|Title:||Philosophical aspects of chaos: definitions in mathematics, unpredictability, and the observational equivalence of deterministic and indeterministic descriptions|
|Abstract:||This dissertation is about some of the most important philosophical aspects of chaos research, a famous recent mathematical area of research about deterministic yet unpredictable and irregular, or even random behaviour. It consists of three parts. First, as a basis for the dissertation, I examine notions of unpredictability in ergodic theory, and I ask what they tell us about the justification and formulation of mathematical definitions. The main account of the actual practice of justifying mathematical definitions is Lakatos's account on proof-generated definitions. By investigating notions of unpredictability in ergodic theory, I present two previously unidentified but common ways of justifying definitions. Furthermore, I criticise Lakatos's account as being limited: it does not acknowledge the interrelationships between the different kinds of justification, and it ignores the fact that various kinds of justification - not only proof-generation - are important. Second, unpredictability is a central theme in chaos research, and it is widely claimed that chaotic systems exhibit a kind of unpredictability which is specific to chaos. However, I argue that the existing answers to the question "What is the unpredictability specific to chaos?" are wrong. I then go on to propose a novel answer, viz. the unpredictability specific to chaos is that for predicting any event all sufficiently past events are approximately probabilistically irrelevant. Third, given that chaotic systems are strongly unpredictable, one is led to ask: are deterministic and indeterministic descriptions observationally equivalent, i.e., do they give the same predictions? I treat this question for measure-theoretic deterministic systems and stochastic processes, both of which are ubiquitous in science. I discuss and formalise the notion of observational equivalence. By proving results in ergodic theory, I first show that for many measure-preserving deterministic descriptions there is an observationally equivalent indeterministic description, and that for all indeterministic descriptions there is an observationally equivalent deterministic description. I go on to show that strongly chaotic systems are even observationally equivalent to some of the most random stochastic processes encountered in science. For instance, strongly chaotic systems give the same predictions at every observation level as Markov processes or semi-Markov processes. All this illustrates that even kinds of deterministic and indeterministic descriptions which, intuitively, seem to give very different predictions are observationally equivalent. Finally, I criticise the claims in the previous philosophical literature on observational equivalence.|
|Appears in Collections:||Theses - Philosophy|
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