


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EDITORS


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बाह्यर्थसिद्धिकारिकानाम् ॥

ཐུ་རོལ་གྱི་དོན་གྲུབ་པ་ཅེས་བྱ་བའི་ཆོག་ལེན་པ་ལྟེན་པ།

BAHYARTHA SIDDHI KARIKA

N. A. SASTRI

BAHYARTHA SIDDHI KARIKA

Introductory

Genesis of the Treatise.

We have in the collection of Tibetan Tripitaka Tangyur five works attributed to Bhadanta Subhagupta in the following order: (1) *Sarvajnasiddhikarika*, (2) *Bahyarthasiddhi Karika* (3) *Srutipariksa*, (4) *Anyapoha-vicara*, (5) *Iswarabhangakarika*. Of these the second, viz. *Bahyarthasiddhi*, Tib. *phyi.röl.gyi.don.grub, pa* is the most valuable and interesting. It consists of about 190 verses (*anustup*) counted for convenience into 188 verses. The purpose of the treatise, as its title implies, to refute the Yogacara idealistic philosophy and to prove the reality of the external universe from the standpoint of the Sarvastivadi-Vaibhasikas. Vasubandhu, for example, in his *Vimsatika* elaborated a good deal to demonstrate the impossibility of atomic theory of the Vaisesikas. Dignaga again in his *Alambanapariksa* confirmed Vasubandhu's opinion on the basis of his logical and epistemological foundations. Next the upholder of the Idealistic School of Buddhism was Dharmakirti who embarked on the task of establishing his philosophy of absolute Idealism by enumerating several logical arguments. Of those, the argument of *Sahopalambha-niyama*, concomittance of co-cognition is most powerful and proverbial with all the posterior writers of Indian philosophy. Now the uphill task of reviewing all the arguments set up by the above masters of Idealism rests with Bhadanta Subhagupta, a renowned master of the Vaibhasika school of Buddhism. Subhagupta, in the present treatise takes up to examine in detail all the points raised in favour of Idealism and succeeds in presenting his case, the case of the Vaibhasika masters (on the subject) so brilliantly and vehemently that still later some masters, like Santaraksita and Kamalasila could not remain without making another attempt to vindicate their own positions in opposition to Subhagupta's premise. In course of their examination into Externalism (*Bahirarthapariksa*) they quote Subhagupta's passages verbatim and refute his arguments one by one. Thus we have about 11 verses of Subhagupta cited all of which are traced in the present treatise (see verses Nos. 29, 35, 44, 66, 68, 71, 81, 87, 89, 95, 101). Kamalasila cites also some prose passages (v. Panjika, p. 574, 20) from Subhagupta giving rise to a surmise that Subhagupta might have also written some commentary on the treatise which is not translated into Tibetan.

This appraisal of the treatise may give a fair idea of when the author Subhagupta must have flourished. His time must be fixed between Dharmakīrti (650 A. D.) and Santaraksita-Kamalasila (700-50 A. D.). He must be also anterior to Akalanka, a Jain author (c.700A. D.) since the latter quotes the former in his *Nyayaviniscaya* the ver : *saha-sabdasca loke'smin*, etc. (Bahyārtha, ver. 71). We may therefore place him during 650-700 A. D. (Cf. T. Sangraha, Intro. XXXIV).

REVIEW OF TOPICS

Now let us make a brief survey of the whole contents of the treatise. One of the most powerful arguments in favour of Idealism is the example of dream experiences. Subhagupta refutes it by pointing out differences between the wake experiences which are never contradicted and the dreams which are always contradicted. To the contention of the Yogacara that all our knowledge and experience are illusive, the author replies that some knowledge may err on account of some defect in our cognitive apparatus but to say that it errs even in the absence of such defects creates an absolute darkness in the universe (v. ver. 31 with note).

Dignaga holds that because each atom is not separately cognized there could be no atoms at all; the author points out in reply that the reason, i.e. non-cognition of atoms in isolation (*ekaika-aparicchēda*) is not conclusive; mind and mental phenomena, though not separately experienced, exist (v. ver. 33, 34). He maintains further that atoms cannot appear in life in isolation; when they appear in association with others they lose their atomic characteristics; how, then, could each of the atoms be reflected in our consciousness?—he asks (ver. 43). On an external material object which is constituted of several atoms, we have an idea of 'one' but this idea of oneness is illusive and is produced as a result of cognition of the uninterrupted and homogeneous atoms (ver. 35) and that is our mental construction (36). The atoms being coagulated into an integrated form discharge a uniform action and therefore they cannot be designated as non-substances (40).

Vasubandhu's criticism of atomic theory on the basis of spacial distinction (*digbhagabheda*) which contradicts the theory itself is not at all reasonable; for we hold that there is no space apart from the atoms themselves. When we talk of space we mean the atoms themselves spread in certain fashion (45-46). The conception of one whole (*avayavin*) is also illogical. If you

consider it possible as a result of the atoms being closely knit together in a large number, you may better also conceive one time-unit on the moments that are preceeding and succeeding in an uninterrupted succession (50). Atoms have a peculiar relationship amongst themselves due to which no intruder could enter in the midst of atoms; by virtue of the same relationship the covering of atoms by other atoms has been upheld and therefore there is not any reason to presume the atoms have parts (52). The atoms, though mutually unrelated and partless become collocated and accomplish the gross things like the globe of earth, etc. on account of some excellence of mutual efficiency (*anugrahavisesa*) (56-57). Certain number of atoms alone enter into combination by virtue of that substance-efficiency (*dravya-sakti*) but there are many others which could not do so on account of their meagre power (58-59). The atoms could be counted by some spiritually advanced saints alone and therefore conceive them to be existing even though we do not cognize them. (65).

Next the author taking up to examine the maxim of *Sahopal-ambhaniyama* remarks that the knowledge is only cognizer and that too is only in the presence of some visible object and therefore they are cognized simultaneously but this fact does not testify their identity (67). Then the said *hetu*, reason has been pointed out to be defective in several respects; sometimes it is indefinite, sometimes contradictory and sometimes unproved and so on. The term *saha* 'together' always implies a companion and if there is really *Saha-vedana*, 'together-cognition', the reason will obviously prove the contrary to what is cherished. The object felt by some other person in his own mind cannot be denied by us because it is far removed from our cognizance. The meaning of *Sahavedana*, according to the author is that when the knowledge-factors, sense-organ, etc. being present previously produce the sensuous consciousness in the next moment, then it may be termed *Saha-vedana* (82). Speaking truly, the knowledge is not at all cognized, but it is said to be cognized figuritively since it cognizes its object by the law of nature. But the object is indeed cognized since it gives rise to its knowledge (85). To the question: How a knowledge cognizes, the author replies: the knowledge functions as if it measures the external thing (90-92).

We have to take note here that the author does not plead, as the Sautrantika does, that the knowledge cognizes through the process of asuming the image of its object. Therefore he says: The image which you presume as existent in the object-

knowledge truly exists in the external things alone and not in the knowledge (96). This image-theory is not favoured by the advocates of *Cittamatrata*, Idea-alone in the ultimate plane of existence. The point becomes evident from the following statement of the author: "You plead that the knowledge which, in fact, is imageless experiences its unreal images. I, likewise, advocate that the imageless knowledge experiences real things (102). He makes his position further clear by saying that the consciousness which is imageless and formless comprehends (*paricchid*) through the agency of material sense-organs like the eye, etc. (105). The author turns the image theory as an unfavourable proposition to the opponent thus:

When a consciousness—form is accepted to be shaped by the form of an object, how does it mean that the consciousness comprehends it? (90). When we maintain that consciousness flashes up in the presence of its object, your query as to how it does so is an irrelevant question (91). The consciousness is not creator of its object; nevertheless people on its simple awareness of its content, attribute to it a creative function (92). The author's realistic outlook is quite obvious in his solemn declaration that the process of cognizing the external things is the same with the saints as with the worldlings, with this much difference that the former is characterized by his detached and comprehensive vision (*Sarvakara dhiya*) whereas the latter by covetous observation of things (94). Immediately after this assertion however, the author concedes a special privilege to Buddha whose power of knowledge cannot be interrogated whether it comprehends simultaneously or in succession and whether it assumes the image of the object or does not (95). This opinion may not be shared by the Sautrantika who is not in favour of allowing any exception to the general law of knowledge operating always in a gradual process. Note Vasubandhu's clear-cut exposition of this law: *Santanena samarthatvat yatha' gñih sarva-bhug math/Tatha sarvavid estavyo na sakrt sarva-vedanat/Kosakarika, IX, 1.*

The *Kramavedana* is also the opinion of Harivarman.—Satyasiddhi, Chaps 75, 76, etc. Cp. Pancavastuka-Vibhasa, p. 27 (Visva-Bharati Annals, X).

It is interesting to note that the well known lamp example cited in favour of *Sva-samvedana* theory has been turned by the author to his advantage thus: As you hold that the lamp illumines itself as well as others, just so I hold that a knowledge illumines the selves of two or more *alambanas* of the same kind

(106). Therefore according to Subhagupta, the visual consciousness, e. g. can comprehend simultaneously several visible things falling within its range; thus our cognition of several colours in a carpet (*citrastarana*) is quite reasonable.

The Yogacara maintains that knowledge cognizes its own aspect as its objects and hence what is cognizable (*grahya*) is only a part of knowledge. On this point the author remarks that the Tathagata's sayings like everything is impermanent, etc. do not at all disclose that things meant there are the aspects of consciousness itself (104). Some doctors maintain that a knowledge of previous moment serves as the object-cause of the next following knowledge; this view is not acceptable to the author; for, no knowledge necessarily follows immediately after another knowledge (118-119). Some other doctors consider that some force (*sakti*) productive of knowledge is regarded as the object-cause; this too is not appropriate for the reason that not any *Sakti* is experienced in our sensuous consciousness (120-21). It has been stated finally on the authority of the world and scripture that the external things alone are reasonable to be upheld as the object-cause of our cognitive experiences (123-24). The author further states that the external things are established not merely on account of their simple efficiency in their presence but also on account of such efficiency being experienced even in the case of their mistaken knowledge (*viparyaya-jnana*) (129-31); that is to say, when we mistake a snake for rope and tread upon it we are at once startled by its reaction.

According to this author the knowledge of the discerners of other's thought is not untrue but it is quite natural. The others mind could be comprehended just as any other external things are comprehended. The grasping of an object by our mind is not an act of running towards its objects, but simply an act of measuring (*pariccheda*). The Buddha is omniscient because he comprehends the entire universe through the agency of his cognizing knowledge (147-48). In the absence of external things none can become omniscient (150). The author has not accepted what Dignaga states in regard to an indescribable form of the object being cognized in the first moment (149-49). Nor does he subscribe his opinion to Dignaga's theory of construction-free mind in the first moment. (115). Dignaga's theory of *Svasamvedana*, introspection is also not favoured by this author, who constantly maintains that knowledge is always a cognizing agent and never becomes cognized. The theory of intro-cognition is generally believed to have been propounded by the Sautrantikas on the strength of memory of the knowledge in a later

period' (v. Madh. Avatara VI, ad. 72 Tib. p. 167, my Skt. text p. 60) and to have been followed by Dignaga and his followers (v. Pramanas. I, II). Subhagupta though not in favour of *Svasamvedana* explains the memory as merely a mind directed towards the past thing; therefore it is not a cognition (*graha*) since it does not flash up from its cause (145-48). The Vaibhasika is not only the school that refuses to certify *Svasamvedana*, the Madhyamika too does the same. The memory however is possible, says the Madhyamika, since the consciousness as a cognizer is related to the past thing (Bodhicar. panjika. p. 401, 16).

The author further points out some more flaws in the system of the Yogacaras. When we assume some entity existing externally then alone the contemplation upon it as no-soul becomes possible; but no such contemplation is possible in the case of Idealism (159). The Buddhahood which is according to you, completely an inactive state can be secured without making any efforts (161). The person who conceives the charity, etc. as mere thoughts is not able to release any person from poverty even by repeated practice of the charity-mind (168). These are some of the objections that are levelled against Idealism; and therefore the scriptural passages which speak of *cittamatratā* must not be interpreted quite literally. Their interpretations, according to Subhagupta are as follows: The Buddha has declared (*cittamatratā*) with reference to the imaginary aspects of the external things but that does not at all imply that the external things are absolutely non-existent (179). Likewise the doctrine of no-soul has been preached with reference to the imaginary aspect of things in order to remove all the passions in the mind of worldlings addicted to sexual pleasures (180). It has also been stated in some place that the external things do not exist in such forms as the ordinary worldlings entertain in their mind (181).

In fine the author sums up his constructive conclusion of his system as follows: There is something inferred (*kalpita*), something fancied (*vikalpita*) and *Dharmata*. The inferred (*kalpita*) is nothing but *bhava*, some basic entity, atoms; the fancied is diversity of the former (like the earth, etc.) and *Dharmata* finally is the self-substance (*Svalaksana*). Of these three the author probably views the first and the last as real and the second, i.e. *Vikalpita* as unreal. This explanation may quite accord with the opinions of the *Vaibhasikas*.

Text and Translation

The Tibetan text that is presented in the following pages is based on *Bstan hgyur* collection of the Tibetan Tripitaka preserved in our Visva-Bharati Library (Narthang edition) and then it was collated with the same in Peking Edn. recently printed in Japan and preserved in the Library of the Sahitya Akademy, New Delhi. Different readings are all noted in the foot-notes to the Tibetan text.

The Tibetan text has been preceded by its English translations with copious annotative foot-notes supplying all the available references and informations on the topics discussed in the text. A tentative rendering into Sanskrit of each verse of the treatise has also been provided in the foot-notes with a view to making the trend of discussion more understandable to the readers who may be familiar with Indian philosophical texts and their styles. Indian (Sastraic) texts are generally not very easy to interpret without having recourse to some commentary. The present text being not provided with any commentary, the task of interpreting it properly has become much tough. I have, however, endeavoured to understand the text with the sole aid of my limited experiences and studies in Buddhism and its philosophy. My Tibetan-Sanskrit glossary contains only those words that are found in the original Sanskrit verses arranged in a separate page 9. My thanks are due to Geshe Byam pa thsul khrim, a Tibetan refugee Lama working in the Visvabharati for supplying me with a transcript of the Tibetan text included in this publication.

N. A. Sastri.

The original Sanskrit verses of the Bahyarthha Siddhi
identified so far

धीमालत्वेन संसाध्ये यत् ज्ञानत्वादि साधनम् ।
विजातीयाविरुद्धत्वात् सर्वं शेषवदुच्यते ॥ २९ ॥

तुल्यापरक्षणोत्पादात् यथा नित्यत्वविभ्रमः ।
अविच्छिन्नसजातीयग्रहे स्यात् नीलविभ्रमः ॥ ३५ ॥

प्रत्येकपरमाणूनां स्वातन्त्र्येणास्त्यसम्भवः ।
अतोऽपि परमाणूनामेकैकाप्रतिभासनम् ॥ ४४ ॥

नान्योऽस्ति ग्राहको ज्ञानात् चाक्षुषैर्विषयैर्विना ।
अतश्च सहसंवित्तिर्नाभिदात् नीलतद्विद्योः ॥ ६६ ॥

एककालविवक्षातः सम्बुद्धज्ञानचेतसा ।
चित्तचैतैश्च हेतुर्हि सर्वथैकान्तिको न च ॥ ६८ ॥

सहशब्दश्च लाकेऽस्मिन् नैवान्येन विना क्वचित् ।
विरुद्धोऽयं ततो हेतुर्यद्यस्ति सहवेदनम् ॥ ७१ ॥

पूर्विकैव तु सामग्रा प्रज्ञानं विषयक्षणम् ।
सालोकरूपवत् कुर्यात् येन स्यात् सहवेदनम् ॥ ८१ ॥

साकारज्ञानपक्षे च तन्निर्वासस्य वेद्यता ।
तस्याभेदे च संसाध्ये सिद्धसाधनता भवेत् ॥ ८७ ॥

कथं तद्ग्राहकं तच्चेत् तत्परिच्छेदलक्षणम् ।
विज्ञानं तेन नाशङ्का कथं तत् किं वदिति ॥ ८९ ॥

साकारं वा निराकारं तुल्यकालमतुल्यजम् ।
इति बौद्धेऽपि विज्ञाने किं नु चिन्ता प्रवर्तते ॥ ९५ ॥

यथा हि भवतां ज्ञानं निराकारञ्च तत्त्वतः ।
वेत्ति चाभूतमाकारं भूतमर्थं तथैव नः ॥ १०१ ॥

BAHYARTHA—SIDDHI

Establishment of Objective Reality

1. One¹ who fulfilled in every aspect all duties beneficial to his own person (*Svartha*) as well as duties beneficial to other living ²beings; to Him I salute in order to achieve the success (*artha-siddhi*) and demonstrate the truth of the objective universe.

2. (The Idealist says :) The³ external thing that serves as the object of consciousness in the person of perfect eyesight does not exist (as real); (Reason); because it is a (mere) idea and because the idea manifests itself as external thing, (example;) just like a dream-thought and the double-moon idea.⁴

3. Thus⁵ the advocate of Idealism (theory of mind alone) proves the non-existence of the external thing. Now, we at the outset prove that the external things on the basis of experience never contradicted⁶ in our daily life (*avisamvadadrsti*).

4. The⁷ alternative proposition that either the object-cause (*alambana*) is unreal because its knowledge is contradicted in our daily experience, or it is so, because the material and other things are not fit to exist, is, both unsatisfactory.

5. One⁸ experiences in dream one's own body chopped up into pieces; but this act of chopping is utterly unreal. If externalism is untrue in dream, does it apply to the waking stage?

6. If⁹ you mean (lit. desire) that the beheading¹⁰ of a waking person and his bodily exuberance resemble a dream experience, why are you then so much care-laden about your gain and loss.

7. If¹¹ you say that every human activity is guided by illusion; but there is no perversion¹² in naming things. A knowledge which is non-illusive is never contradicted. What is contradicted is always illusive.

8. A knowledge¹³ of a material thing which differs from neither space¹⁴ nor time is never contradicted; hence it is non-illusive (*abhrantu*). This alone is the characteristic of non-illusive knowledge and nothing else.

9—10a. The¹⁵ person who comprehends the extremely long things as well as the extremely small things is distinguished as the Saint¹⁶ (Yogin). (In case of absolute denial of external things)

the Buddhist Saint would not be omniscient and not get double sided release¹⁷ (*ubhayatobhaga-vimukti*) and thus Buddhahood would also be contradicted.

10. *b-d*. (The Idealist continues:)¹⁸ Even our truly apprehension (*yathavatpratiti*) that every thing exists absolutely resembles the experience of things in dream.

Now, why does it not become possibly contradicted (as a dreamy thing does) ?

11. If¹⁹ (things exist) on account of deep-rooted impressions (*vasana*), why are not the dreamy things also explained (In the like manner ?) Hence the cognizable things like village and garden, etc. are true and become visible.

12. The²⁰ mere thought bereft of sense-data and its impression (*vasana*) are all momentary ; (thus) the gain of their resultant fruits is interrupted. (Therefore) the sense-data (be admitted) as the stable causes of ²¹fruition.

13. For²² him who opines that the knowledge of one²³ taste does not at all arise from any sense-datum, the nature of that knowledge (we ask) is whether permanent or impermanent.

14. If²⁴ it is similar to a dream (lit. sleep) will it not produce its resultant fruit ? The cause of fruition (*vipaka*) being present, the destruction of fruition is improper.

15. Just²⁵ as something seen by a sleepy person in his dream does not appear the same in the next moment, and hence becomes impermanent ; likewise the destruction of the matured fruition is possible.

16. In²⁶ whose opinion the sense-data are non-existent and hence there is no occasion (lit. cause) for preaching, (for him) the fruition will repeat endless even after its destruction.²⁷

17. Why²⁸ do you view that a man does a religious action by virtue of his deep-rooted impressions (*vasana*) of non-contradiction ? If you say : because the material and other external things are unfit to be real, to this point we shall reply (later on).

18. If²⁹ non-contradiction in the waking state persists on account of the maturation of *asraya* (= *Alayavijnana*) why is it

not (like this) that as long as there is eye-disease (*timira*) as basis (*asraya*), so long there is non-contradiction³⁰ ?

19. Suppose³¹ the Yogacarin acts (*pravrtti*) on the notion of mind alone (*Cittamatrata*) and on the presumption of the all *alambana*^{31A} as false; when in the interval the notion of *Cittamatrata* is absent, even then the act is not contradicted (*avisamvada*) and therefore the act is not caused by that notion.

20. The³² Sakti matured (*paripaka*) for *aropa*, assumption is produced from some other external thing and not from the self³³ just like the sesame seed produced is from its flower.

21. And³⁴ the seed from the water, etc. What is produced from a cause, that product is similar to its cause. No *vasana*³⁵ is to be assumed on account of the genesis of the fruit as one infers the fire at the sight of the smoke.

22. Things³⁶ are made fragrant on account of an act produced from some other thing; for example, the sesame seed becomes fragrant on its contact with the *Jati*³⁷ flowers.

23. Here³⁸ the seven kinds of consciousness are produced from their *upadana* consciousness and their seeds being previously imputed there and dormant become matured into such consciousness under favourable conditions.

24. Therefore³⁹ the theory of *vasana* needs not to be assumed (as the Idealist does) on the presumption that no entity is produced from another entity, declare the advocates of Sakti.⁴⁰

25. Nevertheless,⁴¹ if you say: the knowledge of *adhigama* (*rtogs.pa*), definite perceptual experiences arises of its own accord (*svatantratah*) and this my opinion may be compared with the fact of the seed⁴² which being sowed matures of itself.

26. This⁴³ opinion too is not acceptable. Again your plea that its dependence on its *upadana* consciousness is common to us both, is not valid as it incurs a logical fallacy of mutual reliance (*anyonyaasraya*).⁴⁴

27.-28a. This⁴⁵ defect is absent in the system⁴⁶ which holds that Saktis that are imputed (*aropita*) by the knowledge produced by the sensuous objects get nourished and matured into seven kinds of sensuous consciousness by dint of some *Visesa*, excellence of favourable conditions, like the object, time, individual, etc.

28 *b-d*. But⁴⁷ there is a system⁴⁸ of thought which maintains that there is not any cause (of our objective experiences) other than the knowledge itself named *upadanā* (= *Alaya-vijñāna*) and this is quite irrelevant.

29. When⁴⁹ the proposition of *Cittamātrata* that is to be established the proof or argument (*sādhana*) is the knowledge itself (*Jñānatva*); this proof is non-contradictory to any heterogeneous case (*vijatiya*) and therefore the said proposition is declared to be *śesavat*⁵⁰ (i.e. *śesavad-anumāna*).

30. A⁵¹ close scrutiny (*legs-dpyad*) joyfulness (*dgah mgur*) engagement (*pravṛtti*) gain of the good and rejection of the bad; all these activities of the wake-up person never exist in dream.

31. Certain⁵² sensuous knowledge errors on account of some impediment (-this is possible). But to say that even in the absence of an impediment there is an error⁵³ creates an absolute darkness in the universe.

ATOMIC THEORY PROVED.

32. Others⁵⁴ say: Everything is nothing but consciousness; the notion that there is an external object (corresponding to the sensuous consciousness) is a mental illusion. The knowable (object) is what is produced internally from one's own mind but it is not a visible object (*rūpa*) (existing externally outside of the mind⁵⁵).

33a-c. The⁵⁶ proposition that there exists no object is to be maintained (*samsādhyā*); because each atom is not separately cognized, atoms do not appear in knowledge⁵⁷:—So says Dinnaga.

33d-34. (*Hetu-Reason*)⁵⁸ would become doubtful (*sandighdha*) when it is applied to Citta and Caitta, mind and mental-phenomena.

Just like momentary things are not cognized in their discrete moments, the atoms would be undetermined even by the understanding of Tathagata.

35. (The author continues:)⁵⁹ Just as the illusive idea of permanence appears to us as a result of continuous rise of homogeneous moments (= momentary atoms) in succession, just so the illusive idea of a patch of blue appears as a result of cognition of the uninterrupted and homogeneous atoms.

36. When⁶⁰ we cognize in our mind the uninterrupted and homogeneous atoms, our constructive thought constructs their oneness⁶¹.

37. Therefore⁶² the theory (of the Idealists) that the atoms in their self-substance are not reflected in our⁶³ consciousness is totally unfounded.

38. What⁶⁴ a form of object is reflected in a knowledge, from that object-form its knowledge does not arise, and this object-form is not a substance (*dravya*) and resembles the double⁶⁵ moon: (says-Dinnaga). This conclusion is not a sound one because its *hetu*, *probans* is not at all proved as valid one.

39. The⁶⁶ atoms which being integrated, discharge a uniform action are termed *Sancita*,⁶⁷ integrated;—to the upholder of this opinion how do the atoms become non-substances (*adravya*)?

40. They⁶⁸ (atoms) are spoken of as one but they possess no oneness. For, the import of all words being investigated is not at all reflected in the sensuous consciousness.⁶⁹

41. The⁷⁰ philosopher (i.e. Idealist) who states that one part of the mind reflects as the object-image in consciousness must have witnessed a piece of carpet with pictures in variegated colours⁷¹ (*Citrapataka*).

42. In⁷² certain place, when an image of certain object (*rupa*) is cognized, that image being related to higher and lower areas (*asraya*) appears divided (to form) a picture in varied forms⁷³.

43. An⁷⁴ atom which may manifest its own single knowledge cannot appear in life as separated from other atoms. When it appears associated with other atoms it loses its atomic form, how then could each of the atoms appear to our knowledge?⁷⁵

44. Atoms⁷⁶ cannot each individually and independently appear in life and this is also the reason why each of the atoms never flashes out in our consciousness.

45. Vasubandhu's⁷⁷ criticism of the atoms on the basis of their spacial distinctions is baseless⁷⁸. For, the term, space (*dikṣabda*) is employed on the atom itself that is associated with some other atoms.

46. Hence⁷⁹ by the spacial distinctions the atoms themselves are meant when surrounded by several⁸⁰ other atoms but never the atoms are constituted of parts.

47. When⁸¹ one atom is situated at the bottom and the other on the other side they so situated never become double on account of these two sides.

48. When⁸² the atoms are situated in the midst of several atoms, they are imagined as many and likewise by the process of reverse of the one they are assumed as many.

49. A⁸³ (gross) form distinct from its own, for example, is witnessed on the atoms as a result of their mutual combinations (Lit. one depending upon another) but this gross form does not at all exist there just like a distinction of the front and the back made on the atoms.⁸⁴

50. If,⁸⁵ as a result of atoms being uninterruptedly knit together in a large number, one substantial whole (*avayavin*) is conceived, why will not the moments that are preceeding and succeeding in an uninterrupted succession be conceived so⁸⁶ (i.e. one indivisible time-unit) ?

51. Since⁸⁷ knowledge continues to exist for two moments⁸⁸ its uninterrupted existence (*nairantarya*) is possible, yet the form of one unit (*avayavi-rupa*) is not permissible on the knowledge; the same principle is likewise applicable to the atoms⁸⁹ also.

52. By⁹⁰ virtue of a peculiar relationship (*pratyasatti*) amongst atoms the entry of a moving body into the aggregated company of atoms is hindered and by the same device the covering of atoms by other atoms is accepted, but not due to their constituent parts.⁹¹

53. The⁹² shadow is produced when there is a covering of the sun, but that shadow is not proper to be accepted as existing in between the two atoms of the sun.⁹³

54. Just⁹⁴ as the power of producing the shadow and covering is the phenomenon of several united things so also is the case with several atoms but no single atoms can produce such phenomenon.

55. Therefore⁹⁵ what is stated by Vasubandhu that a lump (*pinda*) is impossible to exist₉₆ since the distinction between the

atoms and the lump is not available, may perhaps be accidental (*kadacitka*) if there is any propriety in maintaining the atoms as stagnant (i.e. never transformed into any other form under any circumstances).

56. The⁹⁷ atoms, (though) they are mutually un-related⁹⁸ and devoid of parts, nevertheless become integrated and accomplish (the gross things like) the globe of earth, and others.

57. By⁹⁹ virtue of some excellence of mutual efficiency (*anugraha*) the atoms become transformed and likewise they never become scattered (i.e.) of the diamond (*vajra*) and other such things.

58. Certain¹⁰⁰ atoms become integrated by virtue of their peculiar substance-efficiency (*dravya-sakti*) just like the evil spirit (*pisaca*) the serpent and others are subdued by force of *mantra-sakti*.

59. But¹⁰¹ there are many other atoms having very little power and strength¹⁰² (to appear in life).

The¹⁰³ person endowed with a sharp intellect and living in a mountain (*acala*) and such other places could count the atoms of the hell (and the heaven), etc. with their numbers and other distinctions.

