference to Suet., Vesp. 4.1.
62 Suet., Otho 1.1.
63 Tacitus, Ann. 12.8.
64 Stace, Silves, v. II, ed. by H. Frere and trans. by H. J. Izaac; see notes to p. 177.
65 Vegetius 2.7. Vegetius' comment is partially confirmed by the codicil from Marcus Aurelius to Q. Domitius Marsianus of Bulla Regia (AE 1962, 183). The codicil notified Marsianus of his appointment to a ducenariate procuratorship and seems to have been written by the emperor (Pflaum, "Une lettre de promotion de l'empereur Marc Aurele pour un procurateur ducenaire de Gaulearbonaise", Bonner Jahrbücher, 171 (1971), p. 357 and Killar, Emperor, p. 288).
66 The Letters of Pliny, p. 581f.
67 Ibid., p. 12.
68 Ad fam. 13.15, 17, 33, 63.
69 For industria, sobrius, acer, diligens, honestas, probitas, innocentia, castitas in Fronto, see Ad amic. 1.1-5, 8; Ad Fium 9; Ad P. Caes. 5.37; Ad Verum Imp. 2.7. The indiscriminate use of such adjectives is illustrated by a funerary dedication to a ten year old boy which includes the same language applied to officials (AE 1931, 43 from Africa).
70 Pliny, Ep. 10.94: a request for the ius trium liberorum in which Suetonius is described as probissimus, honestissimus and eruditissimus, while in Ep. 2.9 Sextus Erucius Clarus is recommended for the aedileship on the grounds that he is probissimus, gravissimus and eruditissimus.
71 Letters of Pliny, p. 211.
72 Ep. 2.13: the eloquentia attributed to Romanus is also a mark of good aristocratic upbringing and is relevant to the quality of his companionship. Also see Ep. 7.22; 2.9.4-5; 3.2.1-3; 4.15.1; 6.6.5f.; 6.23.3; 7.31.5.
73 Ep. 4.15.1-2: "Est homo eximius et bonorum amantissimus. Cur enim non me quoque inter bonos numerum? Ideo Cornelium Tacitum (scis quem virum) ars familiaritate complexus est. Proinde si tu rumque nostrum probas, de Rufo quoque necesse est idem sentias, cum sit ad conectendas amicitias vel tenacissimum vinculum morum similitudo."
74 Ep. 4.17.7: "Quantum ille fame maee domi in publico,
quantum etiam apud principem adstruxit! Nam cum forte de bonis iuuenibus apud Nervam imperatorem sermo incidisset, et plerique me laudibus ferrent, paulisper se intra silentium tenuit, quod illi plurimum auctoritatis addebat; deinde gravitate quam noras: 'Necesse est' inquit 'parcius laudem Secundum, quia nihil nisi ex consilio meo facit.' Qua voce tribuit mihi quantum petere voto immordicum erat, nihil me facere non sapientissime, cum omnia ex consilio sapientissimi viri facerem.'

Ep. 10.94.

\[ \text{C:} (29 \times 19) + (35 \times 21) + (37 \times 22) + (49 \times 19) + (49 \times 12) = 38 \]

\[ \text{LX:} (21 \times 19) + (35 \times 21) + (35 \times 22) + (42 \times 19) + (49 \times 12) = 35 \]

NOTES TO IV

1 De Ben. 1.4.2: "De beneficiis dicendum est et ordinanda res, quae maxime humanam societatem adligat."

2 De Ben. 1.11.2f. Michel provides a discussion of Seneca's De Beneficiis (Gratuité, pp. 519ff.) and more generally of the economic and social significance of exchange (pp. 552ff.). His conclusion (pp. 553ff. and 577) that the importance of reciprocal exchange declined differs from the conclusions reached in this chapter and so deserve several comments. (1) The reason given for the decline is that reciprocal exchange requires a social setting of a small, stable group such as the senatorial aristocracy of the Republic (pp. 578ff.). Michel's view of Republican exchange seems unrealistic; Cicero's letters prove that senators did not engage in reciprocal exchange solely with other senators, and the senate as a whole did not comprise a stable group from generation to generation (Michel cites Gelzer, The Roman Nobility for evidence of the paucity of novi homines, but, as Gelzer himself points out, new men were rare only in the consulate, while "in the lower magistracies, up to the praetorship, such new men were a quite common phenomenon" /p. 357/). (2) Michel's view of the individualism of the Principate which obviated the need for amicitiae seems untenable in view of the evidence presented in this dissertation (p. 584). (3) His evidence for the decline lies partially in the difference in the frequency with which private friendships appear in the classical jurists on the one hand, and in the Theodosian and Justinian Codes on the other (p. 577)--a comparison whose value is vitiated by the general difference in the subject matter in the two bodies of material (see Honore, Tribonian, (London, 1978), pp. 37ff.). (4) Michel's examples of the replacement of friendship by impersonal institutions (p. 553f.) hardly indicate a revolution in social institutions: for instance, the public chairs instituted for teachers were limited in number and did not alter their need for friends and patrons (see V. Nutton, "Notes on Immunities", pp. 55ff.). Michel's examples seem unimportant compared with the functions of amicitia described by Michel himself.
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3 Pflaum, Procurateurs, p. 195.

4 Of 100 Ciceronian commendationes two were concerned with
electioneering and two with legal cases, while 48 requested
financial beneficia and 35 ambiguously asked that the bearer be
taken into the addressee's amicitia.

5 See above p. 8.

6 For the importance of land investment and the problem of
liquidity, see W. I. Finley, The Ancient Economy, (London, 1973),
p. 53, 1. Shatzman, Senatorial Wealth and Roman Politics,
( Brussels, 1975), pp. 135-142, discusses senatorial loans and
their political consequences.

7 Shatzman (ibid., pp. 416ff.) provides a list of Cicero's
debts and loans.

8 M. W. Frederiksen, "Cesar, Cicero and the Problem of Debt",
RIS, 56 (1966), pp. 128ff., reviews the harsh nature of Roman
laws concerning debt, pointing out that "for a man of standing it
was vital to keep out of the courts as long as possible." (p. 130)

9 Cicero, having troubles recovering his money from Faberius,
tried to secure it by persuading Oppius and Balbus on the basis of
amicitia to act as sponsors for the debt. They apparently refused.
Frederiksen (ibid., p. 131) gives the references with his dis-
cussion. Cicero had the tables turned when sertentia countered his
delay in repaying the dowry by turning over the loan to Balbus
(Ad Att. 12.12).


