# बाह्यर्थसिद्धिकारिकानाम ॥ <br>  <br> BAHYARTHA SIDDHI KARIKA 

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# BAHYARTHA SIDDHI KARIKA 

## Introductory

## Genesis of the Treatise.

We have in the collection of Tibetan Tripitaka Tangyur five works attributed to Bhadanta Subhagupta in the following order: (I) Sarvajnasiddhikarika, (2) Bahyäthasiddhi Karika (3) Srutipariksa, (4) Anyapoha-vicara, (5) Iswarabhangakarika. Of these the second, viz. Bahyarthasiddhi, Tib. phyi.rol.gyi.don.grub, $p a$ is the most valuable and interesting. It consists of about 190 verses (anustup) counted for convenience into 188 verses. The purpose of the treatise, as its title implies, to refute the Yogacara idealistic philosophy and to prove the reality of the external universe from the standpoint of the Sarvastivadi-Vaibhasikas. Vasubandhu, for example, in his Vimsatika elaborated a good deal to demonstrate the impossibility of atomic theory of the Vaisesikas. Dignaga again in his Alambanapariksa confirmed Vasubhandhu's opinion on the basis of his logical and epistemological foundations. Next the upholder of the Idealistic School of Buddhism was Dharmakirti who embarked on the task of establishing his philosophy of absolute Idealism by enumerating several logical arguments. Of those, the argument of Sahopalambha-niyama, concomittance of co-cognition is most powerful and proverbial with all the posterior writers of Indian philosophy. Now the uphill task of reviewing all the arguments set up by the above masters of Idealism rests with Bhadanta Subhagupta, a renowned master of the Vaibhasika school of Buddhism. Subhagupta, in the present treatise takes up to examine in detail all the points raised in favour of Idealism and succeeds in presenting his case, the case of the Vaibhasika masters (on the subject) so brilliantly and vehemently that still later some masters, like Santaraksita and Kamalasila could not remain without making another attempt to vindicate their own positions in opposition to Subhagupta's premise. In course of their examination into Externalism (Bahirarthapariksa) they quote Subhagupta's passages verbatim and refute his arguments one by one. Thus we have about 11 verses of Subhagupta cited all of which are traced in the present treatise (see verses Nos. 29, 35, 44, 66, 68, 71, 81, 87, 89, 95, 101). Kamalasila cites also some prose passages (v. Panjika, p. 574, 20) from Subhagupta giving rise to a surmise that Subhagupta might have also written some commentary on the treatise which is not translated into Tibetan.

This appraisal of the treatise may give a fair idea of when the author Subhagupta must have flourished. His time must be fixed between Dharmakirti ( 650 A. D.) and SantaraksitaKamalasila (700-50 A. D.). He must be also anterior to Akalanka, a Jain author (c.700A. D.) since the latter quotes the former in his Nyayaviniscaya the ver : saha-sabdasca loke'smin, etc. (Bahyartha, ver. 71). We may therefore place him during $650-700 \mathrm{~A}$. D. (Cf. T. Sangraha, Intro. XXXIV).

## REVIEW OF TOPICS

Now let us make a brief survey of the whole contents of the treatise. One of the most powerful arguments in favour of Idealism is the example of dream experiences Subhagupta refutes it by pointing our differences between the wake experiences which are never contradicted and the dreams which are always contradicted. To the contention of the Yogacara that all our knowledge and experience are illusive, the author replies that some knowledge may err on account of some defect in our cognitive apparatus but to say that it errs even in the absence of such defects creates an absolute darkness in the universe ( v . ver. 31 with note).

Dignaga holds that because each atom is not separately cognized there could be no atoms at all; the author points out in reply that the reason, ie. non-cognition of atoms in isolation (ekaika-aparicchede) is not conclusive; mind and mental phenomena, though not separately experienced, exist (v. ver. 33, 34). He maintains further that atoms cannot appear in life in isolation; when they appear in association with others they loose their atomic characteristics; how, then, could each of the atoms be reflected in our conciousness?-he asks (ver. 43). On an external material object which is constituted of several atoms, we have an idea of 'one' but this idea of oneness is illusive and is produced as a result of cognition of the uninterrupted and homogeneous atoms (ver. 35) and that is our mental construction (36). The atoms being coagulated into an integrated form discharge a uniform action and therefore they cannot be designated as nonsubstances (40).

Vasubandhu's criticism of atomic theory on the basis of spacial distinction (digbhagabheda) which contradicts the theory itself is not at all reasonable; for we hold that there is no space apart from the atoms themselves. When we talk of space we mean the atoms themselves spread in certain fashion (45-46). The conception of one whole (avayavin) is also illogical. If you
consider it possible as a result of the atoms being closely knit together in a large number, you may better also conceive one time-unit on the moments that are preceeding and succeeding in an uninterrupted succession (50). Atoms have a peculiar relationship amongst themselves due to which no intruder could enter in the midst of atoms; by virtue of the same relationship the covering of atoms by other atoms has been upheld and therefore there is not any reason to presume the atoms have parts (52). The atoms, though mutually unrelated and partless become collocated and accomplish the gross things like the globe of earth, etc. on account of some excellence of mutual efficiency (anugrahavisesa) (56-57). Certain number of atoms alone enter into combination by virtue of that substance-efficiency (drayasakti) but there are many others which could not do so on account of their meagre power (58-59). The atoms could be counted by some spritually advanced saints alone and therefore conceive them to be existing even though we do not cognize them. (65).

Next the author taking up to examine the maxim of Sahopalambhaniyama remarks that the knowledge is only cognizer and that too is only in the presence of some visible object and therefore they are cognized simultaneously but this fact does not testify their identity (67). Then the said hetu, reason has been pointed out to be defective in several respects; sometimes it is indefinite, sometimes contradictory and sometimes unproved and so on. The term saha 'together' always implies a companion and if there is really Saha-vedana, 'together-cognition', the reason will obviously prove the contrary to what is cherished. The object felt by sume other person in his own mind cannot be denied by us because it is far removed from our cognizance. The meaning of Sahavedana, according to the author is that when the knowledge-factors, sense-organ, etc. being present previously prodace the sensuous consciousness in the next moment, then it may be termed Saha-vedana (82). Speaking truly, the knowledge is not at all cognized, but it is said to be cognized figuritively since it cognizes its object by the law of nature. But the object is indeed cognized since it gives rise to its knowledge (85). To the question: How a knowledge cognizes, the author replies: the knowledge functions as if it measures the external thing (90-92).

We have to take note here that the author does not plead, as the Sautrantika does, that the knowledge cognizes through the process of asuming the image of its object. Therefore he says: The image which you presume as existent in the object-
knowledge truly exists in the external things alone and not in the knowledge (96). This image-theory is not favoured by the advocates of Cittamatrata, Idea-alone in the ultimate plane of existence. The point becomes evident from the following statement of the author: "You plead that the knowledge which, in fact, is imageless experiences its unreal images. I, likewise, advocate that the imageless knowledge experiences real things (102). He makes his position further clear by saying that the consciousness which is imageless and formless comprehends (paricchid) through the agency of material sense-organs like the eye, etc. (105). The author turns the image theory as an unfavourable proposition to the opponent thus:

When a consciousness-form is accepted to be shaped by the form of an object, how does it mean that the consciousness comprehends it? (90). When we maintain that consciousness flashes up in the presence of its object, your query as to how it does so is an irrelevant question (91). The consciousness is not creator of its object; nevertheless people on its simple awareness of its content, attribute to it a creative function (92). The author's realistic outlook is quite obvious in his solemn declaration that the process of cognizing the external things is the same with the saints as with the worldings, with this much difference that the former is characterized by his detached and comprehensive vision (Sarvakara dhiya) whereas the latter by covetous observation of things (94). Immediately after this assertion however, the author concedes a special privilege to Buddha whose power of knowledge cannot be interrogated whether it comprehends simultaneously or in succession and whether it assumes the image of the object or does not (95). This opinion may not be shared by the Sautrantika who is not in favour of allowing any exception to the general law of knowledge operating always in a gradual process. Note Vasubandhu's clear-cut exposition of this law: Santanena samarthatvat yatha' gnih sarva-bhug math/Tatha sarvavid estavyo na sakrt sarva-vedanat/Kosakarika, IX, 1.

The Kramavedana is also the opinion of Harivarman.- Satyasiddhi, Chaps 75, 76, etc. Cp. Pancavastuka-Vibhasa, p. 27 (VisvaBharati Annals, X).

It is interesting to note that the well known lamp example cited in favour of Svi-samvedana heory has been turned by the author to his advantage thus: As you hold that the lamp illumines itself as well as others, just so I hold that a knowledge illumines the selves of two or more alambanas of the same kind
(106). Therefore according to Subhagupta, the visual consciousness, e.g. can comprehend simultaneously several visible things falling within its range; thus our cogaition of several colours in a carpet (citrastarana) is quite reasonable.

The Yogacara maintains that knowledge cognizes its own aspect as its objects and hence what is cognizable (grahya) is only a part of knowledge. On this point the author remarks that the Tathagata's sayings like everything is impermanent, etc. do not at all disclose that things meant there are the aspects of consciousness itself (104). Some doctors maintain that a knowledge of previous moment serves as the object-cause of the next following knowledge; this view is not acceptable to the author; for, no knowledge necessarily follows immediately after another knowledge (118-119). Some other doctors consider that some force (sakti) productive of knowledge is regarded as the object-cause; this too is not appropriate for the reason that not any Sakti is experienced in our sensuous consciousness (120-21). It has been stated finally on the authority of the world and scripture that the external things alone are reasonable to be upheld as the object-cause of our cognitive experiences (123-24). The author further states that the external things are established not merely on account of their simpie efficiency in their presence but also on account of such efficiency being experienced even in the case of their mistaken knowledge (viparyaya-jnana) (12931); that is to say, when we mistake a snake for rope and tread upon it we are at once startled by its reaction.

According to this author the knowledge of the discerner of other's thought is not untrue but it is quite natural. The others mind could be comprehended just as any other external things are comprehended. The grasping of an object by our mind is not an act of running towards its objects, but simply an act of measuring (pariccheda). The Buddha is omniscient because he comprehends the entire universe through the agency of his cognizing knowledge (147-48). In the absence of external things none can become omniscient (150). The author has not accepted what Dignaga states in regard to an indescribable form of the object being cogaized in the first moment (149-49). Nor does he subscribe his opinion to Dignaga's theory of construction-free mind in the first moment. (115). Dignaga's theory of Svasamvedana, introspection is also not favoured by this author, who constantly maintains that knowledge is always a cognizing agent and never becomes cognized. The theory of intro-cogniiton is generally believed to have been propounded by the Sautrantikas on the strength of memory of the knowledge in a later
period (v. Madh. Avatara VI, ad. 72 Tib. p. 167, my Skt. text p. 60) and to have been followed by Dignaga and his followers (v. Pramanas. I, II). Subhagupta though not in favour of Svasamvedana explains the memory as merely a mind directed towards the past thing; therefore it is not a cognition (graha) since it does not flash up from its cause (145-48). The Vaibhasika is not only the school that refuses to certify Svasamvedana, the Madhyamika too does the same. The memory however is possible, says the Madhyamika, since the consciousness as a cognizer is related to the past thing (Bodhicar. panjika. p. 401, 16 ).

The author further points out some more flaws in the system of the Yogacaras. When we assume some entity existing externally then alone the contemplation upon it as no-soul becomes possible; but no such contemplation is possible in the case of Idealism (159,. The Buddahood which is according to you, completely an inactive state can be secured without making any efforts (161). The person who conceives the charity, etc. as mere thoughts is not able to release any person from poverty even by repeated practice of the charity-mind (168). These are some of the objections that are levelled against Idealism; and therefore the scriptural passages which speak of cittanatrata must not be interpreted quite literally. Their interpretations, according to Subhagupta are as follows: The Buddha has declared (cittamatrata) with reference to the imaginary aspects of the external things but that does not at all imply that the external things are absolutely non-existent (179). Likewise the doctrine of no-soul has been preached with reference to the imaginary aspect of things in order to remove all the passions in the mind of worldlings addicted to sexual pleasures (180). It has also been stated in some place that the external things do not exist in such forms as the ordinary worldings entertain in their mind (181).

In fine the author sums up his constructive conclusion of his system as follows: There is something inferred (kalpita), something fancied (vikalpita) and Dharmata. The inferred (kalpita) is nothing but bhava, some basic entity, atoms; the fancied is diversity of the former (like the earth, etc.) and Dharmata finally is the self-substance (Svalaksana). Of these three the author probably views the first and the last as real and the second, i.e. Vikalpita as unreal. This explanation may quite accord with the opinions of the Vaibhasikas.

## Text and Translation

The Tibetan text that is presented in the following pages is based on Bstan hgyur collection of the Tibetan Tripitaka preserved in our Visva-Bharati Library (Narthang edition) and then it was collated with the same in Peking Edn. recently printed in Japan and preserved in the Library of the Sahitya Akademy, New Delhi. Different readings are all noted in the foot-notes to the Tibetan text.

The Tibetan text has been preceded by its English translations with copious annotative foot-notes supplying all the available references and informations on the topics discussed in the text. A tentative rendering into Sanskrit of each verse of the treatise has also been provided in the foot-notes with a view to making the trend of discussion more understandable to the readers who may be familiar with Indian philosophical texts and their styles. Indian (Sastraic) texts are generally not very easy to interpret without having recourse to some commentary. The present text being not provided with any commentary, the task of interpreting it properly has become much tough. I have, however, endeavoured to understand the text with the sole aid of my limited experiences and studies in Buddhism and its philosophy. My Tibetan-Sanskrit glossary contains only those words that are found in the original Sanskrit verses arranged in a separate page 9. My thanks are due to Geshe Byam pa thsul khrim, a Tibetan refugee Lama working in the Visvabharati for supplying me with a transcript of the Tibetan text included in this publication.

## N. A. Sastri.

## The original Sanskrit verses of the Bahyartha Siddhi identified so far

धीमालत्वेन संसाध्ये यत् ज्ञानत्वादि साधनम्।
विजातीयाविरद्धावात् सर्व शोष्वदुच्यते ॥ २९॥
तुल्यापरक्षणोत्पादात् यथा नित्यन्वविभ्रमः।
अविच्छन्नसजातीयग्रहें स्याज् नीलविभ्रम:।। ३थ ॥
प्रत्येकपरमाणूनां स्वातन्ल्येणास्यसम्भव:।
अतोरप परमाणूनामेकैकाप्रतिभासनम् ॥ ४४॥
नान्योऽरित ग्राहको ज्ञानात् चाक्षुर्वर्विषयंर्विना।
अतश्र सहसंवित्तिर्नमेदात् नीलतद्वियो: ॥ ६६॥
एककालविउक्षात: सम्बद्बज्ञानचेतसा।
चित्तचैत्तैश्र हेतुरि सर्वर्थकान्तिको नच ॥६Б॥
सहशवदश्न लाकेडसिमन् नैवन्येन विना कचित्।
विर्द्धोऽयूं ततो हेतुर्यद्यस्ति सहृवेदनम् ॥७१ /
पूरवकैव तु सामग्रा प्रज्ञानं विषयक्षणम्।
सालोकरूपव्त् कुर्यांत् येन स्यात् सह्वेदनम् ॥न१॥
साकारज्ञानपक्षे च तन्निर्भसस्य वेद्यता ।
तस्याभेदे च संसाध्ये सिद्धसाधनता भवेत्॥=७॥
कथं तद्रग्राहकं तच्चेत् तप्परिच्छेदलक्षणम्।
विज्ञानं तेन नाशङ्डूा कथं तत् fिं वदिति॥ ॥९ ॥
साकारं वा निराकारं तुल्यकालमतुल्यजम् ।
इति बौद्देरपि विज्ञाने fिं नु चिन्ता प्रवर्तने ॥ ९义॥
यथा दि भवतां ज्ञानं निराकारम्य तन्वतः ।
वेत्ति चाभूतमाकारं भूतमर्ध तथैवन:॥909॥

## BAHYARTHA-SIDDHI

## Establishment of Objective Reality

1. One ${ }^{1}$ who fulfilled in every aspect all duties beneficial to his own person (Svartha) as well as duties beneficial to other living ${ }^{2}$ beings; to Him 1 salute in order to achieve the success (artha-siddhi) arid demonstrate the truth of the objective universe.
2. (The Idealist says:) The ${ }^{3}$ external thing that serves as the object of consciousness in the person of perfect eyesight does not exist (as real) ; (Reason); because it is a (mere) idea and because the idea manifests itself as external thing, (example;) just like a dream-thought and the double-moon idea. ${ }^{4}$
3. Thus ${ }^{5}$ the advocate of Idealism (theory of mind alone) proves the non-existence of the external thing. Now, we at the outset prove that the external things on the basis of experience never contradicted ${ }^{6}$ in our daily life (avisamvadadrsti).
4. The ${ }^{7}$ alternative prosposition that either the object-cause (alambana) is unreal because its knowledge is contradicted in our daily experience, or it is so, because the material and other things are not fit to exist, is, both unsatisfactory.
5. One ${ }^{8}$ experiences in dream one's own body chopped up into pieces; but this act of chopping is utterly unreal. If externalism is untrue in dream, does it apply to the waking stage?
6. If ${ }^{9}$ you mean (lit. desire) that the beheading ${ }^{10}$ of a waking person and his bodily exuberance resemble' a dream experience, why are you then so much care-laden about your gain and loss.
7. If ${ }^{11}$ you say that every human activity is guided by illusion; but there is no perversion ${ }^{12}$ in naming things. A knowledge which is non-illusive is naver contradicted. What is contradicted is always illusive.
8. A knowledge ${ }^{13}$ of a material thing which differs from neither space ${ }^{14}$ nor time is never contradicted; hence it is non-illusive (abhrantu). This alone is the characteristic of non-illusive knowledge and nothing else.