60-61a. Therefore¹⁰⁴ it is not proper to declare that the atoms do not at all exist. If you say that the affirmation of the atoms has been made due to some illusion (*bhramti*) then your understanding¹⁰⁵ that everything is nothing but the activity of the sixth knowledge (= intellect) would be much more illusory resembling an illusory knowledge of the number 'eight' on the aggregate of eight atoms.

61b-62. If¹⁰⁶ you plead that the conception of the atoms is a notion mistaken for some other basic¹⁰⁷ thing for these two considerations, viz. (1) that things like the hell, etc. are known as nothing but condemned living beings¹⁰⁸ and (2) that the atoms are never cognized directly (in our perceptual experiences), then why do you not state likewise (as illusory) of the number form and other characteristics of Pradhana¹⁰⁹ and Purusa, etc.?

63. You¹¹⁰ may say: The same remark holds good with regard to such things also because Pradhana is regarded in the terms of some excellence of characters (*gunatisaya*) (like *sattva*,

rajas and *tamas*). I now reply: though the conception of Pradhana, etc. is illusory, this does not warrant us to forsake our previous contention (about the atoms).

64. Therefore¹¹¹ the atoms are existing really. They are not cognized by any body other ~~the~~ sages living in¹¹² a mountain and other places. The atoms are conceived because the saints cognize them.

Saha-vedana, co-cognition possible

65. When¹¹³ two persons (look at an object) in a place, it is an invariable rule that they have simultaneous cognition of it; it is also the law of nature that knowledge with its content (lit. knowable) are invariably cognized at once.¹¹⁴

66. There¹¹⁵ is no cognizer other than knowledge and the visual knowledge is no more cognizer in the absence of visible objects, and therefore their cognition is simultaneous but this co-cognition is not due to the identity between the object, i.e. patch of blue and its cognizer.

67. If¹¹⁶ the consciousness is not in the mood of cognizer or the knowledge is bereft of an object, then only that could reasonably be stated so and not otherwise.¹¹⁷

68. If¹¹⁸ the term *saha* is employed to signify one and the same time the reason (i.e. *Sahopalambha*) becomes indefinite in all respects (*anaikantika*) when it is applied to the Buddha's knowledge which co-exists with its content, other's mind (*jneyacetasa*) and the mind that co-exists with mental properties (*citta-caittaisca*).

69. If¹¹⁹ the mental properties are not illusory as they are sanctioned in the scriptures; how do you then say that the knowledge of the ghost,¹²⁰ hell and others is an illusion?

70. If,¹²¹ even in the absence of any relevancy some distinction (between the idea of the hell, etc. and the mental elements) saves your difficulty (lit. serves your purpose), that distinction is absolutely unproved, yet you cherish it proved; thus your rejoinder is based again on illusion.

71. The¹²² term 'saha' co-existence is never employed in the world in any place where a companion is not available. The reason (*hetu*—*Sahopalambha*) will then be a contradictory one if there is really a co-cognition.

72. If¹²³ the term *Saha* 'co-existence' is taken to mean one and the same thing (*ekartha*) then *hetu* would be unproved (*asiddha*) for other party;¹²⁴ for example when some common things are present, how does only one person look at them?

73. If¹²⁵ every mind of other living beings is cognized by the knowledge of the omniscient being, then, where is it proved that only one person experiences it (*ekena upalambha*)?

74. The¹²⁶ object-cause felt by a person internally in his own mind cannot be denied by any other person, as there can be no evidence for doing so.

The reason (*hetu*) further becomes doubtful and unproved on the ground that it is, in its very nature, far removed, i.e. beyond the reach of other's cognizance (*svabhava-viprakṛsta = nan-bhin. bhal. ba*).

75. If¹²⁷ the reason (*hetu*) considered to be proved as a result of the denial of external things and (thus leading to the conclusion) that one aspect of the consciousness itself is cognizable, then the reason would be known to only one party¹²⁸ who plead for the doctrine of mind alone (*cittamatratā*).

76. If¹²⁹ you consider it a proven fact that the knowledge and the knowable flash out as identical (*aprthakbhāsa*), then the reason would simply prove what is already proved. Even the advocate of knowledge having the capacity to assume the image of the object (*sakarañjanavadin*) would not dispute here in this matter¹³⁰ (thus leading to *siddhasadhanatā*).

77. If you¹³¹ conceive the object-cause as identical (with its knowledge) how is it that the object-cause is cognized distinctly from the knowledge?

78. Suppose,¹³² for example, a man, while experiencing an external object (*artha*), has joyful feelings in this wise: this shell is black, if these feelings are regarded as coming from the knowledge itself this will be improbable in the absence of experience of the object in that fashion.¹³³

79. If¹³⁴ certain imaginary form (*kalpita-rupa* i.e. black) of knowledge is experienced, then its real form is not experienced; therefore the reason (*Sahopalambha*) is not proper to set up.

80. For¹³⁵ this reason two forms¹³⁶ of the knowledge are to be experienced in the same manner as the double moon is

looked at by some. Thus the author's (= Dharmakirti) statement of "one" (*abheda*) becomes unfounded.

81. The¹³⁷ causal factors (*samagri*)¹³⁸ of the preceeding moment give rise to a full cognition of the object in the next moment just in the same fashion as a visible object (*rupa*) in association with the light produces its cognition, due to which fact a successive¹³⁹ cognition (*sahavedana*) would become justifiable.

82. When¹⁴⁰ the knowledge and its sense-organ happen to be just one after another (*purvapara*) the term co-cognition (*sahavedana*) is used by way of similarity (with a simultaneous phenomenon) but never there is literally co-cognition (*sahavedanam na arthatah*).

83. Since¹⁴¹ the knowledge-content is felt internally, it is no entity other than the self of knowledge; to the advocate of the system of maintaining the knowledge possessing a knowable aspect in itself the reason becomes undetermined.¹⁴²

84. Since¹⁴³ it is the law of nature that a knowledge cognizes its content (*jnanam vetti*), the knowledge is said to be cognized; since the content produces the knowledge as reflector of itself it is considered as cognized.¹⁴⁴

85. Though¹⁴⁵ the term 'cognized' (*samvedya*) is applied equally to the knowledge and its content, its import is quite different. For, the wild cow, etc, e.g. are not regarded of the (same) forms, *visanin*, horned figure on account of^{145A} the usage of the term, cow, etc.

86. There¹⁴⁶ are certain dharmas which are contemplated in the minds of other streams of elements (*santanantara*) are perceived by the knowledge of the Omniscient (*Sarvajna*). Then the reason (when it is applied to those dharmas) becomes uncertain,^{146A} *anaikantika* (because they are perceived simultaneously, yet distinct from the knowledge of the Omniscient). If he does not comprehend them, how can he be an Omniscient?^{146B}

87. In¹⁴⁷ the system of the image-invested knowledge (of the Sautrantika) the knowledge is perceived only when it reflects the image of an object. If you desire to prove the identity of the knowledge with its reflected image the reason would then, simply achieve what is already achieved (*siddha-sadhanata*).

88. The¹⁴⁸ external thing (*artha*) produces in the knowledge an image similar to itself and as a result of this fact it is

considered as perceived figuratively.¹⁴⁹ The external thing is not at all perceived and hence its identity with knowledge will not be proved.

89. If¹⁵⁰ you ask: How is the knowledge (or consciousness) considered to be the cognizer of its object? (we answer:) the consciousness is characterized as (if it is) measuring the object (*tat pariccheda laksana*) and therefore no query should be made as to: how is it and what like it is?

90. (In¹⁵¹ the system of the Sautrantika-Yogacaras) an image is aroused and imprinted in consciousness by the external things; how could it be said that the consciousness is a measurer of the external thing (*artha-paricchedaka*)?

91. Consciousness¹⁵² (by law of nature) is considered to be entirely a comprehending agent and hence it is irrelevant to ask how the consciousness would comprehend its own object.¹⁵³

92. The¹⁵⁴ consciousness is not creator of any thing and in fact, it is functionless. Its characteristic, however, is mere awareness of the presence of an object¹⁵⁵ (*vittimatra*), but the act of creation, is attributed to it by imposition (*sumaropa*).

93. Just¹⁵⁶ as a saint of detached vision enters into the self of knowledge (*jñāna-rupa*), etc. so also the person of a meagre vision enters into it.

94. No¹⁵⁷ distinction exists between the Saint and the worldling so far as their knowledge alone is concerned. But the great souls however, are distinguished by their knowledge of varied aspects¹⁵⁸ (*Sarvakaradhi*).

95. Do¹⁵⁹ we enquire into the knowledge of the Buddha whether it assumes the image of the object or does not, and again whether it comprehends the object simultaneously or successively.¹⁶⁰

Akara-vada disproved

96. What¹⁹¹ image according to you, presumably exists as pertaining to an object-knowledge, that image exists in fact only in the external thing like the visible element (*rupa*), etc. but it is assumed to exist in the knowledge.¹⁶²

97. It¹⁶³ is irrelevant to say that not any cognizable thing exists for the Saint who has given up all obscurations¹⁶⁴ (*avarana*); for, he is anchored in this cognizable (world); how can it be substituted and equalized to the mind alone (*tanmatra-sama*)?

98. Our,¹⁶⁵ intellect is sole demonstrating agent whether the external thing exists or does not exist. There really exist the external objects to which fact no contradiction is experienced,¹⁶⁶ for example in the case of eye-disease, etc. some figure is observed even when there is not any figure.

99. Likewise¹⁶⁶ one thinks that he experiences in the knowledge a patch of blue and accordingly imposes upon the knowledge the presence of the blue image but in fact no such image exists in it.

100. The¹⁶⁷ assumption that the image exists in the knowledge or does not exist is a type of consciousness in the nature of a productive imagination (*kalpanatma*). The consciousness, however, becomes differentiated due to *visesa*, individual characteristic of the observed object.¹⁶⁸

101. You¹⁶⁹ plead that the knowledge which is in fact imageless¹⁷⁰ experiences its unreal image, I likewise, advocate that the imageless knowledge experiences the real external thing.

102. There¹⁷¹ is not a distinct self of the knowledge (in the form of a separate knowable aspect); for, to assume it would contradict the non-dual essence of the knowledge (*advaya-jnana*). No unreal image could be experienced by the knowledge; (if the image is experienced) it would turn to be non-illusory.

103. If¹⁷² (you argue that) the above arrangement has been made in accordance with the presumption under the influence of the deep rooted illusion, then the image of the knowledge ought to be viewed as illusory,¹⁷³ otherwise how could it be an assumed image?

104. Hence¹⁷⁴ consciousness which is imageless in truth, would comprehend (*pariccid*) through the agency of the material eye, etc. all the fitting things whether existent or non-existent.¹⁷⁵

105. If¹⁷⁶ (you say that) just as the lamp¹⁷⁷ illumines the self as well as others, just so the consciousness (illumines) the selves of two *alambanas*¹⁷⁸ (of one kind); then, there would be no contradiction at all.

106. However¹⁷⁹ the various objects, visible, sound etc. are domains of various¹⁸⁰ sense-organs; hence they cannot be experienced by one sense-organ.

107a-b. (According to you) even when different causes are absent the knowledge is experienced as (in the presence of) *alambana*.¹⁸¹

107c-9a. A¹⁸² knowledge arises from an external object as similar to it and that knowledge in the immediately next moment bears an image similar to that external thing:—this contention is a simple illusion¹⁸³; for, the knowledge does not exist as permanent (to assume the image of the object). Further there is not any experience of the self of the knowledge similar to the object at the moment when the object becomes illuminated.

109b-10a. In¹⁸⁴ every mind the knowledge form¹⁸⁵ is uniform—if this view is favoured, it could not be stated particularly, it is similar to this object.

110b-d. When¹⁸⁶ this (knowledge) illumines the cognizable thing no knowledge immediately after that would appear, because it becomes entirely assimilated with its content¹⁸⁷ (*visaya*).

111-12b. If,¹⁸⁸ while the knowledge lights up just a patch of blue, etc. the knowledge lighting up the patch of blue, etc. exists immediately after that, and then, if it exists having the patch of blue as its content, then at that time the knowledge is not similar to the object. True, it exists indeed, but never similar (to its content).

Grahya aspect criticised

112c-13. The¹⁸⁹ Tathagata's saying, for example, that all is impermanent and sorrowful does not exhibit as content the cognizable aspect of knowledge (*grahyabhaga*).

If you are inclined to plead that since the object-cause (*alambana*) is not fit to exist in the external, the cognizable aspect of the knowledge is accepted as the content, then the characteristic¹⁹⁰ of the content cannot appropriately be applied to it (\equiv content).

114. How¹⁹¹ does the mind exist as separated from its act of construction?¹⁹² That idea is only a fancy of your mind (*cittasvabhava*). There does not exist the mind shedding light on its content, because the latter is not available (for you) other the mind itself.

115a-b. If¹⁹³ there is nothing productive (of the knowledge), how is it at all desired¹⁹⁴ (as content)?

Discussion on the actual object

115c-16b. The¹⁹⁵ simple atoms and the co-agulated atoms (in your system) are not the object-causes, because they lack one requisite (*anga*) each.¹⁹⁶ How is the denial of both (simple and co-agulated atoms) cherished?

116c-17b. The¹⁹⁷ knowledge in the form of cognizer is devoid of two characteristics (of *alambana*, viz. objectivity and causality). Then if there is no object-cause (*alambana*) (for you) the cognizable aspect of knowledge is also not accepted (by us).

117c-18b. The¹⁹⁸ opinion that a similar¹⁹⁹ knowledge of the previous moment serves as the object-cause (of the next following knowledge) is also improper; for, no knowledge flashes up (*bhati*) immediately after a similar knowledge.

118c-19b. If²⁰⁰ the knowledge in the form of a visible object (*rupa*) arises due to contact with the knowledge of the sound, how will that knowledge of *rupa* be similar to the *alambana*, i.e. sound?²⁰¹

119c-20b. Some²⁰² consider that a force (*sakti*) producing a knowledge akin to its content is the object-cause.²⁰³ This opinion is also improper; for, no force, *sakti* is reflected in the sensuous knowledge.

120c-21b. If²⁰⁴ (you again argue that) the objectivity lies in the cognizable part of knowledge and that alone remains invariably as the object, (we may reply that) the external thing (*artha*) (as the object) has been proved from the standpoint of the world and therefore its characteristic as *alambana* exists indeed though not expressly stated.

121c-22b. If²⁰⁵ you say that the force of knowledge is also quite familiar with the world, it is not definitely proved as the content (*artha*). If it lacks the characteristic²⁰⁶ (of *alambana*) how can it be *alambana*?

122c-23b. (Thus)²⁰⁷ it is proper to maintain on close scrutiny that the external object-cause alone is desirable on the authority of the world and scripture, but never the cognizable aspect of knowledge by any means.²⁰⁸

123c-24b. The²⁰⁹ objects like desirable and undesirable²¹⁰ never exist in the external in truth and hence all this is nothing but mind: this contention is absolutely irrelevant.

124c-25b. On²¹¹ certain unpleasant material object if one meditates as good (he experiences it as good); for, the result becomes distinguished with some benefaction on account of varied causes.²¹²

125c-26b. Certain²¹³ knowledge relating to an object (*artha*) reflects (the same object) as a patch of bluish (*vinilaka*) and immediately after that (the object) turns to be in the form of unpleasant thing, etc. (*duhkharupadi*) on account of meditation; likewise it may become otherwise on account of other causes.

126c-27b. Feelings²¹⁴ like joy, sorrow and dullness are all become differentiated by virtue of kinds of meditation but they never arise from any kind of external things—if this is your contention; how is it proper?

127c-28b. (The²¹⁵ Idealist continues) All your refutations are made on the assumption (of external things) (*aropa*); Why is it unreasonable to accept the truth of no *alambana* in the external? The external things we establish by virtue of their efficiency (*arthakriya*) and we negate them when there is no efficiency.

128c-30c. If²¹⁶ you say, even in the absence of the external things the purposive action²¹⁷ is achieved and therefore the external things are not accepted, then we may reply that we establish their existence not merely on account of their efficiency, but also on account of efficiency being witnessed even in the case of their perverted knowledge (*viparyaya-jnana*).

130d-31c. But²¹⁸ again as a result of securing the external things good or harm could be afflicted to the body; some sort of simple efficiency (*kriyamatra*)²¹⁹ is experienced even in the case of a mistaken notion (*vibhrama*) of some thing present for something absent.

131d-132c. As²²⁰ to the argument based on the sexual act (*kama-carita*)²²¹ in dream, we may say that the semen-discharge is a necessary phenomenon. If one has not that phenomenon, how can he be considered to have gained the sexual pleasure (one of the four purposes of human actions)?

132d-133c. Since²²² the semen-discharge and the extreme passion (*raga*) are specially related (to each other) the former happens also on the occasion other than the dream; for example when one embraces a woman out of extreme love no contradiction is felt to the phenomenon of semen-discharge.

133d-134c. If,²²³ in the presence of a woman, the discharge happens out of extreme passion why does one not discharge the nail, the tooth, etc. as he discharges semen in dream ?

134d-135c. If,²²⁴ in the absence of a woman, the discharge happens out of extreme passion, why does he not discharge the nail, the tooth, etc. as he discharges semen in dream ?

135d-136b. The²²⁵ semen being discharged out of extreme passion (*raga*)²²⁶ the purpose of life is fulfilled:—this idea is not a happy one.

136d-137b. For²²⁷ example, when it is not spoken even as a simple act,²²⁸ the gain of the son, etc. that are experienced in dream as realities are all contradicted to the actually perceptual experiences.

137c-138c. Since²²⁹ there really exist the keepers²³⁰ of the hell, etc. as produced from the said acts, the system of everything as a reflected image of consciousness is neither admissible nor is any purposive action in dream possible. Therefore the doctrine of *Cittamatratā* "mind alone" becomes unproved.

138d-139c. When²³¹ different living bodies are evident for proving the existence of other minds, the existence of the hell also may likewise, be (entertained). On what evidence then do you deny the existence of other living beings ?²³²

139d-140c. Similarly²³³ the god (i.e. Garuda) bestowing the boon of reviving the life (*anugraha*) on the person who is dead on account venom poured out from the hood (of a serpent) remains true in his promise.²³⁴

140d-141b. In²³⁵ the absence of preliminary²³⁶ rites efficient act can not be accomplished; therefore that (efficient act) is not a simple creation of the mind.

141c-d. Why²³⁷ is the knowledge of the others' thought-discerner is untrue (*ayathartha*) ?²³⁸

142. When²³⁹ other's mind being present our knowledge enters into it (that knowledge is considered to be its cognizer). (or) when some object being present, the knowledge assumes the image²⁴⁰ of that object, then the knowledge is considered to be its cognizer.

143a-c. The²⁴¹ grasping of an object (by the mind) is not an act similar to that of running²⁴² towards its object, just immediately after which the knowledge would arise.

143d-144b. So²⁴³ also is the case with the knowledge of one's own mind.²⁴⁴ (In both the cases) the mind is regarded as cognizer in the manner above described (i.e. *pariccheda-laksana*).

144c-145b. The²⁴⁵ memory is a mind being directed towards the past thing. What is directed towards the past (*bhuta=yan-dag*) is not a cognition²⁴⁶ (*graha*) because that mind does not flash up from its cause.

145c-146b. The²⁴⁷ non-dual form (*advaya-rupa*) which is (supposed to be) domain of the well-awakened (*Sambuddha*) is not cognizable to us and therefore²⁴⁸ untrue (*ayathartha*). What is said to be untrue, is un-satisfactory because of the non-dual nature (*advayatvat*) of the knowledge.

146c-147b. The²⁴⁹ Buddha is Omniscient because he comprehends the entire cognizable universe through the agency of his cognizing knowledge, and not because he does so in a non-dual form.²⁵⁰

147c-148c. To²⁵¹ what is said (by Dignaga), viz. a non-describable form is cognized (by one's own self, we now ask:) What²⁵² is cognized by other person, is it possible to describe because the other's mind can be comprehended?

148d-49. Then²⁵³ there exists definitely the object-cause in the external and therefore every mind is not at all (proved to be) objectless (*niralambana*). If the mind has not any cognizable in the external anywhere, how could one become omniscient?²⁵⁴

150-151b. By²⁵⁵ comprehending one's own mind alone there may be nothing but the self-knowledge of the mind (*svasamvedana*).

If any one is supposed to be omniscient by merely comprehending one's own mind and he is known to be a separate individual then there would be no realisation of the mind alone (*cittamatra-darsana*).

151c-152b. If²⁵⁶ you think that this defect is obviated in view of the fact that the knowledge is non-dual in its nature, how, then does that (non-dual) knowledge comprehend its content?

152c- (If²⁵⁷ you say again, that) when the knowledge becomes freed from every kind of dual form then it comprehends the universe in all aspects—this saying is indeed a matter of great wonder. Therefore there is one (i.e. omniscient) in the nature of comprehending (*grahaka-rupa*) (the entire universe).

153. There²⁵⁸ is not any person known to us as omniscient—says a self-styled wiseman²⁵⁹ amongst the so called learned persons; but this saying reveals his dull intellect (*sva-durmati*) being engrossed in it.

154. As²⁶⁰ the actual experiences dictate it is possible that as a result of contemplation on certain definite antidote the whole group of desire and other defilements are entirely destroyed.

155. But²⁶¹ there is hardly any possibility of applying an antidote in the case (of the Yogacara conception of emancipation; for the Yogacara holds) that the mind of all worldlings is under the firm grip of dual forms (subject and object) and this idea of dual form may be destroyed by contemplation on some object.

156. The²⁶² knowledge which flashes out in the form 'this is void (*sunya*)' is related to (lit. entered into) to the said dual forms and such knowledge being associated with dual forms; how can it serve as an antidote?²⁶³

157. Just²⁶⁴ as one meditating on a desirable object does not destroy his desire, just so a man meditating on a thing in dual form does not destroy the idea of dual form.

158. Assuming²⁶⁵ in the mind an idea of entity²⁶⁶ one contemplates upon it of no-soul. But the principle of non-duality, a mere word has not any purpose (*nirartha*) and hence a contemplation upon it will be quite unnecessary.

159. The²⁶⁷ contemplation upon impermanence frees one quickly from the delusion of permanence. (-a reasonable proposition). (But in your system) by discarding every kind of perceptual experiences one necessarily secures Buddhahood (not a reasonable proposition).

160. The²⁶⁸ person who is free from every kind of perceptual experiences is completely inactive. Thus Buddhahood is desired (by you) without making any effort and practice.²⁶⁹

161. Therefore²⁷⁰ the state of well-faring (*Saugata-pada*) i.e. Buddhahood is secured on constant practice of compassion towards the sentient beings, doing good for them, and meditating on every manifested elements of existence as impermanent (*samas krtanitya*).²⁷¹

162. When²⁷² one entertains the idea of mind alone, how could he fulfil the preliminary duties such as charity, etc. In the absence of charity there is no possibility of one obtaining the Buddhahood.

163. If²⁷³ you argue that under the influence of mutual causation and on the principle²⁷⁴ of mind-alone thought arises in the form of acts like giving and taking the charity. That cannot be proved either by percaption, inference or reliable scripture. Such system is only a presumption and it is nothing but a verbal eloquence.

165. When²⁷⁵ one practises repeatedly and several times mentally a charity-thought (i.e. the thought in the form of charity) it never releases anybody from poverty.

166. Even²⁷⁶ if innumerable thoughts (*manaskara*) of Yogins are meditated upon (by us) neither happiness is gained nor misery is removed in reality.

167. In²⁷⁷ doling out everything (material) to all living beings and in fulfilling the charity of compassion there exists no distinction in the nature of things (*arthatmana=arthasvarupa*) however, in practising the compassion-charity we have a prohibitive injunction not to give certain²⁷⁸ things (viz. three garments, etc).

168. There²⁷⁹ was great Decease of the Buddha in the world and we have his relic now as his mortal remains. The mansion and monastery, etc. are witnessed by us; how can they be products of the mind-alone²⁸⁰ (lit. *paratantra*) ?

169. If²⁸¹ these things have no existence of their own how can we infer therefrom the great events of the past ? If the past events are not inferred, the whole system would be reduced into an extreme materialism (*lokayata*).

170. A²⁹² man witnessing the relics of the Saint who is purified through emancipation of the Sravaka, disciple becomes free from passions. If he has no recollection (lit. inference) of the past event, how can he entertain the faith (in his relics) ?

171. If²⁸⁴ (you say) it is produced by succession (*prabandha*) of people the life is seen to be cut off. If you again say that one continues to exist due to other, how would there be complete and last deliverance²⁸⁵ (*parinirvana*) ?

172. It²⁸⁶ is the settled fact in the worldly system that from the seed, etc. come up sprout, etc. and therefore there is not any sound reasoning for the plea that the whole universe is nothing but the mind.

173. When²⁸⁷ a knowledge arises immediately after a knowledge, the subsequent knowledge is the result of the previous knowledge-cause.²⁸⁸ This rule is also not permissible (in your system).

174. Thus,²⁸⁹ (e.g.) there would arise the knowledge of smoke in the absence of the knowledge of the²⁹⁰ fire, and also the knowledge of the sprout would arise from non-knowledge of the seed.

175. If²⁹¹ you plead that mind perfumed by the knowledge of the fire produces (lit. is the cause of) the knowledge of the smoke; when there are several potentialities (*sakti*) in the mind, wherefrom could arise the thought of distinction?

176. If²⁹² the cause immediately preceeding knowledge (or mind) of fire is the cause of the mind of the smoke, that also is not good; for, the mind of fire is not definite (=concomitant) with the mind of smoke.

177. When²⁹³ the concomitance is completely unproved how do the people talk in the unmixed terms about the cause thus: this result arises from that cause?

178. Therefore²⁹⁴ the doctrine that the whole universe is *Chittamatra*, 'mind-alone' has been declared (by the Buddha) aiming at the imaginary or assumed aspect of the external things (*kalpitam asritya*) but not because the matter, etc. are improbable to exist.²⁹⁵

179. For²⁹⁶ what (object) one may display desire and other passions, Buddha viewing that object as merely an imaginary (*kalpita* = *Vikalpita*) has preached the doctrine of no-soul with reference to these (the assumed) things^{296a} in order to remove all such passions (*dosa*) of the worldings.

180. Similarly ²⁹⁷ in other places too the Buddha has stated that the external things do not exist in such forms as are assumed by the ordinary worldings.²⁹⁸ Why is it so? (Buddha's knowledge) is superior to (that of ordinary worldings).

181. Since²⁹⁹ some sort of agent has been just previously stated and the duties are understood alongside of the attachment

towards an agent as real the idea of agent as real is necessarily to be negated.³⁰⁰

182-183. In³⁰¹ other places it has been likewise declared thus: There is something inferred (*kalpita*) and some other thing fancied, *vikalpita* (= *parikalpita*). The true form of *dharmata* (*dharmata-rupa* = *gzugs* = form = *svarupa*) has been explained thus; *dharmata* is *svalaksana*, self-essence. What is *kalpita* is no other than a basic reality (*bhavamatra*), and the *vikalpita* is its diversity (*bheda*). This diversity of *dharmata* will be inappropriate in the absence of *bhava*³⁰² (some basic entity, i.e. atoms).

184. If³⁰³ the *Rupa* is declared to be *sunya* (devoid of *rupa*-nature) how the term *rupa* is employed on it? If you argue that it is done so on the assumption of the *rupa*-nature, what is the ultimate objective (*phala*) gained³⁰⁴ (therefrom)?

185. Of³⁰⁵ what object any contradiction is impossible to exist that object thereby is verily existing.³⁰⁶ (But, for the opponents) since everything is non-existing their experiences are not really there as in the dream.³⁰⁷

186. The³⁰⁸ advocates of the external reality point out to the Idealist (*citta-matrata-vadin*) thus: Let the men of erudition investigate whether this (my conclusion) is just appropriate or not.

187. But³⁰⁹ I have no wonderful (wise) knowledge suited to investigate what is right and what is wrong; I have however stated in brief the truths propounded by other masters.

188. The³¹⁰ wise men realize the destruction of ignorance darkness by means of the lustre of their true knowledge. Henceforth let the unlearned get purified in the path of the great men.

