

This is a mature answer, particularly strong on political aspects. The writer finds and establishes his points of comparison, and justifies his reasons for selecting Malaya and Ceylon. The style is precise, terse and mature, and the essay has the mark of a well-established Vith former.

In my final assessment for a prize, I place it

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"Compare and contrast the political, social and economic development since 1945 of any two Commonwealth countries":
- Malaya and Ceylon.

Headings by Paragraphs

BACKGROUND	Why Independence came so suddenly to Malaya and Ceylon.
PROBLEM SET	A comparison of their relative development since 1945: the terms of contrast.
POLITICAL and SOCIAL	How England's initial proposals miscarried. The foundation of a Malayan racial political partnership The effect of the Emergency on Malaya. The problem of racial feeling in politics. The exploitation of such feeling in Ceylon; the faults of Ceylon's political system, and an appraisal of their late leader, Bandaranaike.
ECONOMIC	The needs of their separate economies. Overspecialisation. How Malaya has done better than Ceylon in varying her products. Race rivalry in the economic field.
SOCIAL	The alien 'stranglehold' and the need for foreign aid. The development of educational and health services in both countries. Difficulties. Conclusion: the need for racial partnership, and rapid economic development. The challenge.

Notes and Bibliography

1. "Freedom What Then?" (Sarinda Corea)
2. The first occasion was when a cut by the government of rice subsidies caused widespread riots (1952).
3. In the days of the U.M.P., the Minister of Health openly spoke against his prime minister.
4. Both countries will probably double their populations within 25 years.
5. Wiggins "Dilemmas of a New Nation."

Malaya - the Making of a nation. C.O.I. booklet

Malaya - A political and economic appraisal (Mills)

"New Commonwealth" 1959 1960

Malaya - Ginsbury and Roberts

The Population Explosion and Christian Responsibility
R. Faggley

Federation of Malaya - Report 1957

Ceylon Year Book 1957

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Commonwealth Year Book 1959

Underdeveloped countries are very much in the news nowadays; the Cold War revolves around the uncommitted nations and territories which lie between and around the two great power blocs. Interlinked with the continuous world struggle for power is the gradual "winding up" of colonialism, though sometimes the process has been swiftly and disastrously accelerated, as in the Congo. Although it is fair to say that the ultimate aim of British Imperialism, in this century at least, has been to ~~catch~~ coach and nurture its dependencies towards the distant goal of nationhood, the Second World War, for a number of reasons brought that goal much nearer; and in 1943 the Government announced that it intended to prepare Malaya and Ceylon, among others, for independence.

Even so, London underestimated the forces at work, and the recommendations of the Soulbury Commission, which proposed "the grant to Ceylon.... of full, responsible government under the crown in all matters of internal civil administration" ^{were} ~~were~~ merged into the full freedom granting constitution of 1948. Much the same would probably have occurred in Malaya, had it not been for the Emergency. Nevertheless, few administrators in the thirties would have guessed that independence could have come so quickly, and only ~~by~~ a study of the countries since 1945 can reveal whether they were ready at that date to control their political and economic destinies, or whether, in fact, England was "an old man in a hurry", and hurled them out of the nest before they were ready to support themselves. Statistical comparisons are often misleading; for although both countries have a common political heritage, and certain economic similarities,

it would not be right to contrast the monetary value of their G.N.P., or the value of their exports. One can, however, investigate the rate of their individual progress, in terms of stability, achievement, and promise. One can also see how they have tackled the problems which they have had in common; problems which face so many countries in South-East Asia. Finally, one can assess their capacity to face the challenge of the future, and gauge the extent to which they have welded themselves, since independence, into an integral, cohesive society.

As the Japanese in 1941 overran Malaya in only two months, British prestige, and Malayan belief in their invincibility, was quickly and rudely shattered. Leonard Mills has said that "the British were the only colonial government to be welcomed at the end of the war with banners and triumphal arches. No one, however, could pretend that nothing had been changed by the preceding war years, and the British Government devised a plan whereby full independence should be granted as soon as possible. They dispatched a representative, Sir Harold MacMichael, who was instructed to go round the nine provinces, and secure from the Sultan of each the total surrender of his power. The idea of this was to give London a chance to announce their proposals without fear of local opposition. Unfortunately, MacMichael was also entrusted with the task of finding out how many Sultans had been guilty of collaboration with the Japanese during the war, and, when confronted, the Sultans not unnaturally saw a threat to their positions in the dual mission of the representative, and quickly signed away their power. The proposals for the constitution of the new Federation of Malaya were announced shortly after the last signature was put to paper, and their effect, in the words of Leonard Mills, was to "work the miracle of making the Malays lose their indifference

