

5. Their dimensions are different and therefore they are related to substantially non-existent things. For, if we remove the atoms one by one the perception illuminating the image of the pot, etc. will immediately vanish away.

6. It is the object (artha) which exists internally in the knowledge itself as a knowable aspect which appears to us as if it exists externally.

Because that object is essentially in the nature of consciousness and because it acts as the condition (to the consciousness) the knowable aspect is the object.

7a-b. Though it is only a part of the consciousness, it becomes condition to the latter because it is invariably and simultaneously associated with the latter.

Or it becomes condition also in succession by transmitting the force (śakti).

7c-d. What is the sense-organ is (nothing but) the force itself in consciousness by virtue of its acting as an auxiliary (*sahakarin*) to its objectivity.

8. That force is not contradictory to the consciousness. Thus the objective aspect (*visayarupa*) of consciousness and the force (*śakti*) called sense-organ go mutually conditioned from immemorial time.

SUMMARY OF THE TIKA BY VINITADEVA

The author Dignaga presents the first disputant's proposition by stating: Those who...

In this sentence the topics to be discarded are expressed. The opponents' perverse reasons are expressed in the sentence: "Because the atoms are cause of consciousness" and because the aggregates are productive of their image-bearing consciousness".

The purpose and its relevance to the treatise are to be inferred by virtue of its capacity thus. This treatise is commenced in order to refute the external objectivity and in order to establish the internal objectivity. This is the purpose and the treatise is its device. The same idea is repeated and elaborated further.

All disputants do not accept the external things as objects, hence it is stated : Those who.....
The "eye and others" refers to the ear etc. upto the mind, thus the mind is reckoned as relied on the external things; hence they are also negated here.

Acarya Dharmapala in his Tika has elaborated a great deal in order to prove them; we do not understand his deep intention and reasoning.

"The external" is what is other than the consciousness. The term *artha* is expressed as a synonym of content (*visaya*), but not substantially existing. The aggregate is also to be understood likewise. *Alambana* is cognizable. Atoms are those which cannot be further divided and (dissected). The atoms alone appear and disappear together; yet the aggregates are considered as different and object (*alambana*). The sense-organs in their capacity are assigned to their respective objects like colour, taste, etc. Though the colour etc. are integrated in the aggregates they are cognized by their respective sense-organs. Likewise the consciousness in its capacity is fixedly assigned to graspable things (*dravya-pariccheda*) and hence it takes as its object the separate atoms as well as their collocations (*samanya*, सामान्य): this is known to us (from the Sarvastivadins' treatise). The atoms, though very subtle objects because they cause the consciousness and because they exist substantially. What serves as cause is *alambana*, object: this is the opinion of this (first dispu-

tant). Thus the advocates of the external things admit the atoms as objects in view of atoms being producing factor of consciousness.

The saying: "Or they conceive as object the aggregate of atoms" is presentation of the second proposition. They conceive so because the aggregate causes the knowledge invested with the image of the aggregate. This is the reason for this proposition. It is to state thus: In what form a consciousness emerges that form is its content.

So far are the propositions of the opponents.

The following line is to delineate the same: "Though atoms serve etc." Atoms in the ultimate sense are not substantial. They being accepted as constituted of parts become empirical (*samvṛta*) and being considered as partless, they cannot cast shadow and hiding etc. (छायावर्णादि). cp. the same argument in Vasubandhu's *Vimśatikā*. Even then their causality is accepted and their objectivity is denied; for they do not cause consciousness reflecting their own image. The expression *indriya* indicates six senses inclusive of mind sense. "Like the sense - organ" is example. It causes the consciousness; however, it is not its content; for, its image is not reflected in the latter.