9-10a. The ${ }^{15}$ person who comprehends the extremely long things as well as the extremely small things is distinguished as the Saint ${ }^{16}$ (Yogin). (In case of absolute denial of external things)
the Buddhist Saint would not be omniscient and not get double sided release ${ }^{17}$ (ubhayatobhaga-vimukti) and thus Buddhahood would also be contradicted.
10. $b-d$. (The Idealist continues:) ${ }^{18}$ Even our truly apprehension (yathavatpratiti) that every thing exists absolutely resembles the experience of things in dream.

Now, why does it not become possibly contradicted (as a dreamy thing does) ?
11. If ${ }^{19}$ (things exist) on account of deep-rooted impressions (vasana), why are not the dreamy things also explained (In the like manner ?) Hence the cognizable things like village and garden, etc. are true and become visible.
12. The ${ }^{20}$ mere thought bereft of sense-data and its impression (vasana) are all momentary; (thus) the gain of their resultant fruits is interrupted. (Therefore) the sense-data (be admitted) as the stable causes of ${ }^{21}$ fruition.
13. For ${ }^{22}$ him who opines that the knowledge of one ${ }^{23}$ taste does not at all arise from any sense-datum, the nature of that knowledge (we ask) is whether permanent or impermanent.
14. If ${ }^{24}$ it is similar to a dream (lit. sleep) will it not produce its resultant fruit? The cause of fruition (vipaka) being present, the destruction of fruition is improper.
15. Just ${ }^{25}$ as someihing seen by a sleepy person in his dream does not appear the same in the next moment, and hence becomes impermanent; likewise the destruction of the matured fruition is possible.
16. $\mathrm{In}^{26}$ whose opinion the sense-data are non-existent and hence there is no occasion (lit. cause) for preaching, (for him) the fruition will repeat endless even after its destruction. ${ }^{27}$
17. Why ${ }^{28}$ do you view that a man does a religious action by virtue of his deep-rooted impressions (vasana) of non-contradiction? If you say: because the material and other external things are unfit to be real, to this point we shall reply (later on).
18. If ${ }^{29}$ non-contradiction in the waking state persists on account of the maturation of asraya $(=$ Alayavinana $)$ why is it
not (like this) that as long as there is eye-disese (timira) as basis (asraya), so long there is non-contradiction ${ }^{30}$ ?
19. Suppose ${ }^{35}$ the Yogacarin acts (pravriti) on the notion of mind alone (Cittamatrata) and on the presumption of the all alambana ${ }^{3,4}$ as false; when in the interval the notion of Cittamatrata is absent, even then the act is not contradicted (avisamvada) and therefore the act is not caused by that notion.
20. The ${ }^{32}$ Sakti matured (paripaka) for aropa, assumption is produced from some other external thing and not from the self ${ }^{33}$ just like the sesame seed produced is from its flower.
21. And ${ }^{34}$ the seed from the water, etc. What is produced from a cause, that product is similar to its cause. No vasana ${ }^{35}$ is to be assumed on account of the genesis of the fruit as one infers the fire at the sight of the smoke.
22. Things ${ }^{36}$ are made fragrant on account of an act praduced from some other thing; for example, the sesame seed becomes fragrant on its contact with the Jati ${ }^{37}$ flowers.
23. Here ${ }^{38}$ the seven kinds of consciousness are produced from their upadana consciousness and their seeds being previously imputed there and dormant become matured into such consciousness under favourable conditions.
24. Therefore ${ }^{39}$ the theory of vasana needs not to be assumed (as the Idealist does) on the presumption that no entity is produced from another entity, declare the advocates of Sakti. ${ }^{40}$
25. Nevertheless, ${ }^{4 x}$ if you say: the knowledge of udhigama (rtogs.pa), definite perceptual experiences arises of its own accord (svatantratah) and this my opinion may be compared with the fact of the seed ${ }^{42}$ which being sowed matures of itself.
26. This ${ }^{43}$ opinion too is not acceptable. Again your plea that its dependence on its upadana consciousness is common to us both, is not valid as it incurs a logical fallacy of mutual reliance (anyonyastaya). ${ }^{44}$
27.-28a. This ${ }^{45}$ defect is absent in the system ${ }^{46}$ which holds that Saktis that are imputed (aropita) by the knowledge produced by the sensuous objects get nourished and matured into seven kinds of sensuous consciousness by dint of some Visesa, excellence of favourable conditions, like the object, time, individual, etc.
$28 b-d$. But ${ }^{47}$ there is a system ${ }^{48}$ of thought which maintains that there is not any cause (of our objective experiences) other than the knowledge itself named upadand (=Alaya-vijnana) and this is quite irrelevant.
29. When ${ }^{49}$ the proposition of Cittamatrata that is to be established the proof or argument (sadhana) is the knowledge itself (Jnanatva); this proof is non-contradictory to any heterogeneous case (vijatiya) and therefore the said proposition is declared to be sesavat ${ }^{50}$ (i.e. sesavad-anumama).
30. $\mathrm{A}^{51}$ close scrutiny (legs-dpyad) joyfulness (dgah mgur) engagement (praviti) gain of the good and rejection of the bad; all these activities of the wake-up person never exist in dream.
31. Certain ${ }^{52}$ sensuous knowledge errors on account of some impediment (-this is possible). But to say that even in the absence of an impediment there is an error ${ }^{53}$ creates an absolute darkness in the unjverse.

## ATOMIC THEORY PROVED.

32. Others ${ }^{54}$ say: Everything is nothing but consciousness; the notion that there is an external object (corresponding to the sensuous consciousness) is a mental illusion. The knowable (object) is what is produced internally from one's own mind but it is not a visible object (rupa) (existing externally outside of the mind ${ }^{55}$.
$33 a-c$. The ${ }^{56}$ proposition that there exists no object is to be maintained (samsadhya); because each atom is not separately cognized, atoms do not appear in knowledge ${ }^{57}$ :-So says Dinnaga.

33d-34. (Hetu-Reason) ${ }^{58}$ would become doubtful (sandighdha) when it is applied to Citta and Caitta, mind and mentalphenomena.

Just like momentary things are not cognized in their discrete moments, the atoms would be undetermined even by the understand ing of Tathagata.
35. (The author continues: ${ }^{59}$ Just as the illusive idea of permanance appears to us as a result of continuous rise of homogeneous moments (= momentary atoms) in succession, just so the illusive idea of a patch of blue appears as a result of cognition of the uninterrupted and homogeneous atoms. ,
36. When ${ }^{60}$ we cognize in our mind the uninterrupted and homogeneous atoms, our constructive thought constructs their oneness ${ }^{51}$.
37. Therefore ${ }^{62}$ the theory (of the Idealists) that the atoms in their self-substance are not reflected in our ${ }^{63}$ consiousness is totally unfounded.
38. What ${ }^{64}$ a form of object is reflected in a knowledge, from that object-form its knowledge does not arise, and this object-form is not a substance (dravya) and resembles the double ${ }^{65}$ moon: (says-Dinnaga). This conclusion is not a sound one because its hetu, probans is not at all proved as valid one.
39. The ${ }^{66}$ atoms which teing integrated, discharge a uniform action are termed Sancita, ${ }^{67}$ integrated;-to the upholder of this opinion how do the atoms become non-substances (adravya)?
40. They ${ }^{68}$ (atcms) are spoken of as one but they possess no oneness. For, the import of all words being investigated is not at all reffected in the sensuous consciousness. ${ }^{69}$
41. The ${ }^{70}$ philosopher (i.e. Idealist) who states that one part of the mind reflects as the object-image in consciousness must have witnessed a piece of carpet with pictures in variegated colours ${ }^{71}$ (Citrapataka).
42. $\ln ^{72}$ certain place, when an image of certain object (rupa) is cognized, that image being related to higher and lower areas (asraya) appears divided (to form) a picture in varied forms ${ }^{73}$.
43. $\mathrm{An}^{74}$ atom which may manifest its own single knowledge cannot appear in life as separated from other atoms. When it appears associated with other atoms it loses its atomic form, how then could each of the atoms appear to our knowledge ? ${ }^{75}$
44. Atoms ${ }^{76}$ cannot each individually and independently appear in life and this is also the reason why each of the atoms never flashes out in our consciousness.
45. Vasubandhu's ${ }^{77}$ criticism of the atcms on the basis of their spacial distinctions is taseless $^{78}$. For, the term, space (diksabda) is employed on the atom itself that is associated with some other atoms.
46. Hence ${ }^{79}$ by the spacial distinctions the atoms themselves are meant when surrounded by several ${ }^{80}$ other atoms but never the atoms are constituted of parts.
47. When ${ }^{81}$ one atom is situated at the bottom and the other on the other side they so situated never become double on account of these two sides.
48. When ${ }^{82}$ the atoms are situated in the midst of several atoms, they are imagined as many and likewise by the process of reverse of the one they are assumed as many.
49. $\mathrm{A}^{83}$ (gross) form distinct from its own, for example, is witnessed on the atoms as a result of their mutual combinations (Lit. one depending upon another) but this gross form does not at all exist there just like a distinction of the front and the back made on the atoms. ${ }^{84}$
50. If, ${ }^{95}$ as a result of atoms being uninterruptedly knit together in a large number, one substantial whole (avayavin) is conceived, why will not the moments that are preceeding and succeeding in an uninterrupted succession be conceived $\mathrm{so}^{86}$ (i.e. one indivisible time-unit)?
51. Since ${ }^{87}$ knowledge continues to exist for two moments ${ }^{88}$ its uninterrupted existence (nairantarya) is possible, yet the form of one unit (avayavi-rupa) is not permissible on the knowledge; the same principle is likewise applicable to the atoms ${ }^{83}$ also.
52. By ${ }^{90}$ virtue of a peculiar relationship (pratyasatti) amongst atoms the entry of a moving body into the aggregated company of atoms is hindered and by the same device the covering of atoms by other atoms is accepted, but not due to their constituent parts. ${ }^{91}$
53. The ${ }^{92}$ shadow is produced when there is a covering of the sun, but that shadow is not proper to be accepted as existing in between the two atoms of the sun. ${ }^{93}$
54. Just ${ }^{94}$ as the power of producing the shadow and covering is the phenomenon of several united things so also is the case with several atoms but no single atoms can produce such phenomenon.
55. Therefore ${ }^{95}$ what is stated by Vasubandhu that a lump (pinda) is impossible to exist $\mathrm{g}_{96}$ since the distinction between the
atoms and the lump is not available, may perhaps be accidental (kadacitka) if there is any propriety in maintaining the atoms as stagnant (i.e. never transformed into any other form under any circumstances).
56. The ${ }^{97}$ atoms, (though) they are mutually un-related ${ }^{98}$ and devoid of parts, nevertheless become integrated and accomplish (the gross things like) the globe of earth, and others.
57. By ${ }^{99}$ virtue of some excellence of mutual efficiency (anugraha) the atoms become transformed and likewise they never become scattered (i.e.) of the diamond (vajra) and other such things.
58. Certain ${ }^{100}$ atoms become integrated by virtue of their peculiar substance-efficiency (dravya-sakti) just like the evil spirit (pisaca) the serpent and others are subdued by force of mantrasakti.
59. But ${ }^{101}$ there are many other atoms having very little power and strength ${ }^{102}$ (to appear in life).

The ${ }^{103}$ person endowed with a sharp intellect and living in a mountain (acala) and such other places could count the atoms of the hell (and the heaven), etc. wlth their numbers and other distinctions.

60-61a. Therefore ${ }^{104}$ it is not proper to declare that the atoms do not at all exist. If you say that the affirmation of the atoms has been made due to some illusion (bhranti) then your understanding ${ }^{105}$ that everything is nothing but the activity of the sixth knowledge ( $=$ intellect) would be much more illusory resembling an illusory knowledge of the number 'eight' on the aggregate of eight atoms.

61b-62. If ${ }^{106}$ you plead that the conception of the atoms is a notion mistaken for some other basic ${ }^{107}$ thing for these two considerations, viz. (1) that things like the hell, etc. are known as nothing but condemned living beings ${ }^{108}$ and (2) that the atoms are never cognized directly (in our perceptual experiences), then why do you not state likewise (as illusory) of the number form and other characteristics of Pradhana ${ }^{109}$ and Purusa, etc.?
63. You ${ }^{10}$ may say: The same remark holds good with regard to such things also because Pradhana is regarded in the terms of some excellence of characters (gunatisaya) (like sattva,
rajas and tamas). I now reply: though the conception of Pradhana, etc. is illusory, this does not warrant us to forsake our previous contention (about the atoms).
64. Therefore ${ }^{111}$ the atoms are existing really. They are not cognized by any body other the sages living in ${ }^{112}$ a mountain and other places. The atoms are conceived because the saints cognize them.

Saha-vedana, co-cognition possible
65. When ${ }^{13}$ two persons (look at an object) in a place, it is an invariable rule that they have simultaneous cognition of it ; it is also the law of nature that knowledge with its content (lit. knowable) are invariably cognized at once. ${ }^{114}$
66. There ${ }^{15}$ is no cognizer other than knowledge and the visual knowledge is no more cognizer in the absence of visible objects, and therefore their cognition is simultaneous but this co-cognition is not due to the identity between the object, i.e. patch of blue and its cognizer.
67. If ${ }^{166}$ the consciousness is not in the mood of cognizer or the knowledge is bereft of an object, then only that could reasonably be stated so and not otherwise. ${ }^{17}$
68. If ${ }^{118}$ the term saha is employed to signify one and the same time the reason (i.e. Sahopalambha) becomes indefinite in all respects (anaikantika) when it is applied to the Buddha's knowledge which co-exists with its content, other's mind (jneyacetasa) and the mind that co-exists with mental properties (citta-caittaisca).
69. If ${ }^{19}$ the mental properties are not illusory as they are sanctioned in the scriptures; how do you then say that the knowledge of the ghost, ${ }^{120}$ hell and others is an illusion?
70. If, ${ }^{121}$ even in the absence of any relevancy some distinction (between the idea of the hell, etc. and the mental elements) saves your difficulty (lit. serves your purpose), that distinction is absolutely unproved, yet you cherish it proved; thus your rejoinder is based again on illusion.
71. The ${ }^{122}$ term 'saha' co-existence is never employed in the world in any place where a companion is not available. The reason (hetu-Sahopalambha) will then be a contradictory one if there is really a co-cognition.
72. If ${ }^{123}$ the term Saha 'co-existence' is taken to mean one and the same thing (ekarth7) then hetu would be unproved (asiddha) for other party; ${ }^{124}$ for example when some common things are present, how does only one person look at them?
73. If ${ }^{125}$ every mind of other living beings is cognized by the knowledge of the omniscient being, then, where is it proved that only one person experiences it (ekena upalambha)?
74. The ${ }^{126}$ object-cause felt by a peron internally in his own mind cannot be denied by any other person, as there can be no evidence for doing so.

The reason (hetu) further becomes doubtful and unproved on the ground that it is, in its very nature, far removed, i.e. beyond the reach of other's cognizance (svabhava-viprakrsta $=$ nan-bshin. bkhal. ba).
75. If ${ }^{127}$ the reason (hetu) considered to be proved as a result of the denial of external things and (thus leading to the conclusion) that one aspect of the consciousness itself is cognizable, then the reason would be known to only one party ${ }^{128}$ who plead for the doctrine of mind alone (cittamatrata).
76. If ${ }^{129}$ you consider it a proven fact that the knowledge and the knowable flash out as identical (aprthakbhasa), then the reason would simply prove what is already proved. Even the advocate of knowledge having the capacity to assume the image of the object (sakarajnanavadin) would not dispute here in this matter ${ }^{130}$ (thus leading to siddhasadhanata).
77. If you ${ }^{131}$ conceive the object-cause as identical (with its knowledge) how is it that the object-cause is cognized distinctly from the knowledge ?
78. Suppose, ${ }^{132}$ for example, a man, while experiencing an external object (artha), has joyful feelings in this wise: this shell is black, if these feelings are regarded as coming from the knowledge itself this will be improbable in the absence of experience of the object in that fashion. ${ }^{133}$
79. If ${ }^{134}$ certain imaginary form (kalpita-rupa i.e. black) of knowledge is experienced, then its real form is not experienced; therefore the reason (Sahopalambha) is not proper to set up.
80. For ${ }^{135}$ this reason two forms ${ }^{136}$ of the knowledge are to be experienced in the same manner as the double moon is
looked at by some. Thus the author's (=Dharmakirti) statement of "one" (abheda) becomes unfounded.
81. The ${ }^{137}$ causal factors (samagri) ${ }^{138}$ of the preceeding moment give rise to a full cognition of the object in the next moment just in the same fashion as a visible object (rupa) in association with the light produces its cognition, due to which fact a successive ${ }^{139}$ cognition (sahavedana) would become justifiable.

- 82. When ${ }^{\text {140 }}$ the knowledge and its sense-organ happen to be just one after another (purvapara) the term co-cognition (sahavedan. ) is used by way of similarity (with a simultaneous phenomenon) but never there is literally co-cognition (sahavedanam na arthatah).