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to politics." For the Government intended nothing less than to grant equal rights of citizenship to Malays, Chinese, and Indians in the new constitution. To the Malays this was an oversimplification of the worst order. Their economy was already swamped by the Chinese, and the British cold bloodedly proposed to complete the subjugation. The Chinese, who obviously benefited from the proposals were strangely silent, and did not actively support one or the other side. The result of the opposition was the Reid Commission, which announced that the future electorate was to consist only of Malayan citizens, and citizenship was to be much harder to get. The qualification, for those not actually born in Malaya, was to be eight years residence in the Peninsula, with language, character, and loyalty tests. The provisions were, in fact, very detailed, and according to the arrangements, only 375,000 out of the 1,952,682 Chinese in the Malaya were entitled to the vote. The Reid Commission also declared that there were to be special reservations where only Malays might own land; that 5% of the Government services were to be Malay; that in the granting of new business licences, in the award of Scholarships and allowances for education, Malays were to be given great advantages. This report was greeted far more favourably, for it went on to offer guarantees to all minorities. The Federation agreement was signed in February, 1948, but in the meantime, a political event had occurred which was to be of enormous importance to the future of the nine provinces. For the leader of UMNO, the United Malays National Organisation, the most powerful right wing Malay party, himself the son of a wealthy agriculturalist, made an agreement with a

wealthy Chinese, himself H.S. Lee, leader of the M.C.A., the Malaya Chinese organisation. The 'Alliance' of U.M.M.O. and M.C.A. brought political coherence to the Peninsula. The success of the partnership can be judged by the results of the 1955 election, wherein together they won 52 seats outright (almost exactly one half) in the House of Representatives. And whereas when the M.F.P. won the 1956 Ceylon general election, its majority depended on the support of Marxists in the House, The Malayan Alliance, is bound by necessity to no one. The reason for this is that left-wing parties were hopelessly discredited by the Emergency. The Communist uprising, which seems to have been decided on at a major party congress at Calcutta in early 1948 was expensive (it cost Britain more than £18 million pounds a day at one point) and costly in lives. It also aggravated Malay-Chinese feeling animosity, for most of the terrorists were Chinese. On the other hand there were certain advantages in having the rebellion out in the open. Chinese tactics, since Mao Tse-Tung's tactics were first adopted, have usually been to undermine a system and an economy rather than fight overwhelming odds. In 1948, when the Communists first came into the open they had a good chance of success. They had gained a strong foothold in the peninsula in 1945, in the interim period between the period defeat and withdrawal of the Japanese and the return of British troops. The communist terrorists ^{orists} lost no time in assuring the Malay peasant that the British lost the campaign in 1941 so quickly because they had not thought the Peninsula and its inhabitants would fighting for. No British propaganda countered this suggestion, the Malays naturally believed it. The terrorists were however, unable to stop the British from returning to Malaya, nor could they "paralyse" the economy with a series of

organised strikes. The only alternative method of seizing power was open insurrection and, after some initial successes, they were 'under control', if not entirely subjugated. During the Emergency, the political development of the Federation was considerably held up, by as so much of the Executive power was vested in the Military. The ruthless and determined ^{methods} of Sir Gerald Temple precluded any natural growth of a party system.

A far more serious effect of the long emergency was the aggravating of Malay-Chinese animosity, for most of the terrorists were recent immigrants from China; the struggle, in the eyes of many Malays, soon developed into a desperate attempt to keep the already numerous Chinese from overrunning the peninsula. Most Malays were, therefore, not prone to the usual Communist promises of higher wages and better standards of living. Then again, although the Malaya Communist party in fact organised terrorist activities, smaller left-wing groups were automatically brought into discredit. The Alliance has, therefore, despite its numerous ups and downs, quarrels, and divisions, held the political field; and in August 1959 it again swept the polls.