It is the content whose self-being (स्वभाव) is asserted while the consciousness arises in its image. Here the self-being is both the self-characteristic as well as the general characteristic. Its assertion is just its measured grasping. Consciousness cannot discharge any function of determining its object beyond representing its image. Therefore consciousness having arisen in the form of a blue-patch is spoken of as that it has determined the blue patch. What other function has the consciousness here (beyond representing its image)? However, it is metaphorically stated that consciousness grasps its object. There is no, in fact, any act of determination. For example, when the

sen is similar to his father, he is said to have taken the form of his father. Though the atoms are its cause, if consciousness does not represent their individually fixed images how can it grasp their characteristics? When it does not determine them, how can the atoms become its objects.

The example is the sense-organ. Though it is a cause it is not the content of knowledge which bears not its image. Therefore, the objectivity does not lie in mere causality. Thus the atoms are not objects as they are deprived of the characteristics of the objectivity. Here is a syllogism: Atoms are not objects because they are incapable of causing consciousness similar to themselves; example: sense-organ. The knowable aspect is the heterogeneous example. Or they are so, because their characteristics are not cognized; the examples are the same. These two syllogisms are formulated by Acarya Dharmapala and also stated by me, though not formulated by the author Dignaga. Thus is negated the atoms-objectivity./1/

In order to negate the second proposition the following is stated: "Though the aggregates of atoms are alike the image of consciousness", they are not objects, because the consciousness does not arise from the aggregates. Though they are not causal factors, let them be objects, what is harm there? The author replies:

Consciousness does not arise from what is represented in it, etc.

What object form the consciousness imitates, that form would possibly be its object if it is also a causing factor. What is causing factor, that alone is the object: this is understood from the treatise (of the Sarvastivadins). It is stated there: A thing which is characterized as productive of the mind and the mental states is designated as object as it is experienced while the mind and mental states operate. The endowment of the object-image in the consciousness is

not stated in the Sastra as it is recognised in this system (of the Sautrantika-yogacaras) alone. It is to be stated thus: What is endowed with two characteristics is *alambana*, object.

Why is not the aggregate a causing factor?

“Because it does not exist in substance”. What is substantially non-existent is incapable of causing any effect; e.g. double moon. Though it is reflected in consciousness, it does not cause the latter. Phenomenon of that consciousness is not however fortuitous as it is effected by a defective sense-organ. The double moon is perceived when the eye is affected by the eye-disease (*timira*). Hence it is not producer of its experience and becomes non-entity-non-object. The same is the case with the aggregate. The following is the syllogism: The aggregate of atoms is not producing factor of consciousness, because it is not a substantial entity, example: double moon. The heterogeneous example is the cognized part of consciousness. Or, it is not *alambana* because it is a non-cause. The examples are the same. If a non-cause is also *alambana*, the double moon etc. would also be true objects. These two syllogistic proofs are also formulated by Dharmapala.

“Thus both the external things are unfit to be real contents of the consciousness” as both of them are defective in one or another respect.

In the case of atoms there is productivity, but the capacity to impose the image on consciousness is lacking while the aggregate has the latter but lacks in the former. Therefore both are defective. //2//

The third proposition is presented next: Some masters hold that

Some masters, Vagbhāṭa and others hold the integrated form of atoms as the causes of consciousness. They maintain that there exists also an integrated form in the atoms. Whatever exists in the atom is all a substantial entity (*dravyasat*) hence it can serve as cause. Since the integrated form is gross i. is capable to impose its image on the consciousness. Thus the atoms become objects in another fashion (*prakārāntaṇa*, प्रकारान्तरेण)

The atomic form is too subtle; how can it combine in itself the gross integrated form? No harm, they argue that a material thing is combined with several forms or characters, viz: blue colour, fragrance, sweetness, hardness and others. The atoms also interalia has the integrated form. If so, why are not they cognized at once? So it is said: They are cognized in one or another form". Because they are assigned separately to their respective sense organs our senses do not grasp all of them indiscriminately.

This is said in accordance with the system of Buddhadeva, viz. ten bases are mere *bhūtas*, elements (not distinguishable into primary and derivative ones).