83. Since ${ }^{145}$ the knowledge-content is felt internally, it is no entity other than the self of knowledge; to the advocate of the system of maintaining the knowledge possessing a knowable aspect in itself the reason becomes undetermined. ${ }^{142}$
84. Since ${ }^{143}$ it is the law of nature that a knowledge cognizes its content ( jnanam vetti), the knowledge is said to be cognized; since the content produces the knowledge as reffector of itself it is consided as cognized. ${ }^{144}$
85. Though ${ }^{145}$ the term 'cognized' (samvedya) is applied equally to the knowledge and its content, its tmport is quite different. For, the wild cow, etc, e.g. are not regarded of the (same) forms, visunin, horned figure on account of ${ }^{145 A}$ the usage of the term, cow, etc.
86. There ${ }^{146}$ are certain dharmas which are contemplated in the minds of other streams of elements (santanantara) are perceived by the knowledge of the Omnisciant (Sarvajna). Then the reason (when it is applied to those dharmas) becomes uncertain, ${ }^{146 A}$ anaikantika (because they are perceived simultaneously, yet distinct from the knowledge of the Omniscient). If he does not comprehend them, how can he be an Omniscient? ? ${ }^{1468}$
87. In $n^{147}$ the system of the image-invested knowledge (of the Sautrantika) the knowledge is perceived only when it reflects the image of an object. If you desire to prove the identity of the knowledge with its reflected image the reason would then, simply achieve what is already achieved (siddha-sadhanata).
88. The ${ }^{148}$ external thing (artha) produces in the knowledge an image similar to itself and as a result of this fact it is
considered as perceived figuratively. ${ }^{143}$ The external thing is not at all perceived and hence its identity with knowledge will not be proved.
89. If ${ }^{150}$ you ask: How is the knowledge (or consciouness) considered to be the cognizer of its object ? (we answer:) the consciousness is characterized as (if it is) measuring the object (tat pariccheda laksana) and therefore no query should be made as to: how is it and what like it is?
90. (In ${ }^{151}$ the system of the Sautrantika-Yogacaras) an image is aroused and imprinted in consciousness by the external things; how could it be said that the consciousness is a measurer of the external thing (artha-paricchedaka)?
91. Consciousness ${ }^{152}$ (by law of nature) is considered to be entirely a comprehending agent and hence it is irrelevant to ask how the consciousness would comprehend its own object. ${ }^{153}$
92. The ${ }^{154}$ consciousness is not creator of any thing and in fact, it is functionless. Its characteristic, however, is mere awareness of the presence of an object ${ }^{155}$ (vittimatra), but the act of creation, is attributed to it by imposition (samaropa).
93. Jusit ${ }^{155}$ as a saint of detached vision enters into the self of knowledge (jnana-rupa), etc. so also the person of a meagre vision enters into it.
94. $\mathrm{N}_{\mathrm{c}^{157}}$ distinction exists between the Saint and the worldling so far as their knowledge alone is concerned. But the great souls however, are distinguished by their knowledge of varied aspects ${ }^{158}$ (Sarvakaradhi).
95. $\mathrm{D} 0^{159}$ we enquire into the knowledge of the Buddha whether it assumes the image of the object or does not, and again whether it comprehends the object simultaneously or successively. ${ }^{160}$

## Akara-vada disproved

96. What ${ }^{191}$ image according to you, presumably exists as pertaining to an object-knowledge, that image exists in fact only in the external thing like the visible element (rupa), etc. but it is assurned to exist in the knowledge. ${ }^{162}$
97. It ${ }^{163}$ is irrelevant to say that not any cognizable thing exists for the Saint who has given up all obscurations ${ }^{164}$ (avarana); for, he is anchored in this cognizable (world); how can it be substituted and equalized to the mind alone (tanmatra-sama) ?
98. Our, ${ }^{165}$ intellect is sole demonstrating agent whether the external thing exists or does not exist. There really exist the external objects to which fact no contradiction is experienced, ${ }^{166}$ for example in the case of eye-disease, etc. some figure is observed even when there is not any figure.
99. Likewise ${ }^{166}$ one thinks that he experiences in the knowledge a patch of blue and accordingly imposes upon the knowledge the presence of the blue image but in fact no such image exists in it.
100. The ${ }^{157}$ assumption that the image exists in the knowledge or does not exist is a type of consciousness in the nature of a productive imagination (kalpanatma). The consciousness, however, becomes differentiated due to visesa, individual characteristic of the observed object. ${ }^{168}$
101. You ${ }^{169}$ plead that the knowledge which is in fact imageless ${ }^{170}$ experiences its unreal image, I likewise, advocate that the imageless knowledge experiences the real external thing.
102. There ${ }^{171}$ is not a distinct self of the knowledge (in the form of a separate knowable aspect); for, to assume it would contradict the non-dual essence of the knowledge (advaya-jnana). No unreal image could be experienced by the knowledge; (if the image is experienced) it would turn to be non-illusory.
103. If ${ }^{172}$ (you argue that) the above arrangement has been made in accordance with the presumption under the influence of the deep rooted illusion, then the image of the knowledge ought to be viewed as illusory, ${ }^{173}$ otherwise how could it be an assumed image?
104. Hence ${ }^{174}$ consciousness which is imageless in truth, would comprehend (pariccid) through the agency of the material eye, etc. all the fitting things whether existent or non-existent. ${ }^{175}$
105. If ${ }^{176}$ (you say that) just as the lamp ${ }^{177}$ illumines the self as well as others, just so the consciousness (illumines) the selves of two alambanas ${ }^{178}$ (of one kind); then, there would be no contradiction at all.
106. However ${ }^{179}$ the various objects, visible, sound etc. are domains of various ${ }^{180}$ sense-organs; hence they cannot be experienced by one sense-organ.

107a-b. (According to you) even when different causes are absent the knowledge is experienced as (in the presence of) alambana. ${ }^{181}$

107c-9a. $\mathbf{A}^{182}$ knowledge arises from an external object as similar to it and that knowledge in the immediately next moment bears an image similar to that external thing:--this contention is a simple illusion ${ }^{133}$; for, the knowledge does not exist as permanent (to assume the image of the object). Further there is not any experience of the self of the knowledge similar to the object at the moment when the object becomes illuminated.
$109 b-10 a$. In ${ }^{184}$ every mind the knowledge form ${ }^{155}$ is uniform-if this view is favoured, it could not be stated particularly, it is similar to this object.
$110 b-d$. When ${ }^{186}$ this (knowledge) illumines the cognizable thing no knowledge immediately after that would appear, because it becomes entirely assimilated with its content ${ }^{187}$ (visaya).

111-12b. If, ${ }^{188}$ while the knowledge lights up just a patch of blue, etc. the knowledge lighting up the patch of blue, etc. exists immediately after that, and then, if it exists having the patch of blue as its content, then at that time the knowledge is not similar to the object. True, it exists indeed, but never similar (to its content).

## Grahya aspect criticised

112c-13. The ${ }^{189}$ Tathagata's saying, for example, that all is impermanent and sorrowful does not exhibit as content the cognizable aspect of knowledge (grahyabhaga).

If you are inclined to plead that since the object-cause (alambana) is not fit to exist in the external, the cognizable aspect of the knowledge is accepted as the content, then the characteristic ${ }^{190}$ of the content cannot appropriately be applied to it (= content).
114. How ${ }^{191}$ does the mind exist as separated from its act of construction $?^{192}$ That idea is only a fancy of your mind (cittasvaabhasa). There does not exist the mind shedding light on its content, because the latter is not available (for you) other the mind itself.

115a-b. If ${ }^{193}$ there is nothing productive (of the knowledge), how is it at all desired ${ }^{194}$ (as content)?

## Discussion on the actual object

$115 c-16 b$. The ${ }^{195}$ simple atoms and the co-agulated atoms (in your system) are not the object-causes, because they lack one requisite (anga) each. ${ }^{196}$ How is the denial of both (simple and co-agulated atoms) cherished?
$116 c-17 b$. The ${ }^{197}$ knowledge in the form of cognizer is devoid of two characteristics (of alambana, viz. objectivity and causality). Then if there is no object-cause (alambana) (for you) the cognizable aspect of knowledge is also not accepted (by us).
$117 c-18 b$. The ${ }^{198}$ opinion that a similar ${ }^{199}$ knowledge of the previous moment serves as the object-cause (of the next following knowledge) is also improper; for, no knowledge flashes up (bhati) immediately after a similar knowledge.
$118 c-19 b$. If ${ }^{200}$ the knowledge in the form of a visible object (rupa) arises due to contact with the knowledge of the sound, how will that knowledge of rupa be similar to the alambana, i.e. sound ? ${ }^{201}$
$119 c-20 b$. Some ${ }^{202}$ consider that a force (sakti) producing a knowledge akin to its content is the object-cause. ${ }^{203}$ This opinion is also improper; for, no force, sakti is reflected in the sensuous knowledge.
$120 c-21 b$. If ${ }^{204}$ (you again argue that) the objectivity lies in the cognizable part of knowledge and that alone remains invariably as the object, (we may reply that) the external thing (artha) (as the object) has been proved from the standpoint of the world and therefore its characteristic as alambana exists indeed though not expressly stated.
$121 c-22 b$. If ${ }^{205}$ you say that the force of knowledge is also quite familiar with the world, it is not definitely proved as the content (artha). If it lacks the characteristic ${ }^{206}$ (of alambana) how can it be alambana?
$122 c-23 b$. (Thus) ${ }^{207}$ it is proper to maintain on close scrutiny that the external object-cause alone is desirable on the authority of the world and scripture, but never the cognizable aspect of knowledge by any means. ${ }^{208}$
$123 c-24 b$. The ${ }^{209}$ objects like desirable and undesirable ${ }^{210}$ never exist in the external in truth and hence all this is nothing but mind : this contention is absolutely irrelevant.
$124 c-25 b$. On ${ }^{211}$ certain unpleasant material object if one meditates as good (he experiences it as good); for, the result becomes distinguished with some benefaction on account of varied causes. ${ }^{212}$
$125 c-26 b$. Certain ${ }^{213}$ knowledge relating to an object (artha) reflects (the same object) as a patch of bluish (vinilaka) and immediately after that (the object) turns to be in the form of unpleasant thing, etc. (duhkharupadi) on account of meditation; likewise it may become otherwise on account of other causes.
$126 c-27 b$. Feelings ${ }^{214}$ like joy, sorrow and dullness are all become differentiated by virtue of kinds of meditation but they never arise from any kind of external things-if this is your contention; how is it proper?
$127 c-28 b$. (The ${ }^{215}$ Idealist continues) All your refutations are made on the assumption (of external things) (aropa); Why is it unreasonable to accept the truth of no alambana in the external? The external things we establish by virtue of their efficiency (arthakriya) and we negate them when there is no efficiency.
$128 c-30 c$. If ${ }^{216}$ you say, even in the absence of the external things the purposive action ${ }^{217}$ is achieved and therefore the external things are not accepted, then we may reply that we establish their existence not merely on account of their efficiency, but also on account of efficiency being witnessed even in the case of their perverted knowledge (viparyaya-jnana).

130d-31c. But ${ }^{218}$ again as a result of securing the external things good or harm could be afflicted to the body; some sort of simple efficiency (kriyamatra ${ }^{219}$ is experienced even in the case of a mistaken notion (vibhrama) of some thing present for something absent.

131d-132c. $\mathrm{As}^{220}$ to the argument based on the sexual act (kama-carita) ${ }^{221}$ in dream, we may say that the semen-discharge is a necessary phenomenon. If one has not that phenomenon, how can he be considered to have gained the sexual pleasure (one of the four purposes of human actions) ?

132d-133c. Since ${ }^{222}$ the semen-discharge and the extreme passion (raga) are specially related (to each other) the former happens also on the occasion other than the dream; for example when one embraces a woman out of extreme love no contradiction is felt to the phenomenon of semen-discharge.
$133 d-134 c$. If, ${ }^{223}$ in the presence of a woman, the discharge happens out of extreme passion why does one not discharge the nail, the tooth, etc. as he discharges semen in dream?
$134 d-135 c$. If, ${ }^{224}$ in the absence of a woman, the discharge happens out of extreme passion, why does he not discharge the nail, the tooth, etc. as he discharges semen in dream ?
$135 d-136 b$. The ${ }^{225}$ semen being discharged out of extreme passion (raga) the purpose of life is fulfilled:-this idea is not a happy one. ${ }^{226}$
$136 d-137 b$. For ${ }^{227}$ example, when it is not spoken even as a simple act, ${ }^{228}$ the gain of the son, etc. that are experienced in dream as realities are all contradicted to the actually perceptual experiences.
$137 c-138 c$. Since ${ }^{229}$ there really exist the keepers ${ }^{230}$ of the hell, etc. as produced from the said acts, the system of everything as a reflected image of consciousness is neither admissible nor is any purposive action in dream posisible. Therefore the doctrine of Cittamatrata "mind alone" becomes unproved.
$138 d-139 c$. When ${ }^{231}$ different living bodies are evident for proving the existence of other minds, the existence of the hell also may likewise, be (entertained). On what evidence then do you deny the existence of other living beings ? ${ }^{232}$

139d-140c. Similarly ${ }^{233}$ the god (i.e. Garuda) bestowing the boon of reviving the life (anugraha) on the person who is dead on account venom poured out from the hood (of a serpent) remains true in his promise. ${ }^{234}$
$140 d-141 b$. $\mathrm{In}^{235}$ the absence of preliminary ${ }^{236}$ rites efficient act can not be accompliohed; therefore that (efficient act) is not a simple creation of the mind.
$141 c-d$. Why ${ }^{237}$ is the knowledge of the others' thoughtdiscerner is untrue (ayathartha) '? $?^{238}$
142. When ${ }^{239}$ other's mind being present our knowledge enters into it (that knowledge is considered to be its cognizer). (or) when some object being present, the knowledge assumes the image ${ }^{240}$ of that object, then the knowledge is considered to be its cognizer.
$143 a-c$. The ${ }^{241}$ grasping of an object (by the mind) is not an act similar to that of running ${ }^{242}$ towards its object, just immediately after which the knowledge,would arise.
$143 d-144 b$. So ${ }^{243}$ also is the case with the knowledge of one's own mind. ${ }^{244}$ (In both the cases) the mind is regarded as cognizer in the manner above described (i.e. pariccheda-laksana).
$144 c-145 b$. The ${ }^{245}$ memory is a mind being directed towards the past thing What is directed towards the past (bhuta=yan-dag) is not a cognition ${ }^{246}$ (graha) because that mind does not flash up from its cause.
$145 c-146 b$. The ${ }^{247}$. non-dual form (advaya-rupa) which is (supposed to be) domain of the well-awakened (Sambudda) is not cognizable to us and therefore ${ }^{248}$ untrue (ayathartha). What is said to be untrue, is un-satisfactory because of the nori-dual nature (advayatvat) of the knowledge.
$146 c-147 b$. The ${ }^{249}$ Buddha is Omniscient because he comprehends the entire cognizable universe through the agency of his cognizing knowledge, and not because he does so in a non-dual form. ${ }^{250}$
$147 c-148 \mathrm{c}$. To ${ }^{251}$ what is said (by Dignaga), viz. a non-describable form is cognized (by one's own self, we now ask:) What ${ }^{252}$ is cognized by other person, is it possible to describe because the other's mind can be comprehended?
$148 d-49$. Then ${ }^{253}$ there exists definitely the object-cause in the external and therefore every mind is not at all (proved to be) objectless (niralambana). If the mind has not any cognizable in the external anywhere, how could one become omniscient ? ${ }^{254}$
$150-151 b$. By ${ }^{255}$ comprehending one's own mind alone there may be nothing but the self-knowledge of the mind (svasamvedana).

If any one is supposed to be omniscient by merely comprehending one's own mind and he is known to be a separate individual then there would be no realisation of the mind alone (cittamatra-darsana).
$151 c-152 b$. If ${ }^{255}$ you think that this defect is obviated in view of the fact that the knowledge is non-dual in its nature, how, then does that (non-dual) knowledge comprehend its content?

152c- (If ${ }^{257}$ you say again, that) when the knowledge becomes freed from every kind of dual form then it comprehends the universe in all aspects-this saying is indeed a matter of great wonder. Therefore there is one (i.e. omniscient) in the nature of comprehending (grahaka-rupa) (the entire universe).
153. There ${ }^{258}$ is not any person known to us as omniscient says a self-styled wiseman ${ }^{259}$ amongst the so called learned persons; but this saying reveals his dull intellect (sva-durmati) being engrossed in it.
154. As ${ }^{260}$ the actual experiences dictate it is possible that as a result of contemplation on certain definite antidote the whole group of desire and other defilements are entirely destroyed.
155. But ${ }^{261}$ there is hardly any possibility of applying an antidote in the case (of the Yogacara conception of emancipation; for the Yogacara holds) that the mind of all worldlings is under the firm grip of dual forms (subject and object) and this idea of dual form may be destroyed by contemplation on some object.
156. The ${ }^{262}$ knowledge which flashes out in the form 'this is void (sunya)' is related to (lit. entered into) to the said dual forms and such knowledge being associated with dual forms; how can it serve as an antidote ? ${ }^{263}$
157. Just ${ }^{264}$ as one meditating on a desirable object does not destroy his desire, just so a man meditating on a thing in dual form does not destroy the idea of dual form.
158. Assuming ${ }^{265}$ in the mind an idea of entity ${ }^{266}$ one contemplates upon it of no-soul. But the principle of non-duality, a mere word has not any purpose (nirartha) and hence a contemplation upon it will be quite unnecessary.
159. The ${ }^{267}$ contemplation upon impermanence frees one quickly from the delusion of permanence. (-a reasonable proposition). (But in your system) by discarding every kind of perceptual experiences one necessarily secures Buddhahood (not a reasonable proposition).
160. The ${ }^{268}$ person who is free from every kind of perceptual experiences is completely inactive. Thus Buddhahood is desired (by you) without making any effort and practice. ${ }^{269}$
161. Therefore ${ }^{270}$ the state of well-faring (Saugata-pada) i.e. Buddhahood is secured on constant practice of compassion towards the sentient beings, doing good for them, and meditating on every manifested elements of existence as impermanent (samas krtaanitya). ${ }^{271}$
162. When ${ }^{272}$ one entertains the idea of mind alone, how could he fulfiI the preliminary duties such as charity, etc. In the absence of charity there is no possibility of one obtaining the Buddhahood.
163. If ${ }^{273}$ you argue that under the influence of mutual causation and on the principle ${ }^{274}$ of mind-alone thought arises in the form of acts like giving and taking the charity. That cannot be proved either by percaption, inference or reliable scripture. Such system is only a presumption and it is nothing but a verbal eloquence.
165. When ${ }^{275}$ one practises repeatedly and several times mentally a charity-thought (i.e. the thought in the form of charity) it never releases anybody from poverty.
166. Even ${ }^{276}$ if innumerable thoughts (manaskara) of Yogins are meditated upon (by us) neither happiness is gained nor misery is removed in reality.
167. $\mathrm{In}^{277}$ doling out everything (material) to all living beings and in fulfilling the charity of compassion there exists no distinction in the nature of things (arthatmana=arthasyarupa) however, in practising the compassion-charity we have a prohibitive injunction not to give certain ${ }^{278}$ things (viz. three garments, etc).
168. There ${ }^{279}$ was great Decease of the Buddha in the world and we have his relic now as his mortal remains. The mansion and monastery, etc. are witnessed by us; how can they be products of the mind-alone ${ }^{280}$ (lit. paratantra) ?

