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Complexity and Efficiency in Repeated Games and Negotiation


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Working Paper

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Authors

Lee, Jihong 
Sabourian, Hamid 

Abstract

This paper considers the �negotiation game� (Busch and Wen [4]) which combines the features of two-person alternating offers and repeated games. Despite the forces of bargaining, the negotiation game in general admits a large number of equilibria, some of which involve delay in agreement and inefficiency. In order to isolate equilibria in this game, we explicitly consider the complexity of implementing a strategy, introduced in the literature on repeated games played by automata. It turns out that when the players have a preference for less complex strategies (even at the margin) only efficient equilibria survive. Thus, complexity and bargaining in tandem may offer an explanation for co-operation in repeated games.

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Faculty of Economics

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