11 Ann. 11.21. Tacitus labels the financial support "largi-
tiones". Whether Tacitus would have had precise details about the
transactions seems doubtful. I suggest that as Rufus enjoyed
increasing success he would have been in a position to repay the
beneficia (as Cavius Clarus repaid Pius as soon as he was able
Flronto, Ad Verum Imp. 2.7/). See also H.A., Pius 8.4.

12 Pliny, Ep. 6.19.

13 De Ben. 2.21.5f. In the case of Pius' aid to Clarus cited
in note 11, the occasion of the expenditure was the Praetorian
Games.

14 Ad Verum Imp. 2.7.

15 Pius 2.8.

16 Ep. 2.4.

17 Epig. 2.30, 9.46, 12.25; in 4.15 Martial portrays himself
evading a friend's request for a loan.

18 Ep. 6.8; "Huius est heres Maximus noster, quem et ipse amo,
sed conjunctius tu. Rogo ergo, exigo etiam pro iure amicitiae, cures
ut Atilio meo salva sit non sors modo uerum etiam usura plurimum
annorum."
10. Dio 62.2.1; see Griffin, Seneca, p. 231f.


22. Ep. 6.5.2.

23. Pliny gave 100,000 sesterces to Calvina (Ep. 2.4.2) and 50,000 sesterces to Quintilianus' daughter (Ep. 8.32.2). For Cicero's praise of such gifts, De Off. 2.56.

24. For descriptions of such value systems in the modern Mediterranean, see Honour and Shame, ed. by J.S. Peristiany, (London, 1965).

25. Epig. 1.96, 4.46, 4.88, 8.71, 12.72.

26. Epig. 11.18, 12.24, 7.36, 8.28, 8.51, 10.57, 12.36, and 8.33 for the ridiculed cup from the praetor Paulus.

27. Pliny, Ep. 3.21.2: "dederam hoc amicitiae, dederam etiam versiculis quos de me compositum." For that the imperial freedman Parthenius was able not only to forward Martial's poems to Domitian but also to give the poet a fine cloak gives proof of a superiority which conflicted with their relative standings in legal orders. (For status dissonance, see F.R.C. Weaver, "Social mobility in the early Roman Empire: the evidence of the imperial freedmen and slaves", Past and Present, no. 37 (1967), pp. 3-20.)


31. Tacitus, Ann. 13.42; see Griffin, Seneca, p. 289.

32. Duncan-Jones, Economy of the Roman Empire, pp. 25ff.

33. See above p. 135f.

34. Tacitus, Dial. 6; see also Seneca, De Ben. 1.14.3.

35. Pliny, Ep. 9.30; Seneca, De Ben. 4.20.3: "ingratum voco, qui aegro adsidit, quia testamentum facturus est, cui de hereditate aut de legato vacat cogitare. Faciat licet omnia, quae facere bonus amicus et memор officii debet: si animo eius observatur spes lucri, captator est et hamum iacit."

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37 Epig. 5.39 and 6.62. In 1.99 and 4.51 Martial writes of characters whose fortunes were radically altered by inheritance. He scorns those paying court to the childless as well as the childless who accept gifts from the self-interested in 4.56, 6.63, 7.66, 8.27, 9.9, 9.4b, 11.44, 11.55, and 12.10. How to treat Martial's poetry as historical evidence is, of course, difficult, but the frequent recurrence of the theme, other corroborating sources and the inherent plausibility indicate that Martial is working with a realistic theme in this case.

38 De Ben. 4.22.1; see Tacitus, Ann., 16.17.5 for evidence that even legacies could have ulterior motives.

39 Ep. 7.20.6.

40 H.A., Pius 1.9.

41 D.R. Shackleton-Bailey, Cicero's Letters to Atticus, (Cambridge, 1966), v.5, app.3.

42 Ep. 1.24 and 7.11.

43 Martial, Epig. 3.52 and Juvenal, Sat. 3.220.

44 J. Pitt-Rivers, The Fate of Shechem, or the Politics of Sex, (Cambridge, 1977), p. 35. Pitt-Rivers' view cannot be applied schematically and our evidence does not permit us to work out the precise effects of patronal values.

45 Pitt-Rivers (ibid., chaps. 1-2) distinguishes between honor=precedence and honor=virtue. Seneca and other Stoics pronounced the latter view, arguing that a man's honor depended not on external factors such as wealth, but on virtuous character. The evidence cited in this chapter shows that in fact the former equation was dominant in Roman society, or rather that the two were confused (the ability to give to friends and clients was equated with virtue). Such "confusion of the meanings of honour=precedence and honour=virtue served the function of social integration by crediting the rulers with a claim to esteem and a charter to rule. But it is a function which is fulfilled only as long as the confusion is not recognized as such..." One way of conceptualizing the cause of rising tensions in the reigns of Caligula, Nero, Domitian and Commodus is that the emperor's distribution of beneficia to unworthy favorites came to seem irresponsible and the confusion was no longer possible.

46 Letters of Pliny, p. 149.

47 Boissevain, ("when the Saints go marching out", Patrons and Clients, p. 88f.) has recently pointed out that there was no stigma attached to being a client in Malte (for an ordinary man) until recently when the old patronal values have radically altered or disappeared.

48 Seneca, De Ben. 2.11.2.

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49Ep. 4.12: "Omnes enim, qui gloria famaque ducuntur, mirum in modum adsensio et laus a minoribus etiam profecta delectat." Another instance of Pliny's "lack of delicacy" or more proof that the identification of some men as minores and others as superiores was part of the natural order of things?

50Ad amic. 1.5: "Dignus est quem diligas et suffragiis tuis ornies. Tuae propriae gloriae addideris, quantum dignitati praedicatoris tu adstruxeris."

51Seneca, De Ben. 2.21.5.
52De Ben. 2.23.1
53De Ben. 6.42f.
54De Ben. 2.17.6.