169 If ${ }^{281}$ these things have no existence of their own how can we infer therefrom the great events of the past? If the past events are not inferred, the whole system would be reduced into an extreme materialism (lokayata).
170. $\mathrm{A}^{232}$ man witnessing the relics of the Saint who is purified through emancipation of the Sravaka, disciple becomes free from passions. If he has no recollection (lit. inference) of the past event, how can he entertain the faith (in his relics) ?
171. If ${ }^{284}$ (you say) it is produced by succession (prabandha) of people the life is seen to be cut off. If you again say that one continues to exist due to other, how would there be complete and last deliverance ${ }^{285}$ (parinirvara)?
172. It ${ }^{286}$ is the settled fact in the worldly system that from the seed, etc. come up sprout, etc. and therefore there is not any sound reasoning for the plea that the whole universe is nothing but the mind.
173. When ${ }^{287}$ a knowledge arises immediately after a knowledge, the subsequent knowledge is the result of the previous knowledge-cause. ${ }^{288}$ This rule is also not permissible (in your system).
174. Thus, ${ }^{299}$ (e.g.) there would arise the knowledge of smoke in the absence of the knowledge of the ${ }^{290}$ fire, and also the knowledge of the sprout would arise from non-knowledge of the seed.
175. If ${ }^{299}$ you plead that mind perfumed by the knowledge of the fire produces (lit. is the cause of) the knowledge of the smoke; when there are several potentialities (sakti) in the mind, wherefrom could arise the thought of distinction?
176. If ${ }^{292}$ the cause immediately preceeding knowledge (or mind) of fire is the cause of the mind of the smoke, that also is not good; for, the mind of fire is not definite (=concomitant) with the mind of smoke.
177. When ${ }^{293}$ the concomitance is completely unproved how do the people talk in the unmixed terms about the cause thus: this result arises from that cause?
178. Therefore ${ }^{294}$ the doctrine that the whole universe is Chittamatra, 'mind-alone' has been declared (by the Buddha) aiming at the imaginary or assumed aspect of the external things (kalpitam asritya) but not because the matter, etc. are improbable to exist. ${ }^{295}$
179. For ${ }^{295}$ what (object) one may display desire and other passions, Buddha viewing that object as merely an imaginary (kalpita $=$ Vikalpita) has preached the doctrine of no-soul with reference to these (the assumed) things ${ }^{296} a$ in order to remove all such passions (dosa) of the worldings.
180. Similarly ${ }^{297}$ in other places too the Buddha has stated that the external things do not exist in such forms as are assumed by the ordinary worldings. ${ }^{298}$ Why is it so? (Buddha's knowledge) is superior to (that of ordinary worldings).
181. Since ${ }^{299}$ some sort of agent has been just previously stated and the duties are understood alongside of the attachment
towards an agent as real the idea of agent as real is necessarily to be negated. ${ }^{300}$

182-183. In ${ }^{301}$ other places it has been likewise declared thus: There is something inferred (kalpita) and some other thing fancied, vikalpita (=parikalpita). The true form of dharmata (dharmata-rupa $=g z u g s=$ form $=s v a r u p a)$ has been explained thus; dharmata is svalaksana, self-essence. What is kalpita is no other than a basic reality (bhavamatra), and the vikalpita is its diversity (bheda). This diversity of dharmata will be inappropriate in the absence af bhava ${ }^{302}$ (some basic entity, i.e. atoms).
184. If ${ }^{303}$ the Rupa is declared to be sunya (devoid of rupanature) how the term rupa is employed on it? If you argue that it is done so on the assumption of the rupa-nature, what is the ultimate objective (phala) gained ${ }^{304}$ (therefrom)?
185. Of ${ }^{305}$ what object any contradiction is impossible to exist that object thereby is verily existing. ${ }^{.06}$ (But, for the opponents) since everything is non-existing their experiences are not really there as in the dream. ${ }^{307}$
186. The ${ }^{308}$ advocates of the external reality point out to the Idealist (citta-matrata-vadin) thus: Let the men of erudition investigate whether this (my conclusion) is just appropriate or not.
187. But ${ }^{309}$ I have no wonderful (wise) knowledge suited to investigate what is right and what is wrong; I have however stated in brief the truths propounded by other masters.
188. The ${ }^{310}$ wise men realize the destruction of ignorance darkness by means of the lustre of their true knowledge. Henceforth let the unlearned get purified in the path of the great men.

## Notes

1. This verse may be rendered into Sanskrit:

परिपूर्य च य: स्वार्थ परार्थ सर्वधाड खलम् ।
अकरोत्तं प्रणम्यार्थसिद्यावर्थी निरूप्यते ॥ 9 ॥
2. In accordance with the tradition the author speaks of the Buddha as possessing two qualities, svartha and parartha as done by Vasubandhu (Kosa, I, ver. 1), Dignaga (Pram. Sam. I. ver.1. with vrttih. $v$, my Review in ALB, ) and the author of the Sutralankara ( $=$ Kalpanamandatika), Chap. I (v. my Sanskrit text, published in the journal of Sri Venkata. Institute, Tirupati, 1941).
3. स्वस्थनेल्बादिविजानविषयार्थो न बाहचक:।

स्वप्नद्विचन्द्रधीकल्पो $a$ घात्वादर्थावभासनात् ॥ २॥
a. lit ज्ञानट्वात्-Jnanatva as Sadhana, reason is referred to in the verse 29 below.
4. This is the conclusion arrived at in the Vimsatika and the Alambana-pariksa.
5. बाह्यार्थः साध्यते नेति बुद्धिमात्रत्ववादिना।

अविसं वादद्ध्यादावस्तिवादस्तु कच्यते॥३॥
6. Dharmakirti's definition of pramana is: प्रमाणमविसंवादि ज्ञानम्, अर्थक्किस्यास्थितिः संवादनमू. .... 1 Pram. vartika, I, ver, 1. Subhagupta's one of the arguments to prove his externalism is avisamvaditva; cfr. Tatt. San. panjika. p. 574, 11. 20, ff.
7. ज्ञानस्य च। वसंवादात् हरपादोनामयोगत:।

आलम्बनं कचिन्न स्यात् उभयं तन्न शोभनम् ॥ ४ै॥
8. स्वाङ्नच्छेदादयो द्छा: स्वव्ने [ये] न भवन्नि ते।

यद्यर्थनीतिर्नस्तीति प्रबुद्धस्य तथा $a$ ननु ॥ ${ }^{2} \|$
$\mathrm{a}=$ the word is used to bring out the Tib. expression: mi-gyurram implying a simple query.
9. कायक्फीति: शिररछ्छेदो वोधे स्वप्नसमा मता।

इति चेत् एवं कुतोह्यल यत्नवान् नष्टलाभयोः ॥ ६॥
10. The Realists, while opposing the extreme idealism, genrally raises such objection as the present one to prove its absurdity. It may be interesting to Compare a European parallel: Dr.

Johnson is said to have expressed his opinion on Berkeley's philosophy by kicking" a stone with his foot and saying: No, Sir, I prove it wrong (Sir James Jean, Mysterious Universe, the Bridge series, p. 71).
11. आन्त्या संवं पृृृतिश्रेत् नास्ति नामविपर्ययः।

अभान्तमविसं वादि ज्ञानं $a$ भ्रान्तं विसंबदेत् ॥७॥
$a=$ विसं बार्दि भ्राम्यति ।
12. In the illusion there is always a perversion in naming things; e.g. in rope-snake illusion the snake-name is mistaken for the rope-name.
13. देशात् कालादनव्यस्यूज्ञानं यन्न विसंवदेत्।

तदभ्रन्तं पुनर्जानं नान्यदभ्रान्तलक्षणम् ॥与॥
14. The idea meant here is this: Time and space are not different from the materialthings, ie. atems; cp. Nya. binda-pradipa p.44. नीलमेव हि भासमानं देशः नापरो देश: कश्रिदाभासते। and Pram.va. bhasya. p. 188: न देशो नामापरो रूपादिभ्यः। The Buddhists including the Sarvasti-vadin maintain that every thing is momentary and the moment is no other than the thing itself.
15. दीर्घसूक्ष्मादिकज्ञानात् योगीति तु विशेषितः।

असर्वज़ः प्रसज्येत नोभयतोभागमुक्तकः ॥९॥
विसंवदति बुद्रत्वम्।
16. A partly definition of yogin.
17. This is explained in the Puggalapannatti, p. 145 : इधेक्घो पुग्गलो अट्व विमोवखे कायेन फुसित्वा विह्रति। पन्जध्य चस्स दिस्वा आसवा परिक्सीणा होति। अयं वुर्च्चति पुग्गलो उभतो भागविमुत्तो। Abh-kosa (Poussin, VI, p. 276); One who is entered in Nirodhasamaptti is named 'doubly delivered', because by force of prajna and Samadhi he is delivered from klesa-avarana and vimoksa-avarana (cp. 8 vimoksas in VIII, p. 205) Satya siddhi, chap. 163 (Eng. Summary) If he gains both, he is ubhayato-bhaga-vimukta; for the defilement is one part and the element hindering dhyana-concentration is another part. (v. also chap. x. end) V. Magga (XXI para 78). अरूपज्सानेन चेव अरियमग्गेन चाति उभतो भागेन विमुत्तो ति उभतो भागविमुत्तो $\cdots \cdots$ ।
18. यथावदस्तिबो $a$ धनाम् ।
स्वप्नादिवघ निखिल्यम्, विसंवादासंभवः कुत: ॥ १०॥ $a=$ अस्तीति यथावत्प्रतीतिः।
19. छढवासनया चेत् स्यात् उक्त: ₹उप्नश्र नो कुतः।

ग्रामारामश्भभेदान्या द्रयभूतासततः पुनः ॥ $99 ॥$
20. अनिन्द्रियार्थादिबुद्धिवासनाक्षणिकत्वतःः।

विपाकाष्तिव्यंवहिता ह्यक्षार्था दुहेतनवः॥ १२॥
21. It is difficult to understand the author's intention here. According to Abh. kosa theory of momentariness is applicable to the elements both internal and external. It is the Theravadin who makes a distinction in applying it to the elements and pleads that the material elements continue to exist for 17 thought-moments (v, Abh. Athasan, IV. 86. Kosambi's Tika, p. 67). Despite the momentarytheory the Vaibhasika maintains that karman produces its fruits through avijnapti which continues to exist on the support of four great elements (v. kosa, I. 11). This may not hold good in the Yogacara system.
22. यस्य ज्ञानमेकरसमिन्द्रियार्थन्न जायते।

तस्य तस्य स्वभावश्व [2036] किं धुनोडथवा ॥१३॥
23. Ekarasa-jnana=advaya-jnana of the Yogacara which is dichomotized into subject and object due to premordial force, (anadi-vasana). It is somewhat similar to the Sautrantika's ekarasa-skandha=jnana, v. Masuda, sects p. 68 with note 1 .
24. निद्रादिसाम्यवत्त्वाच्चेत् तद्विपाककरो न किम्।

विद्यमाने $a$ पाकहेतौ न युक्तः पाकसंक्षयः ॥ १४॥ $a=$ Jnana-svabhava.
25. दृष्टं सवप्ने निद्वितस्य नोर्ध्व $a$ मfित्ति त्तोऽबध्रुम् सम्भवति यथा तेन परिपकात्मनः क्ष्यय: ॥9र्य $a=$ Tib. de-ma-phyir-mi-brten-shin.
26. $a$ यस्येन्द्रियार्यवैकल्यात् देशानाकारणं न च। (तस्य) पुर्नवपाकान्जिर्योग्या स्याच्च परिक्षयात् ॥१६॥
$a=$ Read in Tib. gan.-gi for gan-gis.
27. The idea seems to be this: when the Yogacara denies the external things, there will be no occasion for preaching dharma or listening to it and arousing the right view which leads to the destruction of Vipaka. Dharmakirti, however, defends his position thus: केवलं लोकबुद्धथंव बाह्यचिन्ता प्रवर्तंते। Pram, va. ver. 220.
28. हढसं $a$ वादवास्यत्वात् क्रियते च कुतो मतम्।

र्वादीनामयोग्यत्वादिति चेत् वाच्यमुत्तरम् $b$ ॥१७॥
$a=$ दढाविसं वाद वासनया ।
$\mathrm{b}=$ See the verse 29 .
29. परिपाकाश्रयतयारविसं वाद: प्रबोधने। fिमिरमाश्रयो यावत्तावन्ना $a$ सं वाद: कुतो न च॥१६॥ $a=$ नासं वाद-अविसं वाद:
30. The knowledge of the eye-diseased person (taimirika) is, however, contradicted at once.
31. तद्ब्द्धचा तु प्रवृतेश्व भ्रान्तालम्बनतोड्तरा। तद्बुदुचसत्वे sविसं वादात भ तद्बुद्यदकृतमिष्यते ॥१ह॥

31a. cp. Nya, bindu-Tippani, p. 19 : सर्बमालन्बने। म्रान्त मुक्त्वा तथागतज्ञानम् 1 Every perceptual knowledge is illusive so far as its object is concerned.
32. आरोपपरिपाकस्य शक्ते वंस्त्वन्तरोद्रवात्। स्वाल्मतो जायते नैव कुसुमाच्र तिलं यथा ॥२०॥
33. This Sakti, according to the Idealist comes into existence from the self of consciousness and not from some other exterrnal causes.
34. अबादिभ्यो यथा $a$ बीजं यज्जातं यत एव च। समानं तच्र तेनैव फलोप्पतेश्र वासना॥ २१॥ नारोप्या धूमतेजोवत् $\mathrm{a}=$ जायते is to be added from the previous sentence.
35. This is probably anadikalika-vasana accepted by the Idealists to account for the universal causation cfr, Madh avatara, VI, ver. 46 with Bhasya, my sanskrit text, p. 42-43; Bud. Logic II, p. 367 with note 3 and p. 400 Jinendrabudhi's comment : Every notion of causation is produced by Biotic Force; and Alambanapariksa, ver. 8.
36. वस्वन्तरोद्नवत् किछिचत् कर्मणं। वास्यते यथा।

जातीपुष्पंश्व संसृष्या गध्ध उत्पद्यते fिले ॥ २२॥
37. Jati flower as a factor in producing fragrance is a common example in Indian Sastraic literature, cp. Kosavy. II p.39. 22
38. तबोपादानविजानाजायते ज्ञानसमकम् । तब तद्वीज आरोव्य स्थितश्राप विपच्चते॥ २३॥
39. अतो भावान्तरानातो मावो नास्तीति वासना।

नारोप्य वर्धनायोग्वा इल्याह शाक्कविज्ननः ॥ २४॥
40. Here Sakti-vadin is the Sautrantika. According to him seven kinds of consciousness (five sensuous, one nonsensuous consciousness and one mind) are produced from their upadana consciousness, a subtle mind in possession of all seeds, something resembling the Alaya-consciousness of the yogacarin. The sautrantika contradicts the vasana theory postulated by the latter on the assumption that nothing is produced from anything but the mind = Alaya-consciousness, or the Sautrantika's subtle mind, v. Et. Lamotte, Histoire du Buddhisme, p. 673; and Masuda, Sects p. 68. The kosa speaks of the seven types of vijnana in this line : बविड्ज्ञानान्यथो मन:/ ( I, 16 ).