What are the political problems which face Malaya in its bold experiment of racial partnership? Clearly, the major pitfall, which must be avoided, is a big issue which might threaten to cause trouble between Malays and Chinese. Already, there are signs that the new radical opposition will foster and foment such feeling. In the 1959 election, the ultra-nationalist Malay P.M.P. and the equally fervent Chinese group, the P.P.P. won 13 and nine seats respectively. The fate of the electorate is also

changing. In 1955, thanks to the requirements of the 1948 constitution, it was 84% Malay, and 11% Chinese. In 1959, the Malay percentage had dropped to 57%, and 36% of the electorate was Chinese. The Malay is naturally a charming, innocuous, rather idle and incompetent lover of the soil. But he can be aroused. When S.W. Jones described the effect of the British proposals of 1945, he said that they "stirred in the Malays an interest in governmental policies which would be bound to transform them from sleepy beneficiaries of a privileged position into champions of their rights and critics of those who tried to destroy them." One can just hope that the *Kelisaian* remains intact, and that racial animosity is not exploited or aroused.

For this has happened in Ceylon, and it has been fomented not by communist agitators, ~~by~~ but by a deliberate government policy. "*Kinhala*", "Ceylon for the *Kinhalese*" is potentially as dangerous a cry as "*Juden Raus*", and it was uttered by no less a person than the late prime minister, Solomon Bandaranaike. Ceylon is politically an interesting country to compare with Malaya because left and right wing interests have fought their battles in Parliament rather than the field. The racial problem is not entirely similar. There are four Chinese Malays to every three Chinese, whereas in Ceylon there are only 900,000 odd Indian immigrants labourers and eight million *Kinhalese*. Nevertheless, a political survey of Ceylon's fifteen years since independence reveals a sideways, rather than a forward-moving progress. Despite the recommendations of the Soulbury Commission, it seemed impractical to grant India full independence, and still keep a hold on Ceylon's foreign policy. D.S. Senayake was an experienced and able man who seemed capable of guiding Ceylon's future. However, the history of the next

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four years, before the Prime Minister died from a fall from his horse, there was to show that family, rather than party, issues guided governmental decisions. The Bandaranaike and Senanayake had always been rivals, and there is little doubt that Colonel John Kotelawala's grooming as Senanayake's successor, and Bandaranaike's relationship with Philip Gunawardene were tempered by family prejudice. The result was that a month before ~~Senanayake's~~ Senanayake's death, Bandaranaike "crossed the floor of the house" and formed his own party, and this move, in turn, meant two things: to begin with, the House of Representatives became more and more the centre of the feuds of rival interests; and high-flowing expressions of political beliefs became increasingly motivated by expediency. The second result was that the U.N.P., Senanayake's old party, was left open so that "bluff pseudo-fascist", as Warrinda Corea calls him, John Kotelawala. Corea's estimate, as an ardent supporter of Bandaranaike, is to say the least biased against the U.N.P. In anger, he quotes Sir Ivor Jennings' comment on the 1947 election. In this election a U.N.P. candidate apparently "counted more on his race, his religion and his caste, his family, and his influence, rather than upon his party label." Dr. Perera, says Corea, was quite right when ^{in claiming} ~~he said~~ that the U.N.P. swept in in 1947 on "a storm of corruption, manipulation, thuggery, and impersonation." Not only said the worthy doctor "was the election 'arranged' so that there were only twenty eight C.S.F., ten B.L.P. ^{and} fourteen C.P. ^{against} seventy-five U.N.P. candidates, but the actual voting was staggered. The dates were organised so that the

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leading members of the opposition (including himself) did not go to the polls until the last minute, when it was obvious that the UNP had ~~not~~ won in the whole country. Perera went out to point out the inequalities of the voting system; in Tawalakele the electorate was 3,000, in Colombo Central 58,000.

However, to the delight of Corea, this aristocratic government of the elite was brought to a conclusive end in 1956, when it won only one seat in thirteen in the House of Representatives. Bandaranaike's day had at last come. The most striking point about his policy was his fanatical appeal to nationalist racial sentiment. The policy of his government, and of his wife's, has been to replace English and Tamil, wherever possible, with Sinhalese. He also wished to nationalise Ceylon products, for he claimed that European countries still had an economic grip on the island. This policy has proved ineffective, mainly because of the inability of the government to replace European-trained with Sinhalese officials.

His 'Sinhala' campaign has been marked by disaster. The 1958 riots (which incidentally, marked the ^{*1} occasion of the Governor-General's second direct interference in a political crisis since 1948) were hushed up in the world ~~the~~ press, but were caused by the irresponsible stirring up of racial sentiment.

