Title: Emissions Trading with Profit-Neutral Permit Allocations
Authors: Hepburn, Cameron J.
Quah, John K.-H.
Ritz, Robert A.
Keywords: Cap-and-trade
permit allocation
profit-neutrality
cost pass-through
abatement
grandfathering
Issue Date: 17-Aug-2012
Publisher: Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge, UK
Series/Report no.: CWPE 1235
Abstract: This paper examines the impact of an emissions trading scheme (ETS) on equilibrium emissions, output, price, market concentration, and profits in a generalized Cournot model. We develop formulae for the number of emissions permits that have to be freely allocated to firms to neutralize the profit impact of the ETS. We show that its profit impact is usually limited
URI: http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/dae/repec/cam/pdf/cwpe1235.pdf
http://www.dspace.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/243947
Appears in Collections:Cambridge Working Papers in Economics

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