In this dissertation, I argue that pain is a sense. This argument is made against pain eliminativism, a position which argues that pain is no longer a meaningful scientific concept and that it should be removed from scientific and philosophical investigations. I make this sensorial argument by focusing on the methodology needed to answer the question: given what we now know about pain, how can we increase our understanding of it?

In Part I, I focus on pain and sense concepts, by first developing three intractable problems for which current theories cannot account, these being: Perceptual Objectivity, Mechanistic Disparity, and Phenomenal Heterogeneity. Stemming from the requirements these three problems methodologically impose, I develop a novel internal logic for the dissertation, formed of two premises. The first, the Veridical Criterion, states that for a perceptual theory to be successful, it must account for the possibility of hallucinations and illusions and thereby differentiate veridical perceptual states versus misperceptions. I argue that for perceptual theories to address the Veridical Criterion, they must methodologically proceed first from a place of public consensus, a position termed within as the Priority Thesis, which forms the second premise. Using these premises, I evaluate and then conclude that the eliminativist methodology is not a viable philosophical argument for scientists or philosophers to adopt for pain concepts. I then contrast the understand of pain concepts with that of sense concepts, and argue that the three preceding problems of pain equally apply to the traditional sense categories, such that pain eliminativism, if accepted, necessitates sense eliminativism. This realisation creates an impasse for the dissertation, having demonstrated the prevailing concepts deficiencies, while simultaneously rejecting the removal of them by means of eliminativism.

In Part II, I respond to this impasse by developing an original definition of sense, termed afferent action, and argue that this definition is inclusive of pain. I reject the prevailing notion of Veridical Criterion, and posit the Standardisation Criterion as a replacement. I show how, if this definition of pain as a sense is accepted, paining must be taken as equivalent to seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, and touching. This novel verbialist theory of pain is put in contrast to prevailing adverbial theories, and is shown to successfully resolve the original three problems of pain. I conclude that this theory allows scientists and philosophers alike to make sense of pain.