55Seneca, Brev. Vit. 14.3f.; at least 20 of Martial's epigrams mention salutations, e.g., 2.18, 3.36, 3.38, 3.46; when Seneca retired from political life, he drove away the "coetus salutantium" (Tacitus, Ann. 14.55); Juvenal, Sat. 1.127 and 3.124; Columella (1.praef.2) mentions mercenarii salutatores who hover about the limina potentiorum; see also CIL 6.21975.

56Epig. 4.5 and 8.42.
58Martial, Epig. 4.68; see also Herodian 2.6.7 for another example. For the beneficium of housing, see Dig. 9.3.5.1.
59Epig. 10.70, 74 and 82.
60Martial, Epig. 12.26; 10.10 and Juvenal, Sat. 1.117.
61Epist. ad Luc. 101.3. In Brev. Vit. 20.1 Seneca says that senators pursuing magistracies have to endure "mille indignitates": this may be a reference to the humiliations of attending salutations (mentioned earlier in the essay, 14.3).

62Moralia 814D: "οι πολλοὶ γναθόκουσιν πρὸς ἀλλερῆς θύρας." Pliny, Ep. 2.9 may also refer to salutations.
63Dio 76.5.3f.: "πρὸ τῶν ἀλλων τῶν ἀρεταίμους συνήν" Tacitus, Ann. 3.55 is ambiguous, if not misleading, about salutations.
64See above p. 28f. and the remark in note 90 about Neuhauser's claims about the declining role of the orator.
65Ann. 1.75.
66 Millar, Emperor, p. 240.


68 Ep. 4.15; see Sherwin-White, Letters of Pliny, p. 291 for the dating.


69 The fact that emperors could have made these subordinate appointments themselves but chose not to do so suggests that emperors did not pursue a conscious policy of minimizing the patronal resources of senators.

70 Ad Plium 8: "Post illa quaecumque ad instruendam provinciam adtinerent, quo facillius a me tanta negotia per amicorum copias obirentur, sedulo praeparavi. Propinquos et amicos meos, quorum fidem et integritatem cognoveram, domo accivi." For other evidence for the appointment of friends to staff positions, see Lucian's Apology and Pliny, Ep. 10.51 and 10.94 (on the latter compare Syme, Tacitus, p. 779 with Sherwin-White's cautious position in Letters Of Pliny, p. 690).

71 B.E. Thomasson, Die Statthalter der Römischen Provinzen Nordafrikas von Augustus bis Diocletianus, (Lund, 1960), v.2, pp. 138-142 for a list of the legates of the proconsul of Africa; six were sons of the proconsuls.

72 "Suffragium", p. 40.

73 Ep. 2.13.2: "Regis exercitum amplissimum: hinc tibi beneficiorum larga materia, longum praeterea tempus, quo amicos tuos exornare potuisti."


75 Pflaum, Procurateurs, p. 196f. provides a list of procurators who had served as praefecti fabrum. For typical comments about the office, see Carrières, p. 295 ("praefectus fabrum, charge toujours avantageuse, qui assure de la protection du sénateur influent"), pp. 344, 510, 555, 707. In Procurateurs Pflaum argues that the post was abolished by Septimius Severus. The circularity of his argument should be noted; his evidence lies in the fact that no praefectus fabrum appears after the reign of Commodus; on the other hand, in his catalogue he gives the reign of Severus as a terminus ante quem for the prefectures of M. Vesperius Lucundianus (no. 209) and M. Porcius Aper (no. 187) because Severus abolished the post.
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77. 7 of 16 praefecti became equestrian officers and 4 of the 7 (57%) succeeded to procuratorships, while 9 of 18 (50%) of all African equestrian officers of the same period succeeded to procuratorships—an insignificant difference with such a small sample.

78. For praefecti fabrum pursuing procuratorial careers in the second century the average number of sexagenariate offices held before advancement was 1.0 and the number held before promotion to ducenariate posts was 1.8. Compare these figures with the similar averages which can be calculated from Table IV of chapt. 3 for all procurators: 0.75 and 1.9, respectively.

79. Ep. 3.2, 3.8 (indirect evidence of a recommendation), 4.4, 7.22, and Fronto, Ad amic. 1.5. In Ep. 3.8 and 7.22 Fliny apparently secured the tribunate without naming his candidate to the governor—an indication of how little consideration was given to merit.

80. Pflaum, Procurateurs, p. 259. In the third century slightly fewer than half of the procurators of known background served in militiae.

81. Fliny, Ep. 3.2.6 and 4.4.2.

82. Ad amic. 1.5: "si mihi liber etiam virilis sexus natu fuissent, eorumque actas hoc potissimum tempore ad munia militaria fungenda adolescet, quo tempore tu provinciam cum exercitu administrareis, uti sub te mei liberi stipendia mererent. Non longe aberit quin hoc, quod uteque cupidemus, evenerit. Nam Faustinianum Statiani mei filium, non minus diligo neque minus eum diligi cupio, quam si ex me genitus esset."

83. See above p. 86f.

84. Fronto, Ad amic. 2.8.

85. Pflaum, Thorigny Marbre, p. 22.

86. Gellner, "Patrons and Clients", in Patrons and Clients, p. 2.


89. See below pp. 207ff.

90. Agric. 6 and 9.7.
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91 E.g., C. Betitius Pietas (p. 221f.), C. Flavonius Anicianus Sanctus (p. 314), M. Ulpius Carminius Claudianus (p. 315), C. Fufidius Atticus (p. 319).

92 Tacitus, pp. 591, 595, 606.


94 Ep. 1.19: "Municeps tu meus et condiscipulus et ab ineunte aetate contubernalis, pater tuus et matri et auunculo meo, mihi etiam quantum aetatis diversitas passa est, familiaris: magnae et graves causae, cur suscipere augere dignitatem tuam debeam."

95 Ep. 3.2, 4.4, 6.8, 6.25, 7.22.

96 Syme, Tacitus, p. 77f. For the friendship of Pliny's mother and Corellia, see Ep. 7.11.3.

97 Pliny's local protégés with literary interests include Natura Arrianus (Ep. 3.2), Atilius Crescens (6.8), Varisidius Nepos (4.4); for a survey of Fronto's clients and friends, see M.-C. Pflaum, "Les correspondants de l'orateur M. Cornelius Fronto de Cirta", Hommages à J. Bayet, (Brussels, 1964), pp. 544-550.