We may note here a parallel discussion between the Yogacara and the Sautrantika as reproduced by the Stcherbatsky from Vacaspati's Nyayakanika: (The Yogacara:) (The external object is superfluous, there is in the internal) Biotic force which accidently becomes mature and evokes an idea; this is also accidental (and changing concomitantly with a change its cause). (The Sautrantika:) But, is it not your Biotic force in this case simply the force of the subject thought contained in one continuous stream, the force to produce out of itself, a corresponding the objective thought, Bud. Logic, II. p. 367-68). One interesting reference to the Sautrantika may be noticed here : सौलान्तिकनयेन त्वविरोध पव। यरमादस्य संस्कारपरिभविता: बविड्ज्ञान काया: संस्कारप्रत्ययं विज्ञारमिष्टं न प्रतिसन्धिविज्ञानमेवेति। Arthaviniscaya Sutratika. The idea probably meant here that the six consciousness-bodies are conditioned by Samskara, a subtle Sakti formed from the experience of external things; $c p$. the ver. 27 below the same idea.
41. स्वतन्त्रादच जायेताधिग $a$ मज्ञानमल च।

यथोप बीज पच्चेत तेन तुल्यं ममापि चेत् ॥ २ः.।
$\mathrm{a}=$ प्रदृत्तिविजान ।
42,
43. पक्षस्यास्य विरद्वत्वादुपदान्ञनतिश्रयः।

उमयोस्तुल्यमितिचेत् न युक्तोऽन्योंन्यनिश्रयः ॥ २६॥
44. Pravrtti-vijnana depends on upadana-vijnana and the latter again on the former to produce it.
45. यस्येन्द्रियार्थ जज्ञानं रारोप्यन्ते च सक्त्तयः।

दिक्कालकायदीनान्च विशेषात् $a$ परिवृद्धिताः ॥२७॥
तस्य पक्षे न दोषोऽस्ति,
$a=$ परिणामिता: ।
46. This is the Sautrantika's standpoint, v. ver. 24, 76.
47. यस्योपादाननामकात् ज्ञानादन्यत् कारणं न प्रतिबन्धो न तस्य च ॥२२॥
48. This is the system of the Yogacara. Alaya is named upadana, cfr. Trimsatika, ver. 3 with Bhasya of Sthiramati.
49. धीमाबत्वेन संसाध्ये यत् ज्ञानत्वादिसाधनम्।

विजातीयाविरद्धत्वात् सवं शोषवदुच्यते ॥२९॥
This verse is cited in Tatt. pan. p. 582.
50. Sesavadanumana $=$ vaidharmyavat, v. Bud. Logic. II. p. 208, n. 1.
51. प्रेक्षा $a$ तुष ष $b$ : प्रवृत्तिश्र $c$ हिताप्तिरहितव्ययः। प्रवुद्धव्यवहाराश्र न स्वत्ने सन्ति सर्वंथा॥३०॥ $\mathrm{a}=$ सुनिःपणम् $b$, Tib. dgah. mgur. c. lit. हिताहितयोर्लीभहानो,
52. प्रतिबाधावशान्नाम भ्राम्यति ज्ञानमश्षजम्। विनापि तां भ्राम्यतीति सर्वं सृष्ट तमः खलु॥ ३१॥
53. According to the Yogacara every human knowledge is illusive with reference to its object ( $v$. note $31 a$ above). The author asserts that knowledge can be illusive if it is vitiated in a laier stage.
54. अन्ये सर्व क्य विज्ञानमर्थधीर्मानसो अम:।

ज्ञेयं ख्वचित्तजातं यत् रूपं वा नास्ति तस्य च ॥३२॥
55. This and the following are the opoinions of Dignaga, $v$. Alam. pariksa, ver. 6 .
56. अर्थो नास्दीति संसाध्यमेकैकस्यापरिचिच्छदे:। नाव्वाभासमिति प्राहु:
57. This is the main argument sei up by Dignaga in favour of his idealism, v. Alam. par. ver. 1.
58.
fित्तचंतसिकैरवि ॥३३॥
सन्दिभ्धता भवेदेव यथा च क्षणभङ्ग़रा:।
एकैका नावभासन्ते तथागतपरिच्च्द्धदि ॥३४॥
निर्धारिता नाणव: स्यु:।
This verse is made of 5 lines, the next four lines being traced to the original Sanskrit. The implied hetu is ekaika-apariccheda.
59. तुल्यापरक्षणोतेपाद्यथानित्यत्वविभ्रम:।

अविचिछ्छनसजातीयग्रहे स्यान्नीलविभ्रम: ॥३久 ॥
Tatt. san. p. 552 cites this verse with the reading स्थृलविभ्रम for न।ल-. The Panjika further quotes his comments thus: सह्याह-यथा सहृशापरापरक्षणोत्पादाद्विप्रलब्धस्य गृह्हीतेडपि प्रत्यक्षेण शबदादौ नित्यत्वविध्रमः। तथा परमाणूनामविचिछन्नदेशानां सजातीयानां स्थूल इति मानसो किभ्रमो भर्वत । (Cp. p. 199 and ver. [589). It is interesting to note the difference in readings. Kamalasila thinks that nila is empirically real from the Sautrantika standpoint of view but sthula is unreal. Subhagupta, on the other hand, thinks that sthula is a real substance rather than nila, a quality, derivative element. The idea may be clear if we look into the discussion in Kosa, IV, 8-12 on Samsthana.
60. बुद्धया सदा त्वबिच्छिन्नसाजात्यग्रहणे सति।

विकल्पकेन ज्ञानेन हेयकत्वमवसीयते॥३₹॥
61. The idea of oneness as illusive is explained in Tatt. san. ver. 598-9. Similarly the idea of grossness as illusive in ver. 592-4 (Ibid). This latter position is of the Sautrantika.
62. अतः स्वलक्षणत्वेन विज्ञाने परमाणव:। आभासन्ते नेति वादो यः सर्वो न स सिध्यति॥३७॥
63. The opinion of Vasubandhu, Vimsatika, ver. 11. and aloo of Dignaga, Alam. par, ver. 1.
64. यदाभासं ततो [204$]$ नास्ति द्रव्याभावाद्विचन्द्रवत। इति सिन्छं वादिनो यत् ना चाल हेतुनिश्यय: ॥३ॅ॥
65. $c p$. Alam. par. ver. 2: Pram. sam. I, ver.
66. संयुक्ता ये $ण व ः$ सन्तः समानैकक्रियाकराः ।

ते सक्रिता $a$ द्व प्रोक़ रद्रव्याणाति ते कुतः॥ ३ह॥ $\mathrm{a}=$ Tib. hdus. pa.
67. The author thinks that Snncita atoms are dravya, substance since they discharge a uniform function. The same opinion in his Anyapoha-vicara, ver. 2. The logical school of Dignaga following the Sautrantika standpoint defines dravya as one capable of discharging a perposive action: artha-kriya-ksamam vastu-taksanam. v. Tatt, pan. p. 730, (18; Nya. bindu Tika p. 76-7.) cp. pram. var. III, ver. 195; अर्थन्तराभिसम्बन्धात् जमयते योगणवोप्परे।
उक्तास्ते सझ्वितास्ते हि निमित्तं ज्ञानजन्मन: ॥
It may be noted here that the opinion of Sancita:-anu as the object of consciousness is atributted to the NeoSarvastevadin, (Sanghabhadra) by Kuei. chi.v. my forthcoming edition of the Alam. par.
68. एकराब्द्राभिधेयास्ते न तेषामेकतास्ति तु।

विचार्यमाण: शब्दार्थो न भातीन्द्रियेचतसि ॥४०॥
69. The same idea in the author's Anyapoha-vicara, ver. 7. $c p$. Tatt. san. ver. 870.

यस्य यस्य हि शब्दस्य यो यो विषय उच्यते स स संविद्यते नैव वस्तूनां सा हि धर्मता ॥ with Pan. citing the Bhavasankrati, ver. 9: येन येन हि नाम्ना बै यो यो धर्मीडभिलप्यते। नासौ सं।बद्यते तल धमंणणां सा हि घमंता।। धर्मता प्रकृतिः। सववाक्पथातीतत्वं वस्तुनां स्वभाव: (स्वक्षणम्) इति यावत्।
70. यस्य बुध्देरेकमागो भात्याकार इतीरणम्।

ईक्षितं तस्य नियतं चिनास्तरणमन्तरा ॥४१॥
71. This very instance compells the Yogacara to declare that the images that are reflected in our consciousness are all false (alika) v. Tatt. pan. ad ver. 2037: ज्ञानादब्यतिरिक्तत्वात्नाकारबहुता भवेत्। ततश्र्य तद्वलेनास्ति नाथंसंवेदनस्थितिः। आकाराण्य। तरिक्तत्वत् ज्ञाने वा अनेकता भवेत्। अन्यथा कथमेकत्वमनयो: परिकल्ध्यते। चिलास्तरणदर्शाने एकसमात् ज्ञानादव्यतिरिकत्वात् ज्ञानस्व रूपवदाकाराणां बहुता न प्राप्नोति। एवमाकाराव्यदिरिक्तरवात् ज्ञानस्याप्येककता प्राॅ्नोति। p. 571, cp. p. 181,
ver. 536. साकारे ननु विज्ञाने...। A thorough examination of this topic from the Yogacara standpoint has been made by Ratna-kirti in hi Citra-advaita-prakasa-vada. (v. Ratnakirtinibandha, K. P. J. Institute. Patna; 1957.

Dharmakirti from the standpoint of his logic offers this explanation: Our practical experiences dictate that several non-sensuous consciousnesses can arise simultaneously; $v$. Pram. var. नानार्थिका भवेत् तस्मात् सिद्धाड्तोविकल्पिका। विकल्पयन्नप्येकार्थ यतोड्न्यदपि - पर्यति। $c p$. vers; Ibid, 197-201; Tatt. san. ver. 1253; अतः संबन्न विषये न ऋरम्रहणं भवेत्। सकृद्रगृणभासस्तु भवेत् शब्दादिबोधवत्। etc.

Another explanation is offered in the following lines: यत् यथा भासते ज्ञानं तत् तथैवनुभूयते। इति नामैकभावः स्यात् चिलाकारस्य चेतस: ॥ Pram. var. III, 222. Bhasya: तस्मात ग्राह्यहकनीलग्राद्याकारा चिल्र बुद्धिरेकैवेति चिलाद्वंतमेव। p. 290.

Dharmakirti further argues as another solution that several things can produce simultaneously one cognition : को वा विरोधो बह्व: सक्रितातिशया: सकृत्। भवेयु: कारणं बुद्धेर्यदि नाल्मेन्द्रियादि वत,॥ Ibid. 224. Bhasya: यथेन्द्रियार्थमनस्कारा आत्मेन्द्रयार्थसन्निकर्षा वा सकृदेकमिन्द्रियनिज्ञानं जनयन्ति। तथा परमाणवोऽपिं। को विरोध:। p. 296. Kosa (IV.10) also refers to the citrastarana problem. $v$. Note. 178 for the author's solution.
72. कचिग कस्य।चद्रूपस्येकाकारग्रह्रो यदि । स उच्ननीचाश्रयतो भिन्नषिाशा $a$ वभासक:॥ ४२॥ a-Tib. bkra-ba--चिन, variegated.
73. A similar explanation in T. Panji. p. 571, $l .16, v$. note 178 below the passage/एवमेकाकारे sपि....।
74. एकज्ञानामकोडणुर्यो विनान्योन्यमतुंद्भवात् ।

तस्याकारस्य विच्छेदे एकेकं भास्यते कथम् ॥ ४३॥
75. Atoms appear and disappear together: सहोत्पद्यन्तो सह विर्क्यन्ते। This is what the Sarvastivadi-Vaibhasikas conclude. It is further made clear in the next verse, $c p$. kosa, I. p. 35, 11. 18-20, and Vis. Mag: गच्धा रसो फस्सो चतस्सो चेव धातवो। अद्बे ते अर्वरणगभागा एकुप्पादा सछव्यया ॥
v. my paper on Nilakesi, Annals of Research Institute, Tirapati, IV, p. 61. Tatt. sangraha defenus that the atoms though invisible individually, become the object of perception; $v$ ver. 570.
76. प्रत्येकपरमाणूनां स्वातल्ध्येणास्त्यसम्भव:।

अतोऽपि परमाणूनामेकैकाप्रतिभासनम्, ॥ ૪૪॥
This verse is cited in T. Panji. p. 551, 1. 21: अथाfि स्यात् समुदिता एवोत्वय्यन्ते विनई्यन्ति चेति सिद्धान्तान्न्नैक्र यथोक्तम्. ......।
77. अणु दिग्भागभेदाच्च नेति यत् तदसङ्ञतम्।

अणौ दिक्झब्द उच्येत केनचित् सीवझेषणे॥ $\|\geq\|$
The second line of this verse is cited in prose in T, panji. p.556, cp. n. 79 below.
78. The author refers here to Vasubandhu's criticism of atomic theory in his Vimsa. ver. 12, 14 :
षटकेन युगपद्योगा त्परमाणो: बडंशता।
षणणां समानदेशत्वात् fिण्डः स्यादणुमालकः ॥
दिग्मागभेदो यस्यास्ति तस्यंकत्वं न युज्यते।
Some similar criticism has also been made by him in the kosabhasya, I. ver, 43. Tib. pp. 81-84. and the Vaibhasika's defence.
79. दिग्भागभेदेनातन्तः: बहुमिः परिवारितः:।

कथिता अणवश्यैव न तु सावयवा६्मका: ॥ ४६॥
cp. T. panji. p. 556: भदन्तगुभग्गुप्तस्तु प्रह—यथैक₹त्रभावस्यासदद्रब्यादिव्यावृत्तस्यानेकं सामान्यं न तत्वेन कल्य्यते। एवमिहापि परमाणूनामनेकवर्तित्वादनेकरंजं कल्प्पते, न भूतार्थेन। तथाहि-न दिक्शबदो नामास्ति कणादादिकल्पित: । तस्यंकस्वरूपह्वादनेकरूप: पूर्वदिक्रत्ययो न स्यात्। केवलमणव एव पौर्वापर्येणावस्थिता दिकशब्दवाच्याः। ततश्र दिग्भागभेद्ववत्वात् इति केबलं बहुभि: परिवारणमेवोक्तं स्यत् न सावयवत्वम्, इति।
80. The same idea in the ver. 8 above, $c p$. note 14 .
81. एकोडणुरचरे भागे स्थितोजन्यः परभागतः। उभाभ्यामपि भागाभ्यां प्रसका न द्विवाजणवः॥४७॥ $c p$. Vimsa, bhasya: अन्यो हि परमाणो: पूर्वदिग्भागो यावदधोदिग्भाग इति दिग्भागभेदे सति कथं तदाल्मकस्य परमाणोरेकत्वं योक्ष्यते। The present verse answers this objection.

82．अनेकमध्यर्वतिववादनेकव्वं विकल्प्यते।
व्यतिरेकमुखादेवमनेकवंवं प्रकल्प्यते॥ ॥ ॥
The idea of this verse is also included in the prose passage above cited in n．－79．वर्यतिरेक 二 एकत्वव्यावृति．This explanation suggests idea of manifoldness on the atom is imaginary as the idea of the oneness on the aggregate．

83．तलापेक्ष्यान्यदयच्च रूपं वै गृह्यते यथा।
नैव तद्विद्याते तल परावरादिभेदवत् ॥ ४乏॥
84．The explanation is made here of how an invisible atomic form becomes a visible gross form．

85．नै रन्तर्यद्वृहनाश्रावर्यविव्वं चद़ीष्यते।
निरन्तराः पूर्वपरक्षणा न ताहशा：कथम्， $1120 ॥$
86．If the latter proposition is acceptable，the former one also will be so．

87．ज्ञानस्य द्विक्षणस्थध्वान्नैरन्तर्यं ततोरस्ति च।
यथा त्ववयविस्पं नेष्यते वं तथाणुषु॥ $\%$ ？॥
88．The advocate of knowledge of two and more moments， duration is probably the Naiyayika．The Theravadin pleads that it exists for three moments，$v$ ，Abh．San．IV．

89．Atoms，though existing in an uninterrupted series are not conceived as one avayavin on the analogy of knowledge．

90．प्रत्र्यासत्या कयाचित्त，गतिबधधो गतीमतः। तथैवान्छ्शादन प्रोक्तमवँयवान्तरतो न तु ॥ प् ॥
91．This is in reply to Vasubandhu＇s criticism ：सान्तरत्वे गतिमतां गतिः केन प्रतिविध्यते। Kosathasya，I．43．This answer implies that the author is a Santura－paramanu－vadin．
92．आच्छादने संति＂च्छाया समु：पन्ना च विद्यते। छाया दिनकराण्वोश्र मध्यलग्ना न युज्यते 11 प३ ॥
93．This answers Vasubandhu＇s query ：छायावृती कथं वा Vimsa． 14.
94．छायाच्छादनयोः शाक्ति बहूनां जायते यथा। परमाणुष्वपि तथा नैकस्मात् सर्वंथाडवि तु ॥乡૪॥
95. अतो भेदस्य नास्तित्वात् पिण्डो नास्तीति यद्वचः।

कादाचिक्क भवेत्त्चेत् $a$ परिणामो न युज्यते 11 रू ॥ $11 a=$ parinama $=$ hgyur. ba.
96. $c p$. Vimsa. 12d: fिण्द: स्यादणुमाबकः।
97. अन्योन्यमात्माइसंसृष्ठा अनंशाश्र ठपर्वस्घता:।

अतः सक्तित्य मवर्वि पृथिवीमण्डलादिकम् ॥ऐ६॥
98. This makes clear that the author holds the opinion that atoms do not contact with one another. Read in Tib. reg. pa for rig. pa.
99. परस्परानुग्रह्र्य विशेषात् $a$ परिणामितःः। पराणवश्र वज्रादेन्न विच्छिन्ना भवन्ति ते ॥ ॥७॥ a-hgyur. ba.v. Madh. vrtti, p. 7.
100. पिशाचसर्पप्रभृतेमें न्त्रशक्त या ग्रहो यथा।
$a$ संङ्चच्छन्जेडणवः केचित् द्रव्यशकत्या परस्रम्, ॥ पूँ॥
$\mathrm{a}=$ brgyus. pa ग्रथित S. Das, Dictionary.
101. अन्येड्प्पर्शक्तिबलकाः ; बुद्विमानचलादिगः।

संख्यादिप्रविशोषेण कत्पयेन्नरकाद्यणून् $1149 ॥$
102. It appears that there are millions of atoms having no capacity strong enough to come into combination and to form any visible object.
103. The Yogin can count the number of atoms even of the hell, etc. remote objects. The expression: acaladigah is again used later in ver. 64 below.
104. अतो नास्तीति नो युक्तम् ; उक्त भ्रान्तिवशार्यदि।

षष्ठधीमालतानो घः $a$ यषाष्परमाणुषु ॥ १०॥ संख्यादि भ्रान्तिरुत्पन्ना ; $a$-भ्रान्तिवशात् इति शेषः।
105. The idea may be amplified thus: If my apprehension of atoms by outer senses is illusive, your understanding of the mind alone with eqully be illusave. Here the author's reference to the mind as the sixth sense is suggestive of the fact that the mind understands always what is apprebended by the outer senses. Cp. the Saying; द्वाभ्यां भिक्षवो रूपं गृह्यते चक्षुर्वजानेन तदाकृष्ठेन मनसा च। cited in NyaTippani, p. 26.
106.

