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Investigation into a new method of estimating regulatory beta

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Cost of Capital and the Regulator's Preferences: An Investigation into a New Method of Estimating Regulatory Beta

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1 Introduction

The optimal regulatory framework of utilities seeks to resolve an inherent conflict between the interests of consumers and investors. On the one hand, to attract investment, the regulator has to assure the utility that the sunk cost of capital will be rewarded appropriately, and prices will be set to cover both short run as well as the long run costs. On the other hand, utilities are natural monopolies and as such are prone to earn excessive profits if unregulated. Thus, acting in the public interest the regulator should seek to transfer to consumers the lower production costs resulting from technological innovation. In the UK this conflict of interest is resolved via price-cap regulation. This paper assumes that the regulator has a reasonable estimate of the profit function of the company, but is faced with the problem of evaluating the cost of capital that the company faces.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate a new estimator for computing the cost of capital in regulated industries. The vast majority of calculations by regulators involve the use of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). The beta of the CAPM is estimated dynamically, or otherwise based on least squares criteria or some time varying variation (see Buckland and Fraser, 1999, for a discussion). This methodology was thought to be quite robust. However, in practice, this has been a very unstable measure. This problem has been documented since the early 1970 (e.g. Blume, 1971, 1975, and Baesel, 1974)

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untill quite recent (e.g. Bos and Newbold, 1984, and Black et al., 1992). In particular, Buckland and Fraser (1999) document this problem in the case of regulated listed companies. Therefore, it seems reasonable to investigate alternative procedures consistent with the CAPM, but more likely to lead to more satisfactory answers than least squares methods have provided. Such a methodology can be criticized for treating equally the overvaluation of the cost of capital with the undervaluation. As discussed in Newey and Powell (1987), interpretation of the estimated coefficients is dependent on the method used as soon as we depart from the classical case where the depednet variable is a linear function of explanatory variables plus iid noise

Suppose, S_t is the price of the stock listed in the market. Let P_t be the price that the company charges to the consumers for its services. Suppose that $P_t \mapsto \pi_t$, where π_t is the profit at time t. Then, in terms of long-run equilibrium

$$S_t = \mathbb{E}_t \left(\sum_{k=1}^K \frac{\pi_{t+k} \left(P_{t+k} \right)}{\left(1 + \tilde{r} \right)^k} \right),$$

where \tilde{r} is the appropriate discount rate based on the cost of capital, and the right hand side can be thought of as the fair price of the stock. If the company distribute its earnings in the form of dividends, then π_t has to be interpreted as dividends payments (or expected dividends payments). We are concerned with the estimation or \tilde{r} when the regulator decides that the capital asset pricing model holds. In this case, let r_f be the interest free rate over one period, and S_t^m be the market price at time t. Then,

$$\tilde{r} = \mathbb{E}_t \left(\frac{S_t}{S_{t-1}} - 1 \right) - r_f = Y_t = \beta \mu_m$$

$$\mu_m := \mathbb{E}_t \left(\frac{S_t^m}{S_{t-1}^m} - 1 \right) - r_f.$$
(1)

It follows that the regulator should consider the estimation of β in such a way that is consistent with its mission: to protect the consumers whilst giving an incentive for future investment.

We propose a method to do this, namely estimation via Linex loss functions. Linex loss functions are a class of asymmetric loss functions which appear to have been used by Varian (1975) in the first place in the context of real estate. It has also been applied in other areas, such as to Bayesian estimation problems in statistics (Zellner, 1986), and to construct optimal forecasts (e.g. Hwang et al., 1997, Elliott and Timmermann, 2003, and references therein). While Linex has been used as a loss function for constructing forecasts, it has been rarely used for in-sample parameter estimation. When the errors in the classical linear regression context are asymmetric or do not satisfy some of the OLS assumptions, asymmetric estimation has been advocated by several authors (e.g. Newey and Powell, 1987, and references therein). In these cases, the interpretation of the estimated coefficients rely heavily on the loss function used. This is particularly so in the case of misspecification when the optimal misspecified model (within the class of chosen models) is the closest to the true (usually unknown) model relatively to the chosen loss function. In this case, preferences must determine the characteristics of the loss function. Linex allows for this flexible approach, as it depends on one parameter that has direct interpretation in terms of risk aversion.

The plan for the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the population properties of Linex estimation. We restrict attention to Linex best linear prediction. These tools allows us to define the population value of beta, which we shall describe how to estimate in the remainder of the paper. In Section 3, we consider the sample properties together with some further discussion and a small simulation to compare the Linex estimator to the least square. In Section 4 we apply our methodology to both UK water and electricity companies. We find substantial differences in the cost of capital when computed by our method versus the traditional one. Conclusions follow in Section 5. An appendix provides some information on the companies used in our empirical study.

2 Asymmetric Prediction and Estimation

Suppose Y is a real random variable. Let h be our predictor of Y and write e = Y - h for the prediction error. Suppose Θ is a compact parameter space, and X is a random variable in S. With increasing level of generality, we can restrict h to be an element into the following classes of functions: 1. the constant functions

$$\mathcal{M}_1 := \left\{ h : h \in \mathbb{R} \right\},\,$$

2. linear maps of X (clearly, X may include a constant term)

$$\mathcal{M}_2(S, X, \Theta) := \left\{ h : h = \beta^T X, \beta \in \Theta, X \in S \right\}$$
(2)

3. arbitrary functions of X indexed in Θ

$$\mathcal{M}_{3}\left(S, X, \Theta\right) := \left\{h : h = \mu_{\theta}\left(X\right), \mu_{\theta} : S \times \Theta \to \mathbb{R}\right\}.$$

For each of these categories, the predictor $h \in \mathcal{M}_i$ (i = 1, 2, 3) will depend on the loss function we wish to minimize, i.e. the optimal predictor is the predictor which minimizes the expectation of the loss function L(e) with respect to $h, L : \mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R}_+$

$$\min_{h\in\mathcal{M}_{i}}\mathbb{E}L\left(Y-h\right),$$

for a fixed i = 1, 2, 3.

2.1 Linear Predictors and Projections

As above h is our predictor of Y and write e = Y - h for the prediction error. We restrict $h \in \mathcal{M}_2(S, \Theta)$. In this case, if $\mathbb{E}e^2 < \infty$, it is natural to consider the best predictor in the space of square integrable linear functions. Therefore, it is natural to equip this space with an inner product, so that we have an Hilbert space, say \mathcal{H} . In this space, the best predictor $h \in \mathcal{M}_2(S, \Theta)$ for Y is equivalent to finding the projection of Y onto S, where $Y \in \mathcal{H}$ and $h \in \mathcal{M}_2(S, \Theta) \cap \mathcal{H}$. This projection is given by $X^T \tilde{\beta}$, where

$$\tilde{\boldsymbol{\beta}} := \arg\min_{\boldsymbol{\beta}\in\boldsymbol{\Theta}} \mathbb{E} \left(\boldsymbol{Y} - \boldsymbol{\theta}^T \boldsymbol{X} \right)^2$$

is the solution of the mean square error problem, i.e. the closest element in $\mathcal{M}_2(S, X, \Theta) \cap \mathcal{H}$ to Y under the L_2 norm $\|...\|_2$.

While this is a natural approach, we do not need to restrict our attention to $\mathcal{M}_2(S,\Theta) \cap \mathcal{H}$ (i.e. we do not need to equip our space with $\|...\|_2$) hence $X^T \tilde{\beta}$ does not need to be the best choice for our purposes: the class of best predictions in $\mathcal{M}_2(S, X, \Theta)$ is much larger than the one in $\mathcal{M}_2(S, X, \Theta) \cap \mathcal{H}$.