But whatever one may think of Bandaranaike's policies, he was certainly what he claimed to be - a ~~man~~ ^{man} of the wealthy few who dedicated himself to the common man; he ~~was~~ always insisted on being available to anyone, and a Buddhist monk had no difficulty in getting at him to shoot him. He understood the aspirations of so many Sinhalese, and shared their desire to improve their lot. If his wife maintains this understanding, and does not become too bogged down

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by faction, there is hope that her Government will remain united, and lead Ceylon along the paths of internal peace.

Malaya and Ceylon are both aware of the urgent need for such ~~order~~ calm; a calm which will allow their economies to expand at least at a rate which is on a par with the frightening population explosion which threatens them both. An ex-Minister of Finance, J.R. Jayewardene once boasted of Ceylon: "Financially and otherwise, the economy of this country can be said to be the most stable in South-East Asia." Unfortunately, stability is not enough. An assessment of the per caput national income of Ceylon in 1950 reckoned that the standard of living of all villagers was the same as it was in 1938; at the same time, the ~~the~~ cost of living has nearly tripled. The average annual income of Ceylon has been estimated at £41 (in Malaya it is £95). Over half the population earns less than Rs. 75 a month, while 88% earn less than Rs. 175. Nor is the poverty pitifully widespread. A mere 1% of the population earns as much as 18.2% of the total income. The gulf in wealth and social standing between the classes is far too wide. In Malaya, it is also true to say that the Alliance is a bit too right wing a ^{group} ~~party~~ to have the poor man's improvements as a primary consideration. An exception to this generalisation is the Minister of Agriculture, Abdul Aziz bin Ishak, but otherwise the government is all too often unwilling to "soil its fingers".

The economies of Malaya and Ceylon are prone to rather violent fluctuation, because they depend so much on their major commodities: tea, coconut and rubber

in Ceylon; rubber and tin in Malaya. Ninety-five percent of Ceylon's export revenue (the figure is eighty-five percent in Malaya) depends on products whose value from year to year is remarkably unpredictable. Variation in exports is essential before a really dependable economy can be assumed.

More rice must certainly be produced. Malaya and Ceylon both have to import one-half of their rice requirements, more than 400,000 tons a year. To be less dependent on three major industries, both countries have realised that two things must be done; vary the exports and industrialise. On top of this, the existing major industries had, of course, to be safeguarded.

Ceylon has certainly done a lot for her major industries. For the replanting and rehabilitation of tea bushes, the government between 1944 and 1955 gave Rs. 2800 an acre; it subsidised the spraying of rubber trees with oidium to the tune of 17,000 acres a year. The Ceylon Coconut Research Institute distributed Rs. 400 million for the replanting of 1,117,000 trees. Thanks to these improvements, tea and coconut production has gone up by 35% and 23% respectively. Ceylon has been less successful in varying her products. Cacao and tobacco, although heavily subsidised, are still in the nursery stages. As for industrialisation; five years after the policy was accepted in principle (1952), the only post-war factory the government had completed was the cement plant initially scheduled for much earlier and begun in 1946. The paper factory mentioned in the first five-year plan was "under construction", and contracts had been let "for the caustic soda plant and the coconut oil mill. The proposed steel mill and textile factory were still in the planning stage, although Rs. 52,000,000 had been

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set aside for them. In short, Ceylon has so far shown that she is easily diverted from her central aim. Malaya has been far more successful. She has built up her exports of fish, valued at \$ M. 122,500,000 a year. General economic development has also meant that more timber has been needed. Between 1944 and 1955 some 450,000 acres were opened, and the value of timber exports has soared up to \$ M. 26,700,000. All sorts of minor industries have been set up, and the Government has enough faith in them to finance R.I.D.B., the Rural and Industrial Development Authority, which has allotted £ 25 million to small holders and nascent businesses of all types. Malaya is doing everything it can to foster the future industries, private enterprise, and interest in industry.