प्रतीविस्तस्य सा तथा।
यदि सत्वसमत्वेन नरकादिविबो $a$ प्रनात् ॥ छ१.॥
परमाणोरनाभासात् प्रतीतिस्तर्य सा यदि ।
अस्ति च अ्रान्तितोऽन्य स्य $b$; प्रधानवुरषषदिषु।
कस्मादनुक्त भवति संख्याय्याकारलक्षणम् ॥६२॥
$a=$ lit. विज्ञान $b \Xi$ अन्यल will be a better reading.
107. The Yogacara conceives the mind as the basis of illusion of the whole universe; thus the mind is a real entity while the objective universe is illusory.
108. The Yogacara's conception of the hell is well explained in the Vimsa-bhasya ad. 4. Read my English translation of the treatise and a bilingual edition of the textes with notes from Vinitadeva's comments (Institute of Tibetology, Gangtok, 1964).
109. The author thinks; As you (opponents) declare the atoms, etc. as illusory, why do you not say likewise of the Pradhana and Purusa as illusory?
110. तदवस्था च संप्राप्षा गुणातिशयसग्मते: । भान्त्या विकल्पित्त्वेजि न त्याज्या पूर्वकल्पना ॥६३॥
111. अणुश्र तरमादझन्येव अचलादिगधीमत:।

ततोडन्येनागृहीतः ते जांनन्तीति कल्ख्यते॥ ६४॥
112. The same expression previously in ver. 59. n. 103.
113. सहोपलम्भनियम उन्को यत्पुखषद्वये ।

ज्ञानजें यस्वभावश्र नियमात् सह वेद्यंते ॥ ६义 ॥
114. T. Panji. explains Jnana-Ineya-svabhava thus: विषयविष्यिभावेन नियतत्वादन्यथापि सहोपल्भम्भनियम सम्भवत्येव । यतो ज्ञानस्य ग्राहक एव स्वभाव: विषयमझणधधर्मकव्वात्तस्य, विषयस्या१ि तद्गाहच एव खवभावः । तयोश्रं कसामग्रचधीनत्वात् नित्यं सहभाविता । न च सहोत्पावाविरोषेडवि चक्षुरादीनांद विषयत्वप्रसझ्झः तथाविधस्वमावाभावात्। तथा हि सामग्रं या नील्गदिविषयाध्यवसायरूपमेव ज्ञानं जन्यते न चक्षुराद्यघ्यवसायरुपम् । नीलादिरपि तु तदध्यवसीयमानरूपो जनितो न चक्षुरादिरिति । आह च नान्योडस्ति ग्राद्वकों...। p. 569.
115. नान्योडसित ग्राहको ज्ञानात् चाक्षुष्षं fिषर्यंविना। अतश्र सहसंविश्तिर्नभेदानान्नीलतद्धियो: 11 ६६॥ This is cited in T. Panji. $v$. note. 114. end.
116. $a$ ग्राहकख्येन बिज्ञानं ज्ञानं वा विषयंविना। तदा ततु तथा वक्तुं युज्यते नान्यथा पुनः ॥ ६७॥ $a=$ lit. अग्राहक.
117. What is implied in the previous verse is made clear here, viz. in the absence of either of the two. knowledge or the object no cognition flashes out and that is the reason why they are felt simultaneopusiy.
118. एककालविवक्षातः सम्बुद्धजानचेतसा ।

चिचतनित्तंश्र हेतुर्द सर्वथैकान्तिको न च $\left\|\xi_{5}\right\|$
This verse is cited in T. Panji (p. 568, 1, 4) in prose: अथ सहशबद एकालविवक्षया तदा बुद्धविजेयचित्ते ने चितचैतैश्न सर्वथा अनैकान्तिकता हेतो:। यथा किल बुद्दस्य भगबतो यद्विजेयं सन्तानान्तरचित्तं तस्य बुद्धज्ञानस्य च सहोपलम्भनियमेडवि अस्त्येव नानात्वम्। तथा चित्तचंत्वानां सत्यकि सहोपल मे नंकत्वर्वम्यतोऽनैकान्तिको हेतुरिति ।
119. आगमेम्यश्र सिद्धत्वात् चंत्तानां भ्रान्तिता न चेत्।

पिशाचनरकादीनां ज्ञानं उत्त: कुतो भ्रमः ॥ ६९॥
120. The author probably intends to say thus: The ghost, the hell, etc. are equally spoken off in the scripture, why do you say that our knowledge of these things is an illusion?
121. असत्यपि सम्बन्धे विशेष इक्टक्रद्यदि ।

तर्मसिद्धमनिच्छेश्य परीहरसि विभ्रमात् ॥ 30 ॥
122. सहशबदश्र लोकेऽस्मिन् नंवान्येन विना कचित् ।

विरुद्धोऽयं ततो हेतुर्यद्यस्ति सह्बेदनम् ॥७१॥
Kamalasila introducing this verse remarks: पत्त भदन्तशुभगुपस्त्वाहविरुद्धोडयं हेतु: यस्मात्-सहूब्दश्व $\cdots$ । This objection is also noticed by Dharmapala in his comment an Alam. par.
133. एकार्थं सहृराब्दश्रेदन्यतोऽसिद्धता तदा ।

कथं साधारणे भाव एकेनैव च दर्शनम् ॥ ७२ ॥
124 T Panji. refers to this idea of oneness and its implications thus: पुनः स एवाह यदि सहशब्द एकार्थ: तदा हेतुरसिद्धः। तथाहि नटचन्द्रमल्ल्रेक्षासु नहचेकेनेवोपलमभो नीलादेः। नापि नीलतदुपलम्भयोरेकेनँवोपलम्मः। तथाहि नीलोपलम्भेडपि तदुपलम्भानामन्यसन्तानगतानामनुपलम्भात् । यदा च सत्वं (sic) प्राणमृतां सर्वे चित्तक्षणाः सर्वज्जेनावसीयन्ते। तदा कथमेकेन वोलभ्म : सिद्धः स्यात् । किभ्वन्योपलअभ्भनिषेचे सति एकोपल्नभ्भनियमः सिध्यति । न चान्योपलभ्भर्रतिषेधसभ्भवः। स्वभारवविक्रकृष्ठस्य विधिप्रतिषेधायोगात् ।
125. सर्वजज्ञानबेद्युज्य सरं चित्त भवेद्यदि i

एकेनैबोपल
The idea expressed in this verse is well state in T. Panji. passage cited in the previous note.
126. आलम्बननिषेधो 5 न्यं: प्रमाभावान सिध्यति । स्वभावविप्रकृष्षस्य सन्दिर्धासिद्धता ततः ॥ ७૪॥
The idea of this verse has been summed up in T. Panji. passage cited in the note 124.
127. बाह्याभववतः सिद्धौ स्वैकभागे विलोकिते । वदतश्रित्तमाबन तत्र्रसिद्धो हेतुरेव हि ॥งथ॥
128. Thus the reason becomes anyatara-asiddha.
129. अपृथम्भाससंसिद्धी [206a] भवेसिद्धस्य साध्यता। साकारज्ञानकथिनो विवादस्तल नो भवेत् ॥ ७६॥
130. For the advocate of sakara jnana, the image is a part of the knowledge. To prove it is useless.
131. एक एव पद़ार्थश्रे दालम्बनं प्रवल्प्यते ।

ज्ञानरूपाद्विवेकेन कथं सं वेढ़्येवेव तब् ॥७७॥
132. अर्थालम्भे $a$ कुष्णशः $b$ तुछस्स $c$ वेदनाश्र्व ताः।

यदि ज्ञानस्वरूपस्य; विना विfत्ति न सम्भवेत् $\|v=\|$
$\mathrm{a}=$ अर्थोपलब्चौ. $b$. No case-ending in Tib. c. dgah. bai.
133. The author appears to mean this: If the experience of the black shall consist, in the nature of knowledge alone, the knowledge should then be experienced as black. Since the black colour canot be attributed to the knowledge, there ought to be something black material other than the knowledge. The classical example is: pitah sankhah. This example of bhrama jnana seems to be purposely employed in order to point out that there are two aspects of the object, viz, black and the shell which cannot be accommodated in the only knowledge.
134. यदि स्पषं कल्पितम्ब किज्यिदेव हि चेद्यते । न वेद्यते ज्ञानखपमित्यत्तन्न युज्यते ॥७६॥
135. तेन रूपद्वयं वेद्य चन्द्रमायुगल यथा ।

शास्त्रकत्तुरेकमिति प्रसिद्ध तन्न युज्यते ॥ $50 \|$
136. I.e. One imaginary form and the other real. Similar objection in T. panji. p. 574, ver. 2051. cp. my paper on Bud. Idealism. Tirupati Institute, Journal, I, pt. 3. p. 83.
137. पूावकैव तु सामग्री प्ञानं विषयक्षणम् । सालोकरुपव् कुर्यात् येन स्यात् सहवेदनम् $1159 \|$ This verse is cited in T. panji. p. 569, ll. 16-17 along with the verse ; नान्योडस्ति . .....1-v. n. 114.
138. Samagri. according to early Buddhist includes three factors: (1) visaya (2) indriya, and (3) vijn ${ }^{\mathrm{A}} a n a$, manas and it gives rise to a sensation, sparsa, which is foll wed by feeling, vedana, and then image, samina, v. Bud. logic. II, p, 311, Table, Cp. Kosa, III, p, 63, 23.
139. Here the term saha is in the sense of immediate suceession: cfr. the next verse,
140. पूर्वपषरं यदा ज्ञानमिन्द्रियम्व प्रवर्तंते ।

तत्साहइयेन तन्नाम नार्थतः सहवेदननम्॥ ॥र॥
141. वेद्यत्वादेव विज्ञानात्नान्योऽर्थो, ग्राह्मभागकम् ।

ज्ञानं सिध्यति यो वादस्तल हेतोरनिश्रय: ॥ द३ ॥
142. That is, the reason is doubtful, (v. ver. 74 above.) Sandigdhxasiddha.
143. ज्ञानवित्त: स्वभावट्वात् वेद्यते चेति कथ्यते ।

विषयाभासिविज्ञानंजनकत्वाच्य वेद्नम् ॥ 11 . 1
144. The idea is made clear in T. Panji, p, 570, l, 18.ff.

नदि मुख्यतो यादखां ज्ञानस्यात्मसंवेदनं ताद्धामेवार्थस्येष्ठम् ।
किं तरिं । स्वाभासज्ञानजनकत्वमेवास्य संवेद्यत्वम्। The author probably means this mukhyato vedyatva by the expression jnana-vitteh svabhavatvat. It does not however follow from it that the author means that the knowledge knows itself. According to the Vaibhasika knowledge knows its preceding moment and hence there is no jnana-sva-vitti.
145. संवेद्यशब्दसाम्येऽवि तदर्थ: पृथगेव हि। गवादोनां यथा गोत्वात्तथाकारो न सिध्याति $a \|$ चथ ॥ a lit. असिद्धे:
145a. The idea of this verse is also referred to in T. Panji. p. 570. l. 20, ff:

ततश्र यदि मुख्यं संवेदनं हेतुत्वेनोपादीयते । तदा हेतोरसिद्धता । अथापि यथाकर्थम्रित संवेदनशब्दवाच्यतासाम्यात्। तथापि न तथाविधादिर्धस्दिब: । नहि गोशब्दसाम्यात् गवयदीनां विषाणित्वसिद्धि:। Mukhya samvedana above referred to is also implied in the following passage: यब्वावात्मसं वेदनं ज्ञानस्य तदेवार्थस्येति परेणापि बाह्यर्थवादिनाइड्ड़कृतम् । (T. Panji. p.568, $l$. 12) The Bahyarthavadin of this passage is probably, the Vaibhasika (?)
146. सर्वजज्ञानसं वेद्यसन्तानान्तरभाविताः।

धर्मा येऽनैकान्तिकास्तिः सर्वंजोऽबोधक: कथम् ॥ ६६॥
146a. This defect of anaikantika is explained in T. Panji. $v$. note on ver. 68.

146b. cp. T. Panji. p. $573, l, 15 f f$. making this same prasanga in a diferent context.
147. साकारज्नभपक्षे च तन्निर्भासस्य वेद्यता।

तस्याभेदे च संसाध्ये सिद्धसाधनता भवेत् ॥ $\because ७ ॥$
This verse is cited in T. panji p. 570, $l / 20-4$ with this introductory remark: अथ ज्ञानाइनं नीलाद्माकारं घर्मिणमाभित्य साकारज्ञानपक्षे विविधोरीप हेतुरमिप्रेतः । तदा सिद्धसाधनता। यथोक्तम्-। The Sakara-Jnana-vadin is the Sautrantika.
148. रूपसाम्यकरोर्थंस्तु $a$ फल्डास्संवेद्यसम्मतः।

भावस्य तस्यावेद्यत्वत् अभेदो न भविष्यकति ॥ $\mathrm{5} 5 \|$
$\mathrm{a}=$ उपचारात्, Its samvedana is gauna. The idea is well explained in the passage quoted in note 145. This is the tandpoint of the Sautrantika also. He is therefore called Bahyarthanumanavadin v. my paper: Bud. Idealism. ob. cit. p. 78; Tsan. p. 402, ver. प्रतिबिम्बस्य तादूूप्याइ्राक्तं स्यार्दपि वेदनम्।
149. कथं तद्यग्राककं तत्रे त् [206b] तत्परिच्छेष्लक्षणम् । विज्ञानं तेन नाश्दूा कथं तत् fंक वदिति $\|$ दह ॥
T. Panji. ( $\mathrm{p} .561,1.11 f$ ) cites this verse with this remark: भदन्न- शुभगुपस्त्वाह : विज्ञानमनापन्न विषयाकारमपि विषयं प्रतिपद्यते। तॅॅपरिच्छेद-
 आह च-1 Definition of pariccheda, $v$. ver. 92. below.-
150. विज्ञान हूपमन्येन व्यवस्थाव्य समो $a$ ह्यते।

कथं वाच्यं तदर्थस्य संपरिच्छेद्रकन्तिति॥ ॥०॥
$\mathbf{a}=$ समारोप्यते ।
151. This is probably the author's criticism of the sarupya theory of the Sautrantika-Yogacaras.
152. अर्थपरिच्छ्क्रत्तिमानक्य विज्ञानमिध्यते यदा।

कथं र्वविषयं ज्ञानं वेत्तीत्युक्तिरसद्ना॥॥ ॥?॥
153.
154. विज्ञानं तर्काराकं न निष्कियं परमार्थत:।

वित्तिमान्रे कारकत्वं समारोप्य हि कध्यते ॥ ९२॥
155. Thus the above stated pariccheda of the ver. 89 is simply vittimatra.
156. अनासङ्झेन दर्शी च विद्वान् संविशते यथा।

किम्विद्दर्शी तथा ज्ञा $a$ नह्रपादौ विशते पुनः॥९३॥ $\mathrm{a}=$ ses. pa. gzugs $=$ knowledge-form,
157. सर्वज्ञस तदन्येषiं न भेदो ज्ञानमालतः। सर्वाकारधिया सर्वे महात्मानो विशोषिता ॥ ३४॥
158. This is very important to note that the author denies an apparent distinction between the Saint and the ordinary man in respect of their grasping the external things. The Saint has an additional virtue of penetrating into different aspects of things; sarvakara-jnana is one of the qualities attributed to the Buddha, v. kosa, IX. ver. 1.
159. साकारं वा निराकारं तुल्यकालमतुल्यजम्।

इति बौद्वेरपि विज्ञाने एंनु चिन्ता ${ }^{A}$ प्रवर्तने ॥ ९x॥
cited in the T. Panji. p. 573, 1. 7 with the explanation: ंथा साकारादिविज़ानेन नार्थस्य ग्रहणं युक्तम् इसि चिन्ता क्रियते। तथा भगवतोड़ि - म्नेनाथंस्य ग्रहणं प्रति नि न क्रियते।
a Read bsam. pa for byis. pa.
160. Sakara ${ }^{\text {vinadin }}$ is the Sautrantika, and nirakara-vadin Vaibhasika. The Yogacara is tulya-kala-vadin and the Vaibhasika and Satyasiddhi are atulya-kala-vadin $=$ Krama-vadin. Similarly Vasubandhu, a follower of the Sautrantika school pleads for atulya-kala-vedana, a Suceessive comprehension even of omniscient Buddha thus:
सन्तानेन समर्थत्वात् यथान्निः सर्वभुङमतः।
तथा सर्वंविदेष्टण्यो न सकृत्सर्ववेदनात् ॥ Kosa. IX. 1.
161. आकारस्तव यस्तल सम्भवत्येव तद्वियः।

आकारः स च रुपादो पुनस्तल प्रकल्प्यते॥ ९६॥
162. We experience different things in different shapes. some long, some short, some square and so on. These shapes according to the Vaibhasikas are external and real belonging to the coagulated atoms. The Sautrantika and Dignaga school on the other hand, hold that they are internal and unreal as they are merely our mind's construction.
163. त्यक्तावृतित्वात् युक्तिश्ने ज्रेये नेति न सर्झतिः।

कधं स ज्ञेयमारूबसत्तत्सम $a$ मतिद्दियते ॥९७॥
$\mathrm{a}=$ lit. तन्मात्रसम ।
164. The Mahayanists think that the yogin, having removed the two kinds of obscuration, klesa and jneya-avarana would not have any idea of external things, The author redicules this point, $c p$. T. Panji. p. 574 ad. ver. 2048.
165. निर्पणात्मिका बुद्दि: सत्यथ वाप्यसत्य।प।
$a$ अर्थासित्वेडविसंचादः,
$\mathrm{a}=$ lit. अर्थोडस्ति यन्न्राविसं वादः।
165a. The avisamvada argument has already been stated in ver. 3 . $v$. also ver. 185. Here we may note the passage cited in T. Panji. 574, 11. 20, ff: अन भदन्तगुभगुसः प्रमाणयति-यो ज्ञानाकारः स संवादित्वे सति तथाविषापरपदार्थजनितः तद्यथा ग्राहक आकारः, ज्ञानाकारश्रायमविलुप्तेन्द्रियस्य नीलादिप्रतिभासविरोष: संवादीति स्वाभावहेतुः। This prose passage may be from his lost commentary on the katikas.
166. तिfमरादो विनार्थकम् ॥ह5॥
प्रेक्षितण्र्य यथा र्पं $a$ नीलानुभव इत्यपि। आरोष्य कथ्यते बुद्धावाकारः कोरीि नास्ति च॥९९॥ $a=$ नीलाकारानुभवः i
167. अस्ति नास्सीति कल्पोरपि विज्ञां कल्पनात्मकम् । अर्थविक्षाविरोषेण विज्ञानं fमन्नमुन्यते ॥900॥
168. The author probably means to say what constitutes distinction of one knowledge from another in his theory of imageless knowledge.
169. यथा हि भवतां जानं निराकार习्य तत्वतः।