NOTES

1. This verse may be rendered into Sanskrit :
परिपूर्णं च यः स्वार्थं परार्थं सर्वथाऽखलम् ।
अकरोत्तं प्रणम्यार्थसिद्ध्यावर्धी निरूप्यते ॥ १ ॥
2. In accordance with the tradition the author speaks of the Buddha as possessing two qualities, *svārtha* and *parārtha* as done by Vasubandhu (Kosa, I, ver. 1), Dignaga (Pram. Sam. I. ver.-1. with *virtti*. v, my Review in ALB,) and the author of the Sutralankara (=Kalpanamandatika), Chap. I (v. my Sanskrit text, published in the journal of Sri Venkata. Institute, Tirupati, 1941).
3. स्वस्थनेलादिविज्ञानविषयार्थो न बाह्यचकः ।
स्वप्नद्विचन्द्रधीकल्पो ऽष्टात्वादर्थविभासनात् ॥ २ ॥
a. lit ज्ञानत्वात्—*Jnanatva* as *Sadhana*, reason is referred to in the verse 29 below.
4. This is the conclusion arrived at in the Vimsatika and the Alambana-pariksa.
5. बाह्यार्थः साध्यते नेति बुद्धिमात्रत्ववादिना ।
अविसंवाददृष्ट्यादावस्तिवादस्तु कथ्यते ॥ ३ ॥
6. Dharmakirti's definition of *pramana* is: प्रमाणमविसंवादि ज्ञानम्, अर्थक्रियास्थितिः संवादनम्.....1 Pram. vartika, I, ver. 1. Subhagupta's one of the arguments to prove his externalism is *avisamvadtva*; cfr. Tatt. San. panjika. p. 574, ll. 20, ff.
7. ज्ञानस्य च ऽविसंवादात् रूपादीनामयोगतः ।
आलम्बनं क्वचिन्न स्यात् उभयं तन्न शोभनम् ॥ ४ ॥
8. स्वाङ्गच्छेदादयो दृष्टाः स्वप्ने [ये] न भवन्ति ते ।
यद्यर्थनीतिनस्तीति प्रबुद्धस्य तथा ऽननु ॥ ५ ॥
a = the word is used to bring out the Tib. expression: *mi-gyur-ram* implying a simple query.
9. कायस्फीतिः शिरश्छेदो बोधे स्वप्नसमा मता ।
इति चेत् त्वं कुतो ह्यल यत्नवान् नष्टलाभयोः ॥ ६ ॥
10. The Realists, while opposing the extreme idealism, genrally raises such objection as the present one to prove its absurdity. It may be interesting to Compare a European parallel: Dr.

Johnson is said to have expressed his opinion on Berkeley's philosophy by kicking "a stone with his foot and saying: No, Sir, I prove it wrong (Sir James Jean, *Mysterious Universe*, the Bridge series, p. 71).

11. भ्रान्त्या सर्वप्रवृत्तिश्चेत् नास्ति नामविपर्ययः ।
अभ्रान्तमविसंवादि ज्ञानं a भ्रान्तं विसंवदेत् ॥ ७ ॥
a = विसंवादि भ्राम्यति ।
12. In the illusion there is always a perversion in naming things ;
e.g. in rope-snake illusion the snake-name is mistaken for the rope-name.
13. देशात् कालादनव्यस्य ज्ञानं यन्न विसंवदेत् ।
तदभ्रान्तं पुनर्ज्ञानं नाव्यदभ्रान्तलक्षणम् ॥ ८ ॥
14. The idea meant here is this: Time and space are not different from the material things, i.e. atoms; cp. *Nya. binda-pradipa* p.44. नीलमेव हि भास्मानं देशः नापरो देशः कश्चिदाभासते । and *Pram. va. bhasya*, p. 188: न देशो नामापरो रूपादिभ्यः । The Buddhists including the Sarvasti-vadin maintain that every thing is momentary and the moment is no other than the thing itself.
15. दीर्घसूक्ष्मादिकज्ञानात् योगीति तु विशेषितः ।
असर्वज्ञः प्रसज्येत नोभयतोभागमुक्तकः ॥ ९ ॥
विसंवदति बुद्धत्वम् ।
16. A partly definition of yogin.
17. This is explained in the *Puggalappannatti*, p. 145 : इधेकञ्चो पुग्गलो अट्ठ विमोवखे कायेन फुसित्वा विहरति । पठ्जय चस्स दिस्वा आसवा परिकखीणा होति । अयं वुच्चति पुग्गलो उभतो भागविमुत्तो । *Abh-kosa* (Poussin, VI, p. 276) ; One who is entered in *Nirodhasamaptti* is named 'doubly delivered', because by force of *prajna* and *Samadhi* he is delivered from *klesa-avarana* and *vimoksa-avarana* (cp. 8 *vimoksas* in VIII, p. 205) Satya siddhi, chap. 163 (Eng. Summary) If he gains both, he is *ubhayato-bhaga-vimukta*; for the defilement is one part and the element hindering dhyana-concentration is another part. (v. also chap. x. end) V. Magga (XXI para 78).
अरूपज्ज्ञानेन चैव अरियमग्गेन चाति उभतो भागेन विमुत्तो ति उभतो भागविमुत्तो ।

18. यथावदस्तिबो *a* धनाम् ।
 स्वप्नादिवच्च निखिलम्, विसंवादासंभवः कुतः ॥ १० ॥
a = अस्तीति यथावत्प्रतीतिः ।
19. दृढवासनया चेत् स्यात् उक्तः स्वप्नश्च नो कुतः ।
 ग्रामारामप्रभेदाद्या दृश्यभूतास्ततः पुनः ॥ ११ ॥
20. अनिन्द्रियार्थादिबुद्धिवासनाक्षणिकत्वतः ।
 विपाकाप्तिव्यवहृता ह्यक्षार्था दृढहेतवः ॥ १२ ॥
21. It is difficult to understand the author's intention here. According to Abh. kosa theory of momentariness is applicable to the elements both internal and external. It is the Theravadin who makes a distinction in applying it to the elements and pleads that the material elements continue to exist for 17 thought-moments (v, Abh. Athasan, IV. 86. Kosambi's Tika, p. 67). Despite the momentary-theory the Vaibhasika maintains that karman produces its fruits through *avijnapti* which continues to exist on the support of four great elements (v. kosa, I. 11). This may not hold good in the Yogacara system.
22. यस्य ज्ञानमेकरसमिन्द्रियार्थान्न जायते ।
 तस्य तस्य स्वभावश्च [2036] किं ध्रुवोऽयं वा ॥ १३ ॥
23. *Ekarasa-jnana* = *advaya-jnana* of the Yogacara which is dichomotized into subject and object due to premordial force, (*anadi-vasana*). It is somewhat similar to the Sautrantika's *ekarasa-skandha-jnana*, v. Masuda, sects p. 68 with note 1.
24. निद्रादिसाम्यवत्त्वाच्चेत् तद्विपाककरो न किम् ।
 विद्यमाने *a* पाकहेतौ न युक्तः पाकसंक्षयः ॥ १४ ॥
a = *Jnana-svabhava*.
25. दृष्टं स्वप्ने निद्रितस्य नोर्ध्वं *a* मस्ति ततोऽवध्रुम्
 सम्भवति यथा तेन परिपक्वात्मनः क्षयः ॥ १५ ॥
a = Tib. de-ma-phyir-mi-brten-shin.
26. *a* यस्येन्द्रियार्यवैकल्यात् देशनाकारणं न च ।
 (तस्य) पुनर्विपाकाप्तियोग्या स्याच्च परिक्षयात् ॥ १६ ॥
a = Read in Tib. *gan.-gi* for *gan-gis*.

27. The idea seems to be this: when the Yogacara denies the external things, there will be no occasion for preaching dharma or listening to it and arousing the right view which leads to the destruction of Vipaka. Dharmakirti, however, defends his position thus: केवलं लोकबुद्ध्यैव बाह्यचिन्ता प्रवर्तते । Pram, va. ver. 220.
28. दृढसं *a* वादवास्तवत्वात् क्रियते च कुतो मतम् ।
रूपादीनामयोग्यत्वादिति चेत् वाच्यमुत्तरम् *b* ॥ १७ ॥
a = दृढाविसंवाद वासनया ।
b = See the verse 29.
29. परिपाकाश्रयतयाऽविसंवादः प्रबोधने ।
तिमिरमाश्रयो यावत्तावन्ना *a* संवादः कुतो न च ॥ १८ ॥
a = नासंवाद-अविसंवादः
30. The knowledge of the eye-diseased person (*taimirika*) is, however, contradicted at once.
31. तद्बुद्ध्या तु प्रवृत्तेश्च भ्रान्तालम्बनतोऽन्तरा ।
तद्बुद्ध्यसत्त्वेऽविसंवादात् न तद्बुद्धिकृतमिष्यते ॥ १९ ॥
- 31a. cp. Nya, bindu-Tippāni, p. 19 : सर्वमालम्बने । भ्रान्तं मुक्त्वा ताथागत-ज्ञानम् । Every perceptual knowledge is illusive so far as its object is concerned.
32. आरोपपरिपाकस्य शक्तेर्वस्त्वन्तरोद्भवात् ।
स्वात्मतो जायते नैव कुसुमाच्च तिलं यथा ॥ २० ॥
33. This Sakti, according to the Idealist comes into existence from the self of consciousness and not from some other external causes.
34. भवादिभ्यो यथा *a* बीजं यज्जातं यत एव च ।
समानं तच्च तेनैव फलोत्पत्तेश्च वासना ॥ २१ ॥
नारोप्या धूमतेजोवत्
a = जायते is to be added from the previous sentence.
35. This is probably *anadikalika-vasana* accepted by the Idealists to account for the universal causation *cfr*, Madh. avatara, VI, ver. 46 with Bhasya, my sanskrit text, p. 42-43; Bud. Logic II, p. 367 with note 3 and p. 400 Jinendrabudhi's comment: Every notion of causation is produced by Biotic Force; and Alambanapariksa, ver. 8.

36. वस्त्वन्तरोद्भवात् किञ्चित् कर्मणो वास्यते यथा ।
जातीपुष्पैश्च संसृष्ट्या गन्ध उत्पद्यते तिले ॥ २२ ॥
37. Jati flower as a factor in producing fragrance is a common example in Indian Sastraic literature, *cp.* Kosavy. II p.39. 22
38. तलोपादानविज्ञानाज्जायते ज्ञानसप्तकम् ।
तत्र तद्वीज आरोप्य स्थितश्चपि विपच्यते ॥ २३ ॥
39. अतो भावान्तराज्जातो भावो नास्तीति वासना ।
नारोप्य वर्धनायोग्या इत्याह शाक्तविज्जनः ॥ २४ ॥
40. Here Sakti-vadin is the Sautrantika. According to him seven kinds of consciousness (five sensuous, one non-sensuous consciousness and one mind) are produced from their *upadana* consciousness, a subtle mind in possession of all seeds, something resembling the Alaya-consciousness of the yogacarin. The-sautrantika contradicts the *vasana* theory postulated by the latter on the assumption that nothing is produced from anything but the mind = Alaya-consciousness, or the Sautrantika's subtle mind, *v. Et. Lamotte, Histoire du Bouddhisme, p. 673; and Masuda, Sects p. 68.* The *kosa* speaks of the seven types of *vijnana* in this line : षड्विज्ञानान्यथो मनः/ (I, 16).

We may note here a parallel discussion between the Yogacara and the Sautrantika as reproduced by the Stcherbatsky from Vacaspati's *Nyayakanika* : (The Yogacara:) (The external object is superfluous, there is in the internal) Biotic force which accidentally becomes mature and evokes an idea ; this is also accidental (and changing concomitantly with a change its cause). (The Sautrantika :) But, is it not your Biotic force in this case simply the force of the subject thought contained in one continuous stream, the force to produce out of itself, a corresponding the objective thought, *Bud. Logic, II. p. 367-68*). One interesting reference to the Sautrantika may be noticed here : सौलान्तिकनयेन त्वविरोध एव । यस्मादस्य संस्कारपरिभविताः षड्विज्ञानकायाः संस्कारप्रत्ययं विज्ञानमिदं न प्रतिसन्धिविज्ञानमेवेति । *Arthaviniscaya Sutratika*. The idea probably meant here that the six consciousness-bodies are conditioned by *Samskara*, a subtle Sakti formed from the experience of external things; *cp.* the ver. 27 below the same idea.

41. स्वतन्त्रादयः जायेताविग *a* मज्ञानमत च ।
यथोक्त बीजं पच्येत तेन तुल्यं ममापि चेत् ॥ २५ ॥
a = प्रवृत्तिविज्ञान ।
- 42.
43. पक्षस्यास्य विरुद्धत्वादुपदाज्ञाननिश्चयः ।
उभयोस्तुल्यमिति चेत् न युक्तोऽन्योन्यनिश्चयः ॥ २६ ॥
44. Pravrtti-vijnana depends on upadana-vijnana and the latter again on the former to produce it.
45. यस्येन्द्रियार्थजज्ञानैरारोप्यन्ते च शक्तयः ।
दिक्कालकायादीनाञ्च विशेषात् *a* परिवृद्धिताः ॥ २७ ॥
तस्य पक्षे न दोषोऽस्ति,
a = परिणामिताः ।
46. This is the Sautrantika's standpoint, v. ver. 24, 76.
47. यस्योपादाननामकात्
ज्ञानादन्यत् कारणं न प्रतिबन्धो न तस्य च ॥ २८ ॥
48. This is the system of the Yogacara. Alaya is named *upadana*, cfr. Trimsatika, ver. 3 with Bhasya of Sthiramati.
49. धीमालत्वेन संसाध्ये यत् ज्ञानत्वादिसाधनम् ।
विजातीयाविरुद्धत्वात् सर्वं शेषवदुच्यते ॥ २९ ॥
This verse is cited in Tatt. pan. p. 582.
50. Sesavadanumana = vaidharmyavat, v. Bud. Logic. II. p. 208, n. 1.
51. प्रेक्षा *a* तुष्ट *b*: प्रवृत्तिश्च *c* हिताप्तिरहितव्ययः ।
प्रबुद्धव्यवहाराश्च न स्वप्ने सन्ति सर्वथा ॥ ३० ॥
a = सुनिष्पणम् *b*, Tib. *dgah. mgur.* *c.* lit. हिताहितयोर्लभहानौ,
52. प्रतिबाधावशान्नाम भ्राम्यति ज्ञानमक्षजम् ।
विनापि तां भ्राम्यतीति सर्वं सृष्टं तमः खलु ॥ ३१ ॥
53. According to the Yogacara every human knowledge is illusive with reference to its object (v. note 31a above). The author asserts that knowledge can be illusive if it is vitiated in a later stage.
54. अन्ये सर्वञ्च विज्ञानमर्थधीर्मानसो अमः ।
ज्ञेयं स्वचित्तजातं यत् रूपं वा नास्ति तस्य च ॥ ३२ ॥

55. This and the following are the opinions of Dignaga, v. Alam. pariksa, ver. 6.
56. अर्थो नास्तीति संसाध्यमेकैकस्यापरिच्छिदे ।
नाण्वाभासमिति प्राहुः ।
57. This is the main argument set up by Dignaga in favour of his idealism, v. Alam. par. ver. 1.
58. चित्तचैतसिकैरपि ॥ ३३ ॥
सन्दिग्धता भवेदेव यथा च क्षणभङ्गुराः ।
एकैका नावभासन्ते तथागतपरिच्छिदि ॥ ३४ ॥
निर्धारिता नाणवः स्युः ।
This verse is made of 5 lines, the next four lines being traced to the original Sanskrit. The implied *hetu* is *ekaika-apariccheda*.
59. तुल्यापरक्षणोत्पाद्यथानित्यत्वविभ्रमः ।
अविच्छिन्नसजातीयग्रहे स्यान्नीलविभ्रमः ॥ ३५ ॥
Tatt. san. p. 552 cites this verse with the reading स्थूलविभ्रम for नाल—. The Panjika further quotes his comments thus: सद्वाह-यथा सदृशापरापरक्षणोत्पादाद्विप्रलब्धस्य गृहीतेऽपि प्रत्यक्षेण शब्दादौ नित्यत्वविभ्रमः । तथा परमाणूनामविच्छिन्नदेशानां सजातीयानां स्थूल इति मानसो विभ्रमो भवति । (Cp. p. 199 and ver. [589]. It is interesting to note the difference in readings. Kamalasila thinks that *nila* is empirically real from the Sautrantika standpoint of view but *sthula* is unreal. Subhagupta, on the other hand, thinks that *sthula* is a real substance rather than *nila*, a quality, derivative element. The idea may be clear if we look into the discussion in Kosa, IV, 8—12 on *Samsthana*.
60. बुद्ध्या सदा त्वविच्छिन्नसजात्यग्रहणे सति ।
विकल्पकेन ज्ञानेन हेयकत्वमवसीयते ॥ ३६ ॥
61. The idea of oneness as illusive is explained in Tatt. san. ver. 598-9. Similarly the idea of grossness as illusive in ver. 592-4 (Ibid). This latter position is of the Sautrantika.
62. अतः स्वलक्षणत्वेन विज्ञाने परमाणवः ।
आभासन्ते नेति वादो यः सर्वो न स सिध्यति ॥ ३७ ॥
63. The opinion of Vasubandhu, Vimsatika, ver. 11. and also of Dignaga, Alam. par, ver. 1.

64. यदाभासं ततो [204¹] नास्ति द्रव्याभावाद्विचन्द्रवत् ।
इति सिद्धं वादिनो यत् ना चाल हेतुनिश्चयः ॥ ३८ ॥
65. *cp. Alam. par. ver. 2:* Pram. sam. I, ver.
66. संयुक्ता येऽणवः सन्तः समानैकक्रियाकराः ।
ते सञ्चिता *a* इति प्रोक्तुरद्रव्याणाति ते कुतः ॥ ३९ ॥
a = Tib. hdus. pa.
67. The author thinks that *Sancita* atoms are *dravya*, substance since they discharge a uniform function. The same opinion in his *Anyapoha-vicara*, ver. 2. The logical school of Dignaga following the Sautrantika standpoint defines *dravya* as one capable of discharging a perposive action: *artha-kriya-ksamam vastu-taksanam. v. Tatt. pan. p. 730, (18; Nya. bindu Tika p. 76-7.) cp. pram. var. III, ver. 195:*
अर्थान्तराभिसम्बन्धात् ज्ञयते योऽणवोऽपरे ।
उक्तास्ते सञ्चितास्ते हि निमित्तं ज्ञानजन्मनः ॥
It may be noted here that the opinion of *Sancita:-anu* as the object of consciousness is attributed to the Neo-Sarvastevadin, (Sanghabhadra) by Kuei. chi. v. my forthcoming edition of the *Alam. par.*
68. एकशब्दाभिधेयास्ते न तेषामेकतास्ति तु ।
विचार्यमाणः शब्दार्थो न भातीन्द्रियचेतसि ॥ ४० ॥
69. The same idea in the author's *Anyapoha-vicara*, ver. 7. *cp. Tatt. san. ver. 870.*
यस्य यस्य हि शब्दस्य यो यो विषय उच्यते स स संविद्यते नैव वस्तूनां सा हि धर्मता ॥
with *Pan.* citing the *Bhavasankrati*, ver. 9: येन येन हि नाम्ना
वै यो यो धर्मीऽभिलप्यते । नासौ संविद्यते तल धर्माणां सा हि धर्मता ॥
धर्मता प्रकृतिः । सववाक्पथातीतत्वं वस्तूनां स्वभावः (स्वलक्षणम्) इति यावत् ।
70. यस्य बुद्धेरेकभागो भात्याकार इतीरणम् ।
ईक्षितं तस्य नियतं चित्तास्तरणमन्तरा ॥ ४१ ॥
71. This very instance compells the Yogacara to declare that the images that are reflected in our consciousness are all false (*alika*) *v. Tatt. pan. ad ver. 2037:* ज्ञानादव्यतिरिक्तत्वान्नाकारबहुता भवेत् । ततश्च तद्वलेनास्ति नार्थसंवेदनस्थितिः । आकाराव्यतिरिक्तत्वात् ज्ञाने वा अनेकता भवेत् । अन्यथा कथमेकत्वमनयोः परिकल्प्यते । चित्तास्तरणदर्शने एकस्मात् ज्ञानादव्यतिरिक्तत्वात् ज्ञानस्वरूपवदाकाराणां बहुता न प्राप्नोति । एवमाकाराव्यतिरिक्तत्वात् ज्ञानस्याप्यनेकता प्राप्नोति । *p. 571, cp. p. 181,*

ver. 536. साकारे ननु विज्ञाने....। A thorough examination of this topic from the Yogacara standpoint has been made by Ratna-kirti in his *Citra-advaita-prakasa-vada*. (v. Ratna-kirtinibandha, K. P. J. Institute. Patna, 1957.

Dharmakirti from the standpoint of his logic offers this explanation: Our practical experiences dictate that several non-sensuous consciousnesses can arise simultaneously; v. Pram. var. नानार्थिका भवेत् तस्मात् सिद्धाज्जोविकल्पिका । विकल्प-यन्नप्येकार्थं यतोऽप्यदपि पश्यति । cp. vers; Ibid, 197-201; Tatt. san. ver. 1253; अतः सर्वत्र विषये न क्रमग्रहणं भवेत् । सकृद्ग्रहण-भासस्तु भवेत् शब्दादिबोधवत् । etc.

Another explanation is offered in the following lines : यत् यथा भासते ज्ञानं तत् तथैवानुभूयते । इति नामैकभावः स्यात् चित्ताकारस्य चेतसः ॥ Pram. var. III, 222. Bhasya: तस्मात् ग्राह्यहकनीलाग्रा-द्याकारा चित्ता बुद्धिरेकैवेति चित्ताद्वैतमेव । p. 290.

Dharmakirti further argues as another solution that several things can produce simultaneously one cognition: को वा विरो-धो बहवः सञ्चितातिशयाः सकृत् । भवेयुः कारणं बुद्धेर्यदि नात्मेन्द्रियादि वत् ॥ Ibid. 224. Bhasya: यथेन्द्रियार्थमनस्कारा आत्मेन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षा वा सकृदेकमिन्द्रियविज्ञानं जनयन्ति । तथा परमाणवोऽपि । को विरोधः । p. 296. Kosa (IV. 10) also refers to the *citrastarana* problem. v. Note. 178 for the author's solution.

72. क्वचिच्च कस्यचिद्रूपस्येकाकारग्रहो यदि ।
स उच्चनीचाश्रयतो भिन्नचित्ता *a*वभासकः ॥ ४२ ॥
a—Tib. *bkra-ba*—चित्त, variegated.
73. A similar explanation in T. Panji. p. 571, l. 16. v. note 178 below the passage/एवमेकाकारेऽपि.... ।
74. एकज्ञानाभकोऽणुर्यो विनान्योन्यमनुद्भवात् ।
तस्याकारस्य विच्छेदे एकैकं भास्यते कथम् ॥ ४३ ॥
75. Atoms appear and disappear together: सहोत्पद्यन्तो सह विरुध्यन्ते ।
This is what the Sarvastivadi-Vaibhasikas conclude. It is further made clear in the next verse, cp. kosa, I. p. 35, ll. 18-20, and Vis. Mag: गन्धा रसो फस्तो चतस्सो चैव धातवो ।
अद्वेते अविणिम्भागा एकुप्पादा सद्व्यया ॥

v. my paper on Nilakesi, Annals of Research Institute, Tirupati, IV, p. 61. Tatt. sangraha defenus that the atoms though invisible individually, become the object of perception; v ver. 570.

76. प्रत्येकपरमाणूनां स्वातन्त्र्येणास्त्यसम्भवः ।

अतोऽपि परमाणूनामेकैकाप्रतिभासनम् ॥ ४४ ॥

This verse is cited in T. Panji. p. 551, l. 21: अथापि स्यात् समुदिता एवोत्पद्यन्ते विनश्यन्ति चेति सिद्धान्तान्नैकैकपरमाणुप्रतिभास इति । यथोक्तम् ।

77. अणु दिग्भागभेदाच्च नेति यत् तदसङ्गतम् ।

अणौ दिक्शब्द उच्येत केनचित् सविशेषणे ॥ ४५ ॥

The second line of this verse is cited in prose in T, panji. p.556, cp. n. 79 below.

78. The author refers here to Vasubandhu's criticism of atomic theory in his Vimsa. ver. 12, 14 :

षट्केन युगपद्योगात्परमाणोः षडंशता ।

षण्णां समानदेशत्वात् पिण्डः स्यादणुमालकः ॥

दिग्भागभेदो यस्यास्ति तस्यैकत्वं न युज्यते ।

Some similar criticism has also been made by him in the kosabhasya, I. ver, 43. Tib. pp. 81-84. and the Vaibhasika's defence.

79. दिग्भागभेदेनातस्तैः बहुभिः परिवारिताः ।

कथिता अणवश्चैव न तु सावयवात्मकाः ॥ ४६ ॥

cp. T. panji. p. 556: भदन्तशुभगुप्तस्तु प्राह—यथैकस्वभावस्यासद्वद्भ्या-
दिव्यावृत्तस्यानेकं सामान्यं न तत्त्वेन कल्प्यते । एवमिहापि परमाणूनामेक-
वर्तित्वाद्नेकत्वं कल्प्यते, न भूतार्थेन । तथाहि-न दिक्शब्दो नामास्ति कणादादिक-
ल्पितः । तस्यैकस्वरूपत्वाद्नेकरूपः पूर्वादिप्रत्ययो न स्यात् । केवलमणव एव
पौर्वापर्येणावस्थिता दिक्शब्दवाच्याः । ततश्च दिग्भागभेदवत्त्वात् इति केवलं बहुभिः
परिवारणमेवोक्तं स्यात् न सावयवत्वम् इति ।

80. The same idea in the ver. 8 above, cp. note 14.

81. एकोऽणुरवरे भागे स्थितोज्ज्वः परभागतः ।

उभाभ्यामपि भागाभ्यां प्रसक्ता न द्विधाऽणवः ॥ ४७ ॥

cp. Vimsa, bhasya: अन्यो हि परमाणोः पूर्वदिग्भागो यावदधोदिग्भाग
इति दिग्भागभेदे सति कथं तदात्मकस्य परमाणोरेकत्वं योक्ष्यते । The present
verse answers this objection.