"Even in the atoms, therefore, there exists the aspect which produces the consciousness possessed of integrated form". That is to say: The atoms are capable of producing the consciousness reflecting the integrated form of their own. Why is it said in this fashion? Because an *ālambana* consists of two parts. The productivity is meant in the statement that the atoms are consciousness-producing factors. The part of the statement: "reflecting integrated form of their own" expresses the capacity of imposing images. Because *artha*, content imposes the image which exists in itself, but not one that does not exist there the integrated form is to be granted as existing in atoms.

If the gross form exists in the atoms, how can it exist there along with the atomic subtlety? Why do we not cognize the atomic form as if it is proximate to us? Therefore the author says: Atomic form, etc. (3c-d)-For example, solidity coldness, heat, etc. though existing, are not contents of the visual cognition because the perceptive powers of the senses are assigned to their respective domains of objects. Likewise are the atoms//3//

“In that case the different perceptions of the pot, bowl, etc. would be identical”.

The advocates of this proposition are to be accused thus: The integrated form that is pleaded as existing in the atom is well known to be existing in the pot, etc. If that form of the atom is the same as that of the pot, etc. then the notion of the pot would arise from all other aggregates of the bowl, etc. Or if it is the same as that of the bowl, etc. then also the notion of bowl arise from all other aggregates of the pot, etc. We have, on the other hand, a distinct notion of pot from certain aggregate, and the notion of bowl from certain other aggregate. This distinction would be impossible in your thesis.

If the distinction is possible on account of number of atoms differing as related to the pot and the bowl, etc. such distinction is not at all admissible in the shape of atoms. If it is your view that the different shapes of the pot, etc. make possible the distinct notions of the pot, etc. we too do not negate them; however those shapes are not apportioned to the substantial atoms. //4//

“The dimensions of the pot, etc. are different,”

The atoms' dimension known as *pārimāṇḍalya* cannot be differentiated. Though the atoms of the pot, bowl, etc. are different real entities; in their dimension i. e. *pāriman-*

ḍalya no differentiation is admissible. Therefore the atoms do not differ in their shapes. As in your system whatever exists in the atom all exists in substance. So also in our system whichever size the atoms has all is one pārimaṇḍalya size.

If the integrated form be admitted as identical, it must be then partless as it has been in substance. If it be admitted as having parts, it would never be in substance. Things having parts, acquire various capacities (*śakti*); then the arrangement of parts also would be possible; but that would not be possible in the case of partless things.

“The distinction of form co-exists with the non-substantial things”. Because the arrangement of parts is not possible in partless things as stated above. The distinction in shape is to be observed only in non-substantial things. The Vaiśeṣika system admits the pot, etc. as real substantial things, but they are empirical, i. e. non-substantial (in our system). For, if we remove atoms one by one the perception of the pot vanishes away. How could that alone prove that the pot, etc. are empirical? If they are substantially real, they would never cease to raise their own perception even when their parts atoms are eliminated. For example, the colour, taste, etc. never cease to evoke their perceptions even when their atoms get separated. Moreover the atoms being removed the conjunction creating the substance (*dravya*) disappear and the pot perishes, then no more arises its cognition.

If you think that the cognition arises no more because everything cannot happen everywhere, we may reply: If there is one whole (*avayavin*) other than the atoms, then you must say: while existing within the atoms, whether it exists covering entire atoms or partly. In the first alternative the whole would be everywhere in the parts constituting the whole. If it does not exist partly, it follows then it exists covering the

entire atoms. Therefore, one whole (*avayavin*) like the pot, etc. exists in as many atoms as there are, and hence when one part of the whole perishes, the substantial whole would become non-existent. For, the whole is constituted of the simultaneously existing entire parts like the chariot (*anasva-ratha*). The heterogeneous example here is *sva-laksana* (स्वलक्षण), self characteristic. If you say that the whole exists by way of *vastu*, substance, it will be vitiated by an unfavourable circumstance (as stated above) viz. impossibility in its formation by parts as the whole is constituted of simultaneously existing several things. //5//

After disproving the others' propositions (*anya-samaya*) the author sets forth his own (*sva-samaya*) in the following: "It is the object which exists internally in the knowledge as a knowable aspect which appears to us as if existing externally".