Our motivation for considering the prediction problem in a more general setup stems from the fact that we are restricted to $\mathcal{M}_2(S, X, \Theta)$, but this is just a convenient parametric approximation. In this case, choosing the best predictor under $\|...\|_2$ is adequate only if we have symmetric beliefs. The following is an example to illustrate the point.

Example 1 Suppose $Y = a + Zb + \varepsilon$, where Z is a conditioning variable and ε is a random variables such that $\mathbb{E}\varepsilon = 0$, $\mathbb{E}\varepsilon^2 < \infty$. Assume we do not know the true generating process for Y, and we choose a predictorh \in $\mathcal{M}_2(S, X = Z, \Theta \subset \mathbb{R})$ i.e. we choose $h = Z\beta$. The second step it to decide the metric under which the predictor is optimal. Suppose we choose the L_2 norm:

$$\tilde{\beta} = (\mathbb{E}Z)^{-2} \mathbb{E}ZY.$$

Substituting for Y,

$$\mathbb{E}ZY = a\mathbb{E}Z + \mathbb{E}Z^2b + \mathbb{E}Z\varepsilon,$$

so that

$$\tilde{\beta} = b + \mathbb{E}Za.$$

If we knew that Z > 0 and a > 0, our predictor would be biased upwards. In this simple case, the problem would be solved by choosing

$$h \in \mathcal{M}_2\left(S, X = (1, Z), \Theta \subset \mathbb{R}^2\right)$$

However, in other cases, we will have to stick to a specific class irrespective either of previous knowledge or preference.

2.2 Linex Loss Function

The previous example shows that if we are forced to restrict attention to a specific class of predictors, than choosing a quadratic risk function may not be the best choice. For example, in the previous case, we may decide to penalize more when the expectation of the predictor error is negative instead of being positive. For this reason, we propose a different approach via Linex loss functions. As mentioned in the Introduction, Linex is not commonly used for in-sample parameter estimation.

When L is a Linex loss function, we have

$$L(e) = \exp\{\alpha e\} - \alpha e - 1. \tag{3}$$

For small $|\alpha| < 1$ the function is nearly symmetric (just take a Taylor expansion), while asymmetry becomes more pronounced as $|\alpha|$ increases (Zellner, 1986, for further details). In particular, for $\alpha > 0$, we penalize more (i.e. L(e) is larger) when e is positive. In the context of the regulation problem, we would punish a value of beta that would lead to an under fitting of the company returns in excess of what the CAPM might predict. Thus beta is being chosen such that positive "alpha" in the company is being penalized. When $h \in \mathcal{M}_i$ (i = 1, 2) the Linex loss function always has a unique minimum and this follows by convexity (e.g. Zellner, 1986).

Example 2 Consider $h \in \mathcal{M}_1$ (recall \mathcal{M}_1 is the class of constant functions). The optimal h, say h^* , will depend on the loss function $L : \mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R}$. If L is Linex, we have that

$$h^{*} = \frac{1}{\alpha} \ln \mathbb{E} \exp \{\alpha Y\}$$

$$= \mathbb{E}Y + \alpha \mathbb{E} \left(Y - \mathbb{E}Y\right)^{2} + O\left(\alpha^{2}\right),$$

$$(4)$$

using the fact that $\ln \mathbb{E} \exp \{\alpha Y\}$ is the cumulative generating function of Y (e.g. McCullagh, 1987, for details). In our case, it is of interest to look at $\alpha > 0$, as we want to penalize gains more than losses. For example, under normality, this implies that for $\alpha > 0$, the Linex estimator is larger than the mean. On the other hand, if $L(e) := e^2$ (which is least squares, a popular symmetric loss function), then $h^* = \mathbb{E}Y$ is the mean. Of course our problem differs from this in that it is the beta that we wish to estimate.

2.2.1 Linex Solution via Moment Condition

The Linex solution to the problem $\mathbb{E}L(e)$ for L as in (3), where we confine attention to $h \in \mathcal{M}_2(S, X, \Theta)$ as in (2), can be characterized via moment restriction. We include an intercept term, and for convenience we write $h = \beta_0 + X^T \beta_1$. Clearly, Y does not need to have linear conditional expectation function with respect to X. For example $Y = f(X, \eta)$, for some measurable function f and some stochastic term η .

$$\mathbb{E}L\left(\alpha\left(Y-\beta_0-X^T\beta_1\right)\right)=\mathbb{E}\exp\left(\alpha\left(Y-\beta_0-X^T\beta_1\right)\right)-\alpha\mathbb{E}\left(Y-\beta_0-X^T\beta_1\right)-1,$$

where expectation is taken over the joint distribution of (X, Y) which can be conditional, steady state et cetera. Under regularity conditions, setting $\beta = (\beta_0, \beta_1)$,

$$\frac{\partial \mathbb{E}L\left(\alpha\left(Y - \beta_0 - X^T \beta_1\right)\right)}{\partial \beta} = \frac{\mathbb{E}\partial L\left(\alpha\left(Y - \beta_0 - X^T \beta_1\right)\right)}{\partial \beta}.$$

Hence

$$\frac{\mathbb{E}\partial L\left(\alpha\left(Y-\beta_{0}-X^{T}\beta_{1}\right)\right)}{\partial\beta_{1}} = -\mathbb{E}X\exp\left(\alpha\left(Y-\beta_{0}-X^{T}\beta_{1}\right)\right) + \mu_{X} = 0$$
$$\frac{\partial\mathbb{E}L\left(\alpha\left(Y-\beta_{0}-X^{T}\beta_{1}\right)\right)}{\partial\beta_{0}} = -\mathbb{E}\exp\left(\alpha\left(Y-\beta_{0}-X^{T}\beta_{1}\right)\right) + 1 = 0,$$

so that, under Linex, the first order conditions can be written as

$$cov (X, \exp (\alpha e)) = \mathbb{E} X \exp (\alpha e) - \mathbb{E} X \mathbb{E} \exp (\alpha e)$$
$$= \mathbb{E} X \exp (\alpha e) - \mu_X = 0.$$
(5)

We see that (5) can be seen as the analogue to the conditions in OLS, where the regressors are orthogonal to the error term.

Computing the Optimal Beta Value using Linex. We intend to use Linex to compute the population value of β in (1). The first thing to notice is that it is a function of α in (3), that is the loss function of the regulator determines the "true" value of the discount factor. Define $\varphi_{Y,X}(s,t) :=$ $\mathbb{E} \exp \{sY + tX\}$ to be the moment generating function of (X, Y), and

$$\varphi_{Y,X}^{i,j}\left(s,t\right) := \frac{\partial^{i+j}\varphi_{Y,X}\left(u,v\right)}{\partial u^{i}\partial v^{j}}|_{u=s,v=t}.$$

Notice that

$$\mathbb{E}\exp\left(\alpha e\right) = \varphi_{Y,X}\left(\alpha, -\alpha\beta_{1}\right)\exp\left\{-\alpha\beta_{0}\right\}.$$

Then, from (5), β is indirectly defined as the solution of the system of equations

$$\varphi_{Y,X}^{0,1}(\alpha, -\alpha\beta_1) = \mu_X \exp\left\{\alpha\beta_0\right\},$$

$$\varphi_{Y,X}(\alpha, -\alpha\beta_1) = \exp\left\{\alpha\beta_0\right\},$$
(6)

and β_1 is the solution of

$$\frac{\varphi_{Y,X}^{0,1}\left(\alpha,-\alpha\beta_{1}\right)}{\varphi_{Y,X}\left(\alpha,-\alpha\beta_{1}\right)}=\mu_{X},\tag{7}$$

while β_0 is proportional to the cumulant generating function of (Y, X) at $(\alpha, -\alpha\beta_1)$, i.e.

$$\beta_0 = \frac{1}{\alpha} \ln \varphi_{Y,X} \left(\alpha, -\alpha \beta_1 \right).$$

This shows that under linex, β_0 is usually different from $\mu_Y - \beta_1 \mu_X$. Therefore, the restriction on the intercept used to test for the CAPM is not meaningful in the general case.