Both countries, to relieve the problems of over population, have opened drastic development schemes. Between 1950 and 1955, 36 new development schemes were begun in Malaya. The Central Electricity Board ^{there} has also opened an 80,000 kilowatt scheme in 1956, and in all, in the ten years after the war some \$ M. 650 million were spent on development. Wiggins has claimed that Ceylon and Malaya together have the greatest natural assets in South South Asia, and both are trying to make use of them. Between 1945 and 1955, Ceylon opened ^{up} ~~out~~ nearly 200,000 acres of its dry zone, and 100,000 people have been allotted new homes. But although the Galoya Valley and the Norton Bridge works are doing well, the Ceylon equivalent of R.I.D.A. (The Institute of Scientific and Industrial Research) has been on the whole paralysed by a series of strikes and communal disorders.

The crucial economic (as well as the political) problem in

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Ceylon and Malaya is economically concerned with race rivalry. The Malay governments' attempt to introduce "co-ops" has met with little support (some seven percent of the population). Malays themselves resent the fact that 40% of their tin mines and 45% of their rubber plantations are not owned by Malays. Ceylon certainly resents the apparent economic stranglehold which Europeans have over plantations. Shortly after independence, one minister stated that his policy was to "ensure a higher percentage of participation by the nationals of the country in trade, commerce and industrial activities, as regards management, labour, and finance." Indians ^{in the island} ~~are~~ are suffering. Retail shopkeepers and immigrant estate labourers are finding work permits more and more difficult to acquire.

Both countries seek desperately for foreign aid and investment. Herein Ceylon is not doing well, for some £2 million pounds, in investments, are being withdrawn from her every year. The Government ^{in 1954} floated a loan in the London Stock Exchange ^{in 1954} for five million pounds with great success, and a rice agreement has been made with China. Malaya, however, has been far more successful. Standard Vacuum want to invest £10 million in an oil refinery, and so do Shell. Metal Box, Glaxo and Dunlop all want to set up factories in the Federation. Possibly one of the reasons for this confidence is to be found in the promise of Malaya's future. Her five-year plan, unlike Ceylon's ten-year, one is practical and not full of speculative theory. Certainly, Ceylon's previous "plans", although warmly encouraged by the International World Bank Mission, have come to naught.

And what of the people of both countries? What is the future of their societies? There are, as already stated, vast

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gaps between the Western elite and the rest of their countrymen. Otherwise the same problems of racial feelings apply. Religion also looms up as a potential source of trouble. "True Freedom", a Buddhist publication, rages in 1954 against the "Western decadence" which has "corrupted and misled our youth from the paths of the simple pursuit of life". Can one however, combine a Buddhist appreciation of a "simple life" with a desperate need for industrialisation? Nehru has contradicted Gandhi, and has answered 'No' to that question. Ceylon is at the moment wracked with the questions: should the Government take over the schools, and should Sinhalese alone be taught? So many Sinhalese, who have seen what nationalisation has done to other things, cling desperately to their competently run Catholic schools. As for the language question; there are simply not enough teachers of Sinhalese to go round Tamil schools, and ~~also~~ thus many Tamil parents suspect the Government of a plot to deprive their children of education. Higher education in two primitive languages would be difficult. In both countries, secondary education is very far behind. One child in seven in Malaya can go to a secondary school. Both countries have a university founded in the 1940s, and even here there is a potential source of bad feeling. For in the University of Malaya, 1,145 of the students are Chinese, 229 are Indians, and only 228 are Malay. So Malays distrust higher education as it seems to be one more sop to the Chinese. All Malayan education is now run according to the Razak plan, which emphasizes the need for a "common content syllabus" as this is an essential element in the development

nationalism" Finally,
of Malayan education. Malaya Both countries have
made giant strides in health services. Malaya can
boast one doctor to every nine thousand five hundred.
In most underdeveloped countries, the percentage is
one to fifty thousand.

Malaya and Ceylon have both been ruled by the
British for over a hundred years, and now, nearly at
the same time, they have been launched into a fiercely
competitive and frightening world. Both are politically
immature; both know that they must change the
pattern of their lives to fight the war for economic
survival in a continent which is becoming more
and more hopelessly overcrowded. They must be able to
supply more of their basic requirements - Ceylon, for
one, has to spend a precious 16% of her annual
income revenue on rice subsidies. Both countries
must maintain the standard of their exports, and
explore new fields of development; it is not good enough
that only eight percent of the people of Ceylon work
in any kind of industry. Above all, neither country
must let itself be diverted from the search for development
by racial jealousies and rivalries; co-operation is
essential for survival. The challenge is not easy, and
we who are fortunate enough to be their partners and
friends in the unique relationship of a Commonwealth
must give them, whenever possible, our material help
and moral support.