The knowable aspect is a graspable part serving as its content. It appears as though existing externally. When, for example, a patch of space being reflected in the well-water appears as if it exists on the surface of the water. Or the image of the moon, being reflected in the mirror appears as though it is in the mirror. Though no external thing is admitted as *alambana*, there is, nevertheless, something internal serving as the object-condition (*alambana-pratyaya*). An eye-diseased person, e. g. perceives the appearance of hairs, flies, etc. which are only some internal flashes (of the diseased mind). Similarly the internal perceivable part of the consciousness is considered as *alambana*.

How could this mind itself be characterised as *alambana* ? Because the knowledge assumes the forms of the blue and the yellow patches as a result of matured forces (*vasana*) accrued from the daily talk of the blue and the yellow, etc. The knowledge is accomplished as endowed with the

forms of the blue and the yellow etc. Because the forms of the blue and the yellow are conditions to the consciousness, they become its causes also.

“The internal consciousness appears as object”..... Because consciousness existing internally becomes endowed with a form on the model of an object (*arthakarana tadāk-āarakam*) and this form (of object) evokes the consciousness, that consciousness becomes in possession of two *alambana* characteristics; hence it is said to be the proper *alambana*. Thus consciousness is possessed of an internally existing object. The form of consciousness is similar to that of the object. Because it is similar, it is said to be of that form. For example, a seal being curved in the form of a letter is (said to be) of that form. (When a consciousness is likewise similar to an object-form, it is known as possessing that form.) //6//

“(If) only the objective reflection of consciousness is experienced in the cognition, etc.”

The cognizable reflection that is internally existing is experienced in a cognition. When it is said that the knowable aspect of consciousness appears as though it is the external object in a definite shape (*niyatākāravat*), it becomes a part of consciousness. That knowable aspect appears simultaneous with the consciousness, how could that aspect be a producing factor of the same consciousness? It will amount, in that case, to accepting an action affecting its self (आत्मनि क्रिया भ्युपगम) and also evolve a formidable error (*atiprasanga*), viz. the cognizing aspect also will give rise to another cognizable aspect. Likewise the horns of the right and the left of an ox would interse produce one by the other. This is the objection raised by the opponent. The author replies: This is not a formidable rule (*aśāsāna*), because the cognizable part, though simultaneous it is,

becomes producing factor, i.e., preceeding moment-cause of the self born consciousness. No cognition arises in the absence of the cognizable part which is resorted to for the purpose of a mere support in the fashion that a man rises up with the support of a staff. Therefore no causal function either entire or in part is imposed upon it.

If the cognizable part thiswise becomes cause, be it so, what contradiction would be there? In the absence of any concomitance between the right horn and the left the causal relation between them, one being the fruit of the other is not accepted. In certain cases a self-affecting action is also desired. The lamp is a fitting example here. The lamp (not only illumines others but) illumines its self also.

How is it proved that the concomitance is criterion for determining the cause-and-effect-relation? The logicians say: *Bhāva* and *abhāva*, i. e. existence and non-existence: These two are the characteristics of the cause and the effect which may appear in succession (or simultaneously). When certain thing present, certain thing happens; the latter is considered to be its effect (*hetumat*). Here in the present case the knowledge arises only when the cognizable part is present and not when it is absent. Therefore things, though simultaneous they are, become one as the cause and the other as the effect. *Haituka* is *Tarkika*. So far the subject and the object are shown to be simultaneous.

