|Title: ||Collective Behavior with Endogenous Thresholds|
|Authors: ||Xue, Jun|
|Issue Date: ||14-Mar-2006|
|Abstract: ||We endogenize the threshold points in Granovetter’s threshold model of collective behavior (Granovetter 1978). We do this in a simple model that combines strategic complementarity and private information in a dynamic setup with endogenous order of moves. Looking at Granovetter’s model in the strategic context allows us to highlight the sensitivity of collective outcomes to the timing of the games and the reversibility of the actions, and to emphasize an extra incentive for people to follow other people: to encourage more people to follow them.|
|Appears in Collections:||Cambridge Working Papers in Economics|
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