82. अनेकमध्यवर्तित्वाद्नेकत्वं विकल्प्यते ।
व्यतिरेकमुखादेवमनेकत्वं प्रकर्यते ॥ ४८ ॥
The idea of this verse is also included in the prose passage above cited in n. -79. व्यतिरेक = एकत्वव्यावृत्ति. This explanation suggests idea of manifoldness on the atom is imaginary as the idea of the oneness on the aggregate.
83. तलापेक्ष्यान्यदयच्च रूपं वै गृह्यते यथा ।
नैव तद्विद्यते तल परावरादिभेदवत् ॥ ४९ ॥
84. The explanation is made here of how an invisible atomic form becomes a visible gross form.
85. नैरन्तर्याद्वहनाश्चावयवित्वं यदीष्यते ।
निरन्तराः पूर्वपरक्षणा न तादृशाः कथम् ॥ ५० ॥
86. If the latter proposition is acceptable, the former one also will be so.
87. ज्ञानस्य द्विक्षणस्थत्वान्नैरन्तर्यं ततोऽस्ति च ।
यथा त्ववयविरूपं नेष्यते वै तथाणुषु ॥ ५१ ॥
88. The advocate of knowledge of two and more moments, duration is probably the Naiyayika. The Theravadin pleads that it exists for three moments, v, Abh. San. IV.
89. Atoms, though existing in an uninterrupted series are not conceived as one *avayavin* on the analogy of knowledge.
90. प्रत्यासत्त्या कयाचित्, गतिबाधो गतीमतः ।
तथैवाच्छादनं प्रोक्तमवयवान्तरतो न तु ॥ ५२ ॥
91. This is in reply to Vasubandhu's criticism : सान्तरत्वे गतिमतां गतिः केन प्रतिषिध्यते । Kosabhasya, I. 43. This answer implies that the author is a *Santara-paramanu-vadin*.
92. आच्छादने सति छाया समुत्पन्ना च विद्यते ।
छाया दिनकराण्वोश्च मध्यलग्ना न युज्यते ॥ ५३ ॥
93. This answers Vasubandhu's query : छायावृत्ती कथं वा Vimsa. 14.
94. छायाच्छादनयोः शक्ति बहूनां जायते यथा ।
परमाणुष्वपि तथा नैकस्मात् सर्वथाऽपि तु ॥ ५४ ॥

95. अतो भेदस्य नास्तित्वात् पिण्डो नास्तीति यद्वचः ।
कादाचित्कं भवेत्तच्चेत् *a* परिणामो न युज्यते ॥ ५५ ॥ *a* = *parinama* = *hgyur. ba.*
96. *cp. Vimsa. 12d:* पिण्डः स्यादणुमालकः ।
97. अन्योन्यमात्माऽसंसृष्टा अनंशाश्च व्यवस्थिताः ।
अतः सञ्चित्य भवति पृथिवीमण्डलादिकम् ॥ ५६ ॥
98. This makes clear that the author holds the opinion that atoms do not contact with one another. Read in Tib. *reg. pa* for *rig. pa*.
99. परस्परानुग्रहस्य विशेषात् *a* परिणामिताः ।
पराणवश्च वज्रादेर्न विच्छिन्ना भवन्ति ते ॥ ५७ ॥
a—*hgyur. ba. v. Madh. vrtti, p. 7.*
100. पिशाचसर्पप्रभृतेर्मलशक्त्या ग्रहो यथा ।
a संज्ञच्छतेऽणवः केचित् द्रव्यशक्त्या परस्परम् ॥ ५८ ॥
a = *brgyus. pa* ग्रथित S. Das, Dictionary.
101. अन्येऽल्पशक्तिबलकाः ; बुद्धिमानचलादिगः ।
संख्यादिप्रविशेषेण कल्पयेन्नरकाद्यणून् ॥ ५९ ॥
102. It appears that there are millions of atoms having no capacity strong enough to come into combination and to form any visible object.
103. The Yogin can count the number of atoms even of the hell, etc. remote objects. The expression : *acaladigah* is again used later in ver. 64 below.
104. अतो नास्तीति नो युक्तम् ; उक्तं भ्रान्तिवशाद्यदि ।
षष्ठधीमालतात्रो घः *a* यथाष्टपरमाणुषु ॥ ६० ॥
संख्यादि भ्रान्तिरुत्पन्ना ; *a*—भ्रान्तिवशात् इति शेषः ।
105. The idea may be amplified thus : If my apprehension of atoms by outer senses is illusive, your understanding of the mind alone with equilly be illusive. Here the author's reference to the mind as the sixth sense is suggestive of the fact that the mind understands always what is apprehended by the outer senses. *Cp. the Saying ; द्रव्यां भिक्षवो रूपं गृह्यते चक्षुर्विज्ञानेन तदाकृष्टेन मनसा च । cited in Nya-Tippani, p. 26.*

106. प्रतीतिस्तस्य सा तथा ।
 यदि सत्त्वसमत्वेन नरकादिविबो *a* धनात् ॥ ६१ ॥
 परमाणोरनाभासात् प्रतीतिस्तस्य सा यदि ।
 अस्ति च भ्रान्तितोज्यस्य *b*; प्रधानपुरुषादिषु ।
 कस्मादनुक्तं भवति संख्याद्याकारलक्षणम् ॥ ६२ ॥
a=lit. विज्ञान *b* = अन्यत् will be a better reading.
107. The Yogacara conceives the mind as the basis of illusion of the whole universe; thus the mind is a real entity while the objective universe is illusory.
108. The Yogacara's conception of the hell is well explained in the Vimsa-bhasya ad. 4. Read my English translation of the treatise and a bilingual edition of the textes with notes from Vinitadeva's comments (Institute of Tibetology, Gangtok, 1964).
109. The author thinks; As you (opponents) declare the atoms, etc. as illusory, why do you not say likewise of the Pradhana and Purusa as illusory?
110. तदवस्था च संप्राप्ता गुणातिशयसम्पत्तेः ।
 भ्रान्त्या विकल्पितत्वेऽपि न त्याज्या पूर्वकल्पना ॥ ६३ ॥
111. अणुश्च तस्मादस्त्येव अचलादिगधीमतः ।
 ततोऽन्येनागृहीतः ते जानन्तीति कल्प्यते ॥ ६४ ॥
112. The same expression previously in ver. 59. n. 103.
113. सहोपलम्भनियम उक्तो यत्पुरुषद्वये ।
 ज्ञानज्ञेयस्वभावश्च नियमात् सह वेद्यते ॥ ६५ ॥
114. T. Panji. explains *Jnana-Jneya-svabhava* thus: विषयविषयिभावेन नियतत्वादित्यथापि सहोपलम्भनियम सम्भवत्येव । यतो ज्ञानस्य ग्राहक एव स्वभावः विषयग्रहणधर्मकत्वात्तस्य, विषयस्यापि तद्ग्राह्य एव स्वभावः । तयो-
 र्नाकसामग्र्यधीनत्वात् नित्यं सहभाविता । न च सहोत्पादाविशेषेऽपि चक्षुरादीनां विषयत्वप्रसङ्गः तथाविधस्वभावाभावात् । तथा हि सामग्र्या नीलादिविषयाध्यवसाय-
 रूपमेव ज्ञानं जन्यते न चक्षुराद्यवसायरूपम् । नीलादिरपि तु तदध्यवसायमानरूपो जनितो न चक्षुरादिरिति । आह च नान्योऽस्ति ग्राहको । p. 569.
115. नान्योऽस्ति ग्राहको ज्ञानात् चाक्षुषं विषयं विना ।
 अतश्च सहसंवित्तिर्नाभिदात्रीलतद्विद्योः ॥ ६६ ॥
 This is cited in T. Panji. v. note. 114. end.

116. अग्राहकश्चेन्न बिज्ञानं ज्ञानं वा विषयविना ।
तदा तत्तु तथा वक्तुं युज्यते नान्यथा पुनः ॥ ६७ ॥
a = lit. अग्राहक.
117. What is implied in the previous verse is made clear here, viz. in the absence of either of the two, knowledge or the object no cognition flashes out and that is the reason why they are felt simultaneously.
118. एककालविवक्षातः सम्बुद्धज्ञानचेतसा ।
चित्तचैतश्च हेतुर्हि सर्वथैकान्तिको न च ॥ ६८ ॥
This verse is cited in T. Panji (p. 568, 1, 4) in prose: अथ सहशब्द एककालविवक्षया तदा बुद्धविज्ञेयचित्तेने चित्तचैतश्च सर्वथा अनैकान्तिकता हेतोः । यथा किल बुद्धस्य भगवतो यद्विज्ञेयं सन्तानान्तरचित्तं तस्य बुद्धज्ञानस्य च सहोपलम्भनियमेऽपि अस्त्येव नानात्वम् । तथा चित्तचैतानां सत्यपि सहोपलम्भे नैकत्वमित्यतोऽनैकान्तिको हेतुरिति ।
119. आगमेभ्यश्च सिद्धत्वात् चैतानां भ्रान्तिता न चेत् ।
पिशाचनरकादीनां ज्ञानं उक्तः कुतो भ्रमः ॥ ६९ ॥
120. The author probably intends to say thus: The ghost, the hell, etc. are equally spoken off in the scripture, why do you say that our knowledge of these things is an illusion?
121. असत्यपि सम्बन्धे विशेष इष्टकृद्यदि ।
तमसिद्धमनिच्छंश्च परीहरसि विभ्रमात् ॥ ७० ॥
122. सहशब्दश्च लोकेऽस्मिन् नैवान्येन विना क्वचित् ।
विरुद्धोऽयं ततो हेतुर्यद्यस्ति सहबेदनम् ॥ ७१ ॥
Kamalasila introducing this verse remarks: तत्र भदन्तशुभगुप्तस्त्वाह-
विरुद्धोऽयं हेतुः यस्मात्-सहशब्दश्च . . . This objection is also noticed by Dharmapala in his comment an Alam. par.
133. एकार्थः सहशब्दश्चेदन्यतोऽसिद्धता तदा ।
कथं साधारणे भाव एकेनेव च दर्शनम् ॥ ७२ ॥
- 124 T Panji. refers to this idea of oneness and its implications thus:
पुनः स एवाह यदि सहशब्द एकार्थः तदा हेतुरसिद्धः । तथाहि नटचन्द्रभल्लप्रेक्षासु नहचेकेनैवोपलम्भो नीलादेः । नापि नीलतदुपलम्भयोरेकेनैवोपलम्भः । तथाहि नीलोपलम्भेऽपि तदुपलम्भानामन्यसन्तानगतानामनुपलम्भात् । यदा च सत्त्वं (sic) प्राणभृतां सर्वे चित्तक्षणाः सर्वज्ञेनावसीयन्ते । तदा कथमेकेनैवोपलम्भः सिद्धः स्यात् । किञ्चान्योपलम्भनिषेधे सति एकोपलम्भनियमः सिध्यति । न चान्योपलम्भप्रतिषेध-
सम्भवः । स्वभावविप्रकृष्टस्य विधिप्रतिषेधायोगात् ।

125. सर्वज्ञज्ञानवेद्यश्च सर्वं चित्तं भवेद्यदि ।
 एकेनैवोपलभ्यश्च तदोक्तः कुत्र सिध्यति ॥ ७३ ॥
 The idea expressed in this verse is well state in T. Panji.
 passage cited in the previous note.
126. आलम्बननिषेधोऽन्यैः प्रमाभावान्न सिध्यति ।
 स्वभावविप्रकृष्टस्य सन्दिग्धासिद्धता ततः ॥ ७४ ॥
 The idea of this verse has been summed up in T. Panji.
 passage cited in the note 124.
127. बाह्याभावतः सिद्धौ स्वैकभागे विलोकिते ।
 वदतश्चित्तमात्रं तत्प्रसिद्धो हेतुरेव हि ॥ ७५ ॥
128. Thus the reason becomes *anyatara-asiddha*.
129. अपृथग्भाससंसिद्धौ [206a] भवेत्सिद्धस्य साध्यता ।
 साकारज्ञानकथिनो विवादस्तल नो भवेत् ॥ ७६ ॥
130. For the advocate of *sakara jnana*, the image is a part of the
 knowledge. To prove it is useless.
131. एक एव पदार्थश्चेदालम्बनं प्रकल्प्यते ।
 ज्ञानरूपाद्विवेकेन कथं संवेद्यमेव तत् ॥ ७७ ॥
132. अर्थालम्बे *a* कृष्णशङ्खे *b* तुष्टस्य *c* वेदनाश्च ताः ।
 यदि ज्ञानस्वरूपस्य; विना विक्ति न सम्भवेत् ॥ ७८ ॥
a=अर्थोपलब्धौ. *b*. No case-ending in Tib. *c*. dgah. bai.
133. The author appears to mean this: If the experience of the
 black shell consist, in the nature of knowledge alone, the
 knowledge should then be experienced as black. Since
 the black colour cannot be attributed to the knowledge,
 there ought to be something black material other than the
 knowledge. The classical example is: *pitah sankhah*. This
 example of *bhrama jnana* seems to be purposely employed
 in order to point out that there are two aspects of the
 object, viz, black and the shell which cannot be accommo-
 dated in the only knowledge.
134. यदि रूपं कल्पितञ्च किञ्चिदेव हि वेद्यते ।
 न वेद्यते ज्ञानरूपमित्यतस्तत्र युज्यते ॥ ७९ ॥
135. तेन रूपद्वयं वेद्यं चन्द्रमायुगलं यथा ।
 शास्त्रकर्तुरेकमिति प्रसिद्धं तत्र युज्यते ॥ ८० ॥

136. I.e. One imaginary form and the other real. Similar objection in T. panji. p. 574, ver. 2051. *cp.* my paper on Bud. Idealism. Tirupati Institute, Journal, I, pt. 3. p. 83.
137. पूर्विकैव तु सामग्री प्रज्ञानं विषयक्षणम् ।
 सालोकरूपवत् कुर्यात् येन स्यात् सहवेदनम् ॥ ८१ ॥
 This verse is cited in T. panji. p. 569, ll. 16-17 along with the verse ; नान्योऽस्ति 1-v. n. 114.
138. *Samagri.* according to early Buddhist includes three factors : (1) *visaya* (2) *indriya*, and (3) *vijn^ana*, *manas* and it gives rise to a sensation, *sparsa*, which is followed by feeling, *vedana*, and then image, *samjna*, v. Bud. logic. II, p. 311, Table, *Cp.* Kosa, III, p. 63, 23.
139. Here the term *saha* is in the sense of immediate suceession: *cfr.* the next verse,
140. पूर्वापरं यदा ज्ञानमिन्द्रियञ्च प्रवर्तते ।
 तत्सादृश्येन तन्नाम नार्थतः सहवेदनम् ॥ ८२ ॥
141. वेद्यत्वादेव विज्ञानान्नान्योऽर्थो, ग्राह्यभागकम् ।
 ज्ञानं सिध्यति यो वादस्तल हेतोरनिश्चयः ॥ ८३ ॥
142. That is, the reason is doubtful, (v. ver. 74 above.) *Sandigdha-asiddha*.
143. ज्ञानवित्तेः स्वभावत्वात् वेद्यते चेति कथ्यते ।
 विषयाभासिविज्ञानजनकत्वाच्च वेदनम् ॥ ८४ ॥
144. The idea is made clear in T. Panji, p, 570, l, 18. *ff.*
 नहि मुख्यतो यादृशं ज्ञानस्यात्मसंवेदनं तादृशमेवार्थस्येष्टम् ।
 किं तर्हि । स्वाभासज्ञानजनकत्वमेवास्य संवेद्यत्वम् । The author probably means this *mukhyato vedyatva* by the expression *jnana-vitteh svabhavatvat*. It does not however follow from it that the author means that the knowledge knows itself. According to the Vaibhasika knowledge knows its preceding moment and hence there is no *jnana-sva-vitti*.
145. संवेद्यशब्दसाम्येऽपि तदर्थः पृथगेव हि ।
 गवादीनां यथा गोत्वात्तथाकारो न सिध्यति *a* ॥ ८५ ॥
a lit. असिद्धेः
- 145a. The idea of this verse is also referred to in T. Panji. p. 570. l. 20, *ff.*

ततश्च यदि मुख्यं संवेदनं हेतुत्वेनोपादीयते । तदा हेतोरसिद्धता । अथापि यथाकथञ्चित् संवेदनशब्दवाच्यतासाम्यात् । तथापि न तथाविधादिसिद्धिः । नहि गोशब्दसाम्यात् गवयादीनां विषाणित्वसिद्धिः । *Mukhya samvedana* above referred to is also implied in the following passage: यदेवात्मसंवेदनं ज्ञानस्य तदेवार्थस्येति परेणापि बाह्यार्थवादिनाऽङ्गीकृतम् । (T. Panji. p. 568, l. 12) The *Bahyarthavadin* of this passage is probably, the *Vaibhasika* (?)

146. सर्वज्ञज्ञानसंवेद्यसन्तानान्तरभाविताः ।

धर्मा येऽनैकान्तिकास्तैः सर्वज्ञोऽबोधकः कथम् ॥ ८६ ॥

146a. This defect of *anaikantika* is explained in T. Panji. v. note on ver. 68.

146b. *cp.* T. Panji. p. 573, l. 15 *ff.* making this same *prasanga* in a different context.

147. साकारज्ञानपक्षे च तन्निर्भासस्य वेद्यता ।

तस्याभेदे च संसाध्ये सिद्धसाधनता भवेत् ॥ ८७ ॥

This verse is cited in T. panji p. 570, // 20-4 with this introductory remark : अथ ज्ञानारूढं नीलाद्याकारं धर्मिणमाश्रित्य साकारज्ञानपक्षे विविधोऽपि हेतुरभिप्रेतः । तदा सिद्धसाधनता । यथोक्तम्—। The *Sakara-Jnana-vadin* is the *Sautrantika*.

148. रूपसाम्यकरोऽर्थस्तु *a* फलात्संवेद्यसम्मतः ।

भावस्य तस्यावेद्यत्वात् अभेदो न भविष्यति ॥ ८८ ॥

a=उपचारात्, Its *samvedana* is *gauna*. The idea is well explained in the passage quoted in note 145. This is the standpoint of the *Sautrantika* also. He is therefore called *Bahyarthanumana-vadin* v. my paper: *Bud. Idealism. ob. cit.* p. 78; *Tsan.* p. 402, ver. प्रतिबिम्बस्य ताद्रूप्याद्भाक्त्वं स्यादपि वेदनम् ।

149. कथं तद्ग्राहकं तच्चेत् [206b] तत्परिच्छेदलक्षणम् ।

विज्ञानं तेन नाशङ्का कथं तत् किं वदिति ॥ ८९ ॥

T. Panji. (p. 561, l. 11 *f*) cites this verse with this remark : भदन्त- शुभगुप्तस्त्वाहः विज्ञानमनापन्न विषयाकारमपि विषयं प्रतिपद्यते । तत्परिच्छेद-रूपत्वात् । तस्मान्नाशङ्का कर्तव्या कथं परिच्छिनत्ति । किंवत् परिच्छिनत्तीति । आह च—1 Definition of *pariccheda*, v. ver. 92. below.—

150. विज्ञानरूपमन्येन व्यवस्थाप्य समो *a* ह्यते ।

कथं वाच्यं तदर्थस्य संपरिच्छेदकन्तिति ॥ ९० ॥

a=समारोप्यते ।

151. This is probably the author's criticism of the *sarupya* theory of the Sautrantika-Yogacaras.
152. अर्थपरिच्छिन्तिमानश्च विज्ञानमिष्यते यदा ।
कथं स्वविषयं ज्ञानं वेत्तीत्युक्तिरसङ्गता ॥ ९१ ॥
- 153.
154. विज्ञानं तत्काराकं न निष्क्रियं परमार्थतः ।
वित्तिमान्ने कारकत्वं समारोप्य हि कथ्यते ॥ ९२ ॥
155. Thus the above stated *pariccheda* of the ver. 89 is simply *vittimatra*.
156. भनासङ्गेन दर्शी च विद्वान् संविशते यथा ।
किञ्चिद्दर्शी तथा ज्ञानरूपादौ विशते पुनः ॥ ९३ ॥
a=ses. pa. gzug=knowledge-form,
157. सर्वज्ञस्य तदन्येषां न भेदो ज्ञानमानतः ।
सर्वाकारधिया सर्वे महात्मानो विशेषिता ॥ ९४ ॥
158. This is very important to note that the author denies an apparent distinction between the Saint and the ordinary man in respect of their grasping the external things. The Saint has an additional virtue of penetrating into different aspects of things; *sarvakara-jnana* is one of the qualities attributed to the Buddha, v. kosa, IX. ver. 1.
159. साकारं वा निराकारं तुल्यकालमतुल्यजम् ।
इति बौद्धेऽपि विज्ञाने किन्तु चिन्ता^A प्रवर्तते ॥ ९५ ॥
cited in the T. Panji. p. 573, l. 7 with the explanation :
तथा साकारादिविज्ञानेन नार्थस्य ग्रहणं युक्तम् इति चिन्ता क्रियते । तथा भगवतोऽपि
नेनार्थस्य ग्रहणं प्रति किं न क्रियते ।
a Read bsam. pa for byis. pa.
160. Sakara-vadin is the Sautrantika, and nirakara-vadin Vaibhasika. The Yogacara is tulya-kala-vadin and the Vaibhasika and Satyasiddhi are *atulya-kala-vadin*=*Krama-vadin*. Similarly Vasubandhu, a follower of the Sautrantika school pleads for *atulya-kala-vedana*, a successive comprehension even of omniscient Buddha thus :
सन्तानेन समर्थत्वात् यथाग्निः सर्वभुङ्मतः ।
तथा सर्वविदेष्टव्यो न सकृत्सर्ववेदनात् ॥ Kosa. IX. 1.

161. आकारस्तव यस्तल सम्भवत्येव तद्विद्यः ।

आकारः स च रूपादौ पुनस्तल प्रकल्प्यते ॥ ९६ ॥

162. We experience different things in different shapes. some long, some short, some square and so on. These shapes according to the Vaibhasikas are external and real belonging to the coagulated atoms. The Sautrantika and Dignaga school on the other hand, hold that they are internal and unreal as they are merely our mind's construction.

163. त्यक्तावृत्तित्वात् युक्तिश्च ज्ञेये नेति न सङ्गतिः ।

कथं स ज्ञेयमारूढस्तत्सम *a* मतिदिश्यते ॥ ९७ ॥

a = lit. तन्मालसम ।

164. The Mahayanists think that the yogin, having removed the two kinds of obscuration, *klesa* and *jneya-avarana* would not have any idea of external things, The author ridicules this point, *cp.* T. Panji. p. 574 ad. ver. 2048.

165. निरूपणात्मिका बुद्धिः सत्यथ वाप्यसत्याप ।

a अर्थास्तित्वेऽविसंवादः,

a = lit. अर्थोऽस्ति यन्नाविसंवादः ।

165a. The *avisamvada* argument has already been stated in ver. 3. v. also ver. 185. Here we may note the passage cited in T. Panji. 574, ll. 20, *ff.*: अत्र भदन्तशुभगुप्तः प्रमाणयति-यो ज्ञानाकारः स संवादित्वे सति तथाविधापरपदार्थजनितः तद्यथा ग्राहक आकारः, ज्ञानाकारश्चायमविलुप्तेन्द्रियस्य नीलादिप्रतिभासविशेषः संवादीति स्वाभावहेतुः । This prose passage may be from his *lost commentary on the katikas*.

166. तिमिरादौ विनार्थकम् ॥ ९८ ॥

प्रेक्षितश्च यथा रूपं *a* नीलानुभव इत्यपि ।

आरोप्य कथ्यते बुद्ध्यावाकारः कोऽपि नास्ति च ॥ ९९ ॥

a = नीलाकारानुभवः ।

167. अस्ति नास्तीति कल्पोऽपि विज्ञानं कल्पनात्मकम् ।

अथपिक्षाविशेषेण विज्ञानं भिन्नमुच्यते ॥ १०० ॥

168. The author probably means to say what constitutes distinction of one knowledge from another in his theory of imageless knowledge.

169. यथा हि भवतां ज्ञानं निराकारञ्च तत्त्वतः ।
वेत्ति चाभूतमाकारं भूतमर्थं तथैव नः ॥ १०१ ॥
This verse is cited in T. san. p. 572.
170. For the Yogacara the true knowledge is non-dual, *advaya* as stated in the next verse and imageless, *cfr.* T. Panji. p. 182 :
तदेतदस्माकमपि निराकारविज्ञानवादिनां बौद्धानामुत्तरं भगिष्यति The images are imputed by *anadi-vasana* or saktis formed out of knowledges produced by the sensuous object for the Sautrantika. v. ver. 27. above.
171. आत्मा *a* ज्ञानस्य नास्त्यस्य विरोधादद्वयात्मनः ।
अभूतं वेद्यते नव प्रसज्येता भ्रान्तमेव तत् ॥ १०२ ॥
a = In the sense of a separate image, *prthak akara*.
172. *a* यथापरीक्षितं भ्रान्त्या व्यवस्थेयं कृतेति चेत् ।
[207a] भ्रान्ताकारोऽवसेयश्च कथं स्यात् कल्पितो न चेत् ॥ १०३ ॥
a or वितर्कितम् ।
173. This is exactly what the Yogacara says; this is accepted by the author himself, note वेत्ति चाभूतमाकारम् in the ver. 101. The author, has, however, stated it as *kalpita* by way of *prasanga*.
174. भूततस्तेन विज्ञानं निराकारञ्च *a* चक्षुषा ।
भौतिकेन परिच्छिन्द्यात् सद्भाज्जडाऽपि योग्यकम् ॥ १०४ ॥
a = lit. चक्षुरादिना ।
175. This is the basic conclusion of the author. The sense-organs, for the Vaibhasika, are derivative material elements; but, for the Yogacara they are some forms of *Sakti*. v. Alambanap. ver. 7. with Vinitadeva's tika. *cp.* Satyasiddhi, chap, 45. they are nominal. *Pariccheda* is explained in ver. 89-92 above, *Yogya* = an object that falls within the range of senses and not a remote one.
176. प्रदीपः स्वपरात्मानौ सम्प्रकाशयते यथा ।
विज्ञानं द्विविधालम्बस्वरूपञ्च तथा यदि ॥ १०५ ॥
विरोधः कोऽपि नैवास्ति ।
This verse is made of 5 lines in order to complete the sense.
177. The lamp-example is cited by the Sautrantika-Yogacaras in favour of their theory of *svasamvedana* which is criticised in Mad. karika, VII, 8 and Madh. avatara, my Sanskrit text,

p. 60: अत्र कश्चित् सौलान्तिकपक्षमभ्युपगम्य । It seems that the early Sautrantika, i.e. Darstantika does not accept the theory of *sva-samvedana*, cfr. Kosa, IX, p. 231, n. 4 ; Vyakhya, p. 698, 2-3; Satya-Siddhi, chap. 68, 71, 72. The Vaibhasika maintains that one knowledge cognizes its preceding one, (cfr. ver. 84. n. 144, cp, ver. 90, 144 and 147. also) In case of not accepting *svasamvedana*, how the memory is possible is explained in Bodhi-avatara IX ver. 246, my Epitom. p. 39, ALB. 1953.

178. This implies that the simultaneous grasping two and more colours, e.g. is possible. Therefore the cognition of several colours in the case of *citrastarana* is quite permissible, v. T. Panji. p. 571: ये तु मन्यन्ते समानजातीयान्याकारसंख्यान्येव बहूनि चित्तास्तरणादिषु युगपत्सम्भवन्त्येव विजातीयरूपशब्दादिज्ञानवदिति । ततश्च प्रसङ्गे सिद्धसाध्यतेति । तेषां चित्तास्तरे नीलादयो बहव आकाराः संवेद्यन्ते । पञ्चमेकाकारेऽपि सितादावर्गमध्यपरमागस्या बहव आकारा इति तदात्मकं तलापि ज्ञानमनेकात्मकं प्राप्नोति । इष्यत एव ति चेत् Kamalasila probably means some Sautrantika author who pleads that several images are simultaneously experienced in the case of *citrastarana*. But Subhagupta may not agree with this opinion, as a sensuous knowledge, according to him can comprehend several homogeneous objects at once.

179. रूपशब्दादयोऽर्थाश्च विभिन्नेन्द्रियगोचराः ।
तेन ते ह्येककाः सन्त्यनुभाव्या न च

180. cp. M. I, 295; S. V, 218, cited in kosa IX, 242 ; Satyasiddhi, chap. 35. The different kinds of objects, such as colour, sound, etc. cannot be simultaneously cognized by their respective sense-organ—says the Vaibhasika. The Yogacara on the other hand, thinks that simultaneity of different nonconstructive consciousnesses is possible as T. san, says ;

नर्तकीदृश्यवस्थादावखिलं वेद्यते सकृत् ।

शुद्धे च मानसे कल्पे व्यवसीयेत न क्रमः ।

अतः सर्वत्र विषये न क्रमग्रहणं भवेत् ।

सकृदग्रहणभासस्तु भवेच्छब्दादिबोधवत् । (1250-53)

The same in Pram. var. III, 136-37.

सकृत्सङ्गतसर्वार्थेष्विन्द्रियेष्विव सत्स्वपि ।

.....तस्मात् सन्तु सकृत् धियः ॥

cp. Ibid. 208: नानार्थिका भवेत् तस्मात् सिद्धाज्ज्ञोऽविकल्पिका ।

विकल्पयन्नप्येकार्थं यतोऽन्यदपि पश्यति ॥

Prajnakara's Bhasya: चित्तप्रतिभासो हि नानानीलादिरूपेण । नीलमिदमिति

विकल्पयन्नपि पर्यन्तवर्तिपीतादिकं पश्यत्येव । न च युगपदनेकविकल्पसम्भवः । p.286.
The last sentence makes clear that the Yogacara bans the simultaneity of different constructive thoughts. *cp.* again T. san: अनिष्टे श्र द्वयोः सकृत् । Panji. p. 241: नह्येकस्मिन् काले युगपदभिलापद्वयं संवद्यते । See also note 71 above.

181.

अल तु ॥ १०९ ॥

विभिन्नकारणमृते ज्ञानमालम्बल a क्षणम् ।

a=*dmigs*, *pa*.

182.

यत् उत्पद्यते यादृक् ज्ञानं यत् तदनन्तरम् ॥ १०७ ॥

विषयस्तुल्योवषयमित्ये [वं] भ्रान्तितो वचः ।

तत्तु नित्यं विद्यते न, विषयाभासतो यतः ॥ १०८ ॥

समस्ववेदनाऽभावात् ;

183.

Here and onwards the author criticises the opinion of some Sautrantika masters who hold that our consciousness while grasping an external thing, moulds itself into an image similar to that of the external thing and that this moulding is effected in just immediately next moment after the external thing falls within the ken of the sense-organ. According to Dharmakirti a non-constructive mental perception intervenes in the second moment and the synthetic cognition (*savikalpa*) is effected with the image-formation in the third moment (v. Bud. logic. II, p. 312, the Table) our author here, without taking notice of the second stage mental perception speaks of the image-invested knowledge as immediately following the first moment's pure sensation.

184.

ज्ञानाकारः समानकः ।

सवचित्तेषु भवति मते चवं विशेषतः ॥ १०६ ॥

न वाच्यं । वषयस्तुल्यम् [इति]

185.

Jnanakara, for this author, is *grahakakara*, *cfr.* n. 165a.