वेत्ति चाभूतमाकारं भूतमर्थं तथैव नः 11 १०१॥
This verse is cited in T. san. p. 572.
170. For the Yogacara the true knowledge is non-dual, advaya as stated in the next verse and imageless, cfr. T. Panji. p. 182: तदेतदस्माकमपि निराकारविजानवादिनां बौद्धानामुत्तरं भर्ष्यिति The images?are imputed by anadi-vasana or saktis formed out of knowledges produced by the sensuous objecet for the Sautraatika. v. ver. 27. above.
171. आढमा $a$ ज्ञानस्य नास्त्यस्य विरोधादद्यात्मनः।

अभूतं वेद्यते नव प्रसज्येता अणन्तमेव तत् ॥9०२॥ $a \equiv$ In the sense of a separate image, prthak akara.
172. $a$ यथापरीक्षितं भ्रान्त्या व्यवस्थेयं कुतेति चेत् । [207a] भान्ताकारोऽबसेयश्न कथं स्यात् कल्पितो नचेत्॥ 10 ₹ ॥ a or वितfक्तम्।
173. This is exactly what the Yogacara says; this is accepted by the author himself, note वेत्ति चाभूतमाकारम in the ver. 101. The author, has, however, stated it as kalpita by way of prasanga.
174. भूततस्तेन विज्ञानं निराकारम्य $a$ चक्षुषा।

भौतिकेन परिच्छिन्द्यात् राद्वाउसदाऽपि योग्यकम् ॥ 90४ ॥ $\mathrm{a} x$ lit. चक्षुरादिना।
175. This is the basic conclusion of the author. The sense-organs, for the Vaibhasika, are derivative material elements ; but, for the Yogacara they are some forms of Sakti. v. Alambanap. ver. 7. with Vinitadeva's tika. $c p$. Satyasiddhi, chap, 45. they are nominal. Pariccheda is explained in ver. 89-92 above, Yogya $=$ an object that falls within the range of senses and not a remote one.
176. पदीप: स्वपरातमानौ सम्प्रकाइयते यथा।

किज्ञानं दिविधालम्बस्वरूपम्य तथा यदि $1190 \% 11$
विरोध: कोऽfि नैवास्ति।
This verse is made of 5 lines in order to complete the sense.
177. The lamp-example is cited by the Sautrantika-Yogacaras in favour of their theory of svasamvedana which is criticised in Mad. karika, VII, 8 and Madh. avatara, my Sanskrit text,
p. 60: अल कश्रित् सौलान्तिकपक्षमभ्युपगम्य। It seems that the early Sautrantika, ie. Darstantika does not accept the theory of svasamvedana, cfr, Kosa, IX, p. 231, n. 4 ; Vyakhya, p. 698, 2-3; Satya-Siddhi, chap. 68,71,72. The Vaibhasika maintains that one knowledge cognizes its preceding one, (cfr. ver. 84. n. 144, $c p$, ver. 90,144 and 147. also) In case of not accepting svasamvedana, how the memory is possible is explained in Bodhi-avatara IX ver. 246, my Epitom. p. 39, ALB. 1953.
178. This implies that the simultaneous grasping two and more colours, e.g. is possible. Therefore the cognition of several colours in the case of citrastarana is quite permissible, $v$. T. Panji. p. 571: ये तु मन्यन्ते समानजातीयान्याकारसंख्यान्येव बहूनि चिन्नास्तरणादिषु युगपत्सम्मदन्त्येव बिजातीयरूपशबदादिज्ञानवदिति। ततश्व पसङ़्ञ सिद्धसाध्यतेति। तेषां चिलास्तरणे नीलादयो बह्व आकाराः संवेद्यन्ते। पवमेकाकारेडपि सितादावर्वग्म्य्यपरमागरूपा बहव आकारा इति तदात्मकं तलापि ज्ञानमनेकाट्मकं प्राप्नोति । द्वष्यत एव ति चेत् …… Kamalasila probably means some Sautrantika author who pleads that several images are simultaneously experienced in the case of citrastarana. But Subhagupta may not agree with this opinion, as a sensuous knowledge, according to him can comprehend several homogeneous objects at once.
179. रूपशब्दादयोर्जाश्र विभिन्नेन्द्रियोचचरा:।

तेन ते हचेककाः सन्त्यनुभव्या न च
180. cp. M. I, 295; S. V, 218, cited in kosa IX, 242 ; Satyasiddhi, chap. 35. The different kinds of objects, such as colour, sound, etc. cannot be simultaneously cognized by their respective sense-organ-ssays the Vaibhasika, The Yogacara on the other hand, thinks that simultaneity of different nonconstructive consciousnesses is possible as T, san, says;
नर्तकी हृष्ट्यवस्थादावखिलं वेद्यते सकृत्।
शुड्दे च मानसे कल्पे व्यवसीयेत न क्रः।
अतः सर्वन विषये न क्रम्रहणं भवेत्।
सकृदग्रहणभासस्तु भवेच्छब्दादिबोधवत् । (1250-53)
The same in Pram. var. III, 136-37.
सकृत्सद्नससर्वर्थे षिवन्द्रियेष्वि सत्तर्वरि।
.....तनमात् सन्तु सकृत् धिय:॥
$c p$. Ibid. 208: नानाथिका मवेत् तस्मात् सिद्वा丁तोऽविकल्पिका।
विकःपयन्नव्येकार्थ यतोज्यदपि पश्यति ।।
Prajnakara's Bhasya: चित्रप्रतिमासो हि नानानीलादिरुपणे। नीलमिदमिति

विकल्पयन्नरि पर्यन्तर्वर्तपीतादिकं परयत्येव। न च युगपदनेकविकल्पसम्मवः। p.286. The last sentence makes clear that the Yogacara bans the simultaneity of different constructive thoughts. $c p$. again T . san: अनिस्टेश्र दृयोः सकृत् । Panji. p. 241: नह्चेकस्मिन् काले पुगपदमिलापद्वयं संवंद्यते। See also note 71 above.
181.

अल तु $1190 ६ ॥$
विमिम्नकारणमृते ज्ञानमालम्भल $a$ क्षणम् ।
$\mathrm{a}=d m i g s, p a$.
182. यत उत्पद्यते याद्धक् ज्ञानं यत् तदनम्तरम् ॥ १०७॥

विष्यस्तुल्यावषर्यमत्ये [वं] भ्रान्तितो वचः।
तत्तु नित्यं विद्यते न, विषयाभासतो यतः ॥ १०५॥
समरववेद्दनाऽभावात् ;
183. Here and onwards the author criticises the opinion of some Sautrantika masters who hold that our consciousness while grasping an external thing, moulds itself into an image similar to that of the external thing and that this moulding is effected in just immediately next moment after the external thing falls within the ken of the sense-organ. According to Dharmakirti a non-constructive mental perception intervenes in the second moment and the synthetic cognition (savikalpa) is effected with the image-formation in the third moment (v. Bud. logic. II, p. 312, the Table) our author here, without taking notice of the second stage mental perception speaks of the image-invested knowledge as immediately following the first moment's pure sensation.
184. ज्ञानाकार: समानकः।
सवचित्तेषु भवत्वत मते चवं विशेषतः $11908 ॥$
न वाच्यं।|वषयं स्तुत्यम् [इति]
185. Jnanakara, for this author, is grabakakara, cfr. n. 165a.

186,
अस्मिन् ग्राह्यावभासके।
नानन्तरं ज्ञानं भाषि विषयेण तु साम्यतः ॥ ११०॥
187. cp. T. San. ver. 2039. सर्वा्मना च सास्प्ये ज्ञानमजानतां ब्रजेत् ।

188, नीलादिमालामासें च ज्ञानं नीलादिभासकम्।
तदनन्तरमाक्ते चेत् तदा तद्विषयं हि तत् ॥११?॥
तदा तन्नार्थसह्टराम् अस्ति सत्यं न तुल्यकम् ।
189. अनित्यदु:खादि यथा तथागतेन [देशितमु] ॥११२॥ ग्राह्यावभासकं नैतत्; आल्बम्बनायागतो बहि:
ग्राह्यभागोडध $a$ इस्टर्चेत् न युक्त तस्य लक्षणन . ११३।। $a=$ lit. विषय।
190. Causality and objectivity are two characteristics of the content.
191. कुतो बुद्धि $a$ निनिकल्पा स चित्तस्यामास एव च। तनावभासबुद्यिर्न विषयस्यापृथक्ट्त्तः ॥ १9૪॥ a ₹lit. बुद्ध:
192. The kind of nirvikalpa mind that is pleaded by the Sautran-tika-Yogacara school is not accepted by the author. The Vaibhasika conception of nirvikalpa is explained in kosa. I. ver. 33. with Poussin's note.
193. जनकस्य च नःस्तित्वे कथं नाम तदिष्यते।
194.
195. बाहघाणवश्व सह्वाता एकाङ्गविकलत्वतः ॥ ११४ ॥

नालम्बनं स्यु:, केनँव हचुभयाभाव इष्यते।
196, This argument is set up by Dignaga, $v$. Alambanap, ver. 1-3.
197. ग्राहकाकारकं ज्ञानं लक्षणह्यर्जितम् ॥?१६॥ यथा हचालम्वनं नास्ति ग्राहयाकारोडपि नेप्यते।
198. पूर्वकं सहृरां ज्ञानं आलम्बनं यदीष्यते ॥ ११७॥ तदव्ययुक्तं ज्ञाने नानन्तरं ज्ञानं भाति च ।
199. Here 'similar' is with reference to the objective element. The idea seems to be this: the knowledge first becomes similar to its object and this similraized knowledge becomes the objet of its immediately following knowledge. The author objects to this because no knowledge flashes up immediately after its predecessor. In Tib. or after sna-ma stands for objective case governed by the verb hdod, pa.
200. $a$ आहत्य शाबदं विज्ञानं रूपाकारं भवेद्यार्ति $119 १ ॥$

तेन त्वालन्बनेनैव ज्ञानझ्य सद्हां कथम् ।
a-Tib. mjug. thogs. su.
201. The author's objection appears to be this: Suppose in the first moment there is a knowledge of the Sound and in the next
moment a knowledge of rupa arises in its continuity. This second knowledge must bear the image of the sound according to your Sarupya theory. Therefor it is not well founded.

तस्याप्ययोगात् र्शक्तिस्तु न भातीन्द्रियचेतसि ।
$\dot{a}=$ lit. जनक. b. lit. आलम्बन ।
203. See T. San. ver. 2083: शक्तावनन्तरे ज्ञाने भ्राहयांशो विषयक्यक्यतिः।

Panji. शक्तान्रनन्तरे ज्ञान इति व्यधिकरणसम्तम्यो। अनन्तरे ज्ञान इति समनन्तरप्रत्यय आलयाखूये या शाक्ति: तथाविधार्थप्रतिभासम्रत्ययसमर्थिता ।
Sakti may be considered alambana as it arouses the knowledge. $v$. note 40. Sakti-alambana theory has also been referred to byVinitadeva in his Tika Alambanap. ver. 8. v. my forthcoming edn.
204. ग्राह्ये विषयतव नियमात् विषयस्थितिः ॥ १२०॥

लोक्फतोर्थसंसिद्धे: अस्ति लक्षणमनुक्तकम् ।
205. $a$ ज्नारात्ति लोकिकी चेत् नार्थंत्वेन तु निएश्यता ॥ १२१॥

लक्षणस्याप्यसत्वे च सालम्बनं कर्थ भवेत्।
azTib . ज्ञानं शाष्तिश्र।
206. The Characteristics as stated before (note 190) are causality and objectivity. Saktimay fulfil the first but not the second.
207. लोकनीत्यागमं प्रेत्य बाह्यालम्बनतंब हि ॥ १२२ ॥ परीเक्षता युज्यते च न ज्ञेयं सर्वथास्ति तु।
208. This is the fundamental doctrine of the author, Vaibhasika.

209 इष्टानिष्टदिहपभ्र भूततो बाहयमस्ति न ॥ १२३॥
चित्तमाल्नमिदमिति असम्बद्धमिदं [वचः]।
210. The opponent thinks that there cannot be any thing in the external like desiarable or undesirable; for, what is desırable for one person is undesirable for another, $v$. Bhavasantika, p. 39.
211. दुःखादिरूपे कस्मिंश्रित् गुणादि $a$ भाबनावतः ॥ १२४॥

हेतुभेदत् फलमप्यनुग्रहविशोषितम्।
$\mathrm{a} \pm$ lit. भावनाहेतु-The case-ending is not in Tib.
212. The idea here and in the following seems to be this: The Yogacdra thinks that the yogin can change any thing into another form by dint of his deep meditative power or adhimukti, cp. Madh. Avatara, V1, 69. गुरूपदेशात् किल योगिना हि कड्ूालपूणावनिदर्शनं यत्।
213. अर्थे ।वनीलनिर्भासि ज्ञानं तत्समनन्तरम्, ॥१२३॥

अभ्यासाद्दु:खह्पादि तथान्यदन्यतो भवेत्।
214. प्रीतिक्यसनमिद्धानामभ्यासातिशायात् भिदा $a ॥$ १२६॥

अर्थाकारात्तु नैवेति मतन्चेत् तत् पुनः कग्रम्।
a=Tib. bye-brag-dbye.
215. आरोपाद् दूष्यते तेन ह्यनालम्बनवस्तुता॥ १२७॥

कथं पुनर्नोंपपन्ना, सिद्विरर्थक्रियाह्रा।
तदभावे च तन्नास्ति ;
216. अर्थान् स्वप्नोपघातवत् ॥?२ち॥

विना क्रिया सम्मताइड्र्यक्रियासत्वादतः पुनः।
बाह्याभावो यदीष्येत वयं कारित्रमालतः ॥१२₹॥ बाह्यर्थसिद्विं न ब्रू मो $a$ मिथ्याज्ञानस्वभावतः। करित्रसिध्देर्दे ष्टत्वात् ; $a \geq$ Tib. log-par-ses-pa.
217. Svapnopaghatavat, v. note 221 below. The SautrantikaYogacara's definition of reality is: अर्थक्रियासमर्थलक्षण वस्तु । Nyayabindu, I, 15 ; T. Panji. p. 730, l. 16 : सोनान्तिकनयेन ...... यदर्थक्रियाकारि तदेव परमार्थसत् तदन्यत्तु संवृतिसत्.......।
218. अर्थावाप्तेरथापि च॥ १३०॥

हिताहितfक्षिया काये तद्विहीनेनपि विभ्रमे।
क्रियामानस्य स₹्वेन ;
219. This is already pointed out in the previous verse.

220
[208a] स्वष्ने कामस्य चेधिट्टतम् ॥ १३१॥
तस्योदयस्तु नियतो नाशुच्युर्पत्तिमाबके।
कुतः कामार्थलाभः स्यात् ,
221. This is given as example to disprove externahsm by Vasubandhu in his Vimsa ver. $3 a$ : स्वृ्नोपघावत् कृत्यक्रिया। Bhasya: सिध्देति वेदितक्यम्। यथा स्वन्ने द्वयसमापत्तिमन्तरेण शुकविसर्गसक्षणः स्वप्नोपघातः।

> सग्बन्धात् शुक्करागयोः ॥ १३२॥

अन्यल जायते र्वप्नात् संस्पर्दों कामत स्त्रि्यः
यथा त्वेवाविसवादः ;
233.

कामाश्रयात्व सम्भूतं, कस्मान्न स्वव्नघातबत्। नखदन्तस्त्रवादीनि;
224.

तं समाश्रित्य सम्भुते कस्मान्न ₹वप्नघातवत् ।
नखदन्तरत्रवादीनि;
225.

रागात् झुक्रस्य सम्मवे॥ १३थ॥
बुद्धेरर्थ: कृत इति तत् पुनर्न च शोभते।
226. Blo yi-don $=$ buddher arthah probably is the same as kamartha previously stated in the ver. 132, note, 220, i.e. purusartha purpose of human action.
227. क्रियामान्न यथा नोक्त पुत्रलाभादयश्रये ॥११६ ॥

सत्यतः स्वप्ने ह्यनन्ते विसंवदन्ति हृष्टक्, ।
228. The definition of action is: चेतना कमं वदामि चेतयियवा च corresponding to pali A. III. 415. Ref. Kathavatthu, p. 393. Madh. kar. XVIII, 2-3, Madh. Av, VI, ver, 89. cited in Bodh. Panji. p. 472-Poussin, kosa. IV, n. 3. since there is no cetana, will in dream, there is no real action.
229. प्रोत्तकर्तृ कियाजातःः सन्तो $a$ नरकपादयः ॥१३७॥

अतो विज़्रमाल $b$ ब्वे न काप्यर्थक्रिका स्ति च।
चित्तमाल्नमतोरसंद्धम् ;
$a \approx$ lit. तथा नरकवालादय: सन्ति।
$\mathrm{b} \leq$ lit. निजप्त्याकारमानं
230. The author refutes the Vimsa, ver. 4. .... ..नरकवत् पुनः। सर्व नंरकपालादि दर्शने तंश्र बाधने।
Bhasya : यथा नरकेषु नारकाणां नरकपालादिदर्शन देशकाल-
fनयमेन सिद्धम्, श्ववायसायसपर्वताद्यागमनगमनदर्शनच्चे-
त्यादिग्रहणेन सर्वेषाण्व्व नैकस्यैव तेश्र तद्वाधर्न सिद्धमसत्स्वाप
नरकपालादिषु समानस्वकर्मविपाकधिपत्यात् ।
231.