The author next states that they are in succession too. (This means:) the cognizable part while disappearing, deposits its force (*śakti*) in the store-consciousness. That force, if it accomplishes other necessary requisites in the second moment evokes in the same moment a consciousness similar to itself. If it does not accomplish in that moment it may

do so in the third or the fourth moment; then it would produce a similar consciousness by virtue of its maturity.

In this view (*paksa*) the said logical errors, self-affecting action, simultaneity, "being one part", etc. would never be raised. For, the previous knowledge is graspable, and what is endowed with the image of blue, etc. that evokes in a subsequent moment a similar kind of knowledge. Therefore those objections cannot be raised.

If the force causes perception the force will then be the object but not the previous graspable part. Such error is not there; because the graspable part produces a homogeneous knowledge by succession, it makes the force as deposited in the store-consciousness. If it does not make so, the force would not produce such type of knowledge. Therefore the knowledge that is arisen from the force is indeed produced from the graspable part alone; thus there lurks no contradiction. In this interpretation the fact of *alambana* with two characteristics is well accomplished. Thiswise the graspable part has two (*alambana*) characteristics as it produces subsequently its own homogeneous knowledge.

The opponent now observes: If the self form of a knowledge is accepted as object-condition, how does the visual consciousness arise relying on that self form and the eye? When the matter or colour (*rupa*) falls within the focus of the eye and together with it the eye is to produce its cognition, the self-form of consciousness does not, at all, fall within the focus of the eye. How is it possible that the eye together with the self-form evokes the visual cognition?

The author replies: If the sense-organ is a derivative element, then there may be a serious objection. We, however, desire to say that what force is accessory to objectivity (*visaya-sahakarin*) that is regarded as the sense-organ. Thus,

in our system just as *rupa*, colour exists internally so also the eye exists internally. Therefore, how does the above stated flaw incur ? It is to be borne in mind that the force (*sakti*) that is accessory to objectivity is the sense-organ. The interpretation of *indriya* as what pertains to Indra would reduce it to something inseparable (from Indra).

How is it known as a sort of force ? Because the sense-organ is inferred to be a force from its result, viz. cognition, but not to be a derivative matter (*bhautika*). Again objection: One can infer merely some cause from result, but not a variety of causes (*karana visesa*); for no concomitance of *linga*, cause with the variety of cause has been previously determined. For example, the sight of the smoke can lead one to infer mere presence of fire, but not the kind of fire whether it is the fire of herbs or of the grass, etc. Likewise one could infer from the result i. e. sensory cognition merely a cause but not deduce the genus of the cause, viz: a derivative matter, etc. In the system of the Vaibhasikas the sense-organ is a derivative matter (*bhautika*); in the system of Bhadanta Buddhadeva it is a primary matter (*bhuta-rupa*); for the

Yogacaras it is a consciousness; it is conventional for the Madhyamikas; for the Samkhyas it is *ahankarika*, a derivative from Individuation, and so on. The said variety of cause cannot be inferred. In reply to this the Tika remarks that a simple force is inferred from the inferential process of various forces and their successive flux (*Saktiprabandha*). // 7 //

Again, the force depends on a possessor of the force. No force can be accepted without a support or base. The possessor of the force is the sense-organ which ought to be a derivative matter. Thus the sense-organ becomes again a derivative matter. Therefore the author states :

1—Agamanusari Yogacara. Dignaga's system being known as the Nyayaanusarin Yogacara Vinitadeva specifies thus.

If a support is needed, let the consciousness be its support (*asraya*). The consciousness is well-known to be both as awareness of each object (*prativisaya-vijnapti-rupa*) and as self awareness (*sva-vijnapti-rupa*). Therefore, let it be its base as necessitated by karman previous deed. The force, nevertheless is not contradictory to the consciousness.