In the case of bivariate normality, we have the following.

Proposition 1 Suppose (X, Y) is jointly normal with $\sigma_X^2 = var(X), \sigma_{XY} = cov(X, Y)$. Then, the linear optimal linear predictor $h \in \mathcal{M}_2(S, (1, X), \Theta \in \mathbb{R}^2)$ is given by the linear projection

$$\tilde{\beta}_1 = \frac{\sigma_{XY}}{\sigma_{XX}},$$

and

$$\tilde{\beta}_0 = \mu_Y - \beta_1 \mu_X + \frac{\alpha}{2} \left(\sigma_{YY} - \frac{\sigma_{XY}^2}{\sigma_{XX}} \right)$$

Proof. The moment generating function of Gaussian vector (X, Y) is given by

$$\varphi_{Y,X}(s,t) = \exp\left\{s\mu_Y + t\mu_X + \frac{s^2\sigma_{YY} + 2st\sigma_{XY} + t^2\sigma_{XX}}{2}\right\}.$$

Then, substitute in (7) with $s = \alpha$, $t = -\alpha\beta_1$, and solve.

The proposition shows that under joint normality, not only $\hat{\beta}_1$ does not depend on α , but it is also equal to the linear projection onto the space spanned by the explanatory variable. On the other hand, β_0 does depend on α : the larger α , the lower β_0 . Furthermore, in this special case, the validity of the CAPM ($\mu_Y = \beta \mu_X$) implies that $\tilde{\beta}_0 = \frac{\alpha}{2} \left(\sigma_{YY} - \frac{\sigma_{XY}^2}{\sigma_{XX}} \right)$.

The result that β_1 is independent of α may hold in some other cases, when X is Gaussian and Y conditionally Gaussian.

Example 3 Suppose Y is a measurable random variable with the following stochastic representation in terms of a random variable $X \sim N(\mu_X, \sigma_{XX})$

$$Y = \gamma + \delta X + \theta X^2 + \eta_1$$

where $\eta \sim N\left(0, \sigma_{\eta}^{2}\right)$. Then,

$$\mu_Y = \gamma + \delta \mu_X + \theta \left(\sigma_{XX} + \mu_X^2 \right).$$

This model has been proposed by Treynor and Mazuy (1996) to test for market timing (however, we have imposed some further distributional assumptions). Under the linear forecast model

$$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X + e,$$

use Linex to solve the following

$$\min_{\beta} \mathbb{E}L\left(\alpha\left(Y - \beta_0 - \beta_1 X\right)\right).$$

Now,

$$\mathbb{E}L\left(\alpha\left(\gamma+\delta X+\theta X^{2}+\eta-\beta_{0}-\beta_{1}X\right)\right)$$

$$=\mathbb{E}\exp\left\{\alpha\left(\gamma+\delta X+\theta X^{2}+\eta-\beta_{0}-\beta_{1}X\right)\right\}$$

$$-\alpha\mathbb{E}\left(\gamma+\delta X+\theta X^{2}-\eta-\beta_{0}-\beta_{1}X\right)-1$$

$$=\exp\left\{\alpha\left(\gamma-\beta_{0}+\alpha\sigma_{\eta}^{2}/2\right)\right\}\mathbb{E}\exp\left\{\alpha\left(\theta X^{2}+\left(\delta-\beta_{1}\right)X\right)\right\}$$

$$-\alpha\left(\gamma-\beta_{0}+\theta\left(\sigma_{XX}+\mu_{X}^{2}\right)+\left(\delta-\beta_{1}\right)\mu_{X}\right)-1$$

$$=A\left(\alpha,\beta_{1}\right)\exp\left\{-\alpha\beta_{0}\right\}+B\left(\alpha,\beta_{1}\right)-\alpha\beta_{0}.$$

By Lemma 1 in the appendix, with $s = \alpha (\delta - \beta_1)$ and $t = \alpha \theta$,

$$\mathbb{E}\exp\left\{\alpha\left(\delta-\beta_{1}\right)X+\alpha\theta X^{2}\right\}=\exp\left\{-\frac{\mu_{X}^{2}-\psi\left(\beta_{1}\right)^{2}}{2\sigma_{XX}}\right\}\left(1-2\alpha\theta\sigma_{XX}\right)^{-1/2},$$

where

$$\psi\left(\beta_{1}\right) = \left(\mu_{X} + \alpha\left(\delta - \beta_{1}\right)\sigma_{XX}\right)\left(1 - 2\alpha\theta\sigma_{XX}\right)^{-1/2}$$

Differentiating with respect to β_1

$$A(\alpha,\beta_1)\exp\left\{-\alpha\beta_0\right\}\alpha\left(\frac{\mu_X+\alpha\left(\delta-\beta_1\right)\sigma_{XX}}{(2\alpha\theta\sigma_{XX}-1)}\right)+\alpha\mu_X=0,$$

and with respect to β_0 ,

$$A(\alpha,\beta_1)\exp\left\{-\alpha\beta_0\right\} = 1.$$

The solution is given by

$$\begin{aligned} \alpha \left(\delta - \beta_1 \right) \sigma_{XX} &= - \left(2\alpha \theta \sigma_{XX} - 1 \right) \mu_X - \mu_X \\ &= -2\alpha \theta \sigma_{XX} \mu_X \\ \beta_1 &= \delta + 2\theta \mu_X, \end{aligned}$$

for $\theta < 1/(2\alpha\sigma_{XX})$, and

$$\beta_0 = \gamma - \mu_X^2 + \alpha \frac{\sigma_\eta^2}{2} - \frac{1}{2\alpha} \ln\left(1 - 2\alpha\theta\sigma_{XX}\right).$$

In this case, β_1 is independent of α , while β_0 does depend on α .

However, this is not always the case.

Example 4 Suppose Y is as in the previous example, but the error term is now heteroscedastic, $\eta \sim N(0, \sigma_{\eta}^2 X^2)$. We can solve the same problem. Using conditional expectations

$$\mathbb{E}L\alpha\left(\gamma + \delta X + \theta X^{2} + \eta - \beta_{0} - \beta_{1}X\right)$$

$$= \mathbb{E}\exp\left\{\alpha\left(\gamma + \delta X + \theta X^{2} + \eta - \beta_{0} - \beta_{1}X\right)\right\}$$

$$-\alpha\mathbb{E}\left(\gamma + \delta X + \theta X^{2} - \eta - \beta_{0} - \beta_{1}X\right) - 1$$

$$= \mathbb{E}\exp\left\{\alpha\left(\gamma - \beta_{0} + \alpha\sigma_{\eta}^{2}X^{2}/2\right)\right\}\mathbb{E}\exp\left\{\alpha\left(\theta X^{2} + (\delta - \beta_{1})X\right)\right\}$$

$$-\alpha\left(\gamma - \beta_{0} + \theta\left(\sigma_{XX} + \mu_{X}^{2}\right) + (\delta - \beta_{1})\mu_{X}\right) - 1$$

$$= \exp\left\{\alpha\left(\gamma - \beta_{0}\right)\right\}\mathbb{E}\exp\left\{\alpha\left(\left(\theta + \alpha\sigma_{\eta}^{2}/2\right)X^{2} + (\delta - \beta_{1})X\right)\right\}$$

$$-\alpha\left(\gamma - \beta_{0} + \theta\left(\sigma_{XX} + \mu_{X}^{2}\right) + (\delta - \beta_{1})\mu_{X}\right) - 1.$$

Then calculations similar to the previous example, give

$$\beta_1 = \delta + 2\left(\theta + \alpha \sigma_\eta^2 / 2\right) \mu_X,$$

for $(\theta + \alpha \sigma_{\eta}^2/2) < 1/(2\alpha \sigma_{XX})$. Here β_1 directly depends on α : the larger α , the larger β_1 .