98 Ep. 2.13.5: "Hunc ego, cum simul studeremus, arte familiariterque dilexi; ille meus in urbe ille in secessu contubernalis, cum hoc seria cum hoc isocos miscui." In his Fronto of Cirta (chapt. 4) Champlin stresses the importance of contubernium.

99 Ad amici. 1.10.

100 Dial. 34.

101 Ep. 6.23.2: "Solitum hoc mihi et iam in pluribus claris adolescentibus factitatum; nam mire concupisco bonos juvenes ostendere foro, adsignare famae."


103 Ep. 28.

104 For instance, Pflaum, "Les correspondants", p. 560 singles out wealth and education as the important factors in social mobility. For Killar's view of the importance of literary culture and some doubts, see below p. 229f.

105 "Les correspondants", p. 544.

106 Ep. 6.6.5f. No mention of eloquence is made by Pliny with regard to several of his other protégés (Romatius Firmus, Iunius Avitus, Eurcius Clarus).

107 Pliny, Ep. 1.13 and 8.12.1. The context of Suillius' remark that Seneca was "studiiis inertibus suetus" was an attack
on Seneca's lifeless oratory (Tacitus, Ann. 13.42). Syme notes
the domination of literature of the age by provincials—an
indication that their cultural energies were not fully shared by
the older aristocracy (Tacitus, p. 609).

108 Ep. 8.23.5. For the Republican roots of this patronal
practice, see M. Gelzer, The Roman Nobility, trans. by R. Seager,

109 Dio 78.11.2.

110 See below pp. 205ff.

111 P. 89.

112 Ritterstand, pp. 293-357.

113 Pronto, Ad amic. I.5.

114 Ep. 3.2: Fliny dedicated the first book of his letters to
another prominent equestrian Septicius Clarus.

115 Sejanus: Tacitus, Ann. 4.74; Burrus: Syme, Tacitus, p. 591;
Aemilius Laetus: H.A., Siv. 4.4; Plautianus: see above p. 144.

116 Ad Pium 3.3: "Ego quidem quom ad amicitiam eius accessi,
hiam ei amorem aliorum> strenua opera domi bellique promeruerant.
Ut ceteros eius amicos ommittam, Turboni Marcio et Erucio Claro erat
familiarissimus, qui duo egregii viri alter equestris alter senatorii
ordinis primarii fuerunt."

117 E.g., Petit, Fax Romana, p. 57.

118 Ad W. Caes. 5.37.

119 CIL 8.11175.

120 CIL 3.431: "Hermes Augusti libertus adiutor eius honoris
causa" to the procurator Valerius Eudaeman; also see ILS 8849;
IGR 3.1103, and AE 1956, 123.

121 Dio 52.25.5. The same point should be made about equestrian
procurators appointed as watchdogs over senatorial officials: in
an inscription from Ephesus P. Celer, a procurator, calls himself a
comes of the quaestor of Asia, C. Helvidius Friscus (AE 1924, 79a).

122 P.A. Brunt, "The Equites in the late Republic" in The
Crisis of the Roman Republic, ed. by R. Seager, (Cambridge, 1969),
p. 83. For modern views see C.H. Landé, "Networks and Groups in
Southeast Asia: Some Observations on the Group Theory of Politics",
Patronage in Turkey", Patrons and Clients, p. 103f. and M. Johnson,
"Political bosses and their gangs: Zu'amra and qabadayat in the
Sunni Muslim quarters of Beirut" in the same volume, p. 207.
123 P. Fetit, Pax Romana, p. 169f gives a common view of the
development of the equestrian administration based on a view of
some universal characteristics ascribed to equites: "we may...
feel confident that the knights were adherents of the regime and
the principal buttresses of the state, and that their role in
administration, as public functionaries, in municipal affairs, in
law, in public works, gave their order a certain class-conscious-
ness and a lawyer-like mentality."
124 Ep. 6.6.
125 Dio 58.10.8 claims that the consul Memmius Regulus did not
immediately put the death penalty or imprisonment of Sejanus to a
full vote of the senate after the reading of Tiberius' letter be-
cause he feared opposition from Sejanus' numerous kin and friends.
126 Pliny, Ep. 9.13.11.
127 Ann. 13.52.
128 Seneca, for example, used his influence in his indirect
attack on P. Suillius which ended with Suillius' conviction in the
senate and exile (Tacitus, Ann. 13.42ff.).
130 Pliny, Ep. 6.6.6; see above p. 26.
131 Ep. 4.17.6 and 2.1.8f.
133 Ep. 4.17.9f. and 2.1.9.
134 Pliny emphasizes how Iunius Avitus and Iulius Naso seek
his advice and use him as a model (Ep. 8.23.2 and 6.6.5f.).
135 Origines, p. 225.
136 Pliny encouraged Bruttius Fraesens to return to Rome and
his "dignitas, honor, amicitiae tam superiores quam minores." (Ep.
7.3.2) But Pliny himself complained of having to waste his time
performing officia while in Rome (Ep. 1.9.2f.). Seneca frequently
cites patronal duties as one of the ways people fritter away their
lives in Rome (De Brev. Vit., passim, e.g., 2.4f., 3.2, 7.2).

NOTES TO V

1 A. Felletier, "Les sénateurs d'Afrique proconsulaire
d'Auguste à Gallien", Latomus, 23 (1954), pp. 511-531; R. Duncan-
Jones, "Equestrian rank"; A.-G. Fflaum, "Les juges des cinq
décuries originaires d'Afrique romaine", Ant. Afr., 2 (1968),
pp. 153-195; M. Jarrett, "An album of the equestrians from North
Africa in the emperor's service", Epigraphische Studien, 9 (1972), pp. 145-232; E. Homasson, Statthalter, he lists supplied by Pelletier, Duncan-Jones and Jarrett cannot be assumed to be complete.