186,

अस्मिन् ग्राह्यावभासके ।

नानन्तरं ज्ञानं भासि विषयेण तु साम्यतः ॥ ११० ॥

187.

cp. T. San. ver. 2039. सर्वात्मना च सारूप्ये ज्ञानमज्ञानतां ब्रजेत् ।

188,

नीलादिमालामासे च ज्ञानं नीलादिभासकम् ।

तदनन्तरमास्ते चेत् तदा तद्विषयं हि तत् ॥ १११ ॥

तदा तन्नार्थसदृशम् अस्ति सत्यं न तुल्यकम् ।

189. अनित्यदुःखादि यथा तथागतेन [दिशितम्] ॥ ११२ ॥
 ग्राह्यावभासकं नैतत्; आलम्बनायागतो बहिः
 ग्राह्यभागोऽथ *a* इष्टचेत् न युक्त तस्य लक्षणम् ॥ ११३ ॥
a = lit. विषय ।
190. Causality and objectivity are two characteristics of the content.
191. कुतो बुद्धि *a* निर्विकल्पा स चित्तस्याभास एव च ।
 तत्रावभासबुद्धिर्न विषयस्यापृथक्त्वतः ॥ ११४ ॥
a = lit. बुद्धेः
192. The kind of *nirvikalpa* mind that is pleaded by the Sautran-
 tika-Yogacara school is not accepted by the author. The
 Vaibhasika conception of *nirvikalpa* is explained in kosa. I.
 ver. 33. with Poussin's note.
193. जनकस्य च नास्तित्वे कथं नाम तदिष्यते ।
- 194.
195. बाह्याणवश्च सङ्घाता एकाङ्गविकलत्वतः ॥ ११५ ॥
 नालम्बनं स्युः, केनैव ह्युभयाभाव इष्यते ।
196. This argument is set up by Dignaga, v. Alambanap, ver. 1-3.
197. ग्राहकाकारकं ज्ञानं लक्षणद्वयवर्जितम् ॥ ११६ ॥
 यथा ह्यालम्बनं नास्ति ग्राह्याकारोऽपि नेष्यते ।
198. पूर्वकं सदृशं ज्ञानं आलम्बनं यदीष्यते ॥ ११७ ॥
 तदप्ययुक्तं ज्ञाने नानन्तरं ज्ञानं भाति च ।
199. Here 'similar' is with reference to the objective element. The
 idea seems to be this: the knowledge first becomes similar to
 its object and this similarized knowledge becomes the object
 of its immediately following knowledge. The author objects
 to this because no knowledge flashes up immediately after its
 predecessor. In Tib. or after *sna-ma* stands for objective case
 governed by the verb *hdod, pa*.
200. *a* आहत्य शाब्दं विज्ञानं रूपाकारं भवेद्यदि ॥ ११८ ॥
 तेन त्वालम्बनेनैव ज्ञानञ्च सदृशं कथम् ।
a—Tib. *mjug. thogs. su*.
201. The author's objection appears to be this: Suppose in the first
 moment there is a knowledge of the Sound and in the next

moment a knowledge of rupa arises in its continuity. This second knowledge must bear the image of the sound according to your *Sarupya* theory. Therefor it is not well founded.

202. केचिदाहुस्तुल्यज्ञानकृ *a* वल्लक्तिः *b* विषयस्त्विति ॥ ११६ ॥
तस्याप्ययोगात् शक्तिस्तु न भातीन्द्रियचेतसि ।
a = lit. जनक. *b*. lit. आलम्बन ।
203. See T. San. ver. 2083 : शक्तावनन्तरे ज्ञाने ग्राह्यांशे विषयस्थितिः ।
Panji. शक्तावनन्तरे ज्ञान इति व्यधिकरणसप्तम्यौ । अनन्तरे ज्ञान इति समनन्तरप्रत्यय
आलयाख्ये या शक्तिः तथाविधार्थप्रतिभासप्रत्ययसमर्थिता ।
Sakti may be considered *alambana* as it arouses the knowledge.
v. note 40. *Sakti—alambana* theory has also been referred
to by Vinitadeva in his Tika Alambanap. ver. 8. v. my forthcoming
edn.
204. ग्राह्ये विषयतव नियमात् विषयस्थितिः ॥ १२० ॥
लोकतोऽर्थसंसिद्धेः अस्ति लक्षणमनुक्तकम् ।
205. *a* ज्ञानशक्ति लौकिकी चेत् नार्थत्वेन तु निश्चिता ॥ १२१ ॥
लक्षणस्याप्यसत्त्वे च सालम्बनं कथं भवेत् ।
a = Tib. ज्ञानं शक्तिश्च ।
206. The Characteristics as stated before (note 190) are causality
and objectivity. Sakti may fulfil the first but not the second.
207. लोकनीत्यागमं प्रेत्य बाह्यालम्बनतैव हि ॥ १२२ ॥
परीक्षता युज्यते च न ज्ञेयं सर्वथास्ति तु ।
208. This is the fundamental doctrine of the author, Vaibhasika.
209. इष्टानिष्टदिरूपश्च भूततो बाह्यमस्ति न ॥ १२३ ॥
चित्तमालमिदमिति असम्बद्धमिदं [वचः] ।
210. The opponent thinks that there cannot be any thing in the
external like desirable or undesirable; for, what is desirable
for one person is undesirable for another, v. Bhavasan-
tika, p. 39.
211. दुःखादिरूपे कस्मिंश्चित् गुणादि *a* भावनावतः ॥ १२४ ॥
हेतुभेदात् फलमप्यनुग्रहविशेषितम् ।
a = lit. भावनाहेतु—The case-ending is not in Tib.

212. The idea here and in the following seems to be this : The Yogacara thinks that the yogin can change any thing into another form by dint of his deep meditative power or *adhimukti*, cp. Madh. Avatara, VI, 69. गुरुपदेशात् किल योगिना हि कङ्कालपूणावनिदर्शनं यत् ।
213. अर्थे ।वनीलनिर्भासि ज्ञानं तत्समनन्तरम् ॥ १२५ ॥
अभ्यासाद्दुःखरूपादि तथान्यदन्यतो भवेत् ।
214. प्रीतिव्यसनमिदधानामभ्यासातिशयात् मिदा *a* ॥ १२६ ॥
अर्थकारात् नैवेति मतञ्चेत् तत् पुनः कथम् ।
a = Tib. *bye-brag-dbye*.
215. आरोपाद् दृश्यते तेन ह्यनालम्बनवस्तुता ॥ १२७ ॥
कथं पुनर्नोपपन्ना, सिद्धिरर्थक्रियादृशा ।
तदभावे च तन्नास्ति ;
216. अर्थान् स्वप्नोपघातवत् ॥ १२८ ॥
विना क्रिया सम्मताऽर्थक्रियासत्त्वादतः पुनः ।
बाह्याभावो यदीष्येत वयं कारिलमालतः ॥ १२९ ॥
बाह्यर्थसिद्धिं न ब्रूमो *a* मिथ्याज्ञानस्वभावतः ।
करिलसिध्देर्दृष्टत्वात् ; *a* = Tib. *log-par-ses-pa*.
217. *Svapnopaghatavat*, v. note 221 below. The Sautrantika-Yogacara's definition of reality is: अर्थक्रियासमर्थलक्षणं वस्तु । Nyayabindu, I, 15 ; T. Panji. p. 730, l. 16 : सौत्रान्तिकनयेन यदर्थक्रियाकारि तदेव परमार्थसत् तदन्यत्तु संवृतिसत्।
218. अर्थावाप्तेरथापि च ॥ १३० ॥
हिताहितक्रिया काये तद्विहीनेऽपि विभ्रमे ।
क्रियामालस्य सत्त्वेन ;
219. This is already pointed out in the previous verse.
- 220 [208a] स्वप्ने कामस्य चेष्टितम् ॥ १३१ ॥
तस्योदयस्तु नियतो नाशुच्युत्पत्तिमालके ।
कुतः कामार्थलाभः स्यात् ,
221. This is given as example to disprove externalism by Vasubandhu in his *Vimsa* ver. 3 *a* : स्वप्नोपघातवत् कृत्यक्रिया । Bhasya: सिध्देति वेदितव्यम् । यथा स्वप्ने द्वयसमापत्तिमन्तरेण शुक्रविसर्गलक्षणः स्वप्नोपघातः ।

222. सम्बन्धात् शुक्ररागयोः ॥ १३२ ॥

अन्यत्र जायते स्वप्नात् संपर्शो कामतः स्त्रियः ।
यथा त्वेवाविसवादः ;

223. कामिन्या दर्शने यदि ॥ १३३ ॥

कामाश्रयाच्च सम्भूतं, कस्मान्न स्वप्नघातवत् ।
नखदन्तस्रवादीनि;

224. विहायापि च योषितम् ॥ १३४ ॥

तं समाश्रित्य सम्भूते कस्मान्न स्वप्नघातवत् ।
नखदन्तरत्रवादीनि;

225. रागात् शुक्रस्य सम्भवे ॥ १३५ ॥

बुद्धेरर्थः कृत इति तत् पुनर्न च शोभते ।

226. Blo yi-don = *buddher arthah* probably is the same as *kamartha* previously stated in the ver. 132, note, 220, i.e. *purusartha* purpose of human action.

227. क्रियामात्रं यथा नोक्तं पुत्रलाभादयश्च ये ॥ १३६ ॥

सत्यतः स्वप्ने दृश्यन्ते विसंवदन्ति दृष्टकम् ।

228. The definition of action is : चेतना कर्म वदामि चेतयित्वा च corresponding to pali A. III. 415. Ref. Kathavatthu, p. 393. Madh. kar. XVIII, 2-3, Madh. Av, VI, ver, 89. cited in Bodh. Panji. p. 472-Poussin, kosa. IV, n. 3. since there is no *cetana*, will in dream, there is no real action.

229. प्रोक्तकर्तृक्रियाजाताः सन्तो नरकपादयः ॥ १३७ ॥

अतो विज्ञप्तिमाला^b त्वेन काप्यर्थक्रिया स्ति च ।

चित्तमालामतोऽसिद्धम् ;

a = lit. तथा नरकपालादयः सन्ति ।

b = lit. विज्ञप्त्याकारमालां

230. The author refutes the Vimsa, ver. 4. नरकवत् पुनः ।

सर्वं नरकपालादि दर्शने तैश्च बाधने ।

Bhasya : यथा नरकेषु नारकाणां नरकपालादिदर्शनं देशकाल-

नियमेन सिद्धम्, श्रवणसायसपर्वताद्यागमनगमनदर्शनञ्चे-

त्यादिग्रहणेन सर्वेषां नैकस्यैव तैश्च तद्वाधनं सिद्धमसत्त्वाप

नरकपालादिषु समानस्वकर्मविपाकधिपत्यात् ।

231. नानाकायावभासने ॥ १३८ ॥

सन्तानान्तरसंसिद्धौ नरकश्च तथास्ति तु ।

परसत्त्वः कुतो नास्ति,

232. Vasubandhu and other Yogacaras deny the existence of other living beings *cp.* Ratnakirti's Santanantara-dusana, K. P. T. Institute, 1959. Dharmakirti however, does reverse it in his Santanantara-Siddhi, v. Bud. logic I, P. 521, P. 521 ff.
233. तथा निभृतमण्डलात् ॥ १३९ ॥
 सद्गीर्णविषयस्य देवोऽमुग्रहकारकः ।
 स्वसत्यवचने तिष्ठन् ,
234. Reference is probably a Garuda-mantra promising the boon.
235. पूर्वतन्त्रं विना यतः ॥ १४० ॥
 अर्थक्रिया न शक्येत तत्तश्चित्तकृता न सा ।
236. *Purvatantra*, rituals containing the Buddhist Tantric rites described in Tantric literature as to how one may ward off the influence of the evil spirits and gain earthly prosperity. Here reviving the dead person cannot be accomplished without the assistance of such rituals.
237. परचित्तविदो ज्ञानमयथार्थं कथं भवेत् ॥ १४१ ॥
238. Vasubandhu contends that *para-citta-jnana* is untrue, v. Vimsa. ver. 20, but is true for the author, v. ver. 148. below.
239. यदान्यचित्ते सत्येव ज्ञानं निविशते हि तत् ।
 सत्यथ [वा] तदाकारं विज्ञानं ग्राहकं मतम् ॥ १४२ ॥
240. This is said from the standpoint of the Sautrantika-Yogacaras.
241. स्वविषयान्तिकप्राप्त्या व्यापारवत् ग्रहो न च ।
 अयदनन्तरमुपाद्यम् ;
 a = Tib. gan-gi-mjug-pa-thogs-su-hbyun, *cp.* ver. 173.
242. The author probably refers to the Naiyayika's theory of of *rasmi* moving towards the object much criticised in the Satya-siddhi, Chap. 49-50 what is termed. व्यापार (*vyapara*) for Dignaga, Pram-sam I, 9, T. Panji. p. 399:
243. तथा ज्ञानं स्वचेतसः ॥ १४३ ॥
 लक्षणेन यद्योक्तेन ग्राहकं चित्तमस्ति तत् ।
244. *Sva-citta-jnana*, knowing one's own mind is possible in the same manner as *paracitta-jnana* is. This is not, however,

sva-samvedana, self-knowledge of the Yogacaras, but simply one mind knowing the other mind.

245. अतीतचित्तं । स्मरणं यद्भूतगतमस्ति च ॥ १४४ ॥
तस्य हेतोश्च चित्तस्यानुत्पत्तेर्न तु ग्रहः ।
246. Memory is not a perceptual cognition (*grahu*), v. Pram. Sam. I, 8. Read Bodhi. Panji. p. 401-2 explaining it without accepting *sva-samvedana*, cp. Satyasiddhi chap. 91. same explanation of memory.
247. सम्बुद्धगोचराद्वैतरूपस्याज्ञानतः पुनः ॥ १४५ ॥
अयं धार्यं यदुक्तं तदद्वयत्वान्न शोभनम् ।
a = Tib. *don-bsin-min*. The same expression in Vimsa. Tib. version.
248. cp. Vimsa. p. 10: यथा । स्वचित्तज्ञानम् । तदपि कथमयथार्थम् ।
अज्ञानाद्यथा बुद्धस्यगोचरः ॥ २१ ॥ यथा तन्निरभिलाष्येनात्मना बुद्धानां गोचरः । तथा
तदज्ञानात् । तदुभयं न यथार्थं वितथप्रतिभासतया ग्राह्यग्राहकविकल्पस्याप्रहीणत्वात् ।
249. ज्ञानेन ग्राहकेणव गृह्णन् ग्राह्यमशेषकम् ॥ १४६ ॥
सर्वज्ञः प्रोच्यते न त्वेवाद्याकारवेदनात् ।
250. This is the Vaibhasika's conception of *Sarvajna*.
251. अनिर्देश्यरूपस्तु वेद्यते यत् पुनर्वचः ॥ १४७ ॥
अन्यस्य वेद्यं यत् तत्तु निर्देशुं किमु शक्यते ।
अन्यचित्तपरिज्ञानात्,
252. Dignaga's theory of *anirdesya* in Pram. Sam. I. 5:
स्वसंवेद्यमनिर्देश्यं रूपमिन्द्रियगोचरः ।
253. तस्मादालम्ब्यसत्त्वतः ॥ १४८ ॥
निरालम्बं सर्वचित्तं नास्ति, तत् यदि कुत्रचित् ।
न बहिर्विद्यते ग्राह्यं, सर्वज्ञश्च कथं पुनः ॥ १४९ ॥
254. In the absence of an object nothing could be regarded as cognizer of it v. n. 249-50.
255. स्वचित्तमात्रविज्ञानात् स्वसंवेदनमेव च ।
स्वचित्तमात्रविज्ञानात् सर्वज्ञश्च प्रकल्पितः ॥ १५० ॥ -
ज्ञायते चेत् पृथक् कश्चित् न स्यात् धीमालदर्शनम् ।
256. अद्वयज्ञानमात्रत्वे न दोष इति चेन्मतम् ॥ १५१ ॥
कथं तथापि विज्ञानं विषयस्योपलम्भकम् ।

257. ज्ञाने द्वयविमुक्ते च सर्वाकारप्रवेदनम् a ॥ १५२ ॥
इति विम्मयमेवेदं ; ततोऽस्ति ग्राहकात्मकः ।
सर्वज्ञ उपलब्धोऽयः
 $a \pm \text{lit. संवेदनम्}$
258. आस्ते नैवेति कश्चन ।
प्राज्ञं मन्यस्य प्राज्ञानां स्वदुर्मतेश्च a खेदितम् ॥ १५३ ॥
 $a \pm \text{Tib. der. sdugs. so.}$
259. This probably refers to Kumarila's objection.
260. प्रत्यक्षहेतोर्नियतं a प्रतापभावोद्भवात् ।
रागादिदोषसामग्रा नितान्तं b परिहीयते ॥ १५४ ॥
 $a \pm \text{lit. किञ्चित्प्रतिपक्षभावनासम्भवात् ।}$
 $b \pm \text{lit. नितान्तपरिक्षयः सम्भवति ।}$
261. सर्वं वै बालचित्तञ्च द्वयाकारकमित्यतः ।
किञ्चिद्भावनाया क्षये a न प्रतीपक्षसङ्गतिः b ॥ १५५ ॥
 $a \pm \text{परिक्षये } b \pm \text{अवसरः}$
262. शून्यमित्येव यत् ज्ञान मुक्ताकारगतं पुनः ।
आकारद्वयसंयुक्तं प्रतिपक्षश्च ततः कथम् ॥ १५६ ॥
 $a \pm \text{lit. प्रविष्टम् ।}$
263. This probably refers to the Sunyata-meditation as interpreted by the Yogacara.
264. कामरागं भावयतो रागक्षयो न च ।
द्वयरूपं भावयतः स्यादक्षीणं द्वयं तथा ॥ १५७ ॥
265. बुद्धौ भावांशमारोप्य [209a] नैरात्म्यकादिभावना ।
अद्वये शब्दमाले चानर्था तद्भावना नहि ॥ १५८ ॥
266. It is interesting to note that the author's statement to the effect that our idea of one entity (bhava) in as assumption on the discrete atoms.
267. नित्योपलब्धिसंज्ञेश a मतिक्रामत्यनित्यता ।
सर्वोपलब्धिनास्तित्वात् बुद्धत्वाप्तिरवश्यकी ॥ १५९ ॥
 $a \pm \text{add. आशु ।}$
268. सर्वोपलब्धिरहितः सर्वथापि च निष्क्रियः ।
व्यवसायश्च चर्याश्च विना बुद्धत्वमिष्यते ॥ १६० ॥

269. It is historically true that the Buddha obtained his enlightenment as a result of long practices and effort. That enlightenment can not be obtained very easily and in a moment by the Yogacara.
270. अतः सत्त्वेषु करुणा तद्धितोपायतः पुनः ।
संस्कृतानित्यचिन्तातः सौगतं पदमिष्यते ॥ १६१ ॥
271. The author has summed up here how Buddhahood should be secured in the system of the Vaibhasikas.
272. कथं धीशब्दमालत्वे दानादिपरिपूरणम् ।
देयं न विद्यते तस्मात् बुद्धत्वञ्च न सम्भवेत् ॥ १६२ ॥
273. अन्योन्यप्रवशादेव विज्ञप्तिनियमेन च ।
दानादानाकारिका च बुद्धिरुत्पद्यते यदि ॥ १६३ ॥
तत्प्रत्यक्षानुमानाभ्यामाप्तागमात् सिध्यति ।
तत्पुनः कल्पनामालं केवलं परिकीर्तनम् ॥ १६४ ॥
274. cp. Vimsa. ver. 18: अन्योन्याधिपतित्वेन विज्ञप्तिनियमो मिथः ।
275. दानाकृतिकविज्ञाने ह्यभ्यस्ते शतशोऽपि च ।
सत्त्वस्य कस्यचित् किन्तु न दारिद्र्यवियोजनम् ॥ १६५ ॥
276. अप्रमाणे मनस्कारे भावितेऽपि हि योगिनाम् ।
न दुःखसुखयोर्हानिः रनुप्राप्तिश्चभूततः ॥ १६६ ॥
277. सर्वेषां सर्वदाने च कृपादानप्रपूरणे ।
अर्थात्मना न भेदोऽस्ति तत्तादाननिषेधनम् ॥ १६७ ॥
278. See. Bodhic. avat. V, 86 and Panji, citing the authority of the *Bodhisattva-pratimoksa*.
279. परिनिर्वाणमस्त्येव धातुश्च मृतकायिकः ।
दृष्टा गृहविहाराश्च कथं स्युः परतन्त्रकाः ॥ १६८ ॥
280. cp. Trimisa. ver. 24.
281. यदि स्वतन्त्रा न स्युस्ते ह्यतीतानुमितिः कथम् ।
नातीतञ्चेदनुमितं तत्तु स्यादतिलौकिकम् a ॥ १६९ ॥
a = lit. अतिलोकप्रक्रान्त = *sin-tu-hjig-rten-thal*.
282. श्रुतमुक्त्या विशुद्धस्य मूर्तिद्वक् वीतरागकः ।
अनुमानं भवेन्नो चेत् श्रद्धा च कथमुद्भवेत् ॥ १७० ॥

283. Tib. nan-thos-grol pas-rnam-dag-gi. . . .
Sravaka-moksa is the highest perfection attainable by any disciple of the Buddha.
284. यदि प्रबन्धतो; जीवः खण्डितः [209b] किल दृश्यते ।
 तत् पुनस्तदधीनञ्चेत् कथं स्यात् परिनिर्वृतिः ॥ १७१ ॥
285. A tentative interpretation.
286. व्यवस्थितं लोकनीत्या बीजादिभ्योऽङ्कुरादिकम् ।
 उदेतीति चित्तमालवादे नास्ति तु युक्तता ॥ १७२ ॥
287. यज्ज्ञानानन्तरं^a ज्ञानं नियतमुद्भवेद्यदि ।
 तत्तस्य हेतोस्तत् कार्यं, नियमोऽपि न विद्यते ॥ १७३ ॥
^a = Ses-pa-gan-mjug-thogs-su. cp. ver. 143 above.
288. cp. T. Panji. p. 180 : यस्यैवानन्तरं यत् भवति तत् तस्य कारणमिष्यते ।
289. तथाऽग्न्याकारकं ज्ञानं विना धूममतिर्भवेत् ।
 बीजेन रहिते चित्ते ह्यङ्कुरावासिधौ भवेत् ॥ १७४ ॥
290. This *prasanga* has been made, because the knowledge of smoke is not concomittant with the knowledge of fire : this will become clear from the just next verse.
291. अग्निधीवासितं चित्तं धूमधीकारणं यदि ।
 अनेकशक्तौ सत्याश्च भेदबोधः कुतो भवेत् ॥ १७५ ॥
292. अनन्तराग्निधीहेतौ धूमचित्तस्य कारणे ।
 तदप्यचारु; धूमस्य चित्तेऽनियतऽग्निधीः ॥ १७६ ॥
293. प्रतिबन्धेऽप्रसिद्धे च कथमस्मादिदं भवेत् ।
 अमिश्रव्यवहारश्च कथं हेतौ प्रवर्तते ॥ १७७ ॥
294. अतः कल्पितमाश्रित्य चित्तमात्रं लिघातुकम् ।
 इति प्रभाषितं सर्वं न रूपादेरसम्भवात् ॥ १७८ ॥
295. The author, from here, attempts to offer his own interpretations of those passages which speak of *cittamatratā*.
296. यस्मिन् रागादयो जाताः अक्षीकृत्य च कल्पितम् ।
 दोषोपशान्तये तस्मादर्थे^a नैरात्म्यदेशना ॥ १७९ ॥
^a = lit. विषये ।
- 296a. This is the author's explanation of *Dharma-nairatmya*, a Mahayanic idea of the external things. Thus, according to

him all the passages declaring *dharmā-nairātmya* are to be understood in the manner indicated here.

297. अन्यत्वापि तथा प्रोक्तं यथा बालैर्विकल्पितम् ।
बाह्यभावश्च न वास्त इति; कस्मात्, विशिष्यते ॥ १८० ॥
298. *cp. ver.* बाह्यो न विद्यते भावो यथा बालैर्विकल्प्यते ।
वासनालुटितं चित्तमर्थमासं प्रवर्तते ॥
cited in T. Panji. p. 14 and Subh. sangraha.
299. अनन्तरोपदेशाच्च कारकाभिनिवेशतः ।
कृत्यानाञ्च परिज्ञानं, तेनात्मापोह उच्यते ॥ १८१ ॥
300. *Pudgala-nairātmya* is also accepted by the Sarvasti-vadi-Vai-
bhasikas. The author here puts forth the reason for
accepting it.
301. तथोपदेशादन्यत्र कल्पितञ्च विकल्पितम् ।
व्याख्यातं धर्मतारूपं धर्मता तु स्वलक्षणम् ॥ १८२ ॥
भावमात्रं कल्पितन्तु [तस्य] भेदो विकल्पितम् ।
धर्मतायाः प्रभेदोऽयं भावेऽसति न युज्यते ॥ १८३ ॥
302. It is well-known that the Yogacara accepts three characteris-
tics, (*laksana*), viz. *Parikalpita*, *paratantra* and *parinispāna*,
Likewise this author enumerates three things, viz *kalpita*, *vikal-*
pita and *dharmata*, of which the last one is explained as *svalak-*
sana corresponding to *Parinispāna* of the Yogacara. *Kalpita*,
a basic entity, i.e. a *bhavamatra* may correspond to *Paratantra*
and *Vikalpita*, a false aspect imputed on may correspond to
parikalpita. Thus according to this Vaibhasika author as in
the case of the Yogacara, two things, *Kalpita* and *dharmata* are
true whereas *vikalpita* like *parikalpita* of the Yogacara is
untrue. That the *vikalpita* is untrue has already been pointed
out in the note 297 above. It is entirely false in as much as
fancied by worldlings. *cp. ver.* 40. विकल्पितश्च शब्दार्थो न भाती-
न्द्रियचेतसि । *Dharmata*, is an everlastingly true as it is the same
as *svalaksana*, an everlasting *svabhava*, (*svabhavaḥ sarvada*
casti) *Kalpita* that is explained as *bhavamatra*, a basic
entity probably implies atomic foundations on which the
various things are fancied. Atoms are *kalpita*, i.e. inferred, v.
ver. 64, (n. 111). why the separate atoms are not cognized is
made clear by the author in the ver. 44 (n. 76), though the
aggregate atoms are cognized in their *svalaksana*, v. ver. 37.
(n. 62).

303. यदि रूपं शून्यमुक्तं रूपशब्दः कथन्तिवद् ।
कल्पयित्वा देश्यते चेत् कतमत्फलमिष्यते ॥ १८४ ॥
304. This is said probably with reference to the Madhyamika standpoint.
305. नासंवादो यत्न [210a] भावी तेन सन् भाव एव सः ।
अभावादेव सवस्य *a* नो पलब्धिस्तु स्वप्नवत् ॥ १८५ ॥
a Tib. *dmigs-ma-yin*.
306. The author's repeated argument of reality of the external things is *avisamvada*, a non-contradicted experience, v. vers: 3, (n. 5) 19 (n. 31) and 98. (n. 165).
307. This refers to the Madhyamika's position. The sentence may also read thus: their experiences resemble the dream, and [therefore] are non-existent.
308. बाह्यार्थवादिनः प्राहुरेवं *a* चित्तैकवादिनम् ।
किं न्यायोऽप्यमुत नो वा विचारयन्तु पण्डिताः ॥ १८६ ॥
a = lit. चित्तमान ।
309. न्यायान्यायविचारे मेऽद्भुता बुधधीर्न हि ।
किन्त्वन्येरितसत्यानां बहुसंक्षिप्य देशनात् ॥ १८७ ॥
310. ज्ञानभासा मोहतमोर्ध्वसः *a* साक्षात्कृतो बुधैः ।
अद्यचोर्ध्वश्च महतां मार्गे *b* मूढः प्रसी *c* दैतु ॥ १८८ ॥
a. Tib. *mnon. mdzed. cin* = साक्षात्कृ—
b. Tib. *skye. ba glen* = मूढजनः ।
c. Tib. *dwang-sig*.