2.2.2 Expected Utility Interpretation of Linex

Linex estimation is given by

$$\min_{h \in \mathcal{M}_i} \mathbb{E}L\left(Y - h\right) := \min_{h \in \mathcal{M}_i} \mathbb{E}\exp\left\{\alpha\left(Y - h\right)\right\} - \alpha\left(Y - h\right) - 1,$$

such that $\mathbb{E}(Y - h) = 0$. This problem is equivalent to

$$\max_{h \in \mathcal{M}_{i}} \mathbb{E}\left[-L\left(Y-h\right)\right] = \max_{h \in \mathcal{M}_{i}} \mathbb{E}\left[\alpha\left(Y-h\right) - \exp\left\{\alpha\left(Y-h\right)\right\} + 1\right].$$

Then we have the natural interpretation of the Linex optimization in term of expected utility optimization of an agent with linear plus Bernoulli utility function. A similar interpretation has been provided by Knight et al. (2003). The only difference is that we are considering a mapping from $e \in \mathbb{R}$, whereas in a standard utility context the argument of objective function (i.e. wealth) is a non-negative random variable. If we are to retain this interpretation, then $\alpha (Y - h) \rightarrow \infty$ implies a higher utility and $\alpha (Y - h) \rightarrow -\infty$ lower utility. For this reason $sign(\alpha)$ will have to be chosen consistently with this. Considering our context, we see that $|\alpha|$ is chosen so to reflect the level of risk aversion of the regulator, which both in theory and good practice leads to a coefficient of risk aversion independent of wealth (Bell and Fishburn, 2001). Infact, the linear plus Bernoulli utility function is one of the only two Bernoulli utility functions that are consistent with the notion that gambles may be ordered by riskiness and that this rank is independent of the decision maker's wealth (Bell and Fishburn, 2001).

3 In Sample Properties of Linex Estimators

3.1 Generalized Linear Estimation

Suppose $(Y_i)_{i\in\mathbb{Z}}$ is a sequence of stationary random variables with values in the probability space $(\mathbb{R}, \mathcal{F}, \mathbb{P})$. Suppose $(X_i)_{i\in\mathbb{Z}}$ is a sequence of \mathbb{R}^K $(K \ge 1)$ stationary random variables. Consider $h \in \mathcal{M}_2$, i.e.

$$h = \beta^T X, \tag{8}$$

for $\beta \in \Theta$ (Θ is some compact separable space, e.g. $\subset \mathbb{R}^{K}$), where for simplicity β may contain the intercept. In the previous section we phrased the problem in terms of the true measure \mathbb{P} . However this is not always known. In this case, it needs to be replaced by the empirical measure. Suppose we want to choose the best linear forecast with respect to the Linex loss function using the empirical measure. For any sample $\{x_1, ..., x_n\}$ from X, define $\mathbb{P}_n := n^{-1} \sum_i^n \delta_{x_i}$, where δ_{x_i} is the Dirac measure (i.e. \mathbb{P}_n is the empirical measure which assign mass n^{-1} at each observation). Setting $e_{\beta} := Y - \beta^T X$, we define the following M-estimator (which we may call the empirical linex estimator),

$$\min_{h \in \mathcal{M}_2} \mathbb{P}_n L\left(Y - h\right) = \min_{\beta \in \Theta} \mathbb{P}_n L\left(Y - \beta^T X\right) = \min_{\beta \in \Theta} \mathbb{P}_n\left(\exp\left\{\alpha e_\beta\right\} - \alpha e_\beta - 1\right),$$

and

$$\hat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}(n) := \arg\min_{\boldsymbol{\beta}\in\Theta} \mathbb{P}_n L\left(\boldsymbol{Y} - \boldsymbol{\beta}^T \boldsymbol{X}\right)$$

is its solution. Under suitable conditions, $\mathbb{P}_n L\left(Y - \beta^T X\right)$ converges to a non-random limit. In this case, $\mathbb{P}L\left(Y - \beta^T X\right) = \mathbb{E}L\left(Y - \beta^T X\right)$ is the "asymptotic" version of $\mathbb{P}_n L\left(Y - \beta^T X\right)$, i.e. its limit with respect to n. This limit is the population value considered in terms of X and Y. Then,

$$\tilde{\beta} := \arg\min_{\beta \in \Theta} \mathbb{E}L\left(Y - \beta^T X\right),$$

and

$$L_{\tilde{\beta}} := \left[\frac{\partial L \left(Y - \beta^T X \right)}{\partial \beta^T} \right]_{\beta = \tilde{\beta}}, \qquad (9)$$
$$L_{\tilde{\beta}\tilde{\beta}} := \left[\frac{\partial^2 L \left(Y - \beta^T X \right)}{\partial \beta \partial \beta^T} \right]_{\beta = \tilde{\beta}}.$$

Under suitable conditions on e_{β} , $\hat{\beta}(n) \rightarrow \tilde{\beta}$, and

$$\sqrt{n}\left(\hat{\beta}\left(n\right)-\tilde{\beta}\right) \rightsquigarrow \mathcal{N}\left(0,\left(\mathbb{E}L_{\tilde{\beta}\tilde{\beta}}\right)^{-1}\mathbb{E}L_{\tilde{\beta}}L_{\tilde{\beta}}^{T}\left(\mathbb{E}L_{\tilde{\beta}\tilde{\beta}}\right)^{-1}\right),$$

where \rightsquigarrow stands for weak convergence and \mathcal{N} for the Gaussian distribution. In particular,

$$L_{\tilde{\beta}} = \alpha X \left(1 - \exp\left\{\alpha e_{\tilde{\beta}}\right\} \right),$$
$$L_{M} = \alpha^2 X X^T \exp\left\{\alpha e_{\tilde{\beta}}\right\}$$

and

$$L_{\tilde{\beta}\tilde{\beta}} = \alpha^2 X X^T \exp\left\{\alpha e_{\tilde{\beta}}\right\},\,$$

so that

$$\sqrt{n}cov\left(\hat{\beta}\left(n\right)-\tilde{\beta}\right)$$

$$= \alpha^{-2}\left[\mathbb{E}XX^{T}\exp\left\{\alpha e_{\tilde{\beta}}\right\}\right]^{-1}\mathbb{E}\left[XX^{T}\left(1-\exp\left\{\alpha e_{\tilde{\beta}}\right\}\right)^{2}\right]\left[\mathbb{E}XX^{T}\exp\left\{\alpha e_{\tilde{\beta}}\right\}\right]^{-1}$$

The distribution of the Least Squares Estimator is exactly Gaussian when the regressors are non-stochastic and the errors are normal. Suppose that $x_1, ..., x_n, x_i \in \mathbb{R}^K$ are non-stochastic and we want to use $h \in \mathcal{M}_2$ as best linear predictor for Y, i.e. we want to estimate

$$Y = \beta^T x + \varepsilon$$

using Linex.