2Patrons and Clients, p. 41.
3E.g., M. Griffin, Seneca, pp. 88ff.
4Boissevain, Friends of Friends, passim; Patrons and Clients.
5Duncan-Jones cautiously suggests that the maximum survival rate was probably 5.1% in The Economy of the Roman Empire, pp. 360f.
7Degrassi, III RP 341, 386, 432, 433. I can find no others in a brief survey of CIL I.
8E.g., I was tempted to include AE 1917-18, 71 and AE 1939, 38 in the table.
9Duncan-Jones, Economy of the Roman Empire, p. 78.
10Arbitrarily taking a decurion worth 100,000 sestertes who achieves a 10% return on his property investment.
12E.g., CIL 8.20584: "...amico indulgentissimo ob beneficiaria quaee in se contulit..." (no. 7)
13Inscriptions put up for an official of the province and listing the official's next appointment seem likely instances of this (e.g., AE 1922, 19).
14All of the inscriptions cited in this chapter concerning Numidia are dated to the second century A.D. or later when the legate of III Augusta was a governor de facto. For the date of the formal separation of the province from Proconsularis, see H.-C. Pflaum, "À propos de la date de la création de la province de Numidie", Libyca, 5 (1957), p. 61.
16Plur. 9.
17Burton, Proconsuls, chapt. 1.
18Or. 1.107 (the official here is Strategius, the praetorian
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prefect): "οἱ τε γὰρ δὴ ύψο δυνατωτέρων ἀδικοῦμενοι οἱ τε κατ᾽ ὁργήν
ἐγγεγραμμένοι, τῆς ἁρχῆς δὲ εἰς ἀπαλλαγὴν ἱδίονοι οἱ τε ἐπιθυμοῦντες
ὡς τέχνητα θέου τυχεῖν—κολλάς ὧν καὶ ἄλλας ἀρχής δοὶς χάριτας οὐ
λυκοῦσα τὸν νομὸ—οὕτω, οἱ μὲν αὐτοῖς, τῶν δὲ γυναικῶς, ἥπου καὶ
ὑπὲρ σον έλθείν ἔχειος."

19 Or. 1.232.
21 See note 83 and p. 189 below; Fronto, Ad amic. 1.1.1; and
see also Ste. Croix, "Suffragium", p. 42f. for similar evidence
from Cicero and a discussion of the Fronto letter.
22 Burton, Proconsuls, chapt. 4 and "Proconsuls, Assizes", p.
102. The reference to the Digest is found in 1.16.9.4.
23 Apol. 84.
24 Ad amic. 1.1.1: "progressus est, ut etiam eos qui in publico
vel privato iudicio discipserant, non tamen improba res videretur
iedicibus ipsis aut iis, qui concilio adessent, commendare, non,
ominem, ad iustitiam iudicis labefactandam vel de vera sententia
deducendam. Sed iste in ipsis iudiciis mos inveteratus erat causa
perorata laudatores adhibere, quin quid de reo existimarent, pro
sua opinione cum fide exponerent; item istae commendantium
litterae laudationis munere fungi visae sunt."
25 Apol. 96.
26 Ep. 2.11.8
27 Ἀλέξανδρος Ἡ Ἡσυχομαντίς 57 "ἀλλ' ὃ τότε ἡγούμενος Βιθυνίας
καὶ τοῦ Πόντου ἄλοιπός ἔπεισε, μονοσκυλίκετεν καὶ ἀντιβολῶν
παύσασθαι, διὰ χάρι τὴν πρὸς Πουτιλιανὸν ἐρνοῦν μή ἀν δύνασθαι, καὶ
εἰ διάφορως λάβοις ἀδικοῦντα, κολάσαι αὐτόν."
28 J.A. 1.3: the discussion includes more than a judge hearing
charges against a friend in court, but his initial anecdote concerns
such a case and so the general discussion pertains to such a situ­
ation by implication.
29 Proconsuls, chapt. 3.
30 Moralia 814G: "οὐ μόνον δὲ δὲ παρέχειν αὐτὸν, τε καὶ τὴν
πατριάδα πρὸς τὸς ἡγομόνας αναιτίον, ἀλλὰ καὶ φίλου ἔχειν ὅσει τινα
τῶν ἐνω δυνατώτατων, ὥστε ἐρμα τῆς πολιτείας βεβαιον, αὐτοὶ γὰρ
εἰς Ἄρματοι πρὸς τὰς πολιτικὰς σφουγγας προεπιτάτοι τοις φίλοις,
καὶ καρποὺς ἐκ φιλίας ηγεμονικῆς λαμβάνοντας...εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν
ὅμοιον ἄξενενγκασθαί καλόν."
31 Ad amic. 2.8.

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34. *Moralia* 814 D.

35. *Dig.* 50.4.3.15: "praeses provinciae provideat munera et honores in civitatis aequaliter per vices secundum aetates et dignitates, ut gradus munerum honorumque qui statuti sunt, iniungi, ne sine discrimine et frequent er isdem oppressis simul viris et viribus res publicae desituantur."

36. Greek Sophists, pp. 36-40.

37. *Or.* 45.8.

38. In *Ep.* 4.13.10 Fliny asked Tacitus to send one of his students to begin a school at Comum.


40. A local aristocrat might promise more than the compulsory *summa legitima* once made, the promise could be enforced by the governor. But enforcement was probably not uniform and "there are indications that powerful individuals and groups within cities were prepared to call in friendly governors in order to win short-term victories over their rivals." J. Garnsey, "*taxatio* and *pollicitatio* in Roman Africa*, *JRS*, 61 (1971), p. 129.

41. *Dio Chrys.*, *Or.* 40, 45, 47 and Fliny, *Ep.* 10. 17a-b and 61 illustrate the quarreling, fraud and mismanagement that might arise.

42. For the inscription and a discussion of other gubernatorial interventions to enforce the fulfillment of *pollicitationes* by municipal aristocrats, see Garnsey, "*taxatio*", pp. 115-129.

43. The governor was supposed to travel around the province inspecting public buildings (*Dig.* 1.16.7.1). If, as in the case of Fliny, something in these spot checks aroused his suspicion, he could make further enquiries (Ep. 10.17a.3).

44. *Ad amic.* 2.8.


47. "*Roman Civil Service*", p. 155.


49. See, for example, CIL 8.2746, 2750, 2751, 2733; *AE* 1917-18, 71, 72, 77, 78.
(NOTES TO V)

50 Ep. 2.13; see above p. 146.

51 "Promotions and Transfers in the Roman Army", Carnuntum Jahrbuch, 7 (1953-54), pp. 22ff. Dedications from centurions to the Numidian legate include CIL 8.2730, 2737, 2742, 2753 and AE 1917-18, 50-51 and 1954, 138. Note also IIAlg. II.i.534 which may represent the same sort of case of patronage.