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7. | གལ་དེ་འབྲུག་པ་མ་ཕམས་ཅད་དྲ། | འཇམ་ག་ཅི་ན་སྤང་ཕྱོག་ཅད།
| ཤེས་པ་སྤྱི་བསྟུ་སྤྱི་འབྲུག་དེ། | བསྟུ་བ་དག་གི་འབྲུག་པ་ཡིན། |
8. | ཡུལ་དང་རྩ་མ་དང་སྤྱི་གཞན་ལ། | ཤེས་པ་སྤྱི་བསྟུ་གང་ཡིན་པ།
| དེ་ནི་སྤྱི་འབྲུག་ཡིན་པར་ཤེས། | མ་འབྲུག་མ་ཅོད་ཉིད་གཞན་མིད་དེ། |
9. | རིང་དང་མུ་སྟོགས་ཤེས་པ་ལས། | རྣལ་འབྱོར་ཅན་གྱིས་བྱེ་བྲག་དབྱེའི།
| ཕམས་ཅད་མཁུན་སྤྱི་ནམས་པ་འབྱུང་བྱུར། | ཁ་སྤྱིས་ཀྱི་རྩལ་པ་ལས་གྲོལ་སྤྱིན། |
10. | སངས་རྒྱལ་ཉིད་ནི་དེ་བསྟུ་བ། | ཡོད་དེ་གྱིས་ནི་རྩལ་དེ་གས།
| སྤྱི་ལས་སྟོགས་བཞིན་ཕམས་ཅད་དྲ། | ཅི་ཡིར་བསྟུ་བ་སྤྱི་དམི་འབྱུར། |
11. | གལ་དེ་བག་ཅགས་བདན་ཡིར་གྱིས། | སྤྱི་ལས་ཅི་ཡིར་ཡང་སྤྱི་བསྟུ་ན།
| དེ་ལས་བྱེད་དང་གྲན་དགའ་དང། | བཞེད་བྱེ་བ་སྤྱིས་སྟོགས་མཐོང་བ་འདྲ། |
12. | དབང་དོན་མེད་པ་སྟོགས་པ་ལོ་ཁྲོ། | བག་ཅགས་སྟེད་ཅིག་སྟེད་ཅིག་ལ།
| སྤྱི་ནམ་པ་འཕག་དང་པར་ཅད་དེ། | དབང་པོ་དེ་དག་པ་ལྟན་པ་ལོ་བྱ། |
13. | གང་གི་ཤེས་པ་དེ་ཅི་ག་ཅིང། | དབང་པོ་དོན་པ་མ་རྒྱུ་བ།
| དེ་ཡི་དེ་ཡི་དེ་བོ་ནི། (203b) | ཁ་དྲན་དུ་བདན་པ་ལས་སྤྱི་བདན་འབྱུར། |
14. | གལ་དེ་གཉིད་སྟོགས་མཐོངས་ལུན་བྱུར། | དེ་དཔྱི་སྤྱི་བྱེད་མ་ཡིན་ནས།
| སྤྱི་ནམ་པོ་བྱུ་ནི་ཡོད་བཞིན་དྲ། | སྤྱི་ནམ་ཡང་དག་ཅེད་སྤྱི་རིགས། |
15. | གཉིད་ཀྱི་སྤྱི་ལས་ན་མཐོང་བ། | དེ་ས་ཆ་ཡི་ཡིར་སྤྱི་བདན་གྱིང་།
| འབྲུགས་འབྱུར་རྩེ་རྩུར་དེ་ཡིས་ནི། | ཡོངས་སྤྱི་ནམ་བདག་ཉིད་ཡང་དག་ཅེད། |
16. | གང་གིས་དབང་དེ་གལ་བ་ལོ་ཡིར། | བསྟུ་ན་པ་ལོ་བྱུ་ནི་མེད་པ་ལ།
| སྤྱི་ནམ་འཕྲོག་དང་ཡང་དང་ཡང། | ཡོངས་སྟུ་ཅེད་པས་བྱུང་བར་འབྱུར། |

17. | མི་བསྟུ་བག་ཆགས་བདུན་པ་ཡིས། | ཁྱས་སྟོགས་ཞིས་པ་གང་ལས་འདིང་།
 | གཤམ་ཏྲ་གཞུགས་སྟོགས་མི་ཤུང་ཡིར། | དྲིལ་འོག་མས་བཞེད་པར་བྱ། |
18. | གཤམ་ཏྲ་ཡོངས་སྟུ་མི་ཤུག་ཏེ་མ་⁷ བའི་ཡིར། | མང་པའི་ཆོན་མི་བསྟུ་ན།
 | རལ་པའི་བཞེད་པ་ཏེ་མ་པའི་བར། | དེ་སྟུང་མི་བསྟུ་ཆི་ཡིར་ཆོན། |
19. | དེ་སྟུ་རལ་ཏུ་བསྟུག་པ་ཡང་། | ཁསྟུ་པ་དཔལ་གསུམ་པའི་ཡིར་པར་དང་།
 | དེ་སྟུ་མི་ན་འདང་མི་བསྟུ་འི་ཡིར། | དེ་སྟུ་ཁྱས་པས་མི་འདྲོད་དྲ། |
20. | འཛེག་དང་ཡོངས་སྟུ་མི་ན་པའི་མཐུ། | དངོས་པོ་གཞན་ལས་བྱུང་བའི་ཡིར།
 | བདག་ཉིད་བས་སྟུ་མ་ལས་མི་ན་ཏེ། | དཔའ་ན་མི་ཏྲ་གཞུགས་ཏིང་དང་། |
21. | ཆུ་སྟོགས་ལས་མི་ས་པོ་ན་བཞིན། | གང་དང་གང་ལས་སྟུ་མ་པ་ཉིད།
 | དྲོད་རལ་དང་མཐུན་པ་ཡི། | འགས་པ་སྟུ་ཡིར་པ་གཞུགས་དག
 | མི་འཛེག་མི་དང་དུ་བ་བཞིན། |
22. | དོན་གཞན་ལས་ནི་བྱུང་བ་ཡི། | ལས་ལས་འགའ་ཞིག་བསྟེ་བར་བྱིང་།
 | དཔའ་ན་སྟུ་མའི་མི་ཏྲ་ག་དང་། | མང་པས་ཏིང་ལས་དྲོད་བྱུང་བཞིན། |
23. | འདི་ལ་འེན་པའི་ནུས་ཤུས་ལས། | དྲུས་པ་བདུན་ཆི་སྟུ་འགྱུར་ཞིང་།
 | དེ་ལ་དེ་ཡི་ས་པོ་ན་འཛེག | བཞུག་པ་འདུ་སྟུ་པར་བྱིད་པ་ཉིད། |
24. | དེ་ཡིར་དོན་གཞན་ལས་བྱུང་བའི། | དངོས་པོ་མེད་ཡིར་བག་ཆགས་ནི།
 | འཛེག་དང་ཁྱས་པར་མི་ཤུང་⁸ ཞེས། | མཐུ་ལ་མཁས་པའི་བྱེ་བོ་སྟུ། |
25. | འོན་ཏེ་གཤམ་ཏྲ་རལ་གྱུར་ལས། | དེ་སྟུ་པའི་ཤུས་པ་སྟུ་མ་མས་དེར།
 | ས་བོ་ན་འཛེག་ཅིང་སྟུ་ན་པ་⁹ ལུར། | བདག་གི་འདྲ་དང་འདྲ་བཞིན། |
26. | སྟུགས་འདི་ལ་ནི་སྤང་བའི་ཡིར། | འེན་པའི་ཤུས་ལ་ཡང་དག་བདེན།
 | [204a] བཞིས་གཤང་མཚུངས་པ་ཉིད་ཡིན་ན། | ཤའི་གཤམ་ཏུ་གའི་གཤམ་པ་བདུན་མི་རིཌ། |

27. |གང་གི་དབང་དོན་ལས་སྐྱེས་པའི། |ཤེས་པས་མཐུན་མས་འབྲེལ་བྱེད་ཅིང་།
|ཡུལ་དུས་ལུས་ལ་སྤྲུག་པ་ཡི། |ཁྱད་པར་གྱིས་ཤི་རྒྱུས་འབྱུང་བ། |
28. |དེ་ཡི་ཐུགས་ལ་ཉིས་པ་མིང། |གང་གི་ལོན་པ་ཞིས་བྱ་བའི།
|ཤེས་པ་ལས་རྒྱ་གཞན་མིང་པ། |དེ་ཡི་ཤེས་དུ་འབྲེལ་པ་མིང། |
29. |ཁྱོ་ཉམ་ཉི་དུ་བསྐྱེབ་པ་ལ། |ཤེས་ཡིར་ལ་སྤྲུག་པ་སྐྱེབ་པ་གང་།
|སྤྱི་མཐུན་མིལ་དང་མི་འགལ་ཡིར། |ཐམས་ཅད་ཞུགས་དང་པམས་ཤེས་བྱ། |
30. |ལེགས་དབྱེད་དགའ་མཁུར་ལ་འཇུག་ཅིང་། |ཐན་དང་སྤི་མན་འཕྲོལ་གཏོང་བ།
|སྔ་པ་པར་འབྱུར་པའི་ཐ་སྐྱད་ཤི། |མི་ལམ་ནམ་ཤི་ཐམས་ཅད་མིང། |
31. |གསོད་པའི་དབང་གིས་འགལ་ཞིག་དུ། |དབང་པོ་ལས་སྐྱེས་ཤེས་འབྲེལ་པ།
|དེ་མིང་པར་ཡོང་ཐམས་ཅད་དུ། |འབྲེལ་ཞིས་བྱ་བ་ཐུན་པ་ལོ། |
32. |གཞན་དག་ནས་ཤེས་ཐམས་ཅད་ཤི། |ཡུལ་ཡོད་དོན་ལས་པས་འབྲེལ་སྤིམས་གྱི།
|ཤེས་བྱ་པར་ཤི་མས་ལས་སྐྱེས་གང་། |ཁ་ཁྱུག་མཐུད་ཤི་མ་ཡིན་ཤི། |
33. |དོན་མིང་ཡང་དག་པ་སྐྱེབ་པ་ལ། |པར་ཡོང་མ་ཐུ་སྤི་མོད་ཡིར།
|ཡུལ་ཡོད་སྤི་མུང་ཞིས་སྐྱེས་པ། |ཤི་མས་དང་ཤི་མས་ལུང་ན་མས་ཤིས་ཤིས་¹⁰ ཀྱང་།
34. |ཐེ་ཚོས་ཟབ་ཉིད་དུ་འབྱུང། |ཧེ་ཐུར་སྐད་ཅིག་འཇིག་པ་ནམས།
|པར་ཡོད་སྤི་མོད་ཤིག་པ་ཐུང། |དེ་བཞིན་གཤེགས་པས་ཡོངས་ལ་ཅན་འཔང་།
|ཡུལ་ཡོད་ཤིས་པར་མི་འབྱུར་པ། |
35. |འདྲ་པའི་སྐད་ཅིག་གཞན་འབྱུང་ཡིར། |ཧེ་ཐུར་དག་པ་ཉིད་འབྲེལ་ཐུང།
|རྒྱུན་ཆགས་དེ་གས་མཐུན་འཇིན་པ་ལ། |སྤོན་པ་ཉིད་དུ་འབྲེལ་པ་སྐྱེ། |
36. |ཁྱོ་ཡིས་དག་དུ་རྒྱུན་ཆགས་དང་། |དེ་གས་མཐུན་པ་ལ་འཇིན་སྐྱོང་།
|ཉིས་པར་དོག་པའི་ཤེས་པ་ཡིས། |དེ་གཅིག་ཉིད་དང་པར་བྱེད། |

37. །དུམ་དང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱིས། །ཆེ་པར་གསུང་བ་ཕན་ཆེས།
 །མི་སྤང་ཞེས་ནི་སྤྱོད་གང་། །དྲ་དག་ཐམས་ཅད་སྒྲུབ་མ་ཡིན། །
38. །གང་ལུང་སྤང་དྲ་དེ་ལས་^{204b} མིན། །ཟས་མེད་ཕྱིར་ཐུག་ཉིས་བཞིན་ཞེས།
 །སྤྱོད་པའི་སྒྲུབ་པ་གང་ཡིན་པ། །དེ་ལ་འདག་ཅིག་མེད་མ་ཡིས་ཉིད། །
39. །རྟུལ་ཕན་གང་དག་ཕན་གྱིར་ཅིང་། །རྟུལ་མ་ཕན་བྱ་བ་གཅིག་བྱིད་པ།
 །དྲ་དག་འདུམ་པ་ཞེས་བཟློད་ན། །དྲ་གཟུགས་མེད་གལ་ཞིག །
40. །གཅིག་གི་སྤྱོད་བཟློད་དྲ་དག་གི། །དྲ་དག་ལ་ནི་གཅིག་མེད་དོ།
 །སྤྱི་ཡོད་ནི་ཉི་ཆུང་ཉི་མུག་གི། །དཔང་པོའི་ཉི་མས་ལ་མི་སྤང་ངོ་། །
41. །གང་གི་ཐུ་ལ་ཅ་གཅིག་གི། །ཆེ་པ་སྤང་ངོ་ཞེས་སྤྱོད་པ།
 །དེ་ནི་དེས་པར་ཉི་མོ་ཡི། །གདོང་པ་མཐོང་པ་མ་གཤོག་མོ། །
42. །ལ་ལ་དག་དུ་གང་ཞིག་ལ། །ཁུམས་ཀྱི་ཆེ་པ་གཅིག་འཛིན་པ།
 །དེ་ལ་མཐོང་དམན་ཉིད་པ་ཡི། །དབྱེད་པ་གྲ་པར་སྤང་བ་ཡིན། །
43. །ཉིས་གཅིག་སྤང་བའི་རྟུལ་ཕན་གང་། །ཕན་ཅིན་མེད་ན་མི་འབྱུང་ཕྱིར།
 །དེ་ལ་ཆེས་པར་བཅད་ནས་ནི། །ཐུང་པོར་སྤང་བར་འབྱུང་། །
44. །རྟུལ་ཕན་ཆེས་ཉིད་དེ་ཆེས། །རང་དབང་འབྱུང་བ་མི་སྤྱིད་དོ།
 །དེ་ཕྱིར་ཕན་པ་རྟུལ་ཆེས་ཀྱི་[ནི]། །དེ་ཉི་སྤང་བར་མི་འབྱུང་པོ། །
45. །རྟུལ་ཕན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་ཐར་དུ་ཕྱིར། །མེད་ཅེས་སྤྱོད་གང་དེ་མ་འབྲིལ།
 །འགའ་ཡིས་ཁྱད་པར་དང་བཅས་པའི། །རྟུལ་ལ་ཕྱོགས་ཀྱི་སྤྱོད་བཅུན་བྱ། །
46. །དེ་ཕྱིར་ཕྱོགས་མེད་ཁྱད་པར་གྱིས། །དེ་ནི་མང་པོས་ཡོངས་བཟློད་པར།
 །བཟློད་པར་མང་གི་རྟུལ་ཆེས་ཉི། །ཅ་གས་པམས་པའི་འདག་ཉིད་མིན། །

57. | ସହଶ୍ରଦ୍ରୁଶିଃସହଽପ୍ତୋଽସଽଭି । ପ୍ରାପ୍ତାଶିଃଶିଽପ୍ରାପ୍ତଃସଽପଞ୍ଚିନ ।
 | ଦ୍ୱିତ୍ୱିତ୍ୟଶ୍ଚାସଂସ୍ତୁତଃସହଶଃ । ଦ୍ୱିତ୍ୟାଃସଂସଂସ୍ତୁତଃ ।
 58. | ତ୍ୱିତ୍ୱିତ୍ୟଶ୍ଚାସଂସ୍ତୁତଃସହଶଃଶି । ଉତ୍ତୁତ୍ୟାଽଶ୍ଚାସଽପଞ୍ଚିନ ।
 | ଶ୍ଚାସଂସ୍ତୁତଃସହଶଃଦ୍ରୁ । ଉତ୍ତୁତ୍ୟାଽଶ୍ଚାସଽପଞ୍ଚିନ ।
 59. | ଗାନ୍ଧର୍ବଂସହଶଃସଂସ୍ତୁତଃଶ୍ଚାସଂସ୍ତୁତଃ । ଶିଂସଂସହଶଂସହଶଂଶ୍ଚାସଂସ୍ତୁତଃ ।
 | ଗାନ୍ଧର୍ବଂସହଶଂସହଶଂସହଶଂ । ଶ୍ଚାସଂସହଶଂସହଶଂସହଶଂ ।
 60. | ଦ୍ୱିତ୍ୱିତ୍ୟଶ୍ଚାସଂସହଶଂସହଶଂ । ଗାନ୍ଧର୍ବଂସହଶଂସହଶଂସହଶଂ ।
 | ଶ୍ଚାସଂସହଶଂସହଶଂସହଶଂ । ଶ୍ଚାସଂସହଶଂସହଶଂସହଶଂ ।
 61. | ଗାନ୍ଧର୍ବଂସହଶଂସହଶଂସହଶଂ । ଶ୍ଚାସଂସହଶଂସହଶଂସହଶଂ ।
 | ଗାନ୍ଧର୍ବଂସହଶଂସହଶଂସହଶଂ । ଶ୍ଚାସଂସହଶଂସହଶଂସହଶଂ ।
 62. | ଶ୍ଚାସଂସହଶଂସହଶଂସହଶଂ । ଶ୍ଚାସଂସହଶଂସହଶଂସହଶଂ ।
 | ଶ୍ଚାସଂସହଶଂସହଶଂସହଶଂ । ଶ୍ଚାସଂସହଶଂସହଶଂସହଶଂ ।
 63. | ଦ୍ୱିତ୍ୱିତ୍ୟଶ୍ଚାସଂସହଶଂସହଶଂ । ଶ୍ଚାସଂସହଶଂସହଶଂସହଶଂ ।
 | ଶ୍ଚାସଂସହଶଂସହଶଂସହଶଂ । ଶ୍ଚାସଂସହଶଂସହଶଂସହଶଂ ।
 64. | ଦ୍ୱିତ୍ୱିତ୍ୟଶ୍ଚାସଂସହଶଂସହଶଂ । ଶ୍ଚାସଂସହଶଂସହଶଂସହଶଂ ।
 | ଶ୍ଚାସଂସହଶଂସହଶଂସହଶଂ । ଶ୍ଚାସଂସହଶଂସହଶଂସହଶଂ ।
 65. | ଶିଂସଂସହଶଂସହଶଂସହଶଂ । ଶ୍ଚାସଂସହଶଂସହଶଂସହଶଂ ।
 | ଶିଂସଂସହଶଂସହଶଂସହଶଂ । ଶ୍ଚାସଂସହଶଂସହଶଂସହଶଂ ।

66. ། ཤེས་པ་ལས་གཞན་འཛིན་པ་མིང་། ། ཡུལ་མིང་པ་ནི་དབང་ཁྲི་མིང་།
 ། དེ་ཡིར་ལྟན་ཅིག་རིག་པས་ན། ། སྤྱོད་པོའི་དེ་ཁྲི་གཅིག་ཡིར་མིན། །
67. ། གཤམ་དྲུག་མ་ཤེས་མི་འཛིན་པ་འཇམ། ། ཡུལ་མིང་པར་ཡང་ཤེས་ཡོད་ན།
 ། དེ་ཙྨ་དེ་ནི་འདྲི་སྐད་བྱ། ། བཟོད་པར་རིགས་ཀྱི་གཞན་བྱ་མིན། །
68. ། དུས་གཅིག་དུ་ནི་བཟོད་འདྲོད་པས། ། སངས་རྒྱུ་མཁྱིལ་བུའི་སེམས་དང་ནི།
 ། མེས་མ་དང་མེས་མ་བྱུང་ནམས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱང་། ། ཀྱན་བྱ་གདན་ཆོགས་མངས་འབྱུང་། །
69. ། གཤམ་དྲུ་ལུང་ལས་གྲུབ་པའི་ཡིར། ། སེམས་བྱུང་ནམས་ཀྱི་འབྲུལ་མིན་ན།
 ། འདྲི་དཀྱའ་ལ་མཁོགས་ནམ་ཤེས་ཀྱིས། ། ཅི་ཡི་ཡིར་ནད་འབྲུལ་པར་བཟོད། །
70. ། གཤམ་དྲུ་འབྲུལ་པ་མིང་པ་ལ། ། ཁྱད་པར་བྱ་ནི་འདྲོད་བྱུང་ན།
 ། དེ་ནི་མ་གྲུབ་མི་འདྲོད་ནའང་། ། འབྲུལ་པའི་ཡིར་ན་པམ་ལ་པ་ཡིན། །
71. ། འཕྱིག་དེན་འདྲིན་ལྟན་ཅིག་སྟེ། ། གཞན་མིང་པར་ནི་འགའ་ནའང་མིན།
 ། གཤམ་དྲུ་ལྟན་ཅིག་མྱ་གཅིག་དོན། ། དེ་ཡིར་གདན་ཆོགས་འགལ་བའང་ཡིན། །
72. ། གཤམ་དྲུ་ལྟན་ཅིག་སྟེ་གཅིག་དོན། ། དེ་ལྟར་གཞན་ལས་མ་གྲུབ་ནིང་།
 ། བྱན་མོང་གི་ནི་དངོས་པོ་ལ། ། བཅིག་ཡུས་ཇི་ལྟར་མཐོང་བ་ཡིན། །
73. ། གཤམ་དྲུ་མམས་ཅད་མཁྱེན་པ་ཡི། ། ཡེ་ཤེས་ཤེས་བྱ་སེམས་ཀྱན་ན།
 ། དེ་ཆོག་ཅིག་བྱ་ཁྲི་ན་ཡིས། ། དམིགས་པ་གྲུབ་པ་གང་དུ་བཟོད། །
74. ། གཞན་གྱིས་དམིགས་པ་འགོག་པ་ནི། ། རྩད་མ་མིན་པས་མི་གྲུབ་ཉེ།
 ། རང་བཞིན་བསྐལ་བ་ཡིན་པས་ན། ། དེ་ཡིར་ཐོ་ཆོས་མ་གྲུབ་བོ། །
75. ། ཡིད་དངོས་མིང་པར་གྲུབ་གྱུར་ན། ། རང་གི་ཆ་གཅིག་མཐོང་འགྱུར་ན། །
 ། ཁྲི་ཙམ་དུ་ནི་སྟེ་བ་ཡིས། ། དེ་འབྲུག་གཤན་ཆོགས་འདྲི་རྟོད། །

76. | སྒང་དང་ཐང་དང་སྡིན་སྒྲུབ་ན། (206a) ལྟ་བུ་སྒྲུབ་པ་ཉིད་དྲུའཔུར།
 | གཤམ་པ་རྩམ་པ་ཅས་སྒྲུབ་དང་། རི་ལ་ཅིད་པ་ཡིད་མ་ཡིན། |
77. | གལ་ཏེ་དོན་གཅིག་ཁོ་ན་ཞིག འཕྲིག་མཁུ་པ་གལ་ཏེ་དོན་བྱུང་ན།
 | གཤམ་པ་འོ་ཤོ་བུ་སྤྲོད་པ་ཡིས། རི་ནི་ལྷོ་ལྷོ་ཀློན་དུ་སྤྱོད། |
78. | དོན་དམིགས་མ་ཆ་ནག་དྲུབ་དང་། འགའ་པའི་ཆོར་བའི་དགའ་ནི།
 | གལ་ཏེ་གཤམ་པ་འོ་ཤོ་བུ་ཡི། ཆོར་བ་མེད་པར་སྡིན་དེ། |
79. | གལ་ཏེ་དོན་པར་རུང་ཤོ་བོ། འགའ་ཞིག་ཁོ་ན་སྤྱོད་ཞི་ན།
 | གཤམ་དག་ཤོ་བོ་སྡི་སྤྱོད་བས། རི་ཡི་སྤྱོད་ན་དུ་སྡི་རིགས། |
80. | དེ་བས་སྤྱོད་དངོས་གཉིས་ཡིན་ཡང་། ཁྲུ་པའི་ཤོ་བོ་གཉིས་བཞིན་དུ།
 | བཟུན་བཅོས་བྱེད་པས་གཅིག་གེ་ཞེས། རལ་དུ་གྲུབ་པ་དུ་སྡི་རིགས། |
81. | གང་གིས་ལྷན་ཅིག་སྤྱོད་འགྱུར་ག། ཆོག་མཁུ་པ་སྒྲུ་མ་ཁོ་ན་ལས།
 | གཤམ་པ་ཡུལ་བཅས་སྤྲོད་ཅིག་སྤི། སྒྲུང་པ་དང་བཅས་གཟུགས་བཞིན་ནོ། |
82. | གང་ཆོག་ཤམ་པ་པདཔ་ན་དག། སྤྱ་སྤྱོད་ཅན་དུ་འབྱུང་དེའི་ཆོ།
 | དེ་དང་འབྲུ་སྤྱོད་དེ་མིང་གི། རངས་སྤྱ་ལྷན་ཅིག་སྤྱོད་མ་ཡིན། |
83. | སྤྱོད་པར་བྱུང་སྤྱོད་རྩམ་ལས། དོན་གཞན་མ་ཡིན་གཟུང་པ་ཡི།
 | ཆོ་བ་ཞིན་གཤམ་པ་སྤྱོད་སྒྲུབ་གང་། རི་ལ་གདོན་ཆོགས་མ་ངེས་ཉིད། |
84. | གཤམ་ལ་སྤྱོད་པར་རུང་ཤོ་བོ་སྤྱོད། སྤྱོད་པར་བྱ་བ་ཞེས་བཤེད་དོ།
 | ཡུལ་ནི་དཔ་དུ་སྒྲུང་བ་ཡི། གཤམ་པ་སྤྱོད་སྤྱོད་པ་ཡིན། |
85. | སྤྱོད་པར་བྱ་བའི་སྤྱོད་འདྲ་ཡང་། རི་ཡི་དོན་ཅི་ཐང་དེ་ཉིད།
 | དཔེར་ན་པ་ལང་ཉིད་ཀྱི་སྤྱོད། བ་ལང་དག་ལ་སྟོགས་པ་རྩམས།
 | དེ་བཞིན་ནས་པར་སྡི་འབྲུབ་སྤྱོད།

86. | བསམ་ཅད་མཐུན་པའི་ཡེ་ཤེས་གྱི། | མྱོང་པར་བྱ་བ་བརྒྱད་གཞན་ལ།
 | བསྐྱེས་པའི་ཚེས་རྣམས་གང་དག་(ཡིན།) | དེ་དག་གིས་རྒྱང་མ་ཁོང་དེ།
 | དྲགས་མེད་ཇི་ལྟར་བསམ་ཅད་མཐུན། |
87. | ཤེས་པ་རྣམས་བཅས་བྱུགས་ལ་གྱི། | དེ་ལྟར་སྤང་བ་མྱོང་བྱ་ཉིད།
 | དེ་དང་ཐ་དད་ཆིན་འབྲུག་མ། | ལྷག་པ་སྐྱུ་པ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་འབྲུང་། |
88. | གཟུགས་དང་ལུང་པའི་བྱུང་པའི་དོན། | འབྲས་ལུའི་སྒོ་ནས་མྱོང་བྱུང་ལ་དོད།
 | དེ་དངོས་མྱོང་བྱུང་མ་ཡིན་པ་མ། | བཟད་ཆིན་པར་ཆི་འབྲུང་དོ། |
89. | དེ་འཇོན་བྱུང་དེ་ཇི་ལྟར་ཞིས། | [206b] དེ་ནི་ཡོངས་སུ་གཞོན་པ་ཡིས།
 | མཚན་ཉིད་ཡིན་དེ་ཡི་ཕྱུར། | དེ་ནི་ཇི་ལྟར་ཅི་འདྲ་ཞིས།
 | བྲེ་ཚོས་ཟུང་མི་བྱའོ། |
90. | རྣམ་ཤེས་ངོ་བོ་གཞན་གྱིས་གྱི། | རྣམ་པར་བཞུགས་སྒོ་བདགས་དེ།
 | ཇི་ལྟར་བྱུང་ནི་དེ་ཡི་དོན། | ཡོངས་སུ་གཞོན་བྱུང་བཟོད་པར་བྱ། |
91. | གང་གི་ཚེ་ན་རྣམ་ཤེས་དོན། | ཡོངས་གཞོན་ཅས་དུ་འདོད་དེ་དེ་ཆེ།
 | ཤེས་པས་ཇི་ལྟར་རང་གི་ཡུལ། | ཇི་ག་པར་འགྱུར་ཞིས་རྣམས་མ་འབྲེལ། |
92. | རྣམ་ཤེས་དེ་ནི་བྱུང་པ་མིན། | དམ་པའི་དོན་དུ་བྱ་བ་འདའ་ཆིན།
 | ཇི་ག་པ་ཅས་དུ་ཟད་མོད་གྱི། | བྱུང་པ་ཉིད་ལྷོ་བདགས་གསུངས། |
93. | ཇི་ལྟར་བྲེགས་མེད་གཞིགས་པ་ཡི། | མཐུན་པ་རྒྱས་དུ་འཇུག་པ་ལྟར།
 | དེ་བཞིན་ཅང་ཟད་མཐུང་བ་ཡི། | ཤེས་པ་གཟུགས་ལ་སྒྲིགས་ལ་འཇུག།
94. | བསམ་ཅད་མཐུན་དང་གཞན་དག་དུ། | ཤེས་པ་ཅས་དུ་ཁྱུད་པར་མེད།
 | རྒྱས་དུ་བསམ་ཅད་རྣམས་མཐུན་པས། | བདག་ཉིད་ཆེ་རྣམས་བྱེ་བྲག་དབྱེ། |