Proposition 2 Under regularity conditions, $(\mathbb{P}_n - \mathbb{P}) L_{\tilde{\beta}} = \mathbb{P}_n L_{\tilde{\beta}} \to 0$, and

$$\Pr\left(\hat{\beta}\left(n\right) \leq \tilde{\beta}\right) = \Pr\left(\sqrt{n}\mathbb{P}_{n}L_{\hat{\beta}(n)} \leq \mathbb{P}L_{\tilde{\beta}}\right) = \Pr\left(\sqrt{n}\mathbb{P}_{n}L_{\hat{\beta}(n)} \leq 0\right),$$

where, under stationarity,

$$\sqrt{n}\mathbb{P}_n L_\beta = \frac{1}{\sqrt{n}} \sum_{i=1}^n \alpha x_i^T - \frac{1}{\sqrt{n}} \sum_{i=1}^n \alpha x_i^T \exp\left\{-\alpha \beta^T x_i\right\} \exp\left\{\alpha Y_i\right\}$$

has distribution given by the weighted sum of $\exp{\{\alpha Y\}}$.

Example 5 Suppose, $Y_i \sim \mathcal{N}(\theta x_i, \sigma_Y)$. Then, $Z_i = \exp{\{\alpha Y_i\}}$ is lognormally distributed with $\mathbb{E}Z_i = \exp{\{\alpha \theta x_i + \alpha^2 \sigma_Y^2/2\}}$. Therefore, $\hat{\beta}(n)$ solves

$$\frac{1}{n}\sum_{i=1}^{n}x_{i}\exp\left\{\frac{\alpha^{2}\sigma_{Y}^{2}}{2}\right\} = \frac{1}{n}\sum_{i=1}^{n}x_{i}\exp\left\{\alpha\left(\theta-\tilde{\beta}\right)x_{i}\right\},\$$

and $\Pr\left(\hat{\beta}(n) \leq \tilde{\beta}\right)$ is equal to the centered weighted sum of Lognormal random variables. This is a function of the x_i 's, θ , σ_Y^2 , and α . As discussed in the previous section, it is not necessarily true that $\tilde{\beta} = \theta$.

3.2 Linex in a Time Series One Step Ahead Prediction Environment

Under suitable modification, consistency of the estimator is guaranteed in a time series context under possible mispecification. We apply the approach presented in Skouras and Dawid (2000) to our Linex forecasting problem. Suppose $(Y_i)_{i\in\mathbb{Z}}$ is a sequence of possibly non-stationary random variables with values in the probability space $(\mathbb{R}, \mathcal{F}, \mathbb{P})$. We define $(\mathcal{F}_t)_{t\in\mathbb{Z}_+}$ (with \mathcal{F}_0 trivial, if variables are not defined on a product probability space) to be a filtration of \mathcal{F} . Let $(h_t)_{t\in\mathbb{Z}_+}$ be an \mathcal{F}_{t-1} -measurable sequence of forecasts for $(Y_t)_{t\in\mathbb{Z}_+}$ with values in $(\mathbb{R}, \mathcal{F}, \mathbb{P})$. Notice that $(h_t)_{t\in\mathbb{Z}_+}$ is a non-misspecified forecast if $(Y_t - h_t)_{t\in\mathbb{Z}_+}$ is a martingale difference. Clearly, we cannot restrict ourselves to non-misspecified forecasts.

As before, we shall restrict h_t to belong to the class of linear forecasts, i.e.

$$h_t = \beta^T X_{t-1},$$

for $\beta \in \Theta$ (Θ is some compact separable space, e.g. $\subset \mathbb{R}^k$) where X_t ($k \times 1$) is measurable with respect to \mathcal{F}_t (i.e. it is known at time t). Therefore, our \mathcal{F}_{t-1} conditional forecast for time t is given by

$$\mathbb{E}\left(h_t | \mathcal{F}_{t-1}\right) = \beta^T X_{t-1},$$

which is possibly different from

$$\mathbb{E}\left(Y_t | \mathcal{F}_{t-1}\right),\,$$

due to misspecification. Suppose we want to choose the best linear forecast with respect to the loss function L. Setting $e_{\beta|t} := Z_t - \beta^T X_{t-1}$, we define the following problem

$$\min_{\beta \in \Theta} L_T\left(\beta\right) := \min_{\beta \in \Theta} \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T L\left(Y_t - \beta^T X_{t-1}\right) = \min_{\beta \in \Theta} \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T \left(\exp\left\{\alpha e_{\beta|t}\right\} - \alpha e_{\beta|t} - 1\right)$$

and consider

$$L_T^*\left(\beta\right) := \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T \mathbb{E}\left[L\left(Y_t - \beta^T X_{t-1}\right) | \mathcal{F}_{t-1}\right]$$

to be the natural asymptotic version of $L_T(\beta)$. Therefore, we define

$$\tilde{\boldsymbol{\beta}}^{*} := \min_{\boldsymbol{\beta} \in \Theta} L_{T}^{*}\left(\boldsymbol{\beta}\right),$$

where in many cases, but not all (e.g. see Skouras and Dawid, 2000), $\tilde{\beta}^* = \tilde{\beta}$, as defined previously. We could choose a previsible sequence $(A_T)_{T\geq 1}$ as alternative denominator T (e.g. Skouras and Dawid). Clearly, $L_T(\beta) - L_T^*(\beta) \xrightarrow{a.s.}$

0 by the reverse Martingale convergence theorem whenever $L_T(\beta) - L_T^*(\beta)$ is uniformly integrable (Rogers and Williams, 2000). In the case of LinEx, it can be shown that under suitable conditions on e_β , $\hat{\beta}(n) \to \tilde{\beta}$, and (e.g. Hall and Heyde, 1980)

$$\sqrt{n}\left(\hat{\beta}\left(n\right)-\tilde{\beta}\right)\rightsquigarrow\mathcal{N}\left(0,\Sigma\left(\tilde{\beta}\right)\right),$$

where

$$\Sigma\left(\tilde{\beta}\right) := \left[\frac{1}{T}\sum_{t=1}^{T} \mathbb{E}\left(L_{\tilde{\beta}\tilde{\beta}}|\mathcal{F}_{t-1}\right)\right]^{-1} \frac{1}{T}\sum_{t=1}^{T} \mathbb{E}\left(L_{\tilde{\beta}}L_{\tilde{\beta}}^{T}|\mathcal{F}_{t-1}\right) \left[\frac{1}{T}\sum_{t=1}^{T} \mathbb{E}\left(L_{\tilde{\beta}\tilde{\beta}}|\mathcal{F}_{t-1}\right)\right]^{-1}$$

3.3 Efficiency of the Estimator: A Short Simulation Study

As shown in the previous section, the linear coefficient under Linex estimation is asymptotically equivalent to the least square one. However, it would be interesting to know, at least under simple conditions, something about the efficiency of the estimator itself. To this end, we consider the following small Monte Carlo exercise. We generate B samples of size n from the same bivariate distribution. Hence, we estimate the following

$$Y_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_t + \varepsilon_t.$$

For comparison reasons we also estimate the restricted version ($\beta_0 = 0$) under OLS. In particular, we choose B = 1000 and $n = 40, 120, \alpha = -.8, -.2, .2, .8$. For $(X_t, Y_t)_{t \in \mathbb{N}}$, we generate samples from the following bivariate distributions:

1. a Gaussian, with mean and covariance matrix,

$$\mu^{(1)} = (2, (2/4) 2); vec\left(\Sigma^{(1)}\right) = (4, 2, 2.5),$$

respectively;