Again, some objection: The force that is situated in the derivative matter produces some result and the same situated in the consciousness produces some other result. Therefore the sense-organ ought to be a derivative matter. The author's reply is: There is no difference in the nature of result due to the difference in the basis of force. This means to say: Let the force be situated in the consciousness or somewhere else. That force gives rise to a perception of visible (*rupa*), etc. and hence there is not, at all, any difference in its result-productional act.

"Gr. (the force) be in its indescribable self-form".

This is the opinion of some other system about indriya.

The sense-organ cannot be tested because it is not visible. What is not tested cannot be demonstrated. Therefore according to this system it is of indescribable character.

Then it is said by way of conclusion: "Thus the objective aspect of the consciousness....." As this consciousness is produced from the force of sense-organ so the latter is also produced from the previous consciousness which causes the formation of the sense-organ (*indriya ksepaka*). That previous consciousness again is produced from the still anterior force of sense-organ. In this manner the force of sense-organ and the consciousness endowed with the image of the object go on mutually conditioned. Since there has been no starting moment of this flux of the cause and the effect these two are to be viewed as revolving from immemorial time.

1. It is atindriya, transcendental, p. 12.

The author comments on the last aphorism:

“Depending upon the force called eye” Relying upon what is called the force of sense and the internal *rupa*, either simultaneous or of the previous moment the visual consciousness arises as having an indeterminate object (*anavasita-artha-akaraka*). In the system of Realists the consciousness arises from the already determinate object, but not so in our system: this is said:—

“Consciousness reflecting an object but indistinct from that object (*alambana*) arises”.

Some persons read: consciousness (arises) reflecting an indescribable object (*anirdistartha*). That object is not reflected as absolutely distinct (*vivikta*). Nothing is made distinct and it is indescribable; for every self-characteristic (*sva-laksana*) is incapable of being described.....

“These two act mutually conditioned.....” explained as before (see p. 34 above).

Sometimes thanks to the force known as (*vasanā*) of daily talk (*prapanca*) being matured consciousness is transformed into the form of an object and the force sometimes is produced from the mind (appearing) in the form of an object. In this continued succession of the cause-and-effect there is no break of the flux; hence it is understood to be of immemorial time.

One more question: The sense-organ and the object-force, whether they are different from the consciousness or identical with it? In the first alternative the dispute between us would concern only with the nomenclature. The object is external equally for both of us; for, we both accept the sense-organ and the object as distinct and different from the consciousness. In the second alternative none would be able to specify: this is the sense-organ consisting of the force and this is the object. In reply to this question the author says:

Considering the true nature of things the force is a particular stage (of consciousness) and is true only nominally (*samvrtisat*); and as such it is not to be specified as either different from or identical with the consciousness. Considering the worldly talk one can say as he likes. It is sometimes quite different from the consciousness or sometimes identical with it. For, people talk both ways of things which are empirically true. They having in view the idea of difference talk, for example, "the fragrance of the sandal" (*candanagandha*) etc. The idea of identity is also sometimes expressed in this talk: Pitcher is *rupa* (visible), etc.

Any way, in both cases, the object-condition (*ālambana*) has been elucidated as existing internally and to this effect the author says in conclusion: Thus the interior object is endowed with two characteristics (image and causality), and therefore it is logically deduced [that the consciousness alone is transferred into the (external) object (*visaya*).]

KUE-CHI'S COMMENT ON 'ĀLAMBANA

The following are the remarks on *Ālambana* made by Kue-chi while commenting on Vasubandhu's *Viṃśatikā*. In view of the fact that those comments are quite useful to understand and appreciate the respective positions of the realists whose opinions Dignaga has taken great pains to combat in composing his treatise, *Ālambanaparīkṣā*. There are such three groups of the realists whose theories are set forth by way of *Pūrvapakṣā* in this treatise. Now we are at a loss to specify who are they and which group of the realists uphold which type of system. The two *Tikas* that are now available in translations (one in Tibetan and the other in Chinese) are not much of help to us in this respect. However, Kue-chi, the renowned Chinese commentator, though not writing a regular comment