95. | རྩམ་པ་པམས་མཐུ་ཅི་རྩམ་མེད། | རྩམ་མཉམ་མི་མཉམ་ལས་སྤྱིས་ཤུམ།
| མངས་རྩམ་མཁྱིལ་ལང་ཅི་ཡི་ཡིར། | ཁྱིམ་པ་མཐུ་འཇུག་མི་བྱིར། |
96. | ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་དེ་ལ་རྩམ་པ་གང། | མེད་པ་ཤུམ་པ་དེ་ཉིད་ཀྱི།
| རྩམ་པས་གཟུགས་ལ་སྒྲིགས་པ་ལ། | རིམ་ཀྱང་མཐུ་དྲོག་པར་བྱིར། |
97. | སྤྱི་པ་མངས་ཡིར་ཤུམ་བྱ་ལ། | མི་རིགས་ཞིས་པ་འབྱེལ་པ་མེད།
| ཡི་ལྟར་དེ་ནི་ཤིས་བྱ་ལ། | འཇུག་པ་དེ་མཐུ་མཐུན་པར་བསྒྲི། |
98. | ཡོད་པས་མེད་པའི་དོན་ལ་ཡང། | ཁྱོ་ནི་དེ་བཞི་པར་གཏིན་དོ།
| དོན་ཡོད་གང་ལ་མི་བསྒྲི་བ། | རོན་ཅིང་མཐུ་མཐུག་སྒྲིགས་ལ། |
99. | ཡི་ལྟར་མཐུ་དེ་བྱེད་པ་ཞིག་གཟུགས། | སྤྱོན་པ་ཉམས་སྤྱོད་སྤྱིས་དུ།
| ཁྱོལ་སྤྱོ་པར་གས་རྩམ་བསྐྱོད་ཀྱི། | རྩམ་པའལ་གང་ཡང་ཡོད་མ་ཡིན། |
100. | ཡོད་པས་ཡང་ན་མེད་དྲོག་ཀྱང། | རྩམ་ཤུམ་དྲོག་པའི་པར་གཏིན་དོ།
| རོན་མཐུ་དེ་བཞི་བྱི་ག་གིས། | ཤུམ་པ་ཐུད་པར་བསྐྱོད་དོ། |
101. | ཡི་ལྟར་ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་ཤུམ་པ་སྤྱི། | ཡང་དག་དུ་ནི་རྩམ་མེད་ཀྱང།
| ཡང་དག་མིན་པས་ཡོད་པ་ལྟར། | ཁྱོ་བཞི་ཡང་དག་དོན་དེ་བཞིན། |
102. | ཤུམ་པ་དེ་ཡི་པར་གཏིན་མི་སྤྱི། | གཞིས་མིན་པར་གཏིན་འགལ་ཡིར་དོ།
| ཡང་དག་མིན་ནི་སྤྱོད་མ་ཡིན། | རོ་ནི་མ་འབྱུལ་ཐལ་འབྱུར་དོ། |
103. | ཡི་ལྟར་ཅིང་པས་པར་ག་པ་ལྟར། | རྩམ་པར་བཞག་འདི་བྱས་ཞིག།
| (207a)འབྱུལ་པའི་རྩམ་པར་ངེས་གཟུང་བ། | མིད་ན་ཡི་ལྟར་དྲོག་པར་འབྱུར། |
104. | རི་པས་རྩམ་ཤུམ་ཡང་དག་དུ། | རྩམ་པ་མེད་ཀྱང་མིག་ལ་སྒྲིགས།
| འབྱུར་པ་ལས་ནི་ཡོད་པའང། | མེད་ཀྱང་ཅུ་ཡོངས་སྤྱག་ཅོང། |

105. | གལ་ཉིས་ར་སེ་བདག་དང་གཞི། | ཇི་ཕྱར་སྤང་བར་བྱུང་བ་ཕྱུར།
 | རི་བཞིན་ནམ་པ་ཤེས་ཡིན་ཡང། | རམ་གསུམ་པ་གཞིས་ཀྱིང་ལོ་ལྟ།
 | འགའ་ཡང་དགལ་བ་ཡོད་མ་ཡིན། |
106. | གཞུགས་སྒྲུབ་སྔགས་རིན་ཅུས་ནི། | དཔལ་པོ་ཐ་དང་སྤྱེད་ཡུལ་ལོ།
 | རིས་ནད་དག་གཞིག་ཤུ་ཡི། | སྤྱང་བར་བྱ་བ་མ་ཡིན་འདྲི། |
107. | ཐད་དཔ་པོ་ལྷ་མ་ཡིན། | ཤེས་བཤེས་གསུམ་པོའི་མཆོག་ཉིད་དེ།
 | གང་ལས་སྤྱི་ཞིང་གང་འདྲ་བ། | རི་མ་ཐག་པའི་ཤེས་པ་གང། |
108. | ཡུལ་མཆོངས་ཡུལ་དུ་འགྱུར་ར་ཞིས། | འཇུག་བཞིན་དུ་བཤད་པ་ནི།
 | རིན་དྭག་པར་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། | གང་ཡིས་ཡུལ་དུ་སྤང་བ་ལས། |
109. | འདྲ་བ་རང་རིག་སྤྱད་ཡུར་ར། | ཤེས་པའི་ཤུམ་པར་འདྲ་བ་ནི།
 | སེམས་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་ལ་ཡང་ཡོད། | རི་ཕྱུར་འདྲོད་ན་ཡུལ་འདྲ་ཞིས། |
110. | རྒྱད་པར་བརྗོད་པར་སྤྱོད། | གཞུང་བར་སྤང་བ་འདྲི་བ་ནི།
 | རི་མ་ཐག་པའི་ཤེས་སྤྱང་། | ཡུལ་ནི་མཆོངས་པ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ཡིར། |
111. | སྤྲོན་པོ་ལ་སྔགས་ཁོ་ན་སྤང། | སྤྲོན་པོ་ལ་སྔགས་སྤང་བའི་ཤེས།
 | གལ་ཉིད་སྔགས་ཡིན་ན། | རི་ཆོད་ཡུལ་དེ་ཡིན་ན། |
112. | རི་ཆོད་ཡུལ་དེ་ནི་མཆོངས། | ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་བདེན་མཆོངས་མ་ཡིན།
 | ཇི་ཕྱུར་སྤྱི་དྭག་སྤྲུག་སྔགས། | རི་བཞིན་གཤགས་པས་དེ་ལ་ཡང། |
113. | གཞུང་བར་སྤང་བ་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། | ཡུལ་ལ་དམིགས་པ་སྤྱང་ཡིར།
 | ཡུལ་ནི་གཞུང་བའི་ཆར་འདྲོད་ན། | རི་ཡང་མཆོག་ཉིད་སྤེལ་ཐད་པར། |

114. | ཁྲེལ་མི་ཕྱུར་ན་མཆོན་ཏེ། | ར་ཉིད་མཆས་ཀྱི་སྒྲུབ་པ་ཡིན།
| ར་མ་སྒྲུབ་པ་ཡི་ཁྲེལ་མི་ན། | ཡུལ་ཆིབས་དང་མ་ཡིན་ཕྱིར། |
115. | བཟུང་པར་བྱེད་པ་འཇམ་ཡིན་ན། | རྒྱུ་རྩུབ་དེ་ཆེད་པར་བྱེད།
| ལྷ་ཡོ་རྩལ་ལྟན་འདུལ་པ་ནི། | ཡན་ལག་མེད་མ་ཆུང་ཕྱིར། |
116. | ར་ཆོག་མཁུ་པ་མིན་ན་རྒྱུ་ལུས། | གཉི་གཤམ་ཆེད་པར་འདོད་པར་བྱེད།
| འཇམ་པ་འདི་ཆོས་པ་འདི་ཤུམ་པ་ནི། | མཆོན་ཉིད་གཉི་གཤེད་ཆོས་སྒྲུབས་ན། |
117. | རྒྱུ་རྩུབ་རྒྱུ་གསུམ་ཡིན་པ་ཆེན། | གཞུང་པ་འདི་ཆོས་(2076) བཤམ་འདོད་དེ།
| ཤུམ་པ་འདྲ་¹² བ་སྒྲུལ་ལ། | ར་ཆོག་མཁུ་པར་འདོད་པ་གང་ཡིན་པ། |
118. | རི་ཡཔ་མི་རྒྱལ་ཤུམ་པ་པ། | ཤུམ་པ་དེ་མཆོག་གི་སྒྲུབ།
| གཤེད་ཏེ་སྒྲུ་ཤུམ་མཆོག་གི་གསུ་ས། | གཞུགས་ཀྱི་ཆོས་པར་ཤུམ་འབྱུང་ན། |
119. | ཤུམ་པ་ར་ཆོག་མཁུ་པ་དེ་དང་ཆེ། | རྒྱུ་རྩུབ་ན་འདྲ་པ་ཡིན།
| གཉི་གཤེད་ཤུམ་པ་མཆོག་པ་ཤུམ་པ་འདི། | ཤུམ་པ་ར་ཆོག་མཁུ་པ་ཡིན་པར་འདོད། |
120. | རི་ཡཔ་མི་རྒྱལ་གང་གི་ཕྱིར། | ར་པཔ་པ་ཤུམ་མཁུ་པ་ཤུམ་མི་སྒྲུབ།
| གཞུང་པར་བྱ་ལ་ཡུལ་ཉིད་དྲ། | རིས་པས་ཡུལ་དྲ་གཉིས་ཡིན་ན། |
121. | འཇམ་ཏེན་ལས་ཆེད་ཆེན་ལྷ་པ་ཕྱིར། | མཆོན་ཉིད་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་ཆེ་པ་འདྲ།
| ཤུམ་པ་དང་མཐུ་ནི་འཇམ་ཏེན་ན། | རོན་དྲུང་པར་བྱས་མིན་ལ། |
122. | མཆོན་ཉིད་ཀྱང་ཆེ་ཡོད་ཆེན་ན། | རི་ཆེ་ལྷུས་ར་ཆོག་མཁུ་པ་ཡིན།
| འཇམ་ཏེན་རྒྱལ་པ་ཁྱུང་བ་ཉིན་ནས། | ལྷ་ཡོ་རྩལ་ར་ཆོག་མཁུ་པ་ཉིད་དྲ་ནི། |
123. | རྒྱུང་སྒྲུ་པ་དྲག་པར་བྱ་རྒྱལ་གྱི། | ཤུམ་བྱ་གཏན་དུ་མ་ཡིན་ནོ།
| འདོད་དང་མི་འདོད་པ་ཆོག་མཁུ་གཞུགས། | ཡཔ་དག་དྲ་ཆེ་ཕྱི་ཆོག་ཆེན། |

124. | དུམ་འདི་ནི་ཤོ་ཅམ་ཤིས། | བྱ་པ་དེ་ནི་འབྲེལ་མ་ཡིན།
 | སྒྲ་ལ་སྤྲུམ་པ་གཞུགས་ཅིག་ལ། | ཡོན་ཏན་སྤྲུམ་གོས་མ་རྒྱ་པཅས་དྲི། |
125. | ལྷ་ཡི་དབྱེ་བས་འབྲས་ལུ་ཡང་། | བས་འདྲེས་པ་ཡི་བྱེ་བྲག་དབྱེ།
 | དོན་ལ་སྤྲོད་སྦྱང་¹³ པ་ཡི། | །གས་པ་དེ་ཡི་དམ་ཐག། |
126. | གོམས་པ་ལས་ནི་སྒྲ་སྤྲུམ་གཞུགས། | དེ་བཞིན་གཞན་ལས་གཞན་འབྱུང་།
 | དག་ལ་དང་གདུག་གཅིས་གོས་པ་ཡི། | རྒྱད་པར་གྱི་ནི་བྱེ་བྲག་དབྱེ། |
127. | དོན་གྱི་ཅམ་པ་ལས་མིན་པར། | འདྲི་ན་དེ་ནི་ཅི་ཡི་ཡིར།
 | སྤོབས་སུ་ནས་ནི་སྒྲ་ན་འབྱོན་བྱེད། | དེ་བས་དེ་མཁས་པ་མེད་པའི་དངོས། |
128. | ཇི་ལྟ་བུར་ཡང་མི་འགྲད་དོ། | དོན་བྱེད་སྦྱང་ཡིར་གྲུབ་པ་ཡིན།
 | དེ་མེད་ཡིར་ན་དེ་མེད་དོ། | མི་ལས་གཤོན་པ་ཞིན་དེ་ནི་ཅམས་ནི། |
129. | མེད་པར་ཡང་ནི་བྱུང་འདྲོད་པས། | དེ་ཡིར་དེ་ནི་བྱུང་ཡོད་པའི་ཡིར།
 | གཤ་དབྱིར་འུམ་འདྲོད་ན། | ཁོ་པ་བྱུང་པ་ཅམ་གྱིས་ནི། |
130. | ཡུ་དོན་ཁྱེད་པར་མི་སྒྲིམ། | འོག་པར་གསུམ་པའི་རུང་བ་ཞིན་ལས།
 | བྱུད་པར་འགྲུབ་པ་མཐུང་ཡིར་དོ། | འོན་ཀྱང་དེ་ནི་དམ་ཐོག་པ་ཡིས། |
131. | རྒྱུ་ལ་མན་དང་གཤོད་བྱེད་པ། | འབྲུམ་པ་པ་ལ་ནི་དེ་མེད་ཀྱི་¹⁴ |
 | བྱུང་པ་ཅམ་ཤིག་ཡོད་ཡིར་དོ། | ^[208a] མི་ལས་ན་ནི་འདྲོད་སྤྱོད་པ། |
132. | དེ་ཡི་ངས་པ་སྤྱི་འགྲུབ་ག། | ཁ་པ་འབྱུང་ཅམ་མ་ཡིན་ན།
 | འདྲོད་པའི་དོན་ཐོག་གཤ་ཤིག། | ཁྱེད་འདྲོད་ཅགས་འབྲེལ་ཡིན་ཡིར། |
133. | མི་ལས་ལས་གཞན་དག་ལྟར་འབྱུང་། | འདྲོད་པས་བྱུང་མེད་དེ་ག་ཡིན་ན།
 | ཇི་ལྟ་བུར་ནི་མི་བསྐྱེད་ཡིན། | གཤ་དབྱིར་མེད་སྦྱང་པ་ལ། |

144. |¹⁵ཤུད་པ་ཤུད་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་རྒྱུས། |འཛིན་པར་བྱུང་པ་མེས་སུ་དེ་ཡིན།
|འདས་པར་གྱུར་པའི་མེས་སུ་དཔན་པ། |ཡང་དག་འཇུག་པ་གང་ཡིན་པ། |
145. |མཚས་དང་དག་གི་ཁྱུ་ལས་མེ་ནི། |བྱུང་པ་མིན་མྱུར་འཛིན་མ་ཡིན།
|^[208b]མངས་གྱུས་སྤྱོད་ཡུལ་མི་གཉིས་པའི། |ངོ་བོ་རབ་དྲུ་མ་གསུ་མྱུར། |
146. |དོན་པའི་མིན་མིན་ཞུས་གང་སྟུག་པ། |དེ་བཟང་མིན་གཉིས་མིན་པའི་མྱུར།
|གསུ་པ་འཛིན་པ་ཁོ་ན་ཡིས། |དེ་གཟུང་མ་ལུས་འཛིན་པའི་མྱུར། |
147. |ཐམས་ཅད་མཐུན་པར་བཤད་པ་ཡིན། |གཉིས་མིན་རྣམ་པར་རིག་མྱུར་མིན།
|བཟུན་པར་བྱ་མིན་དེ་བོ་ཞིག། |རིག་གོ་ཞུས་ཀྱི་གང་སྟུག་པ། |
148. |གཞན་གྱི་རིག་བྱ་གང་ཡིན་པ། |ཅི་དོར་པ་བྱུ་བ་ལྟར་ལུས་མ།
|པ་དེ་ལེ་མེ་ཐམ་ནི་ཡོངས་གསུ་མྱུར། |དེ་མྱུར་དམིགས་པ་ཡོད་པའི་མྱུར། |
149. |ཡོད་ཀྱང་དམིགས་མེད་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། |གཤམ་ཏི་དེད་ག་གང་དུ་ཡོང།
|ཕྱི་ཡི་གཟུང་པ་མིན་ཞིག། |ཐམས་ཅད་མཐུན་པ་ཇི་ལྟ་བུ། |
150. |རང་མེས་སུ་ཅམ་ཞིག་རྣམ་གསུ་པམ། |རང་མིག་ཁོ་ནར་ཟུང་¹⁵པའོ།
|རང་ལེ་མཚས་ཅམ་ཞིག་རྣམ་གསུ་མྱུར། |ཐམས་ཅད་མཐུན་ཞུས་པ་མེ་ཟུང། |
151. |ལོགས་གསུ་བ་ཞིག་གསུ་¹⁶ན་ནི། |སྤོ་ཅམ་ལྟ་བར་མི་འགྱུར་ངོ།
|མི་གཉིས་ཁོ་ན་གསུ་པའི་མྱུར། |གཤམ་ཏི་ཉིས་པ་མེད་པའི་དོན། |
152. |ཇི་ལྟར་དེ་བཞིན་རྣམ་གསུ་གྱང། |དེ་ལྟར་དམིགས་པ་ཡོད་པ་ཡིན།
|གཉིས་རྣམ་གྱེས་པའི་གསུ་པ་ལ། |རྣམ་པ་གྱུན་བྱུ་གྱུ་རིག་ཅེས། |
153. |བྱ་བ་དེ་ནི་ཡམ་མཚན་ཅེ། |དེ་མྱུར་འཛིན་པའི་ངོ་བོ་རབ་ཡོད།
|ཐམས་ཅད་མཐུན་ཡོང་དམིགས་པ་གཞན། |ཐུང་ཟུང་མེད་ཅེས་བྱ་བ་ནི།

154. |མཁམས་པ་ནམས་ཀྱི་མཁའ་མེད་གྱི། |བདག་གི་ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་ཕྱགས་སོ།
|མངོན་ཀྱང་ཁྱེད་མིང་ངམ་འགའ་ཞིག། |གཉིས་པོ་གཙུག་པ་མེད་མེད། |
155. |འདྲོ་མགས་ལ་སྒྲགས་ཉིས་པའི་མགས། |གཏམ་དུ་ཡོངས་སུ་ཟུང་སྤྱོད་ཀྱི།
|ཁྱིམ་པའི་མཁས་ནི་ཐམས་ཅད་དུ། |གཉིས་ཀྱི་ནུབ་པ་མེད་པས་ན། |
156. |གང་ཞིག་གཉིས་པ་མ་ཡོངས་ཟེད་པ། |གཉིས་པའི་སྐབས་ནི་ཡོད་མ་ཡིན།
|སྤྱོད་པོ་སྒྲུབ་པའི་ཤུམ་པ་གང། |བརྗོད་པའི་ནུབ་པར་འབྱུག་པ་ཡིན། |
157. |གཉིས་ཀྱི་ཁྱོད་པོ་དང་ལུན་པ། |ཇི་ལྟར་དེ་ནི་གཉིས་པོ་ཡིན།
|འདྲོ་མགས་ཁྱོད་པོ་གཉིས་པ་ལས། |ཇི་ལྟར་འདྲོ་མགས་མི་ཟེད་ལྟར། |
158. |དེ་བཞིན་གཉིས་ཀྱི་ཁྱོད་པོ་ལ། |གཉིས་པ་མ་གཉིས་ཟེད་མི་འགྱུར་རོ།
|ཁྱོད་ལ་དངོས་མ་སྟོང་ལྟགས་ཙམ། |བདག་ (2090) མེད་པ་ལ་སྒྲགས་པ་སྟོན། ||
159. |གཉིས་མེད་པ་ལ་སྟོང་ཙམ་སྟེ། |དེ་ནི་མེད་དེ་དག་བཞུགས་མ་ཡིན།
|དག་པར་དམིགས་པ་ཀྱང་ཉིན་མོངས། |སི་དྭགས་ཀྱང་ཀྱང་ཉེ་འདས། |
160. |དམིགས་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་མེད་པ་ལས། |སངས་རྒྱལ་ཉིད་ཐོབ་གདོན་མི་ཟ།
|དམིགས་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་མེད་པ་ནི། |ཐམས་ཅད་དུ་ཡང་བྱ་བ་མེད། |
161. |འབད་དང་སྤྱོད་པ་མེད་པར་ཡང། |སངས་རྒྱལ་ཉིད་དེ་འདྲོད་པར་འགྱུར།
|དེ་མེད་སེམས་ཅན་སྤོང་ཆེད་དང། |དེ་ལ་སྤང་དང་ཐམས་དང་ནི། |
162. |འདུས་བྱས་སི་དྭག་བཞུགས་པ་ལས། |བདེ་བར་གཤམས་པའི་གོ་འཕང་འབྱེད།
|ཁྱོད་སྟེ་ཙམ་ལ་ཆེ་ལྟ་བུར། |སྤྱོད་པ་ལ་སྒྲགས་ཡོངས་སུ་ཆེགས། |
163. |སྤྱོད་བྱ་མེད་པས་དེ་ཡི་མེད། |སངས་རྒྱལ་ཉིད་ཀྱང་མི་སྤྱོད་རོ།
|གལ་ནི་ཐམས་ཅད་དང་གིས་ན། |ནམ་པར་མིགས་པར་ངེས་པ་ལས། |

164. །སྤྲོད་ལན་པའི་རྣམ་པ་ཡིས། །ཁྱོ་ཞིག་གལ་དེ་སྤྲོ་ཞིན།
 །དེ་ནི་མངོན་སུམ་ཤིས་དཔག་དང་། །ཡིད་ཀས་ལུང་གིས་རབ་མ་སྒྲུབས། །
165. །དེ་ནི་དྲིག་པ་ཁྱོ་ན་ཅས། །འབའ་ཞིག་ཡོངས་སུ་བསྒྲགས་པར་ཟད།
 །རྣམ་ཤེས་སྤྲོན་པའི་རྣམ་པ་ཅན། །བརྟེ་སྒྲག་རྣམས་སུ་གྲོས་པ་བྱས་ཀྱང་། །
166. །འོན་ཀྱང་སེམས་ཅན་འགའ་ཞིག་གི། །དབུལ་དང་བྲལ་བར་སྤི་འགྱུར་རོ།
 །ལལ་འབྱེར་རྣམས་ཀྱི་ཡིད་ལ་བྱེད། །གང་ཅོ་ཅོད་མིད་སྒོ་ལ་ན་ཡང་། །
167. །དེ་ཅོ་བདེ་དང་སྤྲོག་བསྐལ་བ། །འཕྱེད་དང་ཡང་དག་ཟད་སྤི་འགྱུར།
 །ཀླན་ལ་ཐམས་ཅད་སྤྲོན་པ་དང་། །སྤོང་ཤིས་སྤྲོན་པ་ཡོངས་ཤིགས་པ། །
168. །དོན་བདག་པ་དང་བྱེ་བྲག་མེད། །དེ་ལ་སྤི་སྤྲོན་དགག་པ་ཡིན། །
 །ཡོངས་སུ་སྤོང་ན་འདས་པ་ཡིན། །སྒྲུག་དང་དང་ནི་གྲི་བའི་ངོ།
169. །ཁྱིམ་དང་ལྷ་ཁང་མཐོང་བ་དག །འཛི་ལྟར་གཞན་གྱིད་བང་ལས་རྒྱ། །
 །གལ་དེ་དང་ཤྱོད་མིན་ལས། །འཛི་ལྟར་འདས་པ་ཤིས་སུ་དཔག
170. །གལ་དེ་འདས་པ་ཤིས་སྤི་དཔག །དེ་ནི་ཤན་དུ་འཛིག་དེས་ཐམ། །
 །ཉན་ཐོས་གྲོལ་¹⁷ བས་རྣམ་དག་གི། །སྒྲུག་དང་མཐོང་བ་ཀགས་བྲལ་བའི།
171. །གལ་དེ་ཤིས་སུ་དཔག་མེད་པར། །འཛི་ལྟ་བུར་ནི་གསུམ་པ་སྤྱི། །
 །གལ་དེ་བརྟེད་པས་ཡིན་ཞིན། །གསོན་པོ་དུམ་བུར་བཅད་^[209b] མཐོང་བ¹⁸།
172. །དེ་ནི་དེ་ཡིད་བང་ཡིན་ན། །ཡོངས་སུ་འདས་པ་འཛི་ལྟ་བུར། །
 །འཛིག་དེན་པ་ཡི་རྒྱལ་གཞས་པ། །ས་པོ་དོ་སྒྲིག་ལས་སྒྲུག་སྒྲིགས།
173. །འབྱུང་ཞིས་བྱ་འདྲི་སེམས་ཅན་དུ། །སྒྲུལ་བྱང་བ་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། །
 །གལ་དེ་ཤེས་གང་མཇུག་གོས་སུ། །ཤེས་པའིས་པར་སྤོ་འགྱུར་བ།

174. |གྱུ་དྲི་པེའུ་བས་བྱ་དྲི། |ངས་པའང་ཕྱིད་པ་མ་ཡིན་དྲི།
|འདྲི་ལྷུང་མེའི་རྣམ་པར་གྲེས། |མེད་པར་དྲུབ་ལྷོ་བྱེའོ། |
175. |ས་བཅོས་མེད་པའི་སེམས་ལ་ཡལ། |བྱ་གྲུ་རྒྱུང་བའི་ཁྲོ་ཕྱིད་དྲི།
|ཁེའི་ཁྲོ་པེའི་བསྐྱེད་མ་པའི་སེམས། |དྲུབ་ལྷོ་སེམས་ཀྱི་བྱ་ཡིན་ག། |
176. |རྣམ་པ་དྲུ་མ་ཕྱིད་པ་ལ། |བྱ་བྲག་དྲིག་མ་པ་ག་ལ་ཞིག
|མེའི་ཁྲོ་དྲི་མ་ཐག་པའི་བྱ། |དྲུབ་ལྷོ་སེམས་ཀྱི་བྱ་ཡིན་ག། |
177. |དེ་ཡང་བཟང་མིན་དྲུ་བ་ཡི། |སེམས་ལ་མེའི་ཕྱིད་མ་ངས།
|འབྲེལ་པར་རབ་དྲུ་མ་གྲག་ག། |ཧེ་ལྷུང་འདྲི་དང་འདྲི་ལས་ཅི་¹⁹། |
178. |གྱུ་ལ་ཐ་སྙད་མ་འབྲེམ་པ། |ཧེ་ལྷུ་བྱུར་ན་འཇུག་པར་འབྱུང་།
|དྲི་ལྷུང་བདག་མ་པ་ལ་བཤོད་ཅས། |ཁམས་པ་སུམ་པ་ནི་སེམས་ཅམ་ཞིས། |
179. |ཐམས་ཅད་རབ་དྲུ་བཤད་ཡིན་གྱི། |གཞུགས་སོགས་མེད་ལྷུང་མ་ཡིན་གྱི།
|གང་ལ་ཅགས་ལ་སོགས་འབྱུང་བ། |བདག་མ་པ་མངོན་སུམ་མཛད་ཅས་ཅི་། |
180. |ཉིས་པ་ཞི་བར་བྱ་བའི་ལྷུང། |དྲི་ལྷུང་ཡལ་བདག་མེད་བསྟན།
|དེ་བཞིན་གཞན་དྲུང་ཧེ་ལྷུ་བྱུར། |བྱིས་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་རྣམ་བདག་པ་ལྷུང། |
181. |ལྷུང་ངས་ཕྱིད་པ་མིན་ཞིས་གསུངས། |ཅི་ཡི་ལྷུང་ན་བྱུང་པར་མཛད།
|དེ་མ་ཐག་དྲུ་བསྟན་པ་ལས། |བྱུང་པར་མངོན་པ་ཞིན་པ་ལས། |
182. |བྱ་བ་རྣམས་སུ་ཕྱིངས་སུ་གྲེས། |དྲི་ལྷུང་བདག་ནི་མག་ཅིས་གསུངས།
|དེ་བཞིན་གཞན་དྲུང་བསྟན་པ་ལས། |བདག་མ་པར་རྣམ་པར་བདག་མ་པ་དང་། |
183. |ཚུས་ཉིད་གཞུགས་ཞིས་བཀའ་རྩལ་དྲི། |ཚུས་ཉིད་རང་གི་མ་ཚན་ཉིད་དྲི།
|དངས་པོ་ཅམ་ནི་བདག་མ་པའོ། |རྣམ་པར་བདག་མ་པ་བྱུང་པར་དུའོ། |

184. | ཆོས་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ནི་དབྱེ་བ་འདི། | དངོས་པོ་མེད་ན་མི་བྱང་ངོ།
 | གཤམ་དེ་གཞུགས་སྟོང་གསུངས་ཤེ་ན། | དེ་ལ་གཞུགས་²⁰སྒྲིའི་ལྟ་བུར། |
185. | བདགས་དེ་བཟུན་²¹པ་ཡིན་ན་ནི། | འབྲས་བུ་འདོད་པ་ཅི་ཞིག་ཡིན།
 | གང་དུ་^[210a]མི་བསྐྱུ་ཡིད་པ་ཡི། | དེ་བས་དེ་དངོས་ཡིད་པ་ཉིད། |
186. | ཐམས་ཅད་མེད་པར་ཁོ་ན་ལས། | མི་ལས་བཞིན་དུ་དམིགས་མ་ཡིན།
 | ཕྱི་རེལ་དོན་དུ་སྒྲ་ནམས་ཀྱིས། | ཁྱོ་ཙམ་སྒྲ་བ་དེ་སྒྲ་སྒྲས། |
187. | འདི་ནི་རིགས་པ་འང་འོན་དེ་མིན། | མཁས་པ་ནམས་ཀྱི་དབྱེད་དུ་གསོལ།
 | རིགས་དང་མི་རིགས་དབྱེད་པ་ལ། | བདག་ལ་མཁས་ཁྱོ་མཚང་ཞིག་མེད། |
188. | འོན་ཀྱང་གཞན་སྒྲས་བདེན་པ་ནི། | མང་པོ་མདོར་བཅུས་ནས་བཟུན་གྱིས།
 | ཤེས་པའི་སྒྲ་བས་གདི་སྒྲ་གཤི། | སྒྲ་བཅོམ་མཁས་པས་མངོན་མཛད་ཅིང་།
 | དེ་རིང་ཕྱིན་ཆད་ཆེ་ནམས་ཀྱི། | ལས་དུ་སྒྲེ་པོ་སྒྲིན་དུངས་ཤིག། |

ཕྱི་རེལ་གྱི་དོན་གྲུབ་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་ཚིག་ཡེན་བྱས་པ། སྒྲེ་བ་དཔོན་དག་སྐྱུངས་ཀྱིས་
 མཛད་པ་ཚོགས་སོ། །

ཁ་ཆེ་བྱེད་པ་དུ་སྒྲ་བའི་སྒྲེ་བ་དཔོན་ཆེན་པོ་ཆོ་ན་མི་བྱ་དང་། བོད་ཀྱི་ལོ་ཙམ་བ་དག་སྒྲོང་
 དཔལ་བཅེགས་རྒྱུ་ཏམ་བསྐྱུར་ཅིང་གཞུང་དེ་²²གདན་ལ་སྐབ་པའོ། [210a, l. 4]

TIBETAN TEXT

Variants

1. This introductory sentence is not found in the Snar-thang edn. (=N.)
2. N. བསྐྱེས་
3. N. བཀའ་བ་ for རྩ་བ་
4. Peking (=P.) གུར་གྲང་
5. P. མ་
6. P. དེས་ན་ for དེ་མ་
7. P. བཟུན་
8. P. མ་
9. P. སྤན་
10. P. ཀྱི་
11. P. རྟོག་པ་
12. P. འདི་བ་
13. N. ཡིན་
14. P. ཀྱིས་
15. P. ན་བ་(?)