2. a Gaussian with

$$\mu^{(2)} = (2, (4.8/4) 2); vec\left(\Sigma^{(2)}\right) = (4, 4.8, 12);$$

3. a skewed non-elliptic distribution with fat tails given by the Kimeldorf-Sampson copula (e.g. Joe, 1997, for details) with shifted double exponential marginals:

$$C(u, v) = (u^{-\delta} + v^{-\delta} - 1)^{\frac{1}{\delta}},$$

$$u := F_X(x) = (1 - q_x) \exp \left\{ \lambda_x^- (x - \mu_x) \right\} I_{\{x < \mu_x\}} + \left(1 - q_x \exp \left\{ \lambda_x^+ (x - \mu_x) \right\} \right) I_{\{x \ge \mu_x\}},$$

$$v := F_Y(y) = (1 - q_y) \exp \left\{ \lambda_y^- \left(y - \mu_y \right) \right\} I_{\left\{ y < \mu_y \right\}} + \left(1 - q_y \exp \left\{ \lambda_y^+ \left(y - \mu_y \right) \right\} \right) I_{\left\{ y \ge \mu_y \right\}},$$

where the parameters (rounded to nearest third digit)

$$\begin{pmatrix} \lambda_x^- \\ \lambda_x^+ \\ \mu_x \\ q_x \\ q_x \\ \lambda_y^- \\ \lambda_y^+ \\ \mu_y \\ q_y \\ \delta \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 0.6 \\ 0.8 \\ 3 \\ 0.229 \\ 0.3 \\ 0.4 \\ 5.549 \\ 0.032 \\ 1.5 \end{pmatrix}$$

are chosen to match the mean and the covariance matrix of distribution 2.

Notice that for the above distributions $\mu_Y = \beta_1 \mu_X$. The motivation for the first two models is that they are consistent with the CAPM: the first gives a low beta, the second a high beta. For the third distribution, the CAPM does not apply without assumptions on the utility function, i.e. to justify the CAPM we would need a quadratic Bernoulli utility function.

Figure I plots the cross plot for a sample of observations from the three distributions. Both figures include a linear fit with intercept.







Unfortunately, the situation in Panel C is more often the rule than the exception. Hence, an asymmetric loss function appears to be more adequate. From our Monte Carlo simulation we compute the salient summary statistics

for the beta estimator. Results are reported in Table I.

	-	8		-				-						
		OLS		alpha=										
	restricted	unrest	ricted	-0.8	8	-0.1	2	0.2	2	0.0	3			
n=40	slope	intercept	slope	intercept	slope	intercept	slope	intercept	slope	intercept	slope			
Mean	0.499	-0.010	0.501	-0.555	0.499	-0.150	0.501	0.130	0.502	0.536	0.505			
Var.	0.005	0.080	0.010	0.113	0.015	0.081	0.011	0.082	0.011	0.116	0.015			
Skewness	-0.026	0.132	-0.043	0.031	-0.124	0.135	-0.067	0.141	-0.018	0.320	0.057			
Kurtosis	-0.127	0.261	0.120	0.153	0.484	0.298	0.159	0.233	0.136	0.537	0.342			
Min.	0.298	-0.877	0.143	-1.545	0.076	-1.019	0.131	-0.730	0.154	-0.404	0.076			
1st Qu.	0.452	-0.195	0.430	-0.779	0.425	-0.345	0.429	-0.060	0.436	0.299	0.424			
Median	0.500	-0.022	0.502	-0.556	0.499	-0.161	0.505	0.119	0.504	0.532	0.503			
3rd Qu.	0.551	0.181	0.570	-0.324	0.581	0.045	0.572	0.325	0.572	0.749	0.586			
Max.	0.734	1.240	0.876	0.896	0.947	1.158	0.893	1.322	0.863	1.833	0.946			
	restricted	ted unrestricted		-0.8		-0.2		0.2		0.8				
n=120	slope	intercept	slope	intercept	slope	intercept	slope	intercept	slope	intercept	slope			
Mean	0.501	-0.004	0.502	-0.586	0.502	-0.151	0.502	0.143	0.503	0.576	0.504			
Var.	0.002	0.024	0.003	0.037	0.005	0.024	0.003	0.025	0.003	0.040	0.005			
Skewness	0.017	-0.154	0.178	-0.123	-0.002	-0.113	0.146	-0.158	0.179	0.093	0.021			
Kurtosis	0.113	0.108	0.067	0.082	0.054	0.035	0.015	0.214	0.065	0.494	-0.028			
Min.	0.375	-0.612	0.339	-1.270	0.270	-0.746	0.337	-0.482	0.341	-0.125	0.287			
1st Qu.	0.475	-0.104	0.465	-0.716	0.456	-0.252	0.465	0.041	0.464	0.437	0.455			
Median	0.503	0.001	0.501	-0.579	0.502	-0.146	0.502	0.149	0.501	0.579	0.502			
3rd Qu.	0.527	0.102	0.537	-0.456	0.544	-0.042	0.537	0.253	0.541	0.713	0.551			
Max.	0.640	0.476	0.712	0.024	0.736	0.355	0.709	0.747	0.712	1.480	0.716			

Table I. Beta EstimatorPanel A. Using Data simulated from Distribution 1

Panel B. Using Data simulated from Distribution 2

		OLS		alpha=									
	restricted	unresti	icted	-0.	8	-0.2	2	0.2	2	0.0	3		
n=40	slope	intercept	slope	intercept	slope	intercept	slope	intercept	slope	intercept	slope		
Mean	1.200	-0.015	1.204	-2.128	1.208	-0.613	1.205	0.586	1.202	2.118	1.200		
Var.	0.020	0.322	0.042	0.983	0.112	0.366	0.047	0.361	0.047	0.950	0.113		
Skewness	-0.002	-0.042	-0.018	-0.659	-0.076	-0.014	-0.082	0.050	-0.027	0.749	-0.119		
Kurtosis	-0.031	0.097	-0.165	1.326	1.480	0.094	-0.051	0.247	-0.207	1.608	0.488		
Min.	0.743	-1.899	0.572	-7.259	-0.445	-2.632	0.375	-1.420	0.534	-0.560	-0.130		
1st Qu.	1.104	-0.382	1.060	-2.704	1.002	-1.003	1.061	0.194	1.048	1.448	0.984		
Median	1.197	0.002	1.206	-2.029	1.203	-0.609	1.207	0.577	1.206	2.037	1.203		
3rd Qu.	1.300	0.354	1.347	-1.438	1.426	-0.205	1.358	0.998	1.352	2.659	1.416		
Max.	1.738	1.954	1.874	0.991	2.523	1.485	1.829	2.634	1.910	7.583	2.198		
	restricted	unrestricted		-0.8		-0.	-0.2		0.2		3		
n=120	slope	intercept	slope	intercept	slope	intercept	slope	intercept	slope	intercept	slope		
Mean	1.201	0.005	1.200	-2.291	1.197	-0.607	1.200	0.619	1.199	2.325	1.199		
Var.	0.007	0.108	0.014	0.424	0.048	0.121	0.015	0.122	0.015	0.404	0.044		
Skewness	0.097	0.128	-0.076	-0.918	-0.042	0.040	-0.055	0.112	-0.038	0.594	0.055		
Kurtosis	0.326	0.082	-0.008	2.561	0.660	0.072	-0.052	0.071	-0.147	0.976	0.359		
Min.	0.924	-0.956	0.837	-6.182	0.210	-1.888	0.839	-0.511	0.845	0.655	0.422		
1st Qu.	1.145	-0.220	1.123	-2.667	1.058	-0.844	1.115	0.403	1.114	1.875	1.058		
Median	1.203	0.012	1.203	-2.255	1.200	-0.611	1.204	0.628	1.202	2.289	1.201		
3rd Qu.	1.252	0.214	1.277	-1.861	1.334	-0.371	1.284	0.837	1.283	2.691	1.339		
Max.	1.519	1.108	1.577	-0.693	2.070	0.486	1.584	1.719	1.608	5.121	1.978		