52 See CIL 3.6154 for a non-African example.

53 Ann. 2.55 and Hist. 3.44.

54 Ad amic. 1.9; for further discussion see below p. 187. Whether this Caelius Optatus should be identified with the Numidian legate has been doubted by Champlin, "The Chronology of Fronto", p. 151. The letter can be used here with some reservations for the following reasons. (1) Champlin's arguments do not appear entirely compelling: the nomen Sardius is so rare as to be indecisive and Fronto's use of "frater" and "filius" to his addressees need not reflect strict considerations of age (the use of filius with regard to Arrius Antoninus could be explained by their patron-protégé relationship, and in any case the senatorial cursus was not so highly structured that Optatus could not have been somewhat older than Antoninus in 167). (2) The numerous parallel requests by Cicero for help with expediting a client's provincial negotia strongly suggest that this letter of Fronto can be used as an example of a letter sent to a governor, even if not a governor of Africa (see Ad fam. 13.11, 14, 26, 27, 30, 56, 57, 63).

55 See references in above note.

56 Burton, Froconsuls, chapt. 2 and Dig. 1.16.7 for orations; Burton, "Froconsuls, Assizes", p. 96 for assize centers.

57 Flor. 9: "offerre ac praedicabili testimonio tuo ad omnem nostram Camenam frui! non hercule penuria laudis, quae mihi dudum integra et florens per omnes antecessores tuos ad te reservata est, sed quoniam nulli me probatiorem volo, quam quem ipse omnis merito probo."

58 Flor. 17.

59 Flor. 9; see Libanius, Or. 1, passim (esp. 180f., 232) for the importance of giving or not giving orations before governors.

60 Philostratus, V.S. 533, 589f., 626.

61 Burton, Froconsuls, chapt. 1; Apuleius remarks very briefly about the time "quo provinciam circumibas /sc. Severianus/" (Flor. 9).

NOTES TO V

63 Libanius, Or. 1.211; C.I. 1.16.12.1 (369 A.D.); for comment see J. Matthews, Western Aristocracies and Imperial Court A.D. 354-425, (Oxford, 1975), p. 29. For the dating of the beginning of the anti-patronage legislation and the idea that it had not been a threat to government and so not prosecuted earlier, see Ste. Croix, "Suffragium", p. 44.

64 Hadrian of Tyre before Marcus Aurelius: V. S. 589; Heliodorus before Caracalla: V. S. 625.

64a The coincidence of municipal patronage by a governor and the success of local aristocrats in securing imperial honors should not be thought to be compelling proof of individual patronage links. In the case of Frontinianus the success of men from Cuicul began before Frontinianus' governorship (160-162).

65 Thomasson, Statthalter, v. 2, pp. 197ff. and 216ff. For the epigraphic evidence for the terms of office of Faustus and Cassianus, respectively.

66 For discussion of municipal patronage see B.H. Warmington, "The Municipal Patrons of Roman North Africa", PEPS, n.s. 9 (1954), pp. 39-55 and L. Harmand, Le Patronat. (The reader should be warned that Harmand's list of municipal patrons is not only incomplete but also unreliable: for example, C. Iulius Lepidus Pertullus is listed as a patron of Diana Veteranorum on the basis of AE 1934, 26 which is a dedication by M. Acmilius Felix Junior to his optimus patronus--clearly a case of private patronage.

67 Nos. 2, 18 and 27. Note also that when Caecina Severus proposed in the senate in 22 A.D. that no provincial magistrate be allowed to take his wife with him, one of the reasons given was that the basest provincials attached themselves to the wives (Tacitus, Ann. 3.33). See also Martial, Epig. 2.56 and Juvenal, Sat. 8.128f.

68 See above p. 73f.

69 CIL 8.2739 is very suggestive of female avenues of access to the governor: "Numisiae F. Fil Celerinae coniugi D. Pontei Frontiniani leg. Augustor. pr. pr. cos. desig. Magnia Procula mater Caecili Concessi corniculari" (Lamabaesis). The fact that Procula specifies that her son was serving under Frontinianus perhaps suggests that she used her contact with Celerina for his benefit. Another inscription in the table indicates that corniculari benefitted from gubernatorial patronage (no. 13).

70 Flor. 9.

71 See ILAfr. 454 for one such wealthy woman (not a governor's wife).


73 "Patronage in Sicily", p. 21.
For a similar form, see Cicero, *Ad fam.* 13.45-47.

Cicero's two commendationes (*Ad fam.* 13.6a-b) to a proconsul of Africa, Valerius Orca, on behalf of provincial friends of F. Cuspius are ambiguous about the nature of the favor. Of course, in some letters Cicero explains what is required, but often he does not (e.g., *Ad fam.* 13.46, 47, 49, 51, 52).

*Ad amic.* 1.3.

*Fronto, Ad amic.* 1.4.

*Ad amic.* 1.9; for the identity of the addressee see note 54 above.

Of course, some commendationes do carry specific requests, most notably for staff offices, but none of these are addressed to governors in Africa.

*Ad amic.* 1.7.


For commendationes from emperors to governors, see *Pline* *Ep.* 10.58.5 and *Fronto, Ad H. Caes.* 5.36.

*Fronto, Ad H. Caes.* 5.36.

*Pline*'s letter (*Ep.* 4.9) concerning the trial of Iulius Bassus indicates that acceptance of any gifts by governors was illegal at the time.

*Dig.* 1.15.6.3: "quantum ad xenia pertinent, aydi quid sensimus: vetus proverbium est: oûte pānta oûte pāntote oûte pārō tañtwv, nam valde inhumanum est a nemine accipere, sed passim vilissimum est et omnia avarissimum."

Sherwin-White, *Letters of Pliny*, p. 277 notes that the date of the change of rules is uncertain.

Cassius Dio 52.23.1 and 52.25.3.

*Acitus, Agric.* 42.2.

See above p. 147f.

For beneficia distributed by the Roman government to its African supporters and potential supporters, see F. Garnsey, "Rome's African Empire under the Principate" to appear in *Imperialism in the Ancient World*, ed. by C.R. Whittaker and F. Garnsey.