16. P. ཤེན་ནི་
17. N. གོལ་བས་
18. P. བས་
19. P. མིན་
20. P. སྒ་
21. P. བདན་
22. P. ཞིང་

Verse 95a : Read རྣམ་མེད་ for རྣམས་—

“d” Read བསམ་པ་ = चिन्ता for བྱིས་པ་ बाल

TIBETAN-SANSKRIT GLOSSARY

(Figure refers to the verse number)

ཀུན་དུ་ सर्वथा 68.

ཀྱང་ च 68, 101.

སྐད་ཅིག་ क्षण 81. v. ཡུལ་

—གཞན་ अपरक्षण v. འདྲ་བའི་

ཁོ་བའི་ नः 101.

ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་ भवताम् 101.

མཐུན་བྱའི་སེམས་དང་ ज्ञानचेतसा 68.

སངས་རྒྱས་མཐུན་ལའང་ बौद्धेऽपि विज्ञाने 95.

འབྲུལ་ विभ्रम 35. v. རྟགས་པ་; སྟོན་པོ་

གང་ यत् 29.

གང་གིས་ལྷན་ཅིག་སྟོང་འགྱུར་བ་ येन स्यात् सहवेदनम् 81d.

གལ་ཏེ་ལྷན་ཅིག་སྟོང་ཡོད་ན་ यद्यस्ति सहवेदनम् 71.

གྲུན་ཆགས་རིགས་མཐུན་འཛིན་པ་ལ་ अविच्छिन्नसजातीयग्रहे 35.

གྲུབ་ན་ संमाध्ये 87. v. དེ་དང་

གྲུབ་པ་གྲུབ་པ་ཉིད་དུ་འགྱུར་ सिद्धसाधनता भवेत् 87.

འགའ་མའང་མིན་ नैव.....कचित् 71.

འགལ་བའང་ཡིན་ विरुद्ध 71.

འགྱུར་ भवेत् 87.

ལྟ་ བློ་ 71.

ལྟ་བ་པ་ཉིད་ སྐྱེ་སྐྱེ་སྐྱེ་ 87.

ལྟ་བ་པ་ལ་ སྐྱེ་སྐྱེ་ 29.

—པ་ སྐྱེ་སྐྱེ་ 29.

ལྟ་བ་པ་ལ་ སྐྱེ་སྐྱེ་ 81. ལ. ལྟ་བ་པ་

ལྟ་བ་པ་ལ་ སྐྱེ་སྐྱེ་ 35.

—པ་ལ་ ལྟ་བ་པ་ ལྟ་བ་པ་ ལྟ་བ་པ་ 66.

ལྟ་ ལྟ་ལྟ་ ལྟ་ 95. ལ. ལྟ་ལྟ་

ལྟ་ལྟ་ ལྟ་ 89. ལ. ལྟ་ལྟ་

ལྟ་ལྟ་ ལྟ་=ལྟ་ལྟ་ for ལྟ་ 95.

ལྟ་ལྟ་ ལྟ་. ལ. ལྟ་

—ལྟ་ལྟ་ ལྟ་ལྟ་ 66.

ལྟ་ལྟ་ ལ. ལྟ་ལྟ་

ལྟ་ལྟ་ ལ. ལྟ་ལྟ་; ལྟ་ལྟ་; ལྟ་ལྟ་

ལྟ་ལྟ་ ལ. ལྟ་

ལྟ་ལྟ་ ལྟ་ 35, ལྟ་ལྟ་ 101, ལྟ་ལྟ་ 89.

..... ལྟ་ ལྟ་ 101.

ལྟ་ལྟ་—ལྟ་ལྟ་ ལྟ་ ལྟ་ ལྟ་ལྟ་ 89:

ལྟ་ལྟ་ལྟ་ལྟ་ ལྟ་ལྟ་ 68.

ལྟ་ལྟ་ལྟ་ལྟ་ ལྟ་ལྟ་ 71.

ལྟ་ལྟ་ ལ. ལྟ་ལྟ་

ལྟ་ལྟ་ལྟ་ 29. sine skt. ལ. ལྟ་ལྟ་

- རྣམ་ pro. genitive, v. རྣམ་ལྟ་
 རྣམ་བཅས་ साकार 87. v. རྣམ་པ་
 —པ་བཅས་སམ་ཅི་རྣམ་མེད་ साकारं वा निराकारम् 95.
 —མེད་ཀྱང་ निराकारञ्च 101.
 ལྷང་བ་ निर्भासि 87. v. རྣམ་ལྟ་
 —བ་དང་བཅས་གཞུགས་བཞིན་ནོ་ सालोकरूपवत् 81.
 —བར་མི་འགྱུར་རོ་ अप्रतिभासनम् 44.
 ལྷོགས་ལ་ पक्षे 87.
 ལྷ་རབ་རྣམ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་ནི་ परमाणूनाम् 44.
 ལྷོ་ཅམ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ धीमान्तवेन 29.
 འགྱུར་ अस्ति v. རང་དབང་
 —ཕྱིར་ उत्पादात् v. འདྲ་བའི་
 མ་ངེས་འགྱུར་ ऐकान्तिको न 68.
 མ་ལྷོད་ནོ་ असम्भवः 44.
 མི་འགལ་
 དང་—ཕྱིར་ अविरुद्धत्वात् 29.
 མི་མཐུན་རིགས་དང་མི་འགལ་ཕྱིར་ विजातीयाविरुद्धत्वात् 29.
 མེད་ नास्ति 66.
 ལྷོང་ वेदन 71, 81.
 —ཏ་ཉིད་ वेद्यता 87.
 ཅམ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་— मातृत्वेन 29.
 ཅོགས་པ་ལྷ་མ་ཁོ་ན་ལས་ पूर्विकैव हि सामग्री 81.

सकृन्नृदं लक्षणं 89. v. अदसःसु

दद्विन्नृदं ग्रह 35, v. सुन्नृदं

— ग्राहक 66.

—उदं ग्राहक 89.

विशं pro. विशन्नृदं केत् 89. v. दद्विन्नृदं

इति 89.

मन्नृदं अन्यः 66.

—सदःपदःकेत् अन्येन विना 71.

नद्विन्नृदं —वत् v. सुदःपदः

अपदः v. प्रेक्षसः

मन्नृदसः स्य v. सुदःपदः

अदःपदःकेत् तत्त्वतः 101.

—द्विन्नृदं भूतमर्थम् 101.

अदःपदसःसुदःकेत्तु विषयक्षणम् 81.

—सदःपदःकेत्पदःज्ञेयसदः चाभ्युपविषयवित्ता 66. (lit. विषयवित्ता इतिद्वयधीमिवित्ता).

अदःसःसुन्नृदंउदःपदी सकृन्नृदःअदः पदिच्छेदलक्षणम् 89.

अदःन्नृदं अस्ति 71.

अदःपदःअदुदःपदःसुदःदेन स्वातन्त्र्येणास्त्यसम्भवः 44.

अदःपदःअदुदःपदःसुदःदेन न प्रवर्तते pro. किं नु प्र—95.

दद्विन्नृदः संवितः 66. v. सुदःकेत्तु

दद्विन्नृदः v. सःसुदःसुदः

—सुदः सजातीय 35. v. सुदः

दद्विन्नृदः प्रत्येक 44. v. सुदः

—ལྷ་བར་མི་འགྱུར་རོ་ འཇཱ་ཁྱེ་འཇཱ་ཁྱེ་ 44.

ལ་ pro. locative v. ལྷ་བར་; ལྷ་བར་

ལྷ་བར་ འཇཱ་ཁྱེ་ 81.

ལྷ་བར་ལྷ་བར་ འཇཱ་ཁྱེ་ 101.

—ལྷ་བར་ལྷ་བར་ལྷ་བར་ འཇཱ་ཁྱེ་ འཇཱ་ཁྱེ་འཇཱ་ཁྱེ་ 87.

—ལྷ་བར་ འཇཱ་ཁྱེ་ 66.

—ལྷ་བར་ལྷ་བར་ འཇཱ་ཁྱེ་ 29.

—ལྷ་བར་ pro. འཇཱ་ཁྱེ་.

ལྷ་བར་ལྷ་བར་ལྷ་བར་ལྷ་བར་ འཇཱ་ཁྱེ་ འཇཱ་ཁྱེ་འཇཱ་ཁྱེ་ 68.

—ལྷ་བར་ལྷ་བར་ འཇཱ་ཁྱེ་ 95.

ལྷ་བར་ འཇཱ་ཁྱེ་ v. ལྷ་བར་

ལྷ་བར་ འཇཱ་ཁྱེ་ 68.

—ལྷ་བར་ལྷ་བར་ལྷ་བར་ལྷ་བར་ འཇཱ་ཁྱེ་ 68.

ལྷ་བར་ལྷ་བར་ འཇཱ་ཁྱེ་ 29.

ལྷ་བར་ལྷ་བར་ལྷ་བར་ འཇཱ་ཁྱེ་ 66.

—ལྷ་བར་ འཇཱ་ཁྱེ་ 71. v. ལྷ་བར་; 81. v. ལྷ་བར་

—ལྷ་བར་ འཇཱ་ཁྱེ་ 71.

ལྷ་བར་ 81. sine. Tib.

GREY WOLF IN TIBETAN TRADITION

—MYNAK R. TULKU

༄༅། །རྩོད་དགས་སུ་སྤང་གི་རྩལ་མཚན་འདིན། །

“Holding the banner of wolf symbolises holding by force, that is, conquest”. (1)

It is true that the expression “grey wolf” is used much later than “wolf”, though ordinarily the colour of the wolf is grey in Tibet as in other parts of the world too (2). The first instances—in the works on Mahākala (mgon-po མགོན་པོ་) and Kila (phur-pa རུར་པ་) in Kanjur (bka’-’gyur བཀའ་འགྱུར་) and Tenjur (bstan-’gyur བསྟན་འགྱུར་) (3)—did not use the epithet grey while later in Sakya Kaḥbum (sa-skya-bka’-’bum ས་སྐ་བཀའ་འབུམ་) (4), Rinchen Terzod (rin-chen-gter-mzod རིན་ཆེན་གྲིང་མཛོད་) (5) and the 5th Dalai Lama’s (lha-pa-chen-po ལྷ་པ་ཆེན་པོ་) works, (6) the epithet was quite current.

When the Mandala (dkyal-’khor དཀྱལ་འཁོར་) (7) of a deity was threatened by the evil spirits an animal like tiger, elephant or wolf emerged from the body of the same deity to protect the Mandala. The fat of the wolf is used in Tantric (rgyud རྒྱུད་) chemistry (8) and some Mandala is surrounded by eight graves and also eight different creatures (9). Wolf is one among the eight creatures.

In Eastern Tibet (khams ཁམས་) a traveller would regard it as a good omen, if he comes across a hawk, a kite or a wolf on the way. This belief can perhaps be traced back to King Gesar (ge-sar གེ་སར་). Gesar had three big generals who were represented by these three creatures. In the epic of Gesar one reads about the general who was symbolised by wolf and who described himself as the wolf of a man who killed or preyed on others as if they were lambs (10).

There are possibilities that the grey wolf motif itself might have developed in Khotan (li-yul ལེ་ཡུལ་) and had come to Tibet *via* India, in the time of Guru Padmasambhava (eighth century A.C.) The Tsenmara (tsi’u-dmar-po རྩུ་དམར་པོ་) and his six brothers appeared as wolves in seven different colours and approached Guru Padmasambhava, desiring to disturb him while he was in meditation in a grave in India (11). On asking who the demons

were, Guru was told that they were the sons of the king of Khotan. By his supernatural power the seven demons were made to be the protectors of the Doctrine. They are known as Tsenmar Pundun (btsan-dmar-spun-bdun བཅོན་དམར་སྤུན་བདུན་) in Tibet.

In Tibetan literature the banner of wolf (spyang.k'i-rgyal-mtsan སྤུང་ཀི་རྒྱལ་མཚན་) (12) is found in the books on Gyalpo Ku-nga (rgyal-po-sku-lha རྒྱལ་པོ་སྐུ་ལྷ་: five kings who are the protectors of the monasteries and the State Oracles of Tibet) who are known as "tobun-qaghan" in Mongolia. In those books the symbolic meaning is as explained above in the opening para. Among those deities, the chief deity known as Pehar (pe-har ཐེ་མར་) or Pekar (pe-kar ཐེ་ཀར་ or pe-dkar ཐེ་དཀར་) is some times addressed as the god of war of all men (skyes-bu-yongs-kyi-dgra-lha སྐུ་ཡུ་ཨང་ལ་གྱི་དང་ལྷ་) or simply as great god of war (dgra-lha-chen-po དང་ལྷ་ཆེན་པོ་) who came to Tibet in the eighth century from Bhata Hor (bha-ta-hor བྱ་ཏ་མོར་) (13). The books on these deities narrate almost the same story about the appearance of Pehar—first in Khotan, then in Bhata Hor (Mongolia) and finally in Tibet (14). It is said that after the completion of Samye (bsam-yas བསམ་ཡས་) monastery the Guru asked a serpent to be the guardian of the monastery but it refused (15). Then the Guru advised the king Thrisong Detsen (khri-srong-lde-btsan ཁྱི་སྔོང་ལྷེ་བཅོན་) to send an army to Bhata Hor for bringing certain objects from the Gomda (sgom-grwa སྐོམ་གྲལ་, Meditation School). An army was sent and they ransacked that school and brought the objects which included a small turquoise image of the Buddha and a mask (16). These were in the monastery of Samye till 1959. Pehar, as custodian of religious property in that school could not leave the site but had to follow those articles, as it was said by Guru. Thereupon he was appointed by the Guru as the guardian of the monastery. There is a temple in Samye which is known as Pehar Chog (pe-har-lcog ཐེ་མར་ལྷོག་) and on which there was a banner of wolf on the roof of the temple on the north (17). Mongolia being on the north of Tibet, the northern direction is significant.

It is interesting to note that in Tibetan tradition a deity riding a grey wolf or having a grey wolf head is usually found on the north, northwest or back of the principal deity surrounded by its retinues (18). In Mongolia the word for north, umar-a, also stands for back.

The animals which the Dharmapalas (Defenders of Law) have are tiger, wolf, kite, crow and owl etc. Thu'u Kan (thu'u-bkan ཐུ་ཁ་བཀྲ་) divides the day and night into six periods and finds the

evil spirits disguised in six forms. To subdue these evils there are six retinues; for instances, when an evil spirit appears in the form of a sheep, the wolf is the subduer of it (19).

Dhalha (dgra-lha དག་ལྷ་ /god of war, see Sarat Chandra Das: *Tibetan English Dictionary*) is one of the five gods, who are inseparable companions of humanity. Dhalha is accompanied by a wolf and a hawk; it is said that Dhalha let emanations of wolves and hawks (20).

The Turks might have got grey wolf banner from Tibet. When the third Dalai Lama visited the Mongol Khan in the 16th century, as it was prophesied in Kadam Legs bam (bka'-gdams-glegs-bam བཀའ་གདམས་གླེང་བ་) and also by Chogyal Phagpa (chos-rgyal-'phags-pa རྒྱལ་པོ་ཤར་པ་) (21), he (D.L.) built a monastery which included a temple named Pehar Chog (22). Whether there was a wolf banner or not on the roof of that temple but there must have been paintings of all the retinues of the Pehar. Among the retinues of Pehar, some hold the banner of wolf (23).

The third Dalai Lama was born in Water Rabbit year corresponding to 1543 and passed away in Mongolia in Earth Rat year, that is, 1588. A recent traveller to Mongolia says that Erdeni Tsu, the largest monastery, was founded in 1586 (24). Though the founder of the monastery is not mentioned in this travel book, one can guess by its date that the third Dalai Lama may have been the founder of it.

A special importance of the wolf for the Mongols is that the first Mongol king had the name Borte-chinua which means grey-blue wolf (25); and the Mongols also believed that their first king was descended from the Tibetan kings. The Mongol historians say that he was the youngest son of Dalai Subin Aru Altan Shiregtetu (Tibetan gri-gum-btsan-po གྲི་གུམ་བཙན་པོ་) whose name was Shaza Thi (sha-za-khri ཤ་ཙ་ཁྲི་, means flesh eater) and his two brothers fled to Kongpo (kong-po ཀོང་པོ་) after their father's assassination (26). From there he crossed over the Tenggis Sea in the direction of the north and came to the land of the Mongols (27). Mongol Chronicles of the Seventeenth century say "tere gongbo-yin utus-i ulu itegegsen" meaning that he (Borte-chinua) did not trust the Kongpo people (28), and came to Mongolia. On the other hand the Tibetan historians as Golotsawa ('gos-lo-tsa-wa གོ་ལོ་ཙ་བ་) Sonam Gyaltsen (bsod-nams-rgyal-mtshan བསོད་ནམས་རྒྱལ་མཚན་) and fifth Dalai Lama describe the first Mongol king Borta Che (sbor-ta-che སྔ་ར་ཇེ་), the son

of Heaven (29) and about Shaza Thi, they said that he later on became the king of Kongpo (30).

The wolf was also described as the god of the travellers ('gro-lha འགྲོ་ལྷ་) (31). It is however difficult to say whether the association of wolf with travels is Bon (བོན་) or Buddhist (nang-pa རྣ་པ་).

NOTES

- (1) རིན་ཆེན་གཏེར་མཛོད་ Vol. ཉི: རྒྱལ་པོ་སྤྱུ་ལྷ་འཁོར་བཅས་ཀྱི་གསོལ་ཁ་ལྷན་ལས་
རྟོག་བཅུ་ས་ pp. 10, 11; and ཐུའུ་བཀའ་རྒྱུ་བཟོ་ Vol. ཅ: book No.
37, pp. 13, 19.
- (2) *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (1959) Vol. 23, p. 697.
- (3) Kanjur, རྒྱུད་ Vol. ཅ: pp. 44, 56 and རྒྱུད་ Vol. བ: p. 209.
Tenjur རྒྱུད་ Vol. ཟ: p. 185.
- (4) ས་སྤྱུ་བཀའ་འབུམ་ Vol. ཉ: pp. 362, 370, 374, 378.
- (5) རིན་ཆེན་གཏེར་མཛོད་ Vol. ཀི: ཡུར་པའི་དམར་ཆེན་གཏེར་མའི་ལས་རིས་
pp. 8, 12; and Vol. ཇི: བཀའ་སྤྱད་ཤུན་ཆེན་པོ་སྤྱུ་བའི་འཕྲིན་ལས་ pp. 3, 6.
- (6) Fifth Dalai Lama Vol. ཏ: ཐོག་མེད་དྲག་ཙམ་རྒྱལ་ཕྱོབས་ལྷན་པའི་དམ་ཅན་
ཆོས་སྤྱད་རྒྱ་མཚོའི་སངས་རྒྱལ་མཚོའི་འབུལ་བསྐང་བཤགས་སྟེ་འཕྲིན་ལས་ནས་བཞི་
ལྷན་གྲུབ་ pp. 177, 188; སྤྱུ་ཆོས་རྒྱལ་ཁྲིར་དེ་ཇིའི་གོ་ཁྲབ་ p. 5.
- (7) Kanjur རྒྱུད་ Vol. ཟ: p. 282.
- (8) Kanjur རྒྱུད་ Vol. ཅ: p. 56.
- (9) Tenjur རྒྱུད་ Vol. ཟ: p. 185.

- (10) འཛམ་གླིང་གི་མང་ཆུང་པོ་འཁོར་བཅས་ཀྱི་སྒྲ་དཔལ་རྒྱལ་ཁ་ཆེར་ཕེབས་པའི་སྒྲ་ཆ་
Ms. with author part. II, p. 35. reads as: མང་མ་དོམ་མི་ཡི་སྒྲ་ཀྱི་རྩེ།
དབྱ་ལྷག་རྒྱུང་ཟེ་བའི་གཤེད་མ་ཡིན། ।
- (11) རིན་ཆེན་གཏེར་མཛོད་ Vol. ཉི: སྐུ་གྱི་དཔར་པོ་སྤྱིང་གི་རྒྱུད་ལེན་བདུན་པ།
དཔལ་དཔོན་གྱི་རྒྱུད་སྐབ་ཐབས་དང་བཅས་པ་ pp. 2, 13, 15.
- (12) RENE DE NEBESKY; *Oracles and Demons of Tibet*
(London 1956) p. 16.
- (13) བུ་བླ་བཀའ་ཐང་ Ms. in Namgyal Institute of Tibetology p. 160;
and སྐུ་བཀྲན་ Vol. རྩ: book No. 37. p. 9; and same thing is
said by the Fifth Dalai Lama: Vol. ཅ: p. 13. In the Golden-
Annals the Bhata Hor is described as middle (བར་) Mongolia.
see part I, p. 3. in LOKESH CHANDRA (ed. New Delhi 1964)
- (14) སྐུ་བཀྲན་ Vol. རྩ: book No. 37, p. 9.
- (15) Fifth Dalai Lama: Vol. ཅ: p. 13.
- (16) Fifth Dalai Lama: Vol. རྩ: རྒྱལ་རབས་ཆོག་མཁན་གཞོན་ནུ་ p. 39 and
also in Vol. ཅ: p. 14; སི་དུ་ཆོས་ཀྱི་རྒྱ་མཚོ་གངས་ལྗོངས་དབུས་གཙང་གནས་
བསྐོར་ལམ་ཡིག་ནོར་བུ་རྒྱུ་ཤེལ་གྱི་སེམས་དོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ p. 95.
- (17) Fifth Dalai Lama: Vol. ཅ: p. 92.
- (18) རིན་ཆེན་གཏེར་མཛོད་ Vol. ཀྱི: སྐུར་བཅུ་སྒྲུང་མ་དང་བཅས་པའི་དབང་ཆོག་
མཚན་ཆའི་འཁོར་ལོ་ p. 3; Fifth Dalai Lama: Vol. ཉི: གསོ་པ་
མཚན་ p. 171, 188 and also བྱལ་རྫོང་རྩོ་རྩེའི་གོ་ཁྲལ་ p. 5.
- (19) སྐུ་བཀྲན་ Vol. རྩ: book No. 5, p. 6.

- (20) བདག་ཆེན་ཀྱུ་གར་བས་སའོ་པའི་དཔལ་ས་སྐྱའི་རམངས་ཡིག་དགོས་འདོད་ལྷན་གྱི་ Ms. with author p. 86 ;
ཐུའུ་བཀྲན་ Vol. 3: book No. 43, p. 2.
- (21) *The Golden Annals* (ed. Lokesh Chandra) part III, p. 20.
reads as : “རྩིས་དུ་བཀའ་གདམས་སྒྲགས་བས་ལས། བོད་བྱང་གི་ཕྱོད་ནས་བྱང་
ཕྱོགས་སུ། །མི་ཁྱེད་ཀྱི་སྐུ་ལ་པ་དམ་པ་ཞིག །འབངས་མགོན་མཉེ་མང་པོ་འདྲན་
དུ་འབྱོ། །ཞིས་པའི་ངང་བཟུན་དང། སྤོན་འབྲོ་མགོན་ཆོས་རྒྱལ་འཕགས་པ་ལ་
སྤོ་པུ་ལའི་སེམས་རྒྱལ་པོས་གོང་དུ་བཞེད་པ་ལྟར་ཐོག་མཐུན་བར་གསུམ་གྱི་འབྲུལ་
ཆེན་བྱས་ཤིས། གོས་སྤྱག་ནག་པོ་བདུན། དེའི་རྩིས་སུ་དཀར་པོ་གཅིག་ཕུལ་བས།
ཁྲ་མའི་ཞལ་ནས། དེའི་རང་གཞི་སྐྱེ་བ་བདུན་གྱི་འོང་མི་ལྟ། དེ་ནས་ཁྱོད་
རྒྱལ་པོ་གསེར་གྱི་མིང་ཅན་དང། རིང་ཆུ་ལས་བྱས་པའི་མིང་ཅན་དུ་གྱུར་ཆོ་མཇུག་
ནས་འགྲོ་དོན་ཀྱུ་ཆེན་པོ་བྱེད་དོ།”
- (22) Fifth Dalai Lama : Vol. 9: རྩི་བཙུན་ཐམས་ཅད་མཁྱེན་པ་བསོད་ནམས་
ཀྱི་མཆོད་ནམས་ཐར་དངོས་གྲུབ་ཀྱི་མཆོད་ཡིང་དྭ་ (Life story of the III
Dalai Lama) p. 96.
- (23) རིན་ཆེན་གདེར་མཆོད་ Vol. 9: སྐུ་ལྔ་འུ་གསལ་ཁ་ pp. 10, 12; ཐུའུ་བཀྲན་
Vol. 3: book No. 37, p. 19.
- (24) JORGEN BISCH *Mongolia: Unknown Land* (London
1963) p. 110.
- (25) HOWORTH : *History of the Mongols* (London 1876/New York
1964) pp. 32, 34.
- (26) ཀྱུ་བོད་ཡིག་ཆང་; Ms. in NIT p. 90; རྒྱལ་རབས་གསལ་བའི་སེ་ལོང་
Ms. in NIT p. 27. and རྒྱལ་རབས་རྩི་གསལ་ལྷན་གཞིན་ནུ་ p. 12.
- (27) C. R. BAWDEN: *The Mongol Chronicle Altan Tobci*
(Wiesbaden 1955), p. 113.

- (28) A. Z. ZAMCARANO: *The Mongol Chronicles of the Seventeenth Century* (Wiesbaden 1955), p. 32.
- (29) རྒྱལ་རབས་གསལ་བའི་མེ་ལོང་ p. 13; དེབ་གཏིང་སྟོན་གོ་ book No. ༡: p. 26 and GEORGE N. ROERICH: *The Blue Annals* (Calcutta 1949) part I, p. 57. and རྒྱ་པོད་ཡིག་ཆང་ p. 177.
- (30) རྒྱལ་རབས་གསལ་བའི་མེ་ལོང་ p. 27; རྒྱ་པོད་ཡིག་ཆང་ p. 87; *The Red Annals* (NIT 1961) and སྟོབ་དེབ་ཕྲ་བ་རབ་གསལ་སྟོན་མེ་ (*Primary School Reader* 5, published by the Council for Tibetan Education 1963) p. 148.

All these books mention their (three sons of རྒྱ་གུས་བཙན་པོ་) flight to Kongpo but they disagree about who was the youngest or eldest.

- (31) རྒྱུང་མའི་ཆོས་འབྱུང་ལེགས་པའང་གསར་པ་འདི་པ་གཞན་པོ་ p. 136.

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