Panel C. Using Data simulated from Distribution 3

		OLS		alpha=									
	restricted	unrest	ricted	-0.8	8	-0.	2	0.2	2	3.0	3		
n=40	slope	intercept	slope	intercept	slope	intercept	slope	intercept	slope	intercept	slope		
Mean	1.213	0.078	1.184	-2.673	1.324	-0.658	1.246	0.766	1.118	2.347	1.007		
Var.	0.029	0.637	0.096	2.320	0.181	0.813	0.107	0.732	0.112	2.675	0.417		
Skewness	0.255	0.280	-0.016	-1.253	0.463	0.027	0.059	1.083	0.147	4.110	0.505		
Kurtosis	0.202	0.246	-0.120	5.353	1.666	0.626	-0.072	6.503	0.923	31.318	4.444		
Min.	0.797	-2.453	0.257	-14.677	-0.036	-4.401	0.281	-1.709	-0.480	-0.403	-2.443		
1st Qu.	1.100	-0.456	0.973	-3.498	1.041	-1.265	1.017	0.208	0.888	1.505	0.630		
Median	1.208	0.031	1.185	-2.483	1.308	-0.690	1.242	0.703	1.115	2.124	0.932		
3rd Qu.	1.320	0.555	1.392	-1.687	1.582	-0.102	1.473	1.257	1.331	2.808	1.295		
Max.	1.917	2.962	2.165	1.107	3.521	2.527	2.408	8.090	2.708	21.065	4.512		
	restricted	unrest	ricted	-0.8		-0.2		0.2		0.8			
n=120	slope	intercept	slope	e intercept slo		intercept	slope	intercept	slope	intercept	slope		
Mean	1.209	0.022	1.199	-3.312	1.331	-0.777	1.265	0.786	1.120	2.898	1.087		
Var.	0.010	0.214	0.033	1.448	0.088	0.284	0.040	0.254	0.041	3.255	0.455		
Skewness	0.205	0.213	-0.099	-1.043	0.364	0.121	-0.054	0.355	0.360	3.884	0.162		
Kurtosis	0.115	0.324	-0.010	2.266	1.801	0.514	0.085	0.785	2.031	24.041	3.023		
Min.	0.902	-1.468	0.611	-9.558	0.202	-2.831	0.584	-0.670	0.426	0.203	-2.296		
1st Qu.	1.140	-0.271	1.080	-3.935	1.141	-1.126	1.129	0.461	0.989	1.988	0.724		
Median	1.205	0.007	1.204	-3.126	1.323	-0.786	1.265	0.770	1.114	2.443	0.989		
3rd Qu.	1.275	0.310	1.320	-2.517	1.508	-0.449	1.398	1.101	1.251	3.174	1.414		
Max.	1.545	1.712	1.767	-0.277	2.677	1.132	1.875	3.094	2.519	20.715	3.977		

Table I shows that in the case of normality, the Linex slope estimator provides very similar answers to the least square estimator and it is basically independent of α . As noticed above, the intercept is not invariant with respect to α , but exhibit a symmetric behaviour. Moreover, as α is set closer to zero, not only the intercept becomes closer to the OLS intercept, but also the standard errors for both estimators under linex and OLS tend to become similar. On the other hand, results are very different for the third case, where Gaussianity does not hold anymore. In this case, standard errors appear to increase as $|\alpha|$ increases, but in a very different way. By construction, distribuiton 3 exhibits lower tails dependence, i.e. joint large negative values of Y and X are more likely to occour than joint large positive values of Y and X. For $\alpha < 0$, we penalize losses more than gains. However, by lower tail dependence, we can expect a higher concentration of observations in the extremes of the negative quadrant than in the positive one, hence estimates are more precise there.

4 Application to Regulated UK Companies

In this section we report the results we obtained by computing the beta coefficient for many UK regulated companies which are listed in the FTSE all share. Our time series sample comprises weekly prices on shares and the FTSE all share together with the three month-guild rate. The time series goes back to as much as 27/11/1992 to as short as just a few weeks, depending on the stock, up to 14/11/2003. We include the starting date in parenthesis for each stock. In particular, we consider the following companies identified by their Bloomberg ticker (details are in the appendix):

Electricity:

IPR LN Equity (13/10/2000), SSE LN Equity (27/11/1992), SPW LN Equity (27/11/1992), VRD LN Equity (02/07/1993)

Utilities:

CNA LN Equity (21/02/1997), IEG LN Equity (16/06/1995), KEL LN Equity (27/11/1992), NGT LN Equity (01/12/1995), PNN LN Equity (27/11/1992), SVT LN Equity (27/11/1992), UU LN Equity (27/11/1992), UUA LN Equity (26/09/2003).

We constract the excess returns on the companies and the market by subtracting the risk free interest rate over a week using the rule $7/365 \times$ (three-month risk free rate). We estimate the beta coefficient using the OLS estimator and the constrained and unconstrained Linex estimator for $\alpha =$ (-1:1)(.1). Table II provides summary statistics for the excess returns on all time series.

The beta estimates are reported in Table III.

Table II. Summary Statistics

	Mean	Var.	Skewness	Kurtosis	Min.	1st Qu.	Median	3rd Qu.	Max.
FT	0.01	4.20	-0.19	1.81	-8.11	-1.14	0.08	1.24	9.89
IPR	-0.52	32.01	-0.39	1.89	-22.94	-3.62	-0.91	2.55	14.74
SSE	0.12	12.48	1.13	10.27	-14.38	-1.96	-0.02	2.01	29.54
SPW	0.21	25.78	4.69	58.30	-17.06	-2.30	-0.10	2.31	68.17
VRD	0.24	16.38	3.84	46.66	-15.80	-1.68	-0.05	1.78	51.04
CAN	0.26	20.44	0.49	1.89	-12.34	-2.19	0.14	2.53	18.71
IEG	-0.02	5.04	1.46	11.37	-9.77	-0.66	-0.11	0.20	14.89
KEL	-0.02	21.04	-1.57	21.23	-47.25	-2.11	-0.08	2.16	24.07
NGT	0.09	12.00	0.39	0.82	-8.39	-2.01	-0.11	2.03	12.19
PNN	0.00	13.13	-0.49	17.67	-33.02	-1.72	0.04	1.58	23.58
SVT	0.03	12.54	-0.03	1.95	-18.10	-2.12	-0.03	2.17	14.38
UU	-0.05	12.62	0.13	2.07	-15.91	-2.04	-0.02	1.89	15.42
UUA	0.51	10.36	-0.05	-0.27	-4.78	-1.07	0.14	2.30	4.95

Table III. Beta Estimates

	OLS				alpha=											
	restricted unrestricted		-0.8		-0.4		-0.2		0.2		0.4		0.8			
	slope	intercept	slope	intercept	slope	intercept	slope	intercept	slope	intercept	slope	intercept	slope	intercept	slope	
IPR	1.15	-0.22	1.14	-8.26	2.13	-2.68	1.53	-1.40	1.30	0.92	1.08	2.05	1.06	7.26	1.00	
SSE	0.39	0.12	0.39	-7.09	-0.17	-1.04	0.33	-0.44	0.37	0.91	0.39	3.28	0.55	20.41	3.19	
SPW	-0.17	0.21	-0.17	-9.41	0.42	-1.63	-0.18	-0.72	-0.18	9.21	2.23	30.43	5.80	54.80	7.83	
VRD	0.18	0.24	0.18	-8.11	0.40	-1.04	0.23	-0.39	0.24	2.64	-1.29	9.73	-2.94	28.02	-3.35	
CAN	0.69	0.31	0.70	-5.26	0.79	-1.31	0.72	-0.52	0.70	1.30	0.71	2.64	0.72	11.15	0.61	
IEG	0.02	-0.02	0.02	-2.98	0.23	-0.48	0.08	-0.25	0.05	0.28	-0.02	0.73	-0.08	8.02	-0.58	
KEL	0.27	-0.02	0.27	-32.10	-3.67	-12.15	-2.65	-2.40	-0.44	1.00	0.15	2.51	-0.19	13.00	-0.71	
NGT	0.54	0.11	0.54	-3.60	0.20	-0.90	0.43	-0.40	0.49	0.66	0.57	1.29	0.58	5.88	0.56	
PNN	0.17	0.00	0.17	-24.72	3.18	-4.59	0.40	-0.89	0.23	0.73	0.05	2.11	-0.26	14.54	-1.51	
SVT	0.27	0.03	0.27	-10.09	0.97	-1.33	0.31	-0.60	0.29	0.65	0.20	1.35	0.09	5.93	-0.47	
UU	0.46	-0.05	0.46	-6.40	0.91	-1.27	0.49	-0.64	0.47	0.56	0.47	1.29	0.47	8.40	0.35	
UUA	-0.41	0.66	-0.47	-1.32	-0.73	-0.06	-0.61	0.28	-0.55	1.05	-0.38	1.45	-0.29	3.12	-0.06	