> नानाकायावभासने ॥ १३द॥

सन्तानान्तरसंसिद्दौ नरकअ्व तथास्ति तु ।
परसत्त्व: कुतो नास्ति,
232. Vasubandhu and other Yogacaras deny the existence of other living beings cp. Ratnakirti's Santanantara-dusana, K. P. T. Institute, 1959. Dharmakirti however, does reverse it in his Santanantara-Siddhi, v. Bud. logic I, P. 521, P. 521 ff .
233. तथा निभृतमण्डलात् ॥१३९ ॥
उद्गीण्णविषनषृस्य देवोडनुग्र्ट्रकारकः।
स्वसत्यवचने तिष्ठन्,
234. Reference is probably a Garuda-mantra promising the boon.
235.

पूर्वंतन्नं विना यत: $119 \%$ ॥
अर्थक्रिया न आाक्येत ततश्रित्तकृता न सा।
236. Purvatantra, rituals containing the Buddhist Tantric rites described in Tantric literature as to how one may ward off the influence of the evil spirits and gain earthly prosperity. Here reviving the dead person cannot be accomplished without the assistance of such rituals.
237. परचितविदो ज्ञानमयथार्थ कथं भवेत् ।। १४१॥
238. Vasubandhu contends that para-citta-jnana is untrue, $v$. Vimsa ver. 20, but is true for the author, $v$. ver. 148. below.
239. यदान्यवित्ते सत्येव ज्ञान निविशाते हि तत् । सत्यथ [वा] तदाकारं विज्ञानं ग्राइकं मतम् ॥ १४₹॥
240. This is said from the standpoint of the Sautrantika-Yogacaras.
241. स्वविषयान्तिकप्राप्त्या व्यापारवत् ग्रहो न च।
$a$ यदनन्तरमुपाद्यम् ;
$\mathrm{a}=$ Tib. gan-gi-mjug-pa-thogs-su-hbyun, cp. ver. 173.
242. The author probably refers to the Naiyayika's theory of of rasmi moving towards the object much criticised in the Satya-siddhi, Chap. 49-50 what is termed. व्यापार (vyapara) for Dignaga, Pram-sam I, 9, T. Panji. p. 399:
243.

तथा ज्ञानं स्वचेतस: ॥ १४३॥
लक्षणेन यवोत्तेन ग्राहकं चित्तमस्ति तत्।
244. Sva-citta-jnana, knowing one's own mind is possible in the same manner as paracitta-jnana is. This is not, however,
sva-samvedana, self-knowledge of the Yogacaras, but simply one mind knowing the other mind.
245. अतीतचित्तं। स्मरणं यद्भूतगतमस्ति च ॥q४॥ ॥ तस्य हेतोश्र चित्तस्यानुत्पत्त न्न तु ग्रहः ।
246. Memory is not a perceptual cognition (grahu), v. Pram. Sam. I, 8. Read Bodhi. Panji. p. 401-2 explaining it without accepting sva-samvedana, cp. Satyasiddhi chap. 91. same explanation of memory.
247. सम्बुद्धगोचराद्ब तरूपस्याज्ञानतः पुनः ॥ १४\% ॥ अय थार्थं $a$ यदुक्त तदद्वयव्वान्न झोभनम् । $\mathrm{a}=$ Tib. don-bsin-min. The same expression in Vimsa. Tib. version.
248. cp. Vimsa. p. 10: .... यथा। स्वचित्तज़ानम्। तदपि कथम यथार्थम्। अज्ञानाद्यथा बुदस्यगोचरः ।। २१ ॥ यथा तन्निरभिलाप्येनात्मना बुद्धानां गोचरः। तथा तदज्ञानात्। तदुभयं न यथार्थ वितथर्रतिभासत्या ग्राह्यग्राहकविकल्पस्यापहीणत्वात् ।
249. ज्ञानेन ग्राहकेणव गृह्लन् ग्राह्यमशोषकम् ॥१४६॥ सर्वशः प्रोच्यते न त्वेवाद्वयाकारवेदनात्।
250. This is the Vaibhasika's conception of Sarvajna.
 अन्यस्य वेद्यं यत तत्तु निर्देष्टुं किमु खक्ते । अन्यचित्तपरिज्ञानत्,
252. Dignaga's theory of anirdesya in Pram. Sam. I. 5: स्वसं वेद्यमनिदेश्र्यं रूपमिन्द्रियोंचरः।
253.

तस्मादालमबसत्वतः ॥ १४६॥
निरालम्बं सर्वाचत्तं नास्ति, तत् यदि कुर्नचित् । न बहिरिद्यते ग्राह्यं; सर्वजश्र कथं पुनः ॥?१९॥
254. In the absence of an object nothing could be regarded as cognizer of it $v$. n. 249-50.
255. स्वचित्तमाव्वविज्ञानात् स्वसंवेदनमेव च ।

स्वचित्तमार्वरिजानात सर्वज्ञ भ्रक्पित: ॥ १र०। ज्ञायते चेत् पृथक कश्रित् न स्यात् धीमात्रदर्शनम्।
256. अद्वयज्ञानमाल्न त्वे न दोष इतिचेन्मतम् ॥१११॥ कथं तथापि विज्ञानं विषयस्योपलन्म्म्क््म्।
257. ज्ञाने द्वयविमुकेच सर्वक्रार्रवेदन म्व $a$ ॥ १र२ ॥

इति विग्मयमेवेदं; ततोरस्ति ग्राहकात्मकः।
सर्वज्ञ उपलब्धोर्य:
$\mathrm{a}=$ lit. संवेदनम्
258.

आस्ते नैवेति कश्रन ।
प्राजें मन्यस्य प्राजानां स्वदुर्मंतेश्र $a$ खेदितम् । १प₹ ॥
$\mathrm{a}=$ Tib. der. sdugs, so.
259. This probably refers to Kumarila's objection.
260. प्रत्यक्षहेतोनियतं $a$ प्रताप भावतोद्शवात्।

रागादिदोषसामग्रा ंनतान्तं $b$ परिहीयते ॥ १२४ ॥
$a=$ lit. किस्रिंद्रतिपक्षभावनासं F्भवात् ।
b :lit. नितान्तपरिक्षयः सम्भवनि ।
261. सर्वं वे बालचित्तर्व द्वायाकारकमिल्यतः।

किस्रिद्रावनया क्षये $a$ न प्रतीपक्षस ह्ऩि $b: 119 \times 2 ॥$ $a \leq q$ रिक्षये $b=$ अवसर:
262. शून्यमित्येव यत् ज्ञान मुक्ताकार $a$ गतं पुनः।

आकारद्दयसंयुक्त प्रतिपक्षश्र तत कथम् ॥ १रह॥
$\mathrm{a}=$ lit. प्रविष्ट्यम ।
263. This probably refers to the Sunyata-meditation as interpreted by the Yogacara.
264. कामरागं भावयतो रागक्षयो न च । द्वयस्पं भावयतः स्यादक्षीणं द्वूयं तथा ।। १र७ ॥
265. बुद्धो भावांशमारोप्य [209a] नंराक्यकादिभावना। अद्वये शुब्दमाते चानर्था तद्वावना नहि ॥१थ५॥
266. It is interesting to note that the author's statement to the affect that our idea of one entity (bhava) in as assumption on the discrete atoms.
267. नित्योपलब्चिसंक्ले रा $a$ म निक्रामल्यनित्यता । सर्वोपलक्लिधनासित्वात् बुद्धत्वापिरवइयकी 11 १थह ॥ a 玉add. आशु।
268. सर्वोपलक्षिरहितः सर्वथापि च निक्रियः। ब्यवसायक्न चर्यां्य विना बुद्वत्वमिष्यते ॥१६०॥
269. It is historically true that the Bưdha obtained his enlightenment as a result of long practices and effort. That enlightenment can not be obtained very easily and in a moment by the Yugacara.

270, अतः सत्त्वेषु करणा तद्वितोपायतः पुनः।
संस्कृतानित्यचिन्तातः सोगतं पदमिष्यते ॥१६१॥
271. The author has summed up here how Buddhahood should be secured in the system of the Vaibhasikas.
272. कथं धीइबदमालत्वे दानादिपरिपूरणम् । देयं न विद्यते तस्मात् बुद्धत्वस्न्र न सम्भवेत् ॥१६२॥
273. अन्योन्यप्रवशादेव विज्ञििियमेन च।

दानादानाकारिका च बुद्धिर्पद्यते यदि ॥ १६尹 ॥
तल्र्रत्यक्षनुमानाम्च्यमाप्तागमान्न सिध्यति ।
तत्पुनः कत्पनामान्न केवलं परिकीर्तनम् ॥ १६४॥
274. $c p$. Vimsa. ver. 18: अन्योन्याधिपतित्वेन विज्ञसिनियमो मिथः।
275. दानाकृतिकविजाने हथभ्यस्ते शतशोऽपिच।

सस्वस्य कस्यचित् कित्तु न दारिद्रूर्चवियेजन् ॥१६श ॥
276. अप्रमाणे मनख्कारे भावितेऽपि हि योगिनाम् ।

न दुःखसुखयोहीनिः रनुप्रामिश्रभूततः ॥१६ः।।
277. सर्वेषां सर्वदाने छ कृपादानप्रपूरणे।

अर्थात्मना न भेदोडस्ति तल्बादार्ननिषेधनम् ॥१६७॥
278. See. Bodhic. avat. V, 86 and Panji, citing the authority of the Bodhisattva-pratimoksa.
279. परिनिर्वाणमस्त्येव धातुक्ष मृतकायिक:।

दृष्टा गृहविहाराश्व कथं स्युःपरतन्लकाः 11 १६弓॥
280. cp. Trimsa ver. 24.
281. यदि स्वतन्ला न स्युस्ते ह्चतीतानुमितिः कथम। नातीतण्चेदनुमितं तत्तु स्यादर्तिलौकिकम् $a \|$ १६ह॥ $\mathrm{a}=$ lit. अतिलोक्रकान्त $=$ sin-tu-hjig-rten-thal.
282. श्रुतमुक्तचा विशुद्दस्य मूर्निक्ष वीतरागक:।

अनुमान भवेन्नो चेत् अद्धा च कथमुद्भवेत् ॥१७०॥
283. Tib. nan-thos-grol pas-rnam-dag-gi.

Sravaka-moksa is the highest perfection attainable by any disciple of the Buddha.
284. यदि प्रबन्धतो; जीव: खणित्रत: [209b] किल दृश्चते ।

तत् पुनस्तदधीनक्चेत् कथं स्यात् परिनिर्वृंतिः 11 १७१॥
285. A tentative interpertation.
286. व्यवस्थितं लोकनीत्या बीजादिभ्योऽद्दुरादिकम्।

उदेतीति चित्तमालवादे नासित तु युक्तता ॥ १७२॥
287. यज्ञानानन्तरं $a$ ज्ञानं नियतमुद्भवेव्धदि ।

तत्तस्य ह्होतोस्त् कार्यं, नियमोऽईि न विद्यते ॥ १७३॥
$\mathrm{a}=$ Ses-pa-gan-mjug-thogs-su. cp. ver. 143 above.
288. cp. T. Panji. p. 180: यस्यंवानन्तरं यत् भर्वत्तत तत् तस्य कारणमिष्यते ।
289. तथाडग्चाकारकं ज्ञानं विना धुममतिर्मेवेत्।

बीजेन रहिते चित्ते ह्यद्नुरा वासिधी भवेत् 11 १७૪।।
290. This prasanga has been mode, because the knowledge of smoke is not concommittant with the knowledge of flre : this will become clear from the just next verse.
291. अण्नधीवासितं चित्तं धूमघीकारणं यदि। अनेकराक्तौ सत्यान्न मेदबोधः कुनो भवेत् ॥ १७ऐ ॥
292. अनन्तराण्नघीहेतौ धूमचित्तस्य कारणे।

293. प्रतिवन्वेऽप्रसिद्धे च कथमस्मादिदं मवेत् ।

अमिश्रव्यवहारश्र कथं हेती प्रवर्तंते ॥ १७७॥
294. अतः कल्पितमाधित्य चित्तमालं निघातुकम् । इति प्रभाषितं सर्नं न रूपादेरसम्भवात् ॥ १७ร॥
295. The author, from here, attempts to offer his own interpretations of those passages which speak of cittamatrata.
296. यर्मिन् रागादयो जाताः अक्षीकुल्य च क्पितम्।

दोषोपशान्तये तस्मादर्थे $a$ नंरात्म्देदेगना ॥१७९।। $a=$ lit. विषये।
296a. This is the author's explanation of Dharma-nairatmya, a Mahayanic idea of the external things. Thus; according to
him all the passages declaring dharma-nairatmya are to be understood in the manner indicated here.
297. अन्यलापि तथा प्रोक्त यथा बालैंविकल्पित।।

बाहचभावश्र निवास्त इति; कस्मात, विशिष्यते ॥95०॥
298. $c p$. ver. बाह्यो न विद्यते भावो यथा बाल्हिंकिकल्वये ।

वासनालुटितं चित्तमर्थामासं प्रवर्तंते।।
cited in T. Panji. p. 14 and Subh sangraha.
299. अनन्तरोपदेकाप्र कारकाभिनिवेशतः ।

कुत्यानएग्र परिज्ञानं, तेनात्मापोह उच्यते ॥ १५१॥
300, Pudgala-nairatmya is also accepted by the Sarvasti-vadi-Vaibhasikas. The author here puts forth the reason for accepting it.
301. तथोपदेशादन्यत्न करिपतम्न विकल्पितम्।

व्याख्यातं धर्मतारूपं धर्मता तु स्वलक्षणम् ॥ ?ム२॥
भावमात कत्पितन्तु [तस्य] भेदो विक्वित्पित् ।
घर्मतायाः प्रभेदोडगं भावेऽसति न युज्यत्ते ॥१६३॥
302. It is well-known that the Yogacara accepts three characteris tics, (laksana), viz. Parikalpita, paratantra and parinispanna, Likewise this author enumerates three things, viz kalpita, vikalpita and dharmata, of which the last one is explained as svalaksana corresponding to Parinispanna of the Yogacara. Kalpita, a basic entity, i.e. a bhavamatra may correspondto Paratantra and Vikalpita, a false aspect imputed on may correspond to parikalpita. Thus according to this Vaibhasika author as in the case of the Yogacara, two things, Kalpita and dharmata are true whereas vikalpita like parikalpita of tie Yogacara is untrue. That the vikalpita is untrue has already been pointed out in the note 297 above. It is entirely false in as much as fancied by worldlings. $c p$. ver. 40 . विकल्पितश्र शब्दार्थो न भातीFन्द्रयचेतसि । Dharmata, is an everlastingly true as it is the same as svalaksana, an everlasting svabhava, (svabhavah sarvada casti...) Kalpita that is explained as bhavamatra, a basic entity probably implies atomic foundations on which the various things are fancied. Atoms are kalpita, i.e. infered, $\nu$. ver. 64, (n. 111). why the separate atoms are not cognized is made clear by the author in the ver, 44 ( n .76 ), though the aggregate atoms are cognized in their svalaksana, v. ver, 37. (n. 62).
303. यदि सूपं शून्यमुक्त सूपशब्द: कथन्त्विह्। कल्प्पयत्वा देर्यते चेत् कतमतफलमिष्यते ॥ श़४॥
304. This is said probably with reference to the Madhyamika standpoint.
305. नासंवादो यब [210a] भावी तेन सन् भाव एव सः।

अभावादेव सदस्य $a$ नो पर्लाचचस्तु स्वप्नवत् $1195 \% 11$
a Tib. dmigs-ma-yin.
306. The author's repeated argument of reality of the external things is avisamvada, a non-contradicted experience, v. vers: 3, (n.5) 19 (n. 31) and 98. (n. 165).
307. This refers to the Madhyamika's position. The sentence may also read thus: their experiences resemble the dream, and [therefore] are non-existent.
308. वाह्यार्थवादिनः श्राहुरेवं $a$ चित्तंकवादिंनम् ।

कि न्यायोगयमुत नो वा विचारयन्तु पण्दिताः 11 १६द्द 11 $\mathrm{a}=$ lit. चित्तमान ।
309. न्यायान्यायविचारे मेइ्हुता बुधधीर्न कि ।

किन्त्वन्येरितसत्यानां बहुसंक्षिप्प देशनात् 11 श्ज०॥
310. ज्ञानभासा मोहतमोध्वंस: $a$ साक्षात्कृतो बुधंः।

अद्यनोध्वंग्य महतां मार्गे $b$ मूढः प्रसीं $c$ देंतु ॥9५५॥
a. Tib. mnon. mdzed. cin=साक्षाहकु-
b. Tib. skye. ba glen=मूढजनः 1


THE TIBETAN TEXT


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## TIBETAN TEXT

Variants

1. This introductory sentence in not found in the Snar-thang edn. ( $=N$.)
2. N. অస্ড্ৰীホ

3. Peking $(=P$.) 멍젝
4. P. \&
5. P. そn'

8: P. ॠ
6. P. 줘ํ
7. P. शิं

8. $P$ : बf.v'
9. $N$ जैष
10. P. गิस
11. P. $\boldsymbol{q}^{\circ}(?)$

## 90


17．N．ズম＇aホ・
18．P．ax＇
19．P．केष
20．P．중
21．P．चद斤
22．P．केโ•
Verse 95a：Read 末ম
＂d＂Read वसみघय＝चिन्ता for פิस＂च＂बाल

## TIBETAN-SANSKRIT GLOSSARY

(Figure refers to the verse numbar)

गु $9^{\circ} 5^{\circ}$ सवंथा 68.
गर. च 68, 101.

—"199ं अपरक्षण v. 95.7रू'
मिंズरे न: 101.




मान यत् 29.







बत्रुए भवेत् 87.

악
ज्ञब्द 71.


-च. साधन 29.






पठिसा एक. v. $5^{*}$

- इ్వे 'छेषं नाभेदात् 66.



Еेवरुन यथा 35, यथा हि 101, कथम् 89.
त्वㄷ․ यथा 101.







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ज्ञानत्वादि 29. pro．उच्यते．


Nは＂
वा 95．v．末ब＂च
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