NOTES TO V

92 Ibid., p. 475.
93 Ibid., p. 480f.
94 CIL 8.10570+144464=Abbott and Johnson no. 111.

95 AE 1922, 19=ILAlg. I.3992; for comment, see the original publication by Albertini, BACTH 1921, pp. CCVff. For the other record of complaint by African coloni, see CIL 8.14428. The motivation behind one other dedication by a local notable to an African procurator (no. 45) is difficult to discern: perhaps this man could also have been a conductor?

96 IRT 330, 342; AE 1935, 32; ILA 506. See Dio 72.11 for examples of bribery of legates by provincials.


NOTES TO VI

1-Flor. 17: "ut non minus vobis amicitia mea capessenda sit quam mihi vestra concupiscenda."

1a Emperor, p. 482ff.

2 Ep. 10.106.


4 Ep. 10.5, 6, 7, 10, 11.

5 Emperor, p. 482.

6 Septimius Severus, (London, 1971), p. 304, where he suggests that the nomen came from Septimius Flaccus, the legate of III Augusta in c. 79.

7 "Patronage and city privileges--the case of Ziufi", Epigraphische Studien, 9 (1972), p. 16.

8 See above p. 56f.


10 Ibid., p. 154.
11 Ibid., 151f. Duncan-Jones' speculation on p. 154 about Lollius Urbicus' patronage of Q. Sittius Faustus faces the criticism that Faustus was "in quinque decurias adlectus" some ten years after Urbicus probably died (PFlR2L 327).

12 See below pp. 209f., 211, 221 for the first three men. For Caecilianus and Flamma see ILAlg. II.1.648.

13 "Equestrian Rank", p. 153. Note the false dichotomy underlying this statement: "direct assessment of personal ability" and attention to "paper qualifications" are not the only alternatives—patronage is another.

14 Ibid., p. 155.

15 Duncan-Jones, "Equestrian Rank", p. 155 lists four additional examples of men who received equestrian honors in the middle of their municipal careers and so cannot be said to have received the status in recognition of their municipal service.

16 "Equestrian Rank", p. 156.

17 The comparison is 94 holding local office to 79 for whom there is no record of local magistracies or priesthhoods.


19 See above p. 55f.

20 Pelletier in "Les sénateurs", pp. 511-531 gives a list of more than 100 senators certainly from Proconsularis. The list does not include Numidia nor is it entirely reliable (see Garnsey, "Rome's African Empire").

21 Suet., Vesp. 4 and H.A., Sev. 1.5.

22 See above p. 176.

23 R.E. I col. 438-440 (Kubitschek).

24 V.S. 626 concerning Heliodorus' favor with Caracalla and appointment as fisci advocatus.


26 No. 51.

27 It should not be assumed automatically that Maximus necessarily established the relationship while Clodianus was still governor (though it is likely). It may have been that Clodianus' stay in Numidia established the chain of links so that Maximus could contact him later through friends of friends (as in Pronto's letters).

28 See below pp. 221f.
This analytical distinction, suggested by Elok in "Variations in Patronage", seems to me an important one for understanding how far a society is actually structured by patronage institutions (as opposed to being merely "lubricated" by patronage).


Ad M. Caes. 5.35.


Ep. 5.4 where Pliny relates Vicetia's attempt to prevent the senator Sollers from holding nundinae on his estate.

CIL 8.270.

Ad fam. 13.32, 34, 36, for example.

No. 51.

The case of Sollemnis from the Thorigny Marble presents another exception, but here the importance of Sollemnis' beneficium to Paulinus provides an explanation.

For the question of inclusion of kinship, see above p. 150.

Ad fam. 13.11, 12.

The arguments for and against the identification of the emperor's grandfather with Statius' friend put forward by A.R. Birley and T.D. Barnes, respectively, seem to me inconclusive. Both in the final analysis rest on the assumption that one collateral line or the other owned land in Veii and, if we can decide which one, we shall have the key to which line Statius' friend, who is said to have owned land near Veii, belonged (Sivy. 4.5.54f.). But this assumption can be challenged. On the one hand, it is quite possible that such a farm was passed from one line to the other by testament, and on the other, it is possible that both lines owned land near Veii. When the future emperor decided to pursue a senatorial career, he would have had to acquire Italian land if he did not already own some, and he may have acquired an estate near that of his kin. Birley acknowledges that the Veientine farm mentioned in the Historia Augusta (Sev. 4.5) is the only piece of positive evidence for his view. It seems to me too fragile to bear the weight of any argument. For Barnes' view, see "The Family and Career of Septimius Severus", Historia, 16 (1967), p. 88. For Birley's rebuttal, see "The Coups d'État of the year 193", Bonner Jahrbücher, 169 (1969), p. 253 and "Some notes on HA Severus 1-4", Historia-Augusta-Colloquium Bonn 1968/69, (1970), p. 63f. For the requirement for senators to own Italian land see Pliny, Ep. 6.19 and H.A., Marc. 11.8.

IRT 412 and 413.
(NOTES TO VI)

42 Silv. 4.praef. and 4.5.


44 Severus 1.5: "Postea studiorum causa Roman venit, latum clavum a divo Marco petit et accepit, favente sibi Septimio Severo adfini suo, bis iam consulari."

45 KEB FR 1963, p. 398; see above p. 146.

46 Silv. 4.praef.; on Vitorius see R-E suppl. IX col. 1744 (Hanslik) and E. Mommsen, Ges. Schr. VII, (Berlin, 1965), p. 221f.


48 The only Maevii Saturnini that I can find in the indices of CIL come from Africa: one from Lambæsis (8.3184, 4073), one from Theveste (8.16589) and one from Uchi Maius (8. 26349).

49 Weydert, "Thermes de Lambèse", p. 353. Weydert notes that Zita is an African name indicating African roots of the family.

50 In 197 when the inscriptions were erected, Menecratilla and Honoratianus must have been married about twenty years (to allow time for a son to grow up and reach a tribunate)—plenty of time in which to fit D. Aelius Menecratianus' militiae.

51 Weydert, "Thermes de Lambèse", p. 353.

52 For all the references, see FIR 2 I 284.


54 FIR 2 I 327 and Champlin, "The Chronology of Fronto", pp. 137ff. (acceptance of Champlin's arguments about the date of Fronto's death need not entail acceptance of his arguments about the date and addressee of Ad amic. 1.9).

55 The tribunate is not mentioned in AE 1913, 21.

56 AE 1916, 13.

57 ILAlg. II.1.29 (=8.7978=ILS 1147).

58 For the other Blaesii from Solus see CIL 8.8944, 20688.

59 See Pliny, Ep. 6.25 for the centurionate commission by patronage.

60 CIL 8.10500 (of second century date).

61 AE 1931, 2.

62 AE 1920, 17.
NOTES TO VI

Pflaum and Jarrett both print avunculo in their collections (Carrières, no. 245a and "Album", no. 87).

See above p. 159.


BAG, 1945, p. 31.

Ed. 1.19.

Apol. 94.


IRT 524.

Jarrett's comment ("Album", p. 198) that Dioga was "probably an adventurer who made his way to Rome in order to profit from the presence of a dynasty from Lepcis on the imperial throne..." is an odd way to describe a man who belonged to a family which had been part of the Lepctic aristocracy for a century and so had certainly been known to, and probably friends with, the Septimii for generations.

"Equestrian Rank", p. 161f.

Ibid., p. 161.

Ibid., p. 162.

Ibid., p. 154.

Ibid., p. 161.

For references, see ibid., p. 161.

Rusicade was one of the four coloniae in the Cirtan Confederation and produced C. Caecilius Gallus, exornatus equo publico, before 115 (ILAq, II.1.36, 71); men from Cuicul, such as Crescentianus (discussed above, p. 209f), held magistracies at Cirta. Cuicul enjoyed some success during Pius' reign with Cosinii Maximus and Primus adlecti in quinque decurias, L. Claudius Honoratus receiving a tribunate and Crescentianus receiving a public horse.
Jarrett ("African Contribution", p. 220) notes the success of these men and the connection between Cuicul and Cirta. The overall distribution of senators and equites from Numidia also supports this suggestion. Cirta produced senators and equites at a roughly constant rate through the second and third centuries. The other Numidian towns produced only a few in the early second century, a few more in the later second century, and more than half of the total in the first half of the third century. The pattern of men from Busilde and Cuicul, by contrast, resembles that of Cirta—i.e., evenly distributed over the whole 150 years.

81 Champlin, Pronto of Cirta, pp. 43ff.
82 M.A. 19.10.1; IIAlg. II.1.638.
83 Pronto, Ad M. Caes. 3.4; FIR2 I 340.
84 Pronto, Ad amic. 2.8; FIR2 A 1088.
85 CIL 8.26475 and nos. 1, 5, 7, 17, 19, 22, 23, 35, 37, 40 in the table. Nos. 1 and 5 for amicus et municeps.
86 No. 7.
87 Flor. 15: "inter nos iura amicitiae a commilitio studiorum eisdem magistri honeste inchoata." For a similar view, Plutarch, Moralia 815c.
88 Ep. 10.87.
89 Sherwin-White, Letters of Pliny, pp. 683ff.
90 Fflaum, Carrières, p. 251.
91 CIL 16.173.
92 Carrières, pp. 247ff.
93 CIL 8.9371.
94 Fflaum, Carrières, p. 603.

95 The next figure of importance from Acholla after Liberalis (in our record) was M. Asinius Rufinus Valerius Verus Sabinianus, consul in the mid-180's (AE 1954, 58). The fact that Liberalis was at the height of his career about the time when Sabinianus was beginning his suggests the possibility of patronage.


97 See above p. 152f.
(NOTES TO VI)

98 **Apol.** 23.

99 **CIL** 8.5528-9.

100 **No.** 44.

101 Fflaum, Carrières, p. 826 and Dessau **ILS** 9016.

102 **Apol.** 72; **Flor.** 16.


104 Ad amic. 1.9.

105 See note 46 above.

106 For the Republic see E. Badian, *Foreign Clientelae*, p. 11f.

107 Ad amic. 1.3.

108 Carnsey, "Rome's African Empire".

109 **Flor.** 16; Strabo's participation in the Carthaginian *curia* gives reason to believe that Carthage was his *patricia*, though certainty is impossible since men from surrounding African *municipia* also participated in Carthaginian local affairs.

110 **No.** 53; no. 45 is the other.

111 **AE** 1892, 13.

112 Given the patronage that the tribune enjoyed, it is difficult to see any justification for Jarrett's speculation that "the tribune was a veteran granted a commission on retirement..." ("Album", p. 163).

113 See above p. 213.


115 The *Emperor*, p. 476.


121 *Ibid.* 10.4 for example.
NOTES TO VI

123 J. Boissevain, "When the Saints go marching out", p. 87f.

124 A. Farrag, "The wastah among Jordanian villagers" in Patrons and Clients, p. 229.

125 Emperor, p. 9.

126 Procureurs, p. 260f.

127 Farrag notes the importance of the economic factor in Jordan: after the 1920s "sons who previously had little chance of escaping their father's economic domination now began to enter the army. This decreased the father's economic control as sons earned their independent salaries..." (p. 229f.) the land allotted to veterans in the Principate perhaps makes the case of the Roman peasant more closely analogous to that of the Jordanians.


129 "Changing forms of political patronage in Lebanon" in Patrons and Clients, p. 189.

130 "Against patron-client relations" in Patrons and Clients, p. 182.

131 CIL 13.3162; see above p. 147.

132 Patrons and Clients, passim, especially J. Boissevain, "When the saints go marching out". Though the bureaucracy increased in the later Roman empire and increased governmental interference perhaps made patronage more valuable, the administration did not specialize in such a way as to cause extensive specialization of patrons. As in the Principate, proximity to the emperor remained the most important factor. As Jones noted with respect to appointments, "in general suffragium was a very haphazard business. What a candidate for office required was the voice of someone in the inner circle of the court who could press his claims, and it did not matter much what office the suffragator held, or indeed if he held any office at all, so long as he had access to the emperor" (Later Roman Empire, (Oxford, 1964), p. 392).


134 AE 1954, 58.

NOTES TO CONCLUSION

1 Boissevain, Friends of Friends, pp. 67ff.


3 Ibid., p. 202. There were other avenues of entry: K. Wittfogel,
"Public Office in the Liao Dynasty and the Chinese Examination System", Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 10 (1947), p. 25, prefers to emphasize the yin privilege of patronage, but even he admits that in the upper echelons of the civil service chin-shih holders predominated.


5 Ibid., p. 194.
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