Both summary statistics and the results in Table III emphasize a large degree of nonlinearity for the data and the possibility of misspecification under OLS.

5 Conclusion

Our paper presents a theory of best linear prediction based on linex loss functions. The extra parameter involved reflects the regulator's preferences in the context of estimating the cost of capital. In the case of bivariate normality, our answers do not differ substantially from the actual ones given by OLS. However, for arbitrary bivariate distributions, the answers are quite different and seem to reflect the degree of nonlinearity in the data. More work is needed to understand general conditions when β_1 , the slope parameter and "beta" of the stock, may be independent of α , and when it is not. We hope to report further results in later research.

A Brief Description of the Companies

Electricity:

IPR LN Equity:

International Power plc generates and sells electricity internationally. The Group has operating facilities in some 13 countries, including Australia, the Czech Republic, Malaysia, Pakistan, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United States and the United Kingdom.

SSE LN Equity: Scottish & Southern Energy Plc

Scottish and Southern Energy plc generates, transmits, distributes and supplies electricity to industrial, commercial and domestic customers in England, Wales and Scotland. The Group also provides electrical and utility contracting services, environmental control systems for the pharmaceutical and manufacturing sectors, and supplies natural gas.

SPW LN Equity: Scottish Power Plc

Scottish Power plc is an integrated power and energy group, which generates, trades and supplies electricity, in addition to providing electrical power systems in the UK and USA.

VRD LN Equity: Viridian Group Plc

Viridian Group PLC operates a utility company which procures, transmits, distributes and supplies electricity. The Group's main subsidiary, Northern Ireland Electricity plc, buys energy in bulk from independent power generating companies and distributes it to other retail suppliers and customers in Northern Ireland. Sx3 is the Group's information technology and business support services group.

Utilities:

CNA LN Equity: Centrica Plc

Centrica plc, through various subsidiaries, provides gas and energy related products and services to residential and business customers throughout Great Britain. The Group has a home services business, which allows customers to protect themselves against problems with their plumbing, heating and kitchen appliances. They also offer roadside assistance and indirect telecom services.

IEG LN Equity: International Energy Group Plc

International Energy Group Ltd. produces, distributes and transports gas. The Company also sells and distributes petroleum products. The Group's main operations are based in Guernsey, with a number of operating subsidiaries in the United Kingdom, Guernsey, the Isle of Man, Portugal and Jersey.

KEL LN Equity: Kelda Group Plc

Kelda Group PLC, through its wholly-owned subsidiary, Yorkshire Water Services Ltd., provides drinking water and waste water services to the Yorkshire region. The Group's other core activities include treatment of liquid and solid wastes, collection and disposal of medical waste. Aquarion offers water services in the US. The company also has interests in water engineering and property management.

NGT LN Equity: National Grid Transco PLC

National Grid Transco PLC owns, operates and develops electricity and gas networks. The Group's electricity transmission and gas distribution networks are located throughout the United Kingdom and in the north-eastern section of the United States. They also own liquefied natural gas storage facilitites in Britain and provide infrastructure services to the mobile telecom industry.

PNN LN Equity: Pennon Group Plc

Pennon Group Plc operates and invests primarily in the areas of water and sewerage services and waste management. Their principal subsidiary, SouthWest Water Limited, holds the water and sewerage appointments for Devon, Cornwall and parts of Somerset and Dorset. Viridor Waste Limited operates a waste treatment and disposal businesses in the United Kingdom.

SVT LN Equity: Severn Trent plc

Severn Trent plc supplies water, waste and utility services throughout the UK, Europe and the USA. The Group offers a range of water purification, sewage treatment and disposal, and recycling services. They also provide utility companies with a range of IT services and software solutions, as well as engineering consultancy and project management services.

UU/ LN Equity: United Utilities PLC

United Utilities plc is an international multi-utility business whose activities include water supply and distribution, wastewater services, facilities management, electricity distribution, business process outsourcing and telecommunications solutions. The Company provides services to approximately seven million people, primarily in the North west of England.

UU/A LN Equity: United Utilities PLC

United Utilities plc is an international multi-utility business whose activities include water supply and distribution, wastewater services, facilities management, electricity distribution, business process outsourcing and telecommunications solutions. The Company provides services to approximately seven million people, primarily in the North west of England.

B Lemma

Lemma 1 Suppose $X \sim N(\mu, \sigma^2)$. If $t < 1/(2\sigma^2)$, then

$$\mathbb{E}\exp\left\{sX + tX^{2}\right\} = \exp\left\{-\frac{\mu^{2} - \psi^{2}}{2\sigma^{2}}\right\} \left(1 - 2t\sigma^{2}\right)^{-1/2},$$

with

$$\psi = \left(\mu + s\sigma^2\right) \left(1 - 2t\sigma^2\right)^{-1/2}$$

Proof.

$$\mathbb{E}\exp\left\{sX+tX^{2}\right\} = \int_{\mathbb{R}} \frac{\exp\left\{sx+tx^{2}\right\}}{\sqrt{2\pi}} \exp\left\{\frac{\left(x-\mu\right)^{2}}{\sigma^{2}}\right\} dx$$
$$= \int_{\mathbb{R}} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}} \exp\left\{-\frac{x^{2}\left(1-2t\sigma^{2}\right)-2x\left(\mu+s\sigma^{2}\right)+\mu^{2}}{2\sigma^{2}}\right\} dx.$$

Make the substitution $y = x (1 - 2t\sigma^2)^{1/2}$ with Jacobian $dy/dx = (1 - 2t\sigma^2)^{1/2}$ and set

$$\psi = \left(\mu + s\sigma^2\right) \left(1 - 2t\sigma^2\right)^{-1/2}$$

Then the last display equals

$$\int_{\mathbb{R}} \frac{\left(1 - 2t\sigma^{2}\right)^{-1/2}}{\sqrt{2\pi}} \exp\left\{-\frac{y^{2} - 2\psi y + \mu^{2}}{2\sigma^{2}}\right\} dx$$

= $\exp\left\{-\frac{\mu^{2} - \psi^{2}}{2\sigma^{2}}\right\} \int_{\mathbb{R}} \frac{\left(1 - 2t\sigma^{2}\right)^{-1/2}}{\sqrt{2\pi}} \exp\left\{-\frac{\left(y - \psi\right)^{2}}{2\sigma^{2}}\right\} dx$
= $\exp\left\{-\frac{\mu^{2} - \psi^{2}}{2\sigma^{2}}\right\} \left(1 - 2t\sigma^{2}\right)^{-